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Part 3., by Ulysses S. Grant

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Title: The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 3.

Author: Ulysses S. Grant

Release Date: June 1, 2004 [EBook #5862]

Language: English

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*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRANT ***




Produced by David Widger




PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, Part 3.

by U. S. Grant



CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON
--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN
TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE
UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command,
became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my
headquarters to Memphis.  I had repeatedly asked, between the fall of
Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty under
Halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of
the town.  I then obtained permission to leave the department, but
General Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urged
me so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain.  My
application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was,
however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point with
my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company.  There was
a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west
to be stationed as a guard to the railroad.  I went under cover of this
escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to La
Grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There were
no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force
guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad.
Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange.
General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his
headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country
house.  The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he
invited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him.  I accepted the
invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a
thorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession.
After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a
recital of the services he was rendering the cause.  He was too old to
be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his
means enabled him to be useful in other ways.  In ordinary times the
homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply
the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi.  Now
he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that
year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who
had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the
"patriotism" of those better off.  The crops around me looked fine, and
I had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be
gathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest
them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the
rebellion instead of its support.  I felt, however, the greatest respect
for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly
believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to
conceive.

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was very
warm, even for that latitude and season.  With my staff and small escort
I started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty
miles of Memphis.  At this point I saw a very comfortable-looking
white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little
distance from the road.  I let my staff and escort ride ahead while I
halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water.  I was invited at
once to dismount and come in.  I found my host very genial and
communicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady of
the house announced dinner and asked me to join them.  The host,
however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and,
mounting my horse, rode on.

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up from
the southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis.  A mile west of
this junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade
of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back
from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the
road.  I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the
afternoon, and then rode into Memphis.

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was a
Mr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union.  He had not pressed me to tarry
longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr.
Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as
if something had hit him.  Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel General
Jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry.  His
neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche in
that of the Union.  The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknown
to Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and
would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant
to him after the call of Dr. Smith.

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding
workmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis.  On the day I
entered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had
been sent east for the troops so engaged.  The drovers were not enlisted
men and he released them.  A day or two after one of these drovers came
to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said
Jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he
was six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad when
he learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and had
ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that
from La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passed
three-quarters of an hour before.  He thought it would be useless to
pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start.
Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with
my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms
in our hands with which to defend ourselves.

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not
capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the
soldiers the facts related were learned.  A day or two later Mr. De
Loche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility
in not insisting on my staying for dinner.  He said that his wife
accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his
neighbor, he had felt restless until I got away.  I never met General
Jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his
very comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado.  I reminded
him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he
was thankful now he had not captured me.  I certainly was very thankful
too.

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long.
The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to
me.  Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where the
citizens were at home in any great numbers.  Dover was within the
fortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, every
citizen was gone.  There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, and
but very few at Corinth.  Memphis, however, was a populous city, and
there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only
thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought
that even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they
could only be induced to make an honest confession.  It took hours of my
time every day to listen to complaints and requests.  The latter were
generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints
were not always, or even often, well founded.  Two instances will mark
the general character.  First:  the officer who commanded at Memphis
immediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troops
had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the
soldiers.  Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit.  Second:
at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a law
confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including the
debts of Southerners to Northern men.  In consequence of this law, when
Memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the
evidences he could obtain of such debts.

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages.  The
gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high
standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian.  He was a deacon in the
church which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and by
a Union chaplain filling the pulpit.  He did not use the word "defile,"
but he expressed the idea very clearly.  He asked that the church be
restored to the former congregation.  I told him that no order had been
issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church.  He said of
course the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differed
so radically with them on questions of government.  I told him the
troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that
they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed
from the pulpit.  This closed the argument on the first point.

Then came the second.  The complainant said that he wanted the papers
restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under
protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the
"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number of
large business houses at the North; that "his government" had
confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners,
or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the
"government":  but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been
permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials
knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar
received. He said that his "government," when it came in possession of
all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims
he had surrendered to the provost-marshal.  His impudence was so sublime
that I was rather amused than indignant.  I told him, however, that if
he would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate government
would ever molest him.  He left, no doubt, as much amazed at my
assurance as I was at the brazenness of his request.

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic orders
appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in
Washington.  His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of
duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and
interests of his previous command.  I was next in rank, and he
telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at
Corinth.  I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been
ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my
headquarters or not.  I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staff
with me, and received word in reply:  "This place will be your
headquarters.  You can judge for yourself."  I left Memphis for my new
field without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month.
General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was very
uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been called
to Corinth for.

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief I
remained in command of the district of West Tennessee.  Practically I
became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that
position over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;
but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the
25th of October.  General Halleck while commanding the Department of the
Mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooga
north.  My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west of
the Cumberland River.  Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, as
previously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, with
instructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as he
advanced.  Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of the
Mobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus.  Other
troops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Grand
Junction, and still others on the road west to Memphis.

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered
Corinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was put
entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to
the Union.  One of the first things I had to do was to construct
fortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could be
spared to man them.  The structures that had been built during the
months of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of the
engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design
but suited to the command available to defend them.

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the
situation as rapidly as possible.  The forces at Donelson, Clarksville
and Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, I
regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west.
The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth,
to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson,
Tennessee, to Bolivar.  Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphis
railroad were abandoned.

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn,
with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to
forty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri.  This
movable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar or
Memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to
weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was.
Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere,
because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present
could guard.  The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the
time the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by
the fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforced
to take the offensive.  The enemy also had cavalry operating in our
rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to
Columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our
supplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of
the command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus.  With
these points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, then
down the river by boat.  To reinforce Memphis would take three or four
days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have
taken at least two days.  Memphis therefore was practically isolated
from the balance of the command.  But it was in Sherman's hands.  Then
too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable
auxiliary.

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there was
much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these
encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be
now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them.  Some of them,
however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded,
were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican war
which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they
occurred.  About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar,
was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be
reinforced from Jackson and Corinth.  On the 27th there was skirmishing
on the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learned
from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Bragg
in person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way
of Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join
him at Rome.  Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with
a large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost.  I proposed to
the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed
that, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops
WAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell.

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanooga
across country, while his troops were transported over a long
round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except
when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops
enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly.  Buell
was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications
thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies.  More men were required
the farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country.  I,
with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purely
on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far
inferior to my own.

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon the
country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far
as practicable.  I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines
without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and
from our lines.  I do not recollect having arrested and confined a
citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion.  I am aware that a
great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet,
Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my
order.  I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;
and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was
said to be confined by my order.  There were many citizens at home who
deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was
afforded to inflict an injury to the National cause.  This class was not
of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that a
few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should
suffer.

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell.
They were sent the same day by way of Decatur.  On the 22d Colonel
Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment.

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off
the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh.  He was by
nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his
action when the battle was over.  He came to me with tears in his eyes
and begged to be allowed to have another trial.  I felt great sympathy
for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville and
Donelson.  He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt
because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy.
But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his
constitutional weakness overcame him.  He inquired the number of men the
enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his
own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender.
Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having
satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered
and informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to do
the same.  The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon
Donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet
them and drove them away.

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was the
fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from
the South and directed me to give every facility toward that end.  Pay
in gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on the
railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be
received.  This opened to the enemy not only the means of converting
cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they
so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and
intelligent information in regard to our position and strength.  It was
also demoralizing to the troops.  Citizens obtaining permits from the
treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given
facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits.
Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like
to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an
enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared
none of their dangers.

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20th
and 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be
about 4,000 strong.  The enemy was driven away with a loss of more than
one hundred men.  On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon was
attacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced,
when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the
field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded.  On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500
infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in
strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with great
loss.  Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field.
Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the
battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded.  Our loss, as
reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded.  On the 2d of
September I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell.  Jackson
and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements.  On the
4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also to
Louisville, Kentucky.

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march upon
Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent one
division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place.  This gave
Buell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repair
the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen
days at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by the
National forces before the rebels could have possibly got there.  The
road between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put in
repair by other troops, so that communication with the North would have
been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the
National troops.  If Buell had been permitted to move in the first
instance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of the
Army of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown
four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and
guard it.

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September.  I was at
the station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and found
General P. H. Sheridan with them.  I expressed surprise at seeing him
and said that I had not expected him to go.  He showed decided
disappointment at the prospect of being detained.  I felt a little
nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him.

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had served
eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast when
the war broke out.  He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, and
before the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, to
get East.  He went to Missouri.  Halleck had known him as a very
successful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians on
the Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west
Missouri.  There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while
Sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his
immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the
use of public transportation for private purposes.  He asked to be
relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and
his request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April,
1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff.  During the advance on
Corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry.
Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him to
suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he
would appoint a good man without reference to his State.  Sheridan was
named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reached
he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of the
Mississippi.  He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July with
two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times
as numerous as his own.  By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of
attack he completely routed the enemy.  For this he was made a
brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about
Corinth.  On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me.  His
departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services
in his new field.

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and on
the night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up works
around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from
the front.



CHAPTER XXVIII.

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA.

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of the
Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville.  There
were at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's,
besides cavalry and artillery.  This force constituted my left wing, of
which Rosecrans was in command.  General Ord commanded the centre, from
Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to
Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.
General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of his
brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River by
the Memphis and Ohio railroad.  This made the most convenient
arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon
any threatened point.  All the troops of the command were within
telegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman.  By
bringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point there
was a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had
with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers.
In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangement
all the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail
by the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops
from Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place.

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price,
apparently upon Corinth.  One division was brought from Memphis to
Bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the
enemy.  I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the
territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing
of Bragg in Middle Tennessee.  Already the Army of Northern Virginia had
defeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland.  In the
Centre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marching
parallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River.

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this time
my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms.  This
included everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction.  If I too
should be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing the
belligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line was
already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of
the war.  It is true Nashville was never given up after its first
capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would
have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in West
Tennessee had been compelled to fall back.  To say at the end of the
second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East was
pushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the West
beyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would have
been discouraging indeed.  As it was, many loyal people despaired in the
fall of 1862 of ever saving the Union.  The administration at Washington
was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But I
believe there was never a day when the President did not think that, in
some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant.

