The Project Gutenberg eBook of The provincial letters of Blaise Pascal
    
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.

Title: The provincial letters of Blaise Pascal
        A new translation, with historical introduction and notes, by the Rev. Thomas M'Crie

Author: Blaise Pascal

Translator: Thomas M'Crie

Release date: July 1, 2024 [eBook #73959]

Language: English

Original publication: United States: Robert Carter & Brothers

Credits: Charlene Taylor, Daniel Lowe and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS OF BLAISE PASCAL ***





                                  THE

                           PROVINCIAL LETTERS

                                   OF

                             BLAISE PASCAL.




                           A NEW TRANSLATION

                WITH HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,

                                   BY

                        THE REV. THOMAS M‘CRIE.

                               EDINBURGH.




      If my letters are condemned at Rome, that which I condemn in
                  them is condemned in heaven.—PASCAL.




                               NEW YORK:
                        ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS
                           No. 530 BROADWAY.

                           ------------------

                                 1856.




                               CONTENTS.

                                                                    PAGE

 PREFACE,                                                            vii


 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION,                                             ix


                                LETTER I.

 Disputes in the Sorbonne, and the invention of proximate power—a
   term employed by the Jesuits to procure the censure of M.
   Arnauld,                                                           63


                               LETTER II.

 Of sufficient grace, which turns out to be not
   sufficient—Concert between the Jesuits and the Dominicans—A
   parable,                                                           76


 Reply of “the Provincial” to the first two Letters,                  88


                               LETTER III.

 Injustice, absurdity, and nullity of the censure on M. Arnauld—A
   personal heresy,                                                   90


                               LETTER IV.

 Actual grace and sins of ignorance—Father Bauny’s Summary of
   sins,                                                             100


                                LETTER V.

 Design of the Jesuits in establishing a new system of morals—Two
   sorts of casuists among them—A great many lax and some severe
   ones—Reason of this difference—Explanation of the doctrine of
   probabilism—A multitude of modern and unknown authors
   substituted in the place of the holy fathers—Escobar,             116


                               LETTER VI.

 Various artifices of the Jesuits to elude the authority of the
   gospel, of councils, and of the popes—Some consequences
   resulting from their doctrine of probability—Their relaxations
   in favor of beneficiaries, of priests, of monks, and of
   domestics—Story of John d’Alba,                                   135


                               LETTER VII.

 Method of directing the intention adopted by the
   casuists—Permission to kill in defence of honor and property,
   extended even to priests and monks—Curious question raised as
   to whether Jesuits may be allowed to kill Jansenists,             152


                              LETTER VIII.

 Corrupt maxims of the casuists relating to judges—Usurers—The
   Contract Mohatra—Bankrupts—Restitution—Divers ridiculous
   notions of these same casuists,                                   170


                               LETTER IX.

 False worship of the Virgin introduced by the Jesuits—Devotion
   made easy—Their maxims on ambition, envy, gluttony,
   equivocation, mental reservations, female dress, gaming, and
   hearing mass,                                                     188


                                LETTER X.

 Palliatives applied by the Jesuits to the sacrament of penance,
   in their maxims regarding confession, satisfaction,
   absolution, proximate occasions of sin, and love to God,          206


                               LETTER XI.

 The Letters vindicated from the charge of profaneness—Ridicule a
   fair weapon, when employed against absurd opinions—Rules to be
   observed in the use of this weapon—Charitableness and
   discretion of the Provincial Letters—Specimens of genuine
   profaneness in the writings of Jesuits,                           225


                               LETTER XII.

 The quirks and chicaneries of the Jesuits on the subjects of
   alms-giving and simony,                                           243


                              LETTER XIII.

 Fidelity of Pascal’s quotations—Speculative murder—Killing for
   slander—Fear of the consequences—The policy of Jesuitism,         260


                               LETTER XIV.

 On murder—The Scriptures on murder—Lessius, Molina, and Layman
   on murder—Christian and Jesuitical legislation contrasted,        277


                               LETTER XV.

 On calumny—M. Puys and Father Alby—An odd heresy—Barefaced
   denials—Flat contradictions and vague insinuations employed by
   the Jesuits—The Capuchin’s _Mentiris impudentissime_,             295


                               LETTER XVI.

 Calumnies against Port-Royal—Port-Royalists no heretics—M. de
   St. Cyran and M. Arnauld vindicated—Slanders against the nuns
   of Port-Royal—Miracle of the holy thorn—No impunity for
   slanderers—Excuse for a long letter,                              314


                              LETTER XVII.

 The author of the Letters vindicated from the charge of
   heresy—The five propositions—The popes fallible in matters of
   fact—Persecution of the Jansenists—The grand object of the
   Jesuits,                                                          341


                              LETTER XVIII.

 The sense of Jansenius not the sense of Calvin—Resistibility of
   grace—Jansenius no heretic—The popes may be
   surprised—Testimony of the senses—Condemnation of
   Galileo—Conclusion,                                               366


                               LETTER XIX.

 Fragment of a nineteenth Provincial Letter, addressed to Père
   Annat,                                                            391




                       THE TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.

The following translation of the Provincial Letters was undertaken
several years ago, in compliance with the suggestion of a revered
parent, chiefly as a literary recreation in a retired country charge,
and, after being finished, was laid aside. It is now published at the
request of friends, who considered such a work as peculiarly seasonable,
and more likely to be acceptable at the present crisis, when general
attention has been again directed to the popish controversy, and when
such strenuous exertions are being made by the Jesuits to regain
influence in our country.

None are strangers to the fame of the Provincials, and few literary
persons would choose to confess themselves altogether ignorant of a work
which has acquired a world-wide reputation. Yet there is reason to
suspect that few books of the same acknowledged merit have had a more
limited circle of _bona fide_ English readers. This may be ascribed, in
a great measure, to the want of a good English translation. Two
translations of the Provincials have already appeared in our language.
The first was contemporary with the Letters themselves, and was printed
at London in 1657, under the title of “_Les Provinciales_; or, The
Mysterie of Jesuitism, discovered in certain Letters, written upon
occasion of the present differences at Sorbonne, between the Jansenists
and the Molinists, from January 1656 to March 1657, S. N. Displaying the
corrupt Maximes and Politicks of that Society. Faithfully rendered into
English. _Sicut Serpentes._” Of the translation under this unpromising
title, it may only be remarked, that it is probably one of the worst
specimens of “rendering into English” to be met with, even during that
age when little attention was paid to the art of translation. Under its
uncouth phraseology, not only are the wit and spirit of the original
completely shrouded, but the meaning is so disguised that the work is
almost as unintelligible as it is uninteresting.

Another translation of the Letters—of which I was not aware till I had
completed mine—was published in London in 1816. On discovering that a
new attempt had been made to put the English public in possession of the
Provincials, and that it had failed to excite any general interest, I
was induced to lay aside all thoughts of publishing my version; but,
after examining the modern translation, I became convinced that its
failure might be ascribed to other causes than want of taste among us
for the beauties and excellences of Pascal. This translation, though
written in good English, bears evident marks of haste, and of want of
acquaintance with the religious controversies of the time; in
consequence of which, the sense and spirit of the original have been
either entirely lost, or so imperfectly developed, as to render its
perusal exceedingly tantalizing and unsatisfactory.

It remains for the public to judge how far the present version may have
succeeded in giving a more readable and faithful transcript of the
Provincial Letters. No pains, at least, have been spared to enhance its
interest and insure its fidelity. Among the numerous French editions of
the Letters, the basis of the following translation is that of
Amsterdam, published in four volumes 12mo, 1767; with the notes of
Nicole, and his prefatory History of the Provincials, which were
translated from the Latin into French by Mademoiselle de Joncourt. With
this and other French editions I have compared Nicole’s Latin
translation, which appeared in 1658, and received the sanction of
Pascal.

The voluminous notes of Nicole, however interesting they may have been
at the time, and to the parties involved in the Jansenist controversy,
are not, in general, of such a kind as to invite attention now; nor
would a full translation even of his historical details, turning as they
do chiefly on local and temporary disputes, be likely to reward the
patience of the reader. So far as they were fitted to throw light on the
original text, I have availed myself of these, along with other sources
of information, in the marginal notes. Some of these annotations, as
might be expected from a Protestant editor, are intended to correct
error, or to guard against misconception.

To the full understanding of the Provincials, however, some idea of the
controversies which occasioned their publication seems almost
indispensable. This I have attempted to furnish in the Historical
Introduction; which will also be found to contain some interesting
facts, hitherto uncollected, and borrowed from a variety of authorities
not generally accessible, illustrating the history of the Letters, and
the parties concerned in them, with a vindication of Pascal from the
charges which this work has provoked from so many quarters against him.




                        HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

                                   TO

                        THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS.

                           BY THE TRANSLATOR.

The Church of Rome, notwithstanding her pretensions to infallibility,
has been fully as prolific in theological controversy and intestine
discord as any of the Reformed Churches. She has contrived, indeed, with
singular policy, to preserve, amidst all her variations, the semblance
of unity. Protestantism, like the primitive Church, suffered its
dissentients to fly off into hostile or independent communions. The
Papacy, on the contrary, has managed to retain hers within the outward
pale of her fellowship, by the institution of various religious orders,
which have served as safety-valves for exuberant zeal, and which, though
often hostile to each other, have remained attached to the mother
Church, and even proved her most efficient supporters. Still, at
different times, storms have arisen within the Romish Church, which
could be quelled neither by the infallibility of popes nor the authority
of councils. It is doubtful if religious controversy ever raged with so
much violence in the Reformed Church, as it did between the Thomists and
the Scotists, the Dominicans and Franciscans, the Jesuits and the
Jansenists, of the Church of Rome.

Uninviting as they may now appear, the disputes about grace, in which
the last mentioned parties were involved, gave occasion to the
Provincial Letters. The origin of these disputes must be traced as far
back as the days of Augustine and the Pelagian controversy of the fifth
century. The motto of Pelagius was free-will; that of Augustine was
efficacious grace. The former held that, notwithstanding the fall, the
human will was perfectly free to choose at any time between good and
evil; the latter, that in consequence of the fall, the will is in a
state of moral bondage, from which it can only be freed by divine grace.
With the British monk, election is suspended on the decision of man’s
will; human nature is still as pure as it came originally from the hands
of the Creator: Christ died equally for all men; and, as the result of
his death, a general grace is granted to all mankind, which any may
comply with, but which all may finally forfeit. With the African bishop,
election is absolute—we are predestinated, not from foreseen holiness,
but that we might be holy;[1] all men are lying under the guilt or penal
obligation of the first sin, and in a state of spiritual helplessness
and corruption; the sacrifice of Christ was, in point of destination,
offered for the elect, though, in point of exhibition, it is offered to
all; and the saints obtain the gift of perseverance in holiness to the
end.[2]

Pelagius, whose real name was Morgan, and who is supposed to have been a
Welshman, belonged to that numerous class of thinkers, who, from their
peculiar idiosyncrasy, are apt to start at the sovereignty of divine
grace, developed in the plan of redemption, as if it struck at once at
the equity of God and the responsibility of man. He is said to have
betrayed his heretical leanings, for the first time, by publicly
expressing his disapprobation of a sentiment of Augustine, which he
heard quoted by a bishop “_Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis_—Give, Lord,
what thou biddest, and bid what thou wilt.” It would be easy to show
that, in recoiling from the odious picture of the orthodox doctrine,
drawn by his own fancy, he fell into the very consequences which he was
so eager to avoid. The deity of Pelagius being subjected to the
changeable will of the creature, all things were left to the direction
of blind chance or unthinking destiny; while man, being represented as
created with concupiscence, to account for his aberrations from
rectitude—in other words, with a constitution in which the seeds of evil
were implanted—the authorship of sin was ascribed, directly and
primarily, to the Creator.[3]

Augustine was a powerful but unsteady writer, and has expressed himself
so inconsistently as to have divided the opinions of the Latin Church,
where he was recognized as a standard, canonized as a saint, and revered
under the title of “The Doctor of Grace.” On the great doctrine of
salvation by grace, he is scriptural and evangelical; and hence he has
been frequently quoted with admiration by our Reformed divines, partly
to evince the declension of Rome from the faith of the earlier fathers,
partly from that veneration for antiquity, which induces us to bestow
more notice on the ivy-mantled ruin, than on the more graceful and
commodious modern edifice in its vicinity. When arguing against
Pelagianism, Augustine is strong in the panoply of Scripture; when
developing his own system, he fails to do justice either to Scripture or
to himself. Loud, and even fierce, for the entire corruption of human
nature, he spoils all by admitting the absurd dogma of baptismal
regeneration. Chivalrous in the defence of grace, as opposed to
free-will, he virtually abandons the field to the enemy, by teaching
that we are justified by our works of evangelical obedience, and that
the faith which justifies includes in its nature all the offices of
Christian charity.

During the dark ages, the Church of Rome, professing the highest
veneration for St. Augustine, had ceased to hold the Augustinian
theology. The Dominicans, indeed, yielded a vague allegiance to it, by
adhering to the views of Thomas Aquinas, “the angelic doctor” of the
schools, from whom they were termed Thomists; while the Franciscans, who
opposed them, under the auspices of Duns Scotus, from whom they were
termed Scotists, leaned to the views of Pelagius. The Scotists, like the
modern advocates of free-will, inveighed against their opponents as
fatalists, and charged them with making God the author of sin; the
Thomists, again, retorted on the Scotists, by accusing them of
annihilating the grace of God. But the doctrines of grace had sunk out
of view, under a mass of penances, oblations, and intercessions, founded
on the assumption of human merit, and on that very confusion of the
forensic change in justification with the moral change in
sanctification, in which Augustine had unhappily led the way. At length
the Reformation appeared; and as both Luther and Calvin appealed to the
authority of Augustine, when treating of grace and free-will, the Romish
divines, in their zeal against the Reformers, became still more
decidedly Pelagian. In the Council of Trent, the admirers of Augustine
durst hardly show themselves; the Jesuits carried everything before
them; and the anathemas of that synod, which were aimed at Calvin fully
as much as Luther, though they professed to condemn only the less
guarded statements of the German reformer, were all in favor of
Pelagius.

The controversy was revived in the Latin Church, about the close of the
sixteenth century, both in the Low Countries and in Spain. In 1588,
Lewis Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, published lectures on “The Concord of
Grace and Free-Will;” and this work, filled with the jargon of the
schools, gave rise to disputes which continued to agitate the Church
during the whole of the succeeding century. Molina conceived that he had
discovered a method of reconciling the divine purposes with the freedom
of the human will, which would settle the question forever. According to
his theory, God not only foresaw from eternity all things possible, by a
foresight of intelligence, and all things future by a foresight of
vision; but by another kind of foresight, intermediate between these
two, which he termed _scientia media_, or middle knowledge, he foresaw
what _might_ have happened under certain circumstances or conditions,
though it never may take place. All men, according to Molina, are
favored with a general grace, sufficient to work out their salvation, if
they choose to improve it; but when God designs to convert a sinner, he
vouchsafes that measure of grace which he foresees, according to the
middle knowledge, or in all the circumstances of the case, the person
will comply with. The honor of this discovery was disputed by another
Jesuit, Peter Fonseca, who declared that the very same thing had burst
upon his mind with all the force of inspiration, when lecturing on the
subject some years before.[4]

Abstruse as these questions may appear, they threatened a serious
rupture in the Romish Church. The Molinists were summoned to Rome in
1598, to answer the charges of the Dominicans; and after some years of
deliberation, Pope Clement VIII. decided against Molina. The Jesuits,
however, alarmed for the credit of their order, never rested till they
prevailed on the old pontiff to re-examine the matter; and in 1602, he
appointed a grand council of cardinals, bishops, and divines, who
convened for discussion no less than seventy-eight times. This council
was called _Congregatio de Auxiliis_, or council on the aids of grace.
Its records being kept secret, the result of their collective wisdom was
not known with certainty, and has been lost to the world.[5] The
probability is, that like Milton’s “grand infernal peers,” who reasoned
high on similar points,

             “They found no end, in wandering mazes lost.”

Those who appealed to them for the settlement of the question, had too
much reason to say, as the man in Terence does to his lawyers—“_Fecistis
probe; incertior sum multo quam dudum._”[6]

But this interminable dispute was destined to assume a more popular
form, and lead to more practical results. In 1604, two young men
entered, as fellow-students, the university of Louvain, which had been
distinguished for its hostility to Molinism. Widely differing in natural
temperament as well as outward rank, Cornelius Jansen, who was
afterwards bishop of Ypres, and John Duverger de Hauranne, afterwards
known as the Abbé de St. Cyran, formed an acquaintance which soon
ripened into friendship. They began to study together the works of
Augustine, and to compare them with the Scriptures. The immediate result
was, an agreement in opinion that the ancient father was in the right,
and that the Jesuits, and other followers of Molina, were in the wrong.
This was followed by an ardent desire to revive the doctrines of their
favorite doctor—a task which each of them prosecuted in the way most
suited to his respective character.

Jansen, or Jansenius, as he is often called,[7] was descended of humble
parentage, and born October 28, 1585, in a village near Leerdam, in
Holland. By his friends he is extolled for his penetrating genius,
tenacious memory, magnanimity, and piety. Taciturn and contemplative in
his habits, he was frequently overheard, when taking his solitary walks
in the garden of the monastery, to exclaim: “_O veritas! veritas!_—O
truth! truth!” Keen in controversy, ascetic in devotion, and rigid in
his Catholicism, his antipathies were about equally divided between
heretics and Jesuits. Towards the Protestants, his acrimony was probably
augmented by the consciousness of having embraced views which might
expose himself to the suspicion of heresy; or, still more probably, by
that uneasy feeling with which we cannot help regarding those who,
holding the same doctrinal views with ourselves, may have made a more
decided and consistent profession of them. The first supposition derives
countenance from the private correspondence between him and his friend
St. Cyran, which shows some dread of persecution;[8] the second is
confirmed by his acknowledged writings. He speaks of Protestants as no
better than Turks, and gives it as his opinion that “they had much more
reason to congratulate themselves on the mercy of princes, than to
complain of their severities, which, as the vilest of heretics, they
richly deserved.”[9] His controversy with the learned Gilbert Voet led
the latter to publish his _Desperata Causa Papatus_, one of the best
exposures of the weaknesses of Popery. When to this we add that the
Calvinistic synod of Dort, in 1618, had condemned Arminius and the Dutch
Remonstrants as having fallen into the errors of Pelagius and Molina,
the position of Jansen became still more complicated. Of Arminius he
could not approve, without condemning Augustine; with the Protestant
synod he could not agree, unless he chose to be denounced as a
Calvinist.

But the natural enemies of Jansen were, without doubt, the Jesuits. To
the history of this Society we can only now advert in a very cursory
manner. It may appear surprising that an order so powerful and politic
should have owed its origin to such a person as Ignatius Loyola, a
Spanish soldier: and that a wound in the leg, which this hidalgo
received at the battle of Pampeluna, should have issued in his becoming
the founder of a Society which has embroiled the world and the Church.
But in fact, Loyola, though the originator of the sect, is not entitled
to the honor, or rather the disgrace, of organizing its constitution.
This must be assigned to Laynez and Aquaviva, the two generals who
succeeded him—men as superior to the founder of the Society in talents
as he excelled them in enthusiasm. Ignatius owed his success to
circumstances. While he was watching his arms as the knight-errant of
the Virgin, in her chapel at Montserrat, or squatting within his cell in
a state of body too noisome for human contact, and of mind verging on
insanity, Luther was making Germany ring with the first trumpet-notes of
the Reformation. The monasteries, in which ignorance had so long
slumbered in the lap of superstition, were awakened; but their inmates
were totally unfit for doing battle on the new field of strife that had
opened around them. Unwittingly, in the heat of his fanaticism, the
illiterate Loyola suggested a line of policy which, matured by wiser
heads, proved more adapted to the times. Bred in the court and the camp,
he contrived to combine the finesse of the one, and the discipline of
the other, with the sanctity of a religious community; and proposed
that, instead of the lazy routine of monastic life, his followers should
actively devote themselves to the education of youth, the conversion of
the heathen, and the suppression of heresy. Such a proposal, backed by a
vow of devotion to the Holy See, commended itself to the pope so highly
that, in 1540, he confirmed the institution by a bull, granted it ample
privileges, and appointed Loyola to be its first general. In less than a
century, this sect, which assumed to itself, with singular arrogance,
the name of “The Society of Jesus,” rose to be the most enterprising and
formidable order in the Romish communion.

Never was the name of the blessed Jesus more grossly prostituted than
when applied to a Society which is certainly the very opposite, in
spirit and character, to Him who was “meek and lowly,” “holy, harmless,
undefiled, and separate from sinners.” The Jesuits may be said to have
invented, for their own peculiar use, an entirely new system of ethics.
In place of the divine law, they prescribed, as the rule of their
conduct, a “blind obedience” to the will of their superiors, whom they
are bound to recognize as “standing in the place of God,” and in
fulfilling whose orders they are to have no more will of their own “than
a corpse, or an old man’s staff.” The glory of God they identify with
the aggrandizement of their Society; and holding that “the end
sanctifies the means,” they scruple at no means, foul or fair, which
they conceive may advance such an end.[10] The supreme power is vested
in the general, who is not responsible to any other authority, civil or
ecclesiastical. A system of mutual espionage, and a secret
correspondence with head-quarters at Rome, in which everything that can,
in the remotest degree, affect the interests of the Society is made
known, and by means of which the whole machinery of Jesuitism can be set
in motion at once, or its minutest feelers directed to any object at
pleasure, presents the most complete system of organization in the
world. Every member is sworn, by secret oath, to obey the orders, and
all are confederated in a solemn league to advance the cause of the
Society. It has been defined to be “a naked sword, the hilt of which is
at Rome.” Such a monstrous combination could not fail to render itself
obnoxious. Constantly aiming at ascendency in the Church, in which it is
an _imperium in imperio_, the Society has not only been embroiled in
perpetual feuds with the other orders, but has repeatedly provoked the
thunders of the Vatican. Ever intermeddling with the affairs of civil
governments, with allegiance to which, under any form, its principles
are utterly at variance, it has been expelled in turn from almost every
European State, as a political nuisance. But Jesuitism is the very soul
of Popery; both have revived or declined together; and accordingly,
though the order was abolished by Clement XIV. in 1775, it was found
necessary to resuscitate it under Pius VII. in 1814; and the Society was
never in greater power, nor more active operation, than it is at the
present moment. It boasts of immortality, and, in all probability, it
will last as long as the Church of Rome. It has been termed “a militia
called out to combat the Reformation,” and exhibiting, as it does to
this day, the same features of ambition, treachery, and intolerance, it
seems destined to fall only in the ruins of that Church of whose
unchanging spirit it is the genuine type and representative.[11]

In prosecuting the ends of their institution, the Jesuits have adhered
with singular fidelity to its distinguishing spirit. As the instructors
of youth, their solicitude has ever been less to enlarge the sphere of
human knowledge than to bar out what might prove dangerous to clerical
domination; they have confined their pupils to mere literary studies,
which might amuse without awakening their minds, and make them subtle
dialecticians without disturbing a single prejudice of the dark ages. As
missionaries, they have been much more industrious and successful in the
manual labor of baptizing all nations than in teaching them the
Gospel.[12] As theologians, they have uniformly preferred the views of
Molina; regarding these, if not as more agreeable to Scripture and right
reason, at least (to use the language of a late writer) as “more
consonant with the common sense and natural feelings of mankind.”[13] As
controversialists, they were the decided foes of all reform and all
reformers, from within or without the Church. As moralists, they
cultivated, as might be expected, the loosest system of casuistry, to
qualify themselves for directing the consciences of high and low, and
becoming, through the confessional, the virtual governors of mankind. In
all these departments they have, doubtless, produced men of abilities;
but the very means which they employed to aggrandize the Society have
tended to dwarf the intellectual growth of its individual members: and
hence, while it is true that “the Jesuits had to boast of the most
vigorous controversialists, the most polite scholars, the most refined
courtiers, and the most flexible casuists of their age,”[14] it has been
commonly remarked, that they have never produced a single great man.

Casuistry, the art in which the Jesuits so much excelled, is, strictly
speaking, that branch of theology which treats of cases of conscience,
and originally consisted in nothing more than an application of the
general precepts of Scripture to particular cases. The ancient casuists,
so long as they confined themselves to the simple rules of the Gospel,
were at least harmless, and their ingenious writings are still found
useful in cases of ecclesiastical discipline; but they gradually
introduced into the science of morals the metaphysical jargon of the
schools, and instead of aiming at making men moral, contented themselves
with disputing about morality.[15] The main source of the aberrations of
casuistry lay in the unscriptural dogma of priestly absolution—in the
right claimed by man to forgive _sin_, as a transgression of the law of
God; and the arbitrary distinction between sins as venial and mortal—a
distinction which assigns to the priest the prerogative, and imposes on
him the obligation, of drawing the critical line, or fixing a kind of
tariff on human actions, and apportioning penance or pardon, as the case
may seem to require. In their desperate attempt to define the endless
forms of depravity on which they were called to adjudicate, or which the
pruriency of the cloister suggested to the imagination, the casuists
sank deeper into the mire at every step; and their productions, at
length, resembled the common sewers of a city, which, when exposed,
become more pestiferous than the filth which they were meant to remove.
Even under the best management, such a system was radically bad; in the
hands of the Jesuits it became unspeakably worse. To their “modern
casuists,” as they were termed, must we ascribe the invention of
_probabilism_, _mental reservation_, and the _direction of the
intention_, which have been sufficiently explained and rebuked in the
Provincial Letters. We shall only remark here, that the actions to which
these principles were applied were not only such as have been termed
indifferent, and the criminality of which may be doubtful, or dependent
on the intention of the actor: the probabilism of the Jesuits was, in
fact, a systematic attempt to legalize crime, under the sanction of some
grave doctor, who had found out some excuse for it; and their theory of
mental reservations, and direction of the intention, was equally
employed to sanctify the plainest violations of the divine law.
Casuistry, it is true, has generally vibrated betwixt the extremes of
impracticable severity and contemptible indulgence; but the charge
against the Jesuits was, not that they softened the rigors of ascetic
virtue, but that they propagated principles which sapped the foundation
of all moral obligation. “They are a people,” said Boileau, “who
lengthen the creed and shorten the decalogue.”

Such was the community with which the Bishop of Ypres ventured to enter
the lists. Already had he incurred their resentment by opposing their
interests in some political negotiations; and by publishing his “Mars
Gallicus,” he had mortally offended their patron, Cardinal Richelieu;
but, strange to say, his deadly sin against the Society was a posthumous
work. Jansen was cut off by the plague, May 8, 1638. Shortly after his
decease, his celebrated work, entitled “Augustinus,” was published by
his friends Fromond and Calen, to whom he had committed it on his
death-bed. To the preparation of this work he may be said to have
devoted his life. It occupied him twenty-two years, during which, we are
told, he had ten times read through the works of Augustine (ten volumes,
folio!) and thirty times collated those passages which related to
Pelagianism.[16] The book itself, as the title imports, was little more
than a digest of the writings of Augustine on the subject of grace.[17]
It was divided into three parts; the first being a refutation of
Pelagianism, the second demonstrating the spiritual disease of man, and
the third exhibiting the remedy provided. The sincerity of Jansen’s love
to truth is beyond question, though we may be permitted to question the
form in which it was evinced. The radical defect of the work is, that
instead of resorting to the living fountain of inspiration, he confined
himself to the cistern of tradition. Enamored with the excellences of
Augustine, he adopted even his inconsistencies. With the former he
challenged the Jesuits; with the latter he warded off the charge of
heresy. As a controvertist, he is chargeable with prejudice, rather than
dishonesty. As a reformer, he wanted the independence of mind necessary
to success. Instead of standing boldly forward on the ground of
Scripture, he attempted, with more prudence than wisdom, to shelter
himself behind the venerable name of Augustine.

If by thus preferring the shield of tradition to the sword of the
Spirit, Jansen expected to out-manœuvre the Jesuits, he had mistaken his
policy. “Augustinus,” though professedly written to revive the doctrine
of Augustine, was felt by the Society as, in reality, an attack upon
them, under the name of Pelagians. To conscious delinquency, the
language of implied censure is ever more galling than formal
impeachment. Jansen’s portrait of Augustine was but too faithfully
executed; and the disciples of Loyola could not fail to see how far they
had departed from the faith of the ancient Church; but the discovery
only served to incense them at the man who had exhibited their defection
before the world. The approbation which the book received from forty
learned doctors, and the rapture with which it was welcomed by the
friends of the author, only added to their exasperation. The whole
efforts of the Society were summoned to defeat its influence. Balked by
the hand of death of their revenge on the person of the author, they
vented it even on his remains. By a decree of the pope, procured through
their instigation, a splendid monument, which had been erected over the
grave of the learned and much-loved bishop, was completely demolished,
that, in the words of his Holiness, “the memory of Jansen might perish
from the earth.” It is even said that his body was torn from its
resting-place, and thrown into some unknown receptacle.[18] His literary
remains were no less severely handled. Nicholas Cornet, a member of the
Society, after incredible pains, extracted the heretical poison of
“Augustinus,” in the form of seven propositions, which were afterwards
reduced to five. These having been submitted to the judgment of Innocent
X., were condemned by that pontiff in a bull dated 31st May, 1653. This
decision, so far from restoring peace, awakened a new controversy. The
Jansenists, as the admirers of Jansen now began to be named by their
opponents, while they professed acquiescence in the judgment of the
pope, denied that these propositions were to be found in “Augustinus.”
The succeeding pope, Alexander VII., who was still more favorable to the
Jesuits, declared formally, in a bull dated 1657, “that the five
propositions were certainly taken from the book of Jansenius, and had
been condemned in the sense of that author.” But the Jansenists were
ready to meet him on this point; they replied, that a decision of this
kind overstepped the limits of papal authority, and that the pope’s
infallibility did not extend to a judgment of facts.[19]

The reader may be curious to know something more about these famous five
propositions, condemned by the pope, which, in fact, may be said to have
given occasion to the Provincial Letters. They were as follows:—

1. There are divine precepts which good men, though willing, are
absolutely unable to obey.

2. No person, in this corrupt state of nature, can resist the influence
of divine grace.

3. In order to render human actions meritorious, or otherwise, it is not
requisite that they be exempt from necessity, but only free from
constraint.

4. The semi-Pelagian heresy consisted in allowing the human will to be
endued with a power of resisting grace, or of complying with its
influence.

5. Whoever says that Christ died or shed his blood for all mankind, is a
semi-Pelagian.

The Jansenists, in their subsequent disputes on these propositions,
contended that they were ambiguously expressed, and that they might be
understood in three different senses—a Calvinistic, a Pelagian, and a
Catholic or Augustinian sense. In the first two senses they disclaimed
them, in the last they approved and defended them. Owing to the extreme
aversion of the party to Calvinism, while they substantially held the
same system under the name of Augustinianism, it becomes extremely
difficult to convey an intelligible idea of their theological views. On
the first proposition, for example, while they disclaimed what they term
the Calvinistic sense, namely, that the best of men are liable to sin in
all that they do, they equally disclaim the Pelagian sentiment, that all
men have a general sufficient grace, at all times, for the discharge of
duty, subject to free will; and they strenuously maintained that,
without efficacious grace, constantly vouchsafed, we can do nothing
spiritually good. In regard to the resistibility of grace, they seem to
have held that the will of man might always resist the influence of
grace, if it chose to do so; but that grace would effectually prevent it
from so choosing. And with respect to redemption, they appear to have
compromised the matter, by holding that Christ died for all, so as that
all might be partakers of the grace of justification by the merits of
his death; but they denied that Christ died for each man in particular,
so as to secure his final salvation; in this sense, he died for the
elect only.

Were this the proper place, it would be easy to show that, in the
leading points of his theology, Jansen did not differ from Calvin, so
much as he misunderstood Calvinism. The Calvinists, for example, never
held, as they are represented in the Provincial Letters,[20] “that we
have not the power of resisting grace.” So far from this, they held that
fallen man could not but resist the grace of God. They preferred,
therefore, the term “invincible,” as applied to grace. In short, they
held exactly the _victrix delectatio_ of Augustine, by which the will of
man is sweetly but effectually inclined to comply with the will of
God.[21] On the subject of necessity and constraint their views are
precisely similar. Nor can they be considered as differing essentially
in their views of the death of Christ, as these, at least, were given by
Jansen, who acknowledges in his “Augustinus,” that, “according to St.
Augustine, Jesus Christ did not die for all mankind.” It is certain that
neither Augustine nor Jansen would have subscribed to the views of grace
and redemption held by many who, in our day, profess evangelical views.
Making allowance for the different position of the parties, it is very
plain that the dispute between Augustine and Pelagius, Jansen and
Molina, Calvin and Arminius, was substantially one and the same. At the
same time, it must be granted that on the great point of justification
by faith, Jansen went widely astray from the truth; and in the
subsequent controversial writings of the party, especially when arguing
against the Protestants, this departure became still more strongly
marked, and more deplorably manifested.[22]

The revenge of the Jesuits did not stop at procuring the condemnation of
Jansen’s book; it aimed at his living followers. Among these none was
more conspicuous for virtue and influence than the Abbé de St. Cyran,
who was known to have shared his counsels, and even aided in the
preparation of his obnoxious work. While Jansen labored to restore the
theoretical doctrines of Augustine, St. Cyran was ambitious to reduce
them to practice. In pursuance of the moral system of that father, he
taught the renunciation of the world, and the total absorption of the
soul in the love of God. His religious fervor led him into some
extravagances. He is said to have laid some claim to a species of
inspiration, and to have anticipated for the Saviour some kind of
temporal dominion, in which the saints alone would be entitled to the
wealth and dignities of the world.[23] But his piety appears to have
been sincere, and, what is more surprising, his love to the Scriptures
was such that he not only lived in the daily study of them himself, but
earnestly enforced it on all his disciples. He recommended them to study
the Scriptures on their knees. “No means of conversion,” he would say,
“can be more apostolic than the Word of God. Every word in Scripture
deserves to be weighed more attentively than gold. The Scriptures were
penned by a direct ray of the Holy Spirit; the fathers only by a reflex
ray emanating therefrom.” His whole character and appearance
corresponded with his doctrine. “His simple mortified air, and his
humble garb formed a striking contrast with the awful sanctity of his
countenance, and his native lofty dignity of manner.”[24] Possessing
that force of character by which men of strong minds silently but surely
govern others, his proselytes soon increased, and he became the nucleus
of a new class of reformers.

St. Cyran was soon called to preside over the renowned monastery of
Port-Royal. Two houses went under this name, though forming one abbey.
One of these was called Port-Royal des Champs, and was situated in a
gloomy forest, about six leagues from Paris; but this having been found
an unhealthy situation, the nuns were removed for some time to another
house in Paris, which went under the name of Port-Royal de Paris. The
Abbey of Port-Royal was one of the most ancient belonging to the order
of Citeaux, having been founded by Eudes de Sully, bishop of Paris, in
1204. It was placed originally under the rigorous discipline of St.
Benedict, but in course of time fell, like most other monasteries, into
a state of the greatest relaxation. In 1602, a new abbess was appointed
in the person of Maria Angelica Arnauld, sister of the famous Arnauld,
then a mere child, scarcely eleven years old! The nuns, promising
themselves a long period of unbounded liberty, rejoiced at this
appointment. But their joy was not of long duration. The young abbess,
at first, indeed, thought of nothing but amusement; but at the age of
seventeen a change came over her spirit. A certain Capuchin, wearied, it
is said, or more probably disgusted, with the monastic life, had been
requested by the nuns, who were not aware of his character, to preach
before them. The preacher, equally ignorant of his audience, and
supposing them to be eminently pious ladies, delivered an affecting
discourse, pitched on the loftiest key of devotion, which left an
impression on the mind of Angelica never to be effaced. She set herself
to reform her establishment, and carried it into effect with a
determination and self-denial quite beyond her years. This
“reformation,” so highly lauded by her panegyrists, consisted chiefly in
restoring the austere discipline of St. Benedict, and other severities
practised in the earlier ages, the details of which would be neither
edifying nor agreeable. The substitution of coarse serge in place of
linen as underclothing, and dropping melted wax on the bare arms, may be
taken as specimens of the reformation introduced by Mère Angelique. In
these mortifying exercises the abbess showed an example to all the rest.
She chose as her dormitory the filthiest cell in the convent, a place
infested with toads and vermin, in which she found the highest delight,
declaring that she “seemed transported to the grotto of Bethlehem.” The
same rigid denial of pleasure was extended to her food, her dress, her
whole occupations. Clothed herself in the rudest dress she could
procure, nothing gave her greater offence than to see in her nuns any
approach to the fashions of the world, even in the adjustment of the
coarse black serge, with the scarlet cross, which formed their humble
apparel[25]. Yet, in the midst of all this “voluntary humility,” her
heart seems to have been turned mainly to the Saviour. It was Jesus
Christ whom she aimed at adoring in the worship she paid to “the
sacrament of the altar.” And in a book of devotion, composed by her for
private use, she gave expression to sentiments too much savoring of
undivided affection to Christ to escape the censure of the Church. It
was dragged to light and condemned at Rome[26]. There is reason to
believe that, under the direction of M. de St. Cyran, her religious
sentiments, as well as those of her community, became much more
enlightened. Her firmness in resisting subscription to the formulary and
condemning Jansen, in spite of the most cruel and unmanly persecution,
and the piety and faith she manifested on her death-bed, when, in the
midst of exquisite suffering, and in the absence of the rites which her
persecutors denied her, she expired in the full assurance of salvation
through the merits of the only Saviour, form one of the most interesting
chapters in the martyrology of the Church.

But St. Cyran aimed at higher objects than the management of a nunnery.
His energetic mind planned a system of education, in which, along with
the elements of learning, the youth might be imbued with early piety.
Attracted by his fame, several learned men, some of them of rank and
fortune, fled to enjoy at Port-Royal des Champs a sacred retreat from
the world. This community, which differed from a monastery in not being
bound by any vows, settled in a farm adjoining the convent, called Les
Granges. The names of Arnauld, D’Andilly, Nicole, Le Maitre, Sacy,[27]
Fontaine, Pascal, and others, have conferred immortality on the spot.
The system pursued in this literary hermitage was, in many respects,
deserving of praise. The time of the recluses was divided between
devotional and literary pursuits, relieved by agricultural and
mechanical labors. The Scriptures, and other books of devotion, were
translated into the vernacular language; and the result was, the
singular anomaly of a Roman Catholic community distinguished for the
devout and diligent study of the Bible. Protestants they certainly were
not, either in spirit or in practice. Firm believers in the
infallibility of their Church, and fond devotees in the observance of
her rites, they held it a point of merit to yield a blind obedience, in
matters of faith, to the dogmas of Rome. None were more hostile to
Protestantism. St. Cyran, it is said, would never open a Protestant
book, even for the purpose of refuting it, without first making the sign
of the cross on it, to exorcise the evil spirit which he believed to
lurk within its pages.[28] From no community did there emanate more
learned apologies for Rome than from Port-Royal. Still, it must be
owned, that in attachment to the doctrines of grace, so far as they
went, and in the exhibition of the Christian virtues, attested by their
sufferings, lives, and writings, the Port-Royalists, including under
this name both the nuns and recluses, greatly surpassed many Protestant
communities. Their piety, indeed, partook of the failings which have
always characterized the religion of the cloister. It seems to have
hovered between superstition and mysticism. Afraid to fight against the
world, they fled from it; and, forgetting that our Saviour was driven
into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil, they retired to a
wilderness to avoid temptation. Half conscious of the hollowness of the
ceremonial they practised, they sought to graft on its dead stock the
vitalities of the Christian faith. In their hands, penance was
sublimated into the symbol of penitential sorrow, and the mass into a
spiritual service, the benefit of which depended on the preparation of
the heart of the worshipper. In their eyes, the priest was but a
suggestive emblem of the Saviour; and to them the altar, with its
crucifix and bleeding image, served only as a platform on which they
might obtain a more advantageous view of Calvary. Transferring to the
Church of Rome the attributes of the Church of God, and regarding her
still, in spite of her eclipse and disfigurement, as of one spirit, and
even of one body, with Christ, infallible and immortal, they worshipped
the fond creation of their own fancy. At the same time, they attempted
to revive the doctrine of religious abstraction, or the absorption of
the soul in Deity, and the total renouncement of everything in the shape
of sensual enjoyment, which afterwards distinguished the mystics of the
Continent. Even in their literary recreations, while they acquired an
elegance of style which marked a new era in the literature of France,
they betrayed their ascetic spirit. Poetry was only admissible when
clothed in a devotional garb. It was by stealth that Racine, who studied
at Port-Royal, indulged his poetic vein in the profane pieces which
afterwards gave him celebrity. And yet it is candid to admit, that the
mortifications in which this amiable fraternity engaged, consisted
rather in the exclusion of pleasure than the infliction of pain, and
that the object aimed at in these austerities was not so much to merit
heaven as to attain an ideal perfection on earth. Port-Royalism, in
short, was Popery in its mildest type, as Jesuitism is Popery in its
perfection; and had it been possible to present that system in a form
calculated to disarm prejudice and to cover its native deformities, the
task might have been achieved by the pious devotees of Les Granges. But
the same merciful Providence which, for the preservation of the human
species, has furnished the snake with his rattle, and taught the lion to
“roar for his prey,” has so ordered it that the Romish Church should
betray her real character, in order that his people might “come out of
her, and not be partakers of her sins, that they receive not of her
plagues.” The whole system adopted at Port-Royal was regarded, from the
commencement, with extreme jealousy by the authorities of that Church;
the schools were soon dispersed, and the Jesuits never rested till they
had destroyed every vestige of the obnoxious establishment.

The enemies of Port-Royal have attempted to show that St. Cyran and his
associates had formed a deep-laid plot for overturning the Roman
Catholic faith. From time to time, down to the present day, works have
appeared, under the auspices of the Jesuits, in which this charge is
reiterated; and the old calumnies against the sect are revived—a
periodical trampling on the ashes of the poor Jansenists (after having
accomplished their ruin two hundred years ago), which reminds one of
nothing so much as the significant grinning and yelling with which the
modern Jews celebrate to this day the downfal of Haman the Agagite.[29]
In one point only could their assailants find room to question their
orthodoxy—the supremacy of the pope. Here, certainly, they were led,
more from circumstances than from inclination, to lean to the side of
the Gallican liberties. But even Jansen himself, after spending a
lifetime on his “Augustinus,” and leaving it behind him as a sacred
legacy, abandoned himself and his treatise to the judgment of the pope.
The following are his words, dictated by him half an hour before his
death: “I feel that it will be difficult to alter anything. Yet if the
Romish see should wish anything to be altered, I am her obedient son;
and to that Church in which I have always lived, even to this bed of
death, I will prove obedient. This is my last will.” The same sentiment
is expressed by Pascal, in one of his letters. Alas! how sad is the
predicament in which the Church of Rome places her conscientious
votaries! Both of these excellent men were as firmly persuaded, no
doubt, of the faith which they taught, as of the facts which came under
their observation; and yet they held themselves bound to cast their
religious convictions at the feet of a fellow-mortal, notoriously under
the influence of the Jesuits, and professed themselves ready, at a
signal from Rome, to renounce what they held as divine truth, and to
embrace what they regarded as damnable error! A spectacle more painful
and piteous can hardly be imagined than that of such men struggling
between the dictates of conscience, and the night-mare of that “strong
delusion,” which led them to “believe a lie.”

In every feature that distinguished the Port-Royalists, they stood
opposed to the Jesuits. In theology they were antipodes—in learning they
were rivals. The schools of Port-Royal already eclipsed those of the
Jesuits, whose policy it has always been to monopolize education, under
the pretext of charity. But the Jansenists might have been allowed to
retain their peculiar tenets, had they not touched the idol of every
Jesuit, “the glory of the Society,” by supplanting them in the
confessional. The priests connected with Port-Royal, from their
primitive simplicity of manners and severity of morals, and, above all,
from their spiritual Christianity, acquired a popularity which could not
fail to give mortal offence to the Society, who then ruled the councils
both of the Church and the nation. Nothing less than the annihilation of
the whole party would satisfy their vengeful purpose. In this nefarious
design they were powerfully aided by Cardinal Richelieu, and by Louis
XIV., a prince who, though yet a mere youth, was entirely under
Jesuitical influence in matters of religion; and who, having resolved to
extirpate Protestantism, could not well endure the existence of a sect
within the Church, which seemed to favor the Reformation by exposing the
corruptions of the clergy.[30]

To effect their object, St. Cyran, the leader and ornament of the party,
required to be disposed of. He was accused of various articles of
heresy; and Cardinal Richelieu at once gratified his party resentment
and saved himself the trouble of controversy, by immuring him in the
dungeon of Vincennes. In this prison St. Cyran languished for five
years, and survived his release only a few months, having died in
October, 1643. His place, however, as leader of the Jansenist party, was
supplied by one destined to annoy the Jesuits by his controversial
talents fully more than his predecessor had done by his apostolic
sanctity. Anthony Arnauld may be said to have been born an enemy to the
Jesuits. His father, a celebrated lawyer, had distinguished himself for
his opposition to the Society, and having engaged in an important
law-suit against them, in which he warmly pleaded, in the name of the
university, that they should be interdicted from the education of youth,
and even expelled from the kingdom. Anthony, who inherited his spirit,
was the youngest in a family of twenty children, and was born February
6, 1612.[31] Several of them were connected with Port-Royal. His sister,
as we have seen, became its abbess; and five other sisters were nuns in
that establishment. He is said to have given precocious proof of his
polemic turn. Busying himself, when a mere boy, with some papers in his
uncle’s library, and being asked what he was about, he replied, “Don’t
you see that I am helping you to refute the Hugonots?” This
prognostication he certainly verified in after life. He wrote, with
almost equal vehemence, against Rome, against the Jesuits, and against
the Protestants. He was, for many years, the _facile princeps_ of the
party termed Jansenists; and was one of those characters who present to
the public an aspect nearly the reverse of the estimate formed of them
by their private friends. By the latter he is represented as the best of
men, totally free from pride and passion. Judging from his physiognomy,
his writings and his life, we would say the natural temper of Arnauld
was austere and indomitable. Expelled from the Sorbonne, driven out of
France, and hunted from place to place, he continued to fight to the
last. On one occasion, wishing his friend Nicole to assist him in a new
work, the latter observed, “We are now old, is it not time to rest?”
“Rest!” exclaimed Arnauld, “have we not all eternity to rest in?”

Such was the character of the man who now entered the lists against the
redoubtable Society. His first offence was the publication, in 1643, of
a book on “Frequent Communion;” in which, while he inculcates the
necessity of a spiritual preparation for the eucharist, he insinuated
that the Church of Rome had a two-fold head, in the persons of Peter and
Paul.[32] His next was in the shape of two letters, published in 1656,
occasioned by a dispute referred to in the first Provincial Letter, in
which he declared that he had not been able to find the condemned
propositions in Jansen, and added some opinions on grace. The first of
these assertions was deemed derogatory to the holy see; the second was
charged with heresy. The Jesuits, who sighed for an opportunity of
humbling the obnoxious doctor, strained every nerve to procure his
expulsion from the Sorbonne, or college of divinity in the university.
This object they had just accomplished, and everything promised fair to
secure their triumph, when another combatant unexpectedly appeared, like
one of those closely-visored knights of whom we read in romance, who so
opportunely enter the field at the critical moment, and with their
single arm turn the tide of battle. Need we say that we allude to the
author of the PROVINCIAL LETTERS?

Bayle commences his Life of Pascal by declaring him to be “one of the
sublimest geniuses that the world ever produced.” Seldom, at least, has
the world ever seen such a combination of excellences in one man. In him
we are called to admire the loftiest attributes of mind with the
loveliest simplicity of moral character. He is a rare example of one
born with a natural genius for the exact sciences, who applied the
subtlety of his mind to religious subjects, combining with the closest
logic the utmost elegance of style, and crowning all with a simple and
profound piety. Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont, 19th June, 1623. His
family had been ennobled by Louis XI., and his father, Stephen Pascal,
occupied a high post in the civil government. Blaise manifested from an
early age a strong liking for the study of mathematics, and, while yet a
child, made some astonishing discoveries in natural philosophy. To these
studies he devoted the greater part of his life. An incident, however,
which occurred in his thirty-first year—a narrow escape from sudden
death—had the effect of giving an entire change to the current of his
thoughts. He regarded it as a message from heaven, calling him to
renounce all secular occupations, and devote himself exclusively to God.
His sister and niece being nuns in Port-Royal, he was naturally led to
associate with those who then began to be called Jansenists. But though
he had several of the writings of the party, there can be no doubt that
it was the devotion rather than the theology of Port-Royal that
constituted its charm in the eyes of Pascal. His sister informs us, in
her memoirs of him, that “he had never applied himself to abstruse
questions in divinity.” Nor, beyond a temporary retreat to Port-Royal
des Champs, and an intimacy with its leading solitaries, can he be said
to have had any connection with that establishment. His fragile frame,
which was the victim of complicated disease, and his feminine delicacy
of spirit, unfitting him for the rough collisions of ordinary life, he
found a congenial retreat amidst these literary solitudes; while, with
his clear and comprehensive mind, and his genuine piety of heart, he
must have sympathized with those who sought to remove from the Church
corruptions which he could not fail to deplore, and to renovate the
spirit of that Christianity which he loved far above any of its
organized forms. His life, not unlike a perpetual miracle, is ever
exciting our admiration, not unmingled, however, with pity. We see great
talents enlisted in the support, not indeed of the errors of a system,
but of a system of errors—we see a noble mind debilitated by
superstition—we see a useful life prematurely terminating in, if not
shortened by, the petty austerities and solicitudes of monasticism.
Truth requires us to state, that he not only denied himself, at last,
the most common comforts of life, but wore beneath his clothes a girdle
of iron, with sharp points, which, as soon as he felt any pleasurable
sensation, he would strike with his elbow, so as to force the points of
iron more deeply into his sides. Let the Church, which taught him such
folly, be responsible for it; and let us ascribe to the grace of God the
patience, the meekness, the charity, and the faith, which hovered,
seraph-wise, over the death-bed of expiring genius. The curate who
attended him, struck with the triumph of religion over the pride of an
intellect which continued to burn after it had ceased to blaze, would
frequently exclaim: “He is an infant—humble and submissive as an
infant!” He died on the 19th of August, 1662, aged thirty-nine years and
two months.

While Arnauld’s process before the Sorbonne was in dependence, a few of
his friends, among whom were Pascal and Nicole, were in the habit of
meeting privately at Port-Royal, to consult on the measures they should
adopt. During these conferences one of their number said to Arnauld:
“Will you really suffer yourself to be condemned like a child, without
saying a word, or telling the public the real state of the question?”
The rest concurred, and in compliance with their solicitations, Arnauld,
after some days, produced and read before them a long and serious
vindication of himself. His audience listened in coolness and silence,
upon which he remarked: “I see you don’t think highly of my production,
and I believe you are right; but,” added he, turning himself round and
addressing Pascal, “you who are young, why cannot you produce
something?” The appeal was not lost upon our author; he had hitherto
written almost nothing, but he engaged to try a sketch or rough draft,
which they might fill up; and retiring to his room, he produced, in a
few hours, instead of a sketch, the first letter to a provincial. On
reading this to his assembled friends, Arnauld exclaimed, “That is
excellent! that will go down; we must have it printed immediately.”

Pascal had, in fact, with the native superiority of genius, pitched on
the very tone which, in a controversy of this kind, was calculated to
arrest the public mind. Treating theology in a style entirely new, he
brought down the subject to the comprehension of all, and translated
into the pleasantries of comedy, and familiarities of dialogue,
discussions which had till then been confined to the grave utterances of
the school. The framework which he adopted in his first letter was
exceedingly happy. A Parisian is supposed to transmit to one of his
friends in the provinces an account of the disputes of the day. It is
said that the provincial with whom he affected to correspond was
Perrier, who had married one of his sisters. Hence arose the name of the
_Provincials_, which was given to the rest of the letters.

This title they owe, it would appear, to a mistake of the printer; for
in an advertisement prefixed to one of the early editions, it is stated
that “they have been called ‘Provincials,’ because the first having been
addressed without any name to a person in the country, the printer
published it under the title ‘Letter written to a Provincial by one of
his Friends.’” This may be regarded as an apology for the use of a term
which, critically speaking, was rather unhappy. The word _provincial_ in
French, when used to signify a person residing in the provinces, was
generally understood in a bad sense, as denoting an unpolished
clown.[33] But the title, uncouth as it is, has been canonized and made
classical forever; and “The Provincials” is a phrase which it would now
be fully as ridiculous to attempt to change as it could be at first to
apply it to the Letters.

The most trifling particulars connected with such a publication possess
an interest. The Letters, we learn, were published at first in separate
stitched sheets of a quarto size; and, on account of their brevity, none
of them extending to more than one sheet of eight pages, except the last
three, which were somewhat longer, they were at first known by the name
of the “LITTLE LETTERS.” No stated time was observed in their
publication. The first letter appeared January 13, 1656, being on a
Wednesday; the second on January 29, being Saturday; and the rest were
issued at intervals varying from a week to a month, till March 24, 1657,
which is the date of the last letter in the series; the whole thus
extending over the space of a year and three months.

All accounts agree in stating that the impression produced by the
Provincials, on their first appearance, was quite unexampled. They were
circulated in thousands in Paris and throughout France. Speaking of the
first letter, Father Daniel says: “It created a fracas which filled the
fathers of the Society with consternation. Never did the post-office
reap greater profits; copies were despatched over the whole kingdom; and
I myself, though very little known to the gentlemen of Port-Royal,
received a large packet of them, post-paid, in a town of Brittany where
I was then residing.” The same method was followed with the rest of the
letters. The seventh found its way to Cardinal Mazarin, who laughed over
it very heartily. The eighth did not appear till a month after its
predecessor, apparently to keep up expectation.[34] In short, everybody
read the “Little Letters,” and, whatever might be their opinions of the
points in dispute, all agreed in admiring the genius which they
displayed. They were found lying on the merchant’s counter, the lawyer’s
desk, the doctor’s table, the lady’s toilet; and everywhere they were
sought for and perused with the same avidity.[35] The success of the
Letters in gaining their object was not less extraordinary. The Jesuits
were fairly checkmated; and though they succeeded in carrying through
the censure of Arnauld, the public sympathy was enlisted in his favor.
The confessionals and churches of the Jesuits were deserted, while those
of their opponents were crowded with admiring thousands.[36] “That book
alone,” says one of its bitterest enemies, “has done more for the
Jansenists than the ‘Augustinus’ of Jansen, and all the works of Arnauld
put together.”[37] This is the more surprising when we consider that, at
that time, the influence of the Jesuits was so high in the ascendant,
that Arnauld had to contend with the pope, the king, the chancellor, the
clergy, the Sorbonne, the universities, and the great body of the
populace; and that never was Jansenism at a lower ebb, or more generally
anathematized than when the first Provincial Letter appeared.

This, however, was not all. Besides having the tide of public favor
turned against them, the Jesuits found themselves the objects of
universal derision. The names of their favorite casuists were converted
into proverbs: _Escobarder_ came to signify the same thing with
“paltering in a double sense;” Father Bauny’s grotesque maxims furnished
topics for perpetual badinage; and the Jesuits, wherever they went, were
assailed with inextinguishable laughter. By no other method could Pascal
have so severely stung this proud and self-conceited Society. The rage
into which they were thrown was extreme, and was variously expressed. At
one time it found vent in calumnies and threats of vengeance. At other
times they indulged in puerile lamentations. It was amusing to hear
these stalwart divines, after breathing fire and slaughter against their
enemies, assume the querulous tones of injured and oppressed innocence.
“The persecution which the Jesuits suffer from the buffooneries of
Port-Royal,” they said, “is perfectly intolerable: the wheel and the
gibbet are nothing to it; it can only be compared to the torture
inflicted on the ancient martyrs, who were first rubbed over with honey
and then left to be stung to death by wasps and wild bees. Their tyrants
have subjected them to empoisoned raillery, and the world leaves them
unpitied to suffer a sweet death, more cruel in its sweetness than the
bitterest punishment.”[38]

The Letters were published anonymously, under the fictitious signature
of Louis de Montalte, and the greatest care was taken to preserve the
secret of their authorship. As on all such occasions, many were the
guesses made, and the false reports circulated; but beyond the circle of
Pascal’s personal friends, none knew him to be the author, nor was the
fact certainly or publicly known till after his death. The following
anecdote shows, however, that he was suspected, and was once very nearly
discovered: After publishing the third letter, Pascal left Port-Royal
des Champs, to avoid being disturbed, and took up his residence in
Paris, under the name of M. de Mons, in a _hotel garni_, at the sign of
the King of Denmark, Rue des Poiriers, exactly opposite the college of
the Jesuits. Here he was joined by his brother-in-law, Perrier, who
passed as the master of the house. One day Perrier received a visit from
his relative, Father Frétat, a Jesuit, accompanied by a brother monk.
Frétat told him that the Society suspected M. Pascal to be the author of
the “Little Letters,” which were making such a noise, and advised him as
a friend to prevail on his brother-in-law to desist from writing any
more of them, as he might otherwise involve himself in much trouble, and
even danger. Perrier thanked him for his advice, but said he was afraid
it would be altogether useless, as Pascal would just reply that he could
not hinder people from suspecting him, and that though he should deny it
they would not believe him. The monks took their departure, much to the
relief of Perrier, for at that very time several sheets of the seventh
or eighth letter, newly come from the printer, were lying on the bed,
where they had been placed for the purpose of drying, but, fortunately,
though the curtains were only partially drawn, and one of the monks sat
very close to the bed, they were not observed. Perrier ran immediately
to communicate the incident to his brother-in-law, who was in an
adjoining apartment; and he had reason to congratulate him on the narrow
escape which he had made.[39]

As Pascal proceeded, he transmitted his manuscripts to Port-Royal des
Champs, where they were carefully revised and corrected by Arnauld and
Nicole. Occasionally, these expert divines suggested the plans of the
letters; and by them he was, beyond all doubt, furnished with most of
his quotations from the voluminous writings of the casuists, which, with
the exception of Escobar, he appears never to have read. We must not
suppose, however, that he took these on trust, or gave himself no
trouble to verify them. We shall afterwards have proof of the contrary.
The first letters he composed with the rapidity of new-born enthusiasm;
but the pains and mental exertion which he bestowed on the rest are
almost incredible. Nicole says “he was often twenty whole days on a
single letter: and some of them he recommenced seven or eight times
before bringing them to their present state of perfection.”[40] We are
assured that he wrote over the eighteenth letter no less than thirteen
times.[41] Having been obliged to hasten the publication of the
sixteenth, on account of a search made after it in the printing office,
he apologizes for its length on the ground that “he had found no time to
make it shorter.”[42]

The fruits of this extraordinary elaboration appear in every letter; but
what is equally remarkable, is the art with which so many detached
letters, written at distant intervals, and prompted by passing events,
have been so arranged as to form an harmonious whole. The first three
letters refer to Arnauld’s affair; the questions of grace are but
slightly touched, the main object being to interest the reader in favor
of the Jansenists, and excite his contempt and indignation against their
opponents. After this prelude, the fourth letter serves as a transition
to the following six, in which he takes up maxims of the casuists. In
the eight concluding letters he resumes the grand objects of the
work—the morals of the Jesuits and the question of grace. These three
parts have each their peculiar style. The first is distinguished for
lively dialogue and repartee. Jacobins, Molinists, and Jansenists are
brought on the stage, and speak in character, while Pascal does little
more than act as reporter. In the second part, he comes into personal
contact with a casuistical doctor, and extracts from him, under the
pretext of desiring information, some of the weakest and worst of his
maxims. At the eleventh letter, Pascal throws off his disguise, and
addressing himself directly to the whole order of the Jesuits, and to
their Provincial by name, he pours out his whole soul in an impetuous
and impassioned torrent of declamation. From beginning to end it is a
well-sustained battle, in which the weapons are only changed in order to
strike the harder.

The literary merits of the Provincials have been universally
acknowledged and applauded. On this point, where Pascal’s countrymen
must be considered the most competent judges, we have the testimonies of
the leading spirits of France. Boileau pronounced it a work that has
“surpassed at once the ancients and the moderns.” Perrault has given a
similar judgment: “There is more wit in these eighteen letters than in
Plato’s Dialogues; more delicate and artful raillery than in those of
Lucian; and more strength and ingenuity of reasoning than in the
orations of Cicero. We have nothing more beautiful in this species of
writing.”[43] “Pascal’s style,” says the Abbé d’Artigny, “has never been
surpassed, nor perhaps equalled.”[44] The high encomium of Voltaire is
well known: “The Provincial Letters were models of eloquence and
pleasantry. The best comedies of Molière have not more wit in them than
the first letters; Bossuet has nothing more sublime than the last ones.”
Again, the same writer says: “The first work of genius that appeared in
prose was the collection of the Provincial Letters. Examples of every
species of eloquence may there be found. There is not a single word in
it which, after a hundred years, has undergone the change to which all
living languages are liable. We may refer to this work the era when our
language became fixed. The Bishop of Luçon told me, that having asked
the Bishop of Meaux what work he would wish most to have been the author
of, setting his own works aside, Bossuet instantly replied, ‘The
Provincial Letters.’”[45] “Pascal succeeded beyond all expression,” says
D’Alembert; “several of his bon-mots have become proverbial in our
language, and the Provincials will be ever regarded as a model of taste
and style.”[46] To this day the same high eulogiums are passed on the
work by the best scholars of France.[47]

To these testimonies it would be superfluous to add any criticism of our
own, were it not to prepare the English reader for the peculiar
character of our author’s style. Pascal’s wit is essentially French. It
is not the broad humor of Smollet; it is not the cool irony of Swift;
far less is it the envenomed sarcasm of Junius. It is wit—the lively,
polite, piquant wit of the early French school. Nothing can be finer
than its spirit; but from its very fineness it is apt to evaporate in
the act of transfusion into another tongue. Nothing can be more
ingenious than the transitions by which the author glides insensibly
from one topic to another; and in the more serious letters, we cannot
fail to be struck with the mathematical precision of his reasoning. But
there is a species of iteration, and a style of dovetailing his
sentiments, which does not quite accord with our taste; and the foreign
texture of which, in spite of every effort to the contrary, must shine
through any translation.

High as the Provincials stand in the literary world, they were not
suffered to pass without censure in the high places of the Church. The
first effect of their publication, indeed, was to raise a storm against
the casuists, whom Pascal had so effectually exposed. The curés of
Paris, and afterwards the assembly of the clergy, shocked at the
discovery of such a sink of corruption, the existence of which, though
just beneath their feet, they never appear to have suspected, determined
to institute an examination into the subject. Hitherto the tenets of the
casuists, buried in huge folios, or only taught in the colleges of the
Jesuits, had escaped public observation. The clergy resolved to compare
the quotations of Pascal with these writings; and the result of the
investigation was, that he was found to be perfectly correct, while a
multitude of other maxims, equally scandalous, were dragged to light.
These were condemned in a general assembly of the clergy.[48]
Unfortunately for the Jesuits, they had not a single writer at the time
capable of conducting their vindication. Several replies to the
Provincials were attempted while they were in the course of publication;
but these were taken up by the redoubtable Montalte, and fairly
strangled at their birth.[49] Shortly after the Letters were finished,
there appeared “An Apology for the Casuists,” the production of a Jesuit
named Pirot, who, with a folly and frankness which proved nearly as
fatal to his order as it did to himself, attempted to vindicate the
worst maxims of the casuistical school. This Apology was condemned by
the Sorbonne, and subsequently at Rome; its author died of chagrin, and
the Jesuits fell into temporary disgrace.[50]

But, with that tenaciousness of life and elasticity of limb which have
ever distinguished the Society, it was not long before they rebounded
from their fall and regained their feet. Unable to answer the Letters,
they succeeded in obtaining, in February, 1657, their condemnation by
the Parliament of Provence, by whose orders they were burnt on the
pillory by the hands of the common executioner. Not content with this
clumsy method of refutation, they succeeded in procuring the formal
condemnation of the Provincials by a censure of the pope, Alexander
VII., dated 6th September, 1657. In this decree the work is “prohibited
and condemned, under the pains and censures contained in the Council of
Trent, and in the index of prohibited books, and other pains and
censures which it may please his holiness to ordain.” It is almost
needless to say, that these sentences neither enhanced nor lessened the
fame of the Provincials. It must be interesting to know what the
feelings of Pascal were, on learning that this work, into which he had
thrown his whole heart, and mind, and strength, and which may be said to
have been at once his _chef-d’œuvre_ and his confession of faith, had
been condemned by the head of that Church which he had hitherto believed
to be infallible. Warped as his fine spirit was by education, his
unbending rectitude forbids the supposition that he could surrender his
cherished and conscientious sentiments at the mere dictum of the pope.
An incident occurred in 1661, shortly before his death, strikingly
illustrative of his conscientiousness, and of the sincerity of purpose
with which the Letters were written. The persecution had begun to rage
against Port-Royal; one _mandement_ after another, requiring
subscription to the condemnation of Jansen, came down from the court of
Rome; and the poor nuns, shrinking, on the one hand, from violating
their consciences by subscribing what they believed to be an untruth,
and trembling, on the other, at the consequences of disobeying their
ecclesiastical superiors, were thrown into the most distressing
embarrassment. Their “obstinacy,” as it was termed, only provoked their
persecutors to more stringent demands. In these circumstances, even the
stern Arnauld and the conscientious Nicole were tempted to make some
compromise, and drew up a declaration to accompany the signature of the
nuns, which they thought might save at once the truth and their
consistency. To this Pascal objected, as not sufficiently clear, and as
leaving it to be inferred that they condemned “efficacious grace.” He
could not endure the idea of their employing an ambiguous statement,
which appeared, or might be supposed by their opponents, to grant what
they did not really mean to concede. The consequence was a slight and
temporary dispute—not affecting principle so much as the mode of
maintaining it—in which Pascal stood alone against all the members of
Port-Royal. On one occasion, after exhausting his eloquence upon them
without success, he was so deeply affected, that his feeble frame,
laboring under headache and other disorders, sunk under the excitement,
and he fell into a swoon. After recovering his consciousness, he
explained the cause of his sudden illness, in answer to the affectionate
inquiries of his sister: “When I saw those,” he said, “whom I regard as
the persons to whom God has made known his truth, and who ought to be
its champions, all giving way, I was so overcome with grief that I could
stand it no longer.” Subsequent _mandements_, still more stringent, soon
saved the poor nuns from the temptation of ambiguous submissions, and
reconciled Pascal and his friends.[51]

But we are fortunately furnished with his own reflections on the subject
of the Provincials, in his celebrated “Thoughts on Religion:”

“I feared,” says he, “that I might have written erroneously, when I saw
myself condemned; but the example of so many pious witnesses made me
think differently. It is no longer allowable to write truth. IF MY
LETTERS ARE CONDEMNED AT ROME, THAT WHICH I CONDEMN IN THEM IS CONDEMNED
IN HEAVEN.”[52]

It is only necessary to add, that Pascal continued to maintain his
sentiments on this subject unchanged to the last. On his death-bed, M.
Beurrier, his parish priest, administered to him the last rites of his
Church, and came to learn, after having confessed him, that he was the
author of the “Provincial Letters.” Full of concern at having absolved
the author of a book condemned by the pope, the good priest returned,
and asked him if it was true, and if he had no remorse of conscience on
that account. Pascal replied, that “he could assure him, as one who was
now about to give an account to God of all his actions, that his
conscience gave him no trouble on that score; and that in the
composition of that work he was influenced by no mad motive, but solely
by regard to the glory of God and the vindication of truth, and not in
the least by any passion or personal feeling against the Jesuits.”
Attempts were made by Perefixe, archbishop of Paris, first to bully the
priest for having absolved such an impenitent offender,[53] and
afterwards to force him into a false account of his penitent’s
confession. It was confidently reported, on the pretended authority of
the confessor, that Pascal had expressed his sorrow for having written
the Provincials, and that he had condemned his friends of Port-Royal for
want of due respect to papal authority. Both these allegations were
afterwards distinctly refuted—the first by the written avowal of M.
Beurrier, and the other by two depositions formally made by Nicole,
showing that the real ground of Pascal’s brief disagreement with his
friends was directly the reverse of that which had been assigned.[54]

Few books have passed through more editions than the Provincials. The
following, among many others, may be mentioned as French editions:—The
first, in 1656, 4to; a second in 1657, 12mo; a third in 1658, 8vo; a
fourth in 1659, 8vo; a fifth in 1666, 12mo; a sixth in 1667, 8vo; a
seventh in 1669, 12mo; an eighth in 1689, 8vo; a ninth in 1712, 8vo; a
tenth in 1767, 12mo.[55] The later editions are beyond enumeration. The
Letters were translated into Latin, during the lifetime of Pascal, by
his intimate friend, the learned and indefatigable Nicole, under the
assumed name of “William Wendrock, a Saltzburg divine.”[56] Nicole, who
was a complete master of Latin, has given an elegant, though somewhat
free version of his friend’s work. He has frequently added to the
quotations taken from the writings of the Jesuits and others; a liberty
which he doubtless felt himself the more warranted to take, from the
share he had in the original concoction of the Letters. Nicole’s
preliminary dissertation and notes were translated by Mademoiselle de
Joncourt, a lady, it is said, “possessed of talents and piety, who, to
the graces peculiar to her own sex, added the accomplishments which are
the ornament of ours.”[57] Besides this, the Provincials have been
translated into nearly all the languages of Europe. Bayle informs us
that he had seen an edition of them in 8vo, with four columns,
containing the French, Latin, Italian, and Spanish.[58] The Spanish
translation, executed by Gratien Cordero of Burgos, was suppressed by
order of the Inquisition.[59] But all the efforts made for the
suppression of the Provincials only served to promote their popularity;
and their enemies found that, if they would silence, they must answer
them.

Forty years elapsed after the publication of the Provincials before the
Jesuits ventured on a reply. At length, in 1697, appeared an answer,
entitled _Entretiens de Cleandre et d’Eudoxe, sur les Lettres au
Provincial_. The author is known to have been Father Daniel, the
historiographer of France. This learned Jesuit undertook the desperate
task of refuting the Provincials, in a form somewhat resembling that of
the Letters themselves, being a series of supposed conversations between
two friends, aided by an abbé, “who is excessively frank and honest, one
who never could bear all his life to see people imposed upon.” The
dialogue is conducted with considerable spirit, but is sadly deficient
in _vraisemblance_. The author commences with high professions of
impartiality. Cleander and Eudoxus are supposed to be quite
neutral—somewhat like the free-will of Molina, “in a state of perfect
equilibrium, until good sense and stubborn facts turn the scale.” But,
alas! the equilibrium is soon lost, without the help either of facts or
of sense. The friends have hardly uttered two sentences, till they begin
to talk as like two Jesuits as could well be imagined. Party rage gets
the better of literary discretion; the Port-Royalists are “honest
knaves,” “true hypocrites,” “villains animated with stubborn fury;”
Arnauld’s “pen may be known by the gall that drops from it;” Nicole
“swears like a trooper,” and as to Pascal he is all these characters in
turn, while his book is “a repertory of slander,” and is “villainous in
a supreme degree!”

The whole strain of Daniel’s reply corresponds with this specimen of its
spirit. Avoiding the error of Pirot, and yet without renouncing the
favorite dogmas of the Society, such as probabilism, equivocations, and
mental reservations, which he only attempts to palliate, Father Daniel
has exhausted his skill in an attack on the sincerity of Pascal. His
main object is to convey the impression that the Provincials are a
libel, written in bad faith, and full of altered texts and false
citations. In selecting this plan of defence, the Jesuit champion
evinces considerably more ingenuity than ingenuousness. He was well
aware that, at the time of their publication, the Letters had been
subjected to a sifting process of examination by the most clear-sighted
Jesuits, who had signally failed in proving any falsifications. But he
knew also, that, during the forty years that had elapsed, the writings
of the casuists had fallen into disuse and contempt, mainly in
consequence of the scorching which they had received from the wit and
eloquence of Pascal, and that it would be now a much easier and safer
task to call in question the fidelity of citations which none would give
themselves the trouble of verifying. In this bold attempt to turn the
tables against the Jansenists, by accusing them of chicanery and pious
fraud, the very crimes which they had succeeded in establishing against
their opponents, the unscrupulous Jesuit could be at no loss to find,
among the voluminous writings of the casuists, some plausible grounds
for his charges. At all events, he could calculate on the readiness with
which certain minds, fonder of generalizing than of investigating facts,
would lay hold of the mere circumstance of a book having been written in
defence of his order, as sufficient to show that a great deal may be
said on both sides. As to the manner in which Daniel has executed his
task, it might be sufficient to say, that it has been acknowledged by
the Jesuits themselves to be a failure. Even at its first appearance,
great efforts were made to suppress it altogether, as likely to do more
harm than good to the Society; and in their references to it afterwards,
we see the disappointment which they felt. “There was lately published,”
says Richelet, “an answer to the Lettres Provinciales, which professes
to demolish them, but which, nevertheless, will not do them much harm.
Do you ask how? The reason is, that although this answer shows the
horrid injustice, the abominable slanders, and injurious falsehoods of
the Provincials, against one of the most famous societies in the Church,
yet these Letters have so long, by their facetious touches, got the
laughers of all denominations on their side, that they have acquired a
credit and authority of which it will be difficult to divest them. It
must be confessed that prejudice, on this occasion, is very unjust, very
cruel, and very obstinate in its verdict; since, though these Letters
have been condemned by popes, bishops, and divines, and burnt by the
hands of the hangman, yet they have taken such deep root in people’s
minds as to bid defiance to all these powers.”[60] “The reply,” says
another writer, “as may be easily imagined, was not so well received as
the Letters had been. Father Daniel professed to have reason and truth
on his side; but his adversary had in his favor what goes much further
with men, the arms of ridicule and pleasantry.”[61] This, however, is a
mere begging of the question. _Ridentem dicere verum, quid vetat?_ It is
quite possible that Father Daniel may be lugubriously in the wrong, and
Pascal laughingly in the right. This was very triumphantly made out in
the answer to Daniel’s work, which appeared in the same year with the
_Entretiens_, under the title of “Apology for the Provincial Letters,
against the last Reply of the Jesuits, entitled Conversations of
Cleander and Eudoxus.” The author was Don Mathieu Petitdidier,
Benedictine of the congregation of St. Vanne, who died bishop of
Macra.[62] In this masterly performance, the accusations of Daniel are
shown to be totally groundless, his answers jesuitical and evasive, and
his arguments untenable. The “Apology” was never answered, and Daniel’s
work sank out of sight.

Subsequent apologists of the Jesuits have followed the line of defence
adopted by Father Daniel. The continued repetition of his charges,
though they have been long since disposed of, renders it necessary to
advert to them. For the strict fidelity of Pascal’s citations, we have
not merely the testimony of contemporary witnesses, but what will be to
many a sufficient guarantee, the solemn assertion of Pascal himself. In
a conversation that took place within a year of his death, and which has
been preserved by his sister, he thus answers the chief articles of
accusation that had been brought against the Provincials:—

“I have been asked, first, if I repented of having written the
Provincial Letters? I answered that, far from repenting, if I had it to
do again, I would write them yet more strongly.

“I have been asked, in the second place, why I named the authors from
whom I extracted these abominable passages which I have cited? I
answered, If I were in a town where there were a dozen fountains, and I
knew for certain that one of them was poisoned, I should be under
obligation to tell the world not to draw from that fountain; and, as it
might be supposed that this was a mere fancy on my part, I should be
obliged to name him who had poisoned it, rather than expose a whole city
to the risk of death.

“I have been asked, thirdly, why I adopted an agreeable, jocose, and
entertaining style? I answered, If I had written dogmatically, none but
the learned would have read my book; and they had no need of it, knowing
how the matter stood, at least as well as I did. I conceived it,
therefore, my duty to write, so that my Letters might be read by women,
and people in general, that they might know the danger of all those
maxims and propositions which were then spread abroad, and admitted with
so little hesitation.

“Finally, I have been asked, if I had myself read all the books which I
quoted? I answered, No. To do this, I had need have passed the greater
part of my life in reading very bad books. But I have twice read Escobar
throughout; and for the others, I got several of my friends to read
them; but _I have never used a single passage without having read it
myself in the book quoted_, without having examined the case in which it
is brought forward, and without having read the preceding and subsequent
context, that I might not run the risk of citing that for an answer
which was in fact an objection, which would have been very unjust and
blamable.”[63]

If this solemn declaration, emitted by one whose heart was a stranger to
deceit, and whose shrewdness placed him beyond the risk of delusion, is
not accepted as sufficient, we might refer to the mass of evidence
collected at the time in the _Factums_ of the curés of Paris and Rouen,
to the voluminous notes of Nicole, and to the Apology of Petitdidier, in
which the citations made by Pascal are authenticated with a carefulness
which not only sets all suspicion at rest, but leaves a large balance of
credit in the author’s favor, by showing that, so far from having
reported the worst maxims of the Jesuitical school, or placed them in
the most odious light of which they were susceptible, he has been
extremely tender towards them. But, indeed, the truth was placed beyond
all dispute, through the efforts of the celebrated Bossuet, in 1700,
when, by a sentence of an assembly of the clergy of France, the morals
of the Jesuits, as exhibited in their “monstrous maxims, which had been
long the scandal of the Church and of Europe,” were formally condemned,
and when it may be said that the Provincial Letters met at once their
full vindication and their final triumph.[64]

Another class of objectors, whom the Jesuits have had the good fortune
to number among their apologists, are the sceptical philosophers, whose
native antipathy to Jansenism, as a phase of serious religion, renders
them willing to sacrifice truth for the sake of a sneer at his
disciples. D’Alembert expresses his regret that Pascal did not lampoon
Jesuits and Jansenists alike;[65] and Voltaire, in the mere wantonness
of his cynical humor, if not from a more worthless motive, has appended
to his high panegyric on the Provincials, already quoted, the following
qualifications: “It is true that the whole of Pascal’s book is founded
upon a false principle. He has artfully charged the whole Society with
the extravagant opinions of some few Spanish and Flemish Jesuits, which
he might with equal ease have detected among the casuists of the
Dominican and Franciscan orders; but the Jesuits alone were the persons
he wanted to attack. In these Letters he endeavored to prove that they
had a settled design to corrupt the morals of mankind—a design which no
sect or society ever had, or ever could have. But his business was not
to be right, but to entertain the public.”[66] Every clause here
contains a fallacy. The charge of party-spirit, insinuated throughout,
is perfectly gratuitous. Never, perhaps, was any man more free from this
infirmity than Pascal. That it was pure zeal for the morality of the
Gospel which engaged him to take up his pen against the Jesuits, can be
doubted by none but those who make it a point to call in question the
reality of all religious conviction.[67] Equally unfounded is the
imputation of levity. Pascal was earnest in his raillery. A deep
seriousness of purpose lurked under the smile of his irony. Voltaire
describes himself, not the author of the Provincials, when he says that
“his business was not to be right, but to entertain the public.” As to
Pascal having “endeavored to prove that the Jesuits had a settled design
to corrupt the morals of mankind,” we are not surprised at Father Daniel
saying so; but it is unaccountable how any but a Jesuit, who professed
to have read the Letters, could advance a theory so distinctly
anticipated and disclaimed in the Letters themselves. “Know, then,” it
is said in letter fifth, “that their object is not the corruption of
manners—that is _not their design_. But as little is it their sole aim
to reform them—that would be bad policy.”[68] “Alas!” says the Jesuit,
in letter sixth, “our main object, no doubt, should have been to
establish no other maxims than those of the Gospel; and it is easy to
see, from our rules, that if we tolerate some degree of relaxation in
others, it is rather out of complaisance than _design_.”[69] In truth,
nothing is more clearly marked throughout the Letters than this
distinction between the design of the Society and the tendency of its
policy—a distinction which leaves very small scope for the sage
apophthegm of the philosophical historian. There is some reason to think
that Voltaire expressed himself in this manner, with the view of
procuring the recommendation of Father Latour to enter the Academy—an
object for the accomplishment of which, it is well known, he made the
most unworthy concessions to the Jesuits.[70]

Later critics, in speaking of the Provincials, have indulged in a
similar strain of vague depreciation; as a specimen of which we might
have referred to Schlegel, who talks of their being “nothing more than a
master-piece of sophistry,”[71] and repeats the charge of profaneness,
which Pascal has so triumphantly refuted in his eleventh letter. It
would be a sad waste of time to answer this ridiculous objection. Nor
will it be surprising to those who know the history of Blanco White, to
find him indulging in a sceptical vein on this as on other subjects.
“Pascal and the Jansenist party,” he says, “accused them of systematic
laxity in their moral doctrines; but the charge, I believe, though
plausible in theory, was perfectly groundless in practice. The strict,
unbending maxims of the Jansenists, by urging persons of all characters
and tempers on to an imaginary goal of perfection, bring quickly their
whole system to the decision of experience. A greater knowledge of
mankind made the Jesuits more cautious in the culture of devotional
feelings. They well knew that but few can prudently engage in open
hostility with what, in ascetic language, is called the world.”[72] The
strange mixture of truth and error in this statement leaves an
unfavorable impression on the mind, the fallacy of which we feel ere we
have time to analyze it. It is true that nothing could be more opposite
to the laxity of the Jesuits than the asceticism of Port-Royal. But it
is doing injustice to Pascal to insinuate that he measured Jesuitical
morality by “the strict, unbending maxims of the Jansenists;” and it is
flagrantly untrue that the Jesuits merely aimed at reducing monastic
enthusiasm to the standard of common sense and ordinary life. We repeat
that the real charge which Pascal substantiates against them is, not
that they softened the austerities of the cloister, but that they
sacrificed the eternal laws of morality—not that they prudently suited
their rules to men’s tempers, but that they licensed the worst passions
and propensities of our nature—not that they declined urging all to
forsake the world (which he never expected), but that they sought, for
their own politic ends, to veil its impurities, and countenance its evil
customs.

Disguising their hostility to science, under the mask of friendship to
literature, the Jesuits have succeeded in making to themselves friends
of many who are acquainted with them only through the medium of their
writings. And it is the remarkable fact of our day, that, while on the
Continent, where they are practically known, the Jesuits have enlisted
against themselves the pens of its most eminent novelists, historians,
and philosophers, in Protestant England it is quite the reverse. The
most talented of our periodical writers have exerted all their powers to
white-wash them, to paint and paper them, and set them off with
ornamental designs; and where they have not dared to defend, they have
tried to blunt the edge of censure against them. Following in the same
line of defence, a certain class of Protestant writers, fond of
historical paradox, and of appearing superior to vulgar prejudices, have
volunteered to protect the Jesuits. “No man is a stranger to the fame of
Pascal,” says Sir James Macintosh; “but those who may desire to form a
right judgment on the contents of the _Lettres Provinciales_ would do
well to cast a glance over the _Entretiens d’Ariste et d’Eugenie_, by
Bouhours, a Jesuit, who has ably vindicated his order.”[73] Sir James
had heard, perhaps, of Father Daniel’s _Entretiens de Cleandre et
d’Eudoxe_, but it is very evident that he had never even “cast a glance
over” that book; for the work of Bouhours, which he has confounded with
it, is a philological treatise, which has no reference whatever to the
Provincial Letters; and yet he could say that the Jesuit “has ably
vindicated his order!” Next to the art which the Jesuits have shown in
smuggling themselves into places of power and trust, is that by which
they have succeeded in hoodwinking the merely literary portion of
society.