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroad
east of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in.  By the 12th all were
in except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin.  He
had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet
been brought in to Corinth.

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a town
about twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charleston
railroad.  Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place.  He
made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy.
I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops
into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to
be.  The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief of
the army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East
and Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account
as for any danger threatening my command.  I had not force enough at
Corinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there was
danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far
on his way across the Tennessee.  To prevent this all spare forces at
Bolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated
at Jackson for their transportation.  Within twenty-four hours from the
transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although
there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train
getting off the track and stopping all the others.  This gave a
reinforcement of near 8,000 men, General Ord in command.  General
Rosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force of
about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left
behind.  It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' march
south of us, with a large force.  It might have been part of his plan to
attack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from the
south.  My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reach
Corinth or go to his relief.

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where his
command was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroad
eastward.  While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all
the roads and streams in the surrounding country.  He was also
personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him
in my plans for the approach.  We had cars enough to transport all of
General Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on
the road about seven miles west of Iuka.  From there his troops were to
march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the
north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south
of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road.  A small force was to hold the
Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force
moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east.  This plan
was suggested by Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable
obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of
which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity.  The
Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable
obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force.  Ord was on the
north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that
direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have
carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it
from all support.  It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka
until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to
Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of
the programme.  He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the
day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next
morning.  Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two
roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters
simultaneously.  Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain
any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into
Corinth until I could be notified.  There was a telegraph wire along the
railroad, so there would be no delay in communication.  I detained cars
and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's
command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of
Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or
8,000 before he could have arrived.  I remained at Burnsville with a
detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with my
two wings by courier.  Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after
leaving Burnsville.  Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the
rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer
killed.  He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight
the next morning.  I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch
from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka,
saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of
his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto.  He said, however, that he
would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day.  I did not believe
this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads,
which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are
not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through.  It
might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make
an assault.  I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch and
ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east.  He was instructed to notify his
officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the
19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either
towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the
head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka
leaves the road going east.  He here turned north without sending any
troops to the Fulton road.  While still moving in column up the Jacinto
road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and
driven back upon the main road.  In this short engagement his loss was
considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.
The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit
sounds towards either Ord or me.  Neither he nor I nor any one in either
command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.  After the
engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result.  This was
brought by a courier.  There was no road between Burnsville and the
position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a
man on horseback.  The courier bearing the message was compelled to move
west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.
This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle
that had taken place during the afternoon.  I at once notified Ord of
the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning.  The next
morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but
little resistance.  Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming
from the south-west must be up by that time.  Rosecrans, however, had
put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of
this neglect and retreated by that road during the night.  Word was soon
brought to me that our troops were in Iuka.  I immediately rode into
town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.
I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on with
him a few miles in person.  He followed only a few miles after I left
him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.
I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had so
high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.



CHAPTER XXIX.

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TENNESSEE.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to
reinforce Buell.  This threw the army at my command still more on the
defensive.  The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at
Corinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.
Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar
became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad.
Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were
sent out to watch the movements of the enemy.  We were in a country
where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and
friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.  It was easy,
therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.
We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then
often returned without it.

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of Grand
Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and
artillery.  I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person to
superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be
made upon.  The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel the
threatened movement without a battle.  Our cavalry followed the enemy
south of Davis' mills in Mississippi.

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike
the Mississippi River above Memphis.  At the same time other points
within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to
concentrate a force to drive him away.  There was at this juncture a
large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within my
command, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break up
the Mississippi Central railroad far to the south.  This would not only
have called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a
large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids
on the enemy's line of supplies.  Geographical lines between the
commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were
too rigidly adhered to.

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as had
apparently been his intention.  He was simply covering a deeper design;
one much more important to his cause.  By the 1st of October it was
fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force and
determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust had
joined their strength for this purpose.  There was some skirmishing
outside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d.  The rebels
massed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the
Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth
and all possible reinforcements.  Any fresh troops for us must come by a
circuitous route.

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who
was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements picked
up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade.  Hurlbut had been
ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn
was coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with
the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of
the 3d.  On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to
capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up.  In that case
the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and held
at bay all the Union troops that arrived.  In fact he could have taken
the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their
number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth
to hold them.  He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the
National lines at least once, but the works that were built after
Halleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the
troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front
and rear.  The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter:  all
their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed.  The loss on
our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's.  McPherson
came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy
as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of
Rosecrans just after the repulse.  His approach, as well as that of
Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had
given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the
moment the enemy was repelled.  He did not do so, and I repeated the
order after the battle.  In the first order he was notified that the
force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great
peril if the enemy was not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command
of his troops.  This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating
column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles
out from Corinth.  The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the
operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into.  Ord
attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a
panic.  Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off
the bridge in their hurried retreat.  Ord followed and met the main
force.  He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge
and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher
up the stream.  Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command
devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then
took the wrong road.  Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a
wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war.  His march was
therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his
supplies.  Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without
anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been
worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly
been.  Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken
by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream
in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading
north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as
far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from
battle as when he started.  Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such
force as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he
might have been in great peril.

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and,
after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return.  He kept on
to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther.  I
thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the
general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter,
but inquired "why not pursue?"  Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back.  Had
he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had
at Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the
probabilities are he would have lost his army.

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812
wounded and 232 missing.  The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported
1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners.  We fought behind breastworks, which
accounts in some degree for the disparity.  Among the killed on our side
was General Hackelman.  General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time
supposed mortally, wounded.  I received a congratulatory letter from the
President, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses.

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not
so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think
was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth.  Since
the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to
the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the
North.  The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety
of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving
reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement
against Vicksburg.

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at Holly
Springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama and
Texas.  The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with my
command, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the army
in Middle Tennessee.  I was delighted at the promotion of General
Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when
independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that
time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves.  As a
subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had
determined to relieve him from duty that very day.

At the close of the operations just described my force, in round
numbers, was 48,500.  Of these 4,800 were in Kentucky and Illinois,
7,000 in Memphis, 19,200 from Mound City south, and 17,500 at Corinth.
General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north and
organize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi.  These new levies
with other reinforcements now began to come in.

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of the
Tennessee.  Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the
2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative.  This was a great
relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large
district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready
to give information of our every move.  I have described very
imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during
this time.  To describe all would take more space than I can allot to
the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who
distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)



CHAPTER XXX.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OF
HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE
MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE AND
FOOD.

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high
ground coming close to the river below Memphis.  From there a railroad
runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the
Southern States.  A railroad also starts from the opposite side of the
river, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana.  Vicksburg was
the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter
treats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by the
Mississippi.  So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation
of the river was prevented.  Hence its importance.  Points on the river
between Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their
fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November as
indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:
"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions
from Corinth and two from Bolivar.  Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]
to-morrow, and take command in person.  If found practicable, I will go
to Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and
telegraph as I go."

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad from
about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;
the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with the
Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to Bear
Creek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis.  My entire
command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly
that if kept on the defensive.  By moving against the enemy and into his
unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us,
these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force
for field operations.  My moving force at that time was about 30,000
men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at about
the same number.  General McPherson commanded my left wing and General
C. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the right
wing.  Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly
Springs and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad.  On the
8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerable
force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad.  The
road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the
troops advanced.

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large
bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always
covered and guarded in all forward movements.  There was delay therefore
in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to
the front.

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from
Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the
supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the
chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take
them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government
stores.  The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the
possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the
country itself.

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman's
Bureau" took its origin.  Orders of the government prohibited the
expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came
in voluntarily.  Humanity forbade allowing them to starve.  With such an
army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand
Junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance.
There was no special authority for feeding them unless they were
employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only
able-bodied young men were suitable for such work.  This labor would
support but a very limited percentage of them.  The plantations were all
deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above
ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops.  To do this
work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a
competent chief was necessary.  On inquiring for such a man Chaplain
Eaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissioner
of Education, was suggested.  He proved as efficient in that field as he
has since done in his present one.  I gave him all the assistants and
guards he called for.  We together fixed the prices to be paid for the
negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals.  The
cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to
receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents
per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping
the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizens
remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having
their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms.

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining.  The money was not paid to
them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit.  They
gave me no trouble afterwards.

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the Mississippi
River to supply the large number of steamers on that stream.  A good
price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government
steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with
fuel).  Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price.  In
this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all,
old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins,
hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had
never known before.

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very much
disturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have a
separate and independent command within mine, to operate against
Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River.  Two commanders on the same
field are always one too many, and in this case I did not think the
general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit
him for so important a position.  I feared for the safety of the troops
intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops,
to execute so important a trust.  But on the 12th I received a dispatch
from General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent to
my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased.
The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell back
south of the Tallahatchie.

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war,
all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, except
the few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction.  This was a
long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an
enemy's country.  On the 15th of November, while I was still at Holly
Springs, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus.  We were but
forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was
for me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the same
place.  At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gave
him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the
Mississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was always
prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford.
He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four
regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small
detachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their way
from the north to Memphis.  About this time General Halleck ordered
troops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was not
under my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear.  The
expedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was
successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage
done was very slight and was soon repaired.

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad
bridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side.  A
crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy.  I sent
the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing.  This
caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly
accelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn.  The enemy was
followed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and some
seventeen miles farther by McPherson's command.  Here the pursuit was
halted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in order
to bring up supplies.  The piles on which the railroad bridge rested had
been left standing.  The work of constructing a roadway for the troops
was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars.