But, not to dwell longer on these objections, the Provincials are liable
to another charge, seldomer advanced, and not so easily answered; which
is, that the loose casuistical morality denounced by Pascal was not
confined to the Jesuits, nor to any one of the orders of the Romish
Church, much less, as Voltaire says, to “a few Spanish and Flemish
Jesuits,” but was common to all the divines of that Church, and was, in
fact, the native offspring and inevitable growth of the practices of
confession and absolution. It is admitted that the Jesuits were mainly
responsible for its preservation and propagation; that they have been
the most zealous in reducing it to practice; that, even after it had
incurred the anathemas of popes, bishops, and divines, and after it had
been disclaimed by all the other orders of the Church, the Jesuits
pertinaciously adhered to it; and that, even to this day, they have
identified themselves with the worst tenets of the casuists. But
Protestants writers have generally alleged, not without reason, that the
corruptions of casuistical divinity may be traced from the days of
Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan, whom the Church of Rome owns as authorities;
that the “new casuists” merely carried the maxims of their predecessors
to their legitimate conclusions; and that though condemned by some
popes, the censure has been only partial, and has been more than
neutralized by the condemnation of other works written against the
morality of the Jesuits. Thus, in a work entitled “Guimenius Amadeus,”
the author, who was the Jesuit Moya, boldly claimed the sanction of the
most venerated names in favor of the modern casuists. This work, it is
true, was condemned to the flames in 1680, by Pope Innocent XI., who was
favorable to the Jansenists; but the Jesuits boast of having obtained
other papal constitutions, reversing the judgment of that pontiff, whom
they do not scruple to stigmatize with heresy.[74] It cannot be denied
that the Jesuits have all along succeeded in obtaining for their system
the sanction of the highest authorities in the Church; while those works
which undertook to advocate a purer morality were printed clandestinely,
without privilege or approbation, under fictitious names of authors and
printers; nor can it be forgotten that the Provincial Letters, the most
powerful exposure of Jesuitical morality that ever appeared, were
censured at Rome, and burnt by the hands of the executioner.[75] In
short, and without entering into the question so ingeniously handled by
Nicole and other Jansenists, whether the modern casuists were justified
in their excesses by the ancient schoolmen, it is undeniable that this
is the weakest point of the Provincials, and one on which the
thorough-going Jesuit occupies, on popish principles, the most
advantageous ground. The disciples of Loyola constitute the very soul of
the Papacy; and they must be held as the genuine exponents of that
atrocious system of morals which, engendered in the privacy of the
cloister during the dark ages, reached its maturity in the hands of a
designing priesthood, who still find it too convenient a tool for their
purposes to part with it.

There are other respects in which we cannot fail to detect, throughout
these Letters, the enfeebling and embarrassing influence of Popery over
the naturally ingenuous mind of the author. Among all the maxims
peculiar to the Jesuits, none are more pernicious than those in which
they have openly taught that disobedience to the Papal See releases
subjects from their allegiance and oaths of fidelity to their
sovereigns, and authorizes them to put heretical rulers to death, even
by assassination.[76] On this point Pascal has failed to speak out the
whole truth. Whether it may have been from genuine dread of heresy, or
from a wish to spare the dignity of the pope, it is easy to see the
timidity, the circumspection, the delicacy with which he touches on the
point of papal authority.

The Jansenists have been called the Methodists of the Church of Rome;
but the term is applicable to them rather in the wide sense in which it
has been applied, derisively, to those who have sought reformation or
aimed at superior sanctity within the pale of an established Church,
than as applied to the party now known under that designation. They
disclaimed the title of Jansenists, as a nickname applied to them by
their adversaries. They held themselves to be the true Catholics, the
representatives of the Church as it existed down, at least, to the days
of St. Bernard, whom they termed “the last of the fathers.” They
ascribed a species of semi-inspiration to the early fathers of the
Church. They reverenced the Scriptures, but received them at
second-hand, through the medium of tradition. To be a Catholic and a
Christian were with them convertible terms. Hence the horror evinced by
Pascal, in his concluding letters, at the bare thought of “heresy
existing in the Church.” “Embarrassed at every step,” it has been well
observed, “by their professed submission to the authority of the popes,
galled and oppressed by their necessary acquiescence in the flagrant
errors of their Church, these good men made profession of the great
truths of Christianity under an incomparably heavier weight of
disadvantage than has been sustained by any other class of Christians
from the apostolic to the present times. Enfeebled by the enthusiasm to
which they clung, the piety of these admirable men failed in the force
necessary to carry them through the conflict with their atrocious enemy,
‘the Society.’ They were themselves in too many points vulnerable to
close fearlessly with their adversary, and they grasped the sword of the
Spirit in too infirm a manner to drive home a deadly thrust.... The
Jansenists and the inmates of Port-Royal displayed a constancy that
would doubtless have carried them through the fires of martyrdom; but
the intellectual courage necessary to bear them fearlessly through an
examination of the errors of the papal superstition, could spring only
from a healthy form of mind, utterly incompatible with the dotings of
religious abstraction, and the petty solicitudes of sackclothed
abstinence. The Jansenists had not such courage; if they worshipped not
the Beast, they cringed before him; he placed his dragon-foot upon their
necks, and their wisdom and their virtues were lost forever to
France.”[77]

It is the policy of the Jesuits at present, as of old, to deny,
point-blank, the truthfulness of Pascal’s statements of their doctrine
and policy—to reiterate the exploded charge of his having garbled his
extracts—and, after affecting to join in the laugh at his pleasantry,
and to forgive, for the wit’s sake, his injustice to their innocent and
much-calumniated fathers, to declare that, of course, he could not
himself believe the half of what he said against them, nor comprehend
the profound questions of casuistry on which he presumed to argue. Under
this affectation of charity, they dexterously evade Pascal’s main
charges, and slyly insinuate a vindication of the heresies of which they
have been convicted. Thus, in a late publication, one of their number
actually attempts to vindicate the old Jesuitical doctrine of
_probabilism_![78] At the same time, they retain, with undiminished
tenacity, the moral maxims which Pascal condemns. The discovery lately
made of the Theology of Dens, still taught by the Jesuits in Ireland, is
a proof of this; for it is nothing more than a collection of the most
wicked and obscene maxims of casuistical morality. Matters are no better
in France. Dr. Gilly mentions a publication issued at Lyons, in 1825,
which is so bad that the reviewer says, “We cannot, we dare not copy it;
it is a book to which the cases of conscience of Dr. Sanchez were purity
itself.”[79] The disclosures made still more recently by M. Michelet and
M. Quinet, are equally startling, and will, in all probability, issue in
another expulsion of the Jesuits from France.

The policy of the Society, as hitherto exhibited in the countries where
they have settled, describes a regular cycle of changes. Commencing with
loud professions of charity, of liberal views in politics, and of an
accommodating code of morals, they succeed in gaining popularity among
the non-religious, the dissipated, and the restless portion of society.
Availing themselves of this, and carefully concealing, in a Protestant
country, the more obnoxious parts of their creed, their next step is to
plant some of the most plausible of their apostles in the principal
localities, who are instructed to establish schools and seminaries on
the most charitable footing, so as to ingratiate themselves with the
poor, while they secure the contributions of the rich; to attack the
credit of the most active and influential among the evangelical
ministry; to revive old slanders against the reformers; to disseminate
tracts of the most alluring description; and, when assailed in turn, to
deny everything and to grant nothing. Rising by these means to power and
influence, they gradually monopolize the seats of learning and the halls
of theology—they glide, with noiseless steps, into closets, cabinets,
and palaces—they become the dictators of the public press, the
persecutors of the good, and the oppressors of all public and private
liberty. At length, their treacherous designs being discovered, they
rouse against themselves the storm of natural passions, which,
descending on them first as the authors of the mischief, sweeps away
along with them, in its headlong career, everything that bears the
aspect of that active and earnest religion, under the guise of which
they had succeeded in duping mankind.

What portion of this cycle they have reached among us, it is needless to
demonstrate. They have evidently got beyond the first stage; and it is
highly probable that, in proof of it, the present publication may elicit
a more than ordinary exhibition of their skill in the science of
defamation and denial. It is far from being unlikely that, at the
present point of their revolution, they may find it their interest,
after all the mischief that Pascal has done them, and all the ill that
they have spoken against Pascal, to claim him as a good Catholic, and
take advantage of the prestige of his name to insinuate, that the Church
which could boast of such a man is not to be lightly esteemed. And, in
fact, it requires no small exercise of caution to guard ourselves
against such an illusion. It is difficult to characterize Popery as it
deserves without apparent uncharitableness to individuals, such as
Fenelon and Pascal, who, though members of a corrupt Church, possessed
much of the spirit of true religion. But, though it would be impossible
to class such eminent and pious men with an infidel cardinal or a
Spanish inquisitor, it does not follow that they are free from
condemnation. It has been justly remarked, that “their example has done
much harm, and been only the more pernicious from their eminence and
their virtues. It is difficult to calculate how much assistance their
well-merited reputation has given to prop the falling cause of Popery,
and to lengthen out the continuance of a delusion the most lasting and
the most dangerous that has ever led mankind astray from the truth.”[80]
With regard to our author, in particular, it may be well to remember,
that he was virtuous without being indebted to his Church, and
evangelical in spite of his creed; that his piety, for which he is so
much esteemed by us, was the very quality that exposed him to odium and
suspicion from his own communion; that the truths, for his adherence to
which we would claim him as a brother in Christ, were those which were
reprobated by the authorities of Rome; and that the following Letters,
for which he is so justly admired, were, by the same Church, formally
censured and ignominiously burnt, along with the Bible which Pascal
loved, and the martyrs who have suffered for “the truth as it is in
Jesus.”

-----

Footnote 1:

  Non quia per nos sancti et immaculati futuri essemus, sed elegit
  prædestinavitque ut essemus. (De Prædest., Aug. Op., tom. x. 815.)

Footnote 2:

  De dono Persever. (Ib., 822.)

Footnote 3:

  Neander, Bibl. Repos., iii. 94; Leydecker, de Jansen. Dogm., 413.

Footnote 4:

  The question of the middle knowledge is learnedly handled by Voetius
  (Disp. Theol., i. 264), by Hoornbeck (Socin. Confut.), and other
  Protestant divines, who have shown it to be untenable, useless, and
  fraught with absurdity.

Footnote 5:

  Dupin, Eccl. Hist., 17th cent. 1–14.

Footnote 6:

  “Well done, gentlemen; you have left me more in the dark than ever.”

Footnote 7:

  He was the son of a poor artisan, whose name was Jan, or John Ottho;
  hence Jansen, corresponding to our Johnson, which was Latinized into
  Jansenius.

Footnote 8:

  Petitot, Collect. des Mémoires, Notice sur Port-Royal, tom. xxxiii.,
  p. 19. This author’s attempt to fix the charge of a conspiracy between
  Jansen and St. Cyran to overturn the Church, is a piece of special
  pleading, bearing on its face its own refutation.

Footnote 9:

  The followers of Jansen were not more charitable than he in their
  judgments of the Reformed, and showed an equal zeal with the Jesuits
  to persecute them, when they had it in their power. (Benoit, Hist. de
  l’Edit de Nantes, iii. 200.)

Footnote 10:

  _Cæca quadam obedientia.—Ut Christum Dominum in superiore quolibet
  agnoscere studeatis.—Perinde ac si cadaver essent, vel similiter atque
  senis baculus.—Ad majorem Dei gloriam._ (Constit. Jesuit. pars vi.
  cap. 1; Ignat. Epist., &c.)

Footnote 11:

  Balde, whom the Jesuits honor in their schools as a modern Horace,
  thus celebrates the longevity of the Society, in his _Carmen Seculare
  de Societate Jesu_, 1640:—

                   “Profuit quisquis voluit nocere.
                    Cuncta subsident sociis; ubique
                    Exules vivunt, et ubique cives!
                    Sternimus victi, supreamus imi,
                      Surgimus plures toties cadendo.”

Footnote 12:

  Their famous missionary, Francis Xavier, whom they canonized, was
  ignorant of a single word in the languages of the Indians whom he
  professed to evangelize. He employed a hand-bell to summon the natives
  around him; and the poor savages, mistaking him for one of their
  learned Brahmans, he baptized them until his arm was exhausted with
  the task, and boasted of every one he baptized as a regenerated
  convert!

Footnote 13:

  Macintosh, Hist. of England, ii. 353.

Footnote 14:

  Macintosh, Hist. of England, ii. 357.

Footnote 15:

  Augustine himself is chargeable with having been the first to
  introduce the scholastic mode of treating morality in the form of
  trifling questions, more fitted to gratify curiosity, and display
  acumen, than to edify or enlighten. His example was followed and
  miserably abused, by the moralists of succeeding ages. (Buddei
  Isagoge, vol. i. p. 568.)

Footnote 16:

  Lancelot. Tour to Alet, p. 173; Leydecker, p. 122.

Footnote 17:

  The whole title was: “Augustinus Cornelii Jansenii episcopi, seu
  doctrina sancti Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanctitate ægritudinæ
  medica, adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses.” Louvain, 1640.

Footnote 18:

  Leydecker, p. 132; Lancelot, p. 180.

Footnote 19:

  Ranke, Hist. of the Popes, vol. iii. 143; Abbé Du Mas, Hist. des Cinq
  Propositions, p. 48.

Footnote 20:

  Letter xviii. pp. 310–313.

Footnote 21:

  Witsii Œconom. Fœd., lib. iii.; Turret. Theol., Elenct. xv. quest. 4;
  De Moor Comment, iv. 496; Mestrezat, Serm. sur Rom., viii. 274.

Footnote 22:

  I refer here particularly to Arnauld’s treatise, entitled
  “Renversement de la Morale de Jesus Christ par les Calvinistes,” which
  was answered by Jurieu in his “Justification de la Morale des
  Reformez.” 1685, by M. Merlat, and others. Jurieu has shown at great
  length, and with a severity for which he had too much provocation,
  that Arnauld and his friends, in their violent tirades against the
  Reformed, neither acted in good faith, nor in consistency with the
  sentiments of their much admired leaders, Augustine and Jansen.

Footnote 23:

  Fontaine, Mémoires, i. 200; Mosheim, Eccl. Hist., cent. xvii. 2.

Footnote 24:

  Lancelot, p. 123.

Footnote 25:

  Mémoires pour servir a l’Histoire de Port-Royal, vol. i. pp. 35, 57,
  142.

Footnote 26:

  Ib., p. 456. The title of this work was, “The Secret Chaplet of the
  Holy Sacrament.”

Footnote 27:

  Sacy, or Saci, was the inverted name of Isaac Le Maitre, celebrated
  for his translation of the Bible.

Footnote 28:

  Mosheim, Eccl. Hist., cent. xvii. §2.

Footnote 29:

  We may refer particularly to Petitot in his Collection des Mémoires,
  tom. xxxiii., Paris, 1824; and to a History of the Company of Jesus by
  J. Cretineau-Joly, Paris, 1845. With high pretensions to impartiality,
  these works abound with the most glaring specimens of special
  pleading.

Footnote 30:

  Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV, t. ii.

Footnote 31:

  Mémoires de P. Royal, i. 13. Bayle insists that his father had
  twenty-two children. Dict., art. _Arnauld_.

Footnote 32:

  Weisman, Hist. Eccl., ii. 204.

Footnote 33:

  The title under which the Letters appeared when first collected into a
  volume was, “_Lettres écrites par Louis de Montalte, a un Provincial
  de ses amis, et aux RR. PP. Jesuites, sur la morale et la politique de
  ces Peres_.”

  Father Bouhours, a Jesuit, ridicules the title of the Letters, and
  says he is surprised they were not rather entitled “Letters from a
  Country Bumpkin to his Friends,” and instead of “The Provincials”
  called “The Bumpkins”—“_Campagnardes_.” (Remarques sur la langue
  Fran., p. ii. 306. Dict. Univ., art. _Provincial_.)

Footnote 34:

  Daniel, Entretiens, p. 19.

Footnote 35:

  Petitot, Notices, p. 121.

Footnote 36:

  Benoit, Hist. de l’Edit. de Nantes, iii. 198.

Footnote 37:

  Daniel, Entretiens, p. 11.

Footnote 38:

  Nicole, Notes sur la xi. Lettre iii. 332.

Footnote 39:

  Recueil de Port-Royal, 278, 279; Petitot, pp. 122, 123.

Footnote 40:

  Histoire des Provinciales, p. 12.

Footnote 41:

  Petitot, p. 124. The eighteenth letter embraces the delicate topic of
  papal authority, as well as the distinction between _faith_ and
  _fact_, in stating which we can easily conceive how severely the
  ingenuous mind of Pascal must have labored to find some plausible
  ground for vindicating his consistency as a Roman Catholic. To the
  Protestant reader, it must appear the most unsatisfactory of all the
  Letters.

Footnote 42:

  Prov. Let., p. 340.

Footnote 43:

  Perrault, Parallele des Anc. et Mod., Bayle, art. _Pascal_.

Footnote 44:

  D’Artigny, Nouveaux Mémoires iii. p. 34.

Footnote 45:

  Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV., tom. ii. pp. 171, 274.

Footnote 46:

  D’Alembert, Destruct. des Jesuites, p. 54.

Footnote 47:

  Bordas-Demoulin, Eloge de Pascal, p. xxv. (This was the prize essay
  before the French Academy, in June, 1842.)

Footnote 48:

  Nicole, Hist. des Provinciales.

Footnote 49:

  The names of these unfortunate productions alone survive; 1. “First
  Reply to Letters, &c., by a Father of the Company of Jesus.” 2.
  “Provincial Impostures of Sieur de Montalte, Secretary of Port-Royal,
  discovered and refuted by a Father of the Company of Jesus.” 3. “Reply
  to a Theologian,” &c. 4. “Reply to the Seventeenth Letter, by Francis
  Annat,” &c., &c.

Footnote 50:

  Eichhorn, Geschichte der Litteratur, vol. i. pp. 420–423.

Footnote 51:

  Recueil de Port-Royal, pp. 314–323. Some papers passed between Pascal
  and his friends on this topic. Pascal committed these on his death-bed
  to his friend M. Domat, “with a request that he would burn them if the
  nuns of Port-Royal proved firm, and print them if they should yield.”
  (Ib., p. 322.) The nuns having stood firm, the probability is that
  they were destroyed. Had they been preserved, they might have thrown
  some further light on the opinions of Pascal regarding papal
  authority.

Footnote 52:

  _Si mes Lettres sont condamnées à Rome, ce que j’y condamne, est
  condamné dans le ciel._ (Pensées de Blaise Pascal, tom. ii. 163.
  Paris, 1824.)

Footnote 53:

  “How came you,” said the archbishop to M. Beurrier, “to administer the
  sacraments to such a person? Didn’t you know that he was a Jansenist?”
  (Recueil, 348.)

Footnote 54:

  Recueil de Port-Royal, pp. 327–330; Petitot, p. 165.

Footnote 55:

  Walchii Biblioth. Theol., ii. 295.

Footnote 56:

  The title of Nicole’s translation, now rarely to be met with, is,
  _Ludovici Montaltii Litteræ Provinciales, de Morali et Politica
  Jesuitarum Disciplina. A Willelmo Wendrockio, Salisburgensi Theologo._
  Several editions of this translation were printed. I have the first,
  published at Cologne in 1658, and the fifth, much enlarged, Cologne,
  1679.

Footnote 57:

  Avertissement, Les Provinciales, ed. 1767. Mad. de Joncourt, or
  Joncoux, took a deep interest in the falling fortunes of Port-Royal.
  (See some account of her in Madame Schimmelpenninck’s History of the
  Demolition of Port-Royal, p. 135.)

Footnote 58:

  Bayle, Dict., art. _Pascal_.

Footnote 59:

  Daniel, Entretiens, p. 111.

Footnote 60:

  Bayle, Dict., art. _Pascal_, note K.

Footnote 61:

  Abbé de Castres, Les Trois Siècles, ii. 63.

Footnote 62:

  Barbier, Dict. des Ouvrages Anon. et Pseudon.

Footnote 63:

  Tabaraud, _Dissertation sur la foi qui est due au Temoignage de Pascal
  dans ses Lettres Provinciales_, p. 12.—This work, published some years
  ago in France, contains a complete justification of Pascal’s picture
  of the Jesuits in the Provincials, accompanied with a mass of
  authorities. The above sentiments have been introduced into Pascal’s
  Thoughts. (See Craig’s translation, p. 185.)

Footnote 64:

  Vie de Bossuet, t. iv. p. 19; Tabaraud, Dissert. sur la foi, &c., p.
  43.

Footnote 65:

  “The shocking doctrine of Jansenius and of St. Cyran, afforded at
  least as much room for ridicule as the pliant doctrine of Molina,
  Tambourin, and Vasquez.” (D’Alembert, Dest. of the Jesuits, p. 55.)

Footnote 66:

  Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV., ii. 367.

Footnote 67:

  Eichhorn, Geschichte der Lit., i. 426.

Footnote 68:

  Prov. Let., p. 118.

Footnote 69:

  Ib., p. 142.

Footnote 70:

  Tabaraud, p. 117; Bord. Demoulin, Eloge de Pascal, Append.

Footnote 71:

  Schlegel, Lectures on Hist. of Lit. ii. 188.

Footnote 72:

  Letters from Spain, p. 86.

Footnote 73:

  Macintosh, History of England, vol. ii. 359, note.

Footnote 74:

  Eichhorn, Geschichte der Litter., vol. i. pp. 423–425; Weisman, Hist.
  Eccl., vol. ii. 21; Jurieu, Prejugez Legitimes cont. le Papisme, p.
  386; Claude, Defence of the Reformation, p. 29.

Footnote 75:

  Jurieu, Justification de la Morale des Reformez, contre M. Arnauld, i.
  p. 30.

Footnote 76:

  A disingenuous attempt has been sometimes made to identify these
  nefarious maxims with certain principles held by some of our
  reformers. There is an essential difference between the natural right
  claimed, we do not say with what justice, for subjects to proceed
  against their rulers as tyrants, and the right assumed by the pope to
  depose rulers as heretics. And it is equally easy to distinguish
  between the disallowed acts of some fanatical individuals who have
  taken the law into their own hands, and the atrocious deeds of such
  men as Chatel and Ravaillac, who could plead the authority of Mariana
  the Jesuit, that “to put tyrannical princes to death is not only a
  lawful, but a laudable, heroic, and glorious action.” (Dalton’s
  Jesuits; their Principles and Acts, London, 1843.) The Church of St.
  Ignatius at Rome is or was adorned, it seems, with pictures of all the
  assassinations mentioned in Scripture, which they have, most
  presumptuously, perverted in justification of their feats in this
  department. (D’Alembert, Dest. of the Jesuits, p. 101.)

Footnote 77:

  Taylor, Natural Hist. of Enthusiasm, p. 256.

Footnote 78:

  De l’Existence et de l’Institut des Jesuites. Par le R. P. de
  Ravignan, de la Compagnie de Jesus. Paris, 1845, p. 83. _Probabilism_
  is the doctrine, that if any opinion in morals has been held by any
  _grave doctor_ of the Church, it is _probably true_, and may be safely
  followed in practice.

Footnote 79:

  Gilly, Narrative of an Excursion to Piedmont, p. 156.

Footnote 80:

  Douglas on Errors in Religion, p. 113.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                        THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS.




                               LETTER I.

DISPUTES IN THE SORBONNE, AND THE INVENTION OF PROXIMATE POWER—A TERM
   EMPLOYED BY THE JESUITS TO PROCURE THE CENSURE OF M. ARNAULD.


                                              PARIS, _January 23, 1656_.

SIR,—We were entirely mistaken. It was only yesterday that I was
undeceived. Until that time I had labored under the impression that the
disputes in the Sorbonne were vastly important, and deeply affected the
interests of religion. The frequent convocations of an assembly so
illustrious as that of the Theological Faculty of Paris, attended by so
many extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances, led one to form such
high expectations, that it was impossible to help coming to the
conclusion that the subject was most extraordinary. You will be greatly
surprised, however, when you learn from the following account, the issue
of this grand demonstration, which, having made myself perfectly master
of the subject, I shall be able to tell you in very few words.

Two questions, then, were brought under examination; the one a question
of fact, the other a question of right.

The question of fact consisted in ascertaining whether M. Arnauld was
guilty of presumption, for having asserted in his second letter[81] that
he had carefully perused the book of Jansenius, and that he had not
discovered the propositions condemned by the late pope; but that,
nevertheless, as he condemned these propositions wherever they might
occur, he condemned them in Jansenius, if they were really contained in
that work.[82]

The question here was, if he could, without presumption, entertain a
doubt that these propositions were in Jansenius, after the bishops had
declared that they were.

The matter having been brought before the Sorbonne, seventy-one doctors
undertook his defence, maintaining that the only reply he could possibly
give to the demands made upon him in so many publications, calling on
him to say if he held that these propositions were in that book, was,
that he had not been able to find them, but that if they were in the
book, he condemned them in the book.

Some even went a step farther, and protested that, after all the search
they had made into the book, they had never stumbled upon these
propositions, and that they had, on the contrary, found sentiments
entirely at variance with them. They then earnestly begged that, if any
doctor present had discovered them, he would have the goodness to point
them out; adding, that what was so easy could not reasonably be refused,
as this would be the surest way to silence the whole of them, M. Arnauld
included; but this proposal has been uniformly declined. So much for the
one side.

On the other side are eighty secular doctors, and some forty mendicant
friars, who have condemned M. Arnauld’s proposition, without choosing to
examine whether he has spoken truly or falsely—who, in fact, have
declared, that they have nothing to do with the veracity of his
proposition, but simply with its temerity.

Besides these, there were fifteen who were not in favor of the censure,
and who are called Neutrals.

Such was the issue of the question of fact, regarding which, I must say,
I give myself very little concern. It does not affect my conscience in
the least whether M. Arnauld is presumptuous, or the reverse; and should
I be tempted, from curiosity, to ascertain whether these propositions
are contained in Jansenius, his book is neither so very rare nor so very
large as to hinder me from reading it over from beginning to end, for my
own satisfaction, without consulting the Sorbonne on the matter.

Were it not, however, for the dread of being presumptuous myself, I
really think that I would be disposed to adopt the opinion which has
been formed by the most of my acquaintances, who, though they have
believed hitherto on common report that the propositions were in
Jansenius, begin now to suspect the contrary, owing to this strange
refusal to point them out—a refusal, the more extraordinary to me, as I
have not yet met with a single individual who can say that he has
discovered them in that work. I am afraid, therefore, that this censure
will do more harm than good, and that the impression which it will leave
on the minds of all who know its history will be just the reverse of the
conclusion that has been come to. The truth is, the world has become
sceptical of late, and will not believe things till it sees them. But,
as I said before, this point is of very little moment, as it has no
concern with religion.[83]

The question of right, from its affecting the faith, appears much more
important, and, accordingly, I took particular pains in examining it.
You will be relieved, however, to find that it is of as little
consequence as the former.

The point of dispute here, was an assertion of M. Arnauld’s in the same
letter, to the effect, “that the grace without which we can do nothing,
was wanting to St. Peter at his fall.” You and I supposed that the
controversy here would turn upon the great principles of grace; such as,
whether grace is given to all men? or, if it is efficacious of itself?
But we were quite mistaken. You must know I have become a great
theologian within this short time; and now for the proofs of it!

To ascertain the matter with certainty, I repaired to my neighbor, M.
N——, doctor of Navarre, who, as you are aware, is one of the keenest
opponents of the Jansenists, and my curiosity having made me almost as
keen as himself, I asked him if they would not formally decide at once
that “grace is given to all men,” and thus set the question at rest. But
he gave me a sore rebuff, and told me that that was not the point; that
there were some of his party who held that grace was not given to all;
that the examiners themselves had declared, in a full assembly of the
Sorbonne, that that opinion was _problematical_; and that he himself
held the same sentiment, which he confirmed by quoting to me what he
called that celebrated passage of St. Augustine: “We know that grace is
not given to all men.”

I apologized for having misapprehended his sentiment, and requested him
to say if they would not at least condemn that other opinion of the
Jansenists which is making so much noise, “That grace is efficacious of
itself, and invincibly determines our will to what is good.” But in this
second query I was equally unfortunate. “You know nothing about the
matter,” he said; “that is not a heresy—it is an orthodox opinion; all
the Thomists[84] maintain it; and I myself have defended it in my
Sorbonic thesis.”[85]

I did not venture again to propose my doubts, and yet I was as far as
ever from understanding where the difficulty lay; so, at last, in order
to get at it, I begged him to tell me where, then, lay the heresy of M.
Arnauld’s proposition? “It lies here,” said he, “that he does not
acknowledge that the righteous have the power of obeying the
commandments of God, in the manner in which we understand it.”

On receiving this piece of information, I took my leave of him; and,
quite proud at having discovered the knot of the question, I sought M.
N——, who is gradually getting better, and was sufficiently recovered to
conduct me to the house of his brother-in-law, who is a Jansenist, if
ever there was one, but a very good man notwithstanding. Thinking to
insure myself a better reception, I pretended to be very high on what I
took to be his side, and said: “Is it possible that the Sorbonne has
introduced into the Church such an error as this, ‘that all the
righteous have always the power of obeying the commandments of God?’”

“What say you?” replied the doctor. “Call you that an error—a sentiment
so Catholic that none but Lutherans and Calvinists impugn it?”

“Indeed!” said I, surprised in my turn; “so you are not of their
opinion?”

“No,” he replied; “we anathematize it as heretical and impious.”[86]

Confounded by this reply, I soon discovered that I had overacted the
Jansenist, as I had formerly overdone the Molinist.[87] But not being
sure if I had rightly understood him, I requested him to tell me frankly
if he held “that the righteous have always a real power to observe the
divine precepts?” Upon this the good man got warm (but it was with a
holy zeal), and protested that he would not disguise his sentiments on
any consideration—that such was, indeed, his belief, and that he and all
his party would defend it to the death, as the pure doctrine of St.
Thomas, and of St. Augustine their master.

This was spoken so seriously as to leave me no room for doubt; and under
this impression I returned to my first doctor, and said to him, with an
air of great satisfaction, that I was sure there would be peace in the
Sorbonne very soon; that the Jansenists were quite at one with them in
reference to the power of the righteous to obey the commandments of God;
that I could pledge my word for them, and could make them seal it with
their blood.

“Hold there!” said he. “One must be a theologian to see the point of
this question. The difference between us is so subtle, that it is with
some difficulty we can discern it ourselves—you will find it rather too
much for your powers of comprehension. Content yourself, then, with
knowing that it is very true the Jansenists will tell you that all the
righteous have always the power of obeying the commandments; that is not
the point in dispute between us; but mark you, they will not tell you
that that power is _proximate_. That is the point.”

This was a new and unknown word to me. Up to this moment I had managed
to understand matters, but that term involved me in obscurity; and I
verily believe that it has been invented for no other purpose than to
mystify. I requested him to give me an explanation of it, but he made a
mystery of it, and sent me back, without any further satisfaction, to
demand of the Jansenists if they would admit this _proximate power_.
Having charged my memory with the phrase (as to my understanding, that
was out of the question), I hastened with all possible expedition,
fearing that I might forget it, to my Jansenist friend, and accosted
him, immediately after our first salutations, with: “Tell me, pray, if
you admit _the proximate power_?” He smiled, and replied, coldly: “Tell
me yourself in what sense you understand it, and I may then inform you
what I think of it.” As my knowledge did not extend quite so far, I was
at a loss what reply to make; and yet, rather than lose the object of my
visit, I said at random: “Why, I understand it in the sense of the
Molinists.” “To which of the Molinists do you refer me?” replied he,
with the utmost coolness. I referred him to the whole of them together,
as forming one body, and animated by one spirit.

“You know very little about the matter,” returned he. “So far are they
from being united in sentiment, that some of them are diametrically
opposed to each other. But, being all united in the design to ruin M.
Arnauld, they have resolved to agree on this term _proximate_, which
both parties might use indiscriminately, though they understand it
diversely, that thus, by a similarity of language, and an apparent
conformity, they may form a large body, and get up a majority to crush
him with the greater certainty.”

This reply filled me with amazement; but without imbibing these
impressions of the malicious designs of the Molinists, which I am
unwilling to believe on his word, and with which I have no concern, I
set myself simply to ascertain the various senses which they give to
that mysterious word _proximate_. “I would enlighten you on the subject
with all my heart,” he said; “but you would discover in it such a mass
of contrariety and contradiction, that you would hardly believe me. You
would suspect me. To make sure of the matter, you had better learn it
from some of themselves; and I shall give you some of their addresses.
You have only to make a separate visit to one called M. le Moine,[88]
and to Father Nicolai.”[89]

“I have no acquaintance with any of these persons,” said I.

“Let me see, then,” he replied, “if you know any of those whom I shall
name to you; they all agree in sentiment with M. le Moine.”

I happened, in fact, to know some of them.

“Well, let us see if you are acquainted with any of the Dominicans whom
they call the ‘New Thomists,’[90] for they are all the same with Father
Nicolai.”

I knew some of them also whom he named; and, resolved to profit by this
counsel, and to investigate the matter, I took my leave of him, and went
immediately to one of the disciples of M. le Moine. I begged him to
inform me what it was to have the _proximate power_ of doing a thing.

“It is easy to tell you that,” he replied; “it is merely to have all
that is necessary for doing it in such a manner that nothing is wanting
to performance.”

“And so,” said I, “to have the proximate power of crossing a river, for
example, is to have a boat, boatmen, oars, and all the rest, so that
nothing is wanting?”

“Exactly so,” said the monk.

“And to have the proximate power of _seeing_,” continued I, “must be to
have good eyes and the light of day; for a person with good sight in the
dark would not have the proximate power of seeing, according to you, as
he would want the light, without which one cannot see?”

“Precisely,” said he.

“And consequently,” returned I, “when you say that all the righteous
have the proximate power of observing the commandments of God, you mean
that they have always all the grace necessary for observing them, so
that nothing is wanting to them on the part of God.”

“Stay there,” he replied; “they have always all that is necessary for
observing the commandments, or at least for asking it of God.”

“I understand you,” said I; “they have all that is necessary for praying
to God to assist them, without requiring any new grace from God to
enable them to pray.”

“You have it now,” he rejoined.

“But is it not necessary that they have an efficacious grace, in order
to pray to God?”

“No,” said he; “not according to M. le Moine.”

To lose no time, I went to the Jacobins,[91] and requested an interview
with some whom I knew to be New Thomists, and I begged them to tell me
what “proximate power” was. “Is it not,” said I, “that power to which
nothing is wanting in order to act?”

“No,” said they.

“Indeed! fathers,” said I; “if anything is wanting to that power, do you
call it proximate? Would you say, for instance, that a man in the night
time, and without any light, had the proximate power of seeing?”

“Yes, indeed, he would have it, in our opinion, if he is not blind.”

“I grant that,” said I; “but M. le Moine understands it in a different
manner.”

“Very true,” they replied; “but so it is that we understand it.”

“I have no objections to that,” I said; “for I never quarrel about a
name, provided I am apprized of the sense in which it is understood. But
I perceive from this, that when you speak of the righteous having always
the proximate power of praying to God, you understand that they require
another supply for praying, without which they will never pray.”

“Most excellent!” exclaimed the good fathers, embracing me; “exactly the
thing; for they must have, besides, an efficacious grace bestowed upon
all, and which determines their wills to pray; and it is heresy to deny
the necessity of that efficacious grace in order to pray.”

“Most excellent!” cried I, in return; “but, according to you, the
Jansenists are Catholics, and M. le Moine a heretic; for the Jansenists
maintain that, while the righteous have power to pray, they require
nevertheless an efficacious grace; and this is what you approve. M. le
Moine, again, maintains that the righteous may pray without efficacious
grace; and this is what you condemn.”

“Ay,” said they; “but M. le Moine calls that power _proximate power_.”

“How now! fathers,” I exclaimed; “this is merely playing with words, to
say that you are agreed as to the common terms which you employ, while
you differ with them as to the sense of these terms.”

The fathers made no reply; and at this juncture, who should come in but
my old friend the disciple of M. le Moine! I regarded this at the time
as an extraordinary piece of good fortune; but I have discovered since
then that such meetings are not rare—that, in fact, they are constantly
mixing in each other’s society.[92]

“I know a man,” said I, addressing myself to M. le Moine’s disciple,
“who holds that all the righteous have always the power of praying to
God, but that, notwithstanding this, they will never pray without an
efficacious grace which determines them, and which God does not always
give to all the righteous. Is he a heretic?”

“Stay,” said the doctor; “you might take me by surprise. Let us go
cautiously to work. _Distinguo._[93] If he call that power _proximate
power_, he will be a Thomist, and therefore a Catholic; if not, he will
be a Jansenist, and therefore a heretic.”

“He calls it neither proximate nor non-proximate,” said I.

“Then he is a heretic,” quoth he; “I refer you to these good fathers if
he is not.”

I did not appeal to them as judges, for they had already nodded assent;
but I said to them: “He refuses to admit that word _proximate_, because
he can meet with nobody who will explain it to him.”

Upon this one of the fathers was on the point of offering his definition
of the term, when he was interrupted by M. le Moine’s disciple, who said
to him: “Do you mean, then, to renew our broils? Have we not agreed not
to explain that word _proximate_, but to use it on both sides without
saying what it signifies?” To this the Jacobin gave his assent.

I was thus let into the whole secret of their plot; and rising to take
my leave of them, I remarked: “Indeed, fathers, I am much afraid this is
nothing better than pure chicanery; and whatever may be the result of
your convocations, I venture to predict that, though the censure should
pass, peace will not be established. For though it should be decided
that the syllables of that word _proximate_ should be pronounced, who
does not see that, the meaning not being explained, each of you will be
disposed to claim the victory? The Jacobins will contend that the word
is to be understood in their sense; M. le Moine will insist that it must
be taken in his; and thus there will be more wrangling about the
explanation of the word than about its introduction. For, after all,
there would be no great danger in adopting it without any sense, seeing
it is through the sense only that it can do any harm. But it would be
unworthy of the Sorbonne and of theology to employ equivocal and
captious terms without giving any explanation of them. In short,
fathers, tell me, I entreat you, for the last time, what is necessary to
be believed in order to be a good Catholic?”

“You must say,” they all vociferated simultaneously, “that all the
righteous have the _proximate power_, abstracting from it all sense—from
the sense of the Thomists and the sense of other divines.”

“That is to say,” I replied, in taking leave of them, “that I must
pronounce that word to avoid being the heretic of a name. For, pray, is
this a Scripture word?” “No,” said they. “Is it a word of the Fathers,
the Councils, or the Popes?” “No.” “Is the word, then, used by St.
Thomas?” “No.” “What necessity, therefore, is there for using it, since
it has neither the authority of others nor any sense of itself?” “You
are an opinionative fellow,” said they; “but you shall say it, or you
shall be a heretic, and M. Arnauld into the bargain; for we are the
majority, and should it be necessary, we can bring a sufficient number
of Cordeliers[94] into the field to carry the day.”

On hearing this solid argument, I took my leave of them, to write you
the foregoing account of my interview, from which you will perceive that
the following points remain undisputed and uncondemned by either party.
_First_, That grace is not given to all men. _Second_, That all the
righteous have always the power of obeying the divine commandments.
_Third_, That they require, nevertheless, in order to obey them, and
even to pray, an efficacious grace, which invincibly determines their
will. _Fourth_, That this efficacious grace is not always granted to all
the righteous, and that it depends on the pure mercy of God. So that,
after all, the truth is safe, and nothing runs any risk but that word
without the sense, _proximate_.

Happy the people who are ignorant of its existence!—happy those who
lived before it was born!—for I see no help for it, unless the gentlemen
of the Academy,[95] by an act of absolute authority, banish that
barbarous term, which causes so many divisions, from beyond the
precincts of the Sorbonne. Unless this be done, the censure appears
certain; but I can easily see that it will do no other harm than
diminish the credit[96] of the Sorbonne, and deprive it of that
authority which is so necessary to it on other occasions.

Meanwhile, I leave you at perfect liberty to hold by the word
_proximate_ or not, just as you please; for I love you too much to
persecute you under that pretext. If this account is not displeasing to
you, I shall continue to apprize you of all that happens.—I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 81:

  Anthony Arnauld, or Arnaud, priest and doctor of the Sorbonne, was the
  son of Anthony Arnauld, a famous advocate, and born at Paris, February
  6, 1612. He early distinguished himself in philosophy and divinity,
  advocating the doctrines of Augustine and Port-Royal, and opposing
  those of the Jesuits. The disputes concerning grace which broke out
  about 1643 in the University of Paris, served to foment the mutual
  animosity between M. Arnauld and the Jesuits, who entertained a
  hereditary feud against the whole family, from the active part taken
  by their father against the Society in the close of the preceding
  century. In 1655 it happened that a certain duke, who was educating
  his grand-daughter at Port-Royal, the Jansenist monastery, and kept a
  Jansenist abbé in his house, on presenting himself for confession to a
  priest under the influence of the Jesuits, was refused absolution,
  unless he promised to recall his grand-daughter and discard his abbé.
  This produced two letters from M. Arnauld, in the second of which he
  exposed the calumnies and falsities with which the Jesuits had
  assailed him in a multitude of pamphlets. This is the letter referred
  to in the text.

Footnote 82:

  The book which occasioned these disputes was entitled _Augustinus_,
  and was written by Cornelius Jansenius or Jansen, bishop of Ypres, and
  published after his death. Five propositions, selected from this work,
  were condemned by the pope; and armed with these, as with a scourge,
  the Jesuits continued to persecute the Jansenists till they
  accomplished their ruin.

Footnote 83:

  And yet “the question of fact,” which Pascal professes to treat so
  lightly, became the turning point of all the subsequent persecutions
  directed against the unhappy Port-Royalists! Those who have read the
  sad tale of the demolition of Port-Royal, will recollect with a sigh,
  the sufferings inflicted on the poor scholars and pious nuns of that
  establishment solely on the ground that, from respect to Jansenius and
  to a good conscience they would not subscribe a formulary
  acknowledging the five propositions to be contained in his book.—(See
  Narrative of the Demolition of the Monastery of Port-Royal, by Mary
  Anne Schimmelpenninck p. 170, &c.)

Footnote 84:

  The Thomists were so called after Thomas Aquinas, the celebrated
  “Angelic Doctor” of the schools. He flourished in the thirteenth
  century, and was opposed in the following century, by Duns Scotus, a
  British, some say a Scottish, monk of the order of St. Francis. This
  gave rise to a fierce and protracted controversy, in the course of
  which the Franciscans took the side of Duns Scotus, and were called
  Scotists; while the Dominicans espoused the cause of Thomas Aquinas,
  and were sometimes called Thomists.

Footnote 85:

  _Sorbonique_—an act or thesis of divinity, delivered in the hall of
  the college of the Sorbonne by candidates for the degree of doctor.

Footnote 86:

  The Jansenists, in their dread of being classed with Lutherans and
  Calvinists, condescended to quibble on this question. In reality, as
  we shall see, they agreed with the Reformers for they denied that any
  could actually obey the commandments without efficacious grace.

Footnote 87:

  _Molinist._ The Jesuits were so called, in this dispute, after Lewis
  Molina, a famous Jesuit of Spain, who published a work, entitled
  _Concordia Gratiæ et Liberi Arbitrii_, in which he professed to have
  found out a new way of reconciling the freedom of the human will with
  the divine prescience. This new invention was termed _Scientia Media_,
  or middle knowledge. All who adopted the sentiments of Molina, whether
  Jesuits or not, were termed Molinists.

Footnote 88:

  _Pierre le Moine_ was a doctor of the Sorbonne, whom Cardinal
  Richelieu employed to write against Jansenius. This Jesuit was the
  author of several works which display considerable talent, though
  little principle. His book on Grace was forcibly answered, and himself
  somewhat severely handled, in a work entitled “An Apology for the Holy
  Fathers,” which he suspected to be written by Arnauld. It was Le Moine
  who, according to Nicole, had the chief share in raising the storm
  against Arnauld, of whom he was the bitter and avowed enemy.

Footnote 89:

  _Father Nicolai_ was a Dominican—an order of friars who professed to
  be followers of St. Thomas. He is here mentioned as a representative
  of his class; but Nicole informs us that he abandoned the principles
  of his order, and became a Molinist, or an abettor of Pelagianism.

Footnote 90:

  _New Thomists._ It is more difficult to trace or remember the various
  sects into which the Roman Church is divided, than those of the
  Protestant Church. The New Thomists were the disciples of Diego
  Alvarez, a theologian of the order of St. Dominic, who flourished in
  the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He was sent from Spain to
  Rome in 1596, to defend the doctrine of grace against Molina, and
  distinguished himself in the Congregation _De Auxiliis_. The New
  Thomists contended for _efficacious grace_, but admitted at the same
  time, a _sufficient grace_, which was given to all, and yet not
  sufficient for any actual performance without the efficacious. The
  ridiculous incongruity of this doctrine is admirably exposed by Pascal
  in his second letter.

Footnote 91:

  _Jacobins_, another name for the Dominicans in France, where they were
  so called from the street in Paris, Rue de St. Jacques, where their
  first convent was erected, in the year 1218. In England they were
  called Black Friars. Their founder was Dominick, a Spaniard. His
  mother, it is said, dreamt, before his birth, that she was to be
  delivered of a wolf with a torch in his mouth. The augury was realized
  in the barbarous humor of Dominick, and the massacres which he
  occasioned in various parts of the world, by preaching up crusades
  against the heretics. He was the founder of the Inquisition, and his
  order was, before the Reformation, what the Jesuits were after it—the
  soul of the Romish hierarchy, and the bitterest enemies of the truth.

Footnote 92:

  This is a sly hit at the Dominicans for combining with their natural
  enemies the Jesuits, in order to accomplish the ruin of M. Arnauld.

Footnote 93:

  _Distinguo._ “I draw a distinction”—a humorous allusion to the endless
  distinctions of the Aristotelian school, in which the writings of the
  Casuists abounded, and by means of which they may be said to have more
  frequently eluded than elucidated the truth. M. le Moine was
  particularly famous for these _distinguos_, frequently introducing
  three or four of them in succession on one head; and the disciple in
  the test is made to echo the favorite phrase of his master.

Footnote 94:

  _Cordeliers_, a designation of the Franciscans, or monks of the order
  of St. Francis.

Footnote 95:

  The Royal Academy, which compiled the celebrated dictionary of the
  French language, and was held at that time to be the great umpire in
  literature.

Footnote 96:

  The edition of 1657 had it, _Rendre la Sorbonne meprisable_—“Render
  the Sorbonne contemptible”—an expression much more just, but which the
  editors durst not allow to remain in the subsequent editions.




                               LETTER II.

                          OF SUFFICIENT GRACE.


                                              PARIS, _January 29, 1656_.

SIR,—Just as I had sealed up my last letter, I received a visit from our
old friend M. N——. Nothing could have happened more luckily for my
curiosity; for he is thoroughly informed in the questions of the day,
and is completely in the secret of the Jesuits, at whose houses,
including those of their leading men, he is a constant visitor. After
having talked over the business which brought him to my house, I asked
him to state, in a few words, what were the points in dispute between
the two parties.

He immediately complied, and informed me that the principal points were
two—the _first_ about the _proximate power_, and the _second_ about
_sufficient grace_. I have enlightened you on the first of these points
in my former letter, and shall now speak of the second.

In one word, then, I found that their difference about sufficient grace
may be defined thus: The Jesuits maintain that there is a grace given
generally to all men, subject in such a way to free-will that the will
renders it efficacious or inefficacious at its pleasure, without any
additional aid from God, and without wanting anything on his part in
order to acting effectively; and hence they term this grace
_sufficient_, because it suffices of itself for action. The Jansenists,
on the other hand, will not allow that any grace is actually sufficient
which is not also efficacious; that is, that all those kinds of grace
which do not determine the will to act effectively are insufficient for
action; for they hold that a man can never act without _efficacious
grace_.

Such are the points in debate between the Jesuits and the Jansenists;
and my next object was to ascertain the doctrine of the New
Thomists.[97] “It is rather an odd one,” he said; “they agree with the
Jesuits in admitting a _sufficient grace_ given to all men; but they
maintain, at the same time, that no man can act with this grace alone,
but that, in order to this, he must receive from God an efficacious
grace which really determines his will to the action, and which God does
not grant to all men.” “So that, according to this doctrine,” said I,
“this grace is _sufficient_ without being sufficient.” “Exactly so,” he
replied; “for if it suffices, there is no need of anything more for
acting; and if it does not suffice, why—it is not sufficient.”

“But,” asked I, “where, then, is the difference between them and the
Jansenists?” “They differ in this,” he replied, “that the Dominicans
have this good qualification, that they do not refuse to say that all
men have the _sufficient grace_.” “I understand you,” returned I; “but
they say it without thinking it; for they add that, in order to action,
we must have an _efficacious grace which is not given to all_;
consequently, if they agree with the Jesuits in the use of a term which
has no sense, they differ from them, and coincide with the Jansenists in
the substance of the thing.” “That is very true,” said he. “How, then,”
said I, “are the Jesuits united with them? and why do they not combat
them as well as the Jansenists, since they will always find powerful
antagonists in these men, who, by maintaining the necessity of the
efficacious grace which determines the will, will prevent them from
establishing that grace which they hold to be of itself sufficient?”

“The Dominicans are too powerful,” he replied, “and the Jesuits are too
politic, to come to an open rupture with them. The Society is content
with having prevailed on them so far as to admit the name of _sufficient
grace_, though they understand it in another sense; by which manœuvre
they gain this advantage, that they will make their opinion appear
untenable, as soon as they judge it proper to do so. And this will be no
difficult matter; for, let it be once granted that all men have the
sufficient graces, nothing can be more natural than to conclude, that
the efficacious grace is not necessary to action—the sufficiency of the
general grace precluding the necessity of all others. By saying
_sufficient_ we express all that is necessary for action; and it will
serve little purpose for the Dominicans to exclaim that they attach
another sense to the expression; the people, accustomed to the common
acceptation of that term, would not even listen to their explanation.
Thus the Society gains a sufficient advantage from the expression which
has been adopted by the Dominicans, without pressing them any further;
and were you but acquainted with what passed under Popes Clement VIII.
and Paul V., and knew how the Society was thwarted by the Dominicans in
the establishment of the sufficient grace, you would not be surprised to
find that it avoids embroiling itself in quarrels with them, and allows
them to hold their own opinion, provided that of the Society is left
untouched; and more especially, when the Dominicans countenance its
doctrine, by agreeing to employ, on all public occasions, the term
_sufficient grace_.

“The Society,” he continued, “is quite satisfied with their
complaisance. It does not insist on their denying the necessity of
efficacious grace; this would be urging them too far. People should not
tyrannize over their friends; and the Jesuits have gained quite enough.
The world is content with words; few think of searching into the nature
of things; and thus the name of _sufficient grace_ being adopted on both
sides, though in different senses, there is nobody, except the most
subtle theologians, who ever dreams of doubting that the thing signified
by that word is held by the Jacobins as well as by the Jesuits; and the
result will show that these last are not the greatest dupes.”[98]

I acknowledged that they were a shrewd class of people, these Jesuits;
and, availing myself of his advice, I went straight to the Jacobins, at
whose gate I found one of my good friends, a staunch Jansenist (for you
must know I have got friends among all parties), who was calling for
another monk, different from him whom I was in search of. I prevailed on
him, however, after much entreaty, to accompany me, and asked for one of
my New Thomists. He was delighted to see me again. “How now! my dear
father,” I began, “it seems it is not enough that all men have a
_proximate power_, with which they can never act with effect; they must
have besides this a _sufficient grace_, with which they can act as
little. Is not that the doctrine of your school?” “It is,” said the
worthy monk; “and I was upholding it this very morning in the Sorbonne.
I spoke on the point during my whole half-hour; and but for the
_sand-glass_, I bade fair to have reversed that wicked proverb, now so
current in Paris: ‘He votes without speaking, like a monk in the
Sorbonne.’”[99] “What do you mean by your half-hour and your
sand-glass?” I asked; “do they cut your speeches by a certain measure?”
“Yes,” said he, “they have done so for some days past.” “And do they
oblige you to speak for half an hour?” “No; we may speak as little as we
please.” “But not as much as you please,” said I. “O what a capital
regulation for the boobies! what a blessed excuse for those who have
nothing worth the saying! But, to return to the point, father; this
grace given to all men is _sufficient_, is it not?” “Yes,” said he. “And
yet it has no effect without _efficacious grace_?” “None whatever,” he
replied. “And all men have the sufficient,” continued I, “and all have
not the efficacious?” “Exactly,” said he. “That is,” returned I, “all
have enough of grace, and all have not enough of it—that is, this grace
suffices, though it does not suffice—that is, it is sufficient in name,
and insufficient in effect! In good sooth, father, this is particularly
subtle doctrine! Have you forgotten, since you retired to the cloister,
the meaning attached, in the world you have quitted, to the word
_sufficient_?—don’t you remember that it includes all that is necessary
for acting? But no, you cannot have lost all recollection of it; for, to
avail myself of an illustration which will come home more vividly to
your feelings, let us suppose that you were supplied with no more than
two ounces of bread and a glass of water daily, would you be quite
pleased with your prior were he to tell you that this would be
sufficient to support you, under the pretext that, along with something
else, which, however, he would not give you, you would have all that
would be necessary to support you? How, then, can you allow yourselves
to say that all men have sufficient grace for acting, while you admit
that there is another grace absolutely necessary to acting which all men
have not? Is it because this is an unimportant article of belief, and
you leave all men at liberty to believe that efficacious grace is
necessary or not, as they choose? Is it a matter of indifference to say,
that with sufficient grace a man may really act?” “How!” cried the good
man; “indifference!—it is heresy—formal heresy. The necessity of
_efficacious grace_ for acting effectively, is a point of _faith_—it is
heresy to deny it.”

“Where are we now?” I exclaimed; “and which side am I to take here? If I
deny the sufficient grace, I am a Jansenist. If I admit it, as the
Jesuits do, in the way of denying that efficacious grace is necessary, I
shall be a heretic, say you. And if I admit it, as you do, in the way of
maintaining the necessity of efficacious grace, I sin against common
sense, and am a blockhead, say the Jesuits. What must I do, thus reduced
to the inevitable necessity of being a blockhead, a heretic, or a
Jansenist? And what a sad pass are matters come to, if there are none
but the Jansenists who avoid coming into collision either with the faith
or with reason, and who save themselves at once from absurdity and from
error!”

My Jansenist friend took this speech as a good omen, and already looked
upon me as a convert. He said nothing to me, however; but, addressing
the monk: “Pray, father,” inquired he, “what is the point on which you
agree with the Jesuits?” “We agree in this,” he replied, “that the
Jesuits and we acknowledge the sufficient grace given to all.” “But,”
said the Jansenist, “there are two things in this expression _sufficient
grace_—there is the sound, which is only so much breath; and there is
the thing which it signifies, which is real and effectual. And,
therefore, as you are agreed with the Jesuits in regard to the word
_sufficient_, and opposed to them as to the sense, it is apparent that
you are opposed to them in regard to the substance of that term, and
that you only agree with them as to the sound. Is this what you call
acting sincerely and cordially?”

“But,” said the good man, “what cause have you to complain, since we
deceive nobody by this mode of speaking? In our schools we openly teach
that we understand it in a manner different from the Jesuits.”

“What I complain of,” returned my friend, “is, that you do not proclaim
it everywhere, that by sufficient grace you understand the grace which
is _not_ sufficient. You are bound in conscience, by thus altering the
sense of the ordinary terms of theology, to tell that, when you admit a
sufficient grace in all men, you understand that they have not
sufficient grace in effect. All classes of persons in the world
understand the word sufficient in one and the same sense; the New
Thomists alone understand it in another sense. All the women, who form
one-half of the world, all courtiers, all military men, all magistrates,
all lawyers, merchants, artisans, the whole populace—in short, all sorts
of men, except the Dominicans, understand the word _sufficient_ to
express all that is necessary. Scarcely any one is aware of this
singular exception. It is reported over the whole earth, simply that the
Dominicans hold that all men have the _sufficient graces_. What other
conclusion can be drawn from this, than that they hold that all men have
all the graces necessary for action; especially when they are seen
joined in interest and intrigue with the Jesuits, who understand the
thing in that sense? Is not the uniformity of your expressions, viewed
in connection with this union of party, a manifest indication and
confirmation of the uniformity of your sentiments?

“The multitude of the faithful inquire of theologians: What is the real
condition of human nature since its corruption? St. Augustine and his
disciples reply, that it has no sufficient grace until God is pleased to
bestow it. Next come the Jesuits, and they say that all have the
effectually sufficient graces. The Dominicans are consulted on this
contrariety of opinion; and what course do they pursue? They unite with
the Jesuits; by this coalition they make up a majority; they secede from
those who deny these sufficient graces; they declare that all men
possess them. Who, on hearing this, would imagine anything else than
that they gave their sanction to the opinion of the Jesuits? And then
they add that, nevertheless, these said sufficient graces are perfectly
useless without the efficacious, which are not given to all!

“Shall I present you with a picture of the Church amidst these
conflicting sentiments? I consider her very like a man who, leaving his
native country on a journey, is encountered by robbers, who inflict many
wounds on him, and leave him half dead. He sends for three physicians
resident in the neighboring towns. The first, on probing his wounds,
pronounces them mortal, and assures him that none but God can restore to
him his lost powers. The second, coming after the other, chooses to
flatter the man—tells him that he has still sufficient strength to reach
his home; and, abusing the first physician who opposed his advice,
determines upon his ruin. In this dilemma, the poor patient, observing
the third medical gentleman at a distance, stretches out his hands to
him as the person who should determine the controversy. This
practitioner, on examining his wounds, and ascertaining the opinions of
the first two doctors, embraces that of the second, and uniting with
him, the two combine against the first, and being the stronger party in
number, drive him from the field in disgrace. From this proceeding, the
patient naturally concludes that the last comer is of the same opinion
with the second; and, on putting the question to him, he assures him
most positively that his strength is sufficient for prosecuting his
journey. The wounded man, however, sensible of his own weakness, begs
him to explain to him how he considered him sufficient for the journey.
‘Because,’ replies his adviser, ‘you are still in possession of your
legs, and legs are the organs which naturally suffice for walking.’
‘But,’ says the patient, ‘have I all the strength necessary to make use
of my legs? for, in my present weak condition, it humbly appears to me
that they are wholly useless.’ ‘Certainly you have not,’ replies the
doctor; ‘you will never walk _effectively_, unless God vouchsafes some
extraordinary assistance to sustain and conduct you.’ ‘What!’ exclaims
the poor man, ‘do you not mean to say that I have sufficient strength in
me, so as to want for nothing to walk effectively?’ ‘Very far from it,’
returns the physician. ‘You must, then,’ says the patient, ‘be of a
different opinion from your companion there about my real condition.’ ‘I
must admit that I am,’ replies the other.

“What do you suppose the patient said to this? Why, he complained of the
strange conduct and ambiguous terms of this third physician. He censured
him for taking part with the second, to whom he was opposed in
sentiment, and with whom he had only the semblance of agreement, and for
having driven away the first doctor, with whom he in reality agreed;
and, after making a trial of his strength, and finding by experience his
actual weakness, he sent them both about their business, recalled his
first adviser, put himself under his care, and having, by his advice,
implored from God the strength of which he confessed his need, obtained
the mercy he sought, and, through divine help, reached his house in
peace.”

The worthy monk was so confounded with this parable that he could not
find words to reply. To cheer him up a little, I said to him, in a mild
tone: “But, after all, my dear father, what made you think of giving the
name of _sufficient_ to a grace which you say it is a point of faith to
believe is, in fact, insufficient?” “It is very easy for you to talk
about it,” said he. “You are an independent and private man; I am a
monk, and in a community—cannot you estimate the difference between the
two cases? We depend on superiors; they depend on others. They have
promised our votes—what would you have to become of me?” We understood
the hint; and this brought to our recollection the case of his brother
monk, who, for a similar piece of indiscretion, has been exiled to
Abbeville.

“But,” I resumed, “how comes it about that your community is bound to
admit this grace?” “That is another question,” he replied. “All that I
can tell you is, in one word, that our order has defended, to the utmost
of its ability, the doctrine of St. Thomas on efficacious grace. With
what ardor did it oppose, from the very commencement, the doctrine of
Molina? How did it labor to establish the necessity of the efficacious
grace of Jesus Christ? Don’t you know what happened under Clement VIII.
and Paul V., and how the former having been prevented by death, and the
latter hindered by some Italian affairs from publishing his bull, our
arms still sleep in the Vatican? But the Jesuits, availing themselves,
since the introduction of the heresy of Luther and Calvin, of the scanty
light which the people possess for discriminating between the error of
these men and the truth of the doctrine of St. Thomas, disseminated
their principles with such rapidity and success, that they became, ere
long, masters of the popular belief; while we, on our part, found
ourselves in the predicament of being denounced as Calvinists, and
treated as the Jansenists are at present, unless we qualified the
efficacious grace with, at least, the apparent avowal of a
_sufficient_.[100] In this extremity, what better course could we have
taken for saving the truth, without losing our own credit, than by
admitting the name of sufficient grace, while we denied that it was such
in effect? Such is the real history of the case.”

This was spoken in such a melancholy tone, that I really began to pity
the man; not so, however, my companion. “Flatter not yourselves,” said
he to the monk, “with having saved the truth; had she not found other
defenders, in your feeble hands she must have perished. By admitting
into the Church the name of her enemy, you have admitted the enemy
himself. Names are inseparable from things. If the term sufficient grace
be once established, it will be vain for you to protest that you
understand by it a grace which is _not_ sufficient. Your protest will be
held inadmissible. Your explanation would be scouted as odious in the
world, where men speak more ingenuously about matters of infinitely less
moment. The Jesuits will gain a triumph—it will be their grace, which is
sufficient, in fact, and not yours, which is only so in name, that will
pass as established; and the converse of your creed will become an
article of faith.”

“We will all suffer martyrdom first,” cried the father, “rather than
consent to the establishment of _sufficient grace in the sense of the
Jesuits_. St. Thomas, whom we have sworn to follow even to the death, is
diametrically opposed to such doctrine.”[101]

To this my friend, who took up the matter more seriously than I did,
replied: “Come now, father, your fraternity has received an honor which
it sadly abuses. It abandons that grace which was confided to its care,
and which has never been abandoned since the creation of the world. That
victorious grace, which was waited for by the patriarchs, predicted by
the prophets, introduced by Jesus Christ, preached by St. Paul,
explained by St. Augustine, the greatest of the fathers, embraced by his
followers, confirmed by St. Bernard, the last of the fathers,[102]
supported by St. Thomas, the angel of the schools,[103] transmitted by
him to your order, maintained by so many of your fathers, and so nobly
defended by your monks under popes Clement and Paul—that efficacious
grace, which had been committed as a sacred deposit into your hands,
that it might find, in a sacred and everlasting order, a succession of
preachers, who might proclaim it to the end of time—is discarded and
deserted for interests the most contemptible. It is high time for other
hands to arm in its quarrel. It is time for God to raise up intrepid
disciples of the Doctor of grace,[104] who, strangers to the
entanglements of the world, will serve God for God’s sake. Grace may
not, indeed, number the Dominicans among her champions, but champions
she shall never want; for, by her own almighty energy, she creates them
for herself. She demands hearts pure and disengaged; nay, she herself
purifies and disengages them from worldly interests, incompatible with
the truths of the Gospel. Reflect seriously on this, father; and take
care that God does not remove this candlestick from its place, leaving
you in darkness, and without the crown, as a punishment for the coldness
which you manifest to a cause so important to his Church.”[105]

He might have gone on in this strain much longer, for he was kindling as
he advanced, but I interrupted him by rising to take my leave, and said:
“Indeed, my dear father, had I any influence in France, I should have it
proclaimed, by sound of trumpet: ‘_BE IT KNOWN TO ALL MEN, that when the
Jacobins SAY that sufficient grace is given to all, they MEAN that all
have not the grace which actually suffices!_’ After which, you might say
it as often as you please, but not otherwise.” And thus ended our visit.

You will perceive, therefore, that we have here a _politic sufficiency_
somewhat similar to _proximate power_. Meanwhile I may tell you, that it
appears to me that both the proximate power and this same sufficient
grace may be safely doubted by anybody, provided he is not a
Jacobin.[106]

I have just come to learn, when closing my letter, that the censure[107]
has passed. But as I do not yet know in what terms it is worded, and as
it will not be published till the 15th of February, I shall delay
writing you about it till the next post.—I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 97:

  The Dominicans.

Footnote 98:

  _Et la suite fera voir que ces derniers ne sont pas les plus dupes._
  This clause, which appears in the last Paris edition, is wanting in
  the ordinary editions. The following sentence seems to require it.

Footnote 99:

  _Il opine du bonnet comme un moine en Sorbonne_—literally, “He votes
  with his cap like a monk in the Sorbonne”—alluding to the custom in
  that place of taking off the cap when a member was not disposed to
  speak, or in token of agreement with the rest. The half-hour
  sand-glass was a trick of the Jesuits, or Molinist party, to prevent
  their opponents from entering closely into the merits of the
  controversy, which required frequent references to the fathers.
  (Nicole, i. 184.)

Footnote 100:

  “It is certain,” says Bayle, “that the obligation which the Romish
  Church is under to respect the doctrine of St. Augustine on the
  subject of grace, in consequence of its having received the sanction
  of Popes and Councils at various times, placed it in a very awkward
  and ridiculous situation. It is so obvious to every man who examines
  the matter without prejudice, and with the necessary means of
  information, that the doctrine of Augustine and that of Jansenius are
  one and the same, that it is impossible to see, without feelings of
  indignation, the Court of Rome boasting of having condemned Jansenius,
  and nevertheless preserving to St. Augustine all his glory. The two
  things are utterly irreconcilable. What is more, the Council of Trent,
  by condemning the doctrine of Calvin on free-will, has, by necessity,
  condemned that of St. Augustine; for there is no Calvinist who has
  denied, or who can deny, the concourse of the human will and the
  liberty of the soul, in the sense which St. Augustine gives to the
  words concourse, co-operation, and liberty. There is no Calvinist who
  does not acknowledge the freedom of the will, and its use in
  conversion, if that word is understood according to the ideas of St.
  Augustine. Those whom the Council of Trent condemns do not reject
  free-will, except as signifying the liberty of indifference. The
  Thomists, also, reject it under this notion, and yet they pass for
  very good Catholics.” (Bayle’s Dict., art. _Augustine_.)

Footnote 101:

  It is a singular fact that the Roman Church, which boasts so much of
  her unity, and is ever charging the Reformed with being Calvinists,
  Lutherans, &c., is, in reality, divided into numerous conflicting
  sects, each _sworn_ to uphold the peculiar sentiments of its founder.
  If there is one principle more essential than another to the
  Reformation, it is that of entire independence of all masters in the
  faith: “Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.”

Footnote 102:

  “The famous St. Bernard, abbot of Clairval, whose influence throughout
  all Europe was incredible—whose word was a law, and whose counsels
  were regarded by kings and princes as so many orders to which the most
  respectful obedience was due; this eminent ecclesiastic was the person
  who contributed most to enrich and aggrandize the Cistercian order.”
  (Mosh. Eccl. Hist., cent. xii.)

Footnote 103:

  Thomas Aquinas, a scholastic divine of the thirteenth century, who was
  termed the _Angelic Doctor_.

Footnote 104:

  Augustine.

Footnote 105:

  Who can help regretting that sentiments so evangelical, so truly
  noble, and so eloquently expressed, should have been held by Pascal in
  connection with a Church which denounced him as a heretic for
  upholding them!

Footnote 106:

  An ironical reflection on the cowardly compromise of the Jacobins, or
  Dominicans, for having pledged themselves to the use of the term
  “sufficient,” in order to please the Jesuits.

Footnote 107:

  The censure of the Theological Faculty of the Sorbonne passed against
  M. Arnauld, and which is fully discussed in Letter iii.




   REPLY OF THE “PROVINCIAL” TO THE FIRST TWO LETTERS OF HIS FRIEND.

                                                     _February 2, 1656._

SIR,—Your two letters have not been confined to me. Everybody has seen
them, everybody understands them, and everybody believes them. They are
not only in high repute among theologians—they have proved agreeable to
men of the world, and intelligible even to the ladies.

In a communication which I lately received from one of the gentlemen of
the Academy—one of the most illustrious names in a society of men who
are all illustrious—who had seen only your first letter, he writes me as
follows: “I only wish that the Sorbonne, which owes so much to the
memory of the late cardinal,[108] would acknowledge the jurisdiction of
his French Academy. The author of the letter would be satisfied; for, in
the capacity of an academician, I would authoritatively condemn, I would
banish, I would proscribe—I had almost said exterminate—to the extent of
my power, this _proximate power_, which makes so much noise about
nothing, and without knowing what it would have. The misfortune is, that
our academic ‘power’ is a very limited and _remote_ power. I am sorry
for it; and still more sorry that my small power cannot discharge me
from my obligations to you,” &c.

My next extract is from the pen of a lady, whom I shall not indicate in
any way whatever. She writes thus to a female friend who had transmitted
to her the first of your letters: “You can have no idea how much I am
obliged to you for the letter you sent me—it is so very ingenious, and
so nicely written. It narrates, and yet it is not a narrative; it clears
up the most intricate and involved of all possible matters; its raillery
is exquisite; it enlightens those who know little about the subject, and
imparts double delight to those who understand it. It is an admirable
apology; and, if they would so take it, a delicate and innocent censure.
In short, that letter displays so much art, so much spirit, and so much
judgment, that I burn with curiosity to know who wrote it,” &c.

You too, perhaps, would like to know who the lady is that writes in this
style; but you must be content to esteem without knowing her; when you
come to know her, your esteem will be greatly enhanced.

Take my word for it, then, and continue your letters; and let the
censure come when it may, we are quite prepared for receiving it. These
words, “proximate power,” and “sufficient grace,” with which we are
threatened, will frighten us no longer. We have learned from the
Jesuits, the Jacobins, and M. le Moine, in how many different ways they
may be turned, and how little solidity there is in these new-fangled
terms, to give ourselves any trouble about them.—Meanwhile, I remain,
&c.

-----

Footnote 108:

  The Cardinal de Richelieu, the celebrated founder of the French
  Academy. The Sorbonne owed its magnificence to the liberality of this
  eminent statesman, who rebuilt its house, enlarged its revenues,
  enriched its library, and took it under his special patronage.




                              LETTER III.

    INJUSTICE, ABSURDITY, AND NULLITY OF THE CENSURE ON M. ARNAULD.


                                              PARIS, _February 9, 1656_.

SIR,—I have just received your letter; and, at the same time, there was
brought me a copy of the censure in manuscript. I find that I am as well
treated in the former, as M. Arnauld is ill-treated in the latter. I am
afraid there is some extravagance in both cases, and that neither of us
is sufficiently well known by our judges. Sure I am, that were we better
known, M. Arnauld would merit the approval of the Sorbonne, and I the
censure of the Academy. Thus our interests are quite at variance with
each other. It is his interest to make himself known, to vindicate his
innocence; whereas it is mine to remain in the dark, for fear of
forfeiting my reputation. Prevented, therefore, from showing my face, I
must devolve on you the task of making my acknowledgments to my
illustrious admirers, while I undertake that of furnishing you with the
news of the censure.

I assure you, sir, it has filled me with astonishment. I expected to
find it condemning the most shocking heresy in the world, but your
wonder will equal mine, when informed that these alarming preparations,
when on the point of producing the grand effect anticipated, have all
ended in smoke.

To understand the whole affair in a pleasant way, only recollect, I
beseech you, the strange impressions which, for a long time past, we
have been taught to form of the Jansenists. Recall to mind the cabals,
the factions, the errors, the schisms, the outrages, with which they
have been so long charged; the manner in which they have been denounced
and vilified from the pulpit and the press; and the degree to which this
torrent of abuse, so remarkable for its violence and duration, has
swollen of late years, when they have been openly and publicly accused
of being not only heretics and schismatics, but apostates and
infidels—with “denying the mystery of transubstantiation, and renouncing
Jesus Christ and the Gospel.”[109]

After having published these startling[110] accusations, it was resolved
to examine their writings, in order to pronounce judgment on them. For
this purpose the second letter of M. Arnauld, which was reported to be
full of the greatest errors,[111] is selected. The examiners appointed
are his most open and avowed enemies. They employ all their learning to
discover something that they might lay hold upon, and at length they
produce one proposition of a doctrinal character, which they exhibit for
censure.

What else could any one infer from such proceedings, than that this
proposition, selected under such remarkable circumstances, would contain
the essence of the blackest heresies imaginable. And yet the proposition
so entirely agrees with what is clearly and formally expressed in the
passages from the fathers quoted by M. Arnauld, that I have not met with
a single individual who could comprehend the difference between them.
Still, however, it might be imagined that there was a very great
difference; for the passages from the fathers being unquestionably
catholic, the proposition of M. Arnauld, if heretical, must be widely
opposed[112] to them.

Such was the difficulty which the Sorbonne was expected to clear up. All
Christendom waited, with wide-opened eyes, to discover, in the censure
of these learned doctors, the point of difference which had proved
imperceptible to ordinary mortals. Meanwhile M. Arnauld gave in his
defences, placing his own proposition and the passages of the fathers
from which he had drawn it in parallel columns, so as to make the
agreement between them apparent to the most obtuse understandings.

He shows, for example, that St. Augustine says in one passage, that
“Jesus Christ points out to us, in the person of St. Peter, a righteous
man warning us by his fall to avoid presumption.” He cites another
passage from the same father, in which he says, “that God, in order to
show us that without grace we can do nothing, left St. Peter without
grace.” He produces a third, from St. Chrysostom, who says, “that the
fall of St. Peter happened, not through any coldness towards Jesus
Christ, but because grace failed him; and that he fell, not so much
through his own negligence as through the withdrawment of God, as a
lesson to the whole Church, that without God we can do nothing.” He then
gives his own accused proposition, which is as follows: “The fathers
point out to us, in the person of St. Peter, a righteous man to whom
that grace without which we can do nothing, was wanting.”

In vain did people attempt to discover how it could possibly be, that M.
Arnauld’s expression differed from those of the fathers as much as truth
from error, and faith from heresy. For where was the difference to be
found? Could it be in these words, “that the fathers point out to us, in
the person of St. Peter, a righteous man?” St. Augustine has said the
same thing in so many words. Is it because he says “that grace had
failed him?” The same St. Augustine, who had said that “St. Peter was a
righteous man,” says “that he had not had grace on that occasion.” Is
it, then, for his having said, “that without grace we can do nothing?”
Why, is not this just what St. Augustine says in the same place, and
what St. Chrysostom had said before him, with this difference only, that
he expresses it in much stronger language, as when he says “that his
fall did not happen through his own coldness or negligence, but through
the failure of grace, and the withdrawment of God?”[113]

Such considerations as these kept everybody in a state of breathless
suspense, to learn in what this diversity could consist, when at length,
after a great many meetings, this famous and long-looked for censure
made its appearance. But, alas! it has sadly baulked our expectation.
Whether it be that the Molinist doctors would not condescend so far as
to enlighten us on the point, or for some other mysterious reason, the
fact is, they have done nothing more than pronounce these words: “This
proposition is rash, impious, blasphemous, accursed, and heretical!”

Would you believe it, sir, that most people, finding themselves deceived
in their expectations, have got into bad humor, and begin to fall foul
upon the censors themselves? They are drawing strange inferences from
their conduct in favor of M. Arnauld’s innocence. “What!” they are
saying, “is this all that could be achieved, during all this time, by so
many doctors joining in a furious attack on one individual? Can they
find nothing in all his works worthy of reprehension, but three lines,
and these extracted, word for word, from the greatest doctors of the
Greek and Latin Churches? Is there any author whatever whose writings,
were it intended to ruin him, would not furnish a more specious pretext
for the purpose? And what higher proof could be furnished of the
orthodoxy of this illustrious accused?

“How comes it to pass,” they add, “that so many denunciations are
launched in this censure, into which they have crowded such terms as
‘poison, pestilence, horror, rashness, impiety, blasphemy, abomination,
execration, anathema, heresy’—the most dreadful epithets that could be
used against Arius, or Antichrist himself; and all to combat an
imperceptible heresy, and that, moreover, without telling us what it is?
If it be against the words of the fathers that they inveigh in this
style, where is the faith and tradition? If against M. Arnauld’s
proposition, let them point out the difference between the two; for we
can see nothing but the most perfect harmony between them. As soon as we
have discovered the evil of the proposition, we shall hold it in
abhorrence; but so long as we do not see it, or rather see nothing in
the statement but the sentiments of the holy fathers, conceived and
expressed in their own terms, how can we possibly regard it with any
other feelings than those of holy veneration?”

Such is a specimen of the way in which they are giving vent to their
feelings. But these are by far too deep-thinking people. You and I, who
make no pretensions to such extraordinary penetration, may keep
ourselves quite easy about the whole affair. What! would we be wiser
than our masters? No: let us take example from them, and not undertake
what they have not ventured upon. We would be sure to get boggled in
such an attempt. Why it would be the easiest thing imaginable, to render
this censure itself heretical. Truth, we know, is so delicate, that if
we make the slightest deviation from it, we fall into error; but this
alleged error is so extremely fine-spun, that, if we diverge from it in
the slightest degree, we fall back upon the truth. There is positively
nothing between this obnoxious proposition and the truth but an
imperceptible point. The distance between them is so impalpable, that I
was in terror lest, from pure inability to perceive it, I might, in my
over-anxiety to agree with the doctors of the Sorbonne, place myself in
opposition to the doctors of the Church. Under this apprehension, I
judged it expedient to consult one of those who, through policy, was
neutral on the first question, that from him I might learn the real
state of the matter. I have accordingly had an interview with one of the
most intelligent of that party, whom I requested to point out to me the
difference between the two things, at the same time frankly owning to
him that I could see none.

He appeared to be amused at my simplicity, and replied, with a smile:
“How simple it is in you to believe that there is any difference! Why,
where could it be? Do you imagine that, if they could have found out any
discrepancy between M. Arnauld and the fathers, they would not have
boldly pointed it out, and been delighted with the opportunity of
exposing it before the public, in whose eyes they are so anxious to
depreciate that gentleman?”

I could easily perceive, from these few words, that those who had been
neutral on the first question, would not all prove so on the second; but
anxious to hear his reasons, I asked: “Why, then, have they attacked
this unfortunate proposition?”

“Is it possible,” he replied, “you can be ignorant of these two things,
which I thought had been known to the veriest tyro in these
matters?—that, on the one hand, M. Arnauld has uniformly avoided
advancing a single tenet which is not powerfully supported by the
tradition of the Church; and that, on the other hand, his enemies have
determined, cost what it may, to cut that ground from under him; and,
accordingly, that as the writings of the former afforded no handle to
the designs of the latter, they have been obliged, in order to satiate
their revenge, to seize on some proposition, it mattered not what, and
to condemn it without telling why or wherefore. Do not you know how the
Jansenists keep them in check, and annoy them so desperately, that they
cannot drop the slightest word against the principles of the fathers
without being incontinently overwhelmed with whole volumes, under the
pressure of which they are forced to succumb? So that, after a great
many proofs of their weakness, they have judged it more to the purpose,
and much less troublesome, to censure than to reply—it being a much
easier matter with them to find monks than reasons.”[114]

“Why then,” said I, “if this be the case, their censure is not worth a
straw; for who will pay any regard to it, when they see it to be without
foundation, and refuted, as it no doubt will be, by the answers given to
it?”

“If you knew the temper of people,” replied my friend the doctor, “you
would talk in another sort of way. Their censure, censurable as it is,
will produce nearly all its designed effect for a time; and although, by
the force of demonstration, it is certain that, in course of time, its
invalidity will be made apparent, it is equally true that, at first, it
will tell as effectually on the minds of most people as if it had been
the most righteous sentence in the world. Let it only be cried about the
streets: ‘Here you have the censure of M. Arnauld!—here you have the
condemnation of the Jansenists!’ and the Jesuits will find their account
in it. How few will ever read it! How few of them who do read, will
understand it! How few will observe that it answers no objections! How
few will take the matter to heart, or attempt to sift it to the
bottom?—Mark then, how much advantage this gives to the enemies of the
Jansenists. They are sure to make a triumph of it, though a vain one, as
usual, for some months at least—and that is a great matter for them—they
will look out afterwards for some new means of subsistence. They live
from hand to mouth, sir. It is in this way they have contrived to
maintain themselves down to the present day. Sometimes it is by a
catechism in which a child is made to condemn their opponents; then it
is by a procession, in which sufficient grace leads the efficacious in
triumph; again it is by a comedy, in which Jansenius is represented as
carried off by devils; at another time it is by an almanac; and now it
is by this censure.”[115]

“In good sooth,” said I, “I was on the point of finding fault with the
conduct of the Molinists; but after what you have told me, I must say I
admire their prudence and their policy. I see perfectly well that they
could not have followed a safer or more judicious course.”

“You are right,” returned he; “their safest policy has always been to
keep silent; and this led a certain learned divine to remark, ‘that the
cleverest among them are those who intrigue much, speak little, and
write nothing.’

“It is on this principle that, from the commencement of the meetings,
they prudently ordained that, if M. Arnauld came into the Sorbonne, it
must be simply to explain what he believed, and not to enter the lists
of controversy with any one. The examiners having ventured to depart a
little from this prudent arrangement, suffered for their temerity. They
found themselves rather too vigorously[116] refuted by his second
apology.

“On the same principle, they had recourse to that rare and very novel
device of the half-hour and the sand-glass.[117] By this means they rid
themselves of the importunity of those troublesome doctors,[118] who
might undertake to refute all their arguments, to produce books which
might convict them of forgery, to insist on a reply, and reduce them to
the predicament of having none to give.