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that an
expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have
a competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th of
December back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD,
MISSISSIPPI, December 8,1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command.  On
your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there,
and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the
Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your
own army.  As soon as possible move with them down the river to the
vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet
under command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that
place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may
dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to
take, will be left entirely with yourself.  The Quartermaster at St.
Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men;
should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be
authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come
into the port of Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral
Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will
embark, and such plans as may then be matured.  I will hold the forces
here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements
of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer,
and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and
whatever cavalry may be there.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of
December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south
of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg.
On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena
troops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them and
the Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus
secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi.  Halleck on the same day,
the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the country
south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at Memphis by
the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition.  I sent Sherman with two
divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked
whether I should command the expedition down the river myself or send
Sherman.  I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment
of the great object in view.  I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire
to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct
supervision.  I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was his
senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War to
exercise that particular command,--and independently.  I doubted
McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in
forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose
authority to command was above both him and me.

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between us
or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going
further south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was the
main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the
defence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky.  I
hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg.  The further north the enemy could be held the
better.

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that our
movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held away
from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected
to abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha.  With that point as a
secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo
until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was
contemplated.

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that
if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of
Vicksburg.  I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada on
the Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new
base of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to
fall back upon in case of failure.  It should be remembered that at the
time I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate
in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies.  A halt
was called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to
bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food,
forage and munitions to the front.

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide my
command into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one of
them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate
down the Mississippi.  This interfered with my plans, but probably
resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person.  McClernand was
at that time in Springfield, Illinois.  The order was obeyed without any
delay.  Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity.

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondary
base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by
Colonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our
munitions of war, food and forage.  The capture was a disgraceful one to
the officer commanding but not to the troops under him.  At the same
time Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and
Columbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it.  This cut me off from all
communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than
two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained
in the regular way.  This demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining
so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in
an enemy's country.  I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign
into the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and
Grand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to
Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to draw
supplies.  Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalry
at the front back to drive him from the country.  He had start enough to
move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several
small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad.  All these he
found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him.  Van Dorn did
not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly
Springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together.  Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made no
preparations to meet him.  He did not even notify his command.

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated
Iuka on the approach of the enemy.  General Rosecrans denounced him for
the act and desired to have him tried and punished.  I sustained the
colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with
that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had done
well to get away without falling into their hands.  His leaving large
stores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should,
however, have destroyed them.  This last surrender demonstrated to my
mind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct.
The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed either
the disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed to
serve, or gross cowardice.

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompanied
General Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreat
was almost a panic.  The roads were bad and it was difficult to move the
artillery and trains.  Why there should have been a panic I do not see.
No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River.  Had I known
the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central
Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been in
pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my
rear.

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was to
dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and
bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles
east and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leaving
two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken.
I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded.  It
showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months
instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated.  This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign
when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'
rations by the commissary.  Our loss of supplies was great at Holly
Springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the
country and by the lesson taught.

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of our
supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford.
They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to
ask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat.
I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops and
wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen
miles on each side of the road.  Countenances soon changed, and so did
the inquiry.  The next was, "What are WE to do?"  My response was that
we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources
while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough
to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that
men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty.  I
advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in
eating up what we left.



CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND
--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE
--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off from
communication with a great part of my own command during this time
--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand could
arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand.  Pemberton
got back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there.  The rebel positions
were on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth.  The
waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving
only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the
high bluffs.  These were fortified and defended at all points.  The
rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought
against its front.  Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force.  His
efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were
necessarily unavailing.

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity of
communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph
to my rear on the 20th.  He did not know but what I was in the rear of
the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the
troops with me.  I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him to
take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the
Yazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cutting
loose from my base at Grenada.

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs.  The troops
were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding
supplies abundant and no enemy following.  The road was not damaged
south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to cause
any delay.  As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and to
repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until this
work was completed.

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand
Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters
to the latter place.  During the campaign here described, the losses
(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their
Holly Springs capture, which they could not hold.

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men,
taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena,
Arkansas.  The troops on the west bank of the river had previously been
assigned to my command.  McClernand having received the orders for his
assignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and
immediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part
of his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th.  Sherman,
and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. After
consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render
service to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn
from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to the
Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up that
stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men.  Sherman had
learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been
captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other
supplies intended for his command.  The man had made his escape.
McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says.  No obstacle
was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of
the fort.  After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made
by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in
taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns.  I was at first disposed to
disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no
especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was
understood I regarded it as very important.  Five thousand Confederate
troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of
property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the
garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at the
mouth of the Arkansas River.  From here I received messages from both
Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in
person, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability and
fitness for so important and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It was
here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful
of McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they
could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness.  It
would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into
such danger.  By this time I had received authority to relieve
McClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river
expedition, or to assume command in person.  I felt great embarrassment
about McClernand.  He was the senior major-general after myself within
the department.  It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign
a junior over him.  Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the
command myself.  I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, to
give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December
before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was
junior to McClernand.  Sherman's failure needs no apology.

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, to
Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to make
all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me
secure.  General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command.  The
Memphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Central
was given up.  Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, on
the river, left with a garrison.  All the troops and guns from the posts
on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed command
the following day.  General McClernand took exception in a most
characteristic way--for him.  His correspondence with me on the subject
was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highly
insubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of the
service.  General McClernand was a politician of very considerable
prominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secession
war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all
the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving
the Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at
all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of
where he stood in the contest before the country.  He also gave up his
seat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had
proclaimed.

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began.  The
problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the
river from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg.  The
Mississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley
of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up
to two or more hundred feet above the river.  On the west side the
highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest
water.  Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way,
varying in direction to all points of the compass.  At places it runs to
the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no such
highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg
is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high
water--many of them navigable for steamers.  All of them would be,
except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it
impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length.
Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;
navigating it proved equally impracticable.  The strategical way
according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;
establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses
could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of
railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson,
Mississippi.  At this time the North had become very much discouraged.
Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure.  The
elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the
prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the
last dollar.  Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater
part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our
ranks.  It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement
as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many
of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a
defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the
power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be
done but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY.  This was in my mind from
the moment I took command in person at Young's Point.

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the
Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land,
or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many
miles of river front.  We had to occupy the levees and the ground
immediately behind.  This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under
General McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles above
Vicksburg.

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg.
The water was very high and the rains were incessant.  There seemed no
possibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and it
would not do to lie idle all this time.  The effect would be
demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health.  Friends in
the North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the
same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of
the cause and those engaged in it.

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for the
boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by
press or by individuals, within their control.  War at all times,
whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between
nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor.  But, once entered
into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their
ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or
nation.

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the
river's edge, below that on which Memphis stands.  The bluff, or high
land, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continues
in a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs along
the Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below.  The Yazoo River leaves
the high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into the
Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg.  Vicksburg is built on this high
land where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill.  Haines' Bluff,
eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified.
The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton was
also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits
connecting them.

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction
to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs
south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade,
exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they
were in range of the upper batteries.  Since then the river has made a
cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island.
North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with
bayous, and much overflowed.  A front attack was therefore impossible,
and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem then
became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippi
without an apparent retreat.  Then commenced a series of experiments to
consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and
of the public generally.  I, myself, never felt great confidence that
any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless
I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut a
ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from
Young's Point to the river below.  The distance across was a little over
a mile.  It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it would
cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from
both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise
without doing any execution in the way of cutting.  Mr. Lincoln had
navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well its
tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time.  He set
much store accordingly by this canal.  General McClernand had been,
therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work of
widening and deepening this canal.  After my arrival the work was
diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to
advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a
dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out
until the excavation was completed.  This was on the 8th of March.

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for
steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us.  It runs in a
direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite
side, or east bank, of the river.  As soon as the enemy discovered what
we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout
its length.  This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number,
which were doing the work of thousands of men.  Had the canal been
completed it might have proven of some use in running transports
through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have
to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance.

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying
to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the
river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the
batteries.

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I ordered
General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut
the levee at that point.  If successful in opening a channel for
navigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi River
through the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and four
hundred miles below Vicksburg by the river.

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about a
mile from the present channel.  It is six miles long and has its outlet
through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and Red
Rivers.  The last three are navigable streams at all seasons.  Bayous
Baxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with
dense forests overhanging the channel.  They were also filled with
fallen timber, the accumulation of years.  The land along the
Mississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next
to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the
boundary of the valley through which it winds.  Bayou Baxter, as it
reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a
cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon.  There was about two feet of
water in this swamp at the time.  To get through it, even with vessels
of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy
timber wide enough to make a passage way.  As the trees would have to be
cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great
magnitude.

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained with
him several days.  The work had not progressed so far as to admit the
water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in
drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity,
from the river into the lake.  With this we were able to explore the
lake and bayou as far as cleared.  I saw then that there was scarcely a
chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops
through an enemy's country.  The distance from Lake Providence to the
point where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi
again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river.  The
distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which
this new route would carry us.  The enemy held Port Hudson, below where
the Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg.
The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigable
streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct
our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters.  I let the
work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men.
Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better
prospect of success.  This work was abandoned after the canal proved a
failure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, to
examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible.
Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi River
into Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass
to Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins the
Yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms
the Yazoo River.  These were formerly navigated by steamers trading with
the rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi had
built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the
only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the
mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below.

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut.  The river being high
the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time
the entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled and
much of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the Mississippi
River but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with his
brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way.
The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater
by felling trees into them.  Much of the timber in this region being of
greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their
removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished,
and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting a
fortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite
and the Yazoo begins.  The bends of the rivers are such at this point as
to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the
river.  This island was fortified and manned.  It was named Fort
Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg.  No land approach was
accessible.  The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards
an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of
ground which was discovered above water.  The gunboats, however,
attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March.  Both efforts were
failures and were not renewed.  One gunboat was disabled and we lost six
men killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less.

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a
rise of two feet would drive the enemy out.  In hope of enlisting the
elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time,
a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directly
opposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut.  It did not
accomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back.
On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass.  Quinby was the
senior of Ross, and assumed command.  He was not satisfied with
returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether
anything could be accomplished.  Accordingly Fort Pemberton was
revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time
without an attack.  Quinby, with his command, returned with but little
delay.  In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, not
knowing that Quinby had been able to join him.  Reinforcements were of
no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on
board of their transports.  Relief had to come from another quarter.  So
I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton.

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and its
mouth.  It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy
growth of timber, but it is deep.  It approaches to within one mile of
the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point.
Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek,
Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River,
and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'
Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the
winding of the river.  All these waterways are of about the same nature
so far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; this
affords free navigation.

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14th
of March, and reported it navigable.  On the next day he started with
five gunboats and four mortar-boats.  I went with him for some distance.
The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also
the short turns in so narrow a stream.  The gunboats, however, ploughed
their way through without other damage than to their appearance.  The
transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The road
was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats.  In the evening I
returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went in
person on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps.
They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where
they debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where they
re-embarked on the transports.  The river steamers, with their tall
smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that
the gunboats got far ahead.  Porter, with his fleet, got within a few
hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from
the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he
encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by
obstructions in his front.  He could do nothing with gunboats against
sharpshooters.  The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000
men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet.

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out Black
Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind.  On the
night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been
attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril.  Sherman at once
returned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a
steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up.  They
tried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but,
finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot.
It was night when they landed, and intensely dark.  There was but a
narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush
or cane.  The troops lighted their way through this with candles carried
in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open
plantation.  Here the troops rested until morning.  They made twenty-one
miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to
rescue the fleet.  Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the
gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy.  More
welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this
occasion.  The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous
on the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get
in rear of Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXII.

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE  NORTHERN PRESS
--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE
TROOPS.

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March.  The
effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connecting
bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time.

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start,
which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enter
the Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand
Gulf.  The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these
bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river below.  In
case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its
outlet through the same channels.  The dredges and laborers from the
canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, I
determined to open these other channels, if possible.  If successful the
effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our
transports.  There was a good road back of the levees, along these
bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever
the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather.
Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a
base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken.

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about this
route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the other
undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have been
accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got
all over the country.

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further
than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for
a distance of several miles from their source.  It was necessary,
therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river.
This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede
and the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water.  One small
steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this it
was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter
was whiled away.  All these failures would have been very discouraging
if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not.  From the first
the most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used
below Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries
defending that city.

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water,
unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about
Vicksburg.  The river was higher than its natural banks from December,
1862, to the following April.  The war had suspended peaceful pursuits
in the South, further than the production of army supplies, and in
consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the
whole country was covered with water.  Troops could scarcely find dry
ground on which to pitch their tents.  Malarial fevers broke out among
the men.  Measles and small-pox also attacked them.  The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the
loss of life was much less than might have been expected.  Visitors to
the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came
back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated.  Because I would
not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle,
incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for
my removal.  They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple
removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont,
Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection.  I took no
steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I
understood it, to the best of my ability.  Every one has his
superstitions.  One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility
every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to
change his position.  While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that as
the main field of the war.  I had no idea, myself, of ever having any
large command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had the
vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to my
staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military
education whatever, I said that I would give anything if I were
commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I
believed I could do some good.  Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested
that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry.
I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned
this superstition.

In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders.  He should not be embarrassed in making his
selections.  I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my
doing the best I knew how.  If I had sought the place, or obtained it
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors.  Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster.  Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln
and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign.  I had never
met Mr.  Lincoln, but his support was constant.

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula
behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the
troops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and
discouraging labors with success.

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a
point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the
possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted
to for the purpose of giving us a different base.  This could not be
undertaken until the waters receded.  I did not therefore communicate
this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
make preparations for the start.  My recollection is that Admiral Porter
was the first one to whom I mentioned it.  The co-operation of the navy
was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise.  I had no more authority to command Porter than he
had to command me.  It was necessary to have part of his fleet below
Vicksburg if the troops went there.  Steamers to use as ferries were
also essential.  The navy was the only escort and protection for these
steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles
of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he
had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run
the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than
soldiers.  I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I
admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the
enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side
of the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervened.  Even spies could not get
near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands.
Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused.  Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the
river near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards the
fleet.  On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much
larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a
flag of truce in case of discovery.  The boat, crew and passengers were
brought ashore to me.  The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan.  After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or
more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to
Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my
mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag.

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their
hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries.  The great essential was to
protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires
under the boilers from view.  This he accomplished by loading the
steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the
deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the
boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain.  The hay and grain would
be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls and
barges to be used as ferries when we got below.  By the 16th of April
Porter was ready to start on his perilous trip.  The advance, flagship
Benton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at
intervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the
Price, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet--all of these being naval vessels.  Next came the transports
--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loaded
with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when
below the batteries.  The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear.  Soon
after the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire
across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and
then by batteries all along the line.  The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably
without much effect.  They were under fire for more than two hours and
every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the
gunboats.  The transports did not fare so well.  The Henry Clay was
disabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in the
cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her
to the water's edge.  The burning mass, however, floated down to
Carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to
light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing
houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side.
The sight was magnificent, but terrible.  I witnessed it from the deck
of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low
down as it was prudent to go.  My mind was much relieved when I learned
that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded.  During the running of the batteries men were stationed in the
holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that
might be made in the hulls.  All damage was afterwards soon repaired
under the direction of Admiral Porter.

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however,
during the war.  Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson
with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below
Vicksburg.  The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat
Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below.  She met
Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer.
Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing
the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from
Vicksburg (*10) to the Red River.

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, and
then started up the Mississippi.  The Confederates soon raised the Queen
of the West, (*11) and repaired her.  With this vessel and the ram Webb,
which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two other
steamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered with
barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed
against the rapid current of the Mississippi.  The Confederate fleet
overtook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the
24th of February.  The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away,
but for her encumbrance.  As it was she fought them for an hour and a
half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and
other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking
condition.  The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore.
Officers and crew then surrendered.

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of
March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he
might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get
there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet.  Some
miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several
places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles.  Boats were
collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across
the overflowed interval.  By the 6th of April McClernand had reached New
Carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through
the woods by these boats.  On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person,
and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised.  The water
was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use
boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over.  McClernand had
already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse
occurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage.  This increased the march from Milliken's Bend from
twenty-seven to nearly forty miles.  Four bridges had to be built across
bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all.  The river falling made the current in
these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankee
soldier" was equal to any emergency.  The bridges were soon built of
such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they
that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun
(a thirty-two pounder).  This, if my memory serves me correctly, broke
through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the
peninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, under
the supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th
issued the following final order for the movement of troops:


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.

Special Orders, No. 110. *         *         *         *         * *
* VIII.  The following orders are published for the information and
guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a
foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg
can be approached by practicable roads.

First.--The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernand
commanding, will constitute the right wing.

Second.--The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.

Third.--The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson
commanding, will constitute the centre.

Fourth.--The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.

Fifth.--Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or,
an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may
require.  When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will
remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander,
unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency.

Sixth.--Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can
be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.

Seventh.--In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each
company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each
regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;
and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders
having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for,
are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not
to exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series
of 1862.

Eighth.--All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate
charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will
constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized
camp equipage of the army.

Ninth.--As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth
army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in
like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

Tenth.--Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps
commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.

Eleventh.--General hospitals will be established by the medical director
between Duckport and Milliken's Bend.  All sick and disabled soldiers
will be left in these hospitals.  Surgeons in charge of hospitals will
report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty.  Each corps
commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain
behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;
officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into
squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command
them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates.  The force so
organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to
Milliken's Bend.  They will furnish all the guards and details required
for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the
camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.

Twelfth.--The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage
will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply
of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous
orders.

Thirteenth.--Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the
beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but
wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military
purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without
proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited.  All
such irregularities must be summarily punished.

Fourteenth.--Brigadier-General J. C.  Sullivan is appointed to the
command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from
here to New Carthage.  His particular attention is called to General
Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of date
March 20, 1863.

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S.  GRANT.


McClernand was already below on the Mississippi.  Two of McPherson's
divisions were put upon the march immediately.  The third had not yet
arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend and
was to follow on arrival.

Sherman was to follow McPherson.  Two of his divisions were at Duckport
and Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to return
from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel
battery that had been annoying our transports.

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon
train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between
Milliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation.  Accordingly six more steamers
were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with
supplies.  They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations.  On
the night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting
through more or less disabled while one was sunk.  About half the barges
got through with their needed freight.

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with river
steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to
accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called for
from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating
the western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands
enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we
were moving through this dangerous ordeal.  Most of them were from
Logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of
Illinois and from Missouri.  All but two of the steamers were commanded
by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned.  In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers could
be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every
call for aid whether mechanical or professional.  Colonel W. S. Oliver
was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail.



CHAPTER XXXIII.

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'
plantation.  Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether
there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land
above Grand Gulf.  There was none practicable. Accordingly the troops
were set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down the
river and nearly opposite Grand Gulf.  The loss of two steamers and six
barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved
by water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their
machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less
severely injured.  All the troops, therefore, except what could be
transported in one trip, had to march.  The road lay west of Lake St.
Joseph.  Three large bayous had to be crossed.  They were rapidly
bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson's
was following closely.  I had determined to make the attempt to effect a
landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible.  Accordingly,
on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all the
troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry.  About
10,000 men were so embarked.  The plan was to have the navy silence the
guns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark
in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and
carry the works by storm.  The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA., April 27,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C.