“It is not that they were so blind as not to see that this encroachment
on liberty, which has induced so many doctors to withdraw from the
meetings, would do no good to their censure; and that the protest of
nullity, taken on this ground by M. Arnauld before it was concluded,
would be a bad preamble for securing it a favorable reception. They know
very well that unprejudiced persons place fully as much weight on the
judgment of seventy doctors, who had nothing to gain by defending M.
Arnauld, as on that of a hundred others who had nothing to lose by
condemning him. But, upon the whole, they considered that it would be of
vast importance to have a censure, although it should be the act of a
party only in the Sorbonne, and not of the whole body; although it
should be carried with little or no freedom of debate, and obtained by a
great many small manœuvres not exactly according to order; although it
should give no explanation of the matter in dispute; although it should
not point out in what this heresy consists, and should say as little as
possible about it, for fear of committing a mistake. This very silence
is a mystery in the eyes of the simple; and the censure will reap this
singular advantage from it, that they may defy the most critical and
subtle theologians to find in it a single weak argument.

“Keep yourself easy, then, and do not be afraid of being set down as a
heretic, though you should make use of the condemned proposition. It is
bad, I assure you, only as occurring in the second letter of M. Arnauld.
If you will not believe this statement on my word, I refer you to M. le
Moine, the most zealous of the examiners, who, in the course of
conversation with a doctor of my acquaintance this very morning, on
being asked by him where lay the point of difference in dispute, and if
one would no longer be allowed to say what the fathers had said before
him, made the following exquisite reply: ‘This proposition would be
orthodox in the mouth of any other—it is only as coming from M. Arnauld
that the Sorbonne have condemned it!’ You must now be prepared to admire
the machinery of Molinism, which can produce such prodigious
overturnings in the Church—that what is catholic in the fathers becomes
heretical in M. Arnauld—that what is heretical in the Semi-Pelagians
becomes orthodox in the writings of the Jesuits; the ancient doctrine of
St. Augustine becomes an intolerable innovation, and new inventions,
daily fabricated before our eyes, pass for the ancient faith of the
Church.” So saying, he took his leave of me.

This information has satisfied my purpose. I gather from it that this
same heresy is one of an entirely new species. It is not the sentiments
of M. Arnauld that are heretical; it is only his person. This is a
personal heresy. He is not a heretic for anything he has said or
written, but simply because he is M. Arnauld. This is all they have to
say against him. Do what he may, unless he cease to be, he will never be
a good Catholic. The grace of St. Augustine will never be the true
grace, so long as he continues to defend it. It would become so at once,
were he to take it into his head to impugn it. That would be a sure
stroke, and almost the only plan for establishing the truth and
demolishing Molinism; such is the fatality attending all the opinions
which he embraces.

Let us leave them, then, to settle their own differences. These are the
disputes of theologians, not of theology. We, who are no doctors, have
nothing to do with their quarrels. Tell our friends the news of the
censure, and love me while I am, &c.[119]

-----

Footnote 109:

  The charge of “denying the mystery of transubstantiation,” certainly
  did not justly apply to the Jansenists as such; these religious
  devotees denied nothing. Their system, so far as the dogmas of the
  Church were concerned, was one of implicit faith; but though Arnauld,
  Nicole, and the other learned men among them, stiffly maintained the
  leading tenets of the Romish Church, in opposition to those of the
  Reformers the Jansenist creed, as held by their pious followers, was
  practically at variance with transubstantiation, and many other errors
  of the Church to which they nominally belonged. (Mad.
  Schimmelpenninck’s Demolition of Port-Royal, pp. 77–80, &c.)

Footnote 110:

  _Atroces_—“atrocious.” (Edit. 1657.)

Footnote 111:

  _Des plus detestables erreurs_—“the most detestable errors.” (Edit.
  1657.) _Erreurs_—“errors.” (Nicole’s Edit., 1767.)

Footnote 112:

  _Horriblement contraire_—“horribly contrary.” (Edit. 1657.)

Footnote 113:

  The meaning of Chrysostom is good, but the expressions of these
  ancient fathers are often more remarkable for their strength than
  their precision. The Protestant reader hardly needs to be reminded,
  that if divine grace can be said to have failed the Apostle Peter at
  his fall, it can only be in the sense of a temporary suspension of its
  influences; and that this withdrawment of grace must be regarded as
  the punishment, and not as the cause, of his own negligence.

Footnote 114:

  That is, they could more readily procure monks to vote against M.
  Arnauld, than arguments to answer him.

Footnote 115:

  The allusions in the text afford curious illustrations of the mode of
  warfare pursued by the Jesuits of the seventeenth century. The first
  refers to a comic catechism, in which the simple language of childhood
  was employed as a vehicle for the most calumnious charges against the
  opponents of the Society. Pascal refers again to this catechism in
  Letter xvii. The second device was a sort of school-boy masquerade. A
  handsome youth, disguised as a female, in splendid attire, and bearing
  the inscription of _sufficient grace_, dragged behind him another
  dressed as a bishop (representing Jansenius, bishop of Ypres), who
  followed with a rueful visage, amidst the hootings of the other boys.
  The comedy referred to was acted in the Jesuits’ college of Clermont.
  The almanacs published in France at that period being usually
  embellished with rude cuts for the amusement of the vulgar, the
  Jesuits procured the insertion of a caricature of the Jansenists, who
  were represented as pursued by the pope, and taking refuge among the
  Calvinists. This, however, called forth a retaliation, in the shape of
  a poem, entitled “The Prints of the Famous Jesuitical Almanac,” in
  which the Jesuits were so successfully held up to ridicule, that they
  could hardly show face for some time in the streets of Paris. (Nicole,
  i. p. 208.)

Footnote 116:

  _Vertement_—“smartly.” (Edit. 1657.)

Footnote 117:

  See Letter ii.

Footnote 118:

  _Ces docteurs_—“those doctors.” (Edit. 1767.)

Footnote 119:

  In Nicole’s edition, this letter is signed with the initials “E. A. A.
  B. P. A. F. D. E. P.” which seem merely a chance medley of letters, to
  quiz those who were so anxious to discover the author. There may have
  been an allusion to the absurd story of a Jansenist conference held,
  it was said, at Bourg-Fontaine, in 1621, to deliberate on ways and
  means for abolishing Christianity; among the persons present at which,
  indicated by initials, Anthony Arnauld was ridiculously accused of
  having been one under the initials A. A. (See Bayle’s Dict., art.
  _Ant. Arnauld_.)




                               LETTER IV.

                 ON ACTUAL GRACE AND SINS OF IGNORANCE.


                                             PARIS, _February 25, 1656_.

SIR,—Nothing can come up to the Jesuits. I have seen Jacobins, doctors,
and all sorts of people in my day, but such an interview as I have just
had was wanting to complete my knowledge of mankind. Other men are
merely copies of them. As things are always found best at the
fountainhead, I paid a visit to one of the ablest among them, in company
with my trusty Jansenist—the same who accompanied me to the Dominicans.
Being particularly anxious to learn something of a dispute which they
have with the Jansenists about what they call _actual grace_, I said to
the worthy father that I would be much obliged to him if he would
instruct me on this point—that I did not even know what the term meant,
and would thank him to explain it. “With all my heart,” the Jesuit
replied; “for I dearly love inquisitive people. Actual grace, according
to our definition, ‘is an inspiration of God, whereby he makes us to
know his will, and excites within us a desire to perform it.’”

“And where,” said I, “lies your difference with the Jansenists on this
subject?”

“The difference lies here,” he replied; “we hold that God bestows actual
grace _on all men in every case of temptation_; for we maintain, that
unless a person have, whenever tempted, actual grace to keep him from
sinning, his sin, whatever it may be, can never be imputed to him. The
Jansenists, on the other hand, affirm that sins, though committed
without actual grace, are, nevertheless, imputed; but they are a pack of
fools.” I got a glimpse of his meaning; but, to obtain from him a fuller
explanation, I observed: “My dear father, it is that phrase _actual
grace_ that puzzles me; I am quite a stranger to it, and if you would
have the goodness to tell me the same thing over again, without
employing that term, you would infinitely oblige me.”

“Very good,” returned the father; “that is to say, you want me to
substitute the definition in place of the thing defined; that makes no
alteration on the sense; I have no objections. We maintain it, then, as
an undeniable principle, _that an action cannot be imputed as a sin,
unless God bestow on us, before committing it, the knowledge of the evil
that is in the action, and an inspiration inciting us to avoid it_. Do
you understand me now?”

Astonished at such a declaration, according to which, no sins of
surprise, nor any of those committed in entire forgetfulness of God,
could be imputed, I turned round to my friend the Jansenist, and easily
discovered from his looks that he was of a different way of thinking.
But as he did not utter a word, I said to the monk, “I would fain wish,
my dear father, to think that what you have now said is true, and that
you have good proofs for it.”

“Proofs, say you!” he instantly exclaimed: “I shall furnish you with
these very soon, and the very best sort too; let me alone for that.”

So saying, he went in search of his books, and I took this opportunity
of asking my friend if there was any other person who talked in this
manner? “Is this so strange to you?” he replied. “You may depend upon it
that neither the fathers, nor the popes, nor councils, nor Scripture,
nor any book of devotion, employ such language; but if you wish casuists
and modern schoolmen, he will bring you a goodly number of them on his
side.” “O! but I care not a fig about these authors, if they are
contrary to tradition,” I said. “You are right,” he replied.

As he spoke, the good father entered the room, laden with books; and
presenting to me the first that came to hand, “Read that,” he said;
“this is ‘The Summary of Sins,’ by Father Bauny[120]—the fifth edition
too, you see, which shows that it is a good book.”

“It is a pity, however,” whispered the Jansenist in my ear, “that this
same book has been condemned at Rome, and by the bishops of France.”

“Look at page 906,” said the father. I did so, and read as follows: “In
order to sin and become culpable in the sight of God, it is necessary to
know that the thing we wish to do is not good, or at least to doubt that
it is—to fear or to judge that God takes no pleasure in the action which
we contemplate, but forbids it; and in spite of this, to commit the
deed, leap the fence, and transgress.”

“This is a good commencement,” I remarked. “And yet,” said he, “mark how
far envy will carry some people. It was on that very passage that M.
Hallier, before he became one of our friends, bantered Father Bauny, by
applying to him these words: _Ecce qui tollit peccata mundi_—‘Behold the
man that taketh away the sins of the world!’”

“Certainly,” said I, “according to Father Bauny, we may be said to
behold a redemption of an entirely new description.”

“Would you have a more authentic witness on the point?” added he. “Here
is the book of Father Annat.[121] It is the last that he wrote against
M. Arnauld. Turn up to page 34, where there is a dog’s ear, and read the
lines which I have marked with pencil—they ought to be written in
letters of gold.” I then read these words: “He that has no thought of
God, nor of his sins, nor any apprehension (that is, as he explained it,
any knowledge) of his obligation to exercise the acts of love to God or
contrition, has no actual grace for exercising those acts; but it is
equally true that he is guilty of no sin in omitting them, and that, if
he is damned, it will not be as a punishment for that omission.” And a
few lines below, he adds: “The same thing may be said of a culpable
commission.”

“You see,” said the monk, “how he speaks of sins of _omission_ and of
_commission_. Nothing escapes him. What say you to that?”

“Say!” I exclaimed. “I am delighted! What a charming train of
consequences do I discover flowing from this doctrine! I can see the
whole results already; and such mysteries present themselves before me!
Why, I see more people, beyond all comparison, justified by this
ignorance and forgetfulness of God, than by grace and the
sacraments![122] But, my dear father, are you not inspiring me with a
delusive joy? Are you sure there is nothing here like that _sufficiency_
_which suffices not_? I am terribly afraid of the _Distinguo_;—I was
taken in with that once already! Are you quite in earnest?”

“How now!” cried the monk, beginning to get angry; “here is no matter
for jesting. I assure you there is no such thing as equivocation here.”

“I am not making a jest of it,” said I; “but that is what I really
dread, from pure anxiety to find it true.”[123]

“Well then,” he said, “to assure yourself still more of it, here are the
writings of M. le Moine,[124] who taught the doctrine in a full meeting
of the Sorbonne. He learned it from us, to be sure; but he has the merit
of having cleared it up most admirably. O how circumstantially he goes
to work! He shows that, in order to make out an action to be _a sin_,
all these things must have passed through the mind. Read, and weigh
every word.”—I then read what I now give you in a translation from the
original Latin: “1. On the one hand, God sheds abroad on the soul some
measure of love, which gives it a bias toward the thing commanded; and
on the other, a rebellious concupiscence solicits it in the opposite
direction. 2. God inspires the soul with a knowledge of its own
weakness. 3. God reveals the knowledge of the physician who can heal it.
4. God inspires it with a desire to be healed. 5. God inspires a desire
to pray and solicit his assistance.”

“And unless all these things occur and pass through the soul,” added the
monk, “the action is not properly a sin, and cannot be imputed, as M. le
Moine shows in the same place and in what follows. Would you wish to
have other authorities for this? Here they are.”

“All modern ones, however,” whispered my Jansenist friend.

“So I perceive,” said I to him aside; and then, turning to the monk: “O
my dear sir,” cried I, “what a blessing this will be to some persons of
my acquaintance! I must positively introduce them to you. You have
never, perhaps, met with people who had fewer sins to account for all
your life. For, in the first place, they never think of God at all;
their vices have got the better of their reason; they have never known
either their weakness or the physician who can cure it; they have never
thought of ‘desiring the health of their soul,’ and still less of
‘praying to God to bestow it;’ so that, according to M. le Moine, they
are still in the state of baptismal innocence. They have ‘never had a
thought of loving God or of being contrite for their sins;’ so that,
according to Father Annat, they have never committed sin through the
want of charity and penitence. Their life is spent in a perpetual round
of all sorts of pleasures, in the course of which they have not been
interrupted by the slightest remorse. These excesses had led me to
imagine that their perdition was inevitable; but you, father, inform me
that these same excesses secure their salvation. Blessings on you, my
good father, for this way of justifying people! Others prescribe painful
austerities for healing the soul; but you show that souls which may be
thought desperately distempered are in quite good health. What an
excellent device for being happy both in this world and in the next! I
had always supposed that the less a man thought of God, the more he
sinned; but, from what I see now, if one could only succeed in bringing
himself not to think upon God at all, everything would be pure with him
in all time coming. Away with your half-and-half sinners, who retain
some sneaking affection for virtue! They will be damned every one of
them, these semi-sinners. But commend me to your arrant
sinners—hardened, unalloyed, out-and-out, thorough-bred sinners. Hell is
no place for them; they have cheated the devil, purely by virtue of
their devotion to his service!”

The good father, who saw very well the connection between these
consequences and his principle, dexterously evaded them; and maintaining
his temper, either from good nature or policy, he merely replied: “To
let you understand how we avoid these inconveniences, you must know
that, while we affirm that these reprobates to whom you refer would be
without sin if they had no thoughts of conversion and no desires to
devote themselves to God, we maintain, that they all actually _have_
such thoughts and desires, and that God never permitted a man to sin
without giving him previously a view of the evil which he contemplated,
and a desire, either to avoid the offence, or at all events to implore
his aid to enable him to avoid it; and none but Jansenists will assert
the contrary.”

“Strange! father,” returned I; “is this, then, the heresy of the
Jansenists, to deny that every time a man commits a sin, he is troubled
with a remorse of conscience, in spite of which, he ‘leaps the fence and
transgresses,’ as Father Bauny has it? It is rather too good a joke to
be made a heretic for that. I can easily believe that a man may be
damned for not having good thoughts; but it never would have entered my
head to imagine that any man could be subjected to that doom for not
believing that all mankind must have good thoughts! But, father, I hold
myself bound in conscience to disabuse you, and to inform you that there
are thousands of people who have no such desires—who sin without
regret—who sin with delight—who make a boast of sinning. And who ought
to know better about these things than yourself? You cannot have failed
to have confessed some of those to whom I allude; for it is among
persons of high rank that they are most generally to be met with.[125]
But mark, father, the dangerous consequences of your maxim. Do you not
perceive what effect it may have on those libertines who like nothing
better than to find out matter of doubt in religion? What a handle do
you give them, when you assure them, as an article of faith, that on
every occasion when they commit a sin, they feel an inward presentiment
of the evil, and a desire to avoid it? Is it not obvious that, feeling
convinced by their own experience of the falsity of your doctrine on
this point, which you say is a matter of faith, they will extend the
inference drawn from this to all the other points? They will argue that,
since you are not trust-worthy in one article, you are to be suspected
in them all; and thus you shut them up to conclude, either that religion
is false, or that you must know very little about it.”

Here my friend the Jansenist, following up my remarks, said to him: “You
would do well, father, if you wish to preserve your doctrine, not to
explain so precisely as you have done to us, what you mean by _actual
grace_. For, how could you, without forfeiting all credit in the
estimation of men, openly declare that _nobody sins without having
previously the knowledge of his weakness, and of a physician, or the
desire of a cure, and of asking it of God_? Will it be believed, on your
word, that those who are immersed in avarice, impurity, blasphemy,
duelling, revenge, robbery and sacrilege, have really a desire to
embrace chastity, humility, and the other Christian virtues? Can it be
conceived that those philosophers who boasted so loudly of the powers of
nature, knew its infirmity and its physician? Will you maintain that
those who held it as a settled maxim that ‘it is not God that bestows
virtue, and that no one ever asked it from him,’ would think of asking
it for themselves? Who can believe that the Epicureans, who denied a
divine providence, ever felt any inclination to pray to God?—men who
said that ‘it would be an insult to invoke the Deity in our necessities,
as if he were capable of wasting a thought on beings like us?’ In a
word, how can it be imagined that idolaters and Atheists, every time
they are tempted to the commission of sin, in other words, infinitely
often during their lives, have a desire to pray to the true God, of whom
they are ignorant, that he would bestow on them virtues of which they
have no conception?”

“Yes,” said the worthy monk, in a resolute tone, “we will affirm it: and
sooner than allow that any one sins without having the consciousness
that he is doing evil, and the desire of the opposite virtue, we will
maintain that the whole world, reprobates and infidels included, have
these inspirations and desires in every case of temptation. You cannot
show me, from the Scripture at least, that this is not the truth.”

On this remark I struck in, by exclaiming: “What! father, must we have
recourse to the Scripture to demonstrate a thing so clear as this? This
is not a point of faith, nor even of reason. It is a matter of fact: we
see it—we know it—we feel it.”

But the Jansenist, keeping the monk to his own terms, addressed him as
follows: “If you are willing, father, to stand or fall by Scripture, I
am ready to meet you there; only you must promise to yield to its
authority; and since it is written that ‘God has not revealed his
judgments to the Heathen, but left them to wander in their own ways,’
you must not say that God has enlightened those whom the Sacred Writings
assure us ‘he has left in darkness and in the shadow of death.’ Is it
not enough to show the erroneousness of your principle, to find that St.
Paul calls himself ‘the chief of sinners,’ for a sin which he committed
‘ignorantly, and with zeal?’ Is it not enough to find, from the Gospel,
that those who crucified Jesus Christ had need of the pardon which he
asked for them, although they knew not the malice of their action, and
would never have committed it, according to St. Paul, if they had known
it? Is it not enough that Jesus Christ apprizes us that there will be
persecutors of the Church, who, while making every effort to ruin her,
will ‘think that they are doing God service;’ teaching us that this sin,
which in the judgment of the apostle, is the greatest of all sins, may
be committed by persons who, so far from knowing that they were sinning,
would think that they sinned by not committing it? In fine, is it not
enough that Jesus Christ himself has taught us that there are two kinds
of sinners, the one of whom sin with ‘knowledge of their Master’s will,’
and the other without knowledge; and that both of them will be
‘chastised,’ although, indeed, in a different manner?”

Sorely pressed by so many testimonies from Scripture, to which he had
appealed, the worthy monk began to give way; and, leaving the wicked to
sin without inspiration, he said: “You will not deny that _good men_, at
least, never sin unless God give them”——“You are flinching,” said I,
interrupting him; “you are flinching now, my good father; you abandon
the general principle, and finding that it will not hold good in regard
to the wicked, you would compound the matter, by making it apply at
least to the righteous. But in this point of view the application of it
is, I conceive, so circumscribed, that it will hardly apply to anybody,
and it is scarcely worth while to dispute the point.”

My friend, however, who was so ready on the whole question, that I am
inclined to think he had studied it all that very morning, replied:
“This, father, is the last entrenchment to which those of your party who
are willing to reason at all are sure to retreat; but you are far from
being safe even here. The example of the saints is not a whit more in
your favor. Who doubts that they often fall into sins of surprise,
without being conscious of them? Do we not learn from the saints
themselves how often concupiscence lays hidden snares for them; and how
generally it happens, as St. Augustine complains of himself in his
Confessions, that, with all their discretion, they ‘give to pleasure
what they mean only to give to necessity?’

“How usual is it to see the more zealous friends of truth betrayed by
the heat of controversy into sallies of bitter passion for their
personal interests, while their consciences, at the time, bear them no
other testimony than that they are acting in this manner purely for the
interests of truth, and they do not discover their mistake till long
afterwards!

“What, again, shall we say of those who, as we learn from examples in
ecclesiastical history, eagerly involve themselves in affairs which are
really bad, because they believe them to be really good; and yet this
does not hinder the fathers from condemning such persons as having
sinned on these occasions?

“And were this not the case, how could the saints have their secret
faults? How could it be true that God alone knows the magnitude and the
number of our offences; that no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred
or love; and that the best of saints, though unconscious of any
culpability, ought always, as St. Paul says of himself, to remain in
‘fear and trembling?’[126]

“You perceive, then, father, that this knowledge of the evil, and love
of the opposite virtue, which you imagine to be essential to constitute
sin, are equally disproved by the examples of the righteous and of the
wicked. In the case of the wicked, their passion for vice sufficiently
testifies that they have no desire for virtue; and in regard to the
righteous, the love which they bear to virtue plainly shows that they
are not always conscious of those sins which, as the Scripture teaches,
they are daily committing.

“So true is it, indeed, that the righteous often sin through ignorance,
that the greatest saints rarely sin otherwise. For how can it be
supposed that souls so pure, who avoid with so much care and zeal the
least things that can be displeasing to God as soon as they discover
them, and who yet sin many times every day, could possibly have, every
time before they fell into sin, ‘the knowledge of their infirmity on
that occasion, and of their physician, and the desire of their souls’
health, and of praying to God for assistance,’ and that, in spite of
these inspirations, these devoted souls ‘nevertheless transgress,’ and
commit the sin?

“You must conclude then, father, that neither sinners nor yet saints
have always that knowledge, or those desires and inspirations every time
they offend; that is, to use your own terms, they have not always actual
grace. Say no longer, with your modern authors, that it is impossible
for those to sin who do not know righteousness; but rather join with St.
Augustine and the ancient fathers in saying that it is impossible _not_
to sin, when we do not know righteousness: _Necesse est ut peccet, a quo
ignoratur justitia_.”

The good father, though thus driven from both of his positions, did not
lose courage, but after ruminating a little, “Ha!” he exclaimed, “I
shall settle you immediately.” And again taking up Father Bauny, he
pointed to the same place he had before quoted, exclaiming: “Look
now—see the ground on which he establishes his opinion! I was sure he
would not be deficient in good proofs. Read what he quotes from
Aristotle, and you will see that after so express an authority, you must
either burn the books of this prince of philosophers or adopt our
opinion. Hear, then, the principles which support Father Bauny:
Aristotle states first, ‘_that an action cannot be imputed as
blameworthy, if it be involuntary_.’”

“I grant that,” said my friend.

“This is the first time you have agreed together,” said I. “Take my
advice, father, and proceed no further.”

“That would be doing nothing,” he replied; “we must know what are the
conditions necessary to constitute an action voluntary.”

“I am much afraid,” returned I, “that you will get at loggerheads on
that point.”

“No fear of that,” said he; “this is sure ground—Aristotle is on my
side. Hear, now, what Father Bauny says: ‘In order that an action be
voluntary, it must proceed from a man who perceives, knows, and
comprehends what is good and what is evil in it. _Voluntarium est_—that
is a voluntary action, as we commonly say with the philosopher’ (that is
Aristotle, you know, said the monk, squeezing my hand;) ‘_quod fit a
principio cognoscente singula in quibus est actio_—which is done by a
person knowing the particulars of the action; so that when the will is
led inconsiderately, and without mature reflection, to embrace or
reject, to do or omit to do anything, before the understanding has been
able to see whether it would be right or wrong, such an action is
neither good nor evil; because previous to this mental inquisition,
view, and reflection on the good or bad qualities of the matter in
question, the act by which it is done is not voluntary.’ Are you
satisfied now?” said the father.

“It appears,” returned I, “that Aristotle agrees with Father Bauny; but
that does not prevent me from feeling surprised at this statement. What,
sir! is it not enough to make an action voluntary that the man knows
what he is doing, and does it just because he chooses to do it? Must we
suppose, besides this, that he ‘perceives, knows, and comprehends what
is good and evil in the action?’ Why, on this supposition there would be
hardly such a thing in nature as voluntary actions, for nobody almost
thinks about all this. How many oaths in gambling—how many excesses in
debauchery—how many riotous extravagances in the carnival, must, on this
principle, be excluded from the list of voluntary actions, and
consequently neither good nor bad, because not accompanied by those
‘mental reflections on the good and evil qualities’ of the action? But
is it possible, father, that Aristotle held such a sentiment? I have
always understood that he was a sensible man.”

“I shall soon convince you of that,” said the Jansenist; and requesting
a sight of Aristotle’s Ethics, he opened it at the beginning of the
third book, from which Father Bauny had taken the passage quoted, and
said to the monk: “I excuse you, my dear sir, for having believed, on
the word of Father Bauny, that Aristotle held such a sentiment; but you
would have changed your mind had you read him for yourself. It is true
that he teaches, that ‘in order to make an action voluntary, we must
know the particulars of that action’—_singula in quibus est actio_. But
what else does he mean by that, than the _particular circumstances_ of
the action? The examples which he adduces clearly show this to be his
meaning, for they are exclusively confined to cases in which the persons
were ignorant of some of the circumstances; such as that of ‘a person
who, wishing to exhibit a machine, discharges a dart which wounds a
bystander; and that of Merope, who killed her own son instead of her
enemy,’ and such like.

“Thus you see what is the kind of ignorance that renders actions
involuntary; namely, that of the particular circumstances, which is
termed by divines, as you must know, _ignorance of the fact_. But with
respect to _ignorance of the right_—ignorance of the good or evil in an
action—which is the only point in question, let us see if Aristotle
agrees with Father Bauny. Here are the words of the philosopher: ‘All
wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do, and what they ought to
avoid; and it is this very ignorance which makes them wicked and
vicious. Accordingly, a man cannot be said to act involuntarily merely
because he is ignorant of what it is proper for him to do in order to
fulfil his duty. This ignorance in the choice of good and evil does not
make the action involuntary; it only makes it vicious. The same thing
may be affirmed of the man who is ignorant generally of the rules of his
duty; such ignorance is worthy of blame, not of excuse. And
consequently, the ignorance which renders actions involuntary and
excusable is simply that which relates to the fact and its particular
circumstances. In this case the person is excused and forgiven, being
considered as having acted contrary to his inclination.’

“After this, father, will you maintain that Aristotle is of your
opinion? And who can help being astonished to find that a Pagan
philosopher had more enlightened views than your doctors, in a matter so
deeply affecting morals, and the direction of conscience, too, as the
knowledge of those conditions which render actions voluntary or
involuntary, and which, accordingly, charge or discharge them as sinful?
Look for no more support, then, father, from the prince of philosophers,
and no longer oppose yourselves to the prince of theologians,[127] who
has thus decided the point in the first book of his Retractations,
chapter XV.: ‘Those who sin through ignorance, though they sin without
meaning to sin, commit the deed only because they _will_ commit it. And,
therefore, even this sin of ignorance cannot be committed except by the
will of him who commits it, though by a will which incites him to the
action merely, and not to the sin; and yet the action itself is
nevertheless sinful, for it is enough to constitute it such that he has
done what he was bound not to do.’”

The Jesuit seemed to be confounded more with the passage from Aristotle,
I thought, than that from St. Augustine; but while he was thinking on
what he could reply, a messenger came to inform him that Madame la
Mareschale of ——, and Madame the Marchioness of ——, requested his
attendance. So taking a hasty leave of us, he said: “I shall speak about
it to our fathers. They will find an answer to it, I warrant you; we
have got some long heads among us.”

We understood him perfectly well; and on our being left alone, I
expressed to my friend my astonishment at the subversion which this
doctrine threatened to the whole system of morals. To this he replied
that he was quite astonished at my astonishment. “Are you not yet
aware,” he said, “that they have gone to far greater excess in morals
than in any other matter?” He gave me some strange illustrations of
this, promising me more at some future time. The information which I may
receive on this point, will, I hope, furnish the topic of my next
communication.—I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 120:

  Etienne Bauni, or Stephen Bauny, was a French Jesuit. His “Summary,”
  which Pascal has immortalized by his frequent references to it, was
  published in 1633. It is a large volume, stuffed with the most
  detestable doctrines. In 1642, the General Assembly of the French
  clergy censured his books on moral theology, as containing
  propositions “leading to licentiousness, and the corruption of good
  manners, violating natural equity, and excusing blasphemy, usury,
  simony, and other heinous sins, as trivial matters.” (Nicole, i. 164.)
  And yet this abominable work was formally defended in the “Apology for
  the Casuists,” written in 1657, by Father Pirot, and acknowledged by
  the Jesuits as having been written under their direction! (Nicole,
  Hist. des Provinciales, p. 30.)

Footnote 121:

  Francis Annat was born in the year 1590. He was made rector of the
  College of Toulouse, and appointed by the Jesuits their French
  provincial; and, while in that situation, was chosen by Louis XIV. as
  his confessor. His friends have highly extolled his virtues as a man;
  and the reader may judge of the value of these eulogiums from the
  fact, that he retained his post as the favorite confessor of that
  licentious monarch, without interruption, till deafness prevented him
  from listening any longer to the confessions of his royal penitent.
  (Bayle, art. _Annat_.) They have also extolled his answer to the
  Provincial Letters, in his “Bonne Foy des Jansenistes,” in which he
  professed to expose the falsity of the quotations made from the
  Casuists, with what success, appears from the Notes of Nicole, who has
  completely vindicated Pascal from the unfounded charges which the
  Jesuits have reiterated on this point. (Notes Preliminaires, vol. i.
  p. 256, &c.; Entretiens de Cleandre et Eudoxe, p. 79.)

Footnote 122:

  When Madame du Valois, a lady of birth and high accomplishments, one
  of the nuns of Port-Royal, among other trials by which she was
  harassed and tormented for not signing the formulary condemning
  Jansenius, was threatened with being deprived of the benefit of the
  sacraments at the hour of death, she replied: “If, at the awful hour
  of death, I should be deprived of those assistances which the Church
  grants to all her children, then God himself will, by his grace,
  immediately and abundantly supply their instrumentality. I know,
  indeed, that it is most painful to approach the awful hour of death
  without an outward participation in the sacraments; but it is better
  dying to enter into heaven, though without the sacraments, for the
  cause of truth, than, receiving the sacraments, to be cited to
  irrevocable judgment for committing perjury.” (Narrative of Dem. of
  Port-Royal, p. 176.)

Footnote 123:

  Will it be believed that the Jesuits actually had the consummate
  hypocrisy to pretend that Pascal meant to throw ridicule on the grace
  of God, while he was merely exposing to merited contempt their own
  perversions of the doctrine?

Footnote 124:

  See before, page 70.

Footnote 125:

  The Jesuits were notorious for the assiduity with which they sought
  admission into the families, and courted the confidence of the great,
  with whom, from the laxness of their discipline and morality, as well
  as from their superior manners and accomplishments, they were, as they
  still are, the favorite confessors. They have a maxim among their
  secret instructions, that in dealing with the consciences of the
  great, the confessor must be guided by the looser sort of opinions.
  The author of the _Theatre Jesuitique_ illustrates this by an
  anecdote. A rich gentleman falling sick, confessed himself to a
  Jesuit, and among other sins acknowledged an illicit intercourse with
  a lady, whose portrait, thinking himself dying, he gave with many
  expressions of remorse, to his confessor. The gentleman, however,
  recovered, and with returning health a salutary change was effected on
  his character. The Jesuit, finding himself forgotten, paid a visit to
  his former penitent, and gave him back the portrait, which renewed all
  his former passion, and soon brought him again to the feet of his
  confessor!

Footnote 126:

  “The doubtsome faith of the pope,” as it was styled by our Reformers,
  is here lamentably apparent. The “fear and trembling” of the apostle
  were those of anxious care and diligence, not of doubt or
  apprehension. The Church of Rome, with all her pretensions to be
  regarded as the only safe and infallible guide to salvation, keeps her
  children in darkness and doubt on this point to the last moment of
  life; they are never permitted to reach the peaceful assurance of
  God’s love and the humble hope of eternal life which the Gospel
  warrants the believer to cherish; and this, while it serves to keep
  the superstitious multitude under the sway of priestly domination,
  accounts for the _gloom_ which has characterized, in all ages, the
  devotion of the best and most intelligent Romanists.

Footnote 127:

  Augustine.




                               LETTER V.

DESIGN OF THE JESUITS IN ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM OF MORALS—TWO SORTS
   OF CASUISTS AMONG THEM, A GREAT MANY LAX, AND SOME SEVERE ONES—REASON
   OF THIS DIFFERENCE—EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROBABILITY—A
   MULTITUDE OF MODERN AND UNKNOWN AUTHORS SUBSTITUTED IN THE PLACE OF
   THE HOLY FATHERS.


                                                PARIS, _March 20, 1656_.

SIR,—According to my promise, I now send you the first outlines of the
morals taught by those good fathers the Jesuits—“those men distinguished
for learning and sagacity, who are all under the guidance of divine
wisdom—a surer guide than all philosophy.” You imagine, perhaps, that I
am in jest, but I am perfectly serious; or rather, they are so when they
speak thus of themselves in their book entitled “The Image of the First
Century.”[128] I am only copying their own words, and may now give you
the rest of the eulogy: “They are a society of men, or rather let us
call them angels, predicted by Isaiah in these words, ‘Go, ye swift and
ready angels.’”[129] The prediction is as clear as day, is it not? “They
have the spirit of eagles; they are a flock of phœnixes (a late author
having demonstrated that there are a great many of these birds); they
have changed the face of Christendom!” Of course, we must believe all
this, since they have said it; and in one sense you will find the
account amply verified by the sequel of this communication, in which I
propose to treat of their maxims.

Determined to obtain the best possible information, I did not trust to
the representations of our friend the Jansenist, but sought an interview
with some of themselves. I found, however, that he told me nothing but
the bare truth, and I am persuaded he is an honest man. Of this you may
judge from the following account of these conferences.

In the conversation I had with the Jansenist, he told me so many strange
things about these fathers, that I could with difficulty believe them,
till he pointed them out to me in their writings; after which he left me
nothing more to say in their defence, than that these might be the
sentiments of some individuals only, which it was not fair to impute to
the whole fraternity.[130] And, indeed, I assured him that I knew some
of them who were as severe as those whom he quoted to me were lax. This
led him to explain to me the spirit of the Society, which is not known
to every one; and you will perhaps have no objections to learn something
about it.

“You imagine,” he began, “that it would tell considerably in their favor
to show that some of their fathers are as friendly to Evangelical maxims
as others are opposed to them; and you would conclude from that
circumstance, that these loose opinions do not belong to the whole
Society. That I grant you; for had such been the case, they would not
have suffered persons among them holding sentiments so diametrically
opposed to licentiousness. But as it is equally true that there are
among them those who hold these licentious doctrines, you are bound also
to conclude that the Spirit of the Society is not that of Christian
severity; for had such been the case, they would not have suffered
persons among them holding sentiments so diametrically opposed to that
severity.”

“And what, then,” I asked, “can be the design of the whole as a body?
Perhaps they have no fixed principle, and every one is left to speak out
at random whatever he thinks.”

“That cannot be,” returned my friend; “such an immense body could not
subsist in such a hap-hazard sort of way, or without a soul to govern
and regulate its movements; besides, it is one of their express
regulations, that none shall print a page without the approval of their
superiors.”

“But,” said I, “how can these same superiors give their consent to
maxims so contradictory?”

“That is what you have yet to learn,” he replied. “Know, then, that
their object is not the corruption of manners—that is not their design.
But as little is it their sole aim to reform them—that would be bad
policy. Their idea is briefly this: They have such a good opinion of
themselves as to believe that it is useful, and in some sort essentially
necessary to the good of religion, that their influence should extend
everywhere, and that they should govern all consciences. And the
Evangelical or severe maxims being best fitted for managing some sorts
of people, they avail themselves of these when they find them favorable
to their purpose. But as these maxims do not suit the views of the great
bulk of people, they wave them in the case of such persons, in order to
keep on good terms with all the world. Accordingly, having to deal with
persons of all classes and of all different nations, they find it
necessary to have casuists cut out to match this diversity.

“On this principle, you will easily see that if they had none but the
looser sort of casuists, they would defeat their main design, which is
to embrace all; for those that are truly pious are fond of a stricter
discipline. But as there are not many of that stamp, they do not require
many severe directors to guide them. They have a few for the select few;
while whole multitudes of lax casuists are provided for the multitudes
that prefer laxity.[131]

“It is in virtue of this ‘obliging and accommodating’ conduct, as Father
Petau[132] calls it, that they may be said to stretch out a helping hand
to all mankind. Should any person present himself before them, for
example, fully resolved to make restitution of some ill-gotten gains, do
not suppose that they would dissuade him from it. By no means; on the
contrary, they will applaud and confirm him in such a holy resolution.
But suppose another should come who wishes to be absolved without
restitution, and it will be a particularly hard case indeed, if they
cannot furnish him with means of evading the duty, of one kind or
another, the lawfulness of which they will be ready to guarantee.

“By this policy they keep all their friends, and defend themselves
against all their foes; for, when charged with extreme laxity, they have
nothing more to do than produce their austere directors, with some books
which they have written on the severity of the Christian code of morals;
and simple people, or those who never look below the surface of things,
are quite satisfied with these proofs of the falsity of the accusation.

“Thus are they prepared for all sorts of persons, and so ready are they
to suit the supply to the demand, that when they happen to be in any
part of the world where the doctrine of a crucified God is accounted
foolishness, they suppress the offence of the cross, and preach only a
glorious and not a suffering Jesus Christ. This plan they followed in
the Indies and in China, where they permitted Christians to practise
idolatry itself, with the aid of the following ingenious
contrivance:—they made their converts conceal under their clothes an
image of Jesus Christ, to which they taught them to transfer mentally
those adorations which they rendered ostensibly to the idol Cachinchoam
and Keum-fucum. This charge is brought against them by Gravina, a
Dominican, and is fully established by the Spanish memorial presented to
Philip IV., king of Spain, by the Cordeliers of the Philippine Islands,
quoted by Thomas Hurtado, in his ‘Martyrdom of the Faith,’ page 427. To
such a length did this practice go, that the Congregation _De
Propaganda_ were obliged expressly to forbid the Jesuits, on pain of
excommunication, to permit the worship of idols on any pretext whatever,
or to conceal the mystery of the cross from their catechumens; strictly
enjoining them to admit none to baptism who were not thus instructed,
and ordering them to expose the image of the crucifix in their
churches:—all which is amply detailed in the decree of that
Congregation, dated the 9th of July, 1646, and signed by Cardinal
Capponi.[133]

“Such is the manner in which they have spread themselves over the whole
earth, aided by _the doctrine of probable opinions_, which is at once
the source and the basis of all this licentiousness. You must get some
of themselves to explain this doctrine to you. They make no secret of
it, any more than of what you have already learned; with this difference
only, that they conceal their carnal and worldly policy under the garb
of divine and Christian prudence; as if the faith, and tradition its
ally, were not always one and the same at all times and in all places;
as if it were the part of the rule to bend in conformity to the subject
which it was meant to regulate; and as if souls, to be purified from
their pollutions, had only to corrupt the law of the Lord, in place of
‘the law of the Lord, which is clean and pure, converting the soul which
lieth in sin,’ and bringing it into conformity with its salutary
lessons!

“Go and see some of these worthy fathers, I beseech you, and I am
confident that you will soon discover, in the laxity of their moral
system, the explanation of their doctrine about grace. You will then see
the Christian virtues exhibited in such a strange aspect, so completely
stripped of the charity which is the life and soul of them—you will see
so many crimes palliated and irregularities tolerated, that you will no
longer be surprised at their maintaining that ‘all men have always
enough of grace’ to lead a pious life, in the sense in which they
understand piety. Their morality being entirely Pagan, nature is quite
competent to its observance. When we maintain the necessity of
efficacious grace, we assign it another sort of virtue for its object.
Its office is not to cure one vice by means of another; it is not merely
to induce men to practise the external duties of religion: it aims at a
virtue higher than that propounded by Pharisees, or the greatest sages
of Heathenism. The law and reason are ‘sufficient graces’ for these
purposes. But to disenthral the soul from the love of the world—to tear
it from what it holds most dear—to make it die to itself—to lift it up
and bind it wholly, only, and forever, to God—can be the work of none
but an all-powerful hand. And it would be as absurd to affirm that we
have the full power of achieving such objects, as it would be to allege
that those virtues, devoid of the love of God, which these fathers
confound with the virtues of Christianity, are beyond our power.”

Such was the strain of my friend’s discourse, which was delivered with
much feeling; for he takes these sad disorders very much to heart. For
my own part, I began to entertain a high admiration of these fathers,
simply on account of the ingenuity of their policy; and following his
advice, I waited on a good casuist of the Society, one of my old
acquaintances, with whom I now resolved purposely to renew my former
intimacy. Having my instructions how to manage them, I had no great
difficulty in getting him afloat. Retaining his old attachment, he
received me immediately with a profusion of kindness; and after talking
over some indifferent matters, I took occasion from the present
season,[134] to learn something from him about fasting, and thus slip
insensibly into the main subject. I told him, therefore, that I had
difficulty in supporting the fast. He exhorted me to do violence to my
inclinations; but as I continued to murmur, he took pity on me, and
began to search out some ground for a dispensation. In fact he suggested
a number of excuses for me, none of which happened to suit my case, till
at length he bethought himself of asking me, whether I did not find it
difficult to sleep without taking supper? “Yes, my good father,” said I;
“and for that reason I am obliged often to take a refreshment at
mid-day, and supper at night.”[135]

“I am extremely happy,” he replied, “to have found out a way of
relieving you without sin: go in peace—you are under no obligation to
fast. However, I would not have you depend on my word: step this way to
the library.”

On going thither with him he took up a book, exclaiming, with great
rapture, “Here is the authority for you: and, by my conscience, such an
authority! It is ESCOBAR!”[136]

“Who is Escobar?” I inquired.

“What! not know Escobar?” cried the monk; “the member of our Society who
compiled this Moral Theology from twenty-four of our fathers, and on
this founds an analogy, in his preface, between his book and ‘that in
the Apocalypse which was sealed with seven seals,’ and states that
‘Jesus presents it thus sealed to the four living creatures, Suarez,
Vasquez, Molina, and Valencia,[137] in presence of the four-and-twenty
Jesuits who represent the four-and-twenty elders?’”

He read me, in fact, the whole of that allegory, which he pronounced to
be admirably appropriate, and which conveyed to my mind a sublime idea
of the excellence of the work. At length, having sought out the passage
on fasting, “O here it is!” he said; “treatise 1, example 13, no. 67:
‘If a man cannot sleep without taking supper, is he bound to fast?
Answer: _By no means!_’ Will that not satisfy you?”

“Not exactly,” replied I; “for I might sustain the fast by taking my
refreshment in the morning, and supping at night.”

“Listen, then, to what follows; they have provided for all that: ‘And
what is to be said, if the person might make a shift with a refreshment
in the morning and supping at night?’”

“That’s my case exactly.”

“‘Answer: Still he is not obliged to fast; because no person is obliged
to change the order of his meals.’”

“A most excellent reason!” I exclaimed.

“But tell me, pray,” continued the monk, “do you take much wine?”

“No, my dear father,” I answered; “I cannot endure it.”

“I merely put the question,” returned he, “to apprize you that you
might, without breaking the fast, take a glass or so in the morning, or
whenever you felt inclined for a drop; and that is always something in
the way of supporting nature. Here is the decision at the same place,
no. 57: ‘May one, without breaking the fast, drink wine at any hour he
pleases, and even in a large quantity? Yes, he may: and a dram of
hippocrass too.’[138] I had no recollection of the hippocrass,” said the
monk; “I must take a note of that in my memorandum-book.”

“He must be a nice man, this Escobar,” observed I.

“Oh! everybody likes him,” rejoined the father; “he has such delightful
questions! Only observe this one in the same place, no. 38: ‘If a man
doubt whether he is twenty-one years old, is he obliged to fast?[139]
No. But suppose I were to be twenty-one to-night an hour after midnight,
and to-morrow were the fast, would I be obliged to fast to-morrow? No;
for you were at liberty to eat as much as you pleased for an hour after
midnight, not being till then fully twenty-one; and therefore having a
right to break the fast-day, you are not obliged to keep it.’”

“Well, that is vastly entertaining!” cried I.

“Oh,” rejoined the father, “it is impossible to tear one’s self away
from the book: I spend whole days and nights in reading it; in fact, I
do nothing else.”

The worthy monk, perceiving that I was interested, was quite delighted,
and went on with his quotations. “Now,” said he, “for a taste of
Filiutius, one of the four-and-twenty Jesuits: ‘Is a man who has
exhausted himself any way—by profligacy, for example[140]—obliged to
fast? By no means. But if he has exhausted himself expressly to procure
a dispensation from fasting, will he be held obliged? He will not, even
though he should have had that design.’ There now! would you have
believed that?”

“Indeed, good father, I do not believe it yet,” said I. “What! is it no
sin for a man not to fast when he has it in his power? And is it
allowable to court occasions of committing sin, or rather, are we not
bound to shun them? That would be easy enough, surely.”

“Not always so,” he replied; “that is just as it may happen.”

“Happen, how?” cried I.

“Oho!” rejoined the monk, “so you think that if a person experience some
inconvenience in avoiding the occasions of sin, he is still bound to do
so? Not so thinks Father Bauny. ‘Absolution,’ says he, ‘is not to be
refused to such as continue in the proximate occasions of sin,[141] if
they are so situated that they cannot give them up without becoming the
common talk of the world, or subjecting themselves to personal
inconvenience.’”

“I am glad to hear it, father,” I remarked; “and now that we are not
obliged to avoid the occasions of sin, nothing more remains but to say
that we may deliberately court them.”

“Even that is occasionally permitted,” added he; “the celebrated casuist
Basil Ponce has said so, and Father Bauny quotes his sentiment with
approbation, in his Treatise on Penance, as follows: ‘We may seek an
occasion of sin directly and designedly—_primo et per se_—when our own
or our neighbor’s spiritual or temporal advantage induces us to do so.’”

“Truly,” said I, “it appears to be all a dream to me, when I hear grave
divines talking in this manner! Come now, my dear father, tell me
conscientiously, do _you_ hold such a sentiment as that?”

“No, indeed,” said he, “I do not.”

“You are speaking, then, against your conscience,” continued I.

“Not at all,” he replied; “I was speaking on that point not according to
my own conscience, but according to that of Ponce and Father Bauny, and
them you may follow with the utmost safety, for I assure you that they
are able men.”

“What, father! because they have put down these three lines in their
books, will it therefore become allowable to court the occasions of sin?
I always thought that we were bound to take the Scripture and the
tradition of the Church as our only rule, and not your casuists.”

“Goodness!” cried the monk, “I declare you put me in mind of these
Jansenists. Think you that Father Bauny and Basil Ponce are not able to
render their opinion _probable_?”

“Probable won’t do for me,” said I; “I must have certainty.”

“I can easily see,” replied the good father, “that you know nothing
about our doctrine of _probable opinions_. If you did, you would speak
in another strain. Ah! my dear sir, I must really give you some
instructions on this point; without knowing this, positively you can
understand nothing at all. It is the foundation—the very A, B, C, of our
whole moral philosophy.”

Glad to see him come to the point to which I had been drawing him on, I
expressed my satisfaction, and requested him to explain what was meant
by a probable opinion?[142]

“That,” he replied, “our authors will answer better than I can do. The
generality of them, and, among others, our four-and-twenty elders,
describe it thus: ‘An opinion is called probable, when it is founded
upon reasons of some consideration. Hence it may sometimes happen that a
single _very grave doctor_ may render an opinion probable.’ The reason
is added: ‘For a man particularly given to study would not adhere to an
opinion unless he was drawn to it by a good and sufficient reason.’”

“So it would appear,” I observed, with a smile, “that a single doctor
may turn consciences round about and upside down as he pleases, and yet
always land them in a safe position.”

“You must not laugh at it, sir,” returned the monk; “nor need you
attempt to combat the doctrine. The Jansenists tried this; but they
might have saved themselves the trouble—it is too firmly established.
Hear Sanchez, one of the most famous of our fathers: ‘You may doubt,
perhaps, whether the authority of a single good and learned doctor
renders an opinion probable. I answer, that it does; and this is
confirmed by Angelus, Sylvester Navarre, Emanuel Sa, &c. It is proved
thus: A probable opinion is one that has a considerable foundation. Now
the authority of a learned and pious man is entitled to very great
consideration; because (mark the reason), if the testimony of such a man
has great influence in convincing us that such and such an event
occurred, say at Rome, for example, why should it not have the same
weight in the case of a question in morals?’”

“An odd comparison this,” interrupted I, “between the concerns of the
world and those of conscience!”

“Have a little patience,” rejoined the monk; “Sanchez answers that in
the very next sentence: ‘Nor can I assent to the qualification made here
by some writers, namely, that the authority of such a doctor, though
sufficient in matters of human right, is not so in those of divine
right. It is of vast weight in both cases.’”

“Well, father,” said I, frankly, “I really cannot admire that rule. Who
can assure me, considering the freedom your doctors claim to examine
everything by reason, that what appears safe to one may seem so to all
the rest? The diversity of judgments is so great”—

“You don’t understand it,” said he, interrupting me; “no doubt they are
often of different sentiments, but what signifies that?—each renders his
own opinion probable and safe. We all know well enough that they are far
from being of the same mind; what is more, there is hardly an instance
in which they ever agree. There are very few questions, indeed, in which
you do not find the one saying Yes, and the other saying No. Still, in
all these cases, each of the contrary opinions is probable. And hence
Diana says on a certain subject: ‘Ponce and Sanchez hold opposite views
of it; but, as they are both learned men, each renders his own opinion
probable.’”

“But, father,” I remarked, “a person must be sadly embarrassed in
choosing between them!”—“Not at all,” he rejoined; “he has only to
follow the opinion which suits him best.”—“What! if the other is more
probable?” “It does not signify.”—“And if the other is the safer?” “It
does not signify,” repeated the monk; “this is made quite plain by
Emanuel Sa, of our Society, in his Aphorisms: ‘A person may do what he
considers allowable according to a probable opinion, though the contrary
may be the safer one. The opinion of a single grave doctor is all that
is requisite.’”

“And if an opinion be at once the less probable and the less safe, is it
allowable to follow it,” I asked, “even in the way of rejecting one
which we believe to be more probable and safe?”

“Once more, I say Yes,” replied the monk. “Hear what Filiutius, that
great Jesuit of Rome, says: ‘It is allowable to follow the less probable
opinion, even though it be the less safe one. That is the common
judgment of modern authors.’ Is not that quite clear?”

“Well, reverend father,” said I, “you have given _us_ elbow-room, at all
events! Thanks to your probable opinions, we have got liberty of
conscience with a witness! And are you casuists allowed the same
latitude in giving your responses?”

“O yes,” said he, “we answer just as we please; or rather, I should say,
just as it may please those who ask our advice. Here are our rules,
taken from Fathers Layman, Vasquez, Sanchez, and the four-and-twenty
worthies, in the words of Layman: ‘A doctor, on being consulted, may
give an advice, not only probable according to his own opinion, but
contrary to his opinion, provided this judgment happens to be more
favorable or more agreeable to the person that consults him—_si forte
hæc favorabilior seu exoptatior sit_. Nay, I go further, and say, that
there would be nothing unreasonable in his giving those who consult him
a judgment held to be probable by some learned person, even though he
should be satisfied in his own mind that it is absolutely false.’”

“Well, seriously, father,” I said, “your doctrine is a most uncommonly
comfortable one! Only think of being allowed to answer Yes or No, just
as you please! It is impossible to prize such a privilege too highly. I
see now the advantage of the contrary opinions of your doctors. One of
them always serves your turn, and the other never gives you any
annoyance. If you do not find your account on the one side, you fall
back on the other, and always land in perfect safety.”

“That is quite true,” he replied; “and accordingly, we may always say
with Diana, on his finding that Father Bauny was on his side, while
Father Lugo was against him: _Sæpe premente deo, fert deus alter
opem_.”[143]

“I understand you,” resumed I; “but a practical difficulty has just
occurred to me, which is this, that supposing a person to have consulted
one of your doctors, and obtained from him a pretty liberal opinion,
there is some danger of his getting into a scrape by meeting a confessor
who takes a different view of the matter, and refuses him absolution
unless he recant the sentiment of the casuist. Have you not provided for
such a case as that, father?”

“Can you doubt it?” he replied. “We have bound them, sir, to absolve
their penitents who act according to probable opinions, under the pain
of mortal sin, to secure their compliance. ‘When the penitent,’ says
Father Bauny, ‘follows a probable opinion, the confessor is bound to
absolve him, though his opinion should differ from that of his
penitent.’”

“But he does not say it would be a mortal sin not to absolve him,” said
I.

“How hasty you are!” rejoined the monk; “listen to what follows; he has
expressly decided that, ‘to refuse absolution to a penitent who acts
according to a probable opinion, is a sin which is in its nature
mortal.’ And to settle that point, he cites the most illustrious of our
fathers—Suarez, Vasquez, and Sanchez.”

“My dear sir,” said I, “that is a most prudent regulation. I see nothing
to fear now. No confessor can dare to be refractory after this. Indeed,
I was not aware that you had the power of issuing your orders on pain of
damnation. I thought that your skill had been confined to the taking
away of sins; I had no idea that it extended to the introduction of new
ones. But from what I now see, you are omnipotent.”

“That is not a correct way of speaking,” rejoined the father. “We do not
introduce sins; we only pay attention to them. I have had occasion to
remark, two or three times during our conversation, that you are no
great scholastic.”

“Be that as it may, father, you have at least answered my difficulty.
But I have another to suggest. How do you manage when the Fathers of the
Church happen to differ from any of your casuists?”

“You really know very little of the subject,” he replied. “The Fathers
were good enough for the morality of their own times; but they lived too
far back for that of the present age, which is no longer regulated by
them, but by the modern casuists. On this Father Cellot, following the
famous Reginald, remarks: ‘In questions of morals, the modern casuists
are to be preferred to the ancient fathers, though those lived nearer to
the times of the apostles.’ And following out this maxim, Diana thus
decides: ‘Are beneficiaries bound to restore their revenue when guilty
of mal-appropriation of it? The ancients would say Yes, but the moderns
say No; let us, therefore, adhere to the latter opinion, which relieves
from the obligation of restitution.’”

“Delightful words these, and most comfortable they must be to a great
many people!” I observed.

“We leave the fathers,” resumed the monk, “to those who deal with
positive divinity.[144] As for us, who are the directors of conscience,
we read very little of them, and quote only the modern casuists. There
is Diana, for instance, a most voluminous writer; he has prefixed to his
works a list of his authorities, which amount to two hundred and
ninety-six, and the most ancient of them is only about eighty years
old.”

“It would appear, then,” I remarked, “that all these have come into the
world since the date of your Society?”

“Thereabouts,” he replied.

“That is to say, dear father, on your advent, St. Augustine, St.
Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and all the rest, in so far as
morals are concerned, disappeared from the stage. Would you be so kind
as let me know the names, at least, of those modern authors who have
succeeded them?”

“A most able and renowned class of men they are,” replied the monk.
“Their names are, Villabolos, Conink, Llamas, Achokier, Dealkozer,
Dellacrux, Veracruz, Ugolin, Tambourin, Fernandez, Martinez, Suarez,
Henriquez, Vasquez, Lopez, Gomez, Sanchez, De Vechis, De Grassis, De
Grassalis, De Pitigianis, De Graphœis, Squilanti, Bizozeri, Barcola, De
Bobadilla, Simancha, Perez de Lara, Aldretta, Lorca, De Scarcia,
Quaranta, Scophra, Pedezza, Cabrezza, Bisbe, Dias, De Clavasis,
Villagut, Adam à Manden, Iribarne, Binsfeld, Volfangi à Vorberg,
Vosthery, Strevesdorf.”[145]

“O my dear father!” cried I, quite alarmed, “were all these people
Christians?”

“How! Christians!” returned the casuist; “did I not tell you that these
are the only writers by whom we now govern Christendom?”

Deeply affected as I was by this announcement, I concealed my emotion
from the monk, and only asked him if all these authors were Jesuits?

“No,” said he; “but that is of little consequence; they have said a
number of good things for all that. It is true the greater part of these
same good things are extracted or copied from our authors, but we do not
stand on ceremony with them on that score, more especially as they are
in the constant habit of quoting our authors with applause. When Diana,
for example, who does not belong to our Society, speaks of Vasquez, he
calls him ‘that phœnix of genius;’ and he declares more than once, ‘that
Vasquez alone is to him worth all the rest of men put together’—_instar
omnium_. Accordingly, our fathers often make use of this good Diana; and
if you understand our doctrine of probability, you will see that this is
no small help in its way. In fact, we are anxious that others besides
the Jesuits would render their opinions probable, to prevent people from
ascribing them all to us; for you will observe, that when any author,
whoever he may be, advances a probable opinion, we are entitled, by the
doctrine of probability, to adopt it if we please; and yet, if the
author do not belong to our fraternity, we are not responsible for its
soundness.”

“I understand all that,” said I. “It is easy to see that all are welcome
that come your way, except the ancient fathers; you are masters of the
field, and have only to walk the course. But I foresee three or four
serious difficulties and powerful barriers which will oppose your
career.”

“And what are these?” cried the monk, looking quite alarmed.

“They are, the Holy Scriptures,” I replied, “the popes, and the
councils, whom you cannot gainsay, and who are all in the way of the
Gospel.”[146]

“Is that all!” he exclaimed; “I declare you put me in a fright. Do you
imagine that we would overlook such an obvious scruple as that, or that
we have not provided against it? A good idea, forsooth, to suppose that
we would contradict Scripture, popes, and councils! I must convince you
of your mistake; for I should be sorry you should go away with an
impression that we are deficient in our respect to these authorities.
You have doubtless taken up this notion from some of the opinions of our
fathers, which are apparently at variance with their decisions, though
in reality they are not. But to illustrate the harmony between them
would require more leisure than we have at present; and as I would not
like you to retain a bad impression of us, if you agree to meet with me
to-morrow, I shall clear it all up then.”

Thus ended our interview, and thus shall end my present communication,
which has been long enough, besides, for one letter. I am sure you will
be satisfied with it, in the prospect of what is forthcoming.—I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 128:

  _Imago Primi Seculi._—The work to which Pascal here refers was printed
  by the Jesuits in Flanders in the year 1640, under the title of
  “L’Image du Premier Siècle de la Société de Jesus,” being a history of
  the Society of the Jesuits from the period of its establishment in
  1540—a century before the publication. The work itself is very rare,
  and would probably have fallen into oblivion, had not the substance of
  it been embodied in a little treatise, itself also scarce, entitled
  “La Morale Pratique des Jésuites.” The small specimen which Pascal has
  given conveys but an imperfect idea of the mingled blasphemy and
  absurdity of this Jesuitical production.

Footnote 129:

  Isa. xviii. 2.

Footnote 130:

  The reader is requested to notice how completely the charge brought
  against the Provincial Letters by Voltaire and others is here
  anticipated and refuted. (See Hist. Introduction.)

Footnote 131:

  “It must be observed that most of those Jesuits who were so severe in
  their writings, were less so towards their penitents. It has been said
  of Bourdaloue himself that if he required too much in the pulpit, he
  abated it in the confessional chair: a new stroke of policy well
  understood on the part of the Jesuits, inasmuch as speculative
  severity suits persons of rigid morals, and practical condescension
  attracts the multitude.” (D’Alembert, Account of Dest. of Jesuits, p.
  44.)

Footnote 132:

  Petau was one of the obscure writers who were employed by the Jesuits
  to publish defamatory libels against M. Arnauld and the bishops who
  approved of his book on Frequent Communion. (Coudrette, ii. 426.)

Footnote 133:

  The policy to which Pascal refers was introduced by Matthew Ricci, an
  Italian Jesuit, who succeeded the famous Francis Xavier in attempting
  to convert the Chinese. Ricci declared that, after consulting the
  writings of the Chinese literati, he was persuaded that the Xamti and
  Cachinchoam of the mandarins were merely other names for the King of
  Heaven, and that the idolatries of the natives were harmless civil
  ceremonies. He therefore allowed his converts to practise them, on the
  condition mentioned in the text. In 1631, some new paladins of the
  orders of Dominic and Francis, who came from the Philippine Islands to
  share in the spiritual conquest of that vast empire, were grievously
  scandalized at the monstrous compromise between Christianity and
  idolatry tolerated by the followers of Loyola, and carried their
  complaints to Rome. The result is illustrative of the papal policy.
  Pope Innocent X. condemned the Jesuitical policy; Pope Alexander VII.,
  in 1656 (when this letter was written) sanctioned it; and in 1669,
  Pope Clement IX. ordained that the decrees of _both_ of his
  predecessors should continue in full force. The Jesuits, availing
  themselves of this suspense, paid no regard either to the popes or
  their rival orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, who, in the
  persecutions which ensued, always came off with the worst. (Coudrette,
  iv. 281; Hist. of D. Ign. Loyola, pp. 97–112.)

  The prescription given to the Jesuits by the cardinals, to expose the
  image of the crucifix in their churches, appears to us a sort of
  homœopathic cure, very little better than the disease. Bossuet, and
  others who have tried to soften down the doctrines of Rome, would
  represent the worship ostensibly paid to the crucifix as really paid
  to Christ, who is represented by it. But even this does not accord
  with the determination of the Council of Trent, which declared of
  images _Eisque venerationem impertiendam_; or with Bellarmine who
  devotes a chapter expressly to prove that true and proper worship is
  to be given to images. (Stillingfleet on Popery, by Dr. Cunningham, p.
  77.)

Footnote 134:

  Lent.

Footnote 135:

  “According to the rules of the Roman Catholic fast, one meal alone is
  allowed on a fast-day. Many, however, fall off before the end of Lent,
  and take to their breakfast and suppers, under the sanction of some
  good-natured doctor, who declares fasting injurious to their health.”
  (Blanco White, Letters from Spain, p. 272.)

Footnote 136:

  Father Antoine Escobar of Mendoza was a Jesuit of Spain, and born at
  Valladolid in 1589, where he died in 1669. His principal work is his
  “Exposition of Uncontroverted Opinions in Moral Theology,” in six
  volumes. It abounds with the most licentious doctrines, and being a
  compilation from numerous Jesuitical writers, afforded a rich field
  for the satire of Pascal. The characteristic absurdity of this author
  is, that his questions uniformly exhibit two faces—an affirmative and
  a negative;—so that _escobarderie_ became a synonym in France for
  _duplicity_. (Biographie Pittoresque des Jesuites, par M. C. de
  Plancy, Paris, 1826, p. 38.) Nicole tells us that he had in his
  possession a portrait of the casuist which gave him a “resolute and
  decisive cast of countenance”—not exactly what might have been
  expected from his double-faced questions. His friends describe Escobar
  as a good man, a laborious student, and very devout in his way. It is
  said that, when he heard that his name and writings were so frequently
  noticed in the Provincial Letters, he was quite overjoyed to think
  that his fame would extend as far as the _little letters_ had done.
  Boileau has celebrated him in the following couplet:—

                 Si Bourdaloue un peu sévère,
                 Nous dit, craignez la volupté:
                 Escobar, lui dit-on, mon père,
                 Nous la permet pour la santé.

              “If Bourdaloue, a little too severe,
               Cries, Fly from pleasure’s fatal fascination
               Dear Father, cries another, Escoba,
               Permits it as a healthy relaxation.”

Footnote 137:

  Four celebrated casuists.

Footnote 138:

  _Hippocrass_—a medicated wine.

Footnote 139:

  All persons above the age of one-and-twenty are bound to observe the
  rules of the Roman Catholic fast during Lent. The obligation of
  fasting begins at midnight, just when the leading clock of every town
  strikes twelve. (Letters from Spain, p. 270.)

Footnote 140:

  _Ad insequendam amicam._ (Tom. ii. tr. 27, part 2, c. 6, n. 143.) The
  accuracy with which the references are made to the writings of these
  casuists shows anything but a design to garble or misrepresent them.

Footnote 141:

  In the technical language of theology, an “occasion of sin” is any
  situation or course of conduct which has a tendency to induce the
  commission of sin. “Proximate occasions” are those which have a direct
  and immediate tendency of this kind.

Footnote 142:

  “The casuists are divided into _Probabilistæ_ and _Probabilioristæ_.
  The first, among whom were the Jesuits, maintain that a certain degree
  of probability as to the lawfulness of an action is enough to secure
  against sin. The second, supported by the Dominicans and the
  Jansenists (a kind of Catholic Calvinists condemned by the Church),
  insist on always taking the _safest_ or most probable side. The French
  proverb, _Le mieux est l’ennemi, du bien_, is perfectly applicable to
  the practical effects of these two systems in Spain.” (Letters from
  Spain, p. 277.) Nicole has a long dissertation on the subject in his
  Notes on this Letter.

Footnote 143:

  “When one god presses hard, another brings relief.”

Footnote 144:

  In the twelfth century, in consequence of the writings of Peter
  Lombard, commonly called the “Master of the Sentences,” the Christian
  doctors were divided into two classes—the _Positive_ or dogmatic, and
  the _Scholastic_ divines. The _Positive_ divines, who were the
  teachers of systematic divinity, expounded, though in a wretched
  manner, the Sacred Writings, and confirmed their sentiments by
  Scripture and tradition. The scholastics, instead of the Bible,
  explained the book of Sentences, indulging in the most idle and
  ridiculous speculations.—“The practice of choosing a certain priest,
  not only to be the occasional confessor, but _the director of the
  conscience_, was greatly encouraged by the Jesuits.” (Letters from
  Spain, p. 89.)

Footnote 145:

  In this extraordinary list of obscure and now forgotten casuistical
  writers, most of them belonging to Spain, Portugal, and Flanders, the
  art of the author lies in stringing together the most outlandish names
  he could collect, ranging them mostly according to their terminations,
  and placing them in contrast with the venerable and well-known names
  of the ancient fathers. To a French ear these names must have sounded
  as uncouth and barbarous as those of the Scotch which Milton has
  satirized to the ear of an Englishman:—

      “Cries the stall-reader, ‘Bless us! what a word on
       A title-page is this!’ Why, is it harder, sirs, than Gordon,
       Colkitto, or Macdonnel, or Galasp?
       Those rugged names to our like mouths grow sleek,
       That would have made Quintilian stare and gasp.”

                                                 (Milton’s Minor Poems.)

Footnote 146:

  That is, they were all, in Pascal’s opinion, favorable to the Gospel
  scheme of morality.




                               LETTER VI.

VARIOUS ARTIFICES OF THE JESUITS TO ELUDE THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOSPEL,
   OF COUNCILS, AND OF THE POPES—SOME CONSEQUENCES WHICH RESULT FROM
   THEIR DOCTRINE OF PROBABILITY—THEIR RELAXATION IN FAVOR OF
   BENEFICIARIES, PRIESTS, MONKS, AND DOMESTICS—STORY OF JOHN D’ALBA.


                                                PARIS, _April 10, 1656_.

SIR,—I mentioned, at the close of my last letter, that my good friend
the Jesuit had promised to show me how the casuists reconcile the
contrarieties between their opinions and the decisions of the popes, the
councils, and the Scripture. This promise he fulfilled at our last
interview, of which I shall now give you an account.

“One of the methods,” resumed the monk, “in which we reconcile these
apparent contradictions, is by the interpretation of some phrase. Thus,
Pope Gregory XIV. decided that assassins are not worthy to enjoy the
benefit of sanctuary in churches, and ought to be dragged out of them;
and yet our four-and-twenty elders affirm that ‘the penalty of this bull
is not incurred by all those that kill in treachery.’ This may appear to
you a contradiction; but we get over this by interpreting the word
_assassin_ as follows: ‘Are assassins unworthy of sanctuary in churches?
Yes, by the bull of Gregory XIV. they are. But by the word _assassins_
we understand those that have received money to murder one; and
accordingly, such as kill without taking any reward for the deed, but
merely _to oblige their friends_, do not come under the category of
assassins.’”

“Take another instance: It is said in the Gospel, ‘Give alms of your
superfluity.’[147] Several Casuists, however, have contrived to
discharge the wealthiest from the obligation of alms-giving. This may
appear another paradox, but the matter is easily put to rights by giving
such an interpretation to the word _superfluity_ that it will seldom or
never happen that any one is troubled with such an article. This feat
has been accomplished by the learned Vasquez, in his Treatise on Alms,
c. 4: ‘What men of the world lay up to improve their circumstances, or
those of their relatives, cannot be termed superfluity; and accordingly,
such a thing as superfluity is seldom to be found among men of the
world, not even excepting kings.’ Diana, too, who generally founds on
our fathers, having quoted these words of Vasquez, justly concludes,
‘that as to the question whether the rich are bound to give alms of
their superfluity, even though the affirmative were true, it will seldom
or never happen to be obligatory in practice.’”

“I see very well how that follows from the doctrine of Vasquez,” said I.
“But how would you answer this objection, that, in working out one’s
salvation, it would be as safe, according to Vasquez, to give no alms,
provided one can muster as much ambition as to have no superfluity; as
it is safe, according to the Gospel, to have no ambition at all, in
order to have some superfluity for the purpose of alms-giving?”[148]

“Why,” returned he, “the answer would be, that both of these ways are
safe according to the Gospel; the one according to the Gospel in its
more literal and obvious sense, and the other according to the same
Gospel as interpreted by Vasquez. There you see the utility of
interpretations. When the terms are so clear, however,” he continued,
“as not to admit of an interpretation, we have recourse to the
observation of favorable circumstances. A single example will illustrate
this. The popes have denounced excommunication on monks who lay aside
their canonicals; our casuists, notwithstanding, put it as a question,
‘On what occasions may a monk lay aside his religious habit without
incurring excommunication?’ They mention a number of cases in which they
may, and among others the following: ‘If he has laid it aside for an
infamous purpose, such as to pick pockets or to go _incognito_ into
haunts of profligacy, meaning shortly after to resume it.’ It is evident
the bulls have no reference to cases of that description.”

I could hardly believe that, and begged the father to show me the
passage in the original. He did so, and under the chapter headed
“Practice according to the School of the Society of Jesus”—_Praxis ex
Societatis Jesu Schola_—I read these very words: _Si habitum dimittat ut
furetur occulte, vel fornicetur_. He showed me the same thing in Diana,
in these terms: _Ut eat incognitus ad lupanar_. “And why, father,” I
asked, “are they discharged from excommunication on such occasions?”

“Don’t you understand it?” he replied. “Only think what a scandal it
would be, were a monk surprised in such a predicament with his
canonicals on! And have you never heard,” he continued, “how they answer
the first bull _contra sollicitantes_? and how our four-and-twenty, in
another chapter of the Practice according to the School of our Society,
explain the bull of Pius V. _contra clericos_, &c.?”[149]

“I know nothing about all that,” said I.

“Then it is a sign you have not read much of Escobar,” returned the
monk.

“I got him only yesterday, father,” said I; “and I had no small
difficulty, too, in procuring a copy. I don’t know how it is, but
everybody of late has been in search of him.”[150]

“The passage to which I referred,” returned the monk, “may be found in
treatise 1, example 8, no. 102. Consult it at your leisure when you go
home.”

I did so that very night; but it is so shockingly bad, that I dare not
transcribe it.

The good father then went on to say: “You now understand what use we
make of favorable circumstances. Sometimes, however, obstinate cases
will occur, which will not admit of this mode of adjustment; so much so,
indeed, that you would almost suppose they involved flat contradictions.
For example, three popes have decided that monks who are bound by a
particular vow to a Lenten life,[151] cannot be absolved from it even
though they should become bishops. And yet Diana avers that
notwithstanding this decision they _are_ absolved.”

“And how does he reconcile that?” said I.

“By the most subtle of all the modern methods, and by the nicest
possible application of probability,” replied the monk. “You may
recollect you were told the other day, that the affirmative and negative
of most opinions have each, according to our doctors, some
probability—enough, at least, to be followed with a safe conscience. Not
that the _pro_ and _con_ are both true in the same sense—that is
impossible—but only they are both probable, and therefore safe, as a
matter of course. On this principle our worthy friend Diana remarks: ‘To
the decision of these three popes, which is contrary to my opinion, I
answer, that they spoke in this way by adhering to the affirmative
side—which, in fact, even in my judgment, is probable; but it does not
follow from this that the negative may not have its probability too.’
And in the same treatise, speaking of another subject on which he again
differs from a pope, he says: ‘The pope, I grant, has said it as the
head of the Church; but his decision does not extend beyond the sphere
of the probability of his own opinion.’ Now you perceive this is not
doing any harm to the opinions of the popes; such a thing would never be
tolerated at Rome, where Diana is in high repute. For he does not say
that what the popes have decided is not probable; but leaving their
opinion within the sphere of probability, he merely says that the
contrary is also probable.”

“That is very respectful,” said I.

“Yes,” added the monk, “and rather more ingenious than the reply made by
Father Bauny, when his books were censured at Rome; for when pushed very
hard on this point by M. Hallier, he made bold to write: ‘What has the
censure of Rome to do with that of France?’ You now see how, either by
the interpretation of terms, by the observation of favorable
circumstances, or by the aid of the double probability of _pro_ and
_con_, we always contrive to reconcile those seeming contradictions
which occasioned you so much surprise, without ever touching on the
decisions of Scripture, councils, or popes.”

“Reverend father,” said I, “how happy the world is in having such men as
you for its masters! And what blessings are these probabilities! I never
knew the reason why you took such pains to establish that a single
doctor, _if a grave one_, might render an opinion probable, and that the
contrary might be so too, and that one may choose any side one pleases,
even though he does not believe it to be the right side, and all with
such a safe conscience, that the confessor who should refuse him
absolution on the faith of the casuists would be in a state of
damnation. But I see now that a single casuist may make new rules of
morality at his discretion, and dispose, according to his fancy, of
everything pertaining to the regulation of manners.”

“What you have now said,” rejoined the father, “would require to be
modified a little. Pay attention now, while I explain our method, and
you will observe the progress of a new opinion, from its birth to its
maturity. First, the grave doctor who invented it exhibits it to the
world, casting it abroad like seed, that it may take root. In this state
it is very feeble; it requires time gradually to ripen. This accounts
for Diana, who has introduced a great many of these opinions, saying: ‘I
advance this opinion; but as it is new, I give it time to come to
maturity—_relinquo tempori maturandum_.’ Thus in a few years it becomes
insensibly consolidated; and after a considerable time it is sanctioned
by the tacit approbation of the Church, according to the grand maxim of
Father Bauny, ‘that if an opinion has been advanced by some casuist, and
has not been impugned by the Church, it is a sign that she approves of
it.’ And, in fact, on this principle he authenticates one of his own
principles in his sixth treatise, p. 312.”

“Indeed, father!” cried I, “why, on this principle the Church would
approve of all the abuses which she tolerates, and all the errors in all
the books which she does not censure!”

“Dispute the point with Father Bauny,” he replied. “I am merely quoting
his words, and you begin to quarrel with _me_. There is no disputing
with facts, sir. Well, as I was saying, when time has thus matured an
opinion, it thenceforth becomes completely probable and safe. Hence the
learned Caramuel, in dedicating his Fundamental Theology to Diana,
declares that this great Diana has rendered many opinions probable which
were not so before—_quæ antea non erant_; and that, therefore, in
following them, persons do not sin now, though they would have sinned
formerly—_jam non peccant, licet ante peccaverint_.”

“Truly, father,” I observed, “it must be worth one’s while living in the
neighborhood of your doctors. Why, of two individuals who do the same
actions, he that knows nothing about their doctrine sins, while he that
knows it does no sin. It seems, then, that their doctrine possesses at
once an edifying and a justifying virtue! The law of God, according to
St. Paul, made transgressors;[152] but this law of yours makes nearly
all of us innocent. I beseech you, my dear sir, let me know all about
it. I will not leave you till you have told me all the maxims which your
casuists have established.”

“Alas!” the monk exclaimed, “our main object, no doubt, should have been
to establish no other maxims than those of the Gospel in all their
strictness: and it is easy to see, from the Rules for the regulation of
our manners,[153] that if we tolerate some degree of relaxation in
others, it is rather out of complaisance than through design. The truth
is, sir, we are forced to it. Men have arrived at such a pitch of
corruption now-a-days, that unable to make them come to us, we must e’en
go to them, otherwise they would cast us off altogether; and what is
worse, they would become perfect castaways. It is to retain such
characters as these that our casuists have taken under consideration the
vices to which people of various conditions are most addicted, with the
view of laying down maxims which, while they cannot be said to violate
the truth, are so gentle that he must be a very impracticable subject
indeed who is not pleased with them. The grand project of our Society,
for the good of religion, is never to repulse any one, let him be what
he may, and so avoid driving people to despair.[154]

“They have got maxims, therefore, for all sorts of persons; for
beneficiaries, for priests, for monks; for gentlemen, for servants; for
rich men, for commercial men; for people in embarrassed or indigent
circumstances; for devout women, and women that are not devout; for
married people, and irregular people. In short, nothing has escaped
their foresight.”

“In other words,” said I, “they have got maxims for the clergy, the
nobility, and the commons.[155] Well, I am quite impatient to hear
them.”

“Let us commence,” resumed the father, “with the beneficiaries. You are
aware of the traffic with benefices that is now carried on, and that
were the matter referred to St. Thomas and the ancients who have written
on it, there might chance to be some simoniacs in the Church. This
rendered it highly necessary for our fathers to exercise their prudence
in finding out a palliative. With what success they have done so will
appear from the following words of Valencia, who is one of Escobar’s
‘four living creatures.’ At the end of a long discourse, in which he
suggests various expedients, he propounds the following at page 2039,
vol. iii., which, to my mind, is the best: ‘If a person gives a temporal
in exchange for a spiritual good’—that is, if he gives money for a
benefice—‘and gives the money as the price of the benefice, it is
manifest simony. But if he gives it merely as the motive which inclines
the will of the patron to confer on him the living, it is not simony,
even though the person who confers it considers and expects the money as
the principal object.’ Tanner, who is also a member of our Society,
affirms the same thing, vol. iii., p. 1519, although he ‘grants that St.
Thomas is opposed to it; for he expressly teaches that it is always
simony to give a spiritual for a temporal good, if the temporal is the
end in view.’ By this means we prevent an immense number of simoniacal
transactions; for who would be so desperately wicked as to refuse, when
giving money for a benefice, to take the simple precaution of so
directing his intentions as to give it as _a motive_ to induce the
beneficiary to part with it, instead of giving it as _the price_ of the
benefice? No man, surely, can be so far left to himself as that would
come to.”

“I agree with you there,” I replied; “all men, I should think, have
_sufficient grace_ to make a bargain of that sort.”

“There can be no doubt of it,” returned the monk. “Such, then, is the
way in which we soften matters in regard to the beneficiaries. And now
for the priests—we have maxims pretty favorable to them also. Take the
following, for example, from our four-and-twenty elders: ‘Can a priest,
who has received money to say a mass, take an additional sum upon the
same mass? Yes, says Filiutius, he may, by applying that part of the
sacrifice which belongs to himself as a priest to the person who paid
him last; provided he does not take a sum equivalent to a whole mass,
but only a part, such as the third of a mass.’”

“Surely, father,” said I, “this must be one of those cases in which the
_pro_ and the _con_ have both their share of probability. What you have
now stated cannot fail, of course, to be probable, having the authority
of such men as Filiutius and Escobar; and yet, leaving that within the
sphere of probability, it strikes me that the contrary opinion might be
made out to be probable too, and might be supported by such reasons as
the following: That, while the Church allows priests who are in poor
circumstances to take money for their masses, seeing it is but right
that those who serve at the altar should live by the altar, she never
intended that they should barter the sacrifice for money,[156] and still
less, that they should deprive themselves of those benefits which they
ought themselves, in the first place, to draw from it; to which I might
add, that, according to St. Paul, the priests are to offer sacrifice
first for themselves, and then for the people;[157] and that
accordingly, while permitted to participate with others in the benefit
of the sacrifice, they are not at liberty to forego their share, by
transferring it to another for a third of a mass, or, in other words,
for the matter of fourpence or fivepence. Verily, father, little as I
pretend to be a _grave_ man, I might contrive to make this opinion
probable.”

“It would cost you no great pains to do that,” replied the monk; “it is
visibly probable already. The difficulty lies in discovering probability
in the converse of opinions manifestly good; and this is a feat which
none but great men can achieve. Father Bauny shines in this department.
It is really delightful to see that learned casuist examining with
characteristic ingenuity and subtlety, the negative and affirmative of
the same question, and proving both of them to be right! Thus in the
matter of priests, he says in one place: ‘No law can be made to oblige
the curates to say mass every day; for such a law would unquestionably
(_haud dubiè_) expose them to the danger of saying it sometimes in
mortal sin.’ And yet in another part of the same treatise, he says,
‘that priests who have received money for saying mass every day ought to
say it every day, and that they cannot excuse themselves on the ground
that they are not always in a fit state for the service; because it is
in their power at all times to do penance, and if they neglect this they
have themselves to blame for it, and not the person who made them say
mass.’ And to relieve their minds from all scruples on the subject, he
thus resolves the question: ‘May a priest say mass on the same day in
which he has committed a mortal sin of the worst kind, in the way of
confessing himself beforehand?’ Villabolos says No, because of his
impurity; but Sancius says, He may without any sin; and I hold his
opinion to be safe, and one which may be followed in practice—_et tuta
et sequenda in praxi_.”[158]

“Follow this opinion in practice!” cried I. “Will any priest who has
fallen into such irregularities, have the assurance on the same day to
approach the altar, on the mere word of Father Bauny? Is he not bound to
submit to the ancient laws of the Church, which debarred from the
sacrifice forever, or at least for a long time, priests who had
committed sins of that description—instead of following the modern
opinions of casuists, who would admit him to it on the very day that
witnessed his fall?”

“You have a very short memory,” returned the monk. “Did I not inform you
a little ago that, according to our fathers Cellot and Reginald, ‘in
matters of morality we are to follow, not the ancient fathers, but the
modern casuists?’”

“I remember it perfectly,” said I; “but we have something more here: we
have the laws of the Church.”