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as
there is transportation for.  Have put aboard the artillery and every
article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold
them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's
warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send
to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders
of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all
the batteries commanding the river.  Your corps will be on the river,
ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the
promontory first brought to view passing down the river.  Once on shore,
have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the
ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points,
but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself.  The
first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain
themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops
collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated
to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be
below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out
of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand
Gulf and land at Rodney.  In case this should prove the plan, a signal
will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start
with this view.  Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but
not the men.  In this case, then, the transports would have to be
brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to
below Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place.
There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the
transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that
the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the
transports can run by with the troops on board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to
run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in
their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


At 8 o'clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strength
present, eight gunboats.  For nearly five and a half hours the attack
was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy.  All this time
McClernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the
stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled.  I occupied a tug from
which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range
of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not
calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being
assailed themselves.  About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing
their efforts were entirely unavailing.  The enemy ceased firing as soon
as we withdrew.  I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard his
ship.  The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six
wounded.  A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship,
and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side
and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns.  The
sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded the
ship was sickening.

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of
it.  It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time,
would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack.  I
therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet that
night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be
wanted below.

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towards
Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles
above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the
same distance below.  The land was so low and wet that it would not have
been practicable to march an army across but for a levee.  I had had
this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if
there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney.  It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the
plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports.  I had
intended to make this request, but he anticipated me.  At dusk, when
concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed
his command on the west bank.  The navy and transports ran the batteries
successfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved.  By the time it was light the enemy saw our whole
fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving
down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with
National troops.

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that
we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a
landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a
good landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney,
from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some
twelve miles in the interior.  The information was found correct, and
our landing was effected without opposition.

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet.  On the morning
of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up
the Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg
as I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the
river.  The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned,
created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real
design.  Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th,
with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had
left above Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack
the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff.
This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the
service.  On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent from
Hard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the front
of Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he
could.

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now that
all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy
might fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament and
attempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with a
portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his
command.  The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of the
transports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as a
guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there
and put in position.

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana,
six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi.  Early on the morning of 30th
of April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were
speedily landed.

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled
since.  Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders
demoralized by any of our previous moves.  I was now in the enemy's
country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me
and my base of supplies.  But I was on dry ground on the same side of
the river with the enemy.  All the campaigns, labors, hardships and
exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been
made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and two
brigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPherson
commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the
campaign with.  These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of
Logan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps.  On the 7th
of May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his,
the 15th corps.  My total force was then about thirty-three thousand
men.

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force of
nearly sixty thousand men.  Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and
is connected with it by a railroad.  My first problem was to capture
Grand Gulf to use as a base.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground.  The bottom at that point is
higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a
good road leads to the bluff.  It was natural to expect the garrison
from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our
reaching this solid base.  Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just
above Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the
time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the
nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon.  This more than
doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg.  No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our
transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river
at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one
division of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and early
evening.  McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'
rations (to last five) could be issued to his men.  The bluffs were
reached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to
reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before
the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult.  Port Gibson, too, is the starting point of
roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson
at Thompson's plantation.  There was some firing during the night, but
nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight.  The enemy had
taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison,
numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen.  His
hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring could
reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson.  Two brigades of McPherson's corps
followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued,
and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th
corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the
roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from
one ridge to another.  Where there are no clearings the sides of the
hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with
undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes,
almost impenetrable.  This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay,
if not defeat, a far superior one.

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson
divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two
at the widest point.  These roads unite just outside the town.  This
made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force.  It was not only
divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above
described.  One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching
back to the junction of the roads.  McClernand put the divisions of
Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on
the left.  I was on the field by ten A.M., and inspected both flanks in
person.  On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least
not repulsing our advance.  On the left, however, Osterhaus was not
faring so well.  He had been repulsed with some loss.  As soon as the
road could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who
was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan's
division.  This was about noon.  I ordered him to send one brigade
(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to move
to the left and flank the enemy out of his position.  This movement
carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when
Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed
to renew his front attack.  It was successful and unattended by heavy
loss.  The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left
followed before sunset.  While the movement to our left was going on,
McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for
reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed.  I
had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all
the men he had.  We followed up our victory until night overtook us
about two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for
the night.



CHAPTER XXXIV.

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF
--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough
to see the road.  We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find
that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the
bridge, which he had burned.  The troops were set to work at once to
construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre.  At this
time the water was high and the current rapid.  What might be called a
raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden
buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole
army over safely.  Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned
and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water
and working as hard as any one engaged.  Officers and men generally
joined in this work.  When it was finished the army crossed and marched
eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day.  One brigade of Logan's
division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel
battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent
our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.  Two of his brigades were sent
up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the
bridge there.  The enemy soon left when he found we were building a
bridge elsewhere.  Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced by
Crocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi
at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'
rations.  McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi
River, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until
Sherman's command should relieve it.

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had
joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and
hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into
our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided
by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battle
of Port Gibson--found his way to where I was.  He had no horse to ride
at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal.  He,
therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf.
Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on
the Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege.  He was in
the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess
arrangements were concerned.  The first time I call to mind seeing
either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous
horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and
bridles.

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly
equipped.

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no
anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home.  He looked out
for himself and was in every battle of the campaign.  His age, then not
quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a
recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years.

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon
train.  The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around with
proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times
seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the
battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation,
servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with this
train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg
which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than
stirrups.  I had no other for nearly a week.

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could
be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on
the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting.  I directed,
therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft
animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be
collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.  Quite a train
was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was.  In it could
be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of
cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with
plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons,
with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that
could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for
use or pleasure.  The making out of provision returns was stopped for
the time.  No formalities were to retard our progress until a position
was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the
complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid through
central Mississippi.  He had started from La Grange April 17th with
three regiments of about 1,700 men.  On the 21st he had detached Colonel
Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and
Macon and then return to La Grange.  Hatch had a sharp fight with the
enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at
Okalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26.  Grierson
continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and
Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at
Baton Rouge May 2d.  This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had
attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against
Vicksburg.

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was
repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from
a commanding position; but they were soon driven off.  It was evident
that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's
ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our
progress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night,
seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and
several miles north on the road to Vicksburg.  When the junction of the
road going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond and
Jackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the left
towards Grand Gulf.  I went with him a short distance from this
junction.  McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the
battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;
but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right
flank, and they soon gave way.  McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;
McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to
guard the line back down the bayou.  I did not want to take the chances
of having an enemy lurking in our rear.

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into
the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I
learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on
their way to Vicksburg.  I left Logan to make the proper disposition of
his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry.  Admiral Porter had already arrived with his
fleet.  The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since
the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters,
and no tent to cover me.  The first thing I did was to get a bath,
borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and
get a good meal on the flag-ship.  Then I wrote letters to the
general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be
telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders.  About twelve
o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson's
ferry, arriving there before daylight.  While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men.  Up to
this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of
supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him in
the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the
one intended.  To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month.  The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand
men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high
points close to the river for over three hundred miles.  The enemy would
have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently
of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified.  I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success.  The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable.  Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.  He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life."  To this I replied:  "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf.  I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads.  What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance."  We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.  A delay
would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they
were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them
three days' rations in haversacks.  Beef, mutton, poultry and forage
were found in abundance.  Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was
also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be
obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men.  Every plantation,
however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for
the owners and their slaves.  All these were kept running while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at
all plantations covered by the troops.  But the product was taken by the
troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to
go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo above
Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view of
leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and
attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command that
night and the next day.  Three days' rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued.  Orders were given
for a forward movement the next day.  Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred
wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread,
coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send
four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's
division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in
addition, the latter to join the army in the field.  The four regiments
were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no
delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the
Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond.  That night he and McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry.  McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry.  The 9th, McPherson moved
to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were.  On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy.  The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side.  It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement.  The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.  It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction.  Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills.  The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it.  McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings.  Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss.  McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond.  The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads:  to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack.  In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson.  It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him
in detail.  This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I
had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it.  The right was at Raymond eighteen
miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre on
Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left,
also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two
miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a
considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
McClernand's left was on the Big Black.  In all our moves, up to this
time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had
been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries
under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about two
P.M.  Logan was in advance with one of his brigades.  He deployed and
moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be
cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's,
which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.  The
order was obeyed with alacrity.  Logan got his division in position for
assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying
the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not to
appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing
--nearly or quite all from Logan's division.  The enemy's loss was 100
killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders
as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher
command.  Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he
volunteered.  His weak condition never put him on the sick report when
there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.



CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY
--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown
my position was with Sherman.  I decided at once to turn the whole
column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in
fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000.  A force was also
collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads
communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men
and stores would come by that point.  As I hoped in the end to besiege
Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid.  I therefore
determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force
in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton.  But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication.  So I finally decided to have
none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force
eastward.  I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved
quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in
the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on
the 13th were annulled by new ones.  McPherson was ordered at daylight
to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my
determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward.  He was
ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.
McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to
Raymond.  One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking
reinforcements.  Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his
fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and
declining to send any troops.  I looked upon side movements as long as
the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and
material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th
from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate
troops in Mississippi.  I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the
south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:
"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are
bringing forces from Tullahoma."

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each
other, as far as the nature of the country would admit.  Reconnoissances
were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint
themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case
a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and
immediately set to work destroying the railroad.  Sherman's advance
reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of
the town.  McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward's
station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for
the night in good order.  On the night of the 13th, McPherson was
ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.
Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road
from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and
does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed
the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.
McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton,
one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman's
line, and a third to Raymond.  He was also directed to send his siege
guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With one
division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, at
Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond Mississippi
Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond
could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back
now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson.  If this
last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one
day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different
roads leading to the latter city.  But the most important consideration
in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come
out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on,
he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the
14th.  A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an
unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night and
arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour.  It rained in torrents
during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th.
The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where
the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water.
But the troops never murmured.  By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's
corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and
speedily drove them in upon the main body.  They were outside of the
intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had
been driven out of Raymond.  Johnston had been reinforced; during the
night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force
amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the
town, but speedily drove them in.  He was now on the south and
south-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their
breastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north,
occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad.
Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an
assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployed
Crocker's for the assault.  Sherman made similar dispositions on the
right.  By eleven A.M. both were ready to attack.  Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line.  These troops at
once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body,
when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division
charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main
line.  This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of
his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until
within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he
halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the
next move.  It was now about noon.

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which
enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springs
road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to
pass.  By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy
flanked and speedily driven within the main line.  This brought our
whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous
on the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the
city to the same river south.  I was with Sherman.  He was confronted by
a force sufficient to hold us back.  Appearances did not justify an
assault where we were.  I had directed Sherman to send a force to the
right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River.  This force,
Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, and
soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line.  Tuttle's
movement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a
retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was
getting away.  Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines
without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting
Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery.  I rode
immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman.
About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his
front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they
could not move their guns or destroy them.  He captured seven guns and,
moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital of
Mississippi.  Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat,
but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was:  McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;
Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing.  The enemy lost 845
killed, wounded and captured.  Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and
the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large
amount of commissary stores.

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4th
division.  He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the
only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign.

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupied
the night before.

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directed
the dispositions to be made of their troops.  Sherman was to remain in
Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and
manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most
effectually.  Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had
not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee
troops.  Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either
the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls.  We looked on
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the
looms, with "C. S. A."  woven in each bolt.  There was an immense amount
of cotton, in bales, stacked outside.  Finally I told Sherman I thought
they had done work enough.  The operatives were told they could leave
and take with them what cloth they could carry.  In a few minutes cotton
and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I
was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private.  He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his
property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim.  I
declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward's station:  "I have lately arrived, and learn that
Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton.  It
is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced.  If
practicable, come up in his rear at once.  To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value.  All the troops you can quickly assemble
should be brought.  Time is all-important."  This dispatch was sent in
triplicate, by different messengers.  One of the messengers happened to
be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by
Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a
good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to
those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the
expelled man understood each other.  He delivered his copy of Johnston's
dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly
in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road.  Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson.  I also
informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following
order:  "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and
cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg.  We must not allow them
to do this.  Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there.  Move troops by the most direct road from
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."

And to Blair I wrote:  "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black
and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers.  We
must beat them.  Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the
trains with you.  Smith's division, and any other troops now with you,
will go to the same place.  If practicable, take parallel roads, so as
to divide your troops and train."

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the
night of the 14th.  He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches
announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army.  I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.  Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi?  Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country.  McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad.  McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles.  One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over.  McClernand faced about and moved
promptly.  His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road.  Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories.  I rode in person out to Clinton.  On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning
him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt
very certain of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of
his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton.  This,
indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make the
attempt to reach that point.  It turned out, however, that he had
decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently
determined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and my
base.  I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week
before.  On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward's
station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross
so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away.
This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good
bridge over Baker's Creek.  Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there.  Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of
his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a
dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be
expected.

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me.  They
reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and
that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty
regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five
thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to
complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders
to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander
to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear.  Within
an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road.
At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move
with all speed to Edward's station.  McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present.  Blair's division was a part of
the 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its
corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about
and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our
extreme right.  McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way
of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible.
McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward's
station, over which to march his troops.  Hovey's division of his corps
had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north.
McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle
road.  Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to
feel for the enemy.

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter
the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the
middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found
the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line.  About the
same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon
road from Jackson to Vicksburg.  McPherson was hastening up to join
Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads.  I was
still back at Clinton.  McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up.  By half-past seven I was on the road
and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in
front of troops off the road.  When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing
amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance
to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson.  I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack.  These orders were
repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's
advance.

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us,
whether taken by accident or design, was well selected.  It is one of
the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in
range.  On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a
ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended.  The ridge
occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns
westerly.  The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge.
The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at
this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;
then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek,
nearly a mile away.  On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual
and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek.  There was, when we
were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some three
miles west of Champion's Hill.  There is one also to Bolton.  From this
latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station.  It
was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps,
and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.
Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward's station.  The middle road comes into
the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and
descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles
south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward's
station.  Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east.
Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed
parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested
battle.  Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him,
had captured a battery of the enemy.  But he was not able to hold his
position and had to abandon the artillery.  McPherson brought up his
troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right
of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy.  Logan reinforced Hovey with
one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west
to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit.  Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on
me for more reinforcements.  I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up,
to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries
to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they
did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over
open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them.  He
did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the
belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance.
Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the most
heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our
right around, until I came up with Logan himself.  I found him near the
road leading down to Baker's Creek.  He was actually in command of the
only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two
brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker,
with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hours
before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two
divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, were
confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's
division of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand
Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank.  Neither
Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy.  Just at
this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more
reinforcements.  There were none to spare.  I then gave an order to move
McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered
the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the
enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from
Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with
two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one
about the time the road was opened to the rear.  The enemy fled
precipitately.  This was between three and four o'clock.  I rode
forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north
road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in.
Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers
advanced in like manner.  Hovey's division, and McPherson's two
divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not
in the best condition to follow the retreating foe.  I sent orders to
Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I
explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as
the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.
The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting,
preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose
to the dignity of battle.  Every man of Hovey's division and of
McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle.  No other part
of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before.
Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel
advanced pickets as early as half-past seven.  Their positions were
admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line.  McClernand, with two
divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon
and in easy hearing.  I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully
competent to explain to him the situation.  These traversed the wood
separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he
did not come.  It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small
force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine
obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my
staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or
been cut off.  Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to
his corps, to join on to his right flank.  Hovey was bearing the brunt
of the battle at the time.  To obey the order he would have had to pull
out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had
to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground.
Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate
superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged.  This
excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command except
Hovey.  Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing.  Hovey
alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his
division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the
ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have
escaped with any organized force.  As it was he lost over three thousand
killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in
pursuit.  Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line,
was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg.
Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River.  His
troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the
general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to
their homes.  Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500
sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their
cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded.  The pursuit
was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road.  The night
of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six
miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg.
Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about three
miles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops had
fought so bravely and bled so freely.  Much war material abandoned by
the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of
artillery.  I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept
in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and
took possession of a vacant house.  As no troops came up we moved back a
mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac
on the road.  We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which
had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded
and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the
thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the
battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do
as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend.



CHAPTER XXXVI.

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF
VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton,
without a possibility of a junction of their forces.  Pemberton might
have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and,
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston.  But this would have given us Vicksburg.  It would have been
his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he
been in Pemberton's place.  In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th
and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting.  His rear guard
did not get in until two A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by
daylight.  He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave
his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants.  At Bolton he was
informed of our victory.  He was directed to commence the march early
next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to
find the enemy.  Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon
train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I
hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corps
used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a
crossing for the remainder of the army.  I informed him that I would
endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit
at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps.  As I expected, the enemy
was found in position on the Big Black.  The point was only six miles
from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour.  Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed
close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes
overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation.  A
bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages.  When
the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land
into an island.  The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had
felled into the ditch.  At this time there was a foot or two of water in
it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them.  The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west
of the river.  At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of
uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men.  Carr's
division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme
right and reaching through these woods to the river above.  Osterhaus'
division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entire
front.  McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to
come in wherever he could be of assistance.

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'
staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated
the 11th of May.  It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to
be forwarded to me.  It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to
co-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return
with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg.  I told the officer that
the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position.  The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I
heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that
direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the
enemy.  I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I
think not even to this day.

The assault was successful.  But little resistance was made. The enemy
fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and
leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands.  Many
tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were
drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners.
Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing.  The enemy probably
lost but few men except those captured and drowned.  But for the
successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little
doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent
his occupying his defences around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to
be built.  It was but little after nine o'clock A.M. when the capture
took place.  As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for
the construction of three bridges.  One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson
himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent
volunteer officer.  My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;
and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting
only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from
their stumps.  A bridge was then made with these trees to support the
roadway.  Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose.  By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th
all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair with
the pontoon train already there.  A few of the enemy were intrenched on
the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following
morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops
and as soon as possible joined Sherman.  My first anxiety was to secure
a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg.  Sherman's line
of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy
the December before when he was repulsed.  Sherman was equally anxious
with myself.  Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and
well up with the advanced skirmishers.  There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill.  These were still occupied by the enemy, or
else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg.  At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick
and fast for a short time.  In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of
looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on
the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive
assurance of success.  This, however, he said was the end of one of the
greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at
once.  Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what
might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was
a complete and successful campaign.  I do not claim to quote Sherman's
language; but the substance only.  My reason for mentioning this
incident will appear further on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and
Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear.  He arrived at
night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp.  McClernand moved
by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to
the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg.  This brought him south of McPherson.  I now had my three
corps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads
--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow.  Sherman was on the right, and covered the
high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his
troops would extend.  McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied
ground on both sides of the Jackson road.  McClernand took up the ground
to his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a
continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were
getting into better position.  The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he
would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two
o'clock I ordered an assault.  It resulted in securing more advanced
positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire
of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making
roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou.  Most of
the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary.  They had an abundance of food, however, but
began to feel the want of bread.  I remember that in passing around to
the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in
rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack."  In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"
I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with
everything they needed.  The cry was instantly changed to cheers.  By
the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault.  Johnston was in my rear, only
fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I
had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his
coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent
the capture of the city.  The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save
sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State.  But
the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry
the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the
trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten
o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position.  All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all
might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant,
and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the
very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;
but at no place were we able to enter.  General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements.  I occupied a position from which I believed I could see
as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the
success he reported.  But his request for reinforcements being repeated
I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a
diversion in favor of McClernand.  This last attack only served to
increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever.  As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been
obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus
ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it
were, and to incur no more losses.  The experience of the 22d convinced
officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the
defences and approaches with a will.  With the navy holding the river,
the investment of Vicksburg was complete.  As long as we could hold our
position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of
war to what they had on hand.  These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th.  On the 18th
of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg.  On the 19th, just twenty days
after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had
been made:  five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had
been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had
fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful
for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one
hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but
five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand
prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been
killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces
had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from
Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours.  The Union force that had
crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-three
thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to
take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;
and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field after
the battle.  The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the
roads between these places, over sixty thousand men.  They were in their
own country, where no rear guards were necessary.  The country is
admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive
campaign.  All their troops had to be met.  We were fortunate, to say
the least, in meeting them in detail:  at Port Gibson seven or eight
thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven
thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black,
four thousand.  A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of
those encountered at Raymond.  They were beaten in detail by a force
smaller than their own, upon their own ground.  Our loss up to this time
was:

                             KILLED  WOUNDED  MISSING

 Port Gibson.....              131     719      25
 South Fork Bayou Pierre.....   ..       1      ..
 Skirmishes, May 3 .....         1       9      ..
 Fourteen Mile Creek.....        6      24      ..
 Raymond...............         66     339      39
 Jackson.....                   42     251       7
 Champion's Hill.....          410   1,844     187
 Big Black.....                 39     237       3
 Bridgeport.....                ..       1      ..
 Total.....                    695   3,425     259


Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty.  Not
half of them were disabled for any length of time.