“True,” he replied; “but this shows you do not know another capital
maxim of our fathers, ‘that the laws of the Church lose their authority
when they have gone into desuetude’—_cum jam desuetudine abierunt_—as
Filiutius says.[159] We know the present exigencies of the Church much
better than the ancients could do. Were we to be so strict in excluding
priests from the altar, you can understand there would not be such a
great number of masses. Now a multitude of masses brings such a revenue
of glory to God and of good to souls, that I may venture to say, with
Father Cellot, that there would not be too many priests, ‘though not
only all men and women, were that possible, but even inanimate bodies,
and even brute beasts—_bruta animalia_—were transformed into priests to
celebrate mass.’”[160]

I was so astounded at the extravagance of this imagination, that I
could not utter a word, and allowed him to go on with his discourse.
“Enough, however, about priests; I am afraid of getting tedious: let
us come to the _monks_. The grand difficulty with them is the
obedience they owe to their superiors; now observe the palliative
which our fathers apply in this case. Castro Palao[161] of our Society
has said: ‘Beyond all dispute, a monk who has a probable opinion of
his own, is not bound to obey his superior, though the opinion of the
latter is the more probable. For the monk is at liberty to adopt the
opinion which is more agreeable to himself—_quæ sibi gratior
fuerit_—as Sanchez says. And though the order of his superior be just,
that does not oblige you to obey him, for it is not just at all points
or in every respect—_non undequaquè justè præcepit_—but only probably
so; and consequently, you are only probably bound to obey him, and
probably not bound—_probabiliter obligatus, et probabiliter
deobligatus_.’”

“Certainly, father,” said I, “it is impossible too highly to estimate
this precious fruit of the double probability.”

“It is of great use indeed,” he replied; “but we must be brief. Let me
only give you the following specimen of our famous Molina in favor of
monks who are expelled from their convents for irregularities. Escobar
quotes him thus: ‘Molina asserts that a monk expelled from his monastery
is not obliged to reform in order to get back again, and that he is no
longer bound by his vow of obedience.’”

“Well, father,” cried I, “this is all very comfortable for the clergy.
Your casuists, I perceive, have been very indulgent to them, and no
wonder—they were legislating, so to speak, for themselves. I am afraid
people of other conditions are not so liberally treated. Every one for
himself in this world.”

“There you do us wrong,” returned the monk; “they could not have been
kinder to themselves than we have been to them. We treat all, from the
highest to the lowest, with an even-handed charity, sir. And to prove
this, you tempt me to tell you our maxims for servants. In reference to
this class, we have taken into consideration the difficulty they must
experience, when they are men of conscience, in serving profligate
masters. For if they refuse to perform all the errands in which they are
employed, they lose their places; and if they yield obedience, they have
their scruples. To relieve them from these, our four-and-twenty fathers
have specified the services which they may render with a safe
conscience; such as, ‘carrying letters and presents, opening doors and
windows, helping their master to reach the window, holding the ladder
which he is mounting. All this,’ say they, ‘is allowable and
indifferent; it is true that, as to holding the ladder, they must be
threatened, more than usually, with being punished for refusing; for it
is doing an injury to the master of a house to enter it by the window.’
You perceive the judiciousness of that observation, of course?”

“I expected nothing less,” said I, “from a book edited by
four-and-twenty Jesuits.”

“But,” added the monk, “Father Bauny has gone beyond this; he has taught
valets how to perform these sorts of offices for their masters quite
innocently, by making them direct their intention, not to the sins to
which they are accessary, but to the gain which is to accrue from them.
In his Summary of Sins, p. 710, first edition, he thus states the
matter: ‘Let confessors observe,’ says he, ‘that they cannot absolve
valets who perform base errands, if they consent to the sins of their
masters; but the reverse holds true, if they have done the thing merely
from a regard to their temporal emolument.’ And that, I should conceive,
is no difficult matter to do; for why should they insist on consenting
to sins of which they taste nothing but the trouble? The same Father
Bauny has established a prime maxim in favor of those who are not
content with their wages: ‘May servants who are dissatisfied with their
wages, use means to raise them by laying their hands on as much of the
property of their masters as they may consider necessary to make the
said wages equivalent to their trouble? They may, in certain
circumstances; as when they are so poor that, in looking for a
situation, they have been obliged to accept the offer made to them, and
when other servants of the same class are gaining more than they,
elsewhere.’”

“Ha, father!” cried I, “that is John d’Alba’s passage, I declare.”

“What John d’Alba?” inquired the father: “what do you mean?”

“Strange, father!” returned I: “do you not remember what happened in
this city in the year 1647? Where in the world were you living at that
time?”

“I was teaching cases of conscience in one of our colleges far from
Paris,” he replied.

“I see you don’t know the story, father: I must tell it you. I heard it
related the other day by a man of honor, whom I met in company. He told
us that this John d’Alba, who was in the service of your fathers in the
College of Clermont, in the Rue St. Jacques, being dissatisfied with his
wages, had purloined something to make himself amends; and that your
fathers, on discovering the theft, had thrown him into prison on the
charge of larceny. The case was reported to the court, if I recollect
right, on the 16th of April, 1647; for he was very minute in his
statements, and indeed they would hardly have been credible otherwise.
The poor fellow, on being questioned, confessed to having taken some
pewter plates, but maintained that for all that he had not _stolen_
them; pleading in his defence this very doctrine of Father Bauny, which
he produced before the judges, along with a pamphlet by one of your
fathers, under whom he had studied cases of conscience, and who had
taught him the same thing. Whereupon M. De Montrouge, one of the most
respected members of the court, said, in giving his opinion, ‘that he
did not see how, on the ground of the writings of these fathers—writings
containing a doctrine so illegal, pernicious, and contrary to all laws,
natural, divine, and human, and calculated to ruin all families, and
sanction all sorts of household robbery—they could discharge the
accused. But his opinion was, that this too faithful disciple should be
whipped before the college gate, by the hand of the common hangman; and
that, at the same time, this functionary should burn the writings of
these fathers which treated of larceny, with certification that they
were prohibited from teaching such doctrine in future, upon pain of
death.’

“The result of this judgment, which was heartily approved of, was waited
for with much curiosity when some incident occurred which made them
delay procedure. But in the mean time the prisoner disappeared, nobody
knew how, and nothing more was heard about the affair; so that John
d’Alba got off, pewter plates and all. Such was the account he gave us,
to which he added, that the judgment of M. De Montrouge was entered on
the records of the court, where any one may consult it. We were highly
amused at the story.”

“What are you trifling about now?” cried the monk. “What does all that
signify? I was explaining the maxims of our casuists, and was just going
to speak of those relating to gentlemen, when you interrupt me with
impertinent stories.”

“It was only something put in by the way, father,” I observed; “and
besides, I was anxious to apprize you of an important circumstance,
which I find you have overlooked in establishing your doctrine of
probability.”

“Ay, indeed!” exclaimed the monk, “what defect can this be, that has
escaped the notice of so many ingenious men?”

“You have certainly,” continued I, “contrived to place your disciples in
perfect safety so far as God and the conscience are concerned; for they
are quite safe in that quarter, according to you, by following in the
wake of a grave doctor. You have also secured them on the part of the
confessors, by obliging priests, on the pain of mortal sin, to absolve
all who follow a probable opinion. But you have neglected to secure them
on the part of the judges; so that, in following your probabilities,
they are in danger of coming into contact with the whip and the gallows.
This is a sad oversight.”

“You are right,” said the monk; “I am glad you mentioned it. But the
reason is, we have no such power over magistrates as over the
confessors, who are obliged to refer to us in cases of conscience, in
which we are the sovereign judges.”

“So I understand,” returned I; “but if, on the one hand, you are the
judges of the confessors, are you not, on the other hand, the confessors
of the judges? Your power is very extensive. Oblige them, on pain of
being debarred from the sacraments, to acquit all criminals who act on a
probable opinion; otherwise it may happen, to the great contempt and
scandal of probability, that those whom you render innocent in theory
may be whipped or hanged in practice. Without something of this kind,
how can you expect to get disciples?”

“The matter deserves consideration,” said he; “it will never do to
neglect it. I shall suggest it to our father Provincial. You might,
however, have reserved this advice to some other time, without
interrupting the account I was about to give you of the maxims which we
have established in favor of gentlemen; and I shall not give you any
more information, except on condition that you do not tell me any more
stories.”

This is all you shall have from me at present; for it would require more
than the limits of one letter to acquaint you with all that I learned in
a single conversation.—Meanwhile I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 147:

  Luke xi. 41.—_Quod superest, date eleemosynam_ (Vulgate); τα ἐνοντα
  δότε (Gr.); _Ea quæ penes vos sunt date_ (Beza); “Give alms of such
  things as ye have.” (Eng. Ver.)

Footnote 148:

  When Pascal speaks of alms-giving “working out our salvation,” it is
  evident that he regarded it only as the evidence of our being in a
  state of salvation. Judging by the history of his life, and by his
  “Thoughts on Religion,” no man was more free from spiritual pride, or
  that poor species of it which boasts of or rests in its eleemosynary
  sacrifices. His charity flowed from love and gratitude to God. Such
  was his regard for the poor that he could not refuse to give alms even
  though compelled to take from the supply necessary to relieve his own
  infirmities; and on his death-bed he entreated that a poor person
  should be brought into the house and treated with the same attention
  as himself, declaring that when he thought of his own comforts and of
  the multitudes who were destitute of the merest necessaries, he felt a
  distress which he could not endure. “One thing I have observed,” he
  says in his Thoughts—“that let a man be ever so poor, he has always
  something to leave on his death-bed.”

Footnote 149:

  These bulls were directed against gross and unnatural crimes
  prevailing among the clergy. (Nicolo, ii. pp. 372–376.)

Footnote 150:

  An allusion to the popularity of the Letters, which induced many to
  inquire after the casuistical writings so often quoted in them.

Footnote 151:

  _Lenten life_—an abstemious life, or life of fasting.

Footnote 152:

  _Prevaricateurs._—Alluding probably to such texts as Rom. iv. 15:
  “The law worketh wrath; for where no law is, there is no
  transgression.”—_Ubi enim non est lex, nec prevaricatio_ (Vulg.); or
  Rom. v. 13, &c.

Footnote 153:

  The Rules (_Regulæ Communes_) of the Society of Jesus, it must be
  admitted, are rigid enough in the enforcement of moral decency and
  discipline on the members; and the perfect candor of Pascal appears in
  the admission. This, however, only adds weight to the real charge
  which he substantiates against them, of teaching maxims which tend to
  the subversion of morality. With regard to their personal conduct,
  different opinions prevail. “Whatever we may think of the political
  delinquencies of their leaders,” says Blanco White, “their bitterest
  enemies have never ventured to charge the order of Jesuits with moral
  irregularities. The internal policy of that body,” he adds, “precluded
  the possibility of gross misconduct.” (Letters from Spain, p. 89.) We
  are far from being sure of this. The remark seems to apply to only one
  species of vice, too common in monastic life, and may be true of the
  conventual establishments of the Jesuits, where outward decency forms
  part of the deep policy of the order; but what dependence can be
  placed on the moral purity of men whose consciences must be debauched
  by such maxims? Jarrige informs us that they boasted at one time in
  Spain of possessing an herb which preserved their chastity; and on
  being questioned by the king to tell what it was, they replied: “It
  was the fear of God.” “But,” says the author, “whatever they might be
  then, it is plain that they have since lost the seed of that herb for
  it no longer grows in their garden.” (Jesuites sur l’Echaufaud, ch.
  6.)

Footnote 154:

  It has been observed, with great truth, by Sir James Macintosh, that
  “casuistry, the inevitable growth of the practices of confession and
  absolution, has generally vibrated betwixt the extremes of
  impracticable severity and contemptible indulgence.” (Hist. of
  England, vol. ii. p. 359.)

Footnote 155:

  _Tiers etat._—These were the three orders into which the people of
  France were divided; the _tiers etat_ or third estate, corresponding
  to our commons.

Footnote 156:

  With all respect for Pascal and his good intention, it is plain that
  there is a wide difference between the duty, illustrated by the
  apostle from the ancient law, of supporting those who minister in holy
  things in and for their ministrations, and the practice introduced by
  the Church of Rome, of putting a price on the holy things themselves.
  In the one case, it was simply a recognition of the general principle
  that “the laborer is worthy of his hire.” In the other, it was
  converting the minister into a shopman who was allowed to “barter” his
  sacred wares at the market price, or any price he pleased. To this
  mercenary principle most of the superstitions of Rome may be traced.
  The popish doctrine of the mass is founded on transubstantiation, or
  the superstition broached in the ninth century, that the bread and
  wine are converted by the priest into the real body and blood of
  Christ. It was never settled in the Romish Church to be a proper
  propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead till the Council of
  Trent, in the sixteenth century; so that it is comparatively a modern
  invention. The mass proceeds on the absurd assumption that our blessed
  Lord offered up his body and blood in the institution of the supper,
  before offering them on the cross, and partook of them himself; and it
  involves the blasphemy of supposing that a sinful mortal may, whenever
  he pleases, offer up the great sacrifice of that body and blood, which
  could only be offered by the Son of God and offered by him only once.
  This, however, is the great Diana of the popish priests—by this craft
  they have their wealth—and the whole of its history proves that it was
  invented for no other purposes than imposture and extortion.

Footnote 157:

  Heb. vii. 27.—It is astonishing to see an acute mind like that of
  Pascal so warped by superstition as not to perceive that in this, and
  other allusions to the Levitical priesthood, the object of the apostle
  was avowedly to prove that the great sacrifice for sin, of which the
  ancient sacrifices were the types, had been “once offered in the end
  of the world,” and that “there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins;”
  and that the very text to which he refers, teaches that, in the person
  of Jesus Christ, our high priest, all the functions of the sacrificing
  priesthood were fulfilled and terminated: “Who needeth _not_ daily _as
  those high priests_, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins,
  and then for the people’s: for this he did _once_, when he offered up
  himself.” The ministers of the New Testament are never in Scripture
  called priests, though this name has been applied to the Christian
  people who offer up the “spiritual sacrifices” of praise and good
  works. (Heb. xiii. 15, 16; 1 Pet. ii. 5.)

Footnote 158:

  Treatise 10, p. 474; ib., p. 441; Quest. 32, p. 457.

Footnote 159:

  Tom. ii. tr. 25. n. 33. And yet they will pretend to hold that their
  Church is infallible!

Footnote 160:

  Book of the Hierarchy, p. 611, Rouen edition.

Footnote 161:

  Op. Mor. p. 1, disp. 2, p. 6. _Ferdinand de Castro Palao_ was a Jesuit
  of Spain, and author of a work on Virtues and Vices, published in
  1631.




                            LETTER VII.[162]

METHOD OF DIRECTING THE INTENTION ADOPTED BY THE CASUISTS—PERMISSION TO
   KILL IN DEFENCE OF HONOR AND PROPERTY, EXTENDED EVEN TO PRIESTS AND
   MONKS—CURIOUS QUESTION RAISED BY CARAMUEL, AS TO WHETHER JESUITS MAY
   BE ALLOWED TO KILL JANSENISTS.


                                                PARIS, _April 25, 1656_.

SIR,—Having succeeded in pacifying the good father, who had been rather
disconcerted by the story of John d’Alba, he resumed the conversation,
on my assuring him that I would avoid all such interruptions in future,
and spoke of the maxims of his casuists with regard to gentlemen, nearly
in the following terms:—

“You know,” he said, “that the ruling passion of persons in that rank of
life is ‘the point of honor,’ which is perpetually driving them into
acts of violence apparently quite at variance with Christian piety; so
that, in fact, they would be almost all of them excluded from our
confessionals, had not our fathers relaxed a little from the strictness
of religion, to accommodate themselves to the weakness of humanity.
Anxious to keep on good terms both with the Gospel, by doing their duty
to God, and with the men of the world, by showing charity to their
neighbor, they needed all the wisdom they possessed to devise expedients
for so nicely adjusting matters as to permit these gentlemen to adopt
the methods usually resorted to for vindicating their honor, without
wounding their consciences, and thus reconcile two things apparently so
opposite to each other as piety and the point of honor. But, sir, in
proportion to the utility of the design was the difficulty of the
execution. You cannot fail, I should think, to realize the magnitude and
arduousness of such an enterprize?”

“It astonishes me, certainly,” said I, rather coldly.

“It astonishes you, forsooth!” cried the monk. “I can well believe that;
many besides you might be astonished at it. Why, don’t you know that, on
the one hand, the Gospel commands us ‘not to render evil for evil, but
to leave vengeance to God;’ and that, on the other hand, the laws of the
world forbid our enduring an affront without demanding satisfaction from
the offender, and that often at the expense of his life? You have never,
I am sure, met with anything, to all appearance, more diametrically
opposed than these two codes of morals; and yet, when told that our
fathers have reconciled them, you have nothing more to say than simply
that this astonishes you!”

“I did not sufficiently explain myself, father. I should certainly have
considered the thing perfectly impracticable, if I had not known, from
what I have seen of your fathers, that they are capable of doing with
ease what is impossible to other men. This led me to anticipate that
they must have discovered some method for meeting the difficulty—a
method which I admire even before knowing it, and which I pray you to
explain to me.”

“Since that is your view of the matter,” replied the monk, “I cannot
refuse you. Know, then, that this marvellous principle is our grand
method of _directing the intention_—the importance of which, in our
moral system, is such, that I might almost venture to compare it with
the doctrine of probability. You have had some glimpses of it in
passing, from certain maxims which I mentioned to you. For example, when
I was showing you how servants might execute certain troublesome jobs
with a safe conscience, did you not remark that it was simply by
diverting their intention from the evil to which they were accessary, to
the profit which they might reap from the transaction? Now that is what
we call _directing the intention_. You saw, too, that were it not for a
similar divergence of the mind, those who give money for benefices might
be downright simoniacs. But I will now show you this grand method in all
its glory, as it applies to the subject of homicide—a crime which it
justifies in a thousand instances; in order that, from this startling
result, you may form an idea of all that it is calculated to effect.”

“I foresee already,” said I, “that, according to this mode, everything
will be permitted; it will stick at nothing.”

“You always fly from the one extreme to the other,” replied the monk:
“prithee avoid that habit. For just to show you that we are far from
permitting everything, let me tell you that we never suffer such a thing
as a formal intention to sin, with the sole design of sinning; and if
any person whatever should persist in having no other end but evil in
the evil that he does, we break with him at once: such conduct is
diabolical. This holds true, without exception of age, sex, or rank. But
when the person is not of such a wretched disposition as this, we try to
put in practice our method of _directing the intention_, which simply
consists in his proposing to himself, as the end of his actions, some
allowable object. Not that we do not endeavor, as far as we can, to
dissuade men from doing things forbidden; but when we cannot prevent the
action, we at least purify the motive, and thus correct the viciousness
of the mean by the goodness of the end. Such is the way in which our
fathers have contrived to permit those acts of violence to which men
usually resort in vindication of their honor. They have no more to do
than to turn off their intention from the desire of vengeance, which is
criminal, and direct it to a desire to defend their honor, which,
according to us, is quite warrantable. And in this way our doctors
discharge all their duty towards God and towards man. By permitting the
action, they gratify the world; and by purifying the intention, they
give satisfaction to the Gospel. This is a secret, sir, which was
entirely unknown to the ancients; the world is indebted for the
discovery entirely to our doctors. You understand it now, I hope?”

“Perfectly well,” was my reply. “To men you grant the outward material
effect of the action; and to God you give the inward and spiritual
movement of the intention; and by this equitable partition, you form an
alliance between the laws of God and the laws of men. But, my dear sir,
to be frank with you, I can hardly trust your premises, and I suspect
that your authors will tell another tale.”

“You do me injustice,” rejoined the monk; “I advance nothing but what I
am ready to prove, and that by such a rich array of passages, that
altogether their number, their authority, and their reasonings, will
fill you with admiration. To show you, for example, the alliance which
our fathers have formed between the maxims of the Gospel and those of
the world, by thus regulating the intention, let me refer you to
Reginald:[163] ‘Private persons are forbidden to avenge themselves; for
St. Paul says to the Romans (ch. 12th), ‘Recompense to no man evil for
evil;’ and Ecclesiasticus says (ch. 28th), ‘He that taketh vengeance
shall draw on himself the vengeance of God, and his sins will not be
forgotten.’ Besides all that is said in the Gospel about forgiving
offences, as in the 6th and 18th chapters of St. Matthew.’”

“Well, father, if after that he says anything contrary to the Scripture,
it will not be from lack of scriptural knowledge, at any rate. Pray, how
does he conclude?”

“You shall hear,” he said. “From all this it appears that a military man
may demand satisfaction on the spot from the person who has injured
him—not, indeed, with the intention of rendering evil for evil, but with
that of preserving his honor—‘_non ut malum pro malo reddat, sed ut
conservet honorem_.’ See you how carefully they guard against the
intention of rendering evil for evil, because the Scripture condemns it?
This is what they will tolerate on no account. Thus Lessius[164]
observes, that ‘if a man has received a blow on the face, he must on no
account have an intention to avenge himself; but he may lawfully have an
intention to avert infamy, and may, with that view, repel the insult
immediately, even at the point of the sword—_etiam cum gladio_!’ So far
are we from permitting any one to cherish the design of taking vengeance
on his enemies, that our fathers will not allow any even to _wish their
death_—by a movement of hatred. ‘If your enemy is disposed to injure
you,’ says Escobar, ‘you have no right to wish his death, by a movement
of hatred; though you may, with a view to save yourself from harm.’ So
legitimate, indeed, is this wish, with such an intention, that our great
Hurtado de Mendoza says, that ‘we may _pray God_ to visit with speedy
death those who are bent on persecuting us, if there is no other way of
escaping from it.’”[165]

“May it please your reverence,” said I, “the Church has forgotten to
insert a petition to that effect among her prayers.”

“They have not put in everything into the prayers that one may lawfully
ask of God,” answered the monk. “Besides, in the present case the thing
was impossible, for this same opinion is of more recent standing than
the Breviary. You are not a good chronologist, friend. But, not to
wander from the point, let me request your attention to the following
passage, cited by Diana from Gaspar Hurtado,[166] one of Escobar’s
four-and-twenty fathers: ‘An incumbent may, without any mortal sin,
desire the decease of a life-renter on his benefice, and a son that of
his father, and rejoice when it happens; provided always it is for the
sake of the profit that is to accrue from the event, and not from
personal aversion.’”

“Good!” cried I. “That is certainly a very happy hit; and I can easily
see that the doctrine admits of a wide application. But yet there are
certain cases, the solution of which, though of great importance for
gentlemen, might present still greater difficulties.”

“Propose them, if you please, that we may see,” said the monk.

“Show me, with all your directing of the intention,” returned I, “that
it is allowable to fight a duel.”

“Our great Hurtado de Mendoza,” said the father, “will satisfy you on
that point in a twinkling. ‘If a gentleman,’ says he, in a passage cited
by Diana, ‘who is challenged to fight a duel, is well known to have no
religion, and if the vices to which he is openly and unscrupulously
addicted are such as would lead people to conclude, in the event of his
refusing to fight, that he is actuated, not by the fear of God, but by
cowardice, and induce them to say of him that he was a _hen_, and not a
man—_gallina, et non vir_; in that case he may, to save his honor,
appear at the appointed spot—not, indeed, with the express intention of
fighting a duel, but merely with that of defending himself, should the
person who challenged him come there unjustly to attack him. His action
in this case, viewed by itself, will be perfectly indifferent; for what
moral evil is there in one stepping into a field, taking a stroll in
expectation of meeting a person, and defending one’s self in the event
of being attacked? And thus the gentleman is guilty of no sin whatever;
for in fact it cannot be called accepting a challenge at all, his
intention being directed to other circumstances, and the acceptance of a
challenge consisting in an express intention to fight, which we are
supposing the gentleman never had.’”

“You have not kept your word with me, sir,” said I. “This is not,
properly speaking, to permit duelling; on the contrary, the casuist is
so persuaded that this practice is forbidden, that, in licensing the
action in question, he carefully avoids calling it a duel.”

“Ah!” cried the monk, “you begin to get knowing on my hand, I am glad to
see. I might reply, that the author I have quoted grants all that
duellists are disposed to ask. But since you must have a categorical
answer, I shall allow our Father Layman to give it for me. He permits
duelling in so many words, provided that, in accepting the challenge,
the person directs his intention solely to the preservation of his honor
or his property: ‘If a soldier or a courtier is in such a predicament
that he must lose either his honor or his fortune unless he accepts a
challenge, I see nothing to hinder him from doing so in self-defence.’
The same thing is said by Peter Hurtado, as quoted by our famous
Escobar; his words are: ‘One may fight a duel even to defend one’s
property, should that be necessary; because every man has a right to
defend his property, though at the expense of his enemy’s life!’”

I was struck, on hearing these passages, with the reflection that while
the piety of the king appears in his exerting all his power to prohibit
and abolish the practice of duelling in the State,[167] the piety of the
Jesuits is shown in their employing all their ingenuity to tolerate and
sanction it in the Church. But the good father was in such an excellent
key for talking, that it would have been cruel to have interrupted him;
so he went on with his discourse.

“In short,” said he, “Sanchez (mark, now, what great names I am quoting
to you!) Sanchez, sir, goes a step further; for he shows how, simply by
managing the intention rightly, a person may not only receive a
challenge, but give one. And our Escobar follows him.”

“Prove that, father,” said I, “and I shall give up the point: but I will
not believe that he has written it, unless I see it in print.”

“Read it yourself, then,” he replied: and, to be sure, I read the
following extract from the Moral Theology of Sanchez: “It is perfectly
reasonable to hold that a man may fight a duel to save his life, his
honor, or any considerable portion of his property, when it is apparent
that there is a design to deprive him of these unjustly, by law-suits
and chicanery, and when there is no other way of preserving them.
Navarre justly observes, that in such cases, it is lawful either to
accept or to send a challenge—_licet acceptare et offerre duellum_. The
same author adds, that there is nothing to prevent one from despatching
one’s adversary in a private way. Indeed, in the circumstances referred
to, it is advisable to avoid employing the method of the duel, if it is
possible to settle the affair by privately killing our enemy; for, by
this means, we escape at once from exposing our life in the combat, and
from participating in the sin which our opponent would have committed by
fighting the duel!”[168]

“A most pious assassination!” said I. “Still, however, pious though it
be, it is assassination, if a man is permitted to kill his enemy in a
treacherous manner.”

“Did I say that he might kill him treacherously?” cried the monk. “God
forbid! I said he might kill him _privately_, and you conclude that he
may kill him _treacherously_, as if that were the same thing! Attend,
sir, to Escobar’s definition before allowing yourself to speak again on
this subject: ‘We call it killing in treachery, when the person who is
slain had no reason to suspect such a fate. He, therefore, that slays
his _enemy_ cannot be said to kill him in treachery, even although the
blow should be given insidiously and behind his back—_licet per insidias
aut a tergo percutiat_.’ And again: ‘He that kills his enemy, with whom
he was reconciled under a promise of never again attempting his life,
cannot be _absolutely_ said to kill in treachery, unless there was
between them all the stricter friendship—_arctior amicitia_.’[169] You
see now, you do not even understand what the terms signify, and yet you
pretend to talk like a doctor.”

“I grant you this is something quite new to me,” I replied; “and I
should gather from that definition that few, if any, were ever killed in
treachery; for people seldom take it into their heads to assassinate any
but their enemies. Be this as it may, however, it seems that, according
to Sanchez, a man may freely slay (I do not say _treacherously_, but
only insidiously, and behind his back) a calumniator, for example, who
prosecutes us at law?”

“Certainly he may,” returned the monk, “always, however, in the way of
giving a right direction to the intention: you constantly forget the
main point. Molina supports the same doctrine; and what is more, our
learned brother Reginald maintains that we may despatch the false
witnesses whom he summons against us. And, to crown the whole, according
to our great and famous fathers Tanner and Emanuel Sa, it is lawful to
kill both the false witnesses and _the judge himself_, if he has had any
collusion with them. Here are Tanner’s very words: ‘Sotus and Lessius
think that it is not lawful to kill the false witnesses and the
magistrate who conspire together to put an innocent person to death; but
Emanuel Sa and other authors with good reason impugn that sentiment, at
least so far as the conscience is concerned.’ And he goes on to show
that it is quite lawful to kill both the witnesses and the judge.”

“Well, father,” said I, “I think I now understand pretty well your
principle regarding the direction of the intention; but I should like to
know something of its consequences, and all the cases in which this
method of yours arms a man with the power of life and death. Let us go
over them again, for fear of mistake, for equivocation here might be
attended with dangerous results. Killing is a matter which requires to
be well-timed, and to be backed with a good probable opinion. You have
assured me, then, that by giving a proper turn to the intention, it is
lawful, according to your fathers, for the preservation of one’s honor,
or even property, to accept a challenge to a duel, to give one
sometimes, to kill in a private way a false accuser, and his witnesses
along with him, and even the judge who has been bribed to favor them;
and you have also told me that he who has got a blow, may, without
avenging himself, retaliate with the sword. But you have not told me,
father, to what length he may go.”

“He can hardly mistake there,” replied the father, “for he may go all
the length of killing his man. This is satisfactorily proved by the
learned Henriquez, and others of our fathers quoted by Escobar, as
follows: ‘It is perfectly right to kill a person who has given us a box
on the ear, although he should run away, provided it is not done through
hatred or revenge, and there is no danger of giving occasion thereby to
murders of a gross kind and hurtful to society. And the reason is, that
it is as lawful to pursue the thief that has stolen our honor, as him
that has run away with our property. For, although your honor cannot be
said to be in the hands of your enemy in the same sense as your goods
and chattels are in the hands of the thief, still it may be recovered in
the same way—by showing proofs of greatness and authority, and thus
acquiring the esteem of men. And, in point of fact, is it not certain
that the man who has received a buffet on the ear is held to be under
disgrace, until he has wiped off the insult with the blood of his
enemy?’”

I was so shocked on hearing this, that it was with great difficulty I
could contain myself; but, in my anxiety to hear the rest, I allowed him
to proceed.

“Nay,” he continued, “it is allowable to prevent a buffet, by killing
him that meant to give it, if there be no other way to escape the
insult. This opinion is quite common with our fathers. For example,
Azor, one of the four-and-twenty elders, proposing the question, ‘Is it
lawful for a man of honor to kill another who threatens to give him a
slap on the face, or strike him with a stick?’ replies, ‘Some say he may
not; alleging that the life of our neighbor is more precious than our
honor, and that it would be an act of cruelty to kill a man merely to
avoid a blow. Others, however, think that it is allowable; and I
certainly consider it probable, when there is no other way of warding
off the insult; for, otherwise, the honor of the innocent would be
constantly exposed to the malice of the insolent.’ The same opinion is
given by our great Filiutius; by Father Hereau, in his Treatise on
Homicide; by Hurtado de Mendoza, in his Disputations; by Becan, in his
Summary; by our Fathers Flahaut and Lecourt, in those writings which the
university, in their third petition, quoted at length, in order to bring
them into disgrace (though in this they failed); and by Escobar. In
short, this opinion is so general, that Lessius lays it down as a point
which no casuist has contested; he quotes a great many that uphold, and
none that deny it; and particularly Peter Navarre, who, speaking of
affronts in general (and there is none more provoking than a box on the
ear), declares that ‘by the universal consent of the casuists, it is
lawful to kill the calumniator, if there be no other way of averting the
affront—_ex sententia omnium, licet contumeliosum occidere, si aliter ea
injuria arceri nequit_.’ Do you wish any more authorities?” asked the
monk.

I declared I was much obliged to him; I had heard rather more than
enough of them already. But just to see how far this damnable doctrine
would go, I said, “But, father, may not one be allowed to kill for
something still less? Might not a person so direct his intention as
lawfully to kill another for telling a lie, for example?”

“He may,” returned the monk; “and according to Father Baldelle, quoted
by Escobar, ‘you may lawfully take the life of another for saying, You
have told a lie; if there is no other way of shutting his mouth.’ The
same thing may be done in the case of slanders. Our Fathers Lessius and
Hereau agree in the following sentiments: ‘If you attempt to ruin my
character by telling stories against me in the presence of men of honor,
and I have no other way of preventing this than by putting you to death,
may I be permitted to do so? According to the modern authors, I may, and
that even though I have been really guilty of the crime which you
divulge, provided it is a secret one, which you could not establish by
legal evidence. And I prove it thus: If you mean to rob me of my honor
by giving me a box on the ear, I may prevent it by force of arms; and
the same mode of defence is lawful when you would do me the same injury
with the tongue. Besides, we may lawfully obviate affronts, and
therefore slanders. In fine, honor is dearer than life; and as it is
lawful to kill in defence of life, it must be so to kill in defence of
honor.’ There, you see, are arguments in due form; this is
demonstration, sir—not mere discussion. And, to conclude, this great man
Lessius shows, in the same place, that it is lawful to kill even for a
simple gesture, or a sign of contempt. ‘A man’s honor,’ he remarks, ‘may
be attacked or filched away in various ways—in all which vindication
appears very reasonable; as, for instance, when one offers to strike us
with a stick, or give us a slap on the face, or affront us either by
words or signs—_sive per signa_.’”

“Well, father,” said I, “it must be owned that you have made every
possible provision to secure the safety of reputation; but it strikes me
that human life is greatly in danger, if any one may be conscientiously
put to death simply for a defamatory speech or a saucy gesture.”

“That is true,” he replied; “but as our fathers are very circumspect,
they have thought it proper to forbid putting this doctrine into
practice on such trifling occasions. They say, at least, ‘that it ought
_hardly_ to be reduced to practice—_practicè vix probari potest_.’ And
they have a good reason for that, as you shall see.”

“Oh! I know what it will be,” interrupted I; “because the law of God
forbids us to kill, of course.”

“They do not exactly take that ground,” said the father; “as a matter of
conscience, and viewing the thing abstractly, they hold it allowable.”

“And why, then, do they forbid it?”

“I shall tell you that, sir. It is because, were we to kill all the
defamers among us, we should very shortly depopulate the country.
‘Although,’ says Reginald, ‘the opinion that we may kill a man for
calumny is not without its probability in theory, the contrary one ought
to be followed in practice; for, in our mode of defending ourselves, we
should always avoid doing injury to the commonwealth; and it is evident
that by killing people in this way there would be too many murders.’ ‘We
should be on our guard,’ says Lessius, ‘lest the practice of this maxim
prove hurtful to the State; for in this case it ought not to be
permitted—_tunc enim non est permittendus_.’”

“What, father! is it forbidden only as a point of policy, and not of
religion? Few people, I am afraid, will pay any regard to such a
prohibition, particularly when in a passion. Very probably they might
think they were doing no harm to the State, by ridding it of an unworthy
member.”

“And accordingly,” replied the monk, “our Filiutius has fortified that
argument with another, which is of no slender importance, namely, ‘that
for killing people after this manner, one might be punished in a court
of justice.’”

“There now, father; I told you before, that you will never be able to do
anything worth the while, unless you get the magistrates to go along
with you.”

“The magistrates,” said the father, “as they do not penetrate into the
conscience, judge merely of the outside of the action, while we look
principally to the intention; and hence it occasionally happens that our
maxims are a little different from theirs.”

“Be that as it may, father; from yours, at least, one thing may be
fairly inferred—that, by taking care not to injure the commonwealth, we
may kill defamers with a safe conscience, provided we can do it with a
sound skin. But, sir, after having seen so well to the protection of
honor, have you done nothing for property? I am aware it is of inferior
importance, but that does not signify; I should think one might direct
one’s intention to kill for its preservation also.”

“Yes,” replied the monk; “and I gave you a hint to that effect already,
which may have suggested the idea to you. All our casuists agree in that
opinion; and they even extend the permission to those cases ‘where no
further violence is apprehended from those that steal our property; as,
for example, where the thief runs away.’ Azor, one of our Society,
proves that point.”

“But, sir, how much must the article be worth, to justify our proceeding
to that extremity?”

“According to Reginald and Tanner, ‘the article must be of great value
in the estimation of a judicious man.’ And so think Layman and
Filiutius.”

“But, father, that is saying nothing to the purpose; where am I to find
‘a judicious man’ (a rare person to meet with at any time), in order to
make this estimation? Why do they not settle upon an exact sum at once?”

“Ay, indeed!” retorted the monk; “and was it so easy, think you, to
adjust the comparative value between the life of a man, and a Christian
man, too, and money? It is here I would have you feel the need of our
casuists. Show me any of your ancient fathers who will tell for how much
money we may be allowed to kill a man. What will they say, but ‘_Non
occides_—Thou shalt not kill?’”

“And who, then, has ventured to fix that sum?” I inquired.

“Our great and incomparable Molina,” he replied—“the glory of our
Society—who has, in his inimitable wisdom, estimated the life of a man
‘at six or seven ducats; for which sum he assures us it is warrantable
to kill a thief, even though he should run off;’ and he adds, ‘that he
would not venture to condemn that man as guilty of any sin who should
kill another for taking away an article worth a crown, or even
less—_unius aurei, vel minoris adhuc valoris_;’ which has led Escobar to
lay it down as a general rule, ‘that a man may be killed quite
regularly, according to Molina, for the value of a crown-piece.’”

“O father!” cried I, “where can Molina have got all this wisdom to
enable him to determine a matter of such importance, without any aid
from Scripture, the councils, or the fathers? It is quite evident that
he has obtained an illumination peculiar to himself, and is far beyond
St. Augustine in the matter of homicide, as well as of grace. Well, now,
I suppose I may consider myself master of this chapter of morals; and I
see perfectly that, with the exception of ecclesiastics, nobody need
refrain from killing those who injure them in their property or
reputation.”

“What say you?” exclaimed the monk. “Do you then suppose that it would
be reasonable that those who ought of all men to be most respected,
should alone be exposed to the insolence of the wicked? Our fathers have
provided against that disorder; for Tanner declares that ‘Churchmen, and
even monks, are permitted to kill, for the purpose of defending not only
their lives, but their property, and that of their community.’ Molina,
Escobar, Becan, Reginald, Layman, Lessius, and others, hold the same
language. Nay, according to our celebrated Father Lamy,[170] priests and
monks may lawfully prevent those who would injure them by calumnies from
carrying their ill designs into effect, by putting them to death. Care,
however, must be always taken to direct the intention properly. His
words are: ‘An ecclesiastic or a monk may warrantably kill a defamer who
threatens to publish the scandalous crimes of his community, or his own
crimes, when there is no other way of stopping him; if, for instance, he
is prepared to circulate his defamations unless promptly despatched.
For, in these circumstances, as the monk would be allowed to kill one
who threatened to take his life, he is also warranted to kill him who
would deprive him of his reputation or his property, in the same way as
the men of the world.’”

“I was not aware of that,” said I; “in fact, I have been accustomed
simply enough to believe the very reverse, without reflecting on the
matter, in consequence of having heard that the Church had such an
abhorrence of bloodshed as not even to permit ecclesiastical judges to
attend in criminal cases.”[171]

“Never mind that,” he replied; “our Father Lamy has completely proved
the doctrine I have laid down, although, with a humility which sits
uncommonly well on so great a man, he submits it to the judgment of his
judicious readers. Caramuel, too, our famous champion, quoting it in his
Fundamental Theology, p. 543, thinks it so certain, that he declares the
contrary opinion to be destitute of probability, and draws some
admirable conclusions from it, such as the following, which he calls
‘the conclusion of conclusions—_conclusionum conclusio_:’ ‘That a priest
not only may kill a slanderer, but there are certain circumstances in
which it may be his _duty_ to do so—_etiam aliquando debet occidere_.’
He examines a great many new questions on this principle, such as the
following, for instance: ‘_May the Jesuits kill the Jansenists?_’”

“A curious point of divinity that, father!” cried I. “I hold the
Jansenists to be as good as dead men, according to Father Lamy’s
doctrine.”

“There now, you are in the wrong,” said the monk: “Caramuel infers the
very reverse from the same principles.”

“And how so, father?”

“Because,” he replied, “it is not in the power of the Jansenists to
injure our reputation. ‘The Jansenists,’ says he, ‘call the Jesuits
Pelagians; may they not be killed for that? No; inasmuch as the
Jansenists can no more obscure the glory of the Society than an owl can
eclipse that of the sun; on the contrary, they have, though against
their intention, enhanced it—_occidi non possunt, quia nocere non
potuerunt_.’”

“Ha, father! do the lives of the Jansenists, then, depend on the
contingency of their injuring your reputation? If so, I reckon them far
from being in a safe position; for supposing it should be thought in the
slightest degree _probable_ that they might do you some mischief, why,
they are _killable_ at once! You have only to draw up a syllogism in due
form, and, with a direction of the intention, you may despatch your man
at once with a safe conscience. Thrice happy must those hot spirits be
who cannot bear with injuries, to be instructed in this doctrine! But
woe to the poor people who have offended them! Indeed, father, it would
be better to have to do with persons who have no religion at all, than
with those who have been taught on this system. For, after all, the
intention of the wounder conveys no comfort to the wounded. The poor man
sees nothing of that secret direction of which you speak; he is only
sensible of the direction of the blow that is dealt him. And I am by no
means sure but a person would feel much less sorry to see himself
brutally killed by an infuriated villain, than to find himself
conscientiously stilettoed by a devotee. To be plain with you, father, I
am somewhat staggered at all this; and these questions of Father Lamy
and Caramuel do not please me at all.”

“How so?” cried the monk. “Are you a Jansenist?”

“I have another reason for it,” I replied. “You must know I am in the
habit of writing from time to time, to a friend of mine in the country,
all that I can learn of the maxims of your doctors. Now, although I do
no more than simply report and faithfully quote their own words, yet I
am apprehensive lest my letter should fall into the hands of some stray
genius, who may take into his head that I have done you injury, and may
draw some mischievous conclusion from your premises.”

“Away!” cried the monk; “no fear of danger from that quarter, I’ll give
you my word for it. Know that what our fathers have themselves printed,
with the approbation of our superiors, it cannot be wrong to read nor
dangerous to publish.”

I write you, therefore, on the faith of this worthy father’s word of
honor. But, in the mean time, I must stop for want of paper—not of
passages; for I have got as many more in reserve, and good ones too, as
would require volumes to contain them.—I am, &c.[172]

-----

Footnote 162:

  This Letter was revised by M. Nicole.

Footnote 163:

  _In praxi_: liv. xxi., num. 62, p. 260.

Footnote 164:

  De Just., liv. ii., c. 9, d. 12, n. 79.

Footnote 165:

  In his book, De Spe, vol. ii., d. 15, sec. 4, 848.

Footnote 166:

  De Sub. Pecc., diff. 9; Diana, p. 5; tr. 14, r. 99.

Footnote 167:

  Before the age of Louis XIV. the practice of duelling prevailed in
  France to such a frightful extent that a writer, who is not given to
  exaggerate in such matters, says, that “It had done as much to
  depopulate the country as the civil and foreign wars, and that in the
  course of twenty years, ten of which had been disturbed by war, more
  Frenchmen perished by the hands of Frenchmen than by those of their
  enemies.” (Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV., p. 42.) The abolition of
  this barbarous custom was one of the greatest services which Louis
  XIV. rendered to his country. This was not fully accomplished till
  1663, when a bloody combat of four against four determined him to put
  an end to the practice, by making it death, without benefit of clergy,
  to send or accept a challenge.

Footnote 168:

  Sanchez, Theol. Mor., liv. ii. c. 39, n. 7.

Footnote 169:

  Escobar, tr. 6, ex. 4, n. 26, 56.

Footnote 170:

  Francois Amicus, or L’Amy, was chancellor of the University of Gratz.
  In his _Cours Theologique_, published in 1642 he advances the most
  dangerous tenets, particularly on the subject of murder.

Footnote 171:

  This is true; but in the case of heretics, at least, they found out a
  convenient mode of compromising the matter. Having condemned their
  victim as worthy of death, he was delivered over to the secular court,
  with the disgusting farce of a recommendation to mercy, couched in
  these terms: “My lord judge, we beg of you with all possible
  affection, for the love of God, and as you would expect the gifts of
  mercy and compassion, and the benefit of our prayers, not to do
  anything injurious to this miserable man, tending to death or the
  mutilation of his body!” (Crespin, Hist. des Martyres, p. 185.)

Footnote 172:

  It may be noticed here, that Father Daniel has attempted to evade the
  main charge against the Jesuits in this letter by adroitly altering
  the state of the question. He argues that the _intention_ is the soul
  of an action, and that which often makes it good or evil; thus
  cunningly insinuating that his casuists refer only to _indifferent_
  actions, in regard to which nobody denies that it is the intention
  that makes them good or bad. (Entretiens de Cleandre et d’Eudoxe, p.
  334.) It is unnecessary to do more than refer the reader back to the
  instances cited in the letter, to convince him that what these
  casuists really maintain is, that actions in themselves _evil_, may be
  allowed, provided the _intentions_ are good; and, moreover, that in
  order to make these intentions good, it is not necessary that they
  have any reference to God, but sufficient if they refer to our own
  convenience, cupidity or vanity. (Apologie des Lettres Provinciales,
  pp. 212–221.)




                           LETTER VIII.[173]

CORRUPT MAXIMS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING TO JUDGES—USURERS—THE CONTRACT
   MOHATRA—BANKRUPTS—RESTITUTION—DIVERS RIDICULOUS NOTIONS OF THESE SAME
   CASUISTS.


                                                  PARIS, _May 28, 1656_.

SIR,—You did not suppose that anybody would have the curiosity to know
who we were; but it seems there are people who are trying to make it
out, though they are not very happy in their conjectures. Some take me
for a doctor of the Sorbonne; others ascribe my letters to four or five
persons, who, like me, are neither priests nor Churchmen. All these
false surmises convince me that I have succeeded pretty well in my
object, which was to conceal myself from all but yourself and the worthy
monk, who still continues to bear with my visits, while I still
contrive, though with considerable difficulty, to bear with his
conversations. I am obliged, however, to restrain myself; for were he to
discover how much I am shocked at his communications, he would
discontinue them, and thus put it out of my power to fulfil the promise
I gave you, of making you acquainted with their morality. You ought to
think a great deal of the violence which I thus do to my own feelings.
It is no easy matter, I can assure you, to stand still and see the whole
system of Christian ethics undermined by such a set of monstrous
principles, without daring to put in a word of flat contradiction
against them. But after having borne so much for your satisfaction, I am
resolved I shall burst out for my own satisfaction in the end, when his
stock of information has been exhausted. Meanwhile, I shall repress my
feelings as much as I possibly can; for I find that the more I hold my
tongue, he is the more communicative. The last time I saw him, he told
me so many things, that I shall have some difficulty in repeating them
all. On the point of restitution you will find they have some most
convenient principles. For, however the good monk palliates his maxims,
those which I am about to lay before you really go to sanction corrupt
judges, usurers, bankrupts, thieves, prostitutes and sorcerers—all of
whom are most liberally absolved from the obligation of restoring their
ill-gotten gains. It was thus the monk resumed the conversation:—

“At the commencement of our interviews, I engaged to explain to you the
maxims of our authors for all ranks and classes; and you have already
seen those that relate to beneficiaries, to priests, to monks, to
domestics, and to gentlemen. Let us now take a cursory glance of the
remaining, and begin with the judges.

“Now I am going to tell you one of the most important and advantageous
maxims which our fathers have laid down in their favor. Its author is
the learned Castro Palao, one of our four-and-twenty elders. His words
are: ‘May a judge, in a question of right and wrong, pronounce according
to a probable opinion, in preference to the more probable opinion? He
may, even though it should be contrary to his own judgment—_imo contra
propriam opinionem_.’”

“Well, father,” cried I, “that is a very fair commencement! The judges,
surely, are greatly obliged to you; and I am surprised that they should
be so hostile, as we have sometimes observed, to your probabilities,
seeing these are so favorable to them. For it would appear from this,
that you give them the same power over men’s fortunes, as you have given
to yourselves over their consciences.”

“You perceive we are far from being actuated by self-interest,” returned
he; “we have had no other end in view than the repose of their
consciences; and to the same useful purpose has our great Molina devoted
his attention, in regard to the presents which may be made them. To
remove any scruples which they might entertain in accepting of these on
certain occasions, he has been at the pains to draw out a list of all
those cases in which bribes may be taken with a good conscience,
provided, at least, there be no special law forbidding them. He says:
‘Judges may receive presents from parties, when they are given them
either for friendship’s sake, or in gratitude for some former act of
justice, or to induce them to give justice in future, or to oblige them
to pay particular attention to their case, or to engage them to despatch
it promptly.’ The learned Escobar delivers himself to the same effect:
‘If there be a number of persons, none of whom have more right than
another to have their causes disposed of, will the judge who accepts of
something from one of them on condition—_ex pacto_—of taking up his
cause first, be guilty of sin? Certainly not, according to Layman; for,
in common equity, he does no injury to the rest, by granting to one, in
consideration of his present, what he was at liberty to grant to any of
them he pleased; and besides, being under an equal obligation to them
all in respect of their right, he becomes more obliged to the individual
who furnished the donation, who thereby acquired for himself a
preference above the rest—a preference which seems capable of a
pecuniary valuation—_quæ obligatio videtur pretio æstimabilis_.’”

“May it please your reverence,” said I, “after such a permission, I am
surprised that the first magistrates of the kingdom should know no
better. For the first president[174] has actually carried an order in
Parliament to prevent certain clerks of court from taking money for that
very sort of preference—a sign that he is far from thinking it allowable
in judges; and everybody has applauded this as a reform of great benefit
to all parties.”

The worthy monk was surprised at this piece of intelligence, and
replied: “Are you sure of that? I heard nothing about it. Our opinion,
recollect, is only probable; the contrary is probable also.”

“To tell you the truth, father,” said I, “people think that the first
president has acted more than probably well, and that he has thus put a
stop to a course of public corruption which has been too long winked
at.”

“I am not far from being of the same mind,” returned he; “but let us
waive that point, and say no more about the judges.”

“You are quite right, sir,” said I; “indeed, they are not half thankful
enough for all you have done for them.”

“That is not my reason,” said the father; “but there is so much to be
said on all the different classes, that we must study brevity on each of
them. Let us now say a word or two about men of business. You are aware
that our great difficulty with these gentlemen is to keep them from
usury—an object to accomplish which our fathers have been at particular
pains; for they hold this vice in such abhorrence, that Escobar declares
‘it is heresy to say that usury is no sin;’ and Father Bauny has filled
several pages of his Summary of Sins with the pains and penalties due to
usurers. He declares them ‘infamous during their life, and unworthy of
sepulture after their death.’”

“O dear!” cried I, “I had no idea he was so severe.”

“He can be severe enough when there is occasion for it,” said the monk;
“but then this learned casuist, having observed that some are allured
into usury merely from the love of gain, remarks in the same place, that
‘he would confer no small obligation on society, who, while he guarded
it against the evil effects of usury, and of the sin which gives birth
to it, would suggest a method by which one’s money might secure as
large, if not a larger profit, in some honest and lawful employment,
than he could derive from usurious dealings.’”

“Undoubtedly, father, there would be no more usurers after that.”

“Accordingly,” continued he, “our casuist has suggested ‘a general
method for all sorts of persons—gentlemen, presidents, councillors,’
&c.; and a very simple process it is, consisting only in the use of
certain words which must be pronounced by the person in the act of
lending his money; after which he may take his interest for it without
fear of being a usurer, which he certainly would be on any other plan.”

“And pray what may those mysterious words be, father?”

“I will give you them exactly in his own words,” said the father; “for
he has written his Summary in French, you know, ‘that it may be
understood by everybody,’ as he says in the preface: ‘The person from
whom the loan is asked, must answer, then, in this manner: I have got no
money to _lend_; I have got a little, however, to lay out for an honest
and lawful profit. If you are anxious to have the sum you mention in
order to make something of it by your industry, dividing the profit and
loss between us, I may perhaps be able to accommodate you. But now I
think of it, as it may be a matter of difficulty to agree about the
profit, if you will secure me a certain portion of it, and give me so
much for my principal, so that it incur no risk, we may come to terms
much sooner, and you shall touch the cash immediately.’ Is not that an
easy plan for gaining money without sin? And has not Father Bauny good
reason for concluding with these words: ‘Such, in my opinion, is an
excellent plan by which a great many people, who now provoke the just
indignation of God by their usuries, extortions, and illicit bargains,
might save themselves, in the way of making good, honest, and legitimate
profits?’”

“O sir!” I exclaimed, “what potent words these must be! Doubtless they
must possess some latent virtue to chase away the demon of usury which I
know nothing of, for, in my poor judgment, I always thought that that
vice consisted in recovering more money than what was lent.”

“You know little about it indeed,” he replied. “Usury, according to our
fathers, consists in little more than the intention of taking the
interest as usurious. Escobar, accordingly, shows you how you may avoid
usury by a simple shift of the intention. ‘It would be downright usury,’
says he, ‘to take interest from the borrower, if we should exact it as
due in point of justice; but if only exacted as due in point of
gratitude, it is not usury. Again, it is not lawful to have directly the
intention of profiting by the money lent; but to claim it through the
medium of the benevolence of the borrower—_media benevolentia_—is not
usury.’ These are subtle methods; but, to my mind, the best of them all
(for we have a great choice of them) is that of the Mohatra bargain.”

“The Mohatra, father!”

“You are not acquainted with it, I see,” returned he. “The name is the
only strange thing about it. Escobar will explain it to you: ‘The
Mohatra bargain is effected by the needy person purchasing some goods at
a high price and on credit, in order to sell them over again, at the
same time and to the same merchant, for ready money and at a cheap
rate.’ This is what we call the Mohatra—a sort of bargain, you perceive,
by which a person receives a certain sum of ready money, by becoming
bound to pay more.”

“But, sir, I really think nobody but Escobar has employed such a term as
that; is it to be found in any other book?”

“How little you do know of what is going on, to be sure!” cried the
father. “Why, the last work on theological morality, printed at Paris
this very year, speaks of the Mohatra, and learnedly, too. It is called
_Epilogus Summarum_, and is an abridgment of all the summaries of
divinity—extracted from Suarez, Sanchez, Lessius, Fagundez, Hurtado, and
other celebrated casuists, as the title bears. There you will find it
said, at p. 54, that ‘the Mohatra bargain takes place when a man who has
occasion for twenty pistoles purchases from a merchant goods to the
amount of thirty pistoles, payable within a year, and sells them back to
him on the spot for twenty pistoles ready money.’ This shows you that
the Mohatra is not such an unheard-of term as you supposed.”

“But, father, is that sort of bargain lawful?”

“Escobar,” replied he, “tells us in the same place, that there are laws
which prohibit it under very severe penalties.”

“It is useless, then, I suppose?”

“Not at all; Escobar, in the same passage, suggests expedients for
making it lawful: ‘It is so, even though the principal intention both of
the buyer and seller is to make money by the transaction, provided the
seller, in disposing of the goods, does not exceed their highest price,
and in re-purchasing them does not go below their lowest price, and that
no previous bargain has been made, expressly or otherwise.’ Lessius,
however, maintains, that ‘even though the merchant has sold his goods,
with the intention of re-purchasing them at the lowest price, he is not
bound to make restitution of the profit thus acquired, unless, perhaps,
as an act of charity, in the case of the person from whom it has been
exacted being in poor circumstances, and not even then, if he cannot do
it without inconvenience—_si commode non potest_.’ This is the utmost
length to which they could go.”

“Indeed, sir,” said I, “any further indulgence would, I should think, be
rather too much.”

“Oh, our fathers know very well when it is time for them to stop!” cried
the monk. “So much, then, for the utility of the Mohatra. I might have
mentioned several other methods, but these may suffice; and I have now
to say a little in regard to those who are in embarrassed circumstances.
Our casuists have sought to relieve them, according to their condition
of life. For, if they have not enough of property for a decent
maintenance, and at the same time for paying their debts, they permit
them to secure a portion by making a bankruptcy with their
creditors.[175] This has been decided by Lessius, and confirmed by
Escobar, as follows: ‘May a person who turns bankrupt, with a good
conscience keep back as much of his personal estate as may be necessary
to maintain his family in a respectable way—_ne indecorè vivat_? I hold,
with Lessius, that he may, even though he may have acquired his wealth
unjustly and by notorious crimes—_ex injustitia et notorio delicto_;
only, in this case, he is not at liberty to retain so large an amount as
he otherwise might.’”

“Indeed, father! what a strange sort of charity is this, to allow
property to remain in the hands of the man who has acquired it by
rapine, to support him in his extravagance rather than go into the hands
of his creditors, to whom it legitimately belongs!”

“It is impossible to please everybody,” replied the father; “and we have
made it our particular study to relieve these unfortunate people. This
partiality to the poor has induced our great Vasquez, cited by Castro
Palao, to say, that ‘if one saw a thief going to rob a poor man, it
would be lawful to divert him from his purpose by pointing out to him
some rich individual, whom he might rob in place of the other.’ If you
have not access to Vasquez or Castro Palao, you will find the same thing
in your copy of Escobar; for, as you are aware, his work is little more
than a compilation from twenty-four of the most celebrated of our
fathers. You will find it in his treatise, entitled ‘The Practice of our
Society, in the matter of Charity towards our Neighbors.’”

“A very singular kind of charity this,” I observed, “to save one man
from suffering loss, by inflicting it upon another! But I suppose that,
to complete the charity, the charitable adviser would be bound in
conscience to restore to the rich man the sum which he had made him
lose?”

“Not at all, sir,” returned the monk; “for he did not rob the man—he
only advised the other to do it. But only attend to this notable
decision of Father Bauny, on a case which will still more astonish you,
and in which you would suppose there was a much stronger obligation to
make restitution. Here are his identical words: ‘A person asks a soldier
to beat his neighbor, or to set fire to the barn of a man that has
injured him. The question is, Whether, in the absence of the soldier,
the person who employed him to commit these outrages is bound to make
reparation out of his own pocket for the damage that has followed? My
opinion is, that he is not. For none can be held bound to restitution,
where there has been no violation of justice; and is justice violated by
asking another to do us a favor? As to the nature of the request which
he made, he is at liberty either to acknowledge or deny it; to whatever
side he may incline, it is a matter of mere choice; nothing obliges him
to it, unless it may be the goodness, gentleness, and easiness of his
disposition. If the soldier, therefore, makes no reparation for the
mischief he has done, it ought not to be exacted from him at whose
request he injured the innocent.’”

This sentence had very nearly broken up the whole conversation, for I
was on the point of bursting into a laugh at the idea of the _goodness
and gentleness_ of a burner of barns, and at these strange sophisms
which would exempt from the duty of restitution the principal and real
incendiary, whom the civil magistrate would not exempt from the halter.
But had I not restrained myself, the worthy monk, who was perfectly
serious, would have been displeased; he proceeded, therefore, without
any alteration of countenance, in his observations.

“From such a mass of evidence, you ought to be satisfied now of the
futility of your objections; but we are losing sight of our subject. To
revert, then, to the succor which our fathers apply to persons in
straitened circumstances, Lessius, among others, maintains that ‘it is
lawful to steal, not only in a case of extreme necessity, but even where
the necessity is _grave_, though not extreme.’”

“This is somewhat startling, father,” said I. “There are very few people
in this world who do not consider their cases of necessity to be _grave_
ones, and to whom, accordingly, you would not give the right of stealing
with a good conscience. And though you should restrict the permission to
those only who are really and truly in that condition, you open the door
to an infinite number of petty larcenies which the magistrates would
punish in spite of your ‘grave necessity,’ and which you ought to
repress on a higher principle—you who are bound by your office to be the
conservators, not of justice only, but of charity between man and man, a
grace which this permission would destroy. For after all, now, is it not
a violation of the law of charity, and of our duty to our neighbor, to
deprive a man of his property in order to turn it to our own advantage?
Such, at least, is the way I have been taught to think hitherto.”

“That will not always hold true,” replied the monk; “for our great
Molina has taught us that ‘the rule of charity does not bind us to
deprive ourselves of a profit, in order thereby to save our neighbor
from a corresponding loss.’ He advances this in corroboration of what he
had undertaken to prove—‘that one is not bound in conscience to restore
the goods which another had put into his hands in order to cheat his
creditors.’ Lessius holds the same opinion, on the same ground.[176]
Allow me to say, sir, that you have too little compassion for people in
distress. Our fathers have had more charity than that comes to: they
render ample justice to the poor, as well as the rich; and, I may add,
to sinners as well as saints. For, though far from having any
predilection for criminals, they do not scruple to teach that the
property gained by crime may be lawfully retained. ‘No person,’ says
Lessius, speaking generally, ‘is bound, either by the law of nature or
by positive laws (that is, _by any law_), to make restitution of what
has been gained by committing a criminal action, such as adultery, even
though that action is contrary to justice.’ For, as Escobar comments on
this writer, ‘though the property which a woman acquires by adultery is
certainly gained in an illicit way, yet once acquired, the possession of
it is lawful—_quamvis mulier illicitè acquisat, licitè tamen retinet
acquisita_.’ It is on this principle that the most celebrated of our
writers have formally decided that the bribe received by a judge from
one of the parties who has a bad case, in order to procure an unjust
decision in his favor, the money got by a soldier for killing a man, or
the emoluments gained by infamous crimes, may be legitimately retained.
Escobar, who has collected this from a number of our authors, lays down
this general rule on the point, that ‘the means acquired by infamous
courses, such as murder, unjust decisions, profligacy, &c., are
legitimately possessed, and none are obliged to restore them.’ And
further, ‘they may dispose of what they have received for homicide,
profligacy, &c., as they please; for the possession is just, and they
have acquired a propriety in the fruits of their iniquity.’”[177]

“My dear father,” cried I, “this is a mode of acquisition which I never
heard of before; and I question much if the law will hold it good, or if
it will consider assassination, injustice, and adultery, as giving valid
titles to property.”

“I do not know what your law-books may say on the point,” returned the
monk; “but I know well that our books, which are the genuine rules for
conscience, bear me out in what I say. It is true they make one
exception, in which restitution is positively enjoined; that is, in the
case of any receiving money from those who have no right to dispose of
their property, such as _minors and monks_. ‘Unless,’ says the great
Molina, ‘a woman has received money from one who cannot dispose of it,
such as a monk or a minor—_nisi mulier accepisset ab eo qui alienare non
potest, ut a religioso et filio familias_. In this case she must give
back the money.’ And so says Escobar.”[178]

“May it please your reverence,” said I, “the monks, I see, are more
highly favored in this way than other people.”

“By no means,” he replied; “have they not done as much generally for all
minors, in which class monks may be viewed as continuing all their
lives? It is barely an act of justice to make them an exception; but
with regard to all other people, there is no obligation whatever to
refund to them the money received from them for a criminal action. For,
as has been amply shown by Lessius, ‘a wicked action may have its price
fixed in money, by calculating the advantage received by the person who
orders it to be done, and the trouble taken by him who carries it into
execution; on which account the latter is not bound to restore the money
he got for the deed, whatever that may have been—homicide, injustice, or
a foul act’ (for such are the illustrations which he uniformly employs
in this question); ‘unless he obtained the money from those having no
right to dispose of their property. You may object, perhaps, that he who
has obtained money for a piece of wickedness is sinning, and therefore
ought neither to receive nor retain it. But I reply, that after the
thing is done, there can be no sin either in giving or in receiving
payment for it.’ The great Filiutius enters still more minutely into
details, remarking, ‘that a man is _bound in conscience_, to vary his
payments for actions of this sort, according to the different conditions
of the individuals who commit them, and some may bring a higher price
than others.’ This he confirms by very solid arguments.”[179]

He then pointed out to me, in his authors, some things of this nature so
indelicate that I should be ashamed to repeat them; and indeed the monk
himself, who is a good man, would have been horrified at them himself,
were it not for the profound respect which he entertains for his
fathers, and which makes him receive with veneration everything that
proceeds from them. Meanwhile, I held my tongue, not so much with the
view of allowing him to enlarge on this matter, as from pure
astonishment at finding the books of men in holy orders stuffed with
sentiments at once so horrible, so iniquitous, and so silly. He went on,
therefore, without interruption in his discourse, concluding as
follows:—

“From these premises, our illustrious Molina decides the following
question (and after this, I think you will have got enough): ‘If one has
received money to perpetrate a wicked action, is he obliged to restore
it? We must distinguish here,’ says this great man; ‘if he has not done
the deed, he must give back the cash; if he has, he is under no such
obligation!’[180] Such are some of our principles touching restitution.
You have got a great deal of instruction to-day; and I should like, now,
to see what proficiency you have made. Come, then, answer me this
question: ‘Is a judge, who has received a sum of money from one of the
parties before him, in order to pronounce a judgment in his favor,
obliged to make restitution?’”

“You were just telling me a little ago, father, that he was not.”

“I told you no such thing,” replied the father; “did I express myself so
generally? I told you he was not bound to make restitution, provided he
succeeded in gaining the cause for the party who had the wrong side of
the question. But if a man has justice on his side, would you have him
to purchase the success of his cause, which is his legitimate right? You
are very unconscionable. Justice, look you, is a debt which the judge
owes, and therefore he cannot sell it; but he cannot be said to owe
injustice, and therefore he may lawfully receive money for it. All our
leading authors, accordingly, agree in teaching ‘that though a judge is
bound to restore the money he had received for doing an act of justice,
unless it was given him out of mere generosity, he is not obliged to
restore what he has received from a man in whose favor he has pronounced
an unjust decision.’”[181]

This preposterous decision fairly dumbfounded me, and while I was musing
on its pernicious tendencies, the monk had prepared another question for
me. “Answer me again,” said he, “with a little more circumspection. Tell
me now, ‘if a man who deals in divination is obliged to make restitution
of the money he has acquired in the exercise of his art?’”

“Just as you please, your reverence,” said I.

“Eh! what!—just as I please! Indeed, but you are a pretty scholar! It
would seem, according to your way of talking, that the truth depended on
our will and pleasure. I see that, in the present case, you would never
find it out yourself: so I must send you to Sanchez for a solution of
the problem—no less a man than Sanchez. In the first place, he makes a
distinction between ‘the case of the diviner who has recourse to
astrology and other natural means, and that of another who employs the
diabolical art. In the one case, he says, the diviner is bound to make
restitution; in the other he is not.’ Now, guess which of them is the
party bound?”

“It is not difficult to find out that,” said I.

“I see what you mean to say,” he replied. “You think that he ought to
make restitution in the case of his having employed the agency of
demons. But you know nothing about it; it is just the reverse. ‘If,’
says Sanchez, ‘the sorcerer has not taken care and pains to discover, by
means of the devil, what he could not have known otherwise, he must make
restitution—_si nullam operam apposuit ut arte diaboli id sciret_; but
if he has been at that trouble, he is not obliged.’”

“And why so, father?”

“Don’t you see?” returned he. “It is because men may truly divine by the
aid of the devil, whereas astrology is a mere sham.”

“But, sir, should the devil happen not to tell the truth (and he is not
much more to be trusted than astrology), the magician must, I should
think, for the same reason, be obliged to make restitution?”

“Not always,” replied the monk: “_Distinguo_, as Sanchez says, here. ‘If
the magician be ignorant of the diabolic art—_si sit artis diabolicæ
ignarus_—he is bound to restore: but if he is an expert sorcerer, and
has done all in his power to arrive at the truth, the obligation ceases;
for the industry of such a magician may be estimated at a certain sum of
money.’”

“There is some sense in that,” I said; “for this is an excellent plan to
induce sorcerers to aim at proficiency in their art, in the hope of
making an honest livelihood, as you would say, by faithfully serving the
public.”

“You are making a jest of it, I suspect,” said the father: “that is very
wrong. If you were to talk in that way in places where you were not
known, some people might take it amiss, and charge you with turning
sacred subjects into ridicule.”

“That, father, is a charge from which I could very easily vindicate
myself; for certain I am that whoever will be at the trouble to examine
the true meaning of my words will find my object to be precisely the
reverse; and perhaps, sir, before our conversations are ended, I may
find an opportunity of making this very amply apparent.”

“Ho, ho,” cried the monk, “there is no laughing in your head now.”

“I confess,” said I, “that the suspicion that I intended to laugh at
things sacred, would be as painful for me to incur, as it would be
unjust in any to entertain it.”

“I did not say it in earnest,” returned the father; “but let us speak
more seriously.”

“I am quite disposed to do so, if you prefer it; that depends upon you,
father. But I must say, that I have been astonished to see your friends
carrying their attentions to all sorts and conditions of men so far as
even to regulate the legitimate gains of sorcerers.”

“One cannot write for too many people,” said the monk, “nor be too
minute in particularizing cases, nor repeat the same things too often in
different books. You may be convinced of this by the following anecdote,
which is related by one of the gravest of our fathers, as you may well
suppose, seeing he is our present Provincial—the reverend Father Cellot:
‘We know a person,’ says he, ‘who was carrying a large sum of money in
his pocket to restore it, in obedience to the orders of his confessor,
and who, stepping into a bookseller’s shop by the way, inquired if there
was anything new?—_numquid novi?_—when the bookseller showed him a book
on moral theology, recently published; and turning over the leaves
carelessly, and without reflection, he lighted upon a passage describing
his own case, and saw that he was under no obligation to make
restitution: upon which, relieved from the burden of his scruples, he
returned home with a purse no less heavy, and a heart much lighter, than
when he left it:—_abjecta scrupuli sarcina, retento auri pondere, levior
domum repetiit_.’[182]

“Say, after hearing that, if it is useful or not to know our maxims?
Will you laugh at them now? or rather, are you not prepared to join with
Father Cellot in the pious reflection which he makes on the blessedness
of that incident? ‘Accidents of that kind,’ he remarks, ‘are, with God,
the effect of his providence; with the guardian angel, the effect of his
good guidance; with the individuals to whom they happen, the effect of
their predestination. From all eternity, God decided that the golden
chain of their salvation should depend on such and such an author, and
not upon a hundred others who say the same thing, because they never
happen to meet with them. Had that man not written, this man would not
have been saved. All, therefore, who find fault with the multitude of
our authors, we would beseech, in the bowels of Jesus Christ, to beware
of envying others those books which the eternal election of God and the
blood of Jesus Christ has purchased for them!’ Such are the eloquent
terms in which this learned man proves so successfully the proposition
which he had advanced, namely, ‘How useful it must be to have a great
many writers on moral theology—_quàm utile sit de theologia morali
multos scribere_!’”

“Father,” said I, “I shall defer giving you my opinion of that passage
to another opportunity; in the mean time, I shall only say that as your
maxims are so useful, and as it is so important to publish them, you
ought to continue to give me further instruction in them. For I can
assure you that the person to whom I send them shows my letters to a
great many people. Not that we intend to avail ourselves of them in our
own case; but indeed we think it will be useful for the world to be
informed about them.”

“Very well,” rejoined the monk, “you see I do not conceal them; and, in
continuation, I am ready to furnish you, at our next interview, with an
account of the comforts and indulgences which our fathers allow, with
the view of rendering salvation easy, and devotion agreeable; so that in
addition to what you have hitherto learned as to particular conditions
of men, you may learn what applies in general to all classes, and thus
you will have gone through a complete course of instruction.”—So saying,
the monk took his leave of me.—I am, &c.

                  *       *       *       *       *

_P. S._—I have always forgot to tell you that there are different
editions of Escobar. Should you think of purchasing him, I would advise
you to choose the Lyons edition, having on the title-page the device of
a lamb lying on a book sealed with seven seals; or the Brussels edition
of 1651. Both of these are better and larger than the previous editions
published at Lyons in the years 1644 and 1646.[183]

-----

Footnote 173:

  This Letter also was revised by M. Nicole.

Footnote 174:

  The president referred to was Pompone de Bellievre, on whom M.
  Pelisson pronounced a beautiful eulogy.

Footnote 175:

  The Jesuits exemplified their own maxim in this case by the famous
  bankruptcy of their College of St. Hermenigilde at Seville. We have a
  full account of this in the memorial presented to the King of Spain by
  the luckless creditors. The simple pathos and sincere earnestness of
  this document preclude all suspicion of the accuracy of its
  statements. By the advice of their Father Provincial, the Jesuits, in
  March, 1645, stopped payments after having borrowed upwards of 450,000
  ducats, mostly from poor widows and friendless girls. This shameful
  affair was exposed before the courts of justice, during a long
  litigation, in the course of which it was discovered that the Jesuit
  fathers had been carrying on extensive mercantile transactions, and
  that instead of spending the money left them for _pious uses_—such as
  ransoming captives, and alms-giving—they had devoted it to the
  purposes of what they termed “our poor little house of profession.”
  (Theatre Jesuitique, p. 200, &c.)

Footnote 176:

  Molina, t. ii., tr. 2, disp. 338, n. 8; Lessius, liv. ii., ch. 20,
  dist. 19, n. 168.

Footnote 177:

  Escobar, tr. 3, ex. 1, n. 23, tr. 5, ex. 5, n. 53.

Footnote 178:

  Molina, l. tom. i.; De Just., tr. 2, disp. 94; Escobar, tr. 1, ex. 8,
  n. 59, tr. 3, ex. 1, n. 23.

Footnote 179:

  Tr. 31, c. 9, n. 231.—“Occultæ fornicariæ debetur pretium in
  conscientia, et multo majore ratione, quam publicæ. Copia enim quam
  occulta facit mulier sui corporis, multo plus valet quam ea quam
  publica facit meretrix; nec ulla est lex positiva quæ reddit eam
  incapacem pretii. Idem dicendum de pretio promisso virgini, conjugatæ,
  moniali, et cuicumque alii. Est enim omnium eadem ratio.”

Footnote 180:

  Quoted by Escobar, tr. 3, ex. 2, n. 138.

Footnote 181:

  Molina, 94, 99; Reginald. l. 10, 184; Filiutius, tr. 31; Escobar, tr.
  3; Lessius, l. 2, 14.

Footnote 182:

  Cellot, liv. viii., de la Hierarch, c. 16, 2.

Footnote 183:

  “Since all this, a new edition has been printed at Paris, by Piget,
  more correct than any of the rest. But the sentiments of Escobar may
  be still better ascertained from the great work on moral theology,
  printed at Lyons.” (Note in Nicole’s edition of the Letters.)

  I may avail myself of this space to remark, that not one of the
  charges brought against the Jesuits in this letter has been met by
  Father Daniel in his celebrated reply. Indeed, after some vain efforts
  to contradict about a dozen passages in the letters, he leaves
  avowedly more than a hundred without daring to answer them. The
  pretext for thus failing to perform what he professed to do, and what
  he so loudly boasts, at the commencement, of his being able to do, is
  ingenious enough. “You will easily comprehend,” says one of his
  characters, “that this confronting of texts and quotations is not a
  great treat for a man of my taste. I could not stand this
  _disagreeable labor_ much longer.” (Entretiens de Cleandre et
  d’Eudoxe, p. 277.) We reserve our remarks on the pretended
  falsifications charged against Pascal, till we come to his own
  masterly defence of himself in the subsequent letters.




                               LETTER IX.

FALSE WORSHIP OF THE VIRGIN INTRODUCED BY THE JESUITS—DEVOTION MADE
   EASY—THEIR MAXIMS ON AMBITION, ENVY, GLUTTONY, EQUIVOCATION, AND
   MENTAL RESERVATIONS—FEMALE DRESS—GAMING—HEARING MASS.


                                                  PARIS, _July 3, 1656_.

SIR,—I shall use as little ceremony with you as the worthy monk did with
me, when I saw him last. The moment he perceived me, he came forward
with his eyes fixed on a book which he held in his hand and accosted me
thus: “‘Would you not be infinitely obliged to any one who should open
to you the gates of paradise? Would you not give millions of gold to
have a key by which you might gain admittance whenever you thought
proper? You need not be at such expense; here is one—here are a hundred
for much less money.’”

At first I was at a loss to know whether the good father was reading, or
talking to me, but he soon put the matter beyond doubt by adding:

“These, sir, are the opening words of a fine book, written by Father
Barry of our Society; for I never give you anything of my own.”

“What book is it?” asked I.

“Here is its title,” he replied: “‘_Paradise opened to Philagio, in a
Hundred Devotions to the Mother of God, easily practised._’”

“Indeed, father! and is each of these easy devotions a sufficient
passport to heaven?”

“It is,” returned he. “Listen to what follows: ‘The devotions to the
Mother of God, which you will find in this book, are so many celestial
keys, which will open wide to you the gates of paradise, provided you
practise them;’ and accordingly, he says at the conclusion, ‘that he is
satisfied if you practise only one of them.’”

“Pray, then, father, do teach me one of the easiest of them.”

“They are all easy,” he replied; “for example—‘Saluting the Holy Virgin
when you happen to meet her image—saying the little chaplet of the
pleasures of the Virgin—fervently pronouncing the name of
Mary—commissioning the angels to bow to her for us—wishing to build her
as many churches as all the monarchs on earth have done—bidding her good
morrow every morning, and good night in the evening—saying the _Ave
Maria_ every day, in honor of the heart of Mary’—which last devotion, he
says, possesses the additional virtue of securing us the heart of the
Virgin.”[184]

“But, father,” said I, “only provided we give her our own in return, I
presume?”

“That,” he replied, “is not absolutely necessary, when a person is too
much attached to the world. Hear Father Barry: ‘Heart for heart would,
no doubt, be highly proper; but yours is rather too much attached to the
world, too much bound up in the creature, so that I dare not advise you
to offer, at present, that _poor little slave_ which you call your
heart.’ And so he contents himself with the _Ave Maria_ which he had
prescribed.”[185]

“Why, this is extremely easy work,” said I, “and I should really think
that nobody will be damned after that.”

“Alas!” said the monk, “I see you have no idea of the hardness of some
people’s hearts. There are some, sir, who would never engage to repeat,
every day, even these simple words, _Good day_, _Good evening_, just
because such a practice would require some exertion of memory. And,
accordingly, it became necessary for Father Barry to furnish them with
expedients still easier, such as wearing a chaplet night and day on the
arm, in the form of a bracelet, or carrying about one’s person a rosary,
or an image of the Virgin.[186] ‘And, tell me now,’ as Father Barry
says, ‘if I have not provided you with easy devotions to obtain the good
graces of Mary?’”

“Extremely easy indeed, father,” I observed.

“Yes,” he said, “it is as much as could possibly be done, and I think
should be quite satisfactory. For he must be a wretched creature indeed,
who would not spare a single moment in all his lifetime to put a chaplet
on his arm, or a rosary in his pocket, and thus secure his salvation;
and that, too, with so much certainty that none who have tried the
experiment have ever found it to fail, in whatever way they may have
lived; though, let me add, we exhort people not to omit holy living. Let
me refer you to the example of this, given at p. 34; it is that of a
female who, while she practised daily the devotion of saluting the
images of the Virgin, spent all her days in mortal sin, and yet was
saved after all, by the merit of that single devotion.”

“And how so?” cried I.

“Our Saviour,” he replied, “raised her up again, for the very purpose of
showing it. So certain it is, that none can perish who practise any one
of these devotions.”

“My dear sir,” I observed, “I am fully aware that the devotions to the
Virgin are a powerful mean of salvation, and that the least of them, if
flowing from the exercise of faith and charity, as in the case of the
saints who have practised them, are of great merit; but to make persons
believe that, by practising these without reforming their wicked lives,
they will be converted by them at the hour of death, or that God will
raise them up again, does appear calculated rather to keep sinners going
on in their evil courses, by deluding them with false peace and
fool-hardy confidence, than to draw them off from sin by that genuine
conversion which grace alone can effect.”[187]

“What does it matter,” replied the monk, “by what road we enter
paradise, provided we do enter it? as our famous Father Binet, formerly
our provincial, remarks on a similar subject, in his excellent book On
the Mark of Predestination, ‘Be it by hook or by crook,’ as he says,
‘what need we care, if we reach at last the celestial city.’”

“Granted,” said I; “but the great question is, if we will get there at
all?”

“The Virgin will be answerable for that,” returned he; “so says Father
Barry in the concluding lines of his book: ‘If, at the hour of death,
the enemy should happen to put in some claim upon you, and occasion
disturbance in the little commonwealth of your thoughts, you have only
to say that Mary will answer for you, and that he must make his
application to her.’”

“But, father, it might be possible to puzzle you, were one disposed to
push the question a little further. Who, for example, has assured us
that the Virgin will be answerable in this case?”

“Father Barry will be answerable for her,” he replied. “‘As for the
profit and happiness to be derived from these devotions,’ he says, ‘I
will be answerable for that; I will stand bail for the good Mother.’”

“But, father, who is to be answerable for Father Barry?”

“How!” cried the monk; “for Father Barry? is he not a member of our
Society? and do you need to be told that our Society is answerable for
all the books of its members? It is highly necessary and important for
you to know about this. There is an order in our Society, by which all
booksellers are prohibited from printing any work of our fathers without
the approbation of our divines and the permission of our superiors. This
regulation was passed by Henry III., 10th May 1583, and confirmed by
Henry IV., 20th December 1603, and by Louis XIII., 14th February 1612;
so that the whole of our body stands responsible for the publications of
each of the brethren. This is a feature quite peculiar to our community.
And, in consequence of this, not a single work emanates from us which
does not breathe the spirit of the Society. That, sir, is a piece of
information quite _apropos_.”[188]

“My good father,” said I, “you oblige me very much, and I only regret
that I did not know this sooner, as it will induce me to pay
considerably more attention to your authors.”

“I would have told you sooner,” he replied, “had an opportunity offered;
I hope, however, you will profit by the information in future, and, in
the mean time, let us prosecute our subject. The methods of securing
salvation which I have mentioned are, in my opinion, very easy, very
sure, and sufficiently numerous; but it was the anxious wish of our
doctors that people should not stop short at this first step, where they
only do what is absolutely necessary for salvation, and nothing more.
Aspiring, as they do without ceasing, after the greater glory of
God,[189] they sought to elevate men to a higher pitch of piety; and as
men of the world are generally deterred from devotion by the strange
ideas they have been led to form of it by some people, we have deemed it
of the highest importance to remove this obstacle which meets us at the
threshold. In this department Father Le Moine has acquired much fame, by
his work entitled DEVOTION MADE EASY, composed for this very purpose.
The picture which he draws of devotion in this work is perfectly
charming. None ever understood the subject before him. Only hear what he
says in the beginning of his work: ‘Virtue has never as yet been seen
aright; no portrait of her, hitherto produced, has borne the least
verisimilitude. It is by no means surprising that so few have attempted
to scale her rocky eminence. She has been held up as a cross-tempered
dame, whose only delight is in solitude; she has been associated with
toil and sorrow; and, in short, represented as the foe of sports and
diversions, which are, in fact, the flowers of joy and the seasoning of
life.’”

“But, father, I am sure, I have heard at least, that there have been
great saints who led extremely austere lives.”

“No doubt of that,” he replied; “but still, to use the language of the
doctor, ‘there have always been a number of genteel saints, and
well-bred devotees;’ and this difference in their manners, mark you,
arises entirely from a difference of humors. ‘I am far from denying,’
says my author, ‘that there are devout persons to be met with, pale and
melancholy in their temperament, fond of silence and retirement, with
phlegm instead of blood in their veins, and with faces of clay; but
there are many others of a happier complexion, and who possess that
sweet and warm humor, that genial and rectified blood, which is the true
stuff that joy is made of.’