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege
began.  Sherman occupied the right starting from the river above
Vicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) and
McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton.  Lauman's
division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the
line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been
completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of
the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;
ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be
encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up.  The troops
had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to
this time.  All was now ready for the pick and spade.  Prentiss and
Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared.
Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black,
and to observe Johnston.  I knew that Johnston was receiving
reinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee.
Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make
the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of
losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluff
to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton.  The line of the enemy was about
seven.  In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in
our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line
of defence facing the other way.  I had not troops enough under my
command to man these.  General Halleck appreciated the situation and,
without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible
dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence.  On the north it is
about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point
and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up
with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a
dense forest.  Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was
in cultivation.  But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small
streams.  The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from
the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the
Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a
southwesterly direction to the river.  Deep ravines of the description
given lay in front of these defences.  As there is a succession of
gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was
necessarily very irregular.  To follow each of these spurs with
intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have
lengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places,
their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to
the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally
open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this
outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as
his was against us, was very great.  The problem was also complicated by
our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible.  We had but
four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps,
was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him.
His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock,
also of the Engineer Corps.  To provide assistants on such a long line I
directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they
had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to
their other duties assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates.  The
chief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off,
however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good
for unless he would do for a sap-roller.  As soldiers require rations
while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and
as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let
him off.  The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty
pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none
at the West to draw from.  Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a
battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field
artillery used in the campaign, the siege began.  The first thing to do
was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding
positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the
enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and
covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route.  The
enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries.
Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was
kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready
to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy.
It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than
the ordinary parapet.  To give additional protection sand bags,
bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough
apart to make loop-holes for musketry.  On top of these, logs were put.
By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty,
without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters.  The enemy used in their
defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over
our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not
remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of
these shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was
terrible.  In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well.  Their
use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any
corresponding advantage to those using them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because
we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it
freely.  Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men
behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in
front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the
toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve
pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands.  These answered as
cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the
trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by
the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were
paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made.
The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced
position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the
batteries were advanced.  By the 30th of June there were two hundred and
twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of
heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy.  We were now
as strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were
against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving
constant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger
force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg
reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in.  Some came to
gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through
the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations
came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded.  Often those
coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry.
They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated.  Many of the
soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread
during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon,
almost took away their appetite.  But the intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of
the State officers.  I naturally wanted to show them what there was of
most interest.  In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and
most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure.  I therefore took
them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them.  Before starting out
to look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled
--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which
the North had been so imperfectly informed.  There was a little knot
around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in
the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked
down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:
"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I
opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it."  But for this speech it is
not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of.  His
untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to
a full share of all the credit due for its success.  He could not have
done more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a
force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage.
Blair was instructed to take all of it.  The cattle were to be driven in
for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our
troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the
roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible.  Blair went forty-five
miles and was gone almost a week.  His work was effectually done.  I
requested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating
nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which
proved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcements
could be sent.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforce
him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson.  Of course I could not comply
with his request, nor did I think he needed them.  He was in no danger
of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army
organizing in his rear to raise the siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General
Kimball commanding.  It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east
of Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on
Blair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place with
instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy
the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across
the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men
from Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command.  With the aid of the
gunboats they were speedily repelled.  I sent Mower's brigade over with
instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had no
further trouble in that quarter during the siege.  This was the first
important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire.
These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of
the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under
General Sooy Smith.  It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, and
General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that
point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the
Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut
off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and
Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left while
Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge.  At this point the
water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land.  Through this
opening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to get
messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's
corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff.  These latter
troops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of
sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed.  They arrived
none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men.  More than half were disposed
across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the Big
Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the
latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jackson
road to Baldwin's ferry and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and their
immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;
but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18th
from General McPherson, saying that their respective commands had
complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by
General McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the
other troops engaged in the campaign.  This order had been sent North
and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps.  The
order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside
of McClernand's command until brought in this way.  I at once wrote to
McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order.  He did so,
and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and
ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois.  The publication of his order
in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.



CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE
MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAG
OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTING
THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had
crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to
raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between
Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg
had by this time passed from Johnston's mind.  I immediately ordered
Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the Big
Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman.  Haines' Bluff had been
strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from
there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been
constructed.  The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not
already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also
looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.
But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially
protected as they were against us.  Where we were looking east and north
we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive.  Johnston evidently
took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an
assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides
without accomplishing any result.  We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk
of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at
the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our
position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing.  At three
points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was run
up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined
and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in
reaching our mine.  At this particular point the hill on which the rebel
work stands rises abruptly.  Our sap ran close up to the outside of the
enemy's parapet.  In fact this parapet was also our protection.  The
soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this
barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers
for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over
hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned
them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently
when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.
This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy
it.  On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was
exploded.  A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to
open with the explosion.  The effect was to blow the top of the hill off
and make a crater where it stood.  The breach was not sufficient to
enable us to pass a column of attack through.  In fact, the enemy having
failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most
of the men guarding that point were placed.  There were a few men,
however, left at the advance line, and others working in the
countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours.  All that were
there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side,
still alive.  I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at
work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side.  He was
not much hurt, but terribly frightened.  Some one asked him how high he
had gone up.  "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his
reply.  General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man
to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two
regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had
been placed for the express purpose.  The enemy made a desperate effort
to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line.  From
here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution.  The
compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect.  The
enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the
contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to
be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation.  During
the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against
the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of
their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their
grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of
which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our
ranks.  We found it impossible to continue this work.  Another mine was
consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying
an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its
occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood.  No attempt to
charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.
Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded.  The
enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first.  We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position
nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to
explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at
different points and assault immediately after.  We were up now at three
different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet
of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed
me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order
to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg.  I knew the garrison would make no
formidable effort to relieve itself.  The picket lines were so close to
each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post
pickets--that the men could converse.  On the 21st of June I was
informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by
crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been
canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to
cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because
their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and
had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be
finished in a week to carry them all over.  The rebel pickets also said
that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build
these boats with.  Afterwards this story was verified:  on entering the
city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt
abortive.  Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so
that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on
the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if
the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee
crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side.  Had the attempt been made
the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on
the Louisiana side.  General Richard Taylor was expected on the west
bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor
could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service.  The
Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth,
except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson.  We had
nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to
opposite Bruinsburg.  The roads west were not of a character to draw
supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a
number of places.  At ten points we could move under cover to within
from five to one hundred yards of the enemy.  Orders were given to make
all preparations for assault on the 6th of July.  The debouches were
ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to
be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast.  Plank, and
bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to
enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the
Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the
month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to
cut his way out.  Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached
him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the
following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it
will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place.  I see no
prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable
obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to
inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your
troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues
necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically
did the same.  They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate
would fail.  Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston
suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the
garrison with their arms.  Johnston replied that it would be a
confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to
use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o'clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of
the rebel works.  Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at
once.  Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a
white flag.  They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and
Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following
letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to
arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg.  To this end, if
agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like
number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may
find convenient.  I make this proposition to save the further effusion
of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.
This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by
Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these
white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the
command.  The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard
fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate,
exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the
gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their
suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last
at an end and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me.  I had
been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably
before the war; but his request was refused.  He then suggested that I
should meet Pemberton.  To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if
Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps at
three o'clock that afternoon.  I also sent the following written reply
to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for
several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation
through commissioners, to be appointed, etc.  The useless effusion of
blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you
may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.
Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in
Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can
assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange
the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those
indicated above."

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal
message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of
the morning.  Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, and
several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was
on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines.  Near by
stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event.  It
was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb
had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies.  Since then the same
tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as
"The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the
Mexican War.  I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old
acquaintance.  He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if
it surrendered.  My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his
letter.  Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might
as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave.  I said, "Very well."
General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be
consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking,
showed this.  He now proposed that he and one of our generals should
have a conference.  I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made
binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had
a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away
towards the enemy's lines were in conversation.  After a while Bowen
suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with
the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery.  This
was promptly and unceremoniously rejected.  The interview here ended, I
agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock
that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with
Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of
both army and navy.  It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that they
should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division
commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg.  Half the
army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.  I
informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply and
the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any
suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own
hands.  This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held.
Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent
the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the
following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public
stores, etc.  On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one
division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow.  As
soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and
men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking
with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry
officers one horse each.  The rank and file will be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property.  If these conditions are accepted, any
amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores
you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing
them.  Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one,
will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.
The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and
soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.  The paroles for these
latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized
to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either
army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken's
landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be
exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged.  There was a
Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange.
I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to
perform the functions of his office.  Had I insisted upon an
unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men
to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the
Mississippi.  Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by
rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--all
at very great expense.  At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled,
because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in
exchange.  Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose
homes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war
and would get home just as soon as they could.  A large number of them
had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to
be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and
they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.
In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor
and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have
to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will
perfect the agreement between us.  At ten o'clock A.M. to-morrow, I
propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender
the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors
and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines.  After which you
will take possession.  Officers to retain their side-arms and personal
property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight.  My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d
July.  The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full.  It
will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed
by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will
necessarily take some time.  Again, I can make no stipulations with
regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property.  While I
do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as
stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be
allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one
horse each.  If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march
to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten
o'clock A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as
prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by
nine o'clock A.M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall
act accordingly.  Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be
displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have
been notified, from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between
the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close
together.  All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all Union troops as
"Yanks."  Often "Johnny" would call:  "Well, Yank, when are you coming
into town?"  The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th
of July there."  Sometimes it would be:  "We always treat our prisoners
with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you as
prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves."  The garrison, from
the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the
fourth.  They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful
when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender.
Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of
the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"
boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best
receipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit."  The paper
at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of
wall paper.  The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that
we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third
with a two-fold purpose:  first, to avoid an assault, which he knew
would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on
the great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of
American Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did he
defeated his aim in the latter particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their
works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good
order.  Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.
Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the
first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division
was soon floating over the court-house.  Our soldiers were no sooner
inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize.  Our men had
had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close.  The
enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last.  I myself saw
our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy
they had so recently been engaged in starving out.  It was accepted with
avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for
surrender, the answer is obvious.  I believed that upon that day I
should obtain better terms.  Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew
they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July
into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their
national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from
them at any other time."

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he
did for surrendering.  But it must be recollected that his first letter
asking terms was received about 10 o'clock A.M., July 3d.  It then could
hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a
surrender.  He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of
raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he
could.  He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was
expected on the fourth.  In our interview he told me he had rations
enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks.  It was
this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to
draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine
thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made an
attack upon Helena, Arkansas.  He was totally defeated by General
Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred
soldiers.  Holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed;
but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses.
The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40
missing.  This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to
raise the siege of Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman
and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston,
drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could.  Steele and
Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as
soon as the surrender took place.  Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange
congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I
found that many of the citizens had been living under ground.  The
ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black,
are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity.  Where roads and
streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well
as if composed of stone.  The magazines of the enemy were made by
running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep
cuts.  Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by
carving out rooms in these embankments.  A door-way in these cases would
be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street,
and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved
out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way.  In some
instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with
a door-way in the clay wall separating them.  Some of these were
carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration.  In these the
occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were
dropped into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not
move into the town until the sixth.  On the afternoon of the fourth I
sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where
the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief.
It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning.  The only terms allowed is their
parole as prisoners of war.  This I regard as a great advantage to us at
this moment.  It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and
leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service.  Sherman, with
a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the
State.  I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th
army corps to Burnside."

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a
great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and
the loyal people all over the North.  The fate of the Confederacy was
sealed when Vicksburg fell.  Much hard fighting was to be done
afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE
was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and
sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the
troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy
now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies
of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a
copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of
Port Hudson.  Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the
National forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of
Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him.  He added that if
this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer.  General Banks
gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General
Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July.  Port Hudson
with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores
fell into the hands of the Union forces:  from that day to the close of
the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth,
remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be
paroled.  The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for
each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officers
of the companies or regiments.  Duplicates were also made for each
soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the
soldier signing and one to be retained by us.  Several hundred refused
to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners
to being sent back to fight again.  Others again kept out of the way,
hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their
paroles, but I declined.  It also leaked out that many of the men who
had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as
soon as they got out of our lines.  Pemberton hearing this, again
appealed to me to assist him.  He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as
guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of
instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged.  This
request was also declined.  It was precisely what I expected and hoped
that they would do.  I told him, however, that I would see that they
marched beyond our lines in good order.  By the eleventh, just one week
after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate
garrison marched out.  Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever
returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had
the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James
River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were
established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the
river below.  The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps
behind the intrenchments.  No restraint was put upon them, except by
their own commanders.  They were rationed about as our own men, and from
our supplies.  The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been
fighting for the same cause.  When they passed out of the works they had
so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late
antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give
pain.  Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the
breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their
late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow.  They will be
authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to
Edward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to
be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive
remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have
passed."



CHAPTER XXXIX.

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPON
MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO.

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance
stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new
spirit to the loyal people of the North.  New hopes for the final
success of the cause of the Union were inspired.  The victory gained at
Gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes.  Now the
Mississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;
for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once.  The army of
northern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to
about the same ground it occupied in 1861.  The Army of the Tennessee
united with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate States
completely.

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall of
Vicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual
delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the
cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will
immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case
elsewhere.  If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will
detain them until further orders."

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands
of Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.

At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon
about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition.  The small-arms
of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours.  Up to this time our
troops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lock
muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in
the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed
at--and a few new and improved arms.  These were of many different
calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition
during an engagement.  The enemy had generally new arms which had run
the blockade and were of uniform caliber.  After the surrender I
authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior
muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them
with the latter.  A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance
Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the
Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers,
dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention.  Neither
have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve.
Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with an
army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of
officers and men.  A military education was acquired which no other
school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for
them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good
regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were
equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been
equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the
campaign fitted to command independent armies.

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general,
without having served in a lower grade.  He commanded a division in the
campaign.  I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him
in 1858 when he ran for Congress.  I knew him as a frank, positive and
generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader.
I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficult
to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command
one army officered intelligently and with subordination.  It affords me
the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in
respect to his character.  There was no man braver than he, nor was
there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more
unquestioning alacrity.  He was one man as a soldier, another as a
politician.

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign.
Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully
made with twice the number of men engaged.  It could not have been made
at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such
assistance.  The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of
the service.  There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either
of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly
complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances.
The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war.
Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted
to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made
its execution impossible.  A forward movement to a decisive victory was
necessary.  Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with
Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that base
and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against
Vicksburg.  Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and
fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he
could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen
thousand men.  The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I
therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid
movements were essential to success.  Jackson was captured the day after
a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large
reinforcements were expected.  A rapid movement west was made; the
garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and
driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.  It
looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign
while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three things
that required immediate attention.  The first was to send a force to
drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State.  The second was to
send reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete
the triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth to
the free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes.  The third
was to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the good
news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in
the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart.

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for the
surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended from
Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson
road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his
command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State as
soon as Vicksburg surrendered.  Steele and Ord were directed to be in
readiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and
Sherman was advised of this also.  Sherman moved promptly, crossing the
Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all
concentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson.

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it
occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson.  On the 8th of July
Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up to
the defences of the city and shelling the town.  The siege was kept up
until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had
evacuated during the night.  The weather was very hot, the roads dusty
and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so
much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division,
Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson.

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than one
thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.  The Confederate loss was
probably less, except in captured.  More than this number fell into our
hands as prisoners.

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who
had to be left behind.  A large amount of rations was issued to the
families that remained in Jackson.  Medicine and food were also sent to
Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I
thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the
articles we had taken while marching through the country.  I wrote to
Sherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely
necessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try to
create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people."
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the
people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose
resources had been taken for the supply of our army.  Very large
quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same
position they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff.
Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular
Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, I
felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more
before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while
important points might be captured without bloodshed.  I suggested to
the General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, starting
from Lake Pontchartrain.  Halleck preferred another course.  The
possession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed to
possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the
Mississippi.  I am well aware that the President was very anxious to
have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign
governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the
war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the
Confederate States.  This, however, could have been easily done without
wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending a
garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande.

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that I
was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as
I had been a year before in west Tennessee.  It would have been an easy
thing to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there.  Having that
as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior
to operate against General Bragg's army.  This would necessarily have
compelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear.  If he
had not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflicted
inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and
Lee's were yet receiving their supplies.  I was so much impressed with
this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the
1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking
only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at
or near Mobile.  I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New
Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should be
approved. Both requests were refused.  So far as my experience with
General Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor
than to grant one.  But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simply
in line of duty, though out of my department.

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an
army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had
been the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the army
was sent where it would do the least good.  By orders, I sent to Banks a
force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, when
transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to
Schofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State.  I also
detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that place
permanently.  This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when
Ransom arrived there.  The enemy happened to have a large number, about
5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed the
Eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had
probably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on the
way to Lee's and other armies in the East.

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily and
unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and
small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in
destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads.  The
guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and
therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops.

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton's
army and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also.  The men
determined not to fight again while the war lasted.  Those who lived
beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes.
Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for their
support till the war was over.  Besides all this there was quite a peace
feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of
Mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided.  It is not probable that
Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he
proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition.

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th
corps, General Ord commanding, to Banks.  Besides this I received orders
to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the
Mississippi.  Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer
with Banks about the proposed movement.  All these movements came to
naught.

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance above
Carrollton.  The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on my
return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the
street, fell, probably on me.  I was rendered insensible, and when I
regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with several
doctors attending me.  My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh,
and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the
body up to the arm-pit.  The pain was almost beyond endurance.  I lay at
the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in
bed.  I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was
carried to it on a litter.  I was then taken to Vicksburg, where I
remained unable to move for some time afterwards.

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because,
he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made
in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.  No orders
were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon
consultation with and approval of Sherman.

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Halleck
telegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence to
Tuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga.
On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to
Rosecrans.  This was received on the 27th.  I was still confined to my
bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once ordered
Sherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could be
provided.  The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and was
on the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise,
to report to Hurlbut at Memphis.  Hurlbut was directed to forward these
two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to
send any other troops that might be returning there.  Halleck suggested
that some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphis
to take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, as
being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command,
and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one.  He
was directed to take with him another division of his corps.  This left
one back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still the
equivalent.

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga had
been fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. The
administration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at the
situation of affairs there.  Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War
Department, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters.  I do not know what his
instructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived there
at a later period.

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon as
able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the
west. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d:  "It is the
wish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able he
will come to Cairo and report by telegraph."  I was still very lame, but
started without delay.  Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported by
telegraph:  "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to report
from Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th.  Left the same day with
staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo."

END OF VOLUME I.







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