“You see,” resumed the monk, “that the love of silence and retirement is
not common to all devout people; and that, as I was saying, this is the
effect rather of their complexion than their piety. Those austere
manners to which you refer, are, in fact, properly the character of a
savage and barbarian, and, accordingly, you will find them ranked by
Father Le Moine among the ridiculous and brutal manners of a moping
idiot. The following is the description he has drawn of one of these in
the seventh book of his Moral Pictures: ‘He has no eyes for the beauties
of art or nature. Were he to indulge in anything that gave him pleasure,
he would consider himself oppressed with a grievous load. On festival
days, he retires to hold fellowship with the dead. He delights in a
grotto rather than a palace, and prefers the stump of a tree to a
throne. As to injuries and affronts, he is as insensible to them as if
he had the eyes and ears of a statue. Honor and glory are idols with
whom he has no acquaintance, and to whom he has no incense to offer. To
him a beautiful woman is no better than a spectre; and those imperial
and commanding looks—those charming tyrants who hold so many slaves in
willing and chainless servitude—have no more influence over his optics
than the sun over those of owls,’ &c.”

“Reverend sir,” said I, “had you not told me that Father Le Moine was
the author of that description, I declare I would have guessed it to be
the production of some profane fellow, who had drawn it expressly with
the view of turning the saints into ridicule. For if that is not the
picture of a man entirely denied to those feelings which the Gospel
obliges us to renounce, I confess that I know nothing of the
matter.”[190]

“You may now perceive, then, the extent of your ignorance,” he replied;
“for these are the features of a feeble, uncultivated mind, ‘destitute
of those virtuous and natural affections which it ought to possess,’ as
Father Le Moine says at the close of that description. Such is his way
of teaching ‘Christian virtue and philosophy,’ as he announces in his
advertisement; and, in truth, it cannot be denied that this method of
treating devotion is much more agreeable to the taste of the world than
the old way in which they went to work before our times.”

“There can be no comparison between them,” was my reply, “and I now
begin to hope that you will be as good as your word.”

“You will see that better by-and-by,” returned the monk. “Hitherto I
have only spoken of piety in general, but, just to show you more in
detail how our fathers have disencumbered it of its toils and troubles,
would it not be most consoling to the ambitious to learn that they may
maintain genuine devotion along with an inordinate love of greatness?”

“What, father! even though they should run to the utmost excess of
ambition?”

“Yes,” he replied; “for this would be only a venial sin, unless they
sought after greatness in order to offend God and injure the State more
effectually. Now venial sins do not preclude a man from being devout, as
the greatest saints are not exempt from them.[191] ‘Ambition,’ says
Escobar, ‘which consists in an inordinate appetite for place and power,
is of itself a venial sin; but when such dignities are coveted for the
purpose of hurting the commonwealth, or having more opportunity to
offend God, these adventitious circumstances render it mortal.’”

“Very savory doctrine, indeed, father.”

“And is it not still more savory,” continued the monk, “for misers to be
told, by the same authority, ‘that the rich are not guilty of mortal sin
by refusing to give alms out of their superfluity to the poor in the
hour of their greatest need?—_scio in gravi pauperum necessitate divites
non dando superflua, non peccare mortaliter_.’”

“Why truly,” said I, “if that be the case, I give up all pretension to
skill in the science of sins.”

“To make you still more sensible of this,” returned he, “you have been
accustomed to think, I suppose, that a good opinion of one’s self, and a
complacency in one’s own works, is a most dangerous sin? Now, will you
not be surprised if I can show you that such a good opinion, even though
there should be no foundation for it, is so far from being a sin, that
it is, on the contrary, _the gift of God_?”

“Is it possible, father?”

“That it is,” said the monk; “and our good Father Garasse[192] shows it
in his French work, entitled Summary of the Capital Truths of Religion:
‘It is a result of commutative justice that all honest labor should find
its recompense either in praise or in self-satisfaction. When men of
good talents publish some excellent work, they are justly remunerated by
public applause. But when a man of weak parts has wrought hard at some
worthless production, and fails to obtain the praise of the public, in
order that his labor may not go without its reward, God imparts to him a
personal satisfaction, which it would be worse than barbarous injustice
to envy him. It is thus that God, who is infinitely just, has given even
to frogs a certain complacency in their own croaking.’”

“Very fine decisions in favor of vanity, ambition, and avarice!” cried
I; “and envy, father, will it be more difficult to find an excuse for
it?”

“That is a delicate point,” he replied. “We require to make use here of
Father Bauny’s distinction, which he lays down in his Summary of Sins:
‘Envy of the spiritual good of our neighbor is mortal, but envy of his
temporal good is only venial.’”

“And why so, father?”

“You shall hear,” said he. “‘For the good that consists in temporal
things is so slender, and so insignificant in relation to heaven, that
it is of no consideration in the eyes of God and his saints.’”

“But, father, if temporal good is so _slender_, and of so little
consideration, how do you come to permit men’s lives to be taken away in
order to preserve it?”[193]

“You mistake the matter entirely,” returned the monk; “you were told
that temporal good was of no consideration in the eyes of God, but not
in the eyes of men.”

“That idea never occurred to me,” I replied; “and now, it is to be hoped
that, in virtue of these same distinctions, the world will get rid of
mortal sins altogether.”

“Do not flatter yourself with that,” said the father; “there are still
such things as mortal sins—there is sloth, for example.”

“Nay, then, father dear!” I exclaimed, “after that, farewell to all ‘the
joys of life!’”

“Stay,” said the monk, “when you have heard Escobar’s definition of that
vice, you will perhaps change your tone: ‘Sloth,’ he observes, ‘lies in
grieving that spiritual things are spiritual, as if one should lament
that the sacraments are the sources of grace; which would be a mortal
sin.’”

“O my dear sir!” cried I, “I don’t think that anybody ever took it into
his head to be slothful in that way.”

“And accordingly,” he replied, “Escobar afterwards remarks: ‘I must
confess that it is very rarely that a person falls into the sin of
sloth.’ You see now how important it is to _define_ things properly?”

“Yes, father, and this brings to my mind your other definitions about
assassinations, ambuscades, and superfluities. But why have you not
extended your method to all cases, and given definitions of all vices in
your way; so that people may no longer sin in gratifying themselves?”

“It is not always essential,” he replied, “to accomplish that purpose by
changing the definitions of things. I may illustrate this by referring
to the subject of good cheer, which is accounted one of the greatest
pleasures of life, and which Escobar thus sanctions in his ‘Practice
according to our Society:’ ‘Is it allowable for a person to eat and
drink to repletion, unnecessarily, and solely for pleasure? Certainly he
may, according to Sanchez, provided he does not thereby injure his
health; because the natural appetite may be permitted to enjoy its
proper functions.’”[194]

“Well, father, that is certainly the most complete passage, and the most
finished maxim in the whole of your moral system! What comfortable
inferences may be drawn from it! Why, and is gluttony, then, not even a
venial sin?”

“Not in the shape I have just referred to,” he replied; “but, according
to the same author, it would be a venial sin ‘were a person to gorge
himself, unnecessarily, with eating and drinking, to such a degree as to
produce vomiting.’[195] So much for that point. I would now say a little
about the facilities we have invented for avoiding sin in worldly
conversations and intrigues. One of the most embarrassing of these cases
is how to avoid telling lies, particularly when one is anxious to induce
a belief in what is false. In such cases, our doctrine of equivocations
has been found of admirable service, according to which, as Sanchez has
it, ‘it is permitted to use ambiguous terms, leading people to
understand them in another sense from that in which we understand them
ourselves.’”[196]

“I know that already, father,” said I.

“We have published it so often,” continued he, “that at length, it
seems, everybody knows of it. But do you know what is to be done when no
equivocal words can be got?”

“No, father.”

“I thought as much,” said the Jesuit; “this is something new, sir: I
mean the doctrine of mental reservations. ‘A man may swear,’ as Sanchez
says in the same place, ‘that he never did such a thing (though he
actually did it), meaning within himself that he did not do so on a
certain day, or before he was born, or understanding any other such
circumstance, while the words which he employs have no such sense as
would discover his meaning. And this is very convenient in many cases,
and quite innocent, when necessary or conducive to one’s health, honor,
or advantage.’”

“Indeed, father! is that not a lie, and perjury to boot?”

“No,” said the father; “Sanchez and Filiutius prove that it is not; for,
says the latter, ‘it is the intention that determines the quality of the
action.’[197] And he suggests a still surer method for avoiding
falsehood, which is this: After saying aloud, _I swear that I have not
done that_, to add, in a low voice, _to-day_; or after saying aloud, _I
swear_, to interpose in a whisper, _that I say_, and then continue
aloud, _that I have done that_. This, you perceive, is telling the
truth.”[198]

“I grant it,” said I; “it might possibly, however, be found to be
telling the truth in a low key, and falsehood in a loud one; besides, I
should be afraid that many people might not have sufficient presence of
mind to avail themselves of these methods.”

“Our doctors,” replied the Jesuit, “have taught, in the same passage,
for the benefit of such as might not be expert in the use of these
reservations, that no more is required of them, to avoid lying, than
simply to say that _they have not done_ what they have done, provided
‘they have, in general, the intention of giving to their language the
sense which an _able man_ would give to it.’ Be candid, now, and confess
if you have not often felt yourself embarrassed, in consequence of not
knowing this?”

“Sometimes,” said I.

“And will you not also acknowledge,” continued he, “that it would often
prove very convenient to be absolved in conscience from keeping certain
engagements one may have made?”

“The most convenient thing in the world!” I replied.

“Listen, then, to the general rule laid down by Escobar: ‘Promises are
not binding, when the person in making them had no intention to bind
himself. Now, it seldom happens that any have such an intention, unless
when they confirm their promises by an oath or contract; so that when
one simply says, _I will do it_, he means that he will do it if he does
not change his mind; for he does not wish, by saying that, to deprive
himself of his liberty.’ He gives other rules in the same strain, which
you may consult for yourself, and tells us, in conclusion, ‘that all
this is taken from Molina and our other authors, and is therefore
settled beyond all doubt.’”

“My dear father,” I observed, “I had no idea that the direction of the
intention possessed the power of rendering promises null and void.”

“You must perceive,” returned he, “what facility this affords for
prosecuting the business of life. But what has given us the most trouble
has been to regulate the commerce between the sexes; our fathers being
more chary in the matter of chastity. Not but that they have discussed
questions of a very curious and very indulgent character, particularly
in reference to married and betrothed persons.”

At this stage of the conversation I was made acquainted with the most
extraordinary questions you can well imagine. He gave me enough of them
to fill many letters; but as you show my communications to all sorts of
persons, and as I do not choose to be the vehicle of such reading to
those who would make it the subject of diversion, I must decline even
giving the quotations.

The only thing to which I can venture to allude, out of all the books
which he showed me, and these in French, too, is a passage which you
will find in Father Bauny’s Summary, p. 165, relating to certain little
familiarities, which, provided the intention is well directed, he
explains “_as passing for gallant_;” and you will be surprised to find,
at p. 148, a principle of morals, as to the power which daughters have
to dispose of their persons without the leave of their relatives,
couched in these terms: “When that is done with the consent of the
daughter, although the father may have reason to complain, it does not
follow that she, or the person to whom she has sacrificed her honor, has
done him any wrong, or violated the rules of justice in regard to him;
for the daughter has possession of her honor, as well as of her body,
and can do what she pleases with them, bating death or mutilation of her
members.” Judge, from that specimen, of the rest. It brings to my
recollection a passage from a Heathen poet, a much better casuist, it
would appear, than these reverend doctors; for he says, “that the person
of a daughter does not belong wholly to herself, but partly to her
father and partly to her mother, without whom she cannot dispose of it,
even in marriage.” And I am much mistaken if there is a single judge in
the land who would not lay down as law the very reverse of this maxim of
Father Bauny.

This is all I dare tell you of this part of our conversation, which
lasted so long that I was obliged to beseech the monk to change the
subject. He did so, and proceeded to entertain me with their regulations
about female attire.

“We shall not speak,” he said, “of those who are actuated by impure
intentions; but as to others, Escobar remarks, that ‘if the woman adorn
herself without any evil intention, but merely to gratify a natural
inclination to vanity—_ob naturalem fastus inclinationem_—this is only a
venial sin, or rather no sin at all.’ And Father Bauny maintains, that
‘even though the woman knows the bad effect which her care in adorning
her person may have upon the virtue of those who may behold her, all
decked out in rich and precious attire, she would not sin in so
dressing.’[199] And among others, he cites our Father Sanchez as being
of the same mind.”

“But, father, what do your authors say to those passages of Scripture
which so strongly denounce everything of that sort?”

“Lessius has well met that objection,” said the monk, “by observing,
‘that these passages of Scripture have the force of precepts only in
regard to the women of that period, who were expected to exhibit, by
their modest demeanor, an example of edification to the Pagans.’”

“And where did he find that, father?”

“It does not matter where he found it,” replied he; “it is enough to
know that the sentiments of these great men are always probable of
themselves. It deserves to be noticed, however, that Father Le Moine has
qualified this general permission; for he will on no account allow it to
be extended to _the old ladies_. ‘Youth,’ he observes, ‘is naturally
entitled to adorn itself, nor can the use of ornament be condemned at an
age which is the flower and verdure of life. But there it should be
allowed to remain: it would be strangely out of season to seek for roses
on the snow. The stars alone have a right to be always dancing, for they
have the gift of perpetual youth. The wisest course in this matter,
therefore, for old women, would be to consult good sense and a good
mirror, to yield to decency and necessity, and to retire at the first
approach of the shades of night.’”[200]

“A most judicious advice,” I observed.

“But,” continued the monk, “just to show you how careful our fathers are
about everything you can think of, I may mention that, after granting
the ladies permission to gamble, and foreseeing that, in many cases,
this license would be of little avail unless they had something to
gamble with, they have established another maxim in their favor, which
will be found in Escobar’s chapter on larceny, n. 13: ‘A wife,’ says he,
‘may gamble, and for this purpose may pilfer money from her husband.’”

“Well, father, that is capital!”

“There are many other good things besides that,” said the father; “but
we must waive them, and say a little about those more important maxims,
which facilitate the practice of holy things—the manner of attending
mass, for example. On this subject our great divines, Gaspard Hurtado,
and Coninck, have taught ‘that it is quite sufficient to be present at
mass in body, though we may be absent in spirit, provided we maintain an
outwardly respectful deportment.’ Vasquez goes a step further,
maintaining ‘that one fulfils the precept of hearing mass, even though
one should go with no such intention at all.’ All this is repeatedly
laid down by Escobar, who, in one passage, illustrates the point by the
example of those who are dragged to mass by force, and who put on a
fixed resolution not to listen to it.”

“Truly, sir,” said I, “had any other person told me that, I would not
have believed it.”

“In good sooth,” he replied, “it requires all the support which the
authority of these great names can lend it; and so does the following
maxim by the same Escobar, ‘that even a wicked intention, such as that
of ogling the women joined to that of hearing mass rightly, does not
hinder a man from fulfilling the service.’[201] But another very
convenient device, suggested by our learned brother Turrian,[202] is,
that ‘one may hear the half of a mass from one priest, and the other
half from another; and that it makes no difference though he should hear
first the conclusion of the one, and then the commencement of the
other.’ I might also mention that it has been decided by several of our
doctors, to be lawful ‘to hear the two halves of a mass at the same
time, from the lips of two different priests, one of whom is commencing
the mass, while the other is at the elevation; it being quite possible
to attend to both parties at once, and two halves of a mass making a
whole—_duœ medietates unam missam constituunt_.’[203] ‘From all which,’
says Escobar, ‘I conclude, that you may hear mass in a very short period
of time; if, for example, you should happen to hear four masses going on
at the same time, so arranged that when the first is at the
commencement, the second is at the gospel, the third at the
consecration, and the last at the communion.’”

“Certainly, father, according to that plan, one may hear mass any day at
Notre Dame in a twinkling.”

“Well,” replied he, “that just shows how admirably we have succeeded in
facilitating the hearing of mass. But I am anxious now to show you how
we have softened the use of the sacraments, and particularly that of
penance. It is here that the benignity of our fathers shines in its
truest splendor; and you will be really astonished to find that
devotion, a thing which the world is so much afraid of, should have been
treated by our doctors with such consummate skill, that, to use the
words of Father Le Moine, in his Devotion made Easy, ‘demolishing the
bugbear which the devil had placed at its threshold, they have rendered
it easier than vice, and more agreeable than pleasure; so that, in fact,
simply to live is incomparably more irksome than to live well.’ Is that
not a marvellous change, now?”

“Indeed, father, I cannot help telling you a bit of my mind: I am sadly
afraid that you have overshot the mark, and that this indulgence of
yours will shock more people than it will attract. The mass, for
example, is a thing so grand and so holy, that, in the eyes of a great
many, it would be enough to blast the credit of your doctors forever, to
show them how you have spoken of it.”

“With a certain class,” replied the monk, “I allow that may be the case;
but do you not know that we accommodate ourselves to all sorts of
persons? You seem to have lost all recollection of what I have
repeatedly told you on this point. The first time you are at leisure,
therefore, I propose that we make this the theme of our conversation,
deferring till then the lenitives we have introduced into the
confessional. I promise to make you understand it so well that you will
never forget it.”

With these words we parted, so that our next conversation, I presume,
will, turn on the policy of the Society.—I am, &c.

                  *       *       *       *       *

_P. S._—Since writing the above, I have seen “Paradise Opened by a
Hundred Devotions easily Practised,” by Father Barry; and also the “Mark
of Predestination,” by Father Binet; both of them pieces well worth the
seeing.

-----

Footnote 184:

  “Towards the conclusion of the tenth century, new accessions were made
  to the worship of the Virgin. In this age, (the tenth century) there
  are to be found manifest indications of the institution of the
  _rosary_ and _crown_ (or chaplet) of the Virgin, by which her
  worshippers were to reckon the number of prayers they were to offer to
  this new divinity. The rosary consists of fifteen repetitions of the
  Lords Prayer, and a hundred and fifty salutations of the blessed
  Virgin; while the crown consists in six or seven repetitions of the
  Lord’s Prayer, and seven times ten salutations, or _Ave Marias_.”
  (Mosheim. cent. x.)

Footnote 185:

  These are the devotions presented at pp. 33, 59, 145, 156, 172, 258,
  420 of the first edition.

Footnote 186:

  See the devotions, at pp. 14, 326, 447.

Footnote 187:

  The Jesuits raised a great outcry against Pascal for having, in this
  letter, as they alleged, turned the worship of the Virgin into
  ridicule. Nicole seriously undertakes his defence, and draws several
  distinctions between true and false devotion to the Virgin. The
  Mariolatry or Mary-worship, of Pascal and the Port-Royalists, was
  certainly a different sort of thing from that practised in the Church
  of Rome; but it is sad to see the straits to which these sincere
  devotees were reduced, in their attempts to reconcile this practice
  with the honor due to God and his Son.

Footnote 188:

  Father Daniel makes an ingenious attempt to take off the force of this
  statement, by representing it as no more than what is done by other
  societies, universities, &c. (Entretiens, p. 32.) But while these
  bodies acted in good faith on this rule, the Jesuits (as Pascal
  afterwards shows, Letter xiii.) made it subservient to their double
  policy. Pascal’s point was gained by establishing the fact, that the
  books published by the Jesuits had the imprimatur of the Society; and,
  in answer to all that Daniel has said on the point, it may be
  sufficient to ask, Why not try the simple plan of denouncing the error
  and censuring the author? (See Letter v., p. 117.)

Footnote 189:

  There is an allusion here to the phrase which is perpetually occurring
  in the _Constitutions_ of the Jesuits, “_Ad majorem Dei gloriam_—To
  the greater glory of God,” which is the reason ostentatiously paraded
  for almost all their laws and customs.

Footnote 190:

  If Rome be in the right, Pascal’s notion is correct. The religion of
  the monastery is the only sort of piety or seriousness known to, or
  sanctioned by, the Romish Church.

Footnote 191:

  The Romish distinction of sins into _venial_ and _mortal_, afforded
  too fair a pretext for such sophistical conclusions to be overlooked
  by Jesuitical casuists.

Footnote 192:

  Francois Garasse was a Jesuit of Angouleme; he died in 1631. He was
  much followed as a preacher, his sermons being copiously interlarded
  with buffoonery. His controversial works are full of fire and fury;
  and his theological Summary, to which Pascal here refers, abounds with
  eccentricities. It deserves to be mentioned, as some offset to the
  folly of this writer, that Father Garasse lost his life in consequence
  of his attentions to his countrymen who were infected with the plague.

Footnote 193:

  See before, Letter vii., p. 159.

Footnote 194:

  “_An comedere et libere usque ad satietatem absque necessitate ob
  solam voluptatem, sit peccatum? Cum Sanctio negative respondeo, modo
  non obsit valetudini, quia licite potest appetitus naturalis suis
  actibus frui._” (N. 102.)

Footnote 195:

  “_Si quis se usque ad vomitum ingurgitet._” (Esc., n. 56.)

Footnote 196:

  Op. mor., p. 2, l. 3, c. 6, n. 13.

Footnote 197:

  Tr. 25, chap. 11, n. 331, 328.

Footnote 198:

  The method by which Father Daniel evades this charge is truly
  Jesuitical. First, he attempts to involve the question in a cloud of
  difficulties, by supposing extreme cases, in which equivocation may be
  allowed to preserve life, &c. He has then the assurance to quote
  Scripture in defence of the practice, referring to the equivocations
  of Abraham which he vindicates; to those of Tobit and the angel
  Raphael, which he applauds; and even to the sayings of our blessed
  Lord, which he charges with equivocation! (Entretiens, pp. 378, 382.)
  Even Bossuet was ashamed of this abominable maxim. “I know nothing” he
  says speaking of Sanchez, “more pernicious in morality, than the
  opinion of that Jesuit in regard to an oath; he maintains that the
  intention is necessary to an oath, without which in giving a false
  answer to a judge, when questioned at the bar, one is not capable of
  perjury.” (Journal de l’Abbé le Dieu, apud Dissertation sur la foi qui
  es due au temoignage de Pascal, &c., p. 50.)

Footnote 199:

  Esc. tr. 1, ex. 8; Summary of Sins, c. 46, p. 1094.

Footnote 200:

  “They had their Father Le Moine,” said Cleandre, “and I am surprised
  they did not oppose him to Pascal. That father had a lively
  imagination and a _florid, brilliant_ style; he stood high among
  polished society, and his Apology written against the book entitled
  ‘The Moral Theology of the Jesuits,’ was hardly less popular than his
  _Currycomb for the Jansenist Pegasus_.” “The Society thought,
  perhaps,” replied Eudoxus, “that he could not easily catch the
  delicate and at the same time easy style of Pascal. It was Father Le
  Moine’s failing, to embellish all he said, to be always aiming at
  something witty, and never to speak simply. Perhaps, too, he did not
  feel himself equal for the combat, and did not like to commit
  himself.” (Entretiens de Cleandre et d’Eudoxe, p. 78.)

Footnote 201:

  “_Nec obest alia prava intentio, ut aspiciendi libidinose fœminas._”
  (Esc. tr. 1, ex. 11, n. 31.)

Footnote 202:

  Select., p. 2, d. 16, Sub. 7.

Footnote 203:

  Bauny, Hurtado, Azor, &c. Escobar, “Practice for Hearing Mass
  according to our Society,” Lyons edition.




                               LETTER X.

PALLIATIVES APPLIED BY THE JESUITS TO THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, IN THEIR
   MAXIMS REGARDING CONFESSION, SATISFACTION, ABSOLUTION, PROXIMATE
   OCCASIONS OF SIN, CONTRITION, AND THE LOVE OF GOD.


                                                PARIS, _August 2, 1656_.

SIR,—I have not come yet to the policy of the Society, but shall first
introduce you to one of its leading principles. I refer to the
palliatives which they have applied to confession, and which are
unquestionably the best of all the schemes they have fallen upon to
“attract all and repel none.” It is absolutely necessary to know
something of this before going any further; and, accordingly, the monk
judged it expedient to give me some instructions on the point, nearly as
follows:—

“From what I have already stated,” he observed, “you may judge of the
success with which our doctors have labored to discover, in their
wisdom, that a great many things, formerly regarded as forbidden, are
innocent and allowable; but as there are some sins for which one can
find no excuse, and for which there is no remedy but confession, it
became necessary to alleviate, by the methods I am now going to mention,
the difficulties attending that practice. Thus, having shown you, in our
previous conversations, how we relieve people from troublesome scruples
of conscience, by showing them that what they believed to be sinful was
indeed quite innocent, I proceed now to illustrate our convenient plan
for expiating what is really sinful, which is effected by making
confession as easy a process as it was formerly a painful one.”

“And how do you manage that, father?”

“Why,” said he, “it is by those admirable subtleties which are peculiar
to our Company, and have been styled by our fathers in Flanders, in “The
Image of the First Century,”[204] ‘the pious finesse, the holy artifice
of devotion—_piam et religiosam calliditatem, et pietatis
solertiam_.’[205] By the aid of these inventions, as they remark in the
same place, ‘crimes may be expiated now-a-days _alacrius_—with more zeal
and alacrity than they were committed in former days, and a great many
people may be washed from their stains almost as cleverly as they
contracted them—_plurimi vix citius maculas contrahunt quam eluunt_.’”

“Pray, then, father, do teach me some of these most salutary lessons of
_finesse_.”

“We have a good number of them,” answered the monk; “for there are a
great many irksome things about confession, and for each of these we
have devised a palliative. The chief difficulties connected with this
ordinance are the shame of confessing certain sins, the trouble of
specifying the circumstances of others, the penance exacted for them,
the resolution against relapsing into them, the avoidance of the
proximate occasions of sins, and the regret for having committed them. I
hope to convince you to-day, that it is now possible to get over all
this with hardly any trouble at all; such is the care we have taken to
allay the bitterness and nauseousness of this very necessary medicine.
For, to begin with the difficulty of confessing certain sins, you are
aware it is of importance often to keep in the good graces of one’s
confessor; now, must it not be extremely convenient to be permitted, as
you are by our doctors, particularly Escobar and Suarez, ‘to have two
confessors, one for the mortal sins and another for the venial, in order
to maintain a fair character with your ordinary confessor—_uti bonam
famam apud ordinarium tueatur_—provided you do not take occasion from
thence to indulge in mortal sin?’ This is followed by another ingenious
contrivance for confessing a sin, even to the ordinary confessor,
without his perceiving that it was committed since the last confession,
which is, ‘to make a general confession, and huddle this last sin in a
lump among the rest which we confess.’[206] And I am sure you will own
that the following decision of Father Bauny goes far to alleviate the
shame which one must feel in confessing his relapses, namely, ‘that,
except in certain cases, which rarely occur, the confessor is not
entitled to ask his penitent if the sin of which he accuses himself is
an habitual one, nor is the latter obliged to answer such a question;
because the confessor has no right to subject his penitent to the shame
of disclosing his frequent relapses.’”

“Indeed, father! I might as well say that a physician has no right to
ask his patient if it is long since he had the fever. Do not sins assume
quite a different aspect according to circumstances? and should it not
be the object of a genuine penitent to discover the whole state of his
conscience to his confessor, with the same sincerity and openheartedness
as if he were speaking to Jesus Christ himself, whose place the priest
occupies? If so, how far is he from realizing such a disposition, who,
by concealing the frequency of his relapses, conceals the aggravations
of his offence!”[207]

I saw that this puzzled the worthy monk, for he attempted to elude
rather than resolve the difficulty, by turning my attention to another
of their rules, which only goes to establish a fresh abuse, instead of
justifying in the least the decision of Father Bauny; a decision which,
in my opinion, is one of the most pernicious of their maxims, and
calculated to encourage profligate men to continue in their evil habits.

“I grant you,” replied the father, “that habit aggravates the malignity
of a sin, but it does not alter its nature; and that is the reason why
we do not insist on people confessing it, according to the rule laid
down by our fathers, and quoted by Escobar, ‘that one is only obliged to
confess the circumstances that alter the species of the sin, and not
those that aggravate it.’ Proceeding on this rule, Father Granados says,
‘that if one has eaten flesh in Lent, all he needs to do is to confess
that he has broken the fast, without specifying whether it was by eating
flesh, or by taking two fish meals.’ And, according to Reginald, ‘a
sorcerer who has employed the diabolical art is not obliged to reveal
that circumstance; it is enough to say that he has dealt in magic,
without expressing whether it was by palmistry or by a paction with the
devil.’ Fagundez, again, has decided that ‘rape is not a circumstance
which one is bound to reveal, if the woman give her consent.’ All this
is quoted by Escobar,[208] with many other very curious decisions as to
these circumstances, which you may consult at your leisure.”

“These ‘artifices of devotion’ are vastly convenient in their way,” I
observed.

“And yet,” said the father, “notwithstanding all that, they would go for
nothing, sir, unless we had proceeded to mollify penance, which, more
than anything else, deters people from confession. Now, however, the
most squeamish have nothing to dread from it, after what we have
advanced in our theses of the College of Clermont, where we hold that
‘if the confessor imposes a suitable penance, and the penitent be
unwilling to submit himself to it, the latter may go home, waiving both
the penance and the absolution.’ Or, as Escobar says, in giving the
Practice of our Society, ‘if the penitent declare his willingness to
have his penance remitted to the next world, and to suffer in purgatory
all the pains due to him, the confessor may, for the honor of the
sacrament, impose a very light penance on him, particularly if he has
reason to believe that his penitent would object to a heavier one.’”

“I really think,” said I, “that, if that is the case, we ought no longer
to call confession the sacrament of penance.”

“You are wrong,” he replied; “for we always administer something in the
way of penance, for the form’s sake.”

“But, father, do you suppose that a man is worthy of receiving
absolution, when he will submit to nothing painful to expiate his
offences? And, in these circumstances, ought you not to retain rather
than remit their sins? Are you not aware of the extent of your ministry,
and that you have the power of binding and loosing? Do you imagine that
you are at liberty to give absolution indifferently to all who ask it,
and without ascertaining beforehand if Jesus Christ looses in heaven
those whom you loose on earth?”[209]

“What!” cried the father, “do you suppose that we do not know that ‘the
confessor (as one remarks) ought to sit in judgment on the disposition
of his penitent, both because he is bound not to dispense the sacraments
to the unworthy, Jesus Christ having enjoined him to be a faithful
steward, and not give that which is holy unto dogs; and because he is a
judge, and it is the duty of a judge to give righteous judgment, by
loosing the worthy and binding the unworthy, and he ought not to absolve
those whom Jesus Christ condemns.’”

“Whose words are these, father?”

“They are the words of our father Filiutius,” he replied.

“You astonish me,” said I; “I took them to be a quotation from one of
the fathers of the Church. At all events, sir, that passage ought to
make an impression on the confessors, and render them very circumspect
in the dispensation of this sacrament, to ascertain whether the regret
of their penitents is sufficient, and whether their promises of future
amendment are worthy of credit.”

“That is not such a difficult matter,” replied the father; “Filiutius
had more sense than to leave confessors in that dilemma, and accordingly
he suggests an easy way of getting out of it, in the words immediately
following: ‘The confessor may easily set his mind at rest as to the
disposition of his penitent; for, if he fail to give sufficient evidence
of sorrow, the confessor has only to ask him if he does not detest the
sin in his heart, and if he answers that he does, he is bound to believe
it. The same thing may be said of resolutions as to the future, unless
the case involves an obligation to restitution, or to avoid some
proximate occasion of sin.’”

“As to that passage, father, I can easily believe that it is Filiutius’
own.”

“You are mistaken though,” said the father, “for he has extracted it,
word for word, from Suarez.”[210]

“But, father, that last passage from Filiutius overturns what he had
laid down in the former. For confessors can no longer be said to sit as
judges on the disposition of their penitents, if they are bound to take
it simply upon their word, in the absence of all satisfying signs of
contrition. Are the professions made on such occasions so infallible,
that no other sign is needed? I question much if experience has taught
your fathers, that all who make fair promises are remarkable for keeping
them; I am mistaken if they have not often found the reverse.”

“No matter,” replied the monk; “confessors are bound to believe them for
all that; for Father Bauny, who has probed this question to the bottom,
has concluded ‘that at whatever time those who have fallen into frequent
relapses, without giving evidence of amendment, present themselves
before a confessor, expressing their regret for the past, and a good
purpose for the future, he is bound to believe them on their simple
averment, although there may be reason to presume that such resolution
only came from the teeth outwards. Nay,’ says he, ‘though they should
indulge subsequently to greater excess than ever in the same
delinquencies, still, in my opinion, they may receive absolution.’[211]
There now! that, I am sure, should silence you.”

“But, father,” said I, “you impose a great hardship, I think, on the
confessors, by thus obliging them to believe the very reverse of what
they see.”

“You don’t understand it,” returned he; “all that is meant is, that they
are obliged to act and absolve _as if_ they believed that their
penitents would be true to their engagements, though, in point of fact,
they believe no such thing. This is explained, immediately afterwards,
by Suarez and Filiutius. After having said that ‘the priest is bound to
believe the penitent on his word,’ they add, ‘It is not necessary that
the confessor should be convinced that the good resolution of his
penitent will be carried into effect, nor even that he should judge it
probable; it is enough that he thinks the person has at the time the
design in general, though he may very shortly after relapse. Such is the
doctrine of all our authors—_ita docent omnes autores_.’ Will you
presume to doubt what has been taught by our authors?”

“But, sir, what then becomes of what Father Petau[212] himself is
obliged to own, in the preface to his Public Penance, ‘that the holy
fathers, doctors, and councils of the Church agree in holding it as a
settled point, that the penance preparatory to the eucharist must be
genuine, constant, resolute, and not languid and sluggish, or subject to
after-thoughts and relapses?’”

“Don’t you observe,” replied the monk, “that Father Petau is speaking of
the _ancient Church_? But all that is now _so little in season_, to use
a common saying of our doctors, that, according to Father Bauny, the
reverse is the only true view of the matter. ‘There are some,’ says he,
‘who maintain that absolution ought to be refused to those who fall
frequently into the same sins, more especially if, after being often
absolved, they evince no signs of amendment; and others hold the
opposite view. But the only true opinion is, that they ought not to be
refused absolution; and though they should be nothing the better of all
the advice given them, though they should have broken all their promises
to lead new lives, and been at no trouble to purify themselves, still it
is of no consequence; whatever may be said to the contrary, the true
opinion which ought to be followed is, that even in all these cases,
they ought to be absolved.’ And again: ‘Absolution ought neither to be
denied nor delayed in the case of those who live in habitual sins
against the law of God, of nature, and of the Church, although there
should be no apparent prospect of future amendment—_etsi emendationis
futuræ nulla spes appareat_.’”

“But, father, this certainty of always getting absolution may induce
sinners—”

“I know what you mean,” interrupted the Jesuit: “but listen to Father
Bauny, q. 15: ‘Absolution may be given even to him who candidly avows
that the hope of being absolved induced him to sin with more freedom
than he would otherwise have done.’ And Father Caussin, defending this
proposition, says, ‘that were this not true, confession would be
interdicted to the greater part of mankind; and the only resource left
for poor sinners would be a branch and a rope!’”[213]

“O father, how these maxims of yours will draw people to your
confessionals!”

“Yes,” he replied, “you would hardly believe what numbers are in the
habit of frequenting them; ‘we are absolutely oppressed and overwhelmed,
so to speak, under the crowd of our penitents—_penitentium numero
obruimur_’—as is said in ‘The Image of the First Century.’”

“I could suggest a very simple method,” said I, “to escape from this
inconvenient pressure. You have only to oblige sinners to avoid the
proximate occasions of sin; that single expedient would afford you
relief at once.”

“We have no wish for such a relief,” rejoined the monk; “quite the
reverse; for, as is observed in the same book, ‘the great end of our
Society is to labor to establish the virtues, to wage war on the vices,
and to save a great number of souls.’ Now, as there are very few souls
inclined to quit the proximate occasions of sin, we have been obliged to
define what a proximate occasion is. ‘That cannot be called a proximate
occasion,’ says Escobar, ‘where one sins but rarely, or on a sudden
transport—say three or four times a year;’[214] or, as Father Bauny has
it, ‘once or twice in a month.’[215] Again, asks this author, ‘what is
to be done in the case of masters and servants, or cousins, who, living
under the same roof, are by this occasion tempted to sin?’”

“They ought to be separated,” said I.

“That is what he says, too, ‘if their relapses be very frequent: but if
the parties offend rarely, and cannot be separated without trouble and
loss, they may, according to Suarez and other authors, be absolved,
provided they promise to sin no more, and are truly sorry for what is
past.’”

This required no explanation, for he had already informed me with what
sort of evidence of contrition the confessor was bound to rest
satisfied.

“And Father Bauny,” continued the monk, “permits those who are involved
in the proximate occasions of sin, ‘to remain as they are, when they
cannot avoid them without becoming the common talk of the world, or
subjecting themselves to inconvenience.’ ‘A priest,’ he remarks in
another work, ‘may and ought to absolve a woman who is guilty of living
with a paramour, if she cannot put him away honorably, or has some
reason for keeping him—_si non potest honeste ejicere, aut habeat
aliquam causam retinendi_—provided she promises to act more virtuously
for the future.’”[216]

“Well, father,” cried I, “you have certainly succeeded in relaxing the
obligation of avoiding the occasions of sin to a very comfortable
extent, by dispensing with the duty as soon as it becomes inconvenient;
but I should think your fathers will at least allow it to be binding
when there is no difficulty in the way of its performance?”

“Yes,” said the father, “though even then the rule is not without
exceptions. For Father Bauny says, in the same place, ‘that any one may
frequent profligate houses, with the view of converting their
unfortunate inmates, though the probability should be that he fall into
sin, having often experienced before that he has yielded to their
fascinations. Some doctors do not approve of this opinion, and hold that
no man may voluntarily put his salvation in peril to succor his
neighbor; yet I decidedly embrace the opinion which they controvert.’”

“A novel sort of preachers these, father! But where does Father Bauny
find any ground for investing them with such a mission?”

“It is upon one of his own principles,” he replied, “which he announces
in the same place after Basil Ponce. I mentioned it to you before, and I
presume you have not forgotten it. It is, ‘that one may seek an occasion
of sin, directly and expressly—_primo et per se_—to promote the temporal
or spiritual good of himself or his neighbor.’”

On hearing these passages, I felt so horrified that I was on the point
of breaking out; but, being resolved to hear him to an end, I restrained
myself, and merely inquired: “How, father, does this doctrine comport
with that of the Gospel, which binds us to ‘pluck out the right eye,’
and ‘cut off the right hand,’ when they ‘offend,’ or prove prejudicial
to salvation? And how can you suppose that the man who wilfully indulges
in the occasions of sins, sincerely hates sin? Is it not evident, on the
contrary, that he has never been properly touched with a sense of it,
and that he has not yet experienced that genuine conversion of heart,
which makes a man love God as much as he formerly loved the creature?”

“Indeed!” cried he, “do you call that genuine contrition? It seems you
do not know that, as Father Pintereau[217] says, ‘all our fathers teach,
with one accord, that it is an error, and almost a heresy, to hold that
_contrition_ is necessary; or that _attrition_ alone, induced by the
_sole_ motive, the fear of the pains of hell, which excludes a
disposition to offend, is not sufficient with the sacrament?’”[218]

“What, father! do you mean to say that it is almost an article of faith,
that attrition, induced merely by fear of punishment, is sufficient with
the sacrament? That idea, I think, is peculiar to your fathers; for
those other doctors who hold that attrition is sufficient along with the
sacrament, always take care to show that it must be accompanied with
some love to God at least. It appears to me, moreover, that even your
own authors did not always consider this doctrine of yours so certain.
Your Father Suarez, for instance, speaks of it thus: ‘Although it is a
probable opinion that attrition is sufficient with the sacrament, yet it
is not certain, and it may be false—_non est certa, et potest esse
falsa_. And if it is false, attrition is not sufficient to save a man;
and he that dies knowingly in this state, wilfully exposes himself to
the grave peril of eternal damnation. For this opinion is neither very
ancient nor very common—_nec valde antiqua, nec multum communis_.’
Sanchez was not more prepared to hold it as infallible, when he said in
his Summary, that ‘the sick man and his confessor, who content
themselves at the hour of death with attrition and the sacrament, are
both chargeable with mortal sin, on account of the great risk of
damnation to which the penitent would be exposed, if the opinion that
attrition is sufficient with the sacrament should not turn out to be
true.’ Comitolus, too, says that ‘we should not be too sure that
attrition suffices with the sacrament.’”[219]

Here the worthy father interrupted me. “What!” he cried, “you read our
authors then, it seems? That is all very well; but it would be still
better were you never to read them without the precaution of having one
of _us_ beside you. Do you not see, now, that, from having read them
alone, you have concluded, in your simplicity, that these passages bear
hard on those who have more lately supported our doctrine of attrition?
whereas it might be shown that nothing could set them off to greater
advantage. Only think what a triumph it is for our fathers of the
present day to have succeeded in disseminating their opinion in such
short time, and to such an extent that, with the exception of
theologians, nobody almost would ever suppose but that our modern views
on this subject had been the uniform belief of the faithful in all ages!
So that, in fact, when you have shown, from our fathers themselves,
that, a few years ago, ‘this opinion was not certain,’ you have only
succeeded in giving our modern authors the whole merit of its
establishment!

“Accordingly,” he continued, “our cordial friend Diana, to gratify us,
no doubt, has recounted the various steps by which the opinion reached
its present position.[220] ‘In former days, the ancient schoolmen
maintained that contrition was necessary as soon as one had committed a
mortal sin; since then, however, it has been thought that it is not
binding except on festival days; afterwards, only when some great
calamity threatened the people: others, again, that it ought not to be
long delayed at the approach of death. But our fathers, Hurtado and
Vasquez, have ably refuted all these opinions, and established that one
is not bound to contrition unless he cannot be absolved in any other
way, or at the point of death!’ But, to continue the wonderful progress
of this doctrine, I might add, what our fathers, Fagundez, Granados, and
Escobar, have decided, ‘that contrition is not necessary even at death;
because,’ say they, ‘if attrition with the sacrament did not suffice at
death, it would follow that attrition would not be sufficient with the
sacrament.’ And the learned Hurtado, cited by Diana and Escobar, goes
still further; for he asks, ‘Is that sorrow for sin which flows solely
from apprehension of its temporal consequences, such as having lost
health or money, sufficient? We must distinguish. If the evil is not
regarded as sent by the hand of God, such a sorrow does not suffice; but
if the evil is viewed as sent by God, as, in fact, all evil, says Diana,
except sin, comes from him, that kind of sorrow is sufficient.’[221] Our
Father Lamy holds the same doctrine.”[222]

“You surprise me, father; for I see nothing in all that attrition of
which you speak but what is natural; and in this way a sinner may render
himself worthy of absolution without supernatural grace at all. Now
everybody knows that this is a heresy condemned by the Council.”[223]

“I should have thought with you,” he replied; “and yet it seems this
must not be the case, for the fathers of our College of Clermont have
maintained (in their Theses of the 23rd May and 6th June 1644) ‘that
attrition may be holy and sufficient for the sacrament, although it may
not be supernatural:’ and (in that of August 1643) ‘that attrition,
though merely natural, is sufficient for the sacrament, provided it is
honest.’ I do not see what more could be said on the subject, unless we
choose to subjoin an inference, which may be easily drawn from these
principles, namely, that contrition, so far from being necessary to the
sacrament, is rather prejudicial to it, inasmuch as, by washing away
sins of itself, it would leave nothing for the sacrament to do at all.
That is, indeed, exactly what the celebrated Jesuit Father Valencia
remarks. (Tom. iv., disp. 7, q. 8, p. 4.) ‘Contrition,’ says he, ‘is by
no means necessary in order to obtain the principal benefit of the
sacrament; on the contrary, it is rather an obstacle in the way of
it—_imo obstat potius quominus effectus sequatur_.’ Nobody could well
desire more to be said in commendation of attrition.”[224]

“I believe that, father,” said I; “but you must allow me to tell you my
opinion, and to show you to what a dreadful length this doctrine leads.
When you say that ‘attrition, induced by the mere dread of punishment,’
is sufficient, with the sacrament, to justify sinners, does it not
follow that a person may always expiate his sins in this way, and thus
be saved without ever having loved God all his lifetime? Would your
fathers venture to hold that?”

“I perceive,” replied the monk, “from the strain of your remarks, that
you need some information on the doctrine of our fathers regarding the
love of God. This is the last feature of their morality, and the most
important of all. You must have learned something of it from the
passages about contrition which I have quoted to you. But here are
others still more definite on the point of love to God—Don’t interrupt
me, now; for it is of importance to notice the connection. Attend to
Escobar, who reports the different opinions of our authors, in his
‘Practice of the Love of God according to our Society.’ The question is:
‘When is one obliged to have an actual affection for God?’ Suarez says,
it is enough if one loves him before being _articulo mortis_—at the
point of death—without determining the exact time. Vasquez, that it is
sufficient even at the very point of death. Others, when one has
received baptism. Others, again, when one is bound to exercise
contrition. And others, on festival days. But our father, Castro Palao,
combats all these opinions, and with good reason—_merito_. Hurtado de
Mendoza insists that we are obliged to love God once a-year; and that we
ought to regard it as a great favor that we are not bound to do it
oftener. But our Father Coninck thinks that we are bound to it only once
in three or four years; Henriquez, once in five years; and Filiutius
says that it is _probable_ that we are not strictly bound to it even
once in five years. How often, then, do you ask? Why, he refers it to
the judgment of the judicious.”

I took no notice of all this badinage, in which the ingenuity of man
seems to be sporting, in the height of insolence, with the love of God.

“But,” pursued the monk, “our Father Antony Sirmond surpasses all on
this point, in his admirable book, ‘The Defence of Virtue,’[225] where,
as he tells the reader, ‘he speaks French in France,’ as follows: ‘St.
Thomas says that we are obliged to love God as soon as we come to the
use of reason: that is rather too soon! Scotus says, every Sunday: pray,
for what reason? Others say, when we are sorely tempted: yes, if there
be no other way of escaping the temptation. Scotus says, when we have
received a benefit from God: good, in the way of thanking him for it.
Others say, at death: rather late! As little do I think it binding at
the reception of any sacrament: attrition in such cases is quite enough,
along with confession, if convenient. Suarez says that it is binding at
some time or another; but at what time?—he leaves you to judge of that
for yourself—he does not know; and what that doctor did not know I know
not who should know.’ In short, he concludes that we are not strictly
bound to more than to keep the other commandments, without any affection
for God, and without giving him our hearts, provided that we do not hate
him. To prove this is the sole object of his second treatise. You will
find it in every page; more especially where he says: ‘God, in
commanding us to love him, is satisfied with our obeying him in his
other commandments. If God had said, Whatever obedience thou yieldest
me, if thy heart is not given to me, I will destroy thee!—would such a
motive, think you, be well fitted to promote the end which God must, and
only can, have in view? Hence it is said that we shall love God by doing
his will, _as if_ we loved him with affection, as if the motive in this
case was real charity. If that is really our motive, so much the better;
if not, still we are strictly fulfilling the commandment of love, by
having its works, so that (such is the goodness of God!) we are
commanded, not so much to love him, as not to hate him.’

“Such is the way in which our doctors have discharged men from the
‘painful’ obligation of actually loving God. And this doctrine is so
advantageous, that our Fathers Annat, Pintereau, Le Moine, and Antony
Sirmond himself, have strenuously defended it when it has been attacked.
You have only to consult their answers to the ‘Moral Theology.’ That of
Father Pintereau, in particular, will enable you to form some idea of
the value of this dispensation, from the price which he tells us that it
cost, which is no less than the blood of Jesus Christ. This crowns the
whole. It appears, that this dispensation from the ‘painful’ obligation
to love God, is the privilege of the Evangelical law, in opposition to
the Judaical. ‘It was reasonable,’ he says, ‘that, under the law of
grace in the New Testament, God should relieve us from that troublesome
and arduous obligation which existed under the law of bondage, to
exercise an act of perfect contrition, in order to be justified; and
that the place of this should be supplied by the sacraments, instituted
in aid of an easier disposition. Otherwise, indeed, Christians, who are
the children, would have no greater facility in gaining the good graces
of their Father than the Jews, who were the slaves, had in obtaining the
mercy of their Lord and Master.’”[226]

“O father!” cried I; “no patience can stand this any longer. It is
impossible to listen without horror to the sentiments you have now been
sporting.”

“They are not my sentiments,” said the monk.

“I grant it, sir,” said I; “but you feel no aversion to them; and, so
far from detesting the authors of these maxims, you hold them in esteem.
Are you not afraid that your consent may involve you in a participation
of their guilt? and are you not aware that St. Paul judges worthy of
death, not only the authors of evil things, but also ‘those who have
pleasure in them that do them?’ Was it not enough to have permitted men
to indulge in so many forbidden things, under the covert of your
palliations? Was it necessary to go still further, and hold out a bribe
to them to commit even those crimes which you found it impossible to
excuse, by offering them an easy and certain absolution; and for this
purpose nullifying the power of the priests, and obliging them, more as
slaves than as judges, to absolve the most inveterate sinners—without
any amendment of life—without any sign of contrition except promises a
hundred times broken—without penance ‘unless they choose to accept of
it’—and without abandoning the occasions of their vices, ‘if they should
thereby be put to any inconvenience?’

“But your doctors have gone even beyond this; and the license which they
have assumed to tamper with the most holy rules of Christian conduct
amount to a total subversion of the law of God. They violate ‘the great
commandment on which hang all the law and the prophets;’ they strike at
the very heart of piety; they rob it of the spirit that giveth life;
they hold that to love God is not necessary to salvation; and go so far
as to maintain that ‘this dispensation from loving God is the privilege
which Jesus Christ has introduced into the world!’ This, sir, is the
very climax of impiety. The price of the blood of Jesus Christ paid to
obtain us a dispensation from loving him! Before the incarnation, it
seems men were obliged to love God: but since ‘God has so loved the
world as to give his only-begotten Son,’ the world, redeemed by him, is
released from loving him! Strange divinity of our days—to dare to take
off the ‘anathema’ which St. Paul denounces on those ‘that love not the
Lord Jesus!’ To cancel the sentence of St. John: ‘He that loveth not,
abideth in death!’ and that of Jesus Christ himself: ‘He that loveth me
not keepeth not my precepts!’ and thus to render those worthy of
enjoying God through eternity who never loved God all their life![227]
Behold the Mystery of Iniquity fulfilled! Open your eyes at length, my
dear father, and if the other aberrations of your casuists have made no
impression on you, let these last, by their very extravagance, compel
you to abandon them. This is what I desire from the bottom of my heart,
for your own sake and for the sake of your doctors; and my prayer to God
is, that he would vouchsafe to convince them how false the light must be
that has guided them to such precipices; and that he would fill their
hearts with that love of himself from which they have dared to give man
a dispensation!”

After some remarks of this nature, I took my leave of the monk, and I
see no great likelihood of my repeating my visits to him. This, however,
need not occasion you any regret; for, should it be necessary to
continue these communications on their maxims, I have studied their
books sufficiently to tell you as much of their morality, and more,
perhaps, of their policy, than he could have done himself.—I am, &c.

-----

Footnote 204:

  See before, p. 116.

Footnote 205:

  _Imago Primi Seculi_, l. iii., c. 8.

Footnote 206:

  Esc. tr. 7, a. 4, n. 135; also, Princ., ex. 2, n. 73.

Footnote 207:

  The practice of auricular confession was about three hundred years old
  before the Reformation, having remained undetermined till the year
  1150 after Christ. The early fathers were, beyond all question,
  decidedly opposed to it. Chrysostom reasons very differently from the
  text. “But thou art ashamed to say that thou hast sinned? Confess thy
  faults, then, daily in thy prayer; for do I say, ‘Confess them to thy
  fellow-servant who may reproach thee therewith?’ No; confess them to
  God who healeth them.” (In Ps. l. hom. 2.) And to whom did Augustine
  make his _Confessions_? Was it not to the same Being to whom David in
  the Psalms and the publican in the Gospel, made theirs? “What have I
  to do with men,” says this father, “that they should hear my
  confessions, as if they were to heal all my diseases!” (Confes., lib.
  x., p. 3.)

Footnote 208:

  Princ., ex. 2. n. 39, 41, 61, 62.

Footnote 209:

  John xx. 23: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whose soever sins ye remit,
  they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are
  retained.” All the ancient fathers, such as Basil, Ambrose, Augustine,
  and Chrysostom, explain this remission of sins as the work of the Holy
  Ghost, and not of the apostles except ministerially, in the use of the
  spiritual keys of doctrine and discipline, of intercessary prayer and
  of the sacraments. (Ussher’s Jesuits’ Challenge, p. 122 &c.) Even the
  schoolmen held that the power of binding and loosing committed to the
  ministers of the Church is not absolute, but must be limited by _clave
  non errante_, or when no error is committed in the use of the keys.

Footnote 210:

  In 3 part, t. 4, disp. 32, sect. 2, n. 2.

Footnote 211:

  Summary of Sins, c. 46, p. 1090, 1, 2.

Footnote 212:

  Denis Petau (Dionysius Petavius) a learned Jesuit, was born at Orleans
  in 1593, and died in 1652. The catalogue of his works alone would fill
  a volume. He wrote in elegant Latin, on all subjects, grammar,
  history, chronology, &c., as well as theology. Perrault informs us
  that he had an incredible ardor for the conversion of heretics, and
  had almost succeeded in converting the celebrated Grotius—a very
  unlikely story. (Les Hommes Illustres, p. 19.) His book on Public
  Penance (Paris, 1644) was intended as a refutation of Arnauld’s
  “Frequent Communion;” but is said to have been ill-written and
  unsuccessful. Though he professed the theology of his order, he is
  said to have had a kind of predilection for austere opinions, being
  naturally of a melancholy temper. When invited by the pope to visit
  Rome, he replied, “I am too old to _flit_”—_demenager_. (Dict. Univ.,
  art. _Petau_.)

Footnote 213:

  Reply to the Moral Theol., p. 211.

Footnote 214:

  Esc., Practice of the Society, tr. 7, ex. 4, n. 226.

Footnote 215:

  P. 1082, 1089

Footnote 216:

  Theol. Mor., tr. 4, De Pœnit., q. 13 pp. 93, 94.

Footnote 217:

  The work ascribed to Pintereau was entitled, “Les Impostures et les
  Ignorances du Libelle intituló la Theologie Morale des Jesuites: par
  l’Abbè du Boisic.”

Footnote 218:

  That is, the sacrament of penance, as it is called. “That contrition
  is at all times necessarily required for obtaining remission of sins
  and justification, is a matter determined by the fathers of Trent. But
  mark yet the mystery. They equivocate with us in the term
  _contrition_, and make a distinction thereof into perfect and
  imperfect. The former of these is _contrition_ properly; the latter
  they call _attrition_, which howsoever in itself it be no true
  contrition, yet when the priest, with his power of forgiving sins,
  interposes himself in the business, they tell us that attrition, by
  virtue of the keys, is made contrition: that is to say, that a sorrow
  arising from a servile fear of punishment, and such a fruitless
  repentance as the reprobate may carry with them to hell, by virtue of
  the priest’s absolution, is made so fruitful that it shall serve the
  turn for obtaining forgiveness of sins, as if it had been that godly
  sorrow which worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of. By
  which spiritual cozenage many poor souls are most miserably deluded.”
  (Ussher’s Tracts, p. 153.)

Footnote 219:

  These quotations, carefully marked in the original, afford a
  sufficient answer to Father Daniel’s long argument, which consists
  chiefly of citations from Jesuit writers who hold the views above
  given.

Footnote 220:

  It may be remembered that Diana, though not a Jesuit, was claimed by
  the Society as a favorer of their casuists. This writer was once held
  in such high repute, that he was consulted by people from all parts of
  the world as a perfect oracle in cases of conscience. He is now
  forgotten. His style, like that of most of these scholastics, is
  described as “insipid, stingy, and crawling.” (Biogr. Univ., Anc. et
  Mod.)

Footnote 221:

  Esc. Pratique de notre Société, tr. 7, ex. 4, n. 91.

Footnote 222:

  Tr. 8, disp. 3, n. 13.

Footnote 223:

  Of Trent. Nicole attempts to prove that the “imperfect contrition” of
  this Council includes the love of God, and that they condemned as
  heretical the opinion, that “any could prepare himself for grace
  without a movement of the Holy Spirit.” He is more successful in
  showing that the Jesuits were heretical when judged by Augustine and
  the Holy Scriptures. (Note 2, sur la x. Lettre.)

Footnote 224:

  The Jesuits are so fond of their “attrition,” or purely natural
  repentance, that one of their own theologians (Cardinal Francis Tolet)
  having condemned it they falsified the passage in a subsequent
  edition, making him speak the opposite sentiment. The forgery was
  exposed; but the worthy fathers, according to custom, allowed it to
  pass without notice, _ad majorem Dei gloriam_. (Nicole, iii. 95.)

Footnote 225:

  Tr. 1, ex. 2, n. 21; and tr. 5, ex. 4, n. 8.

Footnote 226:

  Shocking as these principles are, it might be easy to show that they
  necessarily flow from the Romish doctrine, which substitutes the
  imperfect obedience of the sinner as the meritorious ground of
  justification, in the room of the all-perfect obedience and oblation
  of the Son of God, which renders it necessary to lower the divine
  standard of duty. The attempt of Father Daniel to escape from the
  serious charge in the text under a cloud of metaphysical distinctions
  about _affective_ and _effective_ love, is about as lame as the
  argument he draws from the merciful character of the Gospel, is
  dishonorable to the Saviour, who “came not to destroy the law and the
  prophets but to fulfil.” But this “confusion worse confounded” arises
  from putting love to God out of its proper place and representing it
  as the price of our pardon instead of the fruit of faith in pardoning
  mercy. Arnauld was as far wrong on this point as the Jesuits; and it
  is astonishing that he did not discover in their system the radical
  error of his own creed carried out to its proper consequences.
  (Reponse Gen. au Livre de M. Arnauld, par Elie Merlat, p. 30.)

Footnote 227:

  “Nothing on this point,” says Nicole in a note here, “can be finer
  than the prosopopeia in which Despréaux (Boileau) introduces God as
  judging mankind.” He then quotes a long passage from the Twelfth
  Epistle of that poet, beginning—

         “Quand Dieu viendra juger les vivans et les morts,” &c.

  Boileau was the personal friend of Arnauld and Pascal, and satirized
  the Jesuits with such pleasant irony that Father la Chaise, the
  confessor of Louis XIV., though himself a Jesuit, is said to have
  taken a pleasure in repeating his verses.




                               LETTER XI.

               TO THE REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS.[228]

RIDICULE A FAIR WEAPON WHEN EMPLOYED AGAINST ABSURD OPINIONS—RULES TO BE
   OBSERVED IN THE USE OF THIS WEAPON—THE PROFANE BUFFOONERY OF FATHERS
   LE MOINE AND GARASSE.


                                                      _August 18, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—I have seen the letters which you are circulating in
opposition to those which I wrote to one of my friends on your morality;
and I perceive that one of the principal points of your defence is, that
I have not spoken of your maxims with sufficient seriousness. This
charge you repeat in all your productions, and carry it so far as to
allege, that I have been “guilty of turning sacred things into
ridicule.”

Such a charge, fathers, is no less surprising than it is unfounded.
Where do you find that I have turned sacred things into ridicule? You
specify “the Mohatra contract, and the story of John d’Alba.” But are
these what you call “sacred things?” Does it really appear to you that
the Mohatra is something so venerable that it would be blasphemy not to
speak of it with respect? And the lessons of Father Bauny on larceny,
which led John d’Alba to practise it at your expense, are they so sacred
as to entitle you to stigmatize all who laugh at them as profane people?

What, fathers! must the vagaries of your doctors pass for the verities
of the Christian faith, and no man be allowed to ridicule Escobar, or
the fantastical and unchristian dogmas of your authors, without being
stigmatized as jesting at religion? Is it possible you can have ventured
to reiterate so often an idea so utterly unreasonable? Have you no fears
that, in blaming me for laughing at your absurdities, you may only
afford me fresh subject of merriment; that you may make the charge
recoil on yourselves, by showing that I have really selected nothing
from your writings as the matter of raillery, but what was truly
ridiculous; and that thus, in making a jest of your morality, I have
been as far from jeering at holy things, as the doctrine of your
casuists is far from the holy doctrine of the Gospel?

Indeed, reverend sirs, there is a vast difference between laughing at
religion, and laughing at those who profane it by their extravagant
opinions. It were impiety to be wanting in respect for the verities
which the Spirit of God has revealed; but it were no less impiety of
another sort, to be wanting in contempt for the falsities which the
spirit of man opposes to them.[229]

For, fathers (since you will force me into this argument), I beseech you
to consider that, just in proportion as Christian truths are worthy of
love and respect, the contrary errors must deserve hatred and contempt;
there being two things in the truths of our religion—a divine beauty
that renders them lovely, and a sacred majesty that renders them
venerable; and two things also about errors—an impiety, that makes them
horrible, and an impertinence that renders them ridiculous. For these
reasons, while the saints have ever cherished towards the truth the
two-fold sentiment of love and fear—the whole of their wisdom being
comprised between fear, which is its beginning, and love, which is its
end—they have, at the same time, entertained towards error the two-fold
feeling of hatred and contempt, and their zeal has been at once employed
to repel, by force of reasoning, the malice of the wicked, and to
chastise, by the aid of ridicule, their extravagance and folly.

Do not then expect, fathers, to make people believe that it is unworthy
of a Christian to treat error with derision. Nothing is easier than to
convince all who were not aware of it before, that this practice is
perfectly just—that it is common with the fathers of the Church, and
that it is sanctioned by Scripture, by the example of the best of
saints, and even by that of God himself.

Do we not find that God at once hates and despises sinners; so that even
at the hour of death, when their condition is most sad and deplorable,
Divine Wisdom adds mockery to the vengeance which consigns them to
eternal punishment? “_In interitu vestro ridebo et subsannabo_—I will
laugh at your calamity.” The saints, too, influenced by the same
feeling, will join in the derision; for, according to David, when they
witness the punishment of the wicked, “they shall fear, and yet laugh at
it—_videbunt justi et timebunt, et super eum ridebunt_.” And Job says:
“_Innocens subsannabit eos_—The innocent shall laugh at them.”[230]

It is worthy of remark here, that the very first words which God
addressed to man after his fall, contain, in the opinion of the fathers,
“bitter irony” and mockery. After Adam had disobeyed his Maker, in the
hope, suggested by the devil, of being like God, it appears from
Scripture that God, as a punishment, subjected him to death; and after
having reduced him to this miserable condition, which was due to his
sin, he taunted him in that state with the following terms of derision:
“Behold, the man has become as one of us!—_Ecce, Adam quasi unus ex
nobis!_”—which, according to St. Jerome[231] and the interpreters, is “a
grievous and cutting piece of irony,” with which God “stung him to the
quick.” “Adam,” says Rupert, “deserved to be taunted in this manner, and
he would be naturally made to feel his folly more acutely by this
ironical expression than by a more serious one.” St. Victor, after
making the same remark, adds, “that this irony was due to his sottish
credulity, and that this species of raillery is an act of justice,
merited by him against whom it was directed.”[232]

Thus you see, fathers, that ridicule is, in some cases, a very
appropriate means of reclaiming men from their errors, and that it is
accordingly an act of justice, because, as Jeremiah says, “the actions
of those that err are worthy of derision, because of their vanity—_vana
sunt et risu digna_.” And so far from its being impious to laugh at
them, St. Augustine holds it to be the effect of divine wisdom: “The
wise laugh at the foolish, because they are wise, not after their own
wisdom, but after that divine wisdom which shall laugh at the death of
the wicked.”

The prophets, accordingly, filled with the Spirit of God, have availed
themselves of ridicule, as we find from the examples of Daniel and
Elias. In short, examples of it are not wanting in the discourses of
Jesus Christ himself. St. Augustine remarks that, when he would humble
Nicodemus, who deemed himself so expert in his knowledge of the law,
“perceiving him to be puffed up with pride, from his rank as doctor of
the Jews, he first beats down his presumption by the magnitude of his
demands, and having reduced him so low that he was unable to answer,
What! says he, you a master in Israel, and not know these things!—as if
he had said, Proud ruler, confess that thou knowest nothing.” St.
Chrysostom and St. Cyril likewise observe upon this, that “he deserved
to be ridiculed in this manner.”

You may learn from this, fathers, that should it so happen, in our day,
that persons who enact the part of “masters” among Christians, as
Nicodemus and the Pharisees did among the Jews, show themselves so
ignorant of the first principles of religion as to maintain, for
example, that “a man may be saved who never loved God all his life,” we
only follow the example of Jesus Christ, when we laugh at such a
combination of ignorance and conceit.

I am sure, fathers, these sacred examples are sufficient to convince
you, that to deride the errors and extravagances of man is not
inconsistent with the practice of the saints; otherwise we must blame
that of the greatest doctors of the Church, who have been guilty of
it—such as St. Jerome, in his letters and writings against Jovinian,
Vigilantius, and the Pelagians; Tertullian, in his Apology against the
follies of idolaters; St. Augustine against the monks of Africa, whom he
styles “the hairy men;” St. Irenæus the Gnostics; St. Bernard and the
other fathers of the Church, who, having been the imitators of the
apostles, ought to be imitated by the faithful in all time coming; for,
say what we will, they are the true models for Christians, even of the
present day.

In following such examples, I conceived that I could not go far wrong;
and, as I think I have sufficiently established this position, I shall
only add, in the admirable words of Tertullian, which give the true
explanation of the whole of my proceeding in this matter: “What I have
now done is only a little sport before the real combat. I have rather
indicated the wounds that might be given you, than inflicted any. If the
reader has met with passages which have excited his risibility, he must
ascribe this to the subjects themselves. There are many things which
deserve to be held up in this way to ridicule and mockery, lest, by a
serious refutation, we should attach a weight to them which they do not
deserve. Nothing is more due to vanity than laughter; and it is the
Truth properly that has a right to laugh, because she is cheerful, and
to make sport of her enemies, because she is sure of the victory. Care
must be taken, indeed, that the raillery is not too low, and unworthy of
the truth; but, keeping this in view, when ridicule may be employed with
effect, it is a duty to avail ourselves of it.” Do you not think,
fathers, that this passage is singularly applicable to our subject? The
letters which I have hitherto written are “merely a little sport before
a real combat.” As yet I have been only playing with the foils, and
“rather indicating the wounds that might be given you than inflicting
any.” I have merely exposed your passages to the light, without making
almost a reflection on them. “If the reader has met with any that have
excited his risibility, he must ascribe this to the subjects
themselves.” And, indeed, what is more fitted to raise a laugh, than to
see a matter so grave as that of Christian morality decked out with
fancies so grotesque as those in which you have exhibited it? One is apt
to form such high anticipations of these maxims, from being told that
“Jesus Christ himself has revealed them to the fathers of the Society,”
that when one discovers among them such absurdities as “that a priest
receiving money to say mass, may take additional sums from other persons
by giving up to them his own share in the sacrifice;” “that a monk is
not to be excommunicated for putting off his habit, provided it is to
dance, swindle, or go incognito into infamous houses;” and “that the
duty of hearing mass may be fulfilled by listening to four quarters of a
mass at once from different priests”—when, I say, one listens to such
decisions as these, the surprise is such that it is impossible to
refrain from laughing; for nothing is more calculated to produce that
emotion than a startling contrast between the thing looked for and the
thing looked at. And why should the greater part of these maxims be
treated in any other way? As Tertullian says, “To treat them seriously
would be to sanction them.”

What! is it necessary to bring up all the forces of Scripture and
tradition, in order to prove that running a sword through a man’s body,
covertly and behind his back, is to murder him in treachery? or, that to
give one money as a motive to resign a benefice, is to purchase the
benefice? Yes, there are things which it is duty to despise, and which
“deserve only to be laughed at.” In short, the remark of that ancient
author, “that nothing is more due to vanity than derision,” with what
follows, applies to the case before us so justly and so convincingly, as
to put it beyond all question that we may laugh at errors without
violating propriety.

And let me add, fathers, that this may be done without any breach of
charity either, though this is another of the charges you bring against
me in your publications. For, according to St. Augustine, “charity may
sometimes oblige us to ridicule the errors of men, that they may be
induced to laugh at them in their turn, and renounce them—_Hæc tu
misericorditer irride, ut eis ridenda ac fugienda commendes_.” And the
same charity may also, at other times, bind us to repel them with
indignation, according to that other saying of St. Gregory of Nazianzen:
“The spirit of meekness and charity hath its emotions and its heats.”
Indeed, as St. Augustine observes, “who would venture to say that truth
ought to stand disarmed against falsehood, or that the enemies of the
faith shall be at liberty to frighten the faithful with hard words, and
jeer at them with lively sallies of wit; while the Catholics ought never
to write except with a coldness of style enough to set the reader
asleep?”

Is it not obvious that, by following such a course, a wide door would be
opened for the introduction of the most extravagant and pernicious
dogmas into the Church; while none would be allowed to treat them with
contempt, through fear of being charged with violating propriety, or to
confute them with indignation, from the dread of being taxed with want
of charity?

Indeed, fathers! shall you be allowed to maintain, “that it is lawful to
kill a man to avoid a box on the ear or an affront,” and must nobody be
permitted publicly to expose a public error of such consequence? Shall
you be at liberty to say, “that a judge may in conscience retain a fee
received for an act of injustice,” and shall no one be at liberty to
contradict you? Shall you print, with the privilege and approbation of
your doctors, “that a man may be saved without ever having loved God;”
and will you shut the mouth of those who defend the true faith, by
telling them that they would violate brotherly love by attacking you,
and Christian modesty by laughing at your maxims? I doubt, fathers, if
there be any persons whom you could make believe this; if, however,
there be any such, who are really persuaded that, by denouncing your
morality, I have been deficient in the charity which I owe to you, I
would have them examine, with great jealousy, whence this feeling takes
its rise within them. They may imagine that it proceeds from a holy
zeal, which will not allow them to see their neighbor impeached without
being scandalized at it; but I would entreat them to consider, that it
is not impossible that it may flow from another source, and that it is
even extremely likely that it may spring from that secret, and often
self-concealed dissatisfaction, which the unhappy corruption within us
seldom fails to stir up against those who oppose the relaxation of
morals. And to furnish them with a rule which may enable them to
ascertain the real principle from which it proceeds, I will ask them,
if, while they lament the way in which the religious[233] have been
treated, they lament still more the manner in which these religious have
treated the truth. If they are incensed, not only against the letters,
but still more against the maxims quoted in them, I shall grant it to be
barely possible that their resentment proceeds from some zeal, though
not of the most enlightened kind; and, in this case, the passages I have
just cited from the fathers will serve to enlighten them. But if they
are merely angry at the reprehension, and not at the things reprehended,
truly, fathers, I shall never scruple to tell them that they are grossly
mistaken, and that their zeal is miserably blind.

Strange zeal, indeed! which gets angry at those that censure public
faults, and not at those that commit them! Novel charity this, which
groans at seeing error confuted, but feels no grief at seeing morality
subverted by that error! If these persons were in danger of being
assassinated, pray, would they be offended at one advertising them of
the stratagem that had been laid for them; and instead of turning out of
their way to avoid it, would they trifle away their time in whining
about the little charity manifested in discovering to them the criminal
design of the assassins? Do they get waspish when one tells them not to
eat such an article of food, because it is poisoned? or not to enter
such a city, because it has the plague?

Whence comes it, then, that the same persons who set down a man as
wanting in charity, for exposing maxims hurtful to religion, would, on
the contrary, think him equally deficient in that grace were he not to
disclose matters hurtful to health and life, unless it be from this,
that their fondness for life induces them to take in good part every
hint that contributes to its preservation, while their indifference to
truth leads them, not only to take no share in its defence, but even to
view with pain the efforts made for the extirpation of falsehood?

Let them seriously ponder, as in the sight of God, how shameful, and how
prejudicial to the Church, is the morality which your casuists are in
the habit of propagating; the scandalous and unmeasured license which
they are introducing into public manners; the obstinate and violent
hardihood with which you support them. And if they do not think it full
time to rise against such disorders, their blindness is as much to be
pitied as yours, fathers; and you and they have equal reason to dread
that saying of St. Augustine, founded on the words of Jesus Christ, in
the Gospel: “Woe to the blind leaders! woe to the blind followers!—_Væ
cæcis ducentibus! væ cæcis sequentibus!_”

But to leave you no room in future, either to create such impressions on
the minds of others, or to harbor them in your own, I shall tell you,
fathers (and I am ashamed I should have to teach you what I should have
rather learnt from you), the marks which the fathers of the Church have
given for judging when our animadversions flow from a principle of piety
and charity, and when from a spirit of malice and impiety.

The first of these rules is, that the spirit of piety always prompts us
to speak with sincerity and truthfulness; whereas malice and envy make
use of falsehood and calumny. “_Splendentia et vehementia, sed rebus
veris_—Splendid and vehement in words, but true in things,” as St.
Augustine says. The dealer in falsehood is an agent of the devil. No
direction of the intention can sanctify slander; and though the
conversion of the whole earth should depend on it, no man may
warrantably calumniate the innocent: because none may do the least evil,
in order to accomplish the greatest good; and, as the Scripture says,
“the truth of God stands in no need of our lie.” St. Hilary observes,
that “it is the bounden duty of the advocates of truth, to advance
nothing in its support but true things.” Now, fathers, I can declare
before God, that there is nothing that I detest more than the slightest
possible deviation from the truth, and that I have ever taken the
greatest care, not only not to falsify (which would be horrible), but
not to alter or wrest, in the slightest possible degree, the sense of a
single passage. So closely have I adhered to this rule, that if I may
presume to apply them to the present case, I may safely say, in the
words of the same St. Hilary: “If we advance things that are false, let
our statements be branded with infamy; but if we can show that they are
public and notorious, it is no breach of apostolic modesty or liberty to
expose them.”

It is not enough, however, to tell nothing but the truth; we must not
always tell everything that is true; we should publish only those things
which it is useful to disclose, and not those which can only hurt,
without doing any good. And, therefore, as the first rule is to speak
with truth, the second is to speak with discretion. “The wicked,” says
St. Augustine, “in persecuting the good, blindly follow the dictates of
their passion; but the good, in their prosecution of the wicked, are
guided by a wise discretion, even as the surgeon warily considers where
he is cutting, while the murderer cares not where he strikes.” You must
be sensible, fathers, that in selecting from the maxims of your authors,
I have refrained from quoting those which would have galled you most,
though I might have done it, and that without sinning against
discretion, as others who were both learned and catholic writers, have
done before me. All who have read your authors know how far I have
spared you in this respect.[234] Besides, I have taken no notice
whatever of what might be brought against individual characters among
you; and I would have been extremely sorry to have said a word about
secret and personal failings, whatever evidence I might have of them,
being persuaded that this is the distinguishing property of malice, and
a practice which ought never to be resorted to, unless where it is
urgently demanded for the good of the Church. It is obvious, therefore,
that in what I have been compelled to advance against your moral maxims,
I have been by no means wanting in due consideration: and that you have
more reason to congratulate yourself on my moderation than to complain
of my indiscretion.

The third rule, fathers, is: That when there is need to employ a little
raillery, the spirit of piety will take care to employ it against error
only, and not against things holy; whereas the spirit of buffoonery,
impiety, and heresy, mocks at all that is most sacred. I have already
vindicated myself on that score; and indeed there is no great danger of
falling into that vice so long as I confine my remarks to the opinions
which I have quoted from your authors.

In short, fathers, to abridge these rules, I shall only mention another,
which is the essence and the end of all the rest: That the spirit of
charity prompts us to cherish in the heart a desire for the salvation of
those against whom we dispute, and to address our prayers to God while
we direct our accusations to men. “We ought ever,” says St. Augustine,
“to preserve charity in the heart, even while we are obliged to pursue a
line of external conduct which to man has the appearance of harshness;
we ought to smite them with a sharpness, severe but kindly, remembering
that their advantage is more to be studied than their gratification.” I
am sure, fathers, that there is nothing in my letters, from which it can
be inferred that I have not cherished such a desire towards you; and as
you can find nothing to the contrary in them, charity obliges you to
believe that I have been really actuated by it. It appears, then, that
you cannot prove that I have offended against this rule, or against any
of the other rules which charity inculcates; and you have no right to
say, therefore, that I have violated it.

But, fathers, if you should now like to have the pleasure of seeing,
within a short compass, a course of conduct directly at variance with
each of these rules, and bearing the genuine stamp of the spirit of
buffoonery, envy, and hatred, I shall give you a few examples of it; and
that they may be of the sort best known and most familiar to you, I
shall extract them from your own writings.

To begin, then, with the unworthy manner in which your authors speak of
holy things, whether in their sportive and gallant effusions, or in
their more serious pieces, do you think that the parcel of ridiculous
stories, which your father Binet has introduced into his “Consolation to
the Sick,” are exactly suitable to his professed object, which is that
of imparting Christian consolation to those whom God has chastened with
affliction? Will you pretend to say, that the profane, foppish style in
which your Father Le Moine has talked of piety in his “Devotion made
Easy,” is more fitted to inspire respect than contempt for the picture
that he draws of Christian virtue? What else does his whole book of
“Moral Pictures” breathe, both in its prose and poetry, but a spirit
full of vanity, and the follies of this world? Take, for example, that
ode in his seventh book, entitled, “Eulogy on Bashfulness, showing that
all beautiful things are red, or inclined to redden.” Call you that a
production worthy of a priest? The ode is intended to comfort a lady,
called Delphina, who was sadly addicted to blushing. Each stanza is
devoted to show that certain red things are the best of things, such as
roses, pomegranates, the mouth, the tongue; and it is in the midst of
this badinage, so disgraceful in a clergyman, that he has the effrontery
to introduce those blessed spirits that minister before God, and of whom
no Christian should speak without reverence:—

                 “The cherubim—those glorious choirs—
                   Composed of head and plumes,
                 Whom God with his own Spirit inspires,
                   And with his eyes illumes.
                 These splendid faces, as they fly,
                 Are ever red and burning high,
                 With fire angelic or divine;
                 And while their mutual flames combine,
                 The waving of their wings supplies
                 A fan to cool their extacies!
                 But redness shines with better grace,
                 Delphina, on thy beauteous face,
                 Where modesty sits revelling—
                 Arrayed in purple, like a king,” &c.

What think you of this, fathers? Does this preference of the blushes of
Delphina to the ardor of those spirits, which is neither more nor less
than the ardor of divine love, and this simile of the fan applied to
their mysterious wings, strike you as being very Christian-like in the
lips which consecrate the adorable body of Jesus Christ? I am quite
aware that he speaks only in the character of a gallant, and to raise a
smile; but this is precisely what is called laughing at things holy. And
is it not certain, that, were he to get full justice, he could not save
himself from incurring a censure? although, to shield himself from this,
he pleads an excuse which is hardly less censurable than the offence,
“that the Sorbonne has no jurisdiction over Parnassus, and that the
errors of that land are subject neither to censure nor the
Inquisition;”—as if one could act the blasphemer and profane fellow only
in prose! There is another passage, however, in the preface, where even
this excuse fails him, when he says, “that the water of the river, on
whose banks he composes his verses, is so apt to make poets, that,
though it were converted into _holy water_, it would not chase away the
demon of poesy.” To match this, I may add the following flight of your
Father Garasse, in his “Summary of the Capital Truths in Religion,”
where, speaking of the sacred mystery of the incarnation, he mixes up
blasphemy and heresy in this fashion: “The human personality was
grafted, as it were, or _set on horseback_, upon the personality of the
Word!”[235] And omitting many others, I might mention another passage
from the same author, who, speaking on the subject of the name of Jesus,
ordinarily written thus,

                                   ✝
                                I. H. S.

observes that “some have taken away the cross from the top of it,
leaving the characters barely thus, I. H. S.—which,” says he, “is a
stripped Jesus!”

Such is the indecency with which you treat the truths of religion, in
the face of the inviolable law which binds us always to speak of them
with reverence. But you have sinned no less flagrantly against the rule
which obliges us to speak of them with truth and discretion. What is
more common in your writings than calumny? Can those of Father
Brisacier[236] be called sincere? Does he speak with truth when he says,
that “the nuns of Port-Royal do not pray to the saints, and have no
images in their church?” Are not these most outrageous falsehoods, when
the contrary appears before the eyes of all Paris? And can he be said to
speak with discretion, when he stabs the fair reputation of these
virgins, who lead a life so pure and austere, representing them as
“impenitent, unsacramentalists, uncommunicants, foolish virgins,
visionaries, Calagans, desperate creatures, and anything you please,”
loading them with many other slanders, which have justly incurred the
censure of the late Archbishop of Paris? or when he calumniates priests
of the most irreproachable morals,[237] by asserting “that they practise
novelties in confession, to entrap handsome innocent females, and that
he would be horrified to tell the abominable crimes which they commit.”
Is it not a piece of intolerable assurance, to advance slanders so black
and base, not merely without proof, but without the slightest shadow, or
the most distant semblance of truth? I shall not enlarge on this topic,
but defer it to a future occasion, for I have something more to say to
you about it; but what I have now produced is enough to show that you
have sinned at once against truth and discretion.

But it may be said, perhaps, that you have not offended against the last
rule at least, which binds you to desire the salvation of those whom you
denounce, and that none can charge you with this, except by unlocking
the secrets of your breasts, which are only known to God. It is strange,
fathers, but true, nevertheless, that we can convict you even of this
offence; that while your hatred to your opponents has carried you so far
as to wish their eternal perdition, your infatuation has driven you to
discover the abominable wish; that so far from cherishing in secret
desires for their salvation, you have offered up prayers in public for
their damnation; and that, after having given utterance to that hideous
vow in the city of Caen, to the scandal of the whole Church, you have
since then ventured, in Paris, to vindicate, in your printed books, the
diabolical transaction. After such gross offences against piety, first
ridiculing and speaking lightly of things the most sacred; next falsely
and scandalously calumniating priests and virgins; and lastly, forming
desires and prayers for their damnation, it would be difficult to add
anything worse. I cannot conceive, fathers, how you can fail to be
ashamed of yourselves, or how you could have thought for an instant of
charging me with a want of charity, who have acted all along with so
much truth and moderation, without reflecting on your own horrid
violations of charity, manifested in those deplorable exhibitions, which
make the charge recoil against yourselves.

In fine, fathers, to conclude with another charge which you bring
against me, I see you complain that among the vast number of your maxims
which I quote, there are some which have been objected to already, and
that I “say over again, what others have said before me.” To this I
reply, that it is just because you have not profited by what has been
said before, that I say it over again. Tell me now what fruit has
appeared from all the castigations you have received in all the books
written by learned doctors, and even the whole university? What more
have your fathers Annat, Caussin, Pintereau, and Le Moine done, in the
replies they have put forth, except loading with reproaches those who
had given them salutary admonitions? Have you suppressed the books in
which these nefarious maxims are taught?[238] Have you restrained the
authors of these maxims? Have you become more circumspect in regard to
them? On the contrary, is it not the fact, that since that time Escobar
has been repeatedly reprinted in France and in the Low Countries, and
that your fathers Cellot, Bagot, Bauny, Lamy, Le Moine, and others,
persist in publishing daily the same maxims over again, or new ones as
licentious as ever? Let us hear no more complaints, then, fathers,
either because I have charged you with maxims which you have not
disavowed, or because I have objected to some new ones against you, or
because I have laughed equally at them all. You have only to sit down
and look at them, to see at once your own confusion and my defence. Who
can look without laughing at the decision of Bauny, respecting the
person who employs another to set fire to his neighbor’s barn; that of
Cellot on restitution; the rule of Sanchez in favor of sorcerers; the
plan of Hurtado for avoiding the sin of duelling by taking a walk
through a field, and waiting for a man; the compliments of Bauny for
escaping usury; the way of avoiding simony by a detour of the intention,
and keeping clear of falsehood by speaking high and low; and such other
opinions of your most grave and reverend doctors? Is there anything more
necessary, fathers, for my vindication? and as Tertullian says, “can
anything be more justly due to the vanity and weakness of these opinions
than laughter?” But, fathers, the corruption of manners to which your
maxims lead deserves another sort of consideration; and it becomes us to
ask, with the same ancient writer, “Whether ought we to laugh at their
folly, or deplore their blindness?—_Rideam vanitatem, an exprobrem
cæcitatem_?” My humble opinion is, that one may either laugh at them or
weep over them, as one is in the humor. _Hæc tolerabilius vel ridentur,
vel flentur_, as St. Augustine says. The Scripture tells us that “there
is a time to laugh, and a time to weep;” and my hope is, fathers, that I
may not find verified, in your case, these words in the Proverbs: “If a
wise man contendeth with a foolish man, whether he rage or laugh, there
is no rest.”[239]

                  *       *       *       *       *

_P. S._—On finishing this letter, there was put in my hands one of your
publications, in which you accuse me of falsification, in the case of
six of your maxims quoted by me, and also with being in correspondence
with heretics. You will shortly receive, I trust, a suitable reply;
after which, fathers, I rather think you will not feel very anxious to
continue this species of warfare.[240]

-----

Footnote 228:

  In this and the following letters, Pascal changes his style, from that
  of dialogue to that of direct address, and from that of the liveliest
  irony to that of serious invective and poignant satire.

Footnote 229:

  “Religion, they tell us, ought not to be ridiculed; and they tell us
  truth: yet surely the corruptions in it may; for we are taught by the
  tritest maxim in the world, that religion being the best of things,
  its corruptions are likely to be the worst.” (Swift’s Apology for a
  Tale of a Tub.)

Footnote 230:

  Prov. i. 26; Ps. lii. 6; Job xxii. 19. In the first passage, the
  figure is evidently what theologians call _anthropopathic_, or
  speaking of God after the manner of men, and denotes his total
  disregard of the wicked in the day of their calamity.

Footnote 231:

  In most of the editions, it is “St. Chrysostom,” but I have followed
  that of Nicole.

Footnote 232:

  We may be permitted to question the correctness of this
  interpretation, and the propriety of introducing it in the present
  connection. For the former, the fathers, not Pascal, are responsible;
  as to the latter, it was certainly superfluous, and not very happy, to
  have recourse to such an example, to justify the use of ridicule as a
  weapon against religious follies. Among other writers, the Abbé
  D’Artigny is very severe against our author on this score, and quotes
  with approbation the following censure on him: “Is it possible that a
  man of such genius and erudition could justify the most criminal
  excesses by such respectable examples? Not content with making witty
  old fellows of the prophets and the holy fathers, nothing will serve
  him but to make us believe that the Almighty himself has furnished us
  with precedents for the most bitter slanders and pleasantries—an
  evident proof that there is nothing that an author will not seek to
  justify when he follows his own passion.” (Nouveaux Mémoires
  D’Artigny, ii. 185.) How solemnly and eloquently will a man write down
  all such satires, when the jest is pointed against himself and his
  party! D’Artigny quotes, within a few pages, with evident relish, a
  bitter satire against a Protestant minister.

Footnote 233:

  “Religious,” is a general term, applied in the Romish Church to all
  who are in holy orders.

Footnote 234:

  “So far,” says Nicole, “from his having told all that he might against
  the Jesuits, he has spared them on points so essential and important,
  that all who have a complete knowledge of their maxims have admired
  his moderation.” “What would have been the case,” asks another writer,
  “had Pascal exposed the late infamous things put out by their
  miserable casuists, and unfolded the chain and succession of their
  regicide authors?” (Dissertation sur la foi due au Pascal, &c., p.
  14.)

Footnote 235:

  The apologists of the Jesuits attempted to justify this extraordinary
  illustration, by referring to the use which Augustine and other
  fathers make of the parable of the good Samaritan who “set on his own
  beast” the wounded traveller. But Nicole has shown that fanciful as
  these ancient interpreters often were, it is doing them injustice to
  _father_ on them the absurdity of Father Garasse. (Nicole’s Notes,
  iii. 340.)

Footnote 236:

  Brisacier, who became rector of the College of Rouen, was a bitter
  enemy of the Port-Royalists. His defamatory libel against the nuns of
  Port-Royal, entitled “Le Jansenisme Confondu,” published in 1651, was
  censured by the Archbishop of Paris, and vigorously assailed by M.
  Arnauld.

Footnote 237:

  The priests of Port-Royal.

Footnote 238:

  This is the real question, which brings the matter to a point, and
  serves to answer all the evasions of the Jesuits. They boast of their
  unity as a society and their blind obedience to their head. Have they,
  then, ever, _as a society_, disclaimed these maxims?—have they even,
  _as such_, condemned the sentiments their fathers Becan, Mariana, and
  others, on the duty of dethroning and assassinating heretical kings?
  They have not; and till this is done, they must be held, _as Jesuits_,
  responsible for the sentiments which they refuse to disavow.

Footnote 239:

  Prov. xxix. 9.

Footnote 240:

  This postscript, which appeared in the earlier editions, is dropt in
  that of Nicole and others.




                              LETTER XII.

                 TO THE REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS.

   REFUTATION OF THEIR CHICANERIES REGARDING ALMS-GIVING AND SIMONY.


                                                    _September 9, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—I was prepared to write you on the subject of the
abuse with which you have for some time past been assailing me in your
publications, in which you salute me with such epithets as “reprobate,”
“buffoon,” “blockhead,” “merry-Andrew,” “impostor,” “slanderer,”
“cheat,” “heretic,” “Calvinist in disguise,” “disciple of Du
Moulin,”[241] “possessed with a legion of devils,” and everything else
you can think of. As I should be sorry to have all this believed of me,
I was anxious to show the public why you treated me in this manner; and
I had resolved to complain of your calumnies and falsifications, when I
met with your Answers, in which you bring these same charges against
myself. This will compel me to alter my plan; though it will not prevent
me from prosecuting it in some sort, for I hope, while defending myself,
to convict you of impostures more genuine than the imaginary ones which
you have ascribed to me. Indeed, fathers, the suspicion of foul play is
much more sure to rest on you than on me. It is not very likely,
standing as I do, alone, without power or any human defence, against
such a large body, and having no support but truth and integrity, that I
would expose myself to lose everything, by laying myself open to be
convicted of imposture. It is too easy to discover falsifications in
matters of fact such as the present. In such a case there would have
been no want of persons to accuse me, nor would justice have been denied
them. With you, fathers, the case is very different; you may say as much
as you please against me, while I may look in vain for any to complain
to. With such a wide difference between our positions, though there had
been no other consideration to restrain me, it became me to study no
little caution. By treating me, however, as a common slanderer, you
compel me to assume the defensive, and you must be aware that this
cannot be done without entering into a fresh exposition, and even into a
fuller disclosure of the points of your morality. In provoking this
discussion, I fear you are not acting as good politicians. The war must
be waged within your own camp, and at your own expense; and although you
imagine that, by embroiling the questions with scholastic terms, the
answers will be so tedious, thorny, and obscure, that people will lose
all relish for the controversy, this may not, perhaps, turn out to be
exactly the case; I shall use my best endeavors to tax your patience as
little as possible with that sort of writing. Your maxims have something
diverting about them, which keeps up the good humor of people to the
last. At all events, remember that it is you that oblige me to enter
upon this eclaircissement, and let us see which of us comes off best in
defending themselves.

The first of your Impostures, as you call them, is on the opinion of
Vasquez upon alms-giving. To avoid all ambiguity, then, allow me to give
a simple explanation of the matter in dispute. It is well known,
fathers, that according to the mind of the Church, there are two
precepts touching alms—_1st_, “To give out of our superfluity in the
case of the ordinary necessities of the poor;” and _2dly_, “To give even
out of our necessaries, according to our circumstances, in cases of
extreme necessity.” Thus says Cajetan, after St. Thomas; so that, to get
at the mind of Vasquez on this subject, we must consider the rules he
lays down, both in regard to necessaries and superfluities.

With regard to superfluity, which is the most common source of relief to
the poor, it is entirely set aside by that single maxim which I have
quoted in my Letters: “That what the men of the world keep with the view
of improving their own condition and that of their relatives, is not
properly superfluity; so that, such a thing as superfluity is rarely to
be met with among men of the world, not even excepting kings.” It is
very easy to see, fathers, that according to this definition, none can
have superfluity, provided they have ambition; and thus, so far as the
greater part of the world is concerned, alms-giving is annihilated. But
even though a man should happen to have superfluity, he would be under
no obligation, according to Vasquez, to give it away in the case of
ordinary necessity; for he protests against those who would thus bind
the rich. Here are his own words: “Corduba,” says he, “teaches, that
when we have a superfluity we are bound to give out of it in cases of
ordinary necessity; but _this does not please me_—_sed hoc non
placet_—for we have demonstrated the contrary against Cajetan and
Navarre.” So, fathers, the obligation to this kind of alms is wholly set
aside, according to the good pleasure of Vasquez.

With regard to necessaries, out of which we are bound to give in cases
of extreme and urgent necessity, it must be obvious, from the conditions
by which he has limited the obligation, that the richest man in all
Paris may not come within its reach once in a lifetime. I shall only
refer to two of these. The first is, That “_we must know_ that the poor
man cannot be relieved from any other quarter—_hæc intelligo et cætera
omnia, quando SCIO nullum alium opem laturum_.” What say you to this,
fathers? Is it likely to happen frequently in Paris, where there are so
many charitable people, that I _must know_ that there is not another
soul but myself to relieve the poor wretch who begs an alms from me? And
yet, according to Vasquez, if I have not ascertained that fact, I may
send him away with nothing. The second condition is, That the poor man
be reduced to such straits “that he is menaced with some fatal accident,
or the ruin of his character”—none of them very common occurrences. But
what marks still more the rarity of the cases in which one is bound to
give charity, is his remark, in another passage, that the poor man must
be so ill off, “that he may conscientiously rob the rich man!” This must
surely be a very extraordinary case, unless he will insist that a man
may be ordinarily allowed to commit robbery. And so, after having
cancelled the obligation to give alms out of our superfluities, he
obliges the rich to relieve the poor only in those cases when he would
allow the poor to rifle the rich! Such is the doctrine of Vasquez, to
whom you refer your readers for their edification!

I now come to your pretended Impostures. You begin by enlarging on the
obligation to alms-giving which Vasquez imposes on ecclesiastics. But on
this point I have said nothing; and I am prepared to take it up whenever
you choose. This, then, has nothing to do with the present question. As
for laymen, who are the only persons with whom we have now to do, you
are apparently anxious to have it understood that, in the passage which
I quoted, Vasquez is giving not his own judgment, but that of Cajetan.
But as nothing could be more false than this, and as you have not said
it in so many terms, I am willing to believe, for the sake of your
character, that you did not intend to say it.

You next loudly complain that, after quoting that maxim of Vasquez,
“Such a thing as superfluity is rarely if ever to be met with among men
of the world, not excepting kings,” _I have inferred_ from it, “that the
rich are rarely, if ever, bound to give alms out of their superfluity.”
But what do you mean to say, fathers? If it be true that the rich have
almost never superfluity, is it not obvious that they will almost never
be bound to give alms out of their superfluity? I might have put it into
the form of a syllogism for you, if Diana, who has such an esteem for
Vasquez that he calls him “the phœnix of genius,” had not drawn the same
conclusion from the same premises; for, after quoting the maxim of
Vasquez, he concludes, “that, with regard to the question, whether the
rich are obliged to give alms out of their superfluity, though the
affirmation were true, it would seldom, or almost never, happen to be
obligatory in practice.” I have followed this language word for word.
What, then, are we to make of this, fathers? When Diana quotes with
approbation the sentiments of Vasquez—when he finds them probable, and
“very convenient for rich people,” as he says in the same place, he is
no slanderer, no falsifier, and we hear no complaints of misrepresenting
his author; whereas, when I cite the same sentiments of Vasquez, though
without holding him up as a phœnix, I am a slanderer, a fabricator, a
corrupter of his maxims. Truly, fathers, you have some reason to be
apprehensive, lest your very different treatment of those who agree in
their representation, and differ only in their estimate of your
doctrine, discover the real secret of your hearts, and provoke the
conclusion, that the main object you have in view is to maintain the
credit and glory of your Company. It appears that, provided your
accommodating theology is treated as judicious complaisance, you never
disavow those that publish it, but laud them as contributing to your
design; but let it be held forth as pernicious laxity, and the same
interest of your Society prompts you to disclaim the maxims which would
injure you in public estimation. And thus you recognize or renounce
them, not according to the truth, which never changes, but according to
the shifting exigencies of the times, acting on that motto of one of the
ancients, “_Omnia pro tempore, nihil pro veritate_—Anything for the
times, nothing for the truth.” Beware of this, fathers; and that you may
never have it in your power again to say that I drew from the principle
of Vasquez a conclusion which he had disavowed, I beg to inform you that
he has drawn it himself: “According to the opinion of Cajetan, and
according to MY OWN—_et secundum_ _nostram_—(he says, chap, i., no. 27),
one is hardly obliged to give alms at all, when one is only obliged to
give them out of one’s superfluity.” Confess then, fathers, on the
testimony of Vasquez himself, that I have exactly copied his sentiment;
and think how you could have the conscience to say, that “the reader, on
consulting the original, would see to his astonishment, that he there
teaches the very reverse!”

In fine, you insist, above all, that if Vasquez does not bind the rich
to give alms out of their superfluity, he obliges them to atone for this
by giving out of the necessaries of life. But you have forgotten to
mention the list of conditions which he declares to be essential to
constitute that obligation, which I have quoted, and which restrict it
in such a way as almost entirely to annihilate it. In place of giving
this honest statement of his doctrine, you tell us, in general terms,
that he obliges the rich to give even what is necessary to their
condition. This is proving too much, fathers; the rule of the Gospel
does not go so far; and it would be an error, into which Vasquez is very
far, indeed, from having fallen. To cover his laxity, you attribute to
him an excess of severity which would be reprehensible; and thus you
lose all credit as faithful reporters of his sentiments. But the truth
is, Vasquez is quite free from any such suspicion; for he has
maintained, as I have shown, that the rich are not bound, either in
justice or in charity, to give of their superfluities, and still less of
their necessaries, to relieve the ordinary wants of the poor; and that
they are not obliged to give of the necessaries, except in cases so rare
that they almost never happen.

Having disposed of your objections against me on this head, it only
remains to show the falsehood of your assertion, that Vasquez is more
severe than Cajetan. This will be very easily done. That cardinal
teaches “that we are bound in justice to give alms out of our
superfluity, even in the ordinary wants of the poor; because, according
to the holy fathers, the rich are merely the dispensers of their
superfluity, which they are to give to whom they please, among those who
have need of it.” And accordingly, unlike Diana, who says of the maxims
of Vasquez, that they will be “very convenient and agreeable to the rich
and their confessors,” the cardinal, who has no such consolation to
afford them, declares that he has nothing to say to the rich but these
words of Jesus Christ: “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye
of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into heaven;” and to their
confessors: “If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the
ditch.”[242] So indispensable did he deem this obligation! This, too, is
what the fathers and all the saints have laid down as a certain truth.
“There are two cases,” says St. Thomas, “in which we are bound to give
alms as a matter of justice—_ex debito legali_: one, when the poor are
in danger; the other, when we possess superfluous property.” And again:
“The three tenths which the Jews were bound to eat with the poor, have
been augmented under the new law; for Jesus Christ wills that we give to
the poor, not the tenth only, but the whole of our superfluity.” And yet
it does not seem good to Vasquez that we should be obliged to give even
a fragment of our superfluity; such is his complaisance to the rich,
such his hardness to the poor, such his contrariety to those feelings of
charity which teach us to relish the truth contained in the following
words of St. Gregory, harsh as it may sound to the rich of this world:
“When we give the poor what is necessary to them, we are not so much
bestowing on them what is our property, as rendering to them what is
their own; and it may be said to be an act of justice, rather than a
work of mercy.”

It is thus that the saints recommend the rich to share with the poor the
good things of this earth, if they would expect to possess with them the
good things of heaven. While you make it your business to foster in the
breasts of men that ambition which leaves no superfluity to dispose of,
and that avarice which refuses to part with it, the saints have labored
to induce the rich to give up their superfluity, and to convince them
that they would have abundance of it, provided they measured it, not by
the standard of covetousness, which knows no bounds to its cravings, but
by that of piety, which is ingenious in retrenchments, so as to have
wherewith to diffuse itself in the exercise of charity. “We will have a
great deal of superfluity,” says St. Augustine, “if we keep only what is
necessary: but if we seek after vanities, we will never have enough.
Seek, brethren, what is sufficient for the work of God”—that is, for
nature—“and not for what is sufficient for your covetousness,” which is
the work of the devil: “and remember that the superfluities of the rich
are the necessaries of the poor.”

I would fondly trust, fathers, that what I have now said to you may
serve, not only for my vindication—that were a small matter—but also to
make you feel and detest what is corrupt in the maxims of your casuists,
and thus unite us sincerely under the sacred rules of the Gospel,
according to which we must all be judged.

As to the second point, which regards simony, before proceeding to
answer the charges you have advanced against me, I shall begin by
illustrating your doctrine on this subject. Finding yourselves placed in
an awkward dilemma, between the canons of the Church, which impose
dreadful penalties upon simoniacs, on the one hand, and the avarice of
many who pursue this infamous traffic on the other, you have recourse to
your ordinary method, which is to yield to men what they desire, and
give the Almighty only words and shows. For what else does the simoniac
want, but money, in return for his benefice? And yet this is what you
exempt from the charge of simony. And as the name of simony must still
remain standing, and a subject to which it may be ascribed, you have
substituted, in the place of this, an imaginary idea, which never yet
crossed the brain of a simoniac, and would not serve him much though it
did—the idea, namely, that simony lies in estimating the money
considered in itself as highly as the spiritual gift or office
considered in itself. Who would ever take it into his head to compare
things so utterly disproportionate and heterogeneous? And yet, provided
this metaphysical comparison be not drawn, any one may, according to
your authors, give away a benefice, and receive money in return for it,
without being guilty of simony.

Such is the way in which you sport with religion, in order to gratify
the worst passions of men; and yet only see with what gravity your
Father Valentia delivers his rhapsodies in the passage cited in my
letters. He says: “One may give a spiritual for a temporal good in two
ways—first, in the way of prizing the temporal more than the spiritual,
and that would be simony; secondly, in the way of taking the temporal as
the motive and end inducing one to give away the spiritual, but without
prizing the temporal more than the spiritual, and then it is not simony.
And the reason is, that simony consists in receiving something temporal,
as the just price of what is spiritual. If, therefore, the temporal is
sought—_si petatur temporale_—not as the _price_, but only as the
_motive_ determining us to part with the spiritual, it is by no means
simony, even although the possession of the temporal may be principally
intended and expected—_minime erit simonia, etiamsi temporale
principaliter intendatur et expectetur_.” Your redoubtable Sanchez has
been favored with a similar revelation; Escobar quotes him thus: “If one
give a spiritual for a temporal good, not as the _price_, but as a
_motive_ to induce the collator to give it, or as an _acknowledgment_ if
the benefice has been actually received, is that simony? Sanchez assures
us that it is not.” In your Caen Theses of 1644, you say: “It is a
probable opinion, taught by many Catholics, that it is not simony to
exchange a temporal for a spiritual good, when the former is not given
as a price.” And as to Tanner, here is his doctrine, exactly the same
with that of Valentia; and I quote it again to show you how far wrong it
is in you to complain of me for saying that it does not agree with that
of St. Thomas, for he avows it himself in the very passage which I
quoted in my letter: “There is properly and truly no simony,” says he,
“unless when a temporal good is taken as the price of a spiritual; but
when taken merely as the motive for giving the spiritual, or as an
acknowledgment for having received it, this is not simony, at least in
point of conscience.” And again: “The same thing may be said although
the temporal should be regarded as the principal end, and even preferred
to the spiritual; although St. Thomas and others appear to hold the
reverse, inasmuch as they maintain it to be downright simony to exchange
a spiritual for a temporal good, when the temporal is the end of the
transaction.”

Such, then, being your doctrine on simony, as taught by your best
authors, who follow each other very closely in this point, it only
remains now to reply to your charges of misrepresentation. You have
taken no notice of Valentia’s opinion, so that his doctrine stands as it
was before. But you fix on that of Tanner, maintaining that he has
merely decided it to be no simony by divine right; and you would have it
to be believed that, in quoting the passage, I have suppressed these
words, _divine right_. This, fathers, is a most unconscionable trick;
for these words, _divine right_, never existed in that passage. You add
that Tanner declares it to be simony according to _positive right_. But
you are mistaken; he does not say that generally, but only of particular
cases, or, as he expresses it, _in casibus a jure expressis_, by which
he makes an exception to the general rule he had laid down in that
passage, “that it is not simony in point of conscience,” which must
imply that it is not so in point of positive right, unless you would
have Tanner made so impious as to maintain that simony, in point of
positive right, is not simony in point of conscience. But it is easy to
see your drift in mustering up such terms as “divine right, positive
right, natural right, internal and external tribunal, expressed cases,
outward presumption,” and others equally little known; you mean to
escape under this obscurity of language, and make us lose sight of your
aberrations. But, fathers, you shall not escape by these vain artifices;
for I shall put some questions to you so simple, that they will not
admit of coming under your _distinguo_.[243]

I ask you, then, without speaking of “positive rights,” of “outward
presumptions,” or “external tribunals”—I ask if, according to your
authors, a beneficiary would be simoniacal, were he to give a benefice
worth four thousand livres of yearly rent, and to receive ten thousand
francs ready money, not as the price of the benefice, but merely as a
motive inducing him to give it? Answer me plainly, fathers: What must we
make of such a case as this according to your authors? Will not Tanner
tell us decidedly that “this is not simony in point of conscience,
seeing that the temporal good is not the price of the benefice, but only
the motive inducing to dispose of it?” Will not Valentia, will not your
own Theses of Caen, will not Sanchez and Escobar agree in the same
decision, and give the same reason for it? Is anything more necessary to
exculpate that beneficiary from simony? And, whatever might be your
private opinion of the case, durst you deal with that man as a simonist
in your confessionals, when he would be entitled to stop your mouth by
telling you that he acted according to the advice of so many grave
doctors? Confess candidly, then, that, according to your views, that man
would be no simonist; and, having done so, defend the doctrine as you
best can.

Such, fathers, is the true mode of treating questions, in order to
unravel, instead of perplexing them, either by scholastic terms, or, as
you have done in your last charge against me here, by altering the state
of the question. Tanner, you say, has, at any rate, declared that such
an exchange is a great sin; and you blame me for having maliciously
suppressed this circumstance, which, you maintain, “_completely
justifies him_.” But you are wrong again, and that in more ways than
one. For, first, though what you say had been true, it would be nothing
to the point, the question in the passage to which I referred being, not
if it was _sin_, but if it was _simony_. Now, these are two very
different questions. Sin, according to your maxims, obliges only to
confession—simony obliges to restitution; and there are people to whom
these may appear two very different things. You have found expedients
for making confession a very easy affair; but you have not fallen upon
ways and means to make restitution an agreeable one. Allow me to add,
that the case which Tanner charges with sin, is not simply that in which
a spiritual good is exchanged for a temporal, the latter being the
principal end in view, but that in which the party “prizes the temporal
above the spiritual,” which is the imaginary case already spoken of. And
it must be allowed he could not go far wrong in charging such a case as
that with sin, since that man must be either very wicked or very stupid
who, when permitted to exchange the one thing for the other, would not
avoid the sin of the transaction by such a simple process as that of
abstaining from comparing the two things together. Besides, Valentia, in
the place quoted, when treating the question, if it be sinful to give a
spiritual good for a temporal, the latter being the main consideration,
and after producing the reasons given for the affirmative, adds, “_Sed
hoc non videtur mihi satis certum_—But this does not appear to my mind
sufficiently certain.”

Since that time, however, your father, Erade Bille, professor of cases
of conscience at Caen, has decided that there is no sin at all in the
case supposed; for probable opinions, you know, are always in the way of
advancing to maturity.[244] This opinion he maintains in his writings of
1644, against which M. Dupre, doctor and professor at Caen, delivered
that excellent oration, since printed and well known. For though this
Erade Bille confesses that Valentia’s doctrine, adopted by Father
Milhard, and condemned by the Sorbonne, “is contrary to the common
opinion, suspected of simony, and punishable at law when discovered in
practice,” he does not scruple to say that it is a probable opinion, and
consequently sure in point of conscience, and that there is neither
simony nor sin in it. “It is a probable opinion,” he says, “taught by
many Catholic doctors, that there is neither any simony _nor any sin_ in
giving money, or any other temporal thing, for a benefice, either in the
way of acknowledgment, or as a motive, without which it would not be
given, provided it is not given as a price equal to the benefice.” This
is all that could possibly be desired. In fact, according to these
maxims of yours, simony would be so exceedingly rare; that we might
exempt from this sin even Simon Magus himself, who desired to purchase
the Holy Spirit, and is the emblem of those simonists that buy spiritual
things; and Gehazi, who took money for a miracle, and may be regarded as
the prototype of the simonists that sell them. There can be no doubt
that when Simon, as we read in the Acts, “offered the apostles money,
saying, Give me also this power;” he said nothing about buying or
selling, or fixing the price; he did no more than offer the money as a
motive to induce them to give him that spiritual gift; which being,
according to you, no simony at all, he might, had he but been instructed
in your maxims, have escaped the anathema of St. Peter. The same unhappy
ignorance was a great loss to Gehazi, when he was struck with leprosy by
Elisha; for, as he accepted the money from the prince who had been
miraculously cured, simply as an acknowledgment, and not as a price
equivalent to the divine virtue which had effected the miracle, he might
have insisted on the prophet healing him again on pain of mortal sin;
seeing, on this supposition, he would have acted according to the advice
of your grave doctors, who, in such cases, oblige confessors to absolve
their penitents, and to wash them from that spiritual leprosy of which
the bodily disease is the type.

Seriously, fathers, it would be extremely easy to hold you up to
ridicule in this matter, and I am at a loss to know why you expose
yourselves to such treatment. To produce this effect, I have nothing
more to do than simply to quote Escobar, in his “Practice of Simony
according to the Society of Jesus;” “Is it simony when two Churchmen
become mutually pledged thus: Give me your vote for my election as
provincial, and I shall give you mine for your election as prior? By no
means.” Or take another: “It is not simony to get possession of a
benefice by promising a sum of money, when one has no intention of
actually paying the money; for this is merely making a show of simony,
and is as far from being real simony as counterfeit gold is from the
genuine.” By this quirk of conscience, he has contrived means, in the
way of adding swindling to simony, for obtaining benefices without
simony and without money.

But I have no time to dwell longer on the subject, for I must say a word
or two in reply to your third accusation, which refers to the subject of
bankrupts. Nothing can be more gross than the manner in which you have
managed this charge. You rail at me as a libeller in reference to a
sentiment of Lessius, which I did not quote myself, but took from a
passage in Escobar; and therefore, though it were true that Lessius does
not hold the opinion ascribed to him by Escobar, what can be more unfair
than to charge me with the misrepresentation? When I quote Lessius or
others of your authors myself, I am quite prepared to answer for it; but
as Escobar has collected the opinions of twenty-four of your writers, I
beg to ask, if I am bound to guarantee anything beyond the correctness
of my citations from his book? or if I must, in addition, answer for the
fidelity of all his quotations of which I may avail myself? This would
be hardly reasonable; and yet this is precisely the case in the question
before us. I produced in my letter the following passage from Escobar,
and you do not object to the fidelity of my translation: “May the
bankrupt, with a good conscience, retain as much of his property as is
necessary to afford him an honorable maintenance—_ne indecore vivat_? I
answer, with Lessius, that he may—_cum Lessio assero posse_.” You tell
me that Lessius does not hold that opinion. But just consider for a
moment the predicament in which you involve yourselves. If it turns out
that he does hold that opinion, you will be set down as impostors for
having asserted the contrary; and if it is proved that he does not hold
it, Escobar will be the impostor; so it must now of necessity follow,
that one or other of the Society will be convicted of imposture. Only
think what a scandal! You cannot, it would appear, foresee the
consequences of things. You seem to imagine that you have nothing more
to do than to cast aspersions upon people, without considering on whom
they may recoil. Why did you not acquaint Escobar with your objection
before venturing to publish it? He might have given you satisfaction. It
is not so very troublesome to get word from Valladolid, where he is
living in perfect health, and completing his grand work on Moral
Theology, in six volumes, on the first of which I mean to say a few
words by-and-by. They have sent him the first ten letters; you might as
easily have sent him your objection, and I am sure he would have soon
returned you an answer, for he has doubtless seen in Lessius the passage
from which he took the _ne indecore vivat_. Read him yourselves,
fathers, and you will find it word for word, as I have done. Here it is:
“The same thing is apparent from the authorities cited, particularly in
regard to that property which he acquires after his failure, out of
which even the delinquent debtor may retain as much as is necessary for
his honorable maintenance, according to his station of life—_ut non
indecore vivat_. Do you ask if this rule applies to goods which he
possessed at the time of his failure? Such seems to be the judgment of
the doctors.”

I shall not stop here to show how Lessius, to sanction his maxim,
perverts the law that allows bankrupts nothing more than a mere
livelihood, and that makes no provision for “honorable maintenance.” It
is enough to have vindicated Escobar from such an accusation—it is more,
indeed, than what I was in duty bound to do. But you, fathers, have not
done your duty. It still remains for you to answer the passage of
Escobar, whose decisions, by the way, have this advantage, that being
entirely independent of the context, and condensed in little articles,
they are not liable to your distinctions. I quoted the whole of the
passage, in which “bankrupts are permitted to keep their goods, though
unjustly acquired, to provide an honorable maintenance for their
families”—commenting on which in my letters, I exclaim: “Indeed, father!
by what strange kind of charity would you have the ill-gotten property
of a bankrupt appropriated to his own use, instead of that of his lawful
creditors?”[245] This is the question which must be answered; but it is
one that involves you in a sad dilemma, and from which you in vain seek
to escape by altering the state of the question, and quoting other
passages from Lessius, which have no connection with the subject. I ask
you, then, May this maxim of Escobar be followed by bankrupts with a
safe conscience, or no? And take care what you say. If you answer, No,
what becomes of your doctor, and your doctrine of probability? If you
say, Yes—I delate you to the Parliament.[246]

In this predicament I must now leave you, fathers; for my limits will
not permit me to overtake your next accusation, which respects homicide.
This will serve for my next letter, and the rest will follow.

In the mean while, I shall make no remarks on the advertisements which
you have tagged to the end of each of your charges, filled as they are
with scandalous falsehoods. I mean to answer all these in a separate
letter, in which I hope to show the weight due to your calumnies. I am
sorry fathers, that you should have recourse to such desperate
resources. The abusive terms which you heap on me will not clear up our
disputes, nor will your manifold threats hinder me from defending
myself. You think you have power and impunity on your side; and I think
that I have truth and innocence on mine. It is a strange and tedious
war, when violence attempts to vanquish truth. All the efforts of
violence cannot weaken truth, and only serve to give it fresh vigor. All
the lights of truth cannot arrest violence, and only serve to exasperate
it. When force meets force, the weaker must succumb to the stronger;
when argument is opposed to argument, the solid and the convincing
triumphs over the empty and the false; but violence and verity can make
no impression on each other. Let none suppose, however, that the two
are, therefore, equal to each other; for there is this vast difference
between them, that violence has only a certain course to run, limited by
the appointment of Heaven, which overrules its effects to the glory of
the truth which it assails; whereas verity endures forever, and
eventually triumphs over its enemies, being eternal and almighty as God
himself.[247]

-----

Footnote 241:

  Pierre du Moulin is termed by Bayle “one of the most celebrated
  ministers which the Reformed Church in France ever had to boast of.”
  He was born in 1568, and was for some time settled in Paris; but
  having incurred the resentment of Louis XIII., he retired to Sedan in
  1623, where he became a professor in the Protestant University, and
  died, in the ninetieth year of his age, in 1658, two years after the
  time when Pascal wrote. Of his numerous writings, few are known in
  this country, excepting his “Buckler of the Faith,” and his “Anatomy
  of the Mass,” which were translated into English. (Quick’s Synodicon,
  ii., 105.)

Footnote 242:

  De Eleemosyna, c. 6.

Footnote 243:

  See before, page 73.

Footnote 244:

  See before, page 140.

Footnote 245:

  See before, p. 177.

Footnote 246:

  “The Parliament of Paris was originally the court of the kings of
  France, to which they committed the supreme administration of
  justice.” (Robertson’s Charles V., vol. i. 171.)

Footnote 247:

  In most of the French editions, another letter is inserted after this,
  being a refutation of a reply which appeared at the time to Letter
  xii. But as this letter, though well written, was not written by
  Pascal, and as it does not contain anything that would now be
  interesting to the reader, we omit it. Suffice it to say, that the
  reply of the Jesuits consisted, as usual, of the most barefaced
  attempts to fix the charge of misrepresentation on their opponent,
  accusing him of omitting to quote passages from his authors which they
  never wrote, of not answering objections which were never brought
  against him, of not adverting to cases which neither he nor his
  authors dreamt of—in short, like all Jesuitical answers, it is
  anything and everything but a refutation of the charges which have
  been substantiated against them.




                              LETTER XIII.

            TO THE REVEREND FATHERS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.

THE DOCTRINE OF LESSIUS ON HOMICIDE THE SAME WITH THAT OF VALENTIA—HOW
   EASY IT IS TO PASS FROM SPECULATION TO PRACTICE—WHY THE JESUITS HAVE
   RECOURSE TO THIS DISTINCTION, AND HOW LITTLE IT SERVES FOR THEIR
   VINDICATION.


                                                   _September 30, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—I have just seen your last production, in which you
have continued your list of Impostures up to the twentieth, and intimate
that you mean to conclude with this the first part of your accusations
against me, and to proceed to the second, in which you are to adopt a
new mode of defence, by showing that there are other casuists besides
those of your Society who are as lax as yourselves. I now see the
precise number of charges to which I have to reply; and as the fourth,
to which we have now come, relates to homicide, it may be proper, in
answering it, to include the 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and
18th, which refer to the same subject.

In the present letter, therefore, my object shall be to vindicate the
correctness of my quotations from the charges of falsity which you bring
against me. But as you have ventured, in your pamphlets, to assert that
“the sentiments of your authors on murder are agreeable to the decisions
of popes and ecclesiastical laws,” you will compel me, in my next
letter, to confute a statement at once so unfounded and so injurious to
the Church. It is of some importance to show that she is innocent of
your corruptions, in order that heretics may be prevented from taking
advantage of your aberrations, to draw conclusions tending to her
dishonor.[248] And thus, viewing on the one hand your pernicious maxims,
and on the other the canons of the Church which have uniformly condemned
them, people will see, at one glance, what they should shun and what
they should follow.

Your fourth charge turns on a maxim relating to murder, which you say I
have falsely ascribed to Lessius. It is as follows: “That if a man has
received a buffet, he may immediately pursue his enemy, and even return
the blow with the sword, not to avenge himself, but to retrieve his
honor.” This, you say, is the opinion of the casuist Victoria. But this
is nothing to the point. There is no inconsistency in saying, that it is
at once the opinion of Victoria and of Lessius; for Lessius himself says
that it is also held by Navarre and Henriquez, who teach identically the
same doctrine. The only question, then, is, if Lessius holds this view
as well as his brother casuists. You maintain “that Lessius quotes this
opinion solely for the purpose of refuting it, and that I therefore
attribute to him a sentiment which he produces only to overthrow—the
basest and most disgraceful act of which a writer can be guilty.” Now I
maintain, fathers, that he quotes the opinion solely for the purpose of
supporting it. Here is a question of fact, which it will be very easy to
settle. Let us see, then, how you prove your allegation, and you will
see afterwards how I prove mine.

To show that Lessius is not of that opinion, you tell us that he
condemns the practice of it; and in proof of this, you quote one passage
of his (l. 2, c. 9, n. 92), in which he says, in so many words, “I
condemn the practice of it.” I grant that, on looking for these words,
at number 92, to which you refer, they will be found there. But what
will people say, fathers, when they discover, at the same time, that he
is treating in that place of a question totally different from that of
which we are speaking, and that the opinion of which he there says that
he condemns the practice, has no connection with that now in dispute,
but is quite distinct? And yet to be convinced that this is the fact, we
have only to open the book to which you refer, and there we find the
whole subject in its connection as follows: At number 79 he treats the
question, “If it is lawful to kill for a buffet?” and at number 80 he
finishes this matter without a single word of condemnation. Having
disposed of _this_ question, he opens a new one at art. 81, namely, “If
it is lawful to kill for slanders?” and it is when speaking of this
question that he employs the words you have quoted—“I condemn the
practice of it.”

Is it not shameful, fathers, that you should venture to produce these
words to make it be believed that Lessius condemns the opinion that it
is lawful to kill for a buffet? and that, on the ground of this single
proof, you should chuckle over it, as you have done, by saying: “Many
persons of honor in Paris have already discovered this notorious
falsehood by consulting Lessius, and have thus ascertained the degree of
credit due to that slanderer?” Indeed! and is it thus that you abuse the
confidence which those persons of honor repose in you? To show them that
Lessius does not hold a certain opinion, you open the book to them at a
place where he is condemning another opinion; and these persons not
having begun to mistrust your good faith, and never thinking of
examining whether the author speaks in that place of the subject in
dispute, you impose on their credulity. I make no doubt, fathers, that
to shelter yourselves from the guilt of such a scandalous lie, you had
recourse to your doctrine of equivocations; and that, having read the
passage _in a loud voice_, you would say, _in a lower key_, that the
author was speaking there of something else. But I am not so sure
whether this saving clause, which is quite enough to satisfy your
consciences, will be a very satisfactory answer to the just complaint of
those “honorable persons,” when they shall discover that you have
hoodwinked them in this style.

Take care, then, fathers, to prevent them by all means from seeing my
letters; for this is the only method now left you to preserve your
credit for a short time longer. This is not the way in which I deal with
your writings: I send them to all my friends: I wish everybody to see
them. And I verily believe that both of us are in the right for our own
interests; for after having published with such parade this fourth
Imposture, were it once discovered that you have made it up by foisting
in one passage for another, you would be instantly denounced. It will be
easily seen, that if you could have found what you wanted in the passage
where Lessius treated of this matter, you would not have searched for it
elsewhere, and that you had recourse to such a trick only because you
could find nothing in that passage favorable to your purpose.

You would have us believe that we may find in Lessius what you assert,
“that he does _not_ allow that this opinion (that a man may be lawfully
killed for a buffet) is probable in theory;” whereas Lessius distinctly
declares, at number 80: “This opinion, that a man may kill for a buffet,
_is_ probable in theory.” Is not this, word for word, the reverse of
your assertion? And can we sufficiently admire the hardihood with which
you have advanced, in set phrase, the very reverse of a matter of fact!
To your conclusion, from a fabricated passage, that Lessius was _not_ of
that opinion, we have only to place Lessius himself, who, in the genuine
passage, declares that he is of that opinion.

Again, you would have Lessius to say “that he condemns the practice of
it;” and, as I have just observed, there is not in the original a single
word of condemnation; all that he says is: “It appears that it ought not
to be EASILY permitted in practice—_In praxi non videtur FACILE
permittenda_.” Is that, fathers, the language of a man who _condemns_ a
maxim? Would you say that adultery and incest ought not to be _easily
permitted_ in practice? Must we not, on the contrary, conclude, that as
Lessius says no more than that the practice ought not to be easily
permitted, his opinion is, that it may be permitted sometimes, though
rarely? And, as if he had been anxious to apprize everybody when it
might be permitted, and to relieve those who have received affronts from
being troubled with unreasonable scruples, from not knowing on what
occasions they might lawfully kill in practice, he has been at pains to
inform them what they ought to avoid in order to practise the doctrine
with a safe conscience. Mark his words: “It seems,” says he, “that it
ought not to be easily permitted, _because_ of the danger that persons
may act in this matter out of hatred or revenge, or with excess, or that
this may occasion too many murders.” From this it appears that murder is
freely permitted by Lessius, if one avoids the inconveniences referred
to—in other words, if one can act without hatred or revenge, and in
circumstances that may not open the door to a great many murders. To
illustrate the matter, I may give you an example of recent
occurrence—the case of the buffet of Compiègne.[249] You will grant that
the person who received the blow on that occasion has shown by the way
in which he has acted, that he was sufficiently master of the passions
of hatred and revenge. It only remained for him, therefore, to see that
he did not give occasion to too many murders; and you need hardly be
told, fathers, it is such a rare spectacle to find Jesuits bestowing
buffets on the officers of the royal household, that he had no great
reason to fear that a murder committed on this occasion would be likely
to draw many others in its train. You cannot, accordingly, deny that the
Jesuit who figured on that occasion was _killable_ with a safe
conscience, and that the offended party might have converted him into a
practical illustration of the doctrine of Lessius. And very likely,
fathers, this might have been the result had he been educated in your
school, and learnt from Escobar that the man who has received a buffet
is held to be disgraced until he has taken the life of him who insulted
him. But there is ground to believe, that the very different
instructions which he received from a curate, who is no great favorite
of yours, have contributed not a little in this case to save the life of
a Jesuit.

Tell us no more, then, of inconveniences which may, in many instances,
be so easily got over, and in the absence of which, according to
Lessius, murder is permissible even in practice. This is frankly avowed
by your authors, as quoted by Escobar, in his “Practice of Homicide,
according to your Society.” “Is it allowable,” asks this casuist, “to
kill him who has given me a buffet? Lessius says it is permissible in
speculation, though not to be followed in practice—_non consulendum in
praxi_—on account of the risk of hatred, or of murders prejudicial to
the State. Others, however, have judged that, BY AVOIDING THESE
INCONVENIENCES, THIS IS PERMISSIBLE AND SAFE IN PRACTICE—_in praxi
probabilem et tutam judicarunt Henriquez_,” &c. See how your opinions
mount up, by little and little, to the climax of probabilism! The
present one you have at last elevated to this position, by permitting
murder without any distinction between speculation and practice, in the
following terms: “It is lawful, when one has received a buffet, to
return the blow immediately with the sword, not to avenge one’s self,
but to preserve one’s honor.” Such is the decision of your fathers of
Caen in 1644, embodied in their publications produced by the university
before parliament, when they presented their third remonstrance against
your doctrine of homicide, as shown in the book then emitted by them, at
page 339.

Mark, then, fathers, that your own authors have themselves demolished
this absurd distinction between speculative and practical murder—a
distinction which the university treated with ridicule, and the
invention of which is a secret of your policy, which it may now be worth
while to explain. The knowledge of it, besides being necessary to the
right understanding of your 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th charges, is well
calculated, in general, to open up, by little and little, the principles
of that mysterious policy.

In attempting, as you have done, to decide cases of conscience in the
most agreeable and accommodating manner, while you met with some
questions in which religion alone was concerned—such as those of
contrition, penance, love to God, and others only affecting the inner
court of conscience—you encountered another class of cases in which
civil society was interested as well as religion—such as those relating
to usury, bankruptcy, homicide, and the like. And it is truly
distressing to all that love the Church, to observe that, in a vast
number of instances, in which you had only Religion to contend with, you
have violated her laws without reservation, without distinction, and
without compunction; because you knew that it is not here that God
visibly administers his justice. But in those cases in which the State
is interested as well as Religion, your apprehension of man’s justice
has induced you to divide your decisions into two shares. To the first
of these you give the name of _speculation_; under which category
crimes, considered in themselves, without regard to society, but merely
to the law of God, you have permitted, without the least scruple, and in
the way of trampling on the divine law which condemns them. The second
you rank under the denomination of _practice_; and here, considering the
injury which may be done to society, and the presence of magistrates who
look after the public peace, you take care, in order to keep yourselves
on the safe side of the law, not to approve always in practice the
murders and other crimes which you have sanctioned in speculation. Thus,
for example, on the question, “If it be lawful to kill for slanders?”
your authors, Filiutius, Reginald, and others, reply: “This is permitted
in speculation—_ex probabile opinione licet_; but is not to be approved
in _practice_, on account of the great number of murders which might
ensue, and which might injure the State, if all slanderers were to be
killed, _and also because one might be punished in a court of justice
for having killed another for that matter_.” Such is the style in which
your opinions begin to develop themselves, under the shelter of this
distinction, in virtue of which, without doing any sensible injury to
society, you only ruin religion. In acting thus, you consider yourselves
quite safe. You suppose that, on the one hand, the influence you have in
the Church will effectually shield from punishment your assaults on
truth; and that, on the other, the precautions you have taken against
too easily reducing your permissions to practice will save you on the
part of the civil powers, who, not being judges in cases of conscience,
are properly concerned only with the outward practice. Thus an opinion
which would be condemned under the name of practice, comes out quite
safe under the name of speculation. But this basis once established, it
is not difficult to erect on it the rest of your maxims. There is an
infinite distance between God’s prohibition of murder, and your
speculative permission of the crime; but between that permission and the
practice the distance is very small indeed. It only remains to show,
that what is allowable in speculation is also so in practice; and there
can be no want of reasons for this. You have contrived to find them in
far more difficult cases. Would you like to see, fathers, how this may
be managed? I refer you to the reasoning of Escobar, who has distinctly
decided the point in the first of the six volumes of his grand Moral
Theology, of which I have already spoken—a work in which he shows quite
another spirit from that which appears in his former compilation from
your four-and-twenty elders. At that time he thought that there might be
opinions probable in speculation, which might not be safe in practice;
but he has now come to form an opposite judgment, and has, in this, his
latest work, confirmed it. Such is the wonderful growth attained by the
doctrine of probability in general, as well as by every probable opinion
in particular, in the course of time. Attend, then, to what he says: “I
cannot see how it can be that an action which seems allowable in
speculation should not be so likewise in practice; because what may be
done in practice depends on what is found to be lawful in speculation,
and the things differ from each other only as cause and effect.
Speculation is that which determines to action. WHENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT
OPINIONS PROBABLE IN SPECULATION MAY BE FOLLOWED WITH A SAFE CONSCIENCE
IN PRACTICE, and that even with more safety than those which have not
been so well examined as matters of speculation.”[250]

Verily, fathers, your friend Escobar reasons uncommonly well sometimes;
and, in point of fact, there is such a close connection between
speculation and practice, that when the former has once taken root, you
have no difficulty in permitting the latter, without any disguise. A
good illustration of this we have in the permission “to kill for a
buffet,” which, from being a point of simple speculation, was boldly
raised by Lessius into a practice “which ought not easily to be
allowed;” from that promoted by Escobar to the character of “an easy
practice;” and from thence elevated by your fathers of Caen, as we have
seen, without any distinction between theory and practice, into a full
permission. Thus you bring your opinions to their full growth very
gradually. Were they presented all at once in their finished
extravagance, they would beget horror; but this slow imperceptible
progress gradually habituates men to the sight of them, and hides their
offensiveness. And in this way the permission to murder, in itself so
odious both to Church and State, creeps first into the Church, and then
from the Church into the State.

A similar success has attended the opinion of “killing for slander,”
which has now reached the climax of a permission without any
distinction. I should not have stopped to quote my authorities on this
point from your writings, had it not been necessary in order to put down
the effrontery with which you have asserted, twice over, in your
fifteenth Imposture, “that there never was a Jesuit who permitted
killing for slander.” Before making this statement, fathers, you should
have taken care to prevent it from coming under my notice, seeing that
it is so easy for me to answer it. For, not to mention that your fathers
Reginald, Filiutius, and others, have permitted it in speculation, as I
have already shown, and that the principle laid down by Escobar leads us
safely on to the practice, I have to tell you that you have authors who
have permitted it in so many words, and among others Father Hereau in
his public lectures, on the conclusion of which the king put him under
arrest in your house, for having taught, among other errors, that when a
person who has slandered us in the presence of men of honor, continues
to do so after being warned to desist, it is allowable to kill him, not
publicly, indeed, for fear of scandal, but IN A PRIVATE WAY—_sed clam_.

I have had occasion already to mention Father Lamy, and you do not need
to be informed that his doctrine on this subject was censured in 1649 by
the University of Louvain.[251] And yet two months have not elapsed
since your Father Des Bois maintained this very censured doctrine of
Father Lamy, and taught that “it was allowable for a monk to defend the
honor which he acquired by his virtue, EVEN BY KILLING the person who
assails his reputation—_etiam cum morte invasoris_;” which has raised
such a scandal in that town, that the whole of the curés united to
impose silence on him, and to oblige him, by a canonical process, to
retract his doctrine. The case is now pending in the Episcopal court.

What say you now, fathers? Why attempt, after that, to maintain that “no
Jesuit ever held that it was lawful to kill for slander?” Is anything
more necessary to convince you of this than the very opinions of your
fathers which you quote, since they do not condemn murder in
speculation, but only in practice, and that, too, “on account of the
injury that might thereby accrue to the State?” And here I would just
beg to ask, whether the whole matter in dispute between us is not simply
and solely to ascertain if you have or have not subverted the law of God
which condemns murder? The point in question is, not whether you have
injured the commonwealth, but whether you have injured religion. What
purpose, then, can it serve, in a dispute of this kind, to show that you
have spared the State, when you make it apparent, at the same time, that
you have destroyed the faith? Is this not evident from your saying that
the meaning of Reginald, on the question of killing for slanders, is,
“that a private individual has a right to employ that mode of defence,
viewing it simply _in itself_?” I desire nothing beyond this concession
to confute you. “A private individual,” you say, “has a right to employ
that mode of defence” (that is, killing for slanders), “viewing the
thing in itself;” and, consequently, fathers, the law of God, which
forbids us to kill, is nullified by that decision.

It serves no purpose to add, as you have done, “that such a mode is
unlawful and criminal, even according to the law of God, on account of
the murders and disorders which would follow in society, because the law
of God obliges us to have regard to the good of society.” This is to
evade the question: for there are two laws to be observed—one forbidding
us to kill, and another forbidding us to harm society. Reginald has not,
perhaps, broken the law which forbids us to do harm to society; but he
has most certainly violated that which forbids us to kill. Now this is
the only point with which we have to do. I might have shown, besides,
that your other writers, who have permitted these murders in practice,
have subverted the one law as well as the other. But, to proceed, we
have seen that you _sometimes_ forbid doing harm to the State; and you
allege that your design in that is to fulfil the law of God, which
obliges us to consult the interests of society. That may be true, though
it is far from being certain, as you might do the same thing purely from
fear of the civil magistrate. With your permission, then, we shall
scrutinize the real secret of this movement.

Is it not certain, fathers, that if you had really any regard to God,
and if the observance of his law had been the prime and principal object
in your thoughts, this respect would have invariably predominated in all
your leading decisions, and would have engaged you at all times on the
side of religion? But if it turns out, on the contrary, that you
violate, in innumerable instances, the most sacred commands that God has
laid upon men, and that, as in the instances before us, you annihilate
the law of God, which forbids these actions as criminal in themselves,
and that you only scruple to approve of them in practice, from bodily
fear of the civil magistrate, do you not afford us ground to conclude
that you have no respect to God in your apprehensions, and that if you
yield an apparent obedience to his law, in so far as regards the
obligation to do no harm to the State, this is not done out of any
regard to the law itself, but to compass your own ends, as has ever been
the way with politicians of no religion?

What, fathers! will you tell us that, looking simply to the law of God,
which says, “Thou shalt not kill,” we have a right to kill for slanders?
And after having thus trampled on the eternal law of God, do you imagine
that you atone for the scandal you have caused, and can persuade us of
your reverence for him, by adding that you prohibit the practice for
State reasons, and from dread of the civil arm? Is not this, on the
contrary, to raise a fresh scandal?—I mean not by the respect which you
testify for the magistrate; that is not my charge against you, and it is
ridiculous in you to banter, as you have done, on this matter. I blame
you, not for fearing the magistrate, but for fearing none but the
magistrate. And I blame you for this, because it is making God less the
enemy of vice than man. Had you said that to kill for slander was
allowable according to men, but not according to God, that might have
been something more endurable; but when you maintain, that what is too
criminal to be tolerated among men, may yet be innocent and right in the
eyes of that Being who is righteousness itself, what is this but to
declare before the whole world, by a subversion of principle as shocking
in itself as it is alien to the spirit of the saints, that while you can
be braggarts before God, you are cowards before men?

Had you really been anxious to condemn these homicides, you would have
allowed the commandment of God which forbids them to remain intact; and
had you dared at once to permit them, you would have permitted them
openly, in spite of the laws of God and men. But your object being to
permit them imperceptibly, and to cheat the magistrate, who watches over
the public safety, you have gone craftily to work. You separate your
maxims into two portions. On the one side, you hold out “that it is
lawful in speculation to kill a man for slander;”—and nobody thinks of
hindering you from taking a speculative view of matters. On the other
side, you come out with this detached axiom, “that what is permitted in
speculation is also permissible in practice;”—and what concern does
society seem to have in this general and metaphysical-looking
proposition? And thus these two principles, so little suspected, being
embraced in their separate form, the vigilance of the magistrate is
eluded; while it is only necessary to combine the two together, to draw
from them the conclusion which you aim at—namely, that it is lawful in
practice to put a man to death for a simple slander.

It is, indeed, fathers, one of the most subtle tricks of your policy, to
scatter through your publications the maxims which you club together in
your decisions. It is partly in this way that you establish your
doctrine of probabilities, which I have frequently had occasion to
explain. That general principle once established, you advance
propositions harmless enough when viewed apart, but which, when taken in
connection with that pernicious dogma, become positively horrible. An
example of this, which demands an answer, may be found in the 11th page
of your “Impostures,” where you allege that “several famous theologians
have decided that it is lawful to kill a man for a box on the ear.” Now,
it is certain, that if that had been said by a person who did not hold
probabilism, there would be nothing to find fault with in it; it would
in this case amount to no more than a harmless statement, and nothing
could be elicited from it. But you, fathers, and all who hold that
dangerous tenet, “that whatever has been approved by celebrated authors
is probable and safe in conscience,” when _you_ add to this “that
several celebrated authors are of opinion that it is lawful to kill a
man for a box on the ear,” what is this but to put a dagger into the
hand of all Christians, for the purpose of plunging it into the heart of
the first person that insults them, and to assure them that, having the
judgment of so many grave authors on their side, they may do so with a
perfectly safe conscience?

What monstrous species of language is this, which, in announcing that
certain authors hold a detestable opinion, is at the same time giving a
decision in favor of that opinion—which solemnly teaches whatever it
simply tells! We have learnt, fathers, to understand this peculiar
dialect of the Jesuitical school; and it is astonishing that you have
the hardihood to speak it out so freely, for it betrays your sentiments
somewhat too broadly. It convicts you of permitting murder for a buffet,
as often as you repeat that many celebrated authors have maintained that
opinion.

This charge, fathers, you will never be able to repel; nor will you be
much helped out by those passages from Vasquez and Suarez that you
adduce against me, in which they condemn the murders which their
associates have approved. These testimonies, disjoined from the rest of
your doctrine, may hoodwink those who know little about it; but we, who
know better, put your principles and maxims together. You say, then,
that Vasquez condemns murders; but what say you on the other side of the
question, my reverend fathers? Why, “that the probability of one
sentiment does not hinder the probability of the opposite sentiment; and
that it is warrantable to follow the less probable and less safe
opinion, giving up the more probable and more safe one.” What follows
from all this taken in connection, but that we have perfect freedom of
conscience to adopt any one of these conflicting judgments which pleases
us best? And what becomes of all the effect which you fondly anticipate
from your quotations? It evaporates in smoke, for we have no more to do
than to conjoin for your condemnation the maxims which you have
disjoined for your exculpation. Why, then, produce those passages of
your authors which I have not quoted, to qualify those which I have
quoted, as if the one could excuse the other? What right does that give
you to call me an “impostor?” Have I said that all your fathers are
implicated in the same corruptions? Have I not, on the contrary, been at
pains to show that your interest lay in having them of all different
minds, in order to suit all your purposes? Do you wish to kill your
man?—here is Lessius for you. Are you inclined to spare him?—here is
Vasquez. Nobody need go away in ill humor—nobody without the authority
of a grave doctor. Lessius will talk to you like a Heathen on homicide,
and like a Christian, it may be, on charity. Vasquez, again, will
descant like a Heathen on charity, and like a Christian on homicide. But
by means of probabilism, which is held both by Vasquez and Lessius, and
which renders all your opinions common property, they will lend their
opinions to one another, and each will be held bound to absolve those
who have acted according to opinions which each of them has condemned.
It is this very variety, then, that confounds you. Uniformity, even in
evil, would be better than this. Nothing is more contrary to the orders
of St. Ignatius[252] and the first generals of your Society, than this
confused medley of all sorts of opinions, good and bad. I may, perhaps,
enter on this topic at some future period; and it will astonish many to
see how far you have degenerated from the original spirit of your
institution, and that your own generals have foreseen that the
corruption of your doctrine on morals might prove fatal, not only to
your Society, but to the Church universal.[253]

Meanwhile, I repeat that you can derive no advantage from the doctrine
of Vasquez. It would be strange, indeed, if, out of all the Jesuits that
have written on morals, one or two could not be found who may have hit
upon a truth which has been confessed by all Christians. There is no
glory in maintaining the truth, according to the Gospel, that it is
unlawful to kill a man for smiting us on the face; but it is foul shame
to deny it. So far, indeed, from justifying you, nothing tells more
fatally against you than the fact that, having doctors among you who
have told you the truth, you abide not in the truth, but love the
darkness rather than the light. You have been taught by Vasquez that it
is a heathen, and not a Christian, opinion to hold that we may knock
down a man for a blow on the cheek; and that it is subversive both of
the Gospel and of the decalogue to say that we may kill for such a
matter. The most profligate of men will acknowledge as much. And yet you
have allowed Lessius, Escobar, and others, to decide, in the face of
these well-known truths, and in spite of all the laws of God against
manslaughter, that it is quite allowable to kill a man for a buffet!

What purpose, then, can it serve to set this passage of Vasquez over
against the sentiment of Lessius, unless you mean to show that, in the
opinion of Vasquez, Lessius is a “heathen” and a “profligate?” and that,
fathers, is more than I durst have said myself. What else can be deduced
from it than that Lessius “subverts both the Gospel and the decalogue;”
that, at the last day, Vasquez will condemn Lessius on this point, as
Lessius will condemn Vasquez on another; and that all your fathers will
rise up in judgment one against another, mutually condemning each other
for their sad outrages on the law of Jesus Christ?

To this conclusion, then, reverend fathers, must we come at length, that
as your probabilism renders the good opinions of some of your authors
useless to the Church, and useful only to your policy, they merely serve
to betray, by their contrariety, the duplicity of your hearts. This you
have completely unfolded, by telling us, on the one hand, that Vasquez
and Suarez are against homicide, and on the other hand, that many
celebrated authors are for homicide; thus presenting two roads to our
choice, and destroying the simplicity of the Spirit of God, who
denounces his anathema on the deceitful and the double-hearted: “_Væ
duplici corde, et ingredienti duabus viis!_—Woe be to the double hearts,
and the sinner that goeth two ways!”[254]

-----

Footnote 248:

  The Church of Rome has not left those whom she terms heretics so
  doubtfully to “take advantage” of Jesuitical aberrations. She has done
  everything in her power to _give_ them this advantage. By identifying
  herself, at various times, with the Jesuits, she has virtually stamped
  their doctrines with her approbation.

Footnote 249:

  The reference here is to an affray which made a considerable noise at
  the time, between Father Borin, a Jesuit, and M. Guille, one of the
  officers of the royal kitchen, in the College of Compiègne. A quarrel
  having taken place, the enraged Jesuit struck the royal cook in the
  face while he was in the act of preparing dinner, by his majesty’s
  order, for Christina, queen of Sweden, in honor, perhaps, of her
  conversion to the Romish faith. (Nicole, iv. 37)

Footnote 250:

  In Prælog., n. 15.

Footnote 251:

  The doctrines advanced by Lamy are too gross for repetition. Suffice
  it to say, that they sanctioned the murder not only of the slanderer,
  but of the person who might tell tales against a religious order, of
  one who might stand in the way of another enjoying a legacy or a
  benefice, and even of one whom a priest might have robbed of her
  honor, if she threatened to rob him of his. These horrid maxims were
  condemned by civil tribunals and theological faculties; but the
  Jesuits persisted in justifying them. (Nicole, Notes, iv. 41, &c.)

Footnote 252:

  It is very sad to see Pascal reduced to the necessity of saluting the
  founder of the sect which he held up to the scorn of the world, as
  _Saint Ignatius_! Ignatius Loyola was a native of Spain, and born in
  1491. At first a soldier of fortune, he was disabled from service by a
  wound in the leg at the siege of Pampeluna, and his brain having
  become heated by reading romances and legendary tales, he took it into
  his head to become the Don Quixote of the Virgin, and wage war against
  all heretics and infidels. By indomitable perseverance he succeeded in
  establishing the sect calling itself “the Society of Jesus.” This
  ignorant fanatic, who, in more enlightened times, would have been
  consigned to a mad-house, was beatified by one pope, and canonized, or
  put into the list of saints, by another! Jansenius, in his
  correspondence with St. Cyran, indignantly complains of pope Gregory
  XV. for having canonized Ignatius and Xavier. (Leydecker, Hist.
  Jansen. 23.)

Footnote 253:

  This is rather a singular fact, and applies only to one of the
  Society’s generals, viz., Vitelleschi, who, in a circular letter,
  addressed, January 1617, to the Company, much to his own honor,
  strongly recommended a purer morality, and denounced probabilism. But,
  says Nicole, the Jesuits did not profit by his good advice. (Nicole,
  iv., p. 33.) It is true, however, that the Jesuits, during this
  century, had lost sight of the original design of their order, and of
  all the ascetic rules of their founders, Ignatius and Aquaviva. “The
  spirit which once animated them had fallen before the temptations of
  the world, and their sole endeavor now was to make themselves
  necessary to mankind, let the means be what they might.” (Ranke’s
  Hist. of the Popes, iii. 139.)

Footnote 254:

  Ecclesiasticus (Apocrypha), ii. 12.




                              LETTER XIV.

                 TO THE REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS.

IN WHICH THE MAXIMS OF THE JESUITS ON MURDER ARE REFUTED FROM THE
   FATHERS—SOME OF THEIR CALUMNIES ANSWERED BY THE WAY—AND THEIR
   DOCTRINE COMPARED WITH THE FORMS OBSERVED IN CRIMINAL TRIALS.


                                                     _October 23, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—If I had merely to reply to the three remaining
charges on the subject of homicide, there would be no need for a long
discourse, and you will see them refuted presently in a few words; but
as I think it of much more importance to inspire the public with a
horror at your opinions on this subject, than to justify the fidelity of
my quotations, I shall be obliged to devote the greater part of this
letter to the refutation of your maxims, to show you how far you have
departed from the sentiments of the Church, and even of nature itself.
The permissions of murder, which you have granted in such a variety of
cases, render it very apparent, that you have so far forgotten the law
of God, and quenched the light of nature, as to require to be remanded
to the simplest principles of religion and of common sense.

What can be a plainer dictate of nature than that “no private individual
has a right to take away the life of another?” “So well are we taught
this of ourselves,” says St. Chrysostom, “that God, in giving the
commandment not to kill, did not add as a reason that homicide was an
evil; because,” says that father, “the law supposes that nature has
taught us that truth already.” Accordingly, this commandment has been
binding on men in all ages. The Gospel has confirmed the requirement of
the law; and the decalogue only renewed the command which man had
received from God before the law, in the person of Noah, from whom all
men are descended. On that renovation of the world, God said to the
patriarch: “At the hand of man, and at the hand of every man’s brother,
will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall
his blood be shed; for man is made in the image of God.” (Gen. ix. 5,
6.) This general prohibition deprives man of all power over the life of
man. And so exclusively has the Almighty reserved this prerogative in
his own hand, that, in accordance with Christianity, which is at utter
variance with the false maxims of Paganism, man has no power even over
his own life. But, as it has seemed good to his providence to take human
society under his protection, and to punish the evil-doers that give it
disturbance, he has himself established laws for depriving criminals of
life; and thus those executions which, without his sanction, would be
punishable outrages, become, by virtue of his authority, which is the
rule of justice, praiseworthy penalties. St. Augustine takes an
admirable view of this subject. “God,” he says, “has himself qualified
this general prohibition against manslaughter, both by the laws which he
has instituted for the capital punishment of malefactors, and by the
special orders which he has sometimes issued to put to death certain
individuals. And when death is inflicted in such cases, it is not man
that kills, but God, of whom man may be considered as only the
instrument, in the same way as a sword in the hand of him that wields
it. But, these instances excepted, whosoever kills incurs the guilt of
murder.”[255]

It appears, then, fathers, that the right of taking away the life of man
is the sole prerogative of God, and that having ordained laws for
executing death on criminals, he has deputed kings or commonwealths as
the depositaries of that power—a truth which St. Paul teaches us, when,
speaking of the right which sovereigns possess over the lives of their
subjects, he deduces it from Heaven in these words: “He beareth not the
sword in vain; for he is the minister of God to execute wrath upon him
that doeth evil.” (Rom. xiii. 4.) But as it is God who has put this
power into their hands, so he requires them to exercise it in the same
manner as he does himself; in other words, with perfect justice;
according to what St. Paul observes in the same passage: “Rulers are not
a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou, then, not be afraid
of the power? Do that which is good: for he is the minister of God to
thee for good.” And this restriction, so far from lowering their
prerogative, exalts it, on the contrary, more than ever; for it is thus
assimilated to that of God, who has no power to do evil, but is
all-powerful to do good; and it is thus distinguished from that of
devils, who are impotent in that which is good, and powerful only for
evil. There is this difference only to be observed betwixt the King of
Heaven and earthly sovereigns, that God, being justice and wisdom
itself, may inflict death instantaneously on whomsoever and in
whatsoever manner he pleases; for, besides his being the sovereign Lord
of human life, it is certain that he never takes it away either without
cause or without judgment, because he is as incapable of injustice as he
is of error. Earthly potentates, however, are not at liberty to act in
this manner; for, though the ministers of God, still they are but men,
and not gods. They may be misguided by evil counsels, irritated by false
suspicions, transported by passion, and hence they find themselves
obliged to have recourse, in their turn also, to human agency, and
appoint magistrates in their dominions, to whom they delegate their
power, that the authority which God has bestowed on them may be employed
solely for the purpose for which they received it.

I hope you understand, then, fathers, that to avoid the crime of murder,
we must act at once by the authority of God, and according to the
justice of God; and that when these two conditions are not united, sin
is contracted; whether it be by taking away life with his authority, but
without his justice; or by taking it away with justice, but without his
authority. From this indispensable connection it follows, according to
St. Augustine, “that he who, without proper authority, kills a criminal,
becomes a criminal himself, chiefly for this reason, that he usurps an
authority which God has not given him;” and on the other hand,
magistrates, though they possess this authority, are nevertheless
chargeable with murder, if, contrary to the laws which they are bound to
follow, they inflict death on an innocent man.

Such are the principles of public safety and tranquillity which have
been admitted at all times and in all places, and on the basis of which
all legislators, sacred and profane, from the beginning of the world,
have founded their laws. Even Heathens have never ventured to make an
exception to this rule, unless in cases where there was no other way of
escaping the loss of chastity or life, when they conceived, as Cicero
tells us, “that the law itself seemed to put its weapons into the hands
of those who were placed in such an emergency.”

But with this single exception, which has nothing to do with my present
purpose, that such a law was ever enacted, authorizing or tolerating, as
you have done, the practice of putting a man to death, to atone for an
insult, or to avoid the loss of honor or property, where life is not in
danger at the same time; that, fathers, is what I deny was ever done,
even by infidels. They have, on the contrary, most expressly forbidden
the practice. The law of the Twelve Tables of Rome bore, “that it is
unlawful to kill a robber in the day-time, when he does not defend
himself with arms;” which, indeed, had been prohibited long before in
the 22d chapter of Exodus. And the law _Furem_, in the _Lex Cornelia_,
which is borrowed from Ulpian, forbids the killing of robbers even by
night, if they do not put us in danger of our lives.[256]

Tell us now, fathers, what authority you have to permit what all laws,
human as well as divine, have forbidden; and who gave Lessius a right to
use the following language? “The book of Exodus forbids the killing of
thieves by day, when they do not employ arms in their defence; and in a
court of justice, punishment is inflicted on those who kill under these
circumstances. _In conscience_, however, no blame can be attached to
this practice, when a person is not sure of being able otherwise to
recover his stolen goods, or entertains a doubt on the subject, as Sotus
expresses it; for he is not obliged to run the risk of losing any part
of his property merely to save the life of a robber. The same privilege
extends even to clergymen.”[257] Such extraordinary assurance! The law
of Moses punishes those who kill a thief when he does not threaten our
lives, and the law of the Gospel, according to you, will absolve them!
What, fathers! has Jesus Christ come to destroy the law, and not to
fulfil it? “The civil judge,” says Lessius, “would inflict punishment on
those who should kill under such circumstances; but no blame can be
attached to the deed in conscience.” Must we conclude, then, that the
morality of Jesus Christ is more sanguinary, and less the enemy of
murder, than that of Pagans, from whom our judges have borrowed their
civil laws which condemn that crime? Do Christians make more account of
the good things of this earth, and less account of human life, than
infidels and idolaters? On what principle do you proceed, fathers?
Assuredly not upon any law that ever was enacted either by God or man—on
nothing, indeed, but this extraordinary reasoning: “The laws,” say you,
“permit us to defend ourselves against robbers, and to repel force by
force; self-defence, therefore, being permitted, it follows that murder,
without which self-defence is often impracticable, may be considered as
permitted also.”

It is false, fathers, that because self-defence is allowed, murder may
be allowed also. This barbarous method of self-vindication lies at the
root of all your errors, and has been justly stigmatized by the Faculty
of Louvain, in their censure of the doctrine of your friend Father Lamy,
as “_a murderous defence_—_defensio occisiva_.” I maintain that the laws
recognize such a wide difference between murder and self-defence, that
in those very cases in which the latter is sanctioned, they have made a
provision against murder, when the person is in no danger of his life.
Read the words, fathers, as they run in the same passage of Cujas: “It
is lawful to repulse the person who comes to invade our property; but
_we are not permitted to kill him_.” And again: “If any should threaten
to strike us, and not to deprive us of life, it is quite allowable to
repulse him; but _it is against all law to put him to death_.”

Who, then, has given you a right to say, as Molina, Reginald, Filiutius,
Escobar, Lessius, and others among you, have said, “that it is lawful to
kill the man who offers to strike us a blow?” or, “that it is lawful to
take the life of one who means to insult us, by the common consent of
all the casuists,” as Lessius says. By what authority do you, who are
mere private individuals, confer upon other private individuals, not
excepting clergymen, this right of killing and slaying? And how dare you
usurp the power of life and death, which belongs essentially to none but
God, and which is the most glorious mark of sovereign authority? These
are the points that demand explanation; and yet you conceive that you
have furnished a triumphant reply to the whole, by simply remarking, in
your thirteenth Imposture, “that the value for which Molina permits us
to kill a thief, who flies without having done us any violence, is not
so small as I have said, and that it must be a much larger sum than six
ducats!” How extremely silly! Pray, fathers, where would you have the
price to be fixed? At fifteen or sixteen ducats? Do not suppose that
this will produce any abatement in my accusations. At all events, you
cannot make it exceed the value of a horse; for Lessius is clearly of
opinion, “that we may lawfully kill the thief that runs off with our
horse.”[258] But I must tell you, moreover, that I was perfectly correct
when I said that Molina estimates the value of the thief’s life at six
ducats; and, if you will not take it upon my word, we shall refer it to
an umpire, to whom you cannot object. The person whom I fix upon for
this office is your own Father Reginald, who, in his explanation of the
same passage of Molina (l. 28, n. 68), declares that “Molina there
DETERMINES the sum for which it is not allowable to kill at three, or
four, or five ducats.” And thus, fathers, I shall have Reginald in
addition to Molina, to bear me out.

It will be equally easy for me to refute your fourteenth Imposture,
touching Molina’s permission to “kill a thief who offers to rob us of a
crown.” This palpable fact is attested by Escobar, who tells us “that
Molina has regularly determined the sum for which it is lawful to take
away life, at one crown.”[259] And all you have to lay to my charge in
the fourteenth imposture is, that I have suppressed the last words of
this passage, namely, “that in this matter every one ought to study the
moderation of a just self-defence.” Why do you not complain that Escobar
has also omitted to mention these words? But how little tact you have
about you! You imagine that nobody understands what you mean by
self-defence. Don’t we know that it is to employ “_a murderous
defence_?” You would persuade us that Molina meant to say, that if a
person, in defending his crown, finds himself in danger of his life, he
is then at liberty to kill his assailant, in self-preservation. If that
were true, fathers, why should Molina say in the same place, that “in
this matter he was of a contrary judgment from Carrer and Bald,” who
give permission to kill in self-preservation? I repeat, therefore, that
his plain meaning is, that provided the person can save his crown
without killing the thief, he ought not to kill him; but that, if he
cannot secure his object without shedding blood, even though he should
run no risk of his own life, as in the case of the robber being unarmed,
he is permitted to take up arms and kill the man, in order to save his
crown; and in so doing, according to him, the person does not transgress
“the moderation of a just defence.” To show you that I am in the right,
just allow him to explain himself: “One does not exceed the moderation
of a just defence,” says he, “when he takes up arms against a thief who
has none, or employs weapons which give him the advantage over his
assailant. I know there are some who are of a contrary judgment; but I
do not approve of their opinion, even in the external tribunal.”[260]

Thus, fathers, it is unquestionable that your authors have given
permission to kill in defence of property and honor, though life should
be perfectly free from danger. And it is upon the same principle that
they authorize duelling, as I have shown by a great variety of passages
from their writings, to which you have made no reply. You have
animadverted in your writings only on a single passage taken from Father
Layman, who sanctions the above practice, “when otherwise a person would
be in danger of sacrificing his fortune or his honor;” and here you
accuse me with having suppressed what he adds, “that such a case happens
very rarely.” You astonish me, fathers: these are really curious
impostures you charge me withal. You talk as if the question were,
Whether that is a rare case? when the real question is, If, in such a
case, duelling is lawful? These are two very different questions.
Layman, in the quality of a casuist, ought to judge whether duelling is
lawful in the case supposed; and he declares that it is. We can judge
without his assistance, whether the case be a rare one; and we can tell
him that it is a very ordinary one. Or, if you prefer the testimony of
your good friend Diana, he will tell you that “the case is exceedingly
common.”[261] But be it rare or not, and let it be granted that Layman
follows in this the example of Navarre, a circumstance on which you lay
so much stress, is it not shameful that he should consent to such an
opinion as that, to preserve a false honor, it is lawful in conscience
to accept of a challenge, in the face of the edicts of all Christian
states, and of all the canons of the Church, while, in support of these
diabolical maxims, you can produce neither laws, nor canons, nor
authorities from Scripture, or from the fathers, nor the example of a
single saint, nor, in short, anything but the following impious
syllogism: “Honor is more than life: it is allowable to kill in defence
of life; therefore it is allowable to kill in defence of honor!” What,
fathers! because the depravity of men disposes them to prefer that
factitious honor before the life which God hath given them to be devoted
to his service, must they be permitted to murder one another for its
preservation? To love that honor more than life, is in itself a heinous
evil; and yet this vicious passion, which, when proposed as the end of
our conduct, is enough to tarnish the holiest of actions, is considered
by you capable of sanctifying the most criminal of them!

What a subversion of all principle is here, fathers! And who does not
see to what atrocious excesses it may lead? It is obvious, indeed, that
it will ultimately lead to the commission of murder for the most
trifling things imaginable, when one’s honor is considered to be staked
for their preservation—murder, I venture to say, even _for an apple_!
You might complain of me, fathers, for drawing sanguinary inferences
from your doctrine with a malicious intent, were I not fortunately
supported by the authority of the grave Lessius, who makes the following
observation, in number 68: “It is not allowable to take life for an
article of small value, such as for a crown or _for an apple_—_aut pro
pomo_—unless it would be deemed dishonorable to lose it. In this case,
one may recover the article, and even, if necessary, _kill the
aggressor_; for this is not so much defending one’s property as
retrieving one’s honor.” This is plain speaking, fathers; and, just to
crown your doctrine with a maxim which includes all the rest, allow me
to quote the following from Father Hereau, who has taken it from
Lessius: “The right of self-defence extends to whatever is necessary to
protect ourselves from all injury.”

What strange consequences does this inhuman principle involve! and how
imperative is the obligation laid upon all, and especially upon those in
public stations, to set their face against it! Not the general good
alone, but their own personal interest should engage them to see well to
it; for the casuists of your school whom I have cited in my letters,
extend their permissions to kill far enough to reach even them. Factious
men, who dread the punishment of their outrages, which never appear to
them in a criminal light, easily persuade themselves that they are the
victims of violent oppression, and will be led to believe at the same
time, “that the right of self-defence extends to whatever is necessary
to protect themselves from all injury.” And thus, relieved from
contending against the checks of conscience, which stifle the greater
number of crimes at their birth, their only anxiety will be to surmount
external obstacles.

I shall say no more on this subject, fathers; nor shall I dwell on the
other murders, still more odious and important to governments, which you
sanction, and of which Lessius, in common with many others of your
authors, treats in the most unreserved manner.[262] It was to be wished
that these horrible maxims had never found their way out of hell; and
that the devil, who is their original author, had never discovered men
sufficiently devoted to his will to publish them among Christians.[263]

From all that I have hitherto said, it is easy to judge what a
contrariety there is betwixt the licentiousness of your opinions and the
severity of civil laws, not even excepting those of heathens. How much
more apparent must the contrast be with ecclesiastical laws, which must
be incomparably more holy than any other, since it is the Church alone
that knows and possesses the true holiness! Accordingly, this chaste
spouse of the Son of God, who, in imitation of her heavenly husband, can
shed her own blood for others, but never the blood of others for
herself, entertains a horror at the crime of murder altogether singular,
and proportioned to the peculiar illumination which God has vouchsafed
to bestow upon her. She views man, not simply as man, but as the image
of the God whom she adores. She feels for every one of the race a holy
respect, which imparts to him, in her eyes, a venerable character, as
redeemed by an infinite price, to be made the temple of the living God.
And therefore she considers the death of a man, slain without the
authority of his Maker, not as murder only, but as sacrilege, by which
she is deprived of one of her members; for whether he be a believer or
an unbeliever, she uniformly looks upon him, if not as one, at least as
capable of becoming one, of her own children.[264]

Such, fathers, are the holy reasons which, ever since the time that God
became man for the redemption of men, have rendered their condition an
object of such consequence to the Church, that she uniformly punishes
the crime of homicide, not only as destructive to them, but as one of
the grossest outrages that can possibly be perpetrated against God. In
proof of this I shall quote some examples, not from the idea that all
the severities to which I refer ought to be kept up (for I am aware that
the Church may alter the arrangement of such exterior discipline), but
to demonstrate her immutable spirit upon this subject. The penances
which she ordains for murder may differ according to the diversity of
the times, but no change of time can ever effect an alteration of the
horror with which she regards the crime itself.

For a long time the Church refused to be reconciled, till the very hour
of death, to those who had been guilty of wilful murder, as those are to
whom you give your sanction. The celebrated Council of Ancyra adjudged
them to penance during their whole lifetime; and, subsequently, the
Church deemed it an act of sufficient indulgence to reduce that term to
a great many years. But, still more effectually to deter Christians from
wilful murder, she has visited with most severe punishment even those
acts which have been committed through inadvertence, as may be seen in
St. Basil, in St. Gregory of Nyssen, and in the decretals of Popes
Zachary and Alexander II. The canons quoted by Isaac, bishop of Langres
(tr. 2. 13), “ordain seven years of penance for having killed another in
self-defence.” And we find St. Hildebert, bishop of Mans, replying to
Yves de Chartres, “that he was right in interdicting for life a priest
who had, in self-defence, killed a robber with a stone.”

After this, you cannot have the assurance to persist in saying that your
decisions are agreeable to the spirit or the canons of the Church. I
defy you to show one of them that permits us to kill solely in defence
of our property (for I speak not of cases in which one may be called
upon to defend his life—_se suaqae liberando_): your own authors, and,
among the rest, Father Lamy, confess that no such canon can be found.
“There is no authority,” he says, “human or divine, which gives an
express permission to kill a robber who makes no resistance.” And yet
this is what you permit most expressly. I defy you to show one of them
that permits us to kill in vindication of honor, for a buffet, for an
affront, or for a slander. I defy you to show one of them that permits
the killing of witnesses, judges, or magistrates, whatever injustice we
may apprehend from them. The spirit of the church is diametrically
opposite to these seditious maxims, opening the door to insurrections to
which the mob is naturally prone enough already. She has invariably
taught her children that they ought not to render evil for evil; that
they ought to give place unto wrath; to make no resistance to violence;
to give unto every one his due—honor, tribute, submission; to obey
magistrates and superiors, even though they should be unjust, because we
ought always to respect in them the power of that God who has placed
them over us. She forbids them, still more strongly than is done by the
civil law, to take justice into their own hands; and it is in her spirit
that Christian kings decline doing so in cases of high treason, and
remit the criminals charged with this grave offence into the hands of
the judges, that they may be punished according to the laws and the
forms of justice, which in this matter exhibit a contrast to your mode
of management, so striking and complete that it may well make you blush
for shame.

As my discourse has taken this turn, I beg you to follow the comparison
which I shall now draw between the style in which you would dispose of
your enemies, and that in which the judges of the land dispose of
criminals. Everybody knows, fathers, that no private individual has a
right to demand the death of another individual; and that though a man
should have ruined us, maimed our body, burnt our house, murdered our
father, and was prepared, moreover, to assassinate ourselves, or ruin
our character, our private demand for the death of that person would not
be listened to in a court of justice. Public officers have been
appointed for that purpose, who make the demand in the name of the king,
or rather, I would say, in the name of God. Now, do you conceive,
fathers, that Christian legislators have established this regulation out
of mere show and grimace? Is it not evident that their object was to
harmonize the laws of the state with those of the Church, and thus
prevent the external practice of justice from clashing with the
sentiments which all Christians are bound to cherish in their hearts? It
is easy to see how this, which forms the commencement of a civil
process, must stagger you; its subsequent procedure absolutely
overwhelms you.

Suppose, then, fathers, that these official persons have demanded the
death of the man who has committed all the above mentioned crimes, what
is to be done next? Will they instantly plunge a dagger in his breast?
No, fathers; the life of man is too important to be thus disposed of;
they go to work with more decency; the laws have committed it, not to
all sorts of persons, but exclusively to the judges, whose probity and
competency have been duly tried. And is one judge sufficient to condemn
a man to death? No; it requires seven at the very least; and of these
seven there must not be one who has been injured by the criminal, lest
his judgment should be warped or corrupted by passion. You are aware
also, fathers, that the more effectually to secure the purity of their
minds, they devote the hours of the morning to these functions. Such is
the care taken to prepare them for the solemn action of devoting a
fellow-creature to death; in performing which they occupy the place of
God, whose ministers they are, appointed to condemn such only as have
incurred his condemnation.

For the same reason, to act as faithful administrators of the divine
power of taking away human life, they are bound to form their judgment
solely according to the depositions of the witnesses, and according to
all the other forms prescribed to them; after which they can pronounce
conscientiously only according to law, and can judge worthy of death
those only whom the law condemns to that penalty. And then, fathers, if
the command of God obliges them to deliver over to punishment the bodies
of the unhappy culprits, the same divine statute binds them to look
after the interests of their guilty souls, and binds them the more to
this just because they are guilty; so that they are not delivered up to
execution till after they have been afforded the means of providing for
their consciences.[265] All this is quite fair and innocent; and yet,
such is the abhorrence of the Church to blood, that she judges those to
be incapable of ministering at her altars who have borne any share in
passing or executing a sentence of death, accompanied though it be with
these religious circumstances; from which we may easily conceive what
idea the Church entertains of murder.

Such, then, being the manner in which human life is disposed of by the
legal forms of justice, let us now see how you dispose of it. According
to your modern system of legislation, there is but one judge, and that
judge is no other than the offended party. He is at once the judge, the
party, and the executioner. He himself demands from himself the death of
his enemy; he condemns him, he executes him on the spot; and, without
the least respect either for the soul or the body of his brother, he
murders and damns him for whom Jesus Christ died; and all this for the
sake of avoiding a blow on the cheek, or a slander, or an offensive
word, or some other offence of a similar nature, for which, if a
magistrate, in the exercise of legitimate authority, were condemning any
to die, he would himself be impeached; for, in such cases, the laws are
very far indeed from condemning any to death. In one word, to crown the
whole of this extravagance, the person who kills his neighbor in this
style, without authority, and in the face of all law, contracts no sin
and commits no disorder, though he should be religious, and even a
priest! Where are we, fathers? Are these really religious, and priests,
who talk in this manner? Are they Christians? are they Turks? are they
men? or are they demons? And are these “the mysteries revealed by the
Lamb to his Society?” or are they not rather abominations suggested by
the Dragon to those who take part with him?

To come to the point with you, fathers, whom do you wish to be taken
for?—for the children of the Gospel, or for the enemies of the Gospel?
You must be ranged either on the one side or on the other; for there is
no medium here. “He that is not with Jesus Christ is against him.” Into
these two classes all mankind are divided. There are, according to St.
Augustine, two peoples and two worlds, scattered abroad over the earth.
There is the world of the children of God, who form one body, of which
Jesus Christ is the king and the head; and there is the world at enmity
with God, of which the devil is the king and the head. Hence Jesus
Christ is called the King and God of the world, because he has
everywhere his subjects and worshippers; and hence the devil is also
termed in Scripture the prince of this world, and the god of this world,
because he has everywhere his agents and his slaves. Jesus Christ has
imposed upon the Church, which is his empire, such laws as he, in his
eternal wisdom, was pleased to ordain; and the devil has imposed on the
world, which is his kingdom, such laws as he chose to establish. Jesus
Christ has associated honor with suffering; the devil with not
suffering. Jesus Christ has told those who are smitten on the one cheek
to turn the other also; and the devil has told those who are threatened
with a buffet to kill the man that would do them such an injury. Jesus
Christ pronounces those happy who share in his reproach; and the devil
declares those to be unhappy who lie under ignominy. Jesus Christ says,
Woe unto you when men shall speak well of you! and the devil says, Woe
unto those of whom the world does not speak with esteem!

Judge then, fathers, to which of these kingdoms you belong. You have
heard the language of the city of peace, the mystical Jerusalem; and you
have heard the language of the city of confusion, which Scripture terms
“the spiritual Sodom.” Which of these two languages do you understand?
which of them do you speak? Those who are on the side of Jesus Christ
have, as St. Paul teaches us, the same mind which was also in him; and
those who are the children of the devil—_ex patre diabolo_—who has been
a murderer from the beginning, according to the saying of Jesus Christ,
follow the maxims of the devil. Let us hear, therefore, the language of
your school. I put this question to your doctors: When a person has
given me a blow on the cheek, ought I rather to submit to the injury
than kill the offender? or may I not kill the man in order to escape the
affront? Kill him by all means—it is quite lawful! exclaim, in one
breath, Lessius, Molina, Escobar, Reginald, Filiutius, Baldelle, and
other Jesuits. Is that the language of Jesus Christ? One question more:
Would I lose my honor by tolerating a box on the ear, without killing
the person that gave it? “Can there be a doubt,” cries Escobar, “that so
long as a man suffers another to live who has given him a buffet, that
man remains without honor?” Yes, fathers, without that honor which the
devil transfuses, from his own proud spirit into that of his proud
children. This is the honor which has ever been the idol of
worldly-minded men. For the preservation of this false glory, of which
the god of this world is the appropriate dispenser, they sacrifice their
lives by yielding to the madness of duelling; their honor, by exposing
themselves to ignominious punishments; and their salvation, by involving
themselves in the peril of damnation—a peril which, according to the
canons of the Church, deprives them even of Christian burial. We have
reason to thank God, however, for having enlightened the mind of our
monarch with ideas much purer than those of your theology. His edicts
bearing so severely on this subject, have not made duelling a crime—they
only punish the crime which is inseparable from duelling. He has
checked, by the dread of his rigid justice, those who were not
restrained by the fear of the justice of God; and his piety has taught
him that the honor of Christians consists in their observance of the
mandates of Heaven and the rules of Christianity, and not in the pursuit
of that phantom which, airy and unsubstantial as it is, you hold to be a
legitimate apology for murder. Your murderous decisions being thus
universally detested, it is highly advisable that you should now change
your sentiments, if not from religious principle, at least from motives
of policy. Prevent, fathers, by a spontaneous condemnation of these
inhuman dogmas, the melancholy consequences which may result from them,
and for which you will be responsible. And to impress your minds with a
deeper horror at homicide, remember that the first crime of fallen man
was a murder, committed on the person of the first holy man; that the
greatest crime was a murder, perpetrated on the person of the King of
saints; and that of all crimes, murder is the only one which involves in
a common destruction the Church and the state, nature and religion.

                  *       *       *       *       *

I have just seen the answer of your apologist to my Thirteenth Letter;
but if he has nothing better to produce in the shape of a reply to that
letter, which obviates the greater part of his objections, he will not
deserve a rejoinder. I am sorry to see him perpetually digressing from
his subject, to indulge in rancorous abuse both of the living and the
dead. But, in order to gain some credit to the stories with which you
have furnished him, you should not have made him publicly disavow a fact
so notorious as that of the buffet of Compiègne.[266] Certain it is,
fathers, from the deposition of the injured party, that he received upon
his cheek a blow from the hand of a Jesuit; and all that your friends
have been able to do for you has been to raise a doubt whether he
received the blow with the back or the palm of the hand, and to discuss
the question whether a stroke on the cheek with the back of the hand can
be properly denominated a buffet. I know not to what tribunal it belongs
to decide this point; but shall content myself, in the mean time, with
believing that it was, to say the very least, _a probable buffet_. This
gets me off with a safe conscience.

-----

Footnote 255:

  City of God, book i. ch. 28.

Footnote 256:

  See Cujas, tit. dig. de just. et jur. ad l. 3.

Footnote 257:

  L. 2, c. 9, n. 66, 72.

Footnote 258:

  L. ii., c. 9, n. 74.

Footnote 259:

  Treat. i., examp. 7, n. 44.

Footnote 260:

  In casuistical divinity, a distinction is drawn between the internal
  and the external tribunal, or _forum_, as it is called. The internal
  tribunal, or the _forum poli_, is that of conscience or the judgment
  formed of actions according to the law of God. The external tribunal,
  or the _forum soli_, is that of human society, or the judgment of
  actions in the estimation of men, and according to civil law. (Voet.
  Disp. Theol., iv. 62.)

Footnote 261:

  Part. 5, tr. 19, misc. 2, resol. 99.

Footnote 262:

  Doubts 4th and 10th.

Footnote 263:

  “I am happy,” says Nicole, in a note, “to state here an important
  fact, which confers the highest honor on M. Arnauld. A work of
  considerable size was sent him before going to press, in which there
  was a collection of all the authorities, from Jesuit writers,
  prejudicial to the life of kings and princes. That celebrated doctor
  prevented the impression of the work, on the ground that it was
  dangerous for the life of monarchs and for the honor of the Jesuits
  that it should ever see the light; and, in fact, the work was never
  printed. Some other writer, less delicate than M. Arnauld, has
  published something similar, in a work entitled _Recueil de Pieces
  concernant l’ Histoire de la Compagnie de Jesus, par le P. Jouvenci_.”

Footnote 264:

  Surely Pascal is here describing the Church of Christ as she ought to
  be, and not the Church of Rome as she existed in 1656, at the very
  time when she was urging, sanctioning, and exulting in the bloody
  barbarities perpetrated in her name on the poor Piedmontese; or the
  same Church as she appeared in 1572, when one of her popes ordered a
  medal to be struck in honor of the Bartholomew massacre, with the
  inscription, “_Strages Hugonotarum_—The massacre of the Hugunots!” Of
  what Church, if not the Romish, can it be said with truth, that, “in
  her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that
  were slain on the earth?”

Footnote 265:

  _Providing for their consciences_—that is, for the relief of
  conscience, by confessing to a priest, and receiving absolution.

Footnote 266:

  See Letter xiii., p. 264.




                            LETTER XV.[267]

                 TO THE REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS.

SHOWING THAT THE JESUITS FIRST EXCLUDE CALUMNY FROM THEIR CATALOGUE OF
   CRIMES, AND THEN EMPLOY IT IN DENOUNCING THEIR OPPONENTS.


                                                    _November 25, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—As your scurrilities are daily increasing, and as you
are employing them in the merciless abuse of all pious persons opposed
to your errors, I feel myself obliged, for their sake and that of the
Church, to bring out that grand secret of your policy, which I promised
to disclose some time ago, in order that all may know, through means of
your own maxims, what degree of credit is due to your calumnious
accusations.

I am aware that those who are not very well acquainted with you, are at
a great loss what to think on this subject, as they find themselves
under the painful necessity, either of believing the incredible crimes
with which you charge your opponents, or (what is equally incredible) of
setting you down as slanderers. “Indeed!” they exclaim, “were these
things not true, would clergymen publish them to the world—would they
debauch their consciences and damn themselves by venting such libels?”
Such is their way of reasoning, and thus it is that the palpable proof
of your falsifications coming into collision with their opinion of your
honesty, their minds hang in a state of suspense between the evidence of
truth which they cannot gainsay, and the demands of charity which they
would not violate. It follows, that since their high esteem for you is
the only thing that prevents them from discrediting your calumnies, if
we can succeed in convincing them that you have quite a different idea
of calumny from that which they suppose you to have, and that you
actually believe that in blackening and defaming your adversaries you
are working out your own salvation, there can be little question that
the weight of truth will determine them immediately to pay no regard to
your accusations. This, fathers, will be the subject of the present
letter.

My design is, not simply to show that your writings are full of
calumnies: I mean to go a step beyond this. It is quite possible for a
person to say a number of false things believing them to be true; but
the character of a liar implies the intention to tell lies. Now I
undertake to prove, fathers, that it is your deliberate intention to
tell lies, and that it is both knowingly and purposely that you load
your opponents with crimes of which you know them to be innocent,
because you believe that you may do so without falling from a state of
grace. Though you doubtless know this point of your morality as well as
I do, this need not prevent me from telling you about it; which I shall
do, were it for no other purpose than to convince all men of its
existence, by showing them that I can maintain it to your face, while
you cannot have the assurance to disavow it, without confirming, by that
very disavowment, the charge which I bring against you.

The doctrine to which I allude is so common in your schools, that you
have maintained it not only in your books, but, such is your assurance,
even in your public theses; as, for example, in those delivered at
Louvain in the year 1645, where it occurs in the following terms: “What
is it but a venial sin to calumniate and forge false accusations to ruin
the credit of those who speak evil of us?”[268] So settled is this point
among you, that if any one dare to oppose it, you treat him as a
blockhead and a hare-brained idiot. Such was the way in which you
treated Father Quiroga, the German Capuchin, when he was so unfortunate
as to impugn the doctrine. The poor man was instantly attacked by
Dicastille, one of your fraternity; and the following is a specimen of
the manner in which he manages the dispute: “A certain rueful-visaged,
bare-footed, cowled friar—_cucullatus gymnopoda_—whom I do not choose to
name, had the boldness to denounce this opinion, among some women and
ignorant people, and to allege that it was scandalous and pernicious
against all good manners, hostile to the peace of states and societies,
and, in short, contrary to the judgment not only of all Catholic
doctors, but of all true Catholics. But in opposition to him I
maintained, as I do still, that calumny, when employed against a
calumniator, though it should be a falsehood, is not a mortal sin,
either against justice or charity: and to prove the point, I referred
him to the whole body of our fathers, and to whole universities,
exclusively composed of them, whom I had consulted on the subject; and
among others the reverend Father John Gans, confessor to the emperor;
the reverend Father Daniel Bastele, confessor to the archduke Leopold;
Father Henri, who was preceptor to these two princes; all the public and
ordinary professors of the university of Vienna” (wholly composed of
Jesuits); “all the professors of the university of Gratz” (all Jesuits);
“all the professors of the university of Prague” (where Jesuits are the
masters);—“from all of whom I have in my possession approbations of my
opinions, written and signed with their own hands; besides having on my
side the reverend Father Panalossa, a Jesuit, preacher to the emperor
and the king of Spain; Father Pilliceroli, a Jesuit, and many others,
who had all judged this opinion to be probable, before our dispute
began.”[269] You perceive, fathers, that there are few of your opinions
which you have been at more pains to establish than the present, as
indeed there were few of them of which you stood more in need. For this
reason, doubtless, you have authenticated it so well, that the casuists
appeal to it as an indubitable principle. “There can be no doubt,” says
Caramuel, “that it is a probable opinion that we contract no mortal sin
by calumniating another, in order to preserve our own reputation. For it
is maintained by more than twenty grave doctors, by Gaspard Hurtado, and
Dicastille, Jesuits, &c.; so that, were this doctrine not probable, it
would be difficult to find any one such in the whole compass of
theology.”

Wretched indeed must that theology be, and rotten to the very core,
which, unless it has been decided to be safe in conscience to defame our
neighbor’s character to preserve our own, can hardly boast of a safe
decision on any other point! How natural is it, fathers, that those who
hold this principle should occasionally put it in practice! The corrupt
propensity of mankind leans so strongly in that direction of itself,
that the obstacle of conscience once being removed, it would be folly to
suppose that it will not burst forth with all its native impetuosity. If
you desire an example of this, Caramuel will furnish you with one that
occurs in the same passage: “This maxim of Father Dicastille,” he says,
“having been communicated by a German countess to the daughters of the
empress, the belief thus impressed on their minds that calumny was only
a venial sin, gave rise in the course of a few days to such an immense
number of false and scandalous tales, that the whole court was thrown
into a flame and filled with alarm. It is easy, indeed, to conceive what
a fine use these ladies would make of the new light they had acquired.
Matters proceeded to such a length, that it was found necessary to call
in the assistance of a worthy Capuchin friar, a man of exemplary life,
called Father Quiroga” (the very man whom Dicastille rails at so
bitterly), “who assured them that the maxim was most pernicious,
especially among women, and was at the greatest pains to prevail upon
the empress to abolish the practice of it entirely.” We have no reason,
therefore, to be surprised at the bad effects of this doctrine; on the
contrary, the wonder would be, if it had failed to produce them.
Self-love is always ready enough to whisper in our ear, when we are
attacked, that we suffer wrongfully; and more particularly in your case,
fathers, whom vanity has blinded so egregiously as to make you believe
that to wound the honor of your Society, is to wound that of the Church.
There would have been good ground to look on it as something miraculous,
if you had _not_ reduced this maxim to practice. Those who do not know
you are ready to say, How could these good fathers slander their
enemies, when they cannot do so but at the expense of their own
salvation? But if they knew you better, the question would be, How could
these good fathers forego the advantage of decrying their enemies, when
they have it in their power to do so without hazarding their salvation?
Let none, therefore, henceforth be surprised to find the Jesuits
calumniators; they can exercise this vocation with a safe conscience;
there is no obstacle in heaven or on earth to prevent them. In virtue of
the credit they have acquired in the world, they can practise defamation
without dreading the justice of mortals; and, on the strength of their
self-assumed authority in matters of conscience, they have invented
maxims for enabling them to do it without any fear of the justice of
God.

This, fathers, is the fertile source of your base slanders. On this
principle was Father Brisacier led to scatter his calumnies about him,
with such zeal as to draw down on his head the censure of the late
Archbishop of Paris. Actuated by the same motives, Father D’Anjou
launched his invectives from the pulpit of the Church of St. Benedict in
Paris, on the 8th of March, 1655, against those honorable gentlemen who
were intrusted with the charitable funds raised for the poor of Picardy
and Champagne, to which they themselves had largely contributed; and,
uttering a base falsehood, calculated (if your slanders had been
considered worthy of any credit) to dry up the stream of that charity,
he had the assurance to say, “that he knew, from good authority, that
certain persons had diverted that money from its proper use, to employ
it against the Church and the State;” a calumny which obliged the curate
of the parish, who is a doctor of the Sorbonne, to mount the pulpit the
very next day, in order to give it the lie direct. To the same source
must be traced the conduct of your Father Crasset, who preached calumny
at such a furious rate in Orleans that the archbishop of that place was
under the necessity of interdicting him as a public slanderer. In his
mandate, dated the 9th of September last, his lordship declares, “That
whereas he had been informed that Brother Jean Crasset, priest of the
Society of Jesus, had delivered from the pulpit a discourse filled with
falsehoods and calumnies against the ecclesiastics of this city, falsely
and maliciously charging them with maintaining impious and heretical
propositions, such as, That the commandments of God are impracticable;
that internal grace is irresistible; that Jesus Christ did not die for
all men; and others of a similar kind, condemned by Innocent X.: he
therefore hereby interdicts the aforesaid Crasset from preaching in his
diocese, and forbids all his people to hear him, on pain of mortal
disobedience.” The above, fathers, is your ordinary accusation, and
generally among the first that you bring against all whom it is your
interest to denounce. And although you should find it as impossible to
substantiate the charge against any of them, as Father Crasset did in
the case of the clergy of Orleans, your peace of conscience will not be
in the least disturbed on that account; for you believe that this mode
of calumniating your adversaries is permitted you with such certainty,
that you have no scruple to avow it in the most public manner, and in
the face of a whole city.

A remarkable proof of this may be seen in the dispute you had with M.
Puys, curate of St. Nisier at Lyons; and the story exhibits so complete
an illustration of your spirit, that I shall take the liberty of
relating some of its leading circumstances. You know, fathers, that, in
the year 1649, M. Puys translated into French an excellent book, written
by another Capuchin friar, “On the duty which Christians owe to their
own parishes, against those that would lead them away from them,”
without using a single invective, or pointing to any monk or any order
of monks in particular. Your fathers, however, were pleased to put the
cap on their own heads; and without any respect to an aged pastor, a
judge in the Primacy of France, and a man who was held in the highest
esteem by the whole city, Father Alby wrote a furious tract against him,
which you sold in your own church upon Assumption-day; in which book,
among other various charges, he accused him of having “made himself
scandalous by his gallantries,” described him as suspected of having no
religion, as a heretic, excommunicated, and, in short, worthy of the
stake. To this M. Puys made a reply; and Father Alby, in a second
publication, supported his former allegations. Now, fathers, is it not a
clear point, either that you were calumniators, or that you believed all
that you alleged against that worthy priest to be true; and that, on
this latter assumption, it became you to see him purified from all these
abominations before judging him worthy of your friendship? Let us see,
then, what happened at the accommodation of the dispute, which took
place in the presence of a great number of the principal inhabitants of
the town, whose names will be found at the foot of the page,[270]
exactly as they are set down in the instrument drawn up on the 25th of
September, 1650. Before all these witnesses M. Puys made a declaration,
which was neither more nor less than this: “That what he had written was
not directed against the fathers of the Society of Jesus; that he had
spoken in general of those who alienated the faithful from their
parishes, without meaning by that to attack the Society; and that so far
from having such an intention, the Society was the object of his esteem
and affection.” By virtue of these words alone, without either
retractation or absolution, M. Puys recovered, all at once, from his
apostasy, his scandals, and his excommunication; and Father Alby
immediately thereafter addressed him in the following express terms:
“Sir, it was in consequence of my believing that you meant to attack the
Society to which I have the honor to belong, that I was induced to take
up the pen in its defence; and I considered that the mode of reply which
I adopted was _such as I was permitted to employ_. But, on a better
understanding of your intention, I am now free to declare, that _there
is nothing in your work_ to prevent me from regarding you as a man of
genius, enlightened in judgment, profound and _orthodox_ in doctrine,
and _irreproachable_ in manners; in one word, as a pastor worthy of your
Church. It is with much pleasure that I make this declaration, and I beg
these gentlemen to remember what I have now said.”

They do remember it, fathers; and, allow me to add, they were more
scandalized by the reconciliation than by the quarrel. For who can fail
to admire this speech of Father Alby? He does not say that he retracts,
in consequence of having learnt that a change had taken place in the
faith and manners of M. Puys, but solely because, _having understood
that he had no intention of attacking your Society_, there was nothing
further to prevent him from regarding the author as a good Catholic. He
did not then believe him to be actually a heretic! And yet, after
having, contrary to his conviction, accused him of this crime, he will
not acknowledge he was in the wrong, but has the hardihood to say, that
he considered the method he adopted to be “such as he was _permitted_ to
employ!”

What can you possibly mean, fathers, by so publicly avowing the fact,
that you measure the faith and the virtue of men only by the sentiments
they entertain towards your Society? Had you no apprehension of making
yourselves pass, by your own acknowledgment, as a band of swindlers and
slanderers? What, fathers! must the same individual, without undergoing
any personal transformation, but simply according as you judge him to
have honored or assailed your community, be “pious” or “impious,”
“irreproachable” or “excommunicated,” “a pastor worthy of the Church” or
“worthy of the stake;” in short, “a Catholic” or “a heretic?” To attack
your Society and to be a heretic, are, therefore, in your language,
convertible terms! An odd sort of heresy this, fathers! And so it would
appear, that when we see many good Catholics branded, in your writings,
by the name of heretics, it means nothing more than that _you think they
attack you_! It is well, fathers, that we understand this strange
dialect, according to which there can be no doubt that I must be a great
heretic. It is in _this_ sense, then, that you so often favor me with
this appellation! Your sole reason for cutting me off from the Church
is, because you conceive that my letters have done you harm; and,
accordingly, all that I have to do, in order to become a good Catholic,
is either to approve of your extravagant morality, or to convince you
that my sole aim in exposing it has been your advantage. The former I
could not do without renouncing every sentiment of piety that I ever
possessed; and the latter you will be slow to acknowledge till you are
well cured of your errors. Thus am I involved in heresy, after a very
singular fashion; for, the purity of my faith being of no avail for my
exculpation, I have no means of escaping from the charge, except either
by turning traitor to my own conscience, or by reforming yours. Till one
or other of these events happen, I must remain a reprobate and a
slanderer; and, let me be ever so faithful in my citations from your
writings, you will go about crying everywhere, “What an instrument of
the devil must that man be, to impute to us things of which there is not
the least mark or vestige to be found in our books!” And, by doing so,
you will only be acting in conformity with your fixed maxim and your
ordinary practice: to such latitude does your privilege of telling lies
extend! Allow me to give you an example of this, which I select on
purpose: it will give me an opportunity of replying, at the same time,
to your ninth Imposture: for, in truth, they only deserve to be refuted
in passing.

About ten or twelve years ago, you were accused of holding that maxim of
Father Bauny, “that it is permissible to seek directly (_primo et per
se_) a proximate occasion of sin, for the spiritual or temporal good of
ourselves or our neighbor” (tr. 4, q. 14); as an example of which, he
observes, “It is allowable to visit infamous places, for the purpose of
converting abandoned females, even although the practice should be very
likely to lead into sin, as in the case of one who has found from
experience that he has frequently yielded to their temptations.” What
answer did your Father Caussin give to this charge in the year 1644?
“Just let any one look at the passage in Father Bauny,” said he, “let
him peruse the page, the margins, the preface, the appendix, in short,
the whole book from beginning to end, and he will not discover the
slightest vestige of such a sentence, which could only enter into the
mind of a man totally devoid of conscience, and could hardly have been
forged by any other but an instrument of Satan.”[271] Father Pintereau
talks in the same style: “That man must be lost to all conscience who
would teach so detestable a doctrine; but he must be worse than a devil
who attributes it to Father Bauny. Reader, there is not a single trace
or vestige of it in the whole of his book.”[272] Who would not believe
that persons talking in this tone have good reason to complain, and that
Father Bauny has, in very deed, been misrepresented? Have you ever
asserted anything against me in stronger terms? And, after such a solemn
asseveration, that “there was not a single trace or vestige of it in the
whole book,” who would imagine that the passage is to be found, word for
word, in the place referred to?

Truly, fathers, if this be the means of securing your reputation, so
long as you remain unanswered, it is also, unfortunately, the means of
destroying it forever, so soon as an answer makes its appearance. For so
certain is it that you told a lie at the period before mentioned, that
you make no scruple of acknowledging, in your apologies of the present
day, that the maxim in question is to be found in the very place which
had been quoted; and what is most extraordinary, the same maxim which,
twelve years ago, was “detestable,” has now become so innocent, that in
your ninth Imposture (p. 10) you accuse me of “ignorance and malice, in
quarrelling with Father Bauny for an opinion which has not been rejected
in the School.” What an advantage it is, fathers, to have to do with
people that deal in contradictions! I need not the aid of any but
yourselves to confute you; for I have only two things to show—first,
That the maxim in dispute is a worthless one; and, secondly, That it
belongs to Father Bauny; and I can prove both by your own confession. In
1644, you confessed that it was “detestable;” and, in 1656, you avow
that it is Father Bauny’s. This double acknowledgment completely
justifies me, fathers; but it does more, it discovers the spirit of your
policy. For, tell me, pray, what is the end you propose to yourselves in
your writings? Is it to speak with honesty? No, fathers; that cannot be,
since your defences destroy each other. Is it to follow the truth of the
faith? As little can this be your end; since, according to your own
showing, you authorize a “detestable” maxim. But, be it observed, that
while you said the maxim was “detestable,” you denied, at the same time,
that it was the property of Father Bauny, and so he was innocent; and
when you now acknowledge it to be his, you maintain, at the same time,
that it is a good maxim, and so he is innocent still. The innocence of
this monk, therefore, being the only thing common to your two answers,
it is obvious that this was the sole end which you aimed at in putting
them forth; and that, when you say of one and the same maxim, that it is
in a certain book, and that it is not; that it is a good maxim, and that
it is a bad one; your sole object is to white-wash some one or other of
your fraternity; judging in the matter, not according to the truth,
which never changes, but according to your own interest, which is
varying every hour. Can I say more than this? You perceive that it
amounts to a demonstration; but it is far from being a singular
instance; and, to omit a multitude of examples of the same thing, I
believe you will be contented with my quoting only one more.

You have been charged, at different times, with another proposition of
the same Father Bauny, namely, “That absolution ought to be neither
denied nor deferred in the case of those who live in the habits of sin
against the law of God, of nature, and of the Church, although there
should be no apparent prospect of future amendment—_etsi emendationis
futuræ spes nulla appareat_.”[273] Now, with regard to this maxim, I beg
you to tell me, fathers, which of the apologies that have been made for
it is most to your liking; whether that of Father Pintereau, or that of
Father Brisacier, both of your Society, who have defended Father Bauny,
in your _two different_ modes—the one by condemning the proposition, but
disavowing it to be Father Bauny’s; the other by allowing it to be
Father Bauny’s, but vindicating the proposition? Listen, then, to their
respective deliverances. Here comes that of Father Pintereau (p. 8): “I
know not what can be called a transgression of all the bounds of
modesty, a step beyond all ordinary impudence, if the imputation to
Father Bauny of so damnable a doctrine is not worthy of that
designation. Judge, reader, of the baseness of that calumny; see what
sort of creatures the Jesuits have to deal with; and say, if the author
of so foul a slander does not deserve to be regarded from henceforth as
the interpreter of the father of lies.” Now for Father Brisacier: “It is
true, Father Bauny says what you allege.” (That gives the lie direct to
Father Pintereau, plain enough.) “But,” adds he, in defence of Father
Bauny, “if you who find so much fault with this sentiment, wait, when a
penitent lies at your feet, till his guardian angel find security for
his rights in the inheritance of heaven; if you wait till God the
Father, swear by himself that David told a lie, when he said, by the
Holy Ghost, that ‘all men are liars,’ fallible and perfidious; if you
wait till the penitent be no longer a liar, no longer frail and
changeable, no longer a sinner, like other men; if you wait, I say, till
then, you will never apply the blood of Jesus Christ to a single
soul.”[274]

What do you really think now, fathers, of these impious and extravagant
expressions? According to them, if we would wait “till there be some
hope of amendment” in sinners before granting their absolution, we must
wait “till God the Father swear by himself,” that they will never fall
into sin any more! What, fathers! is no distinction to be made between
_hope_ and _certainty_? How injurious is it to the grace of Jesus
Christ, to maintain that it is so impossible for Christians ever to
escape from crimes against the laws of God, nature, and the Church, that
such a thing cannot be looked for, without supposing “that the Holy
Ghost has told a lie;” and if absolution is not granted to those who
give no hope of amendment, the blood of Jesus Christ will be useless,
forsooth, and “would never be applied to a single soul!” To what a sad
pass have you come, fathers, by this extravagant desire of upholding the
glory of your authors, when you can find only two ways of justifying
them—by imposture or by impiety; and when the most innocent mode by
which you can extricate yourselves, is by the barefaced denial of facts
as patient as the light of day!

This may perhaps account for your having recourse so frequently to that
very convenient practice. But this does not complete the sum of your
accomplishments in the art of self-defence. To render your opponents
odious, you have had recourse to the forging of documents, such as that
_Letter of a Minister to M. Arnauld_, which you circulated through all
Paris, to induce the belief that the work on Frequent Communion, which
had been approved by so many bishops and doctors, but which, to say the
truth, was rather against you, had been concocted through secret
intelligence with the ministers of Charenton.[275] At other times, you
attribute to your adversaries writings full of impiety, such as the
_Circular Letter of the Jansenists_, the absurd style of which renders
the fraud too gross to be swallowed, and palpably betrays the malice of
your Father Meynier, who has the impudence to make use of it for
supporting his foulest slanders. Sometimes, again, you will quote books
which were never in existence, such as _The Constitution of the Holy
Sacrament_, from which you extract passages, fabricated at pleasure, and
calculated to make the hair on the heads of certain good simple people,
who have no idea of the effrontery with which you can invent and
propagate falsehoods, actually to bristle with horror. There is not,
indeed, a single species of calumny which you have not put into
requisition; nor is it possible that the maxim which excuses the vice
could have been lodged in better hands.

But those sorts of slander to which we have adverted are rather too
easily discredited; and, accordingly, you have others of a more subtle
character, in which you abstain from specifying particulars, in order to
preclude your opponents from getting any hold, or finding any means of
reply; as, for example, when Father Brisacier says that “his enemies are
guilty of abominable crimes, _which he does not choose to mention_.”
Would you not think it were impossible to prove a charge so vague as
this to be a calumny? An able man, however, has found out the secret of
it; and it is a Capuchin again, fathers. You are unlucky in Capuchins,
as times now go; and I foresee that you may be equally so some other
time in Benedictines. The name of this Capuchin is Father Valerien, of
the house of the Counts of Magnis. You shall hear, by this brief
narrative, how he answered your calumnies. He had happily succeeded in
converting Prince Ernest, the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinsfelt.[276] Your
fathers, however, seized, as it would appear, with some chagrin at
seeing a sovereign prince converted without their having had any hand in
it, immediately wrote a book against the friar (for good men are
everywhere the objects of your persecution), in which, by falsifying one
of his passages, they ascribed to him an heretical doctrine. They also
circulated a letter against him, in which they said: “Ah, we have such
things to disclose” (without mentioning what) “as will gall you to the
quick! If you don’t take care, we shall be forced to inform the pope and
the cardinals about it.” This manœuvre was pretty well executed; and I
doubt not, fathers, but you may speak in the same style of me; but take
warning from the manner in which the friar answered in his book, which
was printed last year at Prague (p. 112, &c.): “What shall I do,” he
says, “to counteract these vague and indefinite insinuations? How shall
I refute charges which have never been specified? Here, however, is my
plan. I declare, loudly and publicly, to those who have threatened me,
that they are notorious slanderers, and most impudent liars, if they do
not discover these crimes before the whole world. Come forth, then, mine
accusers! and publish your lies upon the house tops, in place of telling
them in the ear, and keeping yourselves out of harm’s way by telling
them in the ear. Some may think this a scandalous way of managing the
dispute. It was scandalous, I grant, to impute to me such a crime as
heresy, and to fix upon me the suspicion of many others besides; but, by
asserting my innocence, I am merely applying the proper remedy to the
scandal already in existence.”

Truly, fathers, never were your reverences more roughly handled, and
never was a poor man more completely vindicated. Since you have made no
reply to such a peremptory challenge, it must be concluded that you are
unable to discover the slightest shadow of criminality against him. You
have had very awkward scrapes to get through occasionally; but
experience has made you nothing the wiser. For, some time after this
happened, you attacked the same individual in a similar strain, upon
another subject; and he defended himself after the same spirited manner,
as follows: “This class of men, who have become an intolerable nuisance
to the whole of Christendom, aspire, under the pretext of good works, to
dignities and domination, by perverting to their own ends almost all
laws, human and divine, natural and revealed. They gain over to their
side, by their doctrine, by the force of fear, or of persuasion, the
great ones of the earth, whose authority they abuse for the purpose of
accomplishing their detestable intrigues. Meanwhile their enterprises,
criminal as they are, are neither punished nor suppressed; on the
contrary, they are rewarded; and the villains go about them with as
little fear or remorse as if they were doing God service. Everybody is
aware of the fact I have now stated; everybody speaks of it with
execration; but few are found capable of opposing a despotism so
powerful. This, however, is what I have done. I have already curbed
their insolence; and, by the same means, I shall curb it again. I
declare, then, that _they are most impudent liars_—MENTIRIS
IMPUDENTISSIME. If the charges they have brought against me be true, let
them prove it; otherwise, they stand convicted of falsehood, aggravated
by the grossest effrontery. Their procedure in this case will show who
has the right upon his side. I desire all men to take a particular
observation of it; and beg to remark, in the mean time, that this
precious cabal, who will not suffer the most trifling charge which they
can possibly repel to lie upon them, made a show of enduring, with great
patience, those from which they cannot vindicate themselves, and
conceal, under a counterfeit virtue, their real impotency. My object,
therefore, in provoking their modesty, by this sharp retort, is to let
the plainest people understand, that if my enemies hold their peace,
their forbearance must be ascribed, not to the meekness of their
natures, but to the power of a guilty conscience.” He concludes with the
following sentence: “These gentry, whose history is well known
throughout the whole world, are so glaringly iniquitous in their
measures, and have become so insolent in their impunity, that if I did
not detest their conduct, and publicly express my detestation too, not
merely for my own vindication, but to guard the simple against its
seducing influence, I must have renounced my allegiance to Jesus Christ
and his Church.”

Reverend fathers, there is no room for tergiversation. You must pass for
convicted slanderers, and take comfort in your old maxim, that calumny
is no crime. This honest friar has discovered the secret of shutting
your mouths; and it must be employed on all occasions when you accuse
people without proof. We have only to reply to each slander as it
appears, in the words of the Capuchin, _Mentiris impudentissime_—“You
are most impudent liars.” For instance, what better answer does Father
Brisacier deserve when he says of his opponents that they are “the gates
of hell; the devil’s bishops; persons devoid of faith, hope, and
charity; the builders of Antichrist’s exchequer;” adding, “I say this of
him, not by way of insult, but from deep conviction of its truth?” Who
would be at the pains to demonstrate that he is not “a gate of hell,”
and that he has no concern with “the building up of Antichrist’s
exchequer?”

In like manner, what reply is due to all the vague speeches of this sort
which are to be found in your books and advertisements on my letters;
such as the following, for example: “That restitutions have been
converted to private uses, and thereby creditors have been reduced to
beggary; that bags of money have been offered to learned monks, who
declined the bribe; that benefices are conferred for the purpose of
disseminating heresies against the faith; that pensioners are kept in
the houses of the most eminent churchmen, and in the courts of
sovereigns; that I also am a pensioner of Port-Royal; and that, before
writing my letters, I had composed _romances_”—I, who never read one in
my life, and who do not know so much as the names of those which your
apologist has published? What can be said in reply to all this, fathers,
if you do not mention the names of all these persons you refer to, their
words, the time, and the place, except—_Mentiris impudentissime_? You
should either be silent altogether, or relate and prove all the
circumstances, as I did when I told you the anecdotes of Father Alby and
John d’Alba. Otherwise, you will hurt none but yourselves. Your numerous
fables might, perhaps, have done you some service, before your
principles were known; but now that the whole has been brought to light,
when you begin to whisper as usual, “A man of honor, who desired us to
conceal his name, has told us some horrible stories of these same
people”—you will be cut short at once, and reminded of the Capuchin’s
_Mentiris impudentissime_. Too long by far have you been permitted to
deceive the world, and to abuse the confidence which men were ready to
place in your calumnious accusations. It is high time to redeem the
reputation of the multitudes whom you have defamed. For what innocence
can be so generally known, as not to suffer some injury from the daring
aspersions of a body of men scattered over the face of the earth, and
who, under religious habits, conceal minds so utterly irreligious, that
they perpetrate crimes like calumny, not in opposition to, but in strict
accordance with, their moral maxims? I cannot, therefore, be blamed for
destroying the credit which might have been awarded you; seeing it must
be allowed to be a much greater act of justice to restore to the victims
of your obloquy the character which they did not deserve to lose, than
to leave you in the possession of a reputation for sincerity which you
do not deserve to enjoy. And as the one could not be done without the
other, how important was it to show you up to the world as you really
are! In this letter I have commenced the exhibition; but it will require
some time to complete it. Published it shall be, fathers, and all your
policy will be inadequate to save you from the disgrace; for the efforts
which you may make to avert the blow, will only serve to convince the
most obtuse observers that you were terrified out of your wits, and
that, your consciences anticipating the charges I had to bring against
you, you have put every oar in the water to prevent the discovery.

-----

Footnote 267:

  Pascal was assisted by M. Arnauld in the preparation of this letter.
  (Nicole, iv. 162.)

Footnote 268:

  Quidni non nisi veniale sit, detrahentes autoritatem magnam, tibi
  noxiam, falso crimine elidere?

Footnote 269:

  Dicastillus, De Just., l. 2, tr. 2, disp. 12, n. 404.

Footnote 270:

  M. De Ville, Vicar-General of M., the Cardinal of Lyons; M. Scarron,
  Canon and Curate of St. Paul; M. Margat, Chanter; MM. Bouvand, Seve,
  Aubert, and Dervien, Canons of St. Nisier; M. de Gué, President of the
  Treasurers of France; M. Groslier, Provost of the Merchants; M. de
  Flèchre, President and Lieutenant-General; MM. De Boissart, De St.
  Romain, and De Bartoly, gentlemen; M. Bourgeois, the King’s First
  Advocate in the Court of the Treasurers of France; MM. De Cotton,
  father and son; and M. Boniel; who have all signed the original copy
  of the Declaration, along with M. Puys and Father Alby.

Footnote 271:

  Apology for the Society of Jesus, p. 128.

Footnote 272:

  First Part, p. 24.

Footnote 273:

  Tr. 4, q. 22, p. 100.

Footnote 274:

  Part. 4, p. 21

Footnote 275:

  That is, the Protestant ministers of Paris, who are called “the
  ministers of Charenton,” from the village of that name near Paris,
  where they had their place of worship. The Protestants of Paris were
  forbidden to hold meetings in the city, and were compelled to travel
  five leagues to a place of worship, till 1606, when they were
  _graciously_ permitted to erect their temple at Charenton, about two
  leagues from the city! (Benoit, Hist. de l’Edit. de Nantes, i. 435.)
  Even there they were harassed by the bigoted populace, and at last
  “the ministers of Charenton,” among whom were the famous Claude and
  Daillé, were driven from their homes, their chapel burnt to the
  ground, and their people scattered abroad.

Footnote 276:

  In the first edition it was said to be the Landgrave of Darmstat, by
  mistake, as shown in a note by Nicole.




                            LETTER XVI.[277]

                 TO THE REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS.

 SHAMEFUL CALUMNIES OF THE JESUITS AGAINST PIOUS CLERGYMEN AND INNOCENT
                                 NUNS.


                                                     _December 4, 1656._

REVEREND FATHERS,—I now come to consider the rest of your calumnies, and
shall begin with those contained in your advertisements, which remain to
be noticed. As all your other writings, however, are equally well
stocked with slander, they will furnish me with abundant materials for
entertaining you on this topic as long as I may judge expedient. In the
first place, then, with regard to the fable which you have propagated in
all your writings against the Bishop of Ypres,[278] I beg leave to say,
in one word, that you have maliciously wrested the meaning of some
ambiguous expressions in one of his letters, which being capable of a
good sense, ought, according to the spirit of the Gospel, to have been
taken in good part, and could only be taken otherwise according to the
spirit of your Society. For example, when he says to a friend, “Give
yourself no concern about your nephew; I will furnish him with what he
requires from the money that lies in my hands,” what reason have you to
interpret this to mean, that he would take that money without restoring
it, and not that he merely advanced it with the purpose of replacing it?
And how extremely imprudent was it for you to furnish a refutation of
your own lie, by printing the other letters of the Bishop of Ypres,
which clearly show that, in point of fact, it was merely _advanced_
money, which he was bound to refund. This appears, to your confusion,
from the following terms in the letter, to which you give the date of
July 30, 1619: “Be not uneasy about the money _advanced_; he shall want
for nothing so long as he is here;” and likewise from another, dated
January 6, 1620, where he says: “You are in too great haste; when the
account shall become due, I have no fear but that the little credit
which I have in this place will bring me as much money as I require.”

If you are convicted slanderers on this subject, you are no less so in
regard to the ridiculous story about the charity-box of St. Merri. What
advantage, pray, can you hope to derive from the accusation which one of
your worthy friends has trumped up against that ecclesiastic? Are we to
conclude that a man is guilty, because he is accused? No, fathers. Men
of piety, like him, may expect to be perpetually accused, so long as the
world contains calumniators like you. We must judge of him, therefore,
not from the accusation, but from the sentence; and the sentence
pronounced on the case (February 23, 1656) justifies him completely.
Moreover, the person who had the temerity to involve himself in that
iniquitous process, was disavowed by his colleagues, and himself
compelled to retract his charge. And as to what you allege, in the same
place, about “that famous director, who pocketed at once nine hundred
thousand livres,” I need only refer you to Messieurs the curés of St.
Roch and St. Paul, who will bear witness, before the whole city of
Paris, to his perfect disinterestedness in the affair, and to your
inexcusable malice in that piece of imposition.

Enough, however, for such paltry falsities. These are but the first raw
attempts of your novices, and not the master-strokes of your “grand
professed.”[279] To these do I now come, fathers; I come to a calumny
which is certainly one of the basest that ever issued from the spirit of
your Society. I refer to the insufferable audacity with which you have
imputed to holy nuns, and to their directors, the charge of
“disbelieving the mystery of transubstantiation, and the real presence
of Jesus Christ in the eucharist.” Here, fathers, is a slander worthy of
yourselves. Here is a crime which God alone is capable of punishing, as
you alone were capable of committing it. To endure it with patience,
would require an humility as great as that of these calumniated ladies;
to give it credit would demand a degree of wickedness equal to that of
their wretched defamers. I propose not, therefore, to vindicate them;
they are beyond suspicion. Had they stood in need of defence, they might
have commanded abler advocates than me. My object in what I say here is
to show, not their innocence, but your malignity. I merely intend to
make you ashamed of yourselves, and to let the whole world understand
that, after this, there is nothing of which you are not capable.

You will not fail, I am certain, notwithstanding all this, to say that I
belong to Port-Royal; for this is the first thing you say to every one
who combats your errors: as if it were only at Port-Royal that persons
could be found possessed of sufficient zeal to defend, against your
attacks, the purity of Christian morality. I know, fathers, the work of
the pious recluses who have retired to that monastery, and how much the
Church is indebted to their truly solid and edifying labors. I know the
excellence of their piety and their learning. For, though I have never
had the honor to belong to their establishment, as you, without knowing
who or what I am, would fain have it believed, nevertheless, I do know
some of them, and honor the virtue of them all. But God has not confined
within the precincts of that society all whom he means to raise up in
opposition to your corruptions. I hope, with his assistance, fathers, to
make you feel this; and if he vouchsafe to sustain me in the design he
has led me to form, of employing in his service all the resources I have
received from him, I shall speak to you in such a strain as will,
perhaps, give you reason to regret that you have _not_ had to do with a
man of Port-Royal. And to convince you of this, fathers, I must tell you
that, while those whom you have abused with this notorious slander
content themselves with lifting up their groans to Heaven to obtain your
forgiveness for the outrage, I feel myself obliged, not being in the
least affected by your slander, to make you blush in the face of the
whole Church, and so bring you to that wholesome shame of which the
Scripture speaks, and which is almost the only remedy for a hardness of
heart like yours: “_Imple facies eorum ignominiâ, et quærent nomen tuum,
Domine_—Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek thy name, O
Lord.”[280]

A stop must be put to this insolence, which does not spare the most
sacred retreats. For who can be safe after a calumny of this nature? For
shame, fathers! to publish in Paris such a scandalous book, with the
name of your Father Meynier on its front, and under this infamous title,
“Port-Royal and Geneva in concert against the most holy Sacrament of the
Altar,” in which you accuse of this apostasy, not only Monsieur the abbé
of St. Cyran, and M. Arnauld, but also Mother Agnes, his sister, and all
the nuns of that monastery, alleging that “their faith, in regard to the
eucharist, is as suspicious as that of M. Arnauld,” whom you maintain to
be “a downright Calvinist.”[281] I here ask the whole world if there be
any class of persons within the pale of the Church, on whom you could
have advanced such an abominable charge with less semblance of truth.
For tell me, fathers, if these nuns and their directors, had been “in
concert with Geneva against the most holy sacrament of the altar” (the
very thought of which is shocking), how they should have come to select
as the principal object of their piety that very sacrament which they
held in abomination? How should they have assumed the habit of the holy
sacrament? taken the name of the Daughters of the Holy Sacrament? called
their church the Church of the Holy Sacrament? How should they have
requested and obtained from Rome the confirmation of that institution,
and the right of saying every Thursday the office of the holy sacrament,
in which the faith of the Church is so perfectly expressed, if they had
conspired with Geneva to banish that faith from the Church? Why would
they have bound themselves, by a particular devotion, also sanctioned by
the pope, to have some of their sisterhood, night and day without
intermission, in presence of the sacred host, to compensate, by their
perpetual adorations towards that perpetual sacrifice, for the impiety
of the heresy that aims at its annihilation? Tell me, fathers, if you
can, why, of all the mysteries of our religion, they should have passed
by those in which they believed, to fix upon that in which they believed
not? and how they should have devoted themselves, so fully and entirely,
to that mystery of our faith, if they took it, as the heretics do, for
the mystery of iniquity? And what answer do you give to these clear
evidences, embodied not in words only, but in actions; and not in some
particular actions, but in the whole tenor of a life expressly dedicated
to the adoration of Jesus Christ, dwelling on our altars? What answer,
again, do you give to the books which you ascribe to Port-Royal, all of
which are full of the most precise terms employed by the fathers and the
councils to mark the essence of that mystery? It is at once ridiculous
and disgusting to hear you replying to these, as you have done
throughout your libel. M. Arnauld, say you, talks very well about
transubstantiation; but he understands, perhaps, only “a significative
transubstantiation.” True, he professes to believe in “the real
presence;” who can tell, however, but he means nothing more than “a true
and real figure?” How now, fathers! whom, pray, will you not make pass
for a Calvinist whenever you please, if you are to be allowed the
liberty of perverting the most canonical and sacred expressions by the
wicked subtilties of your modern equivocations? Who ever thought of
using any other terms than those in question, especially in simple
discourses of devotion, where no controversies are handled? And yet the
love and the reverence in which they hold this sacred mystery, have
induced them to give it such a prominence in all their writings, that I
defy you, fathers, with all your cunning, to detect in them either the
least appearance of ambiguity, or the slightest correspondence with the
sentiments of Geneva.

Everybody knows, fathers, that the essence of the Genevan heresy
consists, as it does according to your own showing, in their believing
that Jesus Christ is not contained (_enfermé_), in this sacrament; that
it is impossible he can be in many places at once; that he is, properly
speaking, only in heaven, and that it is as there alone that he ought to
be adored, and not on the altar;[282] that the substance of the bread
remains; that the body of Jesus Christ does not enter into the mouth or
the stomach; that he can only be eaten by faith, and accordingly wicked
men do not eat him at all; and that the mass is not a sacrifice, but an
abomination. Let us now hear, then, in what way “Port-Royal is in
concert with Geneva.” In the writings of the former we read, to your
confusion, the following statement: That “the flesh and blood of Jesus
Christ are contained under the species of bread and wine;”[283] that
“the Holy of Holies is present in the sanctuary, and that there he ought
to be adored;”[284] that “Jesus Christ dwells in the sinners who
communicate, by the real and veritable presence of his body in their
stomach, although not by the presence of his Spirit in their
hearts;”[285] that “the dead ashes of the bodies of the saints derive
their principal dignity from that seed of life which they retain from
the touch of the immortal and vivifying flesh of Jesus Christ;”[286]
that “it is not owing to any natural power, but to the almighty power of
God, to whom nothing is impossible, that the body of Jesus Christ is
comprehended under the host, and under the smallest portion of every
host;”[287] that “the divine virtue is present to produce the effect
which the words of consecration signify;”[288] that “Jesus Christ, while
he is lowered (_rabaissé_), and hidden upon the altar, is, at the same
time, elevated in his glory; that he subsists, of himself and by his own
ordinary power, in divers places at the same time—in the midst of the
Church triumphant, and in the midst of the Church militant and
travelling;”[289] that “the sacramental species remain suspended, and
subsist extraordinarily, without being upheld by any subject; and that
the body of Jesus Christ is also suspended under the species, and that
it does not depend upon these, as substances depend upon
accidents;”[290] that “the substance of the bread is changed, the
immutable accidents remaining the same;”[291] that “Jesus Christ reposes
in the eucharist with the same glory that he has in heaven;”[292] that
“his glorious humanity resides in the tabernacles of the Church, under
the species of bread, which forms its visible covering; and that,
knowing the grossness of our natures, he conducts us to the adoration of
his divinity, which is present in all places, by the adoring of his
humanity, which is present in a particular place;”[293] that “we receive
the body of Jesus Christ upon the tongue, which is sanctified by its
divine touch;”[294] “that it enters into the mouth of the priest;”[295]
that “although Jesus Christ has made himself accessible in the holy
sacrament, by an act of his love and graciousness, he preserves,
nevertheless, in that ordinance, his inaccessibility, as an inseparable
condition of his divine nature; because, although the body alone and the
blood alone are there, by virtue of the words _vi verborum_, as the
schoolmen say, his whole divinity may, notwithstanding, be there also,
as well as his whole humanity, by a necessary conjunction.”[296] In
fine, that “the eucharist is at the same time sacrament and
sacrifice;”[297] and that “although this sacrifice is a commemoration of
that of the cross, yet there is this difference between them, that the
sacrifice of the mass is offered for the Church only, and for the
faithful in her communion; whereas that of the cross has been offered
for all the world, as the Scripture testifies.”[298]

I have quoted enough, fathers, to make it evident that there was never,
perhaps, a more imprudent thing attempted than what you have done. But I
will go a step farther, and make you pronounce this sentence against
yourselves. For what do you require from a man, in order to remove all
suspicion of his being in concert and correspondence with Geneva? “If M.
Arnauld,” says your Father Meynier, p. 93, “had said that in this
adorable mystery, there is no substance of the bread under the species,
but only the flesh and the blood of Jesus Christ, I should have
confessed that he had declared himself absolutely against Geneva.”
Confess it, then, ye revilers! and make him a public apology. How often
have you seen this declaration made in the passages I have just cited?
Besides this, however, the Familiar Theology of M. de St. Cyran having
been approved by M. Arnauld, it contains the sentiments of both. Read,
then, the whole of lesson 15th, and particularly article 2d, and you
will there find the words you desiderate, even more formally stated than
you have done yourselves. “Is there any bread in the host, or any wine
in the chalice? No: for all the substance of the bread and the wine is
taken away, to give place to that of the body and blood of Jesus Christ,
the which substance alone remains therein, covered by the qualities and
species of bread and wine.”

How now, fathers! will you still say that Port-Royal teaches “nothing
that Geneva does not receive,” and that M. Arnauld has said nothing in
his second letter “which might not have been said by a minister of
Charenton?” See if you can persuade Mestrezat[299] to speak as M.
Arnauld does in that letter, at page 237? Make him say, that it is an
infamous calumny to accuse him of denying transubstantiation; that he
takes for the fundamental principle of his writings the truth of the
real presence of the Son of God, in opposition to the heresy of the
Calvinists; and that he accounts himself happy for living in a place
where the Holy of Holies is continually adored in the sanctuary—a
sentiment which is still more opposed to the belief of the Calvinists
than the real presence itself; for as Cardinal Richelieu observes in his
Controversies (page 536): “The new ministers of France having agreed
with the Lutherans, who believe the real presence of Jesus Christ in the
eucharist; they have declared that they remain in a state of separation
from the Church on the point of this mystery, only on account of the
adoration which Catholics render to the eucharist.”[300] Get all the
passages which I have extracted from the books of Port-Royal subscribed
at Geneva, and not the isolated passages merely, but the entire
treatises regarding this mystery, such as the Book of Frequent
Communion, the Explication of the Ceremonies of the Mass, the Exercise
during Mass, the Reasons of the Suspension of the Holy Sacrament, the
Translation of the Hymns in the Hours of Port-Royal, &c.; in one word,
prevail upon them to establish at Charenton that holy institution of
adoring, without intermission, Jesus Christ contained in the eucharist,
as is done at Port-Royal, and it will be the most signal service which
you could render to the Church; for in this case it will turn out, not
that Port-Royal is in concert with Geneva, but that Geneva is in concert
with Port-Royal, and with the whole Church.

Certainly, fathers, you could not have been more unfortunate than in
selecting Port-Royal as the object of attack for not believing in the
eucharist; but I will show what led you to fix upon it. You know I have
picked up some small acquaintance with your policy; in this instance you
have acted upon its maxims to admiration. If Monsieur the abbé of St.
Cyran, and M. Arnauld, had only spoken of what ought to be believed with
great respect to this mystery, and said nothing about what ought to be
done in the way of preparation for its reception, they might have been
the best Catholics alive; and no equivocations would have been
discovered in their use of the terms “real presence” and
“transubstantiation.” But since all who combat your licentious
principles must needs be heretics, and heretics too, in the very point
in which they condemn your laxity, how could M. Arnauld escape falling
under this charge on the subject of the eucharist, after having
published a book expressly against your profanations of that sacrament?
What! must he be allowed to say, with impunity, that “the body of Jesus
Christ ought not to be given to those who habitually lapse into the same
crimes, and who have no prospect of amendment; and that such persons
ought to be excluded, for some time, from the altar, to purify
themselves by sincere penitence, that they may approach it afterwards
with benefit?” Suffer no one to talk in this strain, fathers, or you
will find that fewer people will come to your confessionals. Father
Brisacier says, that “were you to adopt this course, you would never
apply the blood of Jesus Christ to a single individual.” It would be
infinitely more for your interest were every one to adopt the views of
your Society, as set forth by your Father Mascarenhas, in a book
approved by your doctors, and even by your reverend Father-General,
namely, “That persons of every description, and even priests, may
receive the body of Jesus Christ on the very day they have polluted
themselves with odious crimes; that so far from such communions implying
irreverence, persons who partake of them in this manner act a
commendable part; that confessors ought not to keep them back from the
ordinance, but, on the contrary, ought to advise those who have recently
committed such crimes to communicate immediately; because, although the
Church has forbidden it, this prohibition is annulled by the universal
practice in all places of the earth.”[301]

See what it is, fathers, to have Jesuits in all places of the earth!
Behold the universal practice which you have introduced, and which you
are anxious everywhere to maintain! It matters nothing that the tables
of Jesus Christ are filled with abominations, provided that your
churches are crowded with people. Be sure, therefore, cost what it may,
to set down all that dare to say a word against your practice, as
heretics on the holy sacrament. But how can you do this, after the
irrefragable testimonies which they have given of their faith? Are you
not afraid of my coming out with the four grand proofs of their heresy
which you have adduced? You ought, at least, to be so, fathers, and I
ought not to spare your blushing. Let us, then, proceed to examine proof
the first.

“M. de St. Cyran,” says Father Meynier, “consoling one of his friends
upon the death of his mother (tom. i., let. 14), says that the most
acceptable sacrifice that can be offered up to God on such occasions, is
that of patience; therefore he is a Calvinist.” This is marvellously
shrewd reasoning, fathers; and I doubt if anybody will be able to
discover the precise point of it. Let us learn it, then, from his own
mouth. “Because,” says this mighty controversialist, “it is obvious that
he does not believe in the sacrifice of the mass; for this is, of all
other sacrifices, the most acceptable unto God.” Who will venture to say
now that the Jesuits do not know how to reason? Why, they know the art
to such perfection, that they will extract heresy out of anything you
choose to mention, not even excepting the Holy Scripture itself! For
example, might it not be heretical to say, with the wise man in
Ecclesiasticus, “There is nothing worse than to love money;”[302] as if
adultery, murder, or idolatry, were not far greater crimes? Where is the
man who is not in the habit of using similar expressions every day? May
we not say, for instance, that the most acceptable of all sacrifices in
the eyes of God is that of a contrite and humbled heart; just because,
in discourses of this nature, we simply mean to compare certain internal
virtues with one another, and not with the sacrifice of the mass, which
is of a totally different order, and infinitely more exalted? Is this
not enough to make you ridiculous, fathers? And is it necessary, to
complete your discomfiture, that I should quote the passages of that
letter in which M. de St. Cyran speaks of the sacrifice of the mass, as
“the most excellent” of all others, in the following terms? “Let there
be presented to God, daily and in all places, the sacrifice of the body
of his Son, who could not find _a more excellent way_ than that by which
he might honor his Father.” And afterwards: “Jesus Christ has enjoined
us to take, when we are dying, his sacrificed body, to render more
acceptable to God the sacrifice of our own, and to join himself with us
at the hour of dissolution; to the end that he may strengthen us for the
struggle, sanctifying, by his presence, the last sacrifice which we make
to God of our life and our body?” Pretend to take no notice of all this,
fathers, and persist in maintaining, as you do in page 39, that he
refused to take the communion on his death-bed, and that he did not
believe in the sacrifice of the mass. Nothing can be too gross for
calumniators by profession.

Your second proof furnishes an excellent illustration of this. To make a
Calvinist of M. de St. Cyran, to whom you ascribe the book of _Petrus
Aurelius_, you take advantage of a passage (page 80) in which Aurelius
explains in what manner the Church acts towards priests, and even
bishops, whom she wishes to degrade or depose. “The Church,” he says,
“being incapable of depriving them of the power of the order, the
character of which is indelible, she does all that she can do;—she
banishes from her memory the character which she cannot banish from the
souls of the individuals who have been once invested with it; she
regards them in the same light as if they were not bishops or priests;
so that, according to the ordinary language of the Church, it may be
said they are no longer such, although they always remain such, in as
far as the character is concerned—_ob indelebilitatem characteris_.” You
perceive, fathers, that this author, who has been approved by three
general assemblies of the clergy of France, plainly declares that the
character of the priesthood is indelible; and yet you make him say, on
the contrary, in the very same passage, that “the character of the
priesthood is _not_ indelible.” This is what I would call a notorious
slander; in other words, according to your nomenclature, a small venial
sin. And the reason is, this book has done you some harm, by refuting
the heresies of your brethren in England touching the Episcopal
authority. But the folly of the charge is equally remarkable; for, after
having taken it for granted, without any foundation, that M. de St.
Cyran holds the priestly character to be not indelible, you conclude
from this that he does not believe in the real presence of Jesus Christ
in the eucharist.

Do not expect me to answer this, fathers. If you have got no common
sense, I am not able to furnish you with it. All who possess any share
of it will enjoy a hearty laugh at your expense. Nor will they treat
with greater respect your third proof, which rests upon the following
words, taken from the Book of Frequent Communion: “In the eucharist God
vouchsafes us _the same food_ that he bestows on the saints in heaven,
with this difference only, that here he withholds from us its sensible
sight and taste, reserving both of these for the heavenly world.”[303]
These words express the sense of the Church so distinctly, that I am
constantly forgetting what reason you have for picking a quarrel with
them, in order to turn them to a bad use; for I can see nothing more in
them but what the Council of Trent teaches (sess. xiii., c. 8), namely,
that there is no difference between Jesus Christ in the eucharist and
Jesus Christ in heaven, except that here he is veiled, and there he is
not. M. Arnauld does not say that there is no difference in the manner
of receiving Jesus Christ, but only that there is no difference in Jesus
Christ who is received. And yet you would, in the face of all reason,
interpret his language in this passage to mean, that Jesus Christ is no
more eaten with the mouth in this world than he is in heaven; upon which
you ground the charge of heresy against him.

You really make me sorry for you, fathers. Must we explain this further
to you? Why do you confound that divine nourishment with the manner of
receiving it? There is but one point of difference, as I have just
observed, betwixt that nourishment upon earth and in heaven, which is,
that here it is hidden under veils which deprive us of its sensible
sight and taste; but there are various points of dissimilarity in the
manner of receiving it here and there, the principal of which is, as M.
Arnauld expresses it (p. 3, ch. 16), “that here it enters into the mouth
and the breast both of the good and of the wicked,” which is not the
case in heaven.

And if you require to be told the reason of this diversity, I may inform
you, fathers, that the cause of God’s ordaining these different modes of
receiving the same food, is the difference that exists betwixt the state
of Christians in this life and that of the blessed in heaven. The state
of the Christian, as Cardinal Perron observes after the fathers, holds a
middle place between the state of the blessed and the state of the Jews.
The spirits in bliss possess Jesus Christ really, without veil or
figure. The Jews possessed Jesus Christ only in figures and veils, such
as the manna and the paschal lamb. And Christians possess Jesus Christ
in the eucharist really and truly, although still concealed under veils.
“God,” says St. Eucher, “has made three tabernacles—the synagogue, which
had the shadows only, without the truth; the Church, which has the truth
and shadows together; and heaven, where there is no shadow, but the
truth alone.” It would be a departure from our present state, which is
the state of faith, opposed by St. Paul alike to the law and to open
vision, did we possess the figures only, without Jesus Christ; for it is
the property of the law to have the mere figure, and not the substance
of things. And it would be equally a departure from our present state if
we possessed him visibly; because faith, according to the same apostle,
deals not with things that are seen. And thus the eucharist, from its
including Jesus Christ truly, though under a veil, is in perfect
accordance with our state of faith. It follows, that this state would be
destroyed, if, as the heretics maintain, Jesus Christ were not really
under the species of bread and wine; and it would be equally destroyed
if we received him openly, as they do in heaven: since, on these
suppositions, our state would be confounded, either with the state of
Judaism or with that of glory.

Such, fathers, is the mysterious and divine reason of this most divine
mystery. This it is that fills us with abhorrence at the Calvinists, who
would reduce us to the condition of the Jews; and this it is that makes
us aspire to the glory of the beatified, where we shall be introduced to
the full and eternal enjoyment of Jesus Christ. From hence you must see
that there are several points of difference between the manner in which
he communicates himself to Christians and to the blessed; and that,
amongst others, he is in this world received by the mouth, and not so in
heaven; but that they all depend solely on the distinction between our
state of faith and their state of immediate vision. And this is
precisely, fathers, what M. Arnauld has expressed, with great plainness,
in the following terms: “There can be no other difference between the
purity of those who receive Jesus Christ in the eucharist and that of
the blessed, than what exists between faith and the open vision of God,
upon which alone depends the different manner in which he is eaten upon
earth and in heaven.” You were bound in duty, fathers, to have revered
in these words the sacred truths they express, instead of wresting them
for the purpose of detecting an heretical meaning which they never
contained, nor could possibly contain, namely, that Jesus Christ is
eaten by faith only, and not by the mouth; the malicious perversion of
your Fathers Annat and Meynier, which forms the capital count of their
indictment.

Conscious, however, of the wretched deficiency of your proofs, you have
had recourse to a new artifice, which is nothing less than to falsify
the Council of Trent, in order to convict M. Arnauld of nonconformity
with it; so vast is your store of methods for making people heretics.
This feat has been achieved by Father Meynier, in fifty different places
of his book, and about eight or ten times in the space of a single page
(the 54th), wherein he insists that to speak like a true Catholic, it is
not enough to say, “I believe that Jesus Christ is really present in the
eucharist,” but we must say, “I believe, _with the council_, that he is
present by a true _local presence_, or locally.” And in proof of this,
he cites the council, session xiii., canon 3d, canon 4th, and canon 6th.
Who would not suppose, upon seeing the term _local presence_ quoted from
three canons of a universal council, that the phrase was actually to be
found in them? This might have served your turn very well, before the
appearance of my fifteenth letter; but as matters now stand, fathers,
the trick has become too stale for us. We go our way and consult the
council, and discover only that you are falsifiers. Such terms as _local
presence_, _locally_, and _locality_, never existed in the passages to
which you refer; and let me tell you further, they are not to be found
in any other canon of that council, nor in any other previous council,
nor in any father of the Church. Allow me, then, to ask you, fathers, if
you mean to cast the suspicion of Calvinism upon all that have not made
use of that peculiar phrase? If this be the case, the Council of Trent
must be suspected of heresy, and all the holy fathers without exception.
Have you no other way of making M. Arnauld heretical, without abusing so
many other people who never did you any harm, and among the rest, St.
Thomas, who is one of the greatest champions of the eucharist, and who,
so far from employing that term, has expressly rejected it—“_Nullo modo
corpus Christi est in hoc sacramento localiter?_—By no means is the body
of Christ in this sacrament _locally_?” Who are you, then, fathers, to
pretend, on your authority, to impose new terms, and ordain them to be
used by all for rightly expressing their faith; as if the profession of
the faith, drawn up by the popes according to the plan of the council,
in which this term has no place, were defective, and left an ambiguity
in the creed of the faithful, which you had the sole merit of
discovering? Such a piece of arrogance, to prescribe these terms, even
to learned doctors! such a piece of forgery, to attribute them to
general councils! and such ignorance, not to know the objections which
the most enlightened saints have made to their reception! “Be ashamed of
the error of your ignorance,”[304] as the Scripture says of ignorant
impostors like you—_De mendacio ineruditionis tuæ confundere_.

Give up all further attempts, then, to act the masters; you have neither
character nor capacity for the part. If, however, you would bring
forward your propositions with a little more modesty, they might obtain
a hearing. For although this phrase, _local presence_, has been
rejected, as you have seen, by St. Thomas, on the ground that the body
of Jesus Christ is not in the eucharist, in the ordinary extension of
bodies in their places, the expression has, nevertheless, been adopted
by some modern controversial writers, who understand it simply to mean
that the body of Jesus Christ is truly under the species, which being in
a particular place, the body of Jesus Christ is there also. And in this
sense M. Arnauld will make no scruple to admit the term, as M. de St.
Cyran[305] and he have repeatedly declared that Jesus Christ in the
eucharist is truly in a particular place, and miraculously in many
places at the same time. Thus all your subtleties fall to the ground;
and you have failed to give the slightest semblance of plausibility to
an accusation, which ought not to have been allowed to show its face,
without being supported by the most unanswerable proofs.

But what avails it, fathers, to oppose their innocence to your
calumnies? You impute these errors to them, not in the belief that they
maintain heresy, but from the idea that they have done you injury. That
is enough, according to your theology, to warrant you to calumniate them
without criminality; and you can, without either penance or confession,
say mass, at the very time that you charge priests, who say it every
day, with holding it to be pure idolatry; which, were it true, would
amount to sacrilege no less revolting than that of your own Father
Jarrige, whom you yourselves ordered to be hanged in effigy, for having
said mass “at the time he was in agreement with Geneva.”[306]

What surprises me, therefore, is not the little scrupulosity with which
you load them with crimes of the foulest and falsest description, but
the little prudence you display, by fixing on them charges so destitute
of plausibility. You dispose of sins, it is true, at your pleasure; but
do you mean to dispose of men’s beliefs too? Verily, fathers, if the
suspicion of Calvinism must needs fall either on them or on you, you
would stand, I fear, on very ticklish ground. Their language is as
Catholic as yours; but their conduct confirms their faith, and your
conduct belies it. For if you believe, as well as they do, that the
bread is really changed into the body of Jesus Christ, why do you not
require, as they do, from those whom you advise to approach the altar,
that the heart of stone and ice should be sincerely changed into a heart
of flesh and of love? If you believe that Jesus Christ is in that
sacrament in a state of death, teaching those that approach it to die to
the world, to sin, and to themselves, why do you suffer those to profane
it in whose breasts evil passions continue to reign in all their life
and vigor? And how do you come to judge those worthy to eat the bread of
heaven, who are not worthy to eat that of earth?

Precious votaries, truly, whose zeal is expended in persecuting those
who honor this sacred mystery by so many holy communions, and in
flattering those who dishonor it by so many sacrilegious desecrations!
How comely is it in these champions of a sacrifice so pure and so
venerable, to collect around the table of Jesus Christ a crowd of
hardened profligates, reeking from their debaucheries; and to plant in
the midst of them a priest, whom his own confessor has hurried from his
obscenities to the altar; there, in the place of Jesus Christ, to offer
up that most holy victim to the God of holiness, and convey it, with his
polluted hands, into mouths as thoroughly polluted as his own! How well
does it become those who pursue this course “in all parts of the world,”
in conformity with maxims sanctioned by their own general, to impute to
the author of Frequent Communion, and to the Sisters of the Holy
Sacrament, the crime of not believing in that sacrament!

Even this, however, does not satisfy them. Nothing less will satiate
their rage than to accuse their opponents of having renounced Jesus
Christ and their baptism. This is no air-built fable, like those of your
invention; it is a fact, and denotes a delirious frenzy, which marks the
fatal consummation of your calumnies. Such a notorious falsehood as this
would not have been in hands worthy to support it, had it remained in
those of your good friend Filleau, through whom you ushered it into the
world: your Society has openly adopted it; and your Father Meynier
maintained it the other day to be “_a certain truth_,” that Port-Royal
has, for the space of thirty-five years, been forming a secret plot, of
which M. de St. Cyran and M. D’Ypres have been the ring-leaders, “to
ruin the mystery of the incarnation—to make the Gospel pass for an
apocryphal fable—to exterminate the Christian religion, and to erect
Deism upon the ruins of Christianity.” Is this enough, fathers? Will you
be satisfied if all this be believed of the objects of your hate? Would
your animosity be glutted at length, if you could but succeed in making
them odious, not only to all within the Church, by the charge of
“_consenting with Geneva_,” of which you accuse them, but even to all
who believe in Jesus Christ, though beyond the pale of the Church, by
the imputation of _Deism_?

But whom do you expect to convince, upon your simple asseveration,
without the slightest shadow of proof, and in the face of every
imaginable contradiction, that priests who preach nothing but the grace
of Jesus Christ, the purity of the Gospel, and the obligations of
baptism, have renounced at once their baptism, the Gospel, and Jesus
Christ? Who will believe it, fathers? Wretched as you are,[307] do you
believe it yourselves? What a sad predicament is yours, when you must
either prove that they do not believe in Jesus Christ, or must pass for
the most abandoned calumniators. Prove it, then, fathers. Name that
“_worthy clergyman_,” who, you say, attended that assembly at
Bourg-Fontaine[308] in 1621, and discovered to Brother Filleau the
design there concerted of overturning the Christian religion. Name these
six persons who you allege to have formed that conspiracy. Name the
_individual who is designated by the letters A. A._, who you say “_was
not Antony Arnauld_” (because he convinced you that he was at that time
only nine years of age), “_but another person, who you say is still in
life, but too good a friend of M. Arnauld not to be known to him_.” You
know him, then, fathers; and consequently, if you are not destitute of
religion yourselves, you are bound to delate that impious wretch to the
king and parliament, that he may be punished according to his deserts.
You must speak out, fathers; you must name the person, or submit to the
disgrace of being henceforth regarded in no other light than as common
liars, unworthy of being ever credited again. Good Father Valerien has
taught us that this is the way in which such characters should be “put
to the rack,” and brought to their senses. Your silence upon the present
challenge will furnish a full and satisfactory confirmation of this
diabolical calumny. Your blindest admirers will be constrained to admit,
that it will be “the result, not of your goodness, but your impotency;”
and to wonder how you could be so wicked as to extend your hatred even
to the nuns of Port-Royal, and to say, as you do in page 14, that _The
Secret Chaplet of the Holy Sacrament_,[309] composed by one of their
number, was the first-fruit of that conspiracy against Jesus Christ; or,
as in page 95, that “they have imbibed all the detestable principles of
that work;” which is, according to your account, “a lesson in Deism.”
Your falsehoods regarding that book have already been triumphantly
refuted, in the defence of the censure of the late Archbishop of Paris
against Father Brisacier. That publication you are incapable of
answering; and yet you do not scruple to abuse it in a more shameful
manner than ever, for the purpose of charging women, whose piety is
universally known, with the vilest blasphemy.

Cruel, cowardly persecutors! Must, then, the most retired cloisters
afford no retreat from your calumnies? While these consecrated virgins
are employed, night and day, according to their institution, in adoring
Jesus Christ in the holy sacrament, you cease not, night nor day, to
publish abroad that they do not believe that he is either in the
eucharist or even at the right hand of his Father; and you are publicly
excommunicating them from the Church, at the very time when they are in
secret praying for the whole Church, and for you! You blacken with your
slanders those who have neither ears to hear nor mouths to answer you!
But Jesus Christ, in whom they are now hidden, not to appear till one
day together with him, hears you, and answers for them. At the moment I
am now writing, that holy and terrible voice is heard which confounds
nature and consoles the Church.[310] And I fear, fathers, that those who
now harden their hearts, and refuse with obstinacy to hear him, while he
speaks in the character of God, will one day be compelled to hear him
with terror, when he speaks to them in the character of a Judge. What
account, indeed, fathers, will you be able to render to him of the many
calumnies you have uttered, seeing that he will examine them, in that
day, not according to the fantasies of Fathers Dicastille, Gans, and
Pennalossa, who justify them, but according to the eternal laws of
truth, and the sacred ordinances of his own Church, which, so far from
attempting to vindicate that crime, abhors it to such a degree that she
visits it with the same penalty as wilful murder? By the first and
second Councils of Arles she has decided that the communion shall be
denied to slanderers as well as murderers, till the approach of death.
The Council of Lateran has judged those unworthy of admission into the
ecclesiastical state who have been convicted of the crime, even though
they may have reformed. The popes have even threatened to deprive of the
communion at death those who have calumniated bishops, priests, or
deacons. And the authors of a defamatory libel, who fail to prove what
they have advanced, are condemned by Pope Adrian _to be whipped_;—yes,
reverend fathers, _flagellentur_ is the word. So strong has been the
repugnance of the Church at all times to the errors of your Society—a
Society so thoroughly depraved as to invent excuses for the grossest of
crimes, such as calumny, chiefly that it may enjoy the greater freedom
in perpetrating them itself. There can be no doubt, fathers, that you
would be capable of producing abundance of mischief in this way, had God
not permitted you to furnish with your own hands the means of preventing
the evil, and of rendering your slanders perfectly innocuous; for, to
deprive you of all credibility, it was quite enough to publish the
strange maxim, that it is no crime to calumniate. Calumny is nothing, if
not associated with a high reputation for honesty. The defamer can make
no impression, unless he has the character of one that abhors
defamation, as a crime of which he is incapable. And thus, fathers, you
are betrayed by your own principle. You established the doctrine to
secure yourselves a safe conscience, that you might slander without risk
of damnation, and be ranked with those “pious and holy calumniators” of
whom St. Athanasius speaks. To save yourselves from hell, you have
embraced a maxim which promises you this security on the faith of your
doctors; but this same maxim, while it guarantees you, according to
their idea, against the evils you dread in the future world, deprives
you of all the advantage you may have expected to reap from it in the
present; so that, in attempting to escape the guilt, you have lost the
benefit of calumny. Such is the self-contrariety of evil, and so
completely does it confound and destroy itself by its own intrinsic
malignity.

You might have slandered, therefore, much more advantageously for
yourselves, had you professed to hold, with St. Paul, that evil speakers
are not worthy to see God; for in this case, though you would indeed
have been condemning yourselves, your slanders would at least have stood
a better chance of being believed. But by maintaining, as you have done,
that calumny against your enemies is no crime, your slanders will be
discredited, and you yourselves damned into the bargain; for two things
are certain, fathers—first, That it will never be in the power of your
grave doctors to annihilate the justice of God; and, secondly, That you
could not give more certain evidence that you are not of the Truth than
by your resorting to falsehood. If the Truth were on your side, she
would fight for you—she would conquer for you; and whatever enemies you
might have to encounter, “the Truth would set you free” from them,
according to her promise. But you have had recourse to falsehood, for no
other design than to support the errors with which you flatter the
sinful children of this world, and to bolster up the calumnies with
which you persecute every man of piety who sets his face against these
delusions. The truth being diametrically opposed to your ends, it
behooved you, to use the language of the prophet, “to put your
confidence in lies.” You have said, “The scourges which afflict mankind
shall not come nigh unto us; for we have made lies our refuge, and under
falsehood have we hid ourselves.”[311] But what says the prophet in
reply to such? “Forasmuch,” says he, “as ye have put your trust in
calumny and tumult—_sperastis in calumnia et in tumultu_—this iniquity
and your ruin shall be like that of a high wall whose breaking cometh
suddenly at an instant. And he shall break it as the breaking of the
potter’s vessel that is shivered in pieces”—with such violence that
“there shall not be found in the bursting of it a shred to take fire
from the hearth, or to take water withal out of the pit.”[312]
“Because,” as another prophet says, “ye have made the heart of the
righteous sad, whom I have not made sad; and ye have flattered and
strengthened the malice of the wicked; I will therefore deliver my
people out of your hands, and ye shall know that I am their Lord and
yours.”[313]

Yes, fathers, it is to be hoped that if you do not repent, God will
deliver out of your hands those whom you have so long deluded, either by
flattering them in their evil courses with your licentious maxims, or by
poisoning their minds with your slanders. He will convince the former
that the false rules of your casuists will not screen them from his
indignation; and he will impress on the minds of the latter the just
dread of losing their souls by listening and yielding credit to your
slanders, as you lose yours by hatching these slanders and disseminating
them through the world. Let no man be deceived; God is not mocked; none
may violate with impunity the commandment which he has given us in the
Gospel, not to condemn our neighbor without being well assured of his
guilt. And, consequently, what profession soever of piety those may make
who lend a willing ear to your lying devices, and under what pretence
soever of devotion they may entertain them, they have reason to
apprehend exclusion from the kingdom of God, solely for having imputed
crimes of such a dark complexion as heresy and schism to Catholic
priests and holy nuns, upon no better evidence than such vile
fabrications as yours. “The devil,” says M. de Geneve,[314] “is on the
tongue of him that slanders, and in the ear of him that listens to the
slanderer.” “And evil speaking,” says St. Bernard, “is a poison that
extinguishes charity in both of the parties; so that a single calumny
may prove mortal to an infinite number of souls, killing not only those
who publish it, but all those besides by whom it is not
repudiated.”[315]

Reverend fathers, my letters were not wont either to be so prolix, or to
follow so closely on one another. Want of time must plead my excuse for
both of these faults. The present letter is a very long one, simply
because I had no leisure to make it shorter. You know the reason of this
haste better than I do. You have been unlucky in your answers. You have
done well, therefore, to change your plan; but I am afraid that you will
get no credit for it, and that people will say it was done for fear of
the Benedictines.

                  *       *       *       *       *

I have just come to learn that the person who was generally reported to
be the author of your Apologies, disclaims them, and is annoyed at their
having been ascribed to him. He has good reason; and I was wrong to have
suspected him of any such thing; for, in spite of the assurances which I
received, I ought to have considered that he was a man of too much good
sense to believe your accusations, and of too much honor to publish them
if he did not believe them. There are few people in the world capable of
your extravagances; they are peculiar to yourselves, and mark your
character too plainly to admit of any excuse for having failed to
recognize your hand in their concoction. I was led away by the common
report; but this apology, which would be too good for you, is not
sufficient for me, who profess to advance nothing without certain proof.
In no other instance have I been guilty of departing from this rule. I
am sorry for what I said. I retract it; and I only wish that you may
profit by my example.[316]

-----

Footnote 277:

  The plan and materials of this letter were furnished by M. Nicole.
  (Nicole, iv. 243.)

Footnote 278:

  Jansenius, who was made Bishop of Ipres or Ypres, in 1636. The letters
  to which Pascal refers were printed at that time by the Jesuits
  themselves, who retained the originals in their possession; these
  having come into their hands in consequence of the arrest of M. De St.
  Cyran.

Footnote 279:

  The Jesuits must pass through a long novitiate, before they are
  admitted as “professed” members of the Society.

Footnote 280:

  Ps. lxxxiii. 16.

Footnote 281:

  Pp. 96, 4.

Footnote 282:

  It is hardly necessary to observe, that in this passage the Protestant
  faith on the supper is not fairly represented. The Reformers did not
  deny that Christ was really present in that sacrament. They held that
  he was present spiritually, though not corporeally. Some of them
  expressed themselves strongly in opposition to those who spoke of the
  supper as a mere or bare sign. Calvin says: “There are two things in
  the sacrament—corporeal symbols, by which things invisible are
  proposed to the senses; and a spiritual truth, which is represented
  and sealed by the symbols. In the mystery of the supper, Christ is
  _truly_ exhibited to us, and therefore his body and blood.” (Inst.,
  lib. iv., cap. 17, 11.) “The body of Christ,” says Peter Martyr (Loc.
  Com., iv. 10), “is not _substantially_ present anywhere but in heaven.
  I do not, however, deny that his true body and true blood, which were
  offered for human redemption on the cross, are _spiritually_ partaken
  of by believers in the holy supper.” This is the general sentiment of
  Protestant divines. (De Moor, in Marck, Compend. Theol., p. v. 679,
  &c.)

Footnote 283:

  Second letter of M. Arnauld, p. 259.

Footnote 284:

  Ibid., p. 243.

Footnote 285:

  Frequent Communion, 3d part, ch. 16. _Poitrine_—that is, the bodily
  breast or stomach, in opposition to _cœur_—the heart or soul.

Footnote 286:

  Ibid., 1st part, ch. 40.

Footnote 287:

  Theolog. Fam., lec. 15.

Footnote 288:

  Ibid.

Footnote 289:

  De la Suspension. Rais. 21.

Footnote 290:

  Ibid., p. 23.

Footnote 291:

  Hours of the Holy Sacrament, in Prose.

Footnote 292:

  Letters of M. de St. Cyran, tom. i., let. 93.

Footnote 293:

  Ibid.

Footnote 294:

  Letter 32.

Footnote 295:

  Letter 72.

Footnote 296:

  Defence of the Chaplet of the H. Sacrament, p. 217.

Footnote 297:

  Theol. Famil., lec. 15.

Footnote 298:

  Ibid., p. 153.

Footnote 299:

  _John Mestrezat_, Protestant minister of Paris, was born at Geneva in
  1592 and died in May 1657. His Sermons on the Epistle to the Hebrews
  and other discourses, published after his death, are truly excellent.
  This learned and eloquent divine frequently engaged in controversy
  with the Romanists, and on one occasion managed the debate with such
  spirit that Cardinal Richelieu, taking hold of his shoulder,
  exclaimed: “This is the boldest minister in France.” (Bayle, Dict.,
  art. _Mestrezat_.)

Footnote 300:

  The statement of the Protestant faith, given in a preceding note, may
  suffice to show that it differs, _toto cœlo_, from that of Rome, as
  this is explained in the text. The leading fallacy of the Romish creed
  on this subject is the monstrous dogma of transubstantiation; the
  adoration of the host is merely a corollary. Calvinists and Lutherans
  though differing in their views of the ordinance, always agreed in
  acknowledging the _real_ presence of Christ in the eucharist, though
  they consider the sense in which Romanists interpret that term to be
  chargeable with blasphemy and absurdity.

Footnote 301:

  Mascar., tr. 4, disp. 5, n. 284.

Footnote 302:

  Ecclesiasticus (Apocrypha).

Footnote 303:

  Freq. Com., 3 part, ch. 11.

Footnote 304:

  Eccles. iv. 25 (Apocrypha).

Footnote 305:

  _Jean du Verger de Hauranne, the Abbé de Saint Cyran_ was born at
  Bayonne in 1581. He was the intimate friend of Jansenius and a man of
  great piety and talents, but was seized as a heretic, and thrown by
  Cardinal Richelieu into the dungeon of Vincennes. After five years’
  imprisonment he was released, but died shortly after, October, 11,
  1643. By his followers, M. de Saint Cyran was reverenced as a saint
  and a martyr.

Footnote 306:

  This Father Jarrige was a famous Jesuit, who became a Protestant, and
  published, after his separation from Rome, a book, entitled “_Le
  Jesuite sur l’Echaffaut_—The Jesuit on the Scaffold,” in which he
  treats his old friends with no mercy.

Footnote 307:

  _Misérables que vous êtes_—one of the bitterest expressions which
  Pascal has applied to his opponents and one which they have deeply
  felt, but the full force of which can hardly be rendered into English.

Footnote 308:

  With regard to this famous assembly at Bourg-Fontaine, in which it was
  alleged a conspiracy was formed by the Jansenists against the
  Christian religion, the curious reader may consult the work of M.
  Arnauld entitled _Morale Pratique des Jesuites_, vol. viii., where
  there is a detailed account of the whole proceedings. (Nicole, iv.
  283.)

Footnote 309:

  _The Secret Chaplet of the most Holy Sacrament._—Such was the title of
  a very harmless piece of mystic devotion of three or four pages, the
  production of a nun of Port-Royal, called Sister Agnès de Saint Paul,
  which appeared in 1628. It excited the jealousy of the Archbishop of
  Sens—set the doctors of Paris and those of Louvain by the
  ears—occasioned a war of pamphlets and was finally carried by appeal
  to the Court of Rome, by which it was suppressed. (Nicole, iv. 302.)
  Agnès de St. Paul was the younger sister of the Mère Angélique
  Arnauld, and both of them were sisters of the celebrated M. Arnauld.

Footnote 310:

  This refers to the celebrated miracles of “the Holy Thorn,” the first
  of which, said to have lately taken place in Port-Royal, was then
  creating much sensation. The facts are briefly these: A thorn, said to
  have belonged to the crown of thorns worn by our Saviour, having been
  presented, in March 1656, to the Monastery of Port-Royal, the nuns and
  their young pupils were permitted, each in turn, to kiss the relic.
  One of the latter, Margaret Perier, the niece of Pascal, a girl of
  about ten or eleven years of age, had been long troubled with a
  disease in the eye (_fistula lachrymalis_), which had baffled the
  skill of all the physicians of Paris. On approaching the holy thorn,
  she applied it to the diseased organ, and shortly thereafter
  exclaimed, to the surprise and delight of all the sisters, that her
  eye was completely cured. A certificate, signed by some of the most
  celebrated physicians, attested the cure as, in their opinion a
  miraculous one. The friends of Port-Royal, and none more than Pascal,
  were overjoyed at this interposition, which, being followed by other
  extraordinary cures, they regarded as a voice from heaven in favor of
  that institution. The Jesuits alone rejected it with ridicule, and
  published a piece, entitled “_Rabat-joie_, &c.—A Damper: or,
  Observations on what has lately happened at Port-Royal as to the
  affair of the Holy Thorn.” This was answered in November 1656, in a
  tract supposed to have been written by M. de Pont Château, who was
  called “the Clerk of the Holy Thorn,” assisted by Pascal. (Recueil de
  Pieces, &c. de Port-Royal, pp. 283–448.) It has been well observed,
  “that many laborious and voluminous discussions might have been saved,
  if the simple and very reasonable rule had been adopted of waiving
  investigation into the credibility of any narrative of supernatural or
  pretended supernatural events said to have taken place _upon
  consecrated ground, or under sacred roofs_.” (Natural Hist. of
  Enthusiasm, p. 236.) “It is well known,” says Mosheim, “that the
  Jansenists and Augustinians have long pretended to confirm their
  doctrine by miracles; and they even acknowledge that these miracles
  have saved them when their affairs have been reduced to a desperate
  situation.” (Mosh. Eccl. Hist., cent. xvii., sect. 2.)

Footnote 311:

  Isa. xxviii. 15.

Footnote 312:

  Isa. xxx. 12–14.

Footnote 313:

  Ezek. xiii. 23. Pascal does not, either here or elsewhere, when
  quoting from Scripture, adhere very closely to the original, nor even
  to the Vulgate version.

Footnote 314:

  This was the name given to St. Francis de Sales, bishop and prince of
  Geneva, previously to his canonization, which took place in 1665.

Footnote 315:

  Serm. 24 in Cantic.

Footnote 316:

  These two postscripts have been often admired—the former for the
  author’s elegant excuse for the length of his letter; the latter for
  the adroitness with which he turns his apology for an undesigned
  mistake into a stroke at the disingenuousness of his opponents.




                           LETTER XVII.[317]

               TO THE REVEREND FATHER ANNAT, JESUIT.[318]

THE AUTHOR OF THE LETTERS VINDICATED FROM THE CHARGE OF HERESY—AN
   HERETICAL PHANTOM—POPES AND GENERAL COUNCILS NOT INFALLIBLE IN
   QUESTIONS OF FACT.


                                                     _January 23, 1657._

REVEREND FATHER,—Your former behavior had induced me to believe that you
were anxious for a truce in our hostilities; and I was quite disposed to
agree that it should be so. Of late, however, you have poured forth such
a volley of pamphlets, in such rapid succession, as to make it apparent
that peace rests on a very precarious footing when it depends on the
silence of Jesuits. I know not if this rupture will prove very
advantageous to you; but, for my part, I am far from regretting the
opportunity which it affords me of rebutting that stale charge of heresy
with which your writings abound.

It is full time, indeed, that I should, once for all, put a stop to the
liberty you have taken to treat me as a heretic—a piece of gratuitous
impertinence which seems to increase by indulgence, and which is
exhibited in your last book in a style of such intolerable assurance,
that were I not to answer the charge as it deserves, I might lay myself
open to the suspicion of being actually guilty. So long as the insult
was confined to your associates I despised it, as I did a thousand
others with which they interlarded their productions. To these my
fifteenth letter was a sufficient reply. But you now repeat the charge
with a different air: you make it the main point of your vindication. It
is, in fact, almost the only thing in the shape of argument that you
employ. You say that, “as a complete answer to my fifteen letters, it is
enough to say fifteen times that I am a heretic; and having been
pronounced such, I deserve no credit.” In short, you make no question of
my apostasy, but assume it as a settled point, on which you may build
with all confidence. You are serious then, father, it would seem, in
deeming me a heretic. I shall be equally serious in replying to the
charge.

You are well aware, sir, that heresy is a charge of so grave a
character, that it is an act of high presumption to advance, without
being prepared to substantiate it. I now demand your proofs. When was I
seen at Charenton? When did I fail in my presence at mass, or in my
Christian duty to my parish church? What act of union with heretics, or
of schism with the Church, can you lay to my charge? What council have I
contradicted? What papal constitution have I violated? You _must_
answer, father, else——You know what I mean.[319] And what _do_ you
answer? I beseech all to observe it: First of all, you assume “that the
author of the letters is a Port-Royalist;” then you tell us “that
Port-Royal is declared to be heretical;” and, therefore, you conclude,
“the author of the letters must be a heretic.” It is not on me, then,
father, that the weight of this indictment falls, but on Port-Royal; and
I am only involved in the crime because you suppose me to belong to that
establishment; so that it will be no difficult matter for me to
exculpate myself from the charge. I have no more to say than that I am
not a member of that community; and to refer you to my letters, in which
I have declared that “I am a private individual;” and again in so many
words, that “I am not of Port-Royal,” as I said in my sixteenth letter,
which preceded your publication.

You must fall on some other way, then, to prove me a heretic, otherwise
the whole world will be convinced that it is beyond your power to make
good your accusation. Prove from my writings that I do not receive the
constitution.[320] My letters are not very voluminous—there are but
sixteen of them—and I defy you or anybody else to detect in them the
slightest foundation for such a charge. I shall, however, with your
permission, produce something out of them to prove the reverse. When,
for example, I say in the fourteenth that, “by killing our brethren in
mortal sin, according to your maxims, we are damning those for whom
Jesus Christ died,” do I not plainly acknowledge that Jesus Christ died
for those who may be damned, and, consequently, declare it to be false
“that he died only for the predestinated,” which is the error condemned
in the fifth proposition? Certain it is, father, that I have not said a
word in behalf of these impious propositions, which I detest with all my
heart.[321] And even though Port-Royal should hold them, I protest
against your drawing any conclusion from this against me, as, thank God,
I have no sort of connection with any community except the Catholic,
Apostolic and Roman Church, in the bosom of which I desire to live and
die, in communion with the pope, the head of the Church, and beyond the
pale of which I am persuaded there is no salvation.

How are you to get at a person who talks in this way, father? On what
quarter will you assail me, since neither my words nor my writings
afford the slightest handle to your accusations, and the obscurity in
which my person is enveloped forms my protection against your
threatenings? You feel yourselves smitten by an invisible hand—a hand,
however, which makes your delinquencies visible to all; and in vain do
you try to strike at me in the dark, through the sides of those with
whom you suppose me to be associated. I fear you not, either on my own
account or on that of any other, being bound by no tie either to a
community or to any individual whatsoever.[322] All the influence which
your Society possesses can be of no avail in my case. From this world I
have nothing to hope, nothing to dread, nothing to desire. Through the
goodness of God, I have no need of any man’s money or any man’s
patronage. Thus, father, I elude all your attempts to catch hold of me.
You may touch Port-Royal if you choose, but you shall not touch me. You
may turn people out of the Sorbonne, but that will not turn me out of my
domicile. You may hatch plots against priests and doctors, but not
against me, for I am neither the one nor the other. And thus, father,
you never perhaps had to do, in the whole course of your experience,
with a person so completely beyond your reach, and therefore so
admirably qualified for dealing with your errors—one perfectly free—one
without engagement, entanglement, relationship, or business of any
kind—one, too, who is pretty well versed in your maxims, and determined,
as God shall give him light, to discuss them, without permitting any
earthly consideration to arrest or slacken his endeavors.

Since, then, you can do nothing against me, what good purpose can it
serve to publish so many calumnies, as you and your brethren are doing,
against a class of persons who are in no way implicated in our disputes?
You shall not escape under these subterfuges: you shall be made to feel
the force of the truth in spite of them. How does the case stand? I tell
you that you are ruining Christian morality by divorcing it from the
love of God, and dispensing with its obligation; and you talk about “the
death of Father Mester”—a person whom I never saw in my life. I tell you
that your authors permit a man to kill another for the sake of an apple,
when it would be dishonorable to lose it; and you reply by informing me
that somebody “has broken into the poor’s box at St. Merri!” Again, what
can you possibly mean by mixing me up perpetually with the book “On the
Holy Virginity,” written by some father of the Oratory, whom I never
saw, any more than his book?[323] It is rather extraordinary, father,
that you should thus regard all that are opposed to you as if they were
one person. Your hatred would grasp them all at once, and would hold
them as a body of reprobates, every one of whom is responsible for all
the rest.

There is a vast difference between Jesuits and all their opponents.
There can be no doubt that you compose one body, united under one head;
and your regulations, as I have shown, prohibit you from printing
anything without the approbation of your superiors, who are responsible
for all the errors of individual writers, and who “cannot excuse
themselves by saying that they did not observe the errors in any
publication, for they ought to have observed them.” So say your
ordinances, and so say the letters of your generals, Aquaviva,
Vitelleschi, &c. We have good reason, therefore, for charging upon you
the errors of your associates, when we find they are sanctioned by your
superiors and the divines of your Society. With me, however, father, the
case stands otherwise. I have not subscribed the book of the Holy
Virginity. All the alms-boxes in Paris may be broken into, and yet I am
not the less a good Catholic for all that. In short, I beg to inform
you, in the plainest terms, that nobody is responsible for my letters
but myself, and that I am responsible for nothing but my letters.

Here, father, I might fairly enough have brought our dispute to an
issue, without saying a word about those other persons whom you
stigmatize as heretics, in order to comprehend me under that
condemnation. But as I have been the occasion of their ill treatment, I
consider myself bound in some sort to improve the occasion, and I shall
take advantage of it in three particulars. One advantage, not
inconsiderable in its way, is that it will enable me to vindicate the
innocence of so many calumniated individuals. Another, not inappropriate
to my subject, will be to disclose, at the same time, the artifices of
your policy in this accusation. But the advantage which I prize most of
all this, that it affords me an opportunity of apprizing the world of
the falsehood of that scandalous report which you have been so busily
disseminating, namely, “that the Church is divided by a new heresy.” And
as you are deceiving multitudes into the belief that the points on which
you are raising such a storm are essential to the faith, I consider it
of the last importance to quash these unfounded impressions, and
distinctly to explain here what these points are, so as to show that, in
point of fact, there are no heretics in the Church.

I presume, then, that were the question to be asked, Wherein consists
the heresy of those called Jansenists? the immediate reply would be,
“These people hold that the commandments of God are impracticable to
men—that grace is irresistible—that we have not free will to do either
good or evil—that Jesus Christ did not die for all men, but only for the
elect; in short, they maintain the five propositions condemned by the
pope.” Do you not give it out to all that this is the ground on which
you persecute your opponents? Have you not said as much in your books,
in your conversations, in your catechisms? A specimen of this you gave
at the late Christmas festival at St. Louis. One of your little
shepherdesses was questioned thus:—

“For whom did Jesus Christ come into the world, my dear?”

“For all men, father.”

“Indeed, my child; so you are not one of those new heretics who say that
he came only for the elect?”

Thus children are led to believe you, and many others beside children;
for you entertain people with the same stuff in your sermons, as Father
Crasset did at Orleans, before he was laid under an interdict. And I
frankly own that, at one time, I believed you myself. You had given me
precisely the same idea of these good people; so that when you pressed
them on these propositions, I narrowly watched their answer, determined
never to see them more, if they did not renounce them as palpable
impieties.

This, however, they have done in the most unequivocal way. M. de
Sainte-Beuve,[324] king’s professor in the Sorbonne, censured these
propositions in his published writings long before the pope; and other
Augustinian doctors, in various publications, and, among others, in a
work “On Victorious Grace,”[325] reject the same articles as both
heretical and strange doctrines. In the preface to that work they say
that these propositions are “heretical and Lutheran, forged and
fabricated at pleasure, and are neither to be found in Jansenius, nor in
his defenders.” They complain of being charged with such sentiments, and
address you in the words of St. Prosper, the first disciple of St.
Augustine their master, to whom the semi-Pelagians of France had
ascribed similar opinions, with the view of bringing him into disgrace:
“There are persons who denounce us, so blinded by passion that they have
adopted means for doing so which ruin their own reputation. They have,
for this purpose, fabricated propositions of the most impious and
blasphemous character, which they industriously circulate, to make
people believe that we maintain them in the wicked sense which they are
pleased to attach to them. But our reply will show at once our
innocence, and the malignity of these persons who have ascribed to us a
set of impious tenets, of which they are themselves the sole inventors.”

Truly, father, when I found that they had spoken in this way before the
appearance of the papal constitution—when I saw that they afterwards
received that decree with all possible respect, that they offered to
subscribe it, and that M. Arnauld had declared all this in his second
letter, in stronger terms than I can report him, I should have
considered it a sin to doubt their soundness in the faith. And, in fact,
those who were formerly disposed to refuse absolution to M. Arnauld’s
friends, have since declared, that after his explicit disclaimer of the
errors imputed to him, there was no reason left for cutting off either
him or them from the communion of the Church. Your associates, however,
have acted very differently; and it was this that made me begin to
suspect that you were actuated by prejudice.

You threatened first to compel them to sign that constitution, so long
as you thought they would resist it; but no sooner did you see them
quite ready of their own accord to submit to it, than we heard no more
about this. Still, however, though one might suppose this ought to have
satisfied you, you persisted in calling them heretics, “because,” said
you, “their heart belies their hand; they are Catholics outwardly, but
inwardly they are heretics.”[326]

This, father, struck me as very strange reasoning; for where is the
person of whom as much may not be said at any time? And what endless
trouble and confusion would ensue, were it allowed to go on! “If,” says
Pope St. Gregory, “we refuse to believe a confession of faith made in
conformity to the sentiments of the Church, we cast a doubt over the
faith of all Catholics whatsoever.” I am afraid, father, to use the
words of the same pontiff, when speaking of a similar dispute in his
time, “that your object is to make these persons heretics in spite of
themselves; because to refuse to credit those who testify by their
confession that they are in the true faith, is not to purge heresy, but
to create it—_hoc non est hæresim purgare, sed facere_”. But what
confirmed me in my persuasion that there was indeed no heretic in the
Church, was finding that our so-called heretics had vindicated
themselves so successfully, that you were unable to accuse them of a
single error in the faith, and that you were reduced to the necessity of
assailing them on questions of _fact_ only, touching Jansenius, which
could not possibly be construed into heresy. You insist, it now appears,
on their being compelled to acknowledge “that these propositions are
contained in Jansenius, word for word, every one of them, in so many
terms,” or, as you express it, _Singulares, individuæ, totidem verbis
apud Jansenium contentæ_.

Thenceforth your dispute became, in my eyes, perfectly indifferent. So
long as I believed that you were debating the truth or falsehood of the
propositions, I was all attention, for that quarrel touched the faith;
but when I discovered that the bone of contention was whether they were
to be found, word for word, in Jansenius or not, as religion ceased to
be interested in the controversy, I ceased to be interested in it also.
Not but that there was some presumption that you were speaking the
truth; because to say that such and such expressions are to be found,
word for word, in an author, is a matter in which there can be no
mistake. I do not wonder, therefore, that so many people, both in France
and at Rome, should have been led to believe, on the authority of a
phrase so little liable to suspicion, that Jansenius has actually taught
these obnoxious tenets. And for the same reason, I was not a little
surprised to learn that this same point of fact, which you had
propounded as so certain and so important, was false; and that after
being challenged to quote the pages of Jansenius, in which you had found
these propositions “word for word,” you have not been able to point them
out to this day.

I am the more particular in giving this statement, because, in my
opinion, it discovers, in a very striking light, the spirit of your
Society in the whole of this affair; and because some people will be
astonished to find that, notwithstanding all the facts above mentioned,
you have not ceased to publish that they are heretics still. But you
have only altered the heresy to suit the time; for no sooner had they
freed themselves from one charge than your fathers, determined that they
should never want an accusation, substituted another in its place. Thus,
in 1653, their heresy lay in the _quality_ of the propositions; then
came the _word for word_ heresy; after that, we had the _heart_ heresy.
And now we hear nothing of any of these, and they must be heretics,
forsooth, unless they sign a declaration to the effect, “_that the sense
of the doctrine of Jansenius is contained in the sense of the five
propositions_.”

Such is your present dispute. It is not enough for you that they condemn
the five propositions, and everything in Jansenius that bears any
resemblance to them, or is contrary to St. Augustine; for all that they
have done already. The point at issue is not, for example, if Jesus
Christ died for the elect only—they condemn that as much as you do; but,
is Jansenius of that opinion, or not? And here I declare, more strongly
than ever, that your quarrel affects me as little as it affects the
Church. For although I am no doctor, any more than you, father, I can
easily see, nevertheless, that it has no connection with the faith. The
only question is, to ascertain what is the sense of Jansenius. Did they
believe that his doctrine corresponded to the proper and literal sense
of these propositions, they would condemn it; and they refuse to do so,
because they are convinced it is quite the reverse; so that although
they should misunderstand it, still they would not be heretics, seeing
they understand it only in a Catholic sense.

To illustrate this by an example, I may refer to the conflicting
sentiments of St. Basil and St. Athanasius, regarding the writings of
St. Denis of Alexandria, which St. Basil, conceiving that he found in
them the sense of Arius against the equality of the Father and the Son,
condemned as heretical, but which St. Athanasius, on the other hand,
judging them to contain the genuine sense of the Church, maintained to
be perfectly orthodox. Think you, then, father, that St. Basil, who held
these writings to be Arian, had a right to brand St. Athanasius as a
heretic, because he defended them? And what ground would he have had for
so doing, seeing that it was not Arianism that his brother defended, but
the true faith which he considered these writings to contain? Had these
two saints agreed about the true sense of these writings, and had both
recognized this heresy in them, unquestionably St. Athanasius could not
have approved of them, without being guilty of heresy; but as they were
at variance respecting the sense of the passages, St. Athanasius was
orthodox in vindicating them, even though he may have understood them
wrong; because in that case it would have been merely an error in a
matter of fact, and because what he defended was really the Catholic
faith, which he supposed to be contained in these writings.

I apply this to you, father. Suppose you were agreed upon the sense of
Jansenius, and your adversaries were ready to admit with you that he
held, for example, _that grace cannot be resisted_; those who refused to
condemn him would be heretical. But as your dispute turns upon the
meaning of that author, and they believe that, according to his
doctrine, _grace may be resisted_, whatever heresy you may be pleased to
attribute to him, you have no ground to brand them as heretics, seeing
they condemn the sense which you put on Jansenius, and you dare not
condemn the sense which they put on him. If, therefore, you mean to
convict them, show that the sense which they ascribe to Jansenius is
heretical; for then they will be heretical themselves. But how could you
accomplish this, since it is certain, according to your own showing,
that the meaning which they give to his language has never been
condemned?

To elucidate the point still further, I shall assume as a principle,
what you yourselves acknowledge—_that the doctrine of efficacious grace
has never been condemned, and that the pope has not touched it by his
constitution_. And, in fact, when he proposed to pass judgment on the
five propositions, the question of efficacious grace was protected
against all censure. This is perfectly evident from the judgments of the
consulters,[327] to whom the pope committed them for examination. These
judgments I have in my possession, in common with many other persons in
Paris, and, among the rest, the Bishop of Montpelier,[328] who brought
them from Rome. It appears from this document, that they were divided in
their sentiments; that the chief persons among them, such as the Master
of the Sacred Palace, the Commissary of the Holy Office, the General of
the Augustinians, and others, conceiving that these propositions might
be understood in the sense of _efficacious grace_, were of opinion that
they ought not to be censured; whereas the rest, while they agreed that
the propositions would not have merited condemnation, had they borne
that sense, judged that they ought to be censured, because, as they
contended, this was very far from being their proper and natural sense.
The pope, accordingly, condemned them; and all parties have acquiesced
in his judgment.

It is certain, then, father, that efficacious grace has not been
condemned. Indeed, it is so powerfully supported by St. Augustine, by
St. Thomas, and all his school, by a great many popes and councils, and
by all tradition, that to tax it with heresy would be an act of impiety.
Now, all those whom you condemn as heretics declare that they find
nothing in Jansenius, but this doctrine of efficacious grace. And this
was the only point which they maintained at Rome. You have acknowledged
this yourself, when you declare that, “when pleading before the pope,
they did not say a single word about the propositions, but occupied the
whole time in talking about efficacious grace.”[329] So that whether
they be right or wrong in this supposition, it is undeniable, at least,
that what they suppose to be the sense is not heretical sense; and that,
consequently, they are no heretics: for, to state the matter in two
words, either Jansenius has merely taught the doctrine of efficacious
grace, and in this case he has no errors; or he has taught some other
thing, and in this case he has no defenders. The whole question turns on
ascertaining whether Jansenius has actually maintained something
different from efficacious grace; and should it be found that he has,
you will have the honor of having better understood him, but they will
not have the misfortune of having erred from the faith.

It is matter of thankfulness to God, then, father, that there is in
reality no heresy in the Church. The question relates entirely to a
point of fact, of which no heresy can be made; for the Church, with
divine authority, decides the points of _faith_, and cuts off from her
body all who refuse to receive them. But she does not act in the same
manner in regard to matters of _fact_. And the reason is, that our
salvation is attached to the faith which has been revealed to us, and
which is preserved in the Church by tradition, but that it has no
dependence on facts which have not been revealed by God. Thus we are
bound to believe that the commandments of God are not impracticable; but
we are under no obligation to know what Jansenius has said upon that
subject. In the determination of points of faith God guides the Church
by the aid of his unerring Spirit; whereas in matters of fact, he leaves
her to the direction of reason and the senses, which are the natural
judges of such matters. None but God was able to instruct the Church in
the faith; but to learn whether this or that proposition is contained in
Jansenius, all we require to do is to read his book. And from hence it
follows, that while it is heresy to resist the decisions of the faith,
because this amounts to an opposing of our own spirit to the Spirit of
God, it is no heresy, though it may be an act of presumption, to
disbelieve certain particular facts, because this is no more than
opposing reason—it may be enlightened reason—to an authority which is
great indeed, but in this matter not infallible.

What I have now advanced is admitted by all theologians, as appears from
the following axiom of Cardinal Bellarmine, a member of your Society:
“General and lawful councils are incapable of error in defining the
dogmas of faith; but they may err in questions of fact.” In another
place he says: “The pope, as pope, and even as the head of a universal
council, may err in particular controversies of fact, which depend
principally on the information and testimony of men.” Cardinal Baronius
speaks in the same manner: “Implicit submission is due to the decisions
of councils in points of faith; but, in so far as persons and their
writings are concerned, the censures which have been pronounced against
them have not been so rigorously observed, because there is none who may
not chance to be deceived in such matters.” I may add that, to prove
this point, the Archbishop of Toulouse[330] has deduced the following
rule from the letters of two great popes—St. Leon and Pelagius II.:
“That the proper object of councils is the faith; and whatsoever is
determined by them, independently of the faith, may be reviewed and
examined anew: whereas nothing ought to be re-examined that has been
decided in a matter of faith; because, as Tertullian observes, the rule
of faith alone is immovable and irrevocable.”

Hence it has been seen that, while general and lawful councils have
never contradicted one another in points of faith, because, as M. de
Toulouse has said, “it is not allowable to examine _de novo_ decisions
in matters of faith;” several instances have occurred in which these
same councils have disagreed in points of fact, where the discussion
turned upon the sense of an author; because, as the same prelate
observes, quoting the popes as his authorities, “everything determined
in councils, not referring to the faith, may be reviewed and examined
_de novo_.” An example of this contrariety was furnished by the fourth
and fifth councils, which differed in their interpretation of the same
authors. The same thing happened in the case of two popes, about a
proposition maintained by certain monks of Scythia. Pope Hormisdas,
understanding it in a bad sense, had condemned it; but Pope John II.,
his successor, upon re-examining the doctrine, understood it in a good
sense, approved it, and pronounced it to be orthodox. Would you say that
for this reason one of these popes was a heretic? And must you not,
consequently, acknowledge that, provided a person condemn the heretical
sense which a pope may have ascribed to a book, he is no heretic because
he declines condemning that book, while he understands it in a sense
which it is certain the pope has not condemned? If this cannot be
admitted, one of these popes must have fallen into error.

I have been anxious to familiarize you with these discrepancies among
Catholics regarding questions of fact, which involve the understanding
of the sense of a writer, showing you father against father, pope
against pope, and council against council, to lead you from these to
other examples of opposition, similar in their nature, but somewhat more
disproportioned in respect of the parties concerned. For, in the
instances I am now to adduce, you will see councils and popes ranged on
one side, and Jesuits on the other; and yet you have never charged your
brethren, for this opposition, even with presumption, much less with
heresy.

You are well aware, father, that the writings of Origen were condemned
by a great many popes and councils, and particularly by the fifth
general council, as chargeable with certain heresies, and, among others,
that of _the reconciliation of the devils at the day of judgment_. Do
you suppose that, after this, it became absolutely imperative, as a test
of Catholicism, to confess that Origen actually maintained these errors,
and that it is not enough to condemn them, without attributing them to
him? If this were true, what would become of your worthy Father Halloix,
who has asserted the purity of Origen’s faith, as well as many other
Catholics, who have attempted the same thing, such as Pico Mirandola,
and Genebrard, doctor of the Sorbonne? Is it not, moreover, a certain
fact, that the same fifth general council condemned the writings of
Theodoret against St. Cyril, describing them as impious, “contrary to
the true faith, and tainted with the Nestorian heresy?”[331] And yet
this has not prevented Father Sirmond,[332] a Jesuit, from defending
him, or from saying, in his life of that father, that “his writings are
entirely free from the heresy of Nestorius.”

It is evident, therefore, that as the Church, in condemning a book,
assumes that the error which she condemns is contained in that book, it
is a point of faith to hold that error as condemned; but it is not a
point of faith to hold that the book, in fact, contains the error which
the Church supposes it does. Enough has been said, I think, to prove
this; I shall, therefore, conclude my examples by referring to that of
Pope Honorius, the history of which is so well known. At the
commencement of the seventh century, the Church being troubled by the
heresy of the Monothelites,[333] that pope, with the view of terminating
the controversy, passed a decree which seemed favorable to these
heretics, at which many took offence. The affair, nevertheless, passed
over without making much disturbance during his pontificate; but fifty
years after, the Church being assembled in the sixth general council, in
which Pope Agathon presided by his legates, this decree was impeached,
and, after being read and examined, was condemned as containing the
heresy of the Monothelites, and under that character burnt, in open
court, along with the other writings of these heretics. Such was the
respect paid to this decision, and such the unanimity with which it was
received throughout the whole Church, that it was afterwards ratified by
two other general councils, and likewise by two popes, Leon II. and
Adrian II., the latter of whom lived two hundred years after it had
passed; and this universal and harmonious agreement remained undisturbed
for seven or eight centuries. Of late years, however, some authors, and
among the rest Cardinal Bellarmine, without seeming to dread the
imputation of heresy, have stoutly maintained, against all this array of
popes and councils, that the writings of Honorius are free from the
error which had been ascribed to them; “because,” says the cardinal,
“general councils being liable to err in questions of fact, we have the
best grounds for asserting that the sixth council was mistaken with
regard to the fact now under consideration; and that, misconceiving the
sense of the Letters of Honorius, it has placed this pope most unjustly
in the ranks of heretics.” Observe, then, I pray you, father, that a man
is not heretical for saying that Pope Honorius was not a heretic; even
though a great many popes and councils, after examining his writings,
should have declared that he was so.

I now come to the question before us, and shall allow you to state your
case as favorably as you can. What will you then say, father, in order
to stamp your opponents as heretics? That “Pope Innocent X. has declared
that the error of the five propositions is to be found in Jansenius?” I
grant you that; what inference do you draw from it? That “it is
heretical to deny that the error of the five propositions is to be found
in Jansenius?” How so, father? have we not here a question of fact,
exactly similar to the preceding examples? The pope has declared that
the error of the five propositions is contained in Jansenius, in the
same way as his predecessors decided that the errors of the Nestorians
and the Monothelites polluted the pages of Theodoret and Honorius. In
the latter case, your writers hesitate not to say, that while they
condemn the heresies, they do not allow that these authors actually
maintained them; and, in like manner, your opponents now say, that they
condemn the five propositions, but cannot admit that Jansenius has
taught them. Truly, the two cases are as like as they could well be; and
if there be any disparity between them, it is easy to see how far it
must go in favor of the present question, by a comparison of many
particular circumstances, which, as they are self-evident, I do not
specify. How comes it to pass, then, that when placed in precisely the
same predicament, your friends are Catholics and your opponents
heretics? On what strange principle of exception do you deprive the
latter of a liberty which you freely award to all the rest of the
faithful? What answer will you make to this, father? Will you say, “The
pope has confirmed his constitution by a brief.” To this I would reply,
that two general councils and two popes confirmed the condemnation of
the Letters of Honorius. But what argument do you found upon the
language of that brief, in which all that the pope says is, that “he has
condemned the doctrine of Jansenius in these five propositions?” What
does that add to the constitution, or what more can you infer from it?
Nothing certainly, except that as the sixth council condemned the
doctrine of Honorius, in the belief that it was the same with that of
the Monothelites, so the pope has said that he has condemned the
doctrine of Jansenius in these five propositions, because he was led to
suppose it was the same with that of the five propositions. And how
could he do otherwise than suppose it? Your Society published nothing
else; and you, yourself, father, who have asserted that the said
propositions were in that author “word for word,” happened to be in Rome
(for I know all your motions) at the time when the censure was passed.
Was he to distrust the sincerity or the competence of so many grave
ministers of religion? And how could he help being convinced of the
fact, after the assurance which you had given him that the propositions
were in that author “word for word?” It is evident, therefore, that in
the event of its being found that Jansenius has not supported these
doctrines, it would be wrong to say, as your writers have done in the
cases before mentioned, that the pope has deceived himself in this point
of fact, which it is painful and offensive to publish at any time; the
proper phrase is, that you have deceived the pope, which, as you are now
pretty well known, will create no scandal.

Determined, however, to have a heresy made out, let it cost what it may,
you have attempted, by the following manœuvre, to shift the question
from the point of fact, and make it bear upon a point of faith. “The
pope,” say you, “declares that he has condemned the doctrine of
Jansenius in these five propositions; therefore it is essential to the
faith to hold that the doctrine of Jansenius touching these five
propositions is heretical, _let it be what it may_.” Here is a strange
point of faith, that a doctrine is heretical _be what it may_. What! if
Jansenius should happen to maintain that “_we are capable of resisting
internal grace_,” and that “_it is false to say that Jesus Christ died
for the elect only_,” would this doctrine be condemned just because it
is his doctrine? Will the proposition, that “_man has a freedom of will
to do good or evil_,” be true when found in the pope’s constitution, and
false when discovered in Jansenius? By what fatality must he be reduced
to such a predicament, that truth, when admitted into his book, becomes
heresy? You must confess, then, that he is only heretical on the
supposition that he is friendly to the errors condemned, seeing that the
constitution of the pope is the rule which we must apply to Jansenius,
to judge if his character answer the description there given of him;
and, accordingly, the question, _Is his doctrine heretical?_ must be
resolved by another question of fact, _Does it correspond to the natural
sense of these propositions?_ as it must necessarily be heretical if it
does correspond to that sense, and must necessarily be orthodox if it be
of an opposite character. For, in one word, since, according to the pope
and the bishops, “the propositions are condemned _in their proper and
natural sense_,” they cannot possibly be condemned in the sense of
Jansenius, except on the understanding that the sense of Jansenius is
the same with the proper and natural sense of these propositions; and
this I maintain to be purely a question of fact.

The question, then, still rests upon the point of fact, and cannot
possibly be tortured into one affecting the faith. But though incapable
of twisting it into a matter of heresy, you have it in your power to
make it a pretext for persecution, and might, perhaps, succeed in this,
were there not good reason to hope that nobody will be found so blindly
devoted to your interests as to countenance such a disgraceful
proceeding, or inclined to compel people, as you wish to do, to sign a
declaration _that they condemn these propositions in the sense of
Jansenius_, without explaining what the sense of Jansenius is. Few
people are disposed to sign a blank confession of faith. Now this would
really be to sign one of that description, leaving you to fill up the
blank afterwards with whatsoever you pleased, as you would be at liberty
to interpret according to your own taste the unexplained sense of
Jansenius. Let it be explained, then, beforehand, otherwise we shall
have, I fear, another version of your proximate power, without any sense
at all—_abstrahendo ab omni sensu_.[334] This mode of proceeding, you
must be aware, does not take with the world. Men in general detest all
ambiguity, especially in the matter of religion, where it is highly
reasonable that one should know at least what one is asked to condemn.
And how is it possible for doctors, who are persuaded that Jansenius can
bear no other sense than that of efficacious grace, to consent to
declare that they condemn his doctrine without explaining it, since,
with their present convictions, which no means are used to alter, this
would be neither more nor less than to condemn efficacious grace, which
cannot be condemned without sin? Would it not, therefore, be a piece of
monstrous tyranny to place them in such an unhappy dilemma, that they
must either bring guilt upon their souls in the sight of God, by signing
that condemnation against their consciences, or be denounced as heretics
for refusing to sign it?[335]

But there is a mystery under all this. You Jesuits cannot move a step
without a stratagem. It remains for me to explain why you do not explain
the sense of Jansenius. The sole purpose of my writing is to discover
your designs, and, by discovering, to frustrate them. I must, therefore,
inform those who are not already aware of the fact, that your great
concern in this dispute being to uphold the _sufficient grace_ of your
Molina, you could not effect this without destroying the _efficacious
grace_ which stands directly opposed to it. Perceiving, however, that
the latter was now sanctioned at Rome, and by all the learned in the
Church, and unable to combat the doctrine on its own merits, you
resolved to attack it in a clandestine way, under the name of the
doctrine of Jansenius. You were resolved, accordingly, to get Jansenius
condemned without explanation; and, to gain your purpose, gave out that
his doctrine was not that of efficacious grace, so that every one might
think he was at liberty to condemn the one without denying the other.
Hence your efforts, in the present day, to impress this idea upon the
minds of such as have no acquaintance with that author; an object which
you yourself, father, have attempted, by means of the following
ingenious syllogism: “The pope has condemned the doctrine of Jansenius;
but the pope has not condemned efficacious grace: therefore, the
doctrine of efficacious grace must be different from that of
Jansenius.”[336] If this mode of reasoning were conclusive, it might be
demonstrated in the same way that Honorius and all his defenders are
heretics of the same kind. “The sixth council has condemned the doctrine
of Honorius; but the council has not condemned the doctrine of the
Church: therefore the doctrine of Honorius is different from that of the
Church; and therefore all who defend him are heretics.” It is obvious
that no conclusion can be drawn from this; for the pope has done no more
than condemned the doctrine of the five propositions, which was
represented to him as the doctrine of Jansenius.

But it matters not; you have no intention to make use of this logic for
any length of time. Poor as it is, it will last sufficiently long to
serve your present turn. All that you wish to effect by it, in the mean
time, is to induce those who are unwilling to condemn efficacious grace
to condemn Jansenius with the less scruple. When this object has been
accomplished, your argument will soon be forgotten, and their signatures
remaining as an eternal testimony in condemnation of Jansenius, will
furnish you with an occasion to make a direct attack upon efficacious
grace, by another mode of reasoning much more solid than the former,
which shall be forthcoming in proper time. “The doctrine of Jansenius,”
you will argue, “has been condemned by the universal subscriptions of
the Church. Now this doctrine is manifestly that of efficacious grace”
(and it will be easy for you to prove that); “therefore the doctrine of
efficacious grace is condemned even by the confession of his defenders.”

Behold your reason for proposing to sign the condemnation of a doctrine
without giving an explanation of it! Behold the advantage you expect to
gain from subscriptions thus procured! Should your opponents, however,
refuse to subscribe, you have another trap laid for them. Having
dexterously combined the question of faith with that of fact, and not
allowing them to separate between them, nor to sign the one without the
other, the consequence will be, that, because they could not subscribe
the two together, you will publish it in all directions that they have
refused the two together. And thus though, in point of fact, they simply
decline acknowledging that Jansenius has maintained the propositions
which they condemn, which cannot be called heresy, you will boldly
assert that they have refused to condemn the propositions themselves,
and that it is this that constitutes their heresy.

Such is the fruit which you expect to reap from their refusal, and which
will be no less useful to you than what you might have gained from their
consent. So that, in the event of these signatures being exacted, they
will fall into your snares, whether they sign or not, and in both cases
you will gain your point; such is your dexterity in uniformly putting
matters into a train for your own advantage, whatever bias they may
happen to take in their course!

How well I know you, father! and how grieved am I to see that God has
abandoned you so far as to allow you such happy success in such an
unhappy course! Your good fortune deserves commiseration, and can excite
envy only in the breasts of those who know not what truly good fortune
is. It is an act of charity to thwart the success you aim at in the
whole of this proceeding, seeing that you can only reach it by the aid
of falsehood, and by procuring credit to one of two lies—either that the
Church has condemned efficacious grace, or that those who defend that
doctrine maintain the five condemned errors.

The world must, therefore, be apprized of two facts: First, That, by
your own confession, efficacious grace has not been condemned; and
secondly, That nobody supports these errors. So that it may be known
that those who may refuse to sign what you are so anxious to exact from
them, refuse merely in consideration of the question of _fact_; and
that, being quite ready to subscribe that of _faith_, they cannot be
deemed heretical on that account; because, to repeat it once more,
though it be matter of faith to believe these propositions to be
heretical, it will never be matter of faith to hold that they are to be
found in the pages of Jansenius. They are innocent of all error; that is
enough. It may be that they interpret Jansenius too favorably; but it
may be also that you do not interpret him favorably enough. I do not
enter upon this question. All that I know is, that, according to your
maxims, you believe that you may, without sin, publish him to be a
heretic contrary to your own knowledge; whereas, according to their
maxims, they cannot, without sin, declare him to be a Catholic, unless
they are persuaded that he is one. They are, therefore, more honest than
you, father; they have examined Jansenius more faithfully than you; they
are no less intelligent than you; they are, therefore, no less credible
witnesses than you. But come what may of this point of fact, they are
certainly Catholics; for, in order to be so, it is not necessary to
declare that another man is not a Catholic; it is enough, in all
conscience, if a person, without charging error upon anybody else,
succeed in discharging himself.

                  *       *       *       *       *

Reverend father,—If you have found any difficulty in deciphering this
letter, which is certainly not printed in the best possible type, blame
nobody but yourself. Privileges are not so easily granted to me as they
are to you. You can procure them even for the purpose of combating
miracles; I cannot have them even to defend myself. The printing-houses
are perpetually haunted. In such circumstances, you yourself would not
advise me to write you any more letters for it is really a sad annoyance
to be obliged to have recourse to an Osnabruck impression.[337]

-----

Footnote 317:

  M. Nicole furnished the materials for this letter. (Nicole, iv. 324.)

Footnote 318:

  _Francis Annat_, the same person formerly referred to at p. 102. He
  became French provincial of the Jesuits, and confessor to Louis XIV.

Footnote 319:

  A threat, evidently, of administering to him the _Mentiris
  impudentissime_ of the Capuchin, mentioned at p. 310.

Footnote 320:

  _The constitution_—that is, the bull of Pope Alexander VII., issued in
  October 1656, in which he not only condemned the Five Propositions,
  but, in compliance with the solicitations of the Jesuits, added an
  express clause, to the effect that these had been faithfully extracted
  from Jansenius, and were heretical in the sense in which he
  (Jansenius) employed them. This was a more stringent constitution than
  the first; but the Jansenists were ready to meet him on this point;
  they replied that a declaration of this nature overstepped the limits
  of the papal authority, and that the pope’s infallibility did not
  extend to a judgment of _facts_.

Footnote 321:

  _The Five Propositions._—A brief view of these celebrated Propositions
  may be here given, as necessary to the understanding of the text. They
  were as follows:—I. That some commandments of God are impracticable
  even to the righteous, who desire to keep them, according to their
  present strength. II. That grace is irresistible. III. That moral
  freedom consists, not in exemption from necessity, but from
  constraint. IV. That to assert that the will may resist or obey the
  motions of converting grace as it pleased, was a heresy of the
  semi-Pelagians. V. That to assert that Jesus Christ died for all men,
  without exception, is an error of the semi-Pelagians. For a fuller
  explication of the controversy, the reader must be referred to the
  Introduction.

Footnote 322:

  Pascal might say this with truth, for his only relatives being nuns,
  the tie of earthly relationship was considered by him as no longer
  existing; and beyond personal friendship, he had really no connection
  with Port-Royal. There is as little truth as force, therefore, in the
  taunt of a late advocate of the Jesuits, who says, in reference to
  this passage, “Pascal was intimately connected with Port-Royal, he was
  even numbered among its recluses; and yet, in the act of unmasking the
  presumed duplicity of the Jesuits, the sublime writer did not scruple
  to imitate it.” (Hist. de la Comp. de Jésus, par J. Cretineau-Joly,
  tom. iv. p. 54. Paris, 1845.)

Footnote 323:

  “This book of the _Holy Virginity_ was a translation from St.
  Augustine, made by Father Seguenot, priest of the Oratory. So far, all
  was right; but the priest had added to the original text some odd and
  peculiar remarks of his own, which merited censure. As the publication
  came from the Oratory, a community always attached to the doctrine of
  St. Augustine, an attempt was made to throw the blame on those called
  Jansenists.” (Note by Nicole, iv. 332.)

Footnote 324:

  “M. Jacques de Sainte-Beuve, one of the ablest divines of his age,
  preferred to relinquish his chair in the Sorbonne rather than concur
  in the censure of M. Arnauld, whose orthodoxy he regarded as beyond
  suspicion. He died in 1677.” (Note by Nicole.)

Footnote 325:

  This work was entitled “On the Victorious Grace of Jesus Christ; or,
  Molina and his followers convicted of the error of the Pelagians and
  Semi-Pelagians. By the Sieur de Bonlieu. Paris, 1651.” The real author
  was the celebrated M. de la Lane, well known in that controversy.
  (Note by Nicole.)

Footnote 326:

  Réponse a quelques demandes, pp. 27, 47.

Footnote 327:

  These judgments, or _Vota Consultorum_, as they were called, have been
  often printed, and particularly at the end of the _Journal de M. de
  St. Amour_—a book essentially necessary to the right understanding of
  all the intrigues employed in the condemnation of Jansenius. (Note by
  Nicole.)

Footnote 328:

  This was _Francis du Bosquet_, who, from being Bishop of Lodeve, was
  made Bishop of Montpelier in 1655, and died in 1676. He was one of the
  most learned bishops of his time in ecclesiastical matters. (Note by
  Nicole.)

Footnote 329:

  Cavill, p. 35.

Footnote 330:

  M. de Marca, an illustrious prelate, who was Archbishop of Toulouse,
  before he was nominated to the see of Paris, of which he was only
  prevented by death from taking possession. (Nicole.)

Footnote 331:

  _Nestorian heresy_—so called from Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople,
  in the fifth century, who was accused of dividing Christ into _two
  persons_; in other words, representing his human nature a distinct
  person from his divine. There is some reason to think, however, that
  he was quite sound in the faith, and that his real offence was his
  opposition to the use of the phrase, which then came into vogue, _the
  Mother of God_, as applied to the Virgin, whom he called, in
  preference, _the Mother of Christ_.

Footnote 332:

  This was James Sirmond (the uncle of Anthony, formerly mentioned), a
  learned Jesuit, and confessor to Louis XIII. He was distinguished as
  an ecclesiastical historian. (Tableau de la Litt. Fran., iv. 202.)

Footnote 333:

  _The Monothelites_, who arose in the seventh century, were so called
  from holding that there was but _one will_ in Christ, his human will
  being absorbed, as it were, in the divine.

Footnote 334:

  See Letter i., p. 74.

Footnote 335:

  The persecution here supposed was soon lamentably realized, and
  exactly in the way which our author seemed to think impossible.

Footnote 336:

  Cavill, p. 23.

Footnote 337:

  This postscript, which is wanting in the ordinary editions, appeared
  in the first edition at the close of this letter. From this it appears
  that, in consequence of the extreme desire of the Jesuits to discover
  the author, and their increasing resentment against him, he was
  compelled to send this letter to Osnabruck, an obscure place in
  Germany, where it was printed in a very small and indistinct
  character. The _privileges_ referred to were official licenses to
  print books, which, at this time, when the Jesuits were in power, it
  was difficult for their opponents to obtain. Annat had published
  against the miracles of Port-Royal. Pascal was not permitted to
  publish in self-defence. At the same period, no Protestant books could
  be printed at Paris; they were generally sent to Geneva or the Low
  Countries for this purpose, or published furtively under fictitious
  names.




                             LETTER XVIII.

                 TO THE REVEREND FATHER ANNAT, JESUIT.

SHOWING STILL MORE PLAINLY, ON THE AUTHORITY OF FATHER ANNAT HIMSELF,
   THAT THERE IS REALLY NO HERESY IN THE CHURCH, AND THAT IN QUESTIONS
   OF FACT WE MUST BE GUIDED BY OUR SENSES, AND NOT BY AUTHORITY EVEN OF
   THE POPES.


                                                       _March 24, 1657._

REVEREND FATHER,—Long have you labored to discover some error in the
creed or conduct of your opponents; but I rather think you will have to
confess, in the end, that it is a more difficult task than you imagined
to make heretics of people who are not only no heretics, but who hate
nothing in the world so much as heresy. In my last letter I succeeded in
showing that you accuse them of one heresy after another, without being
able to stand by one of the charges for any length of time; so that all
that remained for you was to fix on their refusal to condemn “the sense
of Jansenius,” which you insist on their doing without explanation. You
must have been sadly in want of heresies to brand them with, when you
were reduced to this. For, who ever heard of a heresy which nobody could
explain? The answer was ready, therefore, that if Jansenius has no
errors, it is wrong to condemn him; and if he has, you were bound to
point them out, that we might know at least what we were condemning.
This, however, you have never yet been pleased to do; but you have
attempted to fortify your position by decrees,[338] which made nothing
in your favor, as they gave no sort of explanation of the sense of
Jansenius, said to have been condemned in the five propositions. This
was not the way to terminate the dispute. Had you mutually agreed as to
the genuine sense of Jansenius, and had the only difference between you
been as to whether that sense was heretical or not, in that case the
decisions which might pronounce it to be heretical, would have touched
the real question in dispute. But the great dispute being about the
sense of Jansenius, the one party saying that they could see nothing in
it inconsistent with the sense of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the
other party asserting that they saw in it an heretical sense which they
would not express. It is clear that a constitution[339] which does not
say a word about this difference of opinion, and which only condemns in
general and without explanation the sense of Jansenius, leaves the point
in dispute quite undecided.

You have accordingly been repeatedly told, that as your discussion turns
on a matter of fact, you would never be able to bring it to a conclusion
without declaring what you understand by the sense of Jansenius. But, as
you continued obstinate in your refusal to make this explanation, I
endeavored, as a last resource, to extort it from you, by hinting, in my
last letter, that there was some mystery under the efforts you were
making to procure the condemnation of this sense without explaining it,
and that your design was to make this indefinite censure recoil, some
day or other, upon the doctrine of efficacious grace, by showing, as you
could easily do, that this was exactly the doctrine of Jansenius. This
has reduced you to the necessity of making a reply; for, had you
pertinaciously refused, after such an insinuation, to explain your views
of that sense, it would have been apparent, to persons of the smallest
penetration, that you condemned it in the sense of efficacious grace—a
conclusion which, considering the veneration in which the Church holds
that holy doctrine, would have overwhelmed you with disgrace.

You have, therefore, been forced to speak out your mind; and we find it
expressed in your reply to that part of my letter in which I remarked,
that “if Jansenius was capable of any other sense than that of
efficacious grace, he had no defenders; but if his writings bore no
other sense, he had no errors to defend.” You found it impossible to
deny this position, father; but you have attempted to parry it by the
following distinction: “It is not sufficient,” say you, “for the
vindication of Jansenius, to allege that he merely holds the doctrine of
efficacious grace, for that may be held in two ways—the one heretical,
according to Calvin, which consists in maintaining that the will, when
under the influence of grace, has not the power of resisting it; the
other orthodox, according to the Thomists and the Sorbonists, which is
founded on the principles established by the councils, and which is,
that efficacious grace of itself governs the will in such a way that it
still has the power of resisting it.”

All this we grant, father; but you conclude by adding: “Jansenius would
be orthodox, if he defended efficacious grace in the sense of the
Thomists; but he is heretical, because he opposes the Thomists, and
joins issue with Calvin, who denies the power of resisting grace.” I do
not here enter upon the question of fact, whether Jansenius really
agrees with Calvin. It is enough for my purpose that you assert that he
does, and that you now inform me that by the sense of Jansenius you have
all along understood nothing more than the sense of Calvin. Was this all
you meant, then, father? Was it only the error of Calvin that you were
so anxious to get condemned, under the name of “the sense of Jansenius?”
Why did you not tell us this sooner? You might have saved yourself a
world of trouble; for we were all ready, without the aid of bulls or
briefs, to join with you in condemning that error. What urgent necessity
there was for such an explanation! What a host of difficulties has it
removed! We were quite at a loss, my dear father, to know what error the
popes and bishops meant to condemn, under the name of “the sense of
Jansenius.” The whole Church was in the utmost perplexity about it, and
not a soul would relieve us by an explanation. This, however, has now
been done by you, father—you whom the whole of your party regard as the
chief and prime mover of all their councils, and who are acquainted with
the whole secret of this proceeding. You, then, have told us that the
sense of Jansenius is neither more nor less than the sense of Calvin,
which has been condemned by the council.[340] Why, this explains
everything. We know now that the error which they intended to condemn,
under these terms—_the sense of Jansenius_—is neither more nor less than
the sense of Calvin; and that, consequently, we, by joining with them in
the condemnation of Calvin’s doctrine, have yielded all due obedience to
these decrees. We are no longer surprised at the zeal which the popes
and some bishops manifested against “the sense of Jansenius.” How,
indeed, could they be otherwise than zealous against it, believing as
they did the declarations of those who publicly affirmed that it was
identically the same with that of Calvin?

I must maintain, then, father, that you have no further reason to
quarrel with your adversaries; for they detest that doctrine as heartily
as you do. I am only astonished to see that you are ignorant of this
fact, and that you have such an imperfect acquaintance with their
sentiments on this point, which they have so repeatedly expressed in
their published works. I flatter myself that, were you more intimate
with these writings, you would deeply regret your not having made
yourself acquainted sooner, in the spirit of peace, with a doctrine
which is in every respect so holy and so Christian, but which passion,
in the absence of knowledge, now prompts you to oppose. You would find,
father, that they not only hold that an effective resistance may be made
to those feebler graces which go under the name of _exciting_ or
_inefficacious_, from their not terminating in the good with which they
inspire us; but that they are, moreover, as firm in maintaining, in
opposition to Calvin, the power which the will has to resist even
efficacious and victorious grace, as they are in contending against
Molina for the power of this grace over the will, and fully as jealous
for the one of these truths as they are for the other. They know too
well that man, of his own nature, has always the power of sinning and of
resisting grace; and that, since he became corrupt, he unhappily carries
in his breast a fount of concupiscence which infinitely augments that
power; but that, notwithstanding this, when it pleases God to visit him
with his mercy, he makes the soul do what he wills, and in the manner he
wills it to be done, while, at the same time, the infallibility of the
divine operation does not in any way destroy the natural liberty of man,
in consequence of the secret and wonderful ways by which God operates
this change. This has been most admirably explained by St. Augustine, in
such a way as to dissipate all those imaginary inconsistencies which the
opponents of efficacious grace suppose to exist between the sovereign
power of grace over the free-will and the power which the free-will has
to resist grace. For, according to this great saint, whom the popes and
the Church have held to be a standard authority on this subject, God
transforms the heart of man, by shedding abroad in it a heavenly
sweetness, which, surmounting the delights of the flesh, and inducing
him to feel, on the one hand, his own mortality and nothingness, and to
discover, on the other hand, the majesty and eternity of God, makes him
conceive a distaste for the pleasures of sin, which interpose between
him and incorruptible happiness. Finding his chiefest joy in the God who
charms him, his soul is drawn towards him infallibly, but of its own
accord, by a motion perfectly free, spontaneous, love-impelled; so that
it would be its torment and punishment to be separated from him. Not but
that the person has always the power of forsaking his God, and that he
may not actually forsake him, provided he choose to do it. But how
_could_ he choose such a course, seeing that the will always inclines to
that which is most agreeable to it, and that in the case we now suppose
nothing can be more agreeable than the possession of that _one good_,
which comprises in itself all other good things. “_Quod enim_ (says St.
Augustine) _amplius nos delectat, secundum_ _operemur necesse est_—Our
actions are necessarily determined by that which affords us the greatest
pleasure.”

Such is the manner in which God regulates the free will of man without
encroaching on its freedom, and in which the free will, which always
may, but never will, resist his grace, turns to God with a movement as
voluntary as it is irresistible, whensoever he is pleased to draw it to
himself by the sweet constraint of his efficacious inspirations.[341]

These, father, are the divine principles of St. Augustine and St.
Thomas, according to which it is equally true that _we have the power of
resisting grace_, contrary to Calvin’s opinion, and that, nevertheless,
to employ the language of Pope Clement VIII., in his paper addressed to
the Congregation _de Auxiliis_, “God forms within us the motion of our
will, and effectually disposes of our hearts, by virtue of that empire
which his supreme majesty has over the volitions of men, as well as over
the other creatures under heaven, according to St. Augustine.”

On the same principle, it follows that we act of ourselves, and thus, in
opposition to another error of Calvin, that we have merits which are
truly and properly _ours_; and yet, as God is the first principle of our
actions, and as, in the language of St. Paul, he “worketh in us that
which is pleasing in his sight;” “our merits are the gifts of God,” as
the Council of Trent says.

By means of this distinction we demolish the profane sentiment of
Luther, condemned by that Council, namely, that “we co-operate in no way
whatever towards our salvation, any more than inanimate things;”[342]
and, by the same mode of reasoning, we overthrow the equally profane
sentiment of the school of Molina, who will not allow that it is by the
strength of divine grace that we are enabled to co-operate with it in
the work of our salvation, and who thereby comes into hostile collision
with that principle of faith established by St. Paul, “That it is God
who worketh in us both to will and to do.”

In fine, in this way we reconcile all those passages of Scripture which
seem quite inconsistent with each other, such as the following: “Turn ye
unto God”—“Turn thou us, and we shall be turned”—“Cast away iniquity
from you”—“It is God who taketh away iniquity from his people”—“Bring
forth works meet for repentance”—“Lord, thou hast wrought all our works
in us”—“Make ye a new heart and a new spirit”—“A new spirit will I give
you, and a new heart will I create within you,” &c.

The only way of reconciling these apparent contrarieties, which ascribe
our good actions at one time to God, and at another time to ourselves,
is to keep in view the distinction, as stated by St. Augustine, that
“our actions are ours in respect of the free will which produces them;
but that they are also of God, in respect of his grace which enables our
free will to produce them;” and that, as the same writer elsewhere
remarks, “God enables us to do what is pleasing in his sight, by making
us will to do even what we might have been unwilling to do.”

It thus appears, father, that your opponents are perfectly at one with
the modern Thomists, for the Thomists hold, with them, both the power of
resisting grace, and the infallibility of the effect of grace; of which
latter doctrine they profess themselves the most strenuous advocates, if
we may judge from a common maxim of their theology, which Alvarez,[343]
one of the leading men among them, repeats so often in his book, and
expresses in the following terms (disp. 72, n. 4): “When efficacious
grace moves the free will, it infallibly consents; because the effect of
grace is such, that, although the will has the power of withholding its
consent, it nevertheless consents in effect.” He corroborates this by a
quotation from his master, St. Thomas: “The will of God cannot fail to
be accomplished; and, accordingly, when it is his pleasure that a man
should consent to the influence of grace, he consents infallibly, and
even necessarily, not by an absolute necessity, but by a necessity of
infallibility.” In effecting this, divine grace does not trench upon
“the power which man has to resist it, if he wishes to do so;” it merely
prevents him from wishing to resist it. This has been acknowledged by
your Father Petau, in the following passage (tom. i. p. 602): “The grace
of Jesus Christ insures infallible perseverance in piety, though not by
necessity; for a person may refuse to yield his consent to grace, if he
be so inclined, as the council states; but that same grace provides that
he shall never be so inclined.”

This, father, is the uniform doctrine of St. Augustine, of St. Prosper,
of the fathers who followed them, of the councils, of St. Thomas, and of
all the Thomists in general. It is likewise, whatever you may think of
it, the doctrine of your opponents. And let me add, it is the doctrine
which you yourself have lately sealed with your approbation. I shall
quote your own words: “The doctrine of efficacious grace, which admits
that we have a power of resisting it, is orthodox, founded on the
councils, and supported by the Thomists and Sorbonists.” Now, tell us
the plain truth, father; if you had known that your opponents really
held this doctrine, the interests of your Society might perhaps have
made you scruple before pronouncing this public approval of it; but,
acting on the supposition that they were hostile to the doctrine, the
same powerful motive has induced you to authorize sentiments which you
know in your heart to be contrary to those of your Society; and by this
blunder, in your anxiety to ruin their principles, you have yourself
completely confirmed them. So that, by a kind of prodigy, we now behold
the advocates of efficacious grace vindicated by the advocates of
Molina—an admirable instance of the wisdom of God in making all things
concur to advance the glory of the truth.

Let the whole world observe, then, that by your own admission, the truth
of this efficacious grace, which is so essential to all the acts of
piety, which is so dear to the Church, and which is the purchase of her
Saviour’s blood, is so indisputably Catholic, that there is not a single
Catholic, not even among the Jesuits, who would not acknowledge its
orthodoxy. And let it be noticed, at the same time, that, according to
your own confession, not the slightest suspicion of error can fall on
those whom you have so often stigmatized with it. For so long as you
charged them with clandestine heresies, without choosing to specify them
by name, it was as difficult for them to defend themselves as it was
easy for you to bring such accusations. But now, when you have come to
declare that the error which constrains you to oppose them, is the
heresy of Calvin which you supposed them to hold, it must be apparent to
every one that they are innocent of all error; for so decidedly hostile
are they to this, the only error you charge upon them, that they
protest, by their discourses, by their books, by every mode, in short,
in which they can testify their sentiments, that they condemn that
heresy with their whole heart, and in the same manner as it has been
condemned by the Thomists, whom you acknowledge, without scruple, to be
Catholics, and who have never been suspected to be anything else.

What will you say against them now, father? Will you say that they are
heretics still, because, although they do not adopt the sense of Calvin,
they will not allow that the sense of Jansenius is the same with that of
Calvin? Will you presume to say that this is matter of heresy? Is it not
a pure question of fact, with which heresy has nothing to do? It would
be heretical to say that we have not the power of resisting efficacious
grace; but would it be so to doubt that Jansenius held that doctrine? Is
this a revealed truth? Is it an article of faith which must be believed,
on pain of damnation? or is it not, in spite of you, a point of fact, on
account of which it would be ridiculous to hold that there were heretics
in the Church.

Drop this epithet, then, father, and give them some other name, more
suited to the nature of your dispute. Tell them, they are ignorant and
stupid—that they misunderstand Jansenius. These would be charges in
keeping with your controversy; but it is quite irrelevant to call them
heretics. As this, however, is the only charge from which I am anxious
to defend them, I shall not give myself much trouble to show that they
rightly understand Jansenius. All I shall say on the point, father, is,
that it appears to me that were he to be judged according to your own
rules, it would be difficult to prove him not to be a good Catholic. We
shall try him by the test you have proposed. “To know,” say you,
“whether Jansenius is sound or not, we must inquire whether he defends
efficacious grace in the manner of Calvin, who denies that man has the
power of resisting it—in which case he would be heretical; or in the
manner of the Thomists, who admit that it may be resisted—for then he
would be Catholic.” Judge, then, father, whether he holds that grace may
be resisted, when he says, “That we have always a power to resist grace,
according to the council; that free will may always act or not act, will
or not will, consent or not consent, do good or do evil; and that man,
in this life, has always these two liberties, which may be called by
some contradictions.”[344] Judge, likewise, if he be not opposed to the
error of Calvin, as you have described it, when he occupies a whole
chapter (21st) in showing “that the Church has condemned that heretic
who denies that efficacious grace acts on the free will in the manner
which has been so long believed in the Church, so as to leave it in the
power of free will to consent or not to consent; whereas, according to
St. Augustine and the council, we have always the power of withholding
our consent if we choose; and according to St. Prosper, God bestows even
upon his elect the will to persevere, in such a way as not to deprive
them of the power to will the contrary.” And, in one word, judge if he
do not agree with the Thomists, from the following declaration in
chapter 4th: “That all that the Thomists have written with the view of
reconciling the efficaciousness of grace with the power of resisting it,
so entirely coincides with his judgment, that to ascertain his
sentiments on this subject, we have only to consult their writings.”

Such being the language he holds on these heads, my opinion is, that he
believes in the power of resisting grace; that he differs from Calvin,
and agrees with the Thomists, because he has said so; and that he is,
therefore, according to your own showing, a Catholic. If you have any
means of knowing the sense of an author otherwise than by his
expressions; and if, without quoting any of his passages, you are
disposed to maintain, in direct opposition to his own words, that he
denies this power of resistance, and that he is for Calvin and against
the Thomists, do not be afraid, father, that I will accuse you of heresy
for that. I shall only say, that you do not seem properly to understand
Jansenius; but we shall not be the less on that account children of the
same Church.

How comes it, then, father, that you manage this dispute in such a
passionate spirit, and that you treat as your most cruel enemies, and as
the most pestilent of heretics, a class of persons whom you cannot
accuse of any error, nor of anything whatever, except that they do not
understand Jansenius as you do? For what else in the world do you
dispute about, except the sense of that author? You would have them to
condemn it. They ask what you mean them to condemn. You reply, that you
mean the error of Calvin. They rejoin that they condemn that error; and
with this acknowledgment (unless it is syllables you wish to condemn,
and not the thing which they signify), you ought to rest satisfied. If
they refuse to say that they condemn the sense of Jansenius, it is
because they believe it to be that of St. Thomas, and thus this unhappy
phrase has a very equivocal meaning betwixt you. In your mouth it
signifies the sense of Calvin; in theirs the sense of St. Thomas. Your
dissensions arise entirely from the different ideas which you attach to
the same term. Were I made umpire in the quarrel, I would interdict the
use of the word Jansenius, on both sides; and thus, by obliging you
merely to express what you understand by it, it would be seen that you
ask nothing more than the condemnation of Calvin, to which they
willingly agree; and that they ask nothing more than the vindication of
the sense of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, in which you again perfectly
coincide.

I declare, then, father, that for my part I shall continue to regard
them as good Catholics, whether they condemn Jansenius, on finding him
erroneous, or refuse to condemn him, from finding that he maintains
nothing more than what you yourself acknowledge to be orthodox; and that
I shall say to them what St. Jerome said to John, bishop of Jerusalem,
who was accused of holding the eight propositions of Origen: “Either
condemn Origen, if you acknowledge that he has maintained these errors,
or else deny that he has maintained them—_Aut nega hoc dixisse eum qui
arguitur; aut si locutus est talia, eum damna qui dixerit_.”

See, father, how these persons acted, whose sole concern was with
principles, and not with persons; whereas you who aim at persons more
than principles, consider it a matter of no consequence to condemn
errors, unless you procure the condemnation of the individuals to whom
you choose to impute them.

How ridiculously violent your conduct is, father! and how ill calculated
to insure success! I told you before, and I repeat it, violence and
verity can make no impression on each other. Never were your accusations
more outrageous, and never was the innocence of your opponents more
discernible: never has efficacious grace been attacked with greater
subtility, and never has it been more triumphantly established. You have
made the most desperate efforts to convince people that your disputes
involved points of faith; and never was it more apparent that the whole
controversy turned upon a mere point of fact. In fine, you have moved
heaven and earth to make it appear that this point of fact is founded on
truth; and never were people more disposed to call it in question. And
the obvious reason of this is, that you do not take the natural course
to make them believe a point of fact, which is to convince their senses,
and point out to them in a book the words which you allege are to be
found in it. The means you have adopted are so far removed from this
straightforward course, that the most obtuse minds are unavoidably
struck by observing it. Why did you not take the plan which I followed
in bringing to light the wicked maxims of your authors—which was to cite
faithfully the passages of their writings from which they were
extracted? This was the mode followed by the curés of Paris, and it
never fails to produce conviction. But, when you were charged by them
with holding, for example, the proposition of Father Lamy, that a “monk
may kill a person who threatens to publish calumnies against himself or
his order, when he cannot otherwise prevent the publication,”—what would
you have thought, and what would the public have said, if they had not
quoted the place where that sentiment is literally to be found? or if,
after having been repeatedly demanded to quote their authority, they
still obstinately refused to do it? or if, instead of acceding to this,
they had gone off to Rome, and procured a bull, ordaining all men to
acknowledge the truth of their statement? Would it not be undoubtedly
concluded that they had surprised the pope, and that they would never
have had recourse to this extraordinary method, but for want of the
natural means of substantiating the truth, which matters of fact furnish
to all who undertake to prove them? Accordingly, they had no more to do
than to tell us that Father Lamy teaches this doctrine _in tome 5, disp.
36, n. 118, page 544, of the Douay edition_; and by this means everybody
who wished to see it found it out, and nobody could doubt about it any
longer. This appears to be a very easy and prompt way of putting an end
to controversies of fact, when one has got the right side of the
question.

How comes it, then, father, that you do not follow this plan? You said,
in your book, that the five propositions are in Jansenius, word for
word, in the identical terms—_iisdem verbis_. You were told they were
not. What had you to do after this, but either to cite the page, if you
had really found the words, or to acknowledge that you were mistaken.
But you have done neither the one nor the other. In place of this, on
finding that all the passages from Jansenius, which you sometimes adduce
for the purpose of hoodwinking the people, are not “the condemned
propositions in their individual identity,” as you had engaged to show
us, you present us with Constitutions from Rome, which, without
specifying any particular place, declare that the propositions have been
extracted from his book.

I am sensible, father, of the respect which Christians owe to the Holy
See, and your antagonists give sufficient evidence of their resolution
ever to abide by its decisions. Do not imagine that it implied any
deficiency in this due deference on their part, that they represented to
the pope, with all the submission which children owe to their father,
and members to their head, that it was possible he might be deceived on
this point of fact—that he had not caused it to be investigated during
his pontificate; and that his predecessor, Innocent X., had merely
examined into the heretical character of the propositions, and not into
the fact of their connection with Jansenius. This they stated to the
commissary of the Holy Office, one of the principal examinators,
stating, that they could not be censured, according to the sense of any
author, because they had been presented for examination on their own
merits, and without considering to what author they might belong:
further, that upwards of sixty doctors, and a vast number of other
persons of learning and piety, had read that book carefully over,
without ever having encountered the proscribed propositions, and that
they have found some of a quite opposite description: that those who had
produced that impression on the mind of the pope, might be reasonably
presumed to have abused the confidence he reposed in them, inasmuch as
they had an interest in decrying that author, who has convicted Molina
of upwards of fifty errors:[345] that what renders this supposition
still more probable is, that they have a certain maxim among them, one
of the best authenticated in their whole system of theology, which is,
“that they may, without criminality, calumniate those by whom they
conceive themselves to be unjustly attacked:” and that, accordingly,
their testimony being so suspicious, and the testimony of the other
party so respectable, they had some ground for supplicating his
holiness, with the most profound humility, that he would ordain an
investigation to be made into this fact, in the presence of doctors
belonging to both parties, in order that a solemn and regular decision
might be formed on the point in dispute. “Let there be a convocation of
able judges (says St. Basil on a similar occasion, Ep. 75); let each of
them be left at perfect freedom; let them examine my writings; let them
judge if they contain errors against the faith; let them read the
objections and the replies; that so a judgment may be given in due form,
and with proper knowledge of the case, and not a defamatory libel
without examination.”

It is quite vain for you, father, to represent those who would act in
the manner I have now supposed as deficient in proper subjection to the
Holy See. The popes are very far from being disposed to treat Christians
with that imperiousness which some would fain exercise under their name.
“The Church,” says Pope St. Gregory,[346] “which has been trained in the
school of humility, does not command with authority, but persuades by
reason, her children whom she believes to be in error, to obey what she
has taught them.” And so far from deeming it a disgrace to review a
judgment into which they may have been surprised, we have the testimony
of St. Bernard for saying that they glory in acknowledging the mistake.
“The Apostolic See (he says, Ep. 180) can boast of this recommendation,
that it never stands on the point of honor, but willingly revokes a
decision that has been gained from it by surprise; indeed, it is highly
just to prevent any from profiting by an act of injustice, and more
especially before the Holy See.”

Such, father, are the proper sentiments with which the popes ought to be
inspired; for all divines are agreed that they may be surprised,[347]
and that their supreme character, so far from warranting them against
mistakes, exposes them the more readily to fall into them, on account of
the vast number of cares which claim their attention. This is what the
same St. Gregory says to some persons who were astonished at the
circumstance of another pope having suffered himself to be deluded: “Why
do you wonder,” says he, “that we should be deceived, we who are but
men? Have you not read that David, a king who had the spirit of
prophecy, was induced, by giving credit to the falsehoods of Ziba, to
pronounce an unjust judgment against the son of Jonathan? Who will think
it strange, then, that we, who are not prophets, should sometimes be
imposed upon by deceivers? A multiplicity of affairs presses on us, and
our minds, which, by being obliged to attend to so many things at once,
apply themselves less closely to each in particular, are the more easily
liable to be imposed upon in individual cases.”[348] Truly, father, I
should suppose that the popes know better than you whether they may be
deceived or not. They themselves tell us that popes, as well as the
greatest princes, are more exposed to deception than individuals who are
less occupied with important avocations. This must be believed on their
testimony. And it is easy to imagine by what means they come to be thus
over-reached. St. Bernard, in the letter which he wrote to Innocent II.,
gives us the following description of the process: “It is no wonder, and
no novelty, that the human mind may be deceived, and is deceived. You
are surrounded by monks who come to you in the spirit of lying and
deceit. They have filled your ears with stories against a bishop, whose
life has been most exemplary, but who is the object of their hatred.
These persons bite like dogs, and strive to make good appear evil.
Meanwhile, most holy father, you put yourself into a rage against your
own son. Why have you afforded matter of joy to his enemies? Believe not
every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God. I trust that,
when you have ascertained the truth, all this delusion, which rests on a
false report, will be dissipated. I pray the Spirit of truth to grant
you the grace to separate light from darkness, and to favor the good by
rejecting the evil.” You see then, father, that the eminent rank of the
popes does not exempt them from the influence of delusion; and I may now
add, that it only serves to render their mistakes more dangerous and
important than those of other men. This is the light in which St.
Bernard represents them to Pope Eugenius: “There is another fault, so
common among the great of this world, that I never met one of them who
was free from it; and that is, holy father, an excessive credulity, the
source of numerous disorders. From this proceed violent persecutions
against the innocent, unfounded prejudices against the absent, and
tremendous storms about nothing (_pro nihilo_). This, holy father, is a
universal evil, from the influence of which, if you are exempt, I shall
only say, you are the only individual among all your compeers who can
boast of that privilege.”[349]

I imagine, father, that the proofs I have brought are beginning to
convince you that the popes are liable to be surprised. But, to complete
your conversion, I shall merely remind you of some examples, which you
yourself have quoted in your book, of popes and emperors whom heretics
have actually deceived. You will remember, then, that you have told us
that Apollinarius surprised Pope Damasius, in the same way that
Celestius surprised Zozimus. You inform us, besides, that one called
Athanasius deceived the Emperor Heraclius, and prevailed on him to
persecute the Catholics. And lastly, that Sergius obtained from Honorius
that infamous decretal which was burned at the sixth council, “by
playing the busy-body,” as you say, “about the person of that pope.”

It appears, then, father, by your own confession, that those who act
this part about the persons of kings and popes, do sometimes artfully
entice them to persecute the faithful defenders of the truth, under the
persuasion that they are persecuting heretics. And hence the popes, who
hold nothing in greater horror than these surprisals, have, by a letter
of Alexander III., enacted an ecclesiastical statute, which is inserted
in the canonical law, to permit the suspension of the execution of their
bulls and decretals, when there is ground to suspect that they have been
imposed upon. “If,” says that pope to the Archbishop of Ravenna, “we
sometimes send decretals to your fraternity which are opposed to your
sentiments, give yourselves no distress on that account. We shall expect
you either to carry them respectfully into execution, or to send us the
reason why you conceive they ought not to be executed; for we deem it
right that you should not execute a decree, which may have been procured
from us by artifice and surprise.” Such has been the course pursued by
the popes, whose sole object is to settle the disputes of Christians,
and not to follow the passionate counsels of those who strive to involve
them in trouble and perplexity. Following the advice of St. Peter and
St. Paul, who in this followed the commandment of Jesus Christ, they
avoid domination. The spirit which appears in their whole conduct is
that of peace and truth.[350] In this spirit they ordinarily insert in
their letters this clause, which is tacitly understood in them all—“_Si
ita est—si preces veritate nilantur_—If it be so as we have heard it—if
the facts be true.” It is quite clear, if the popes themselves give no
force to their bulls, except in so far as they are founded on genuine
facts, that it is not the bulls alone that prove the truth of the facts,
but that, on the contrary, even according to the canonists, it is the
truth of the facts which renders the bulls lawfully admissible.

In what way, then, are we to learn the truth of facts? It must be by the
eyes, father, which are the legitimate judges of such matters, as reason
is the proper judge of things natural and intelligible, and faith of
things supernatural and revealed. For, since you will force me into this
discussion, you must allow me to tell you, that, according to the
sentiments of the two greatest doctors of the Church, St. Augustine and
St. Thomas, these three principles of our knowledge, the senses, reason,
and faith, have each their separate objects, and their own degrees of
certainty. And as God has been pleased to employ the intervention of the
senses to give entrance to faith (for “faith cometh by hearing”), it
follows, that so far from faith destroying the certainty of the senses,
to call in question the faithful report of the senses, would lead to the
destruction of faith. It is on this principle that St. Thomas explicitly
states that God has been pleased that the sensible accidents should
subsist in the eucharist, in order that the senses, which judge only of
these accidents, might not be deceived.

We conclude, therefore, from this, that whatever the proposition may be
that is submitted to our examination, we must first determine its
nature, to ascertain to which of those three principles it ought to be
referred. If it relate to a supernatural truth, we must judge of it
neither by the senses nor by reason, but by Scripture and the decisions
of the Church. Should it concern an unrevealed truth, and something
within the reach of natural reason, reason must be its proper judge. And
if it embrace a point of fact, we must yield to the testimony of the
senses, to which it naturally belongs to take cognizance of such
matters.

So general is this rule, that, according to St. Augustine and St.
Thomas, when we meet with a passage even in the Scripture, the literal
meaning of which, at first sight, appears contrary to what the senses or
reason are certainly persuaded of, we must not attempt to reject their
testimony in this case, and yield them up to the authority of that
apparent sense of the Scripture, but we must interpret the Scripture,
and seek out therein another sense agreeable to that sensible truth;
because, the Word of God being infallible in the facts which it records,
and the information of the senses and of reason, acting in their sphere,
being certain also, it follows that there must be an agreement between
these two sources of knowledge. And as Scripture may be interpreted in
different ways, whereas the testimony of the senses is uniform, we must
in these matters adopt as the true interpretation of Scripture that view
which corresponds with the faithful report of the senses. “Two things,”
says St. Thomas, “must be observed, according to the doctrine of St.
Augustine: first, That Scripture has always one true sense; and
secondly, That as it may receive various senses, when we have discovered
one which reason plainly teaches to be false, we must not persist in
maintaining that this is the natural sense, but search out another with
which reason will agree.”[351]

St. Thomas explains his meaning by the example of a passage in Genesis,
where it is written that “God created two great lights, the sun and the
moon, and also the stars,” in which the Scripture appears to say that
the moon is greater than all the stars; but as it is evident, from
unquestionable demonstration, that this is false, it is not our duty,
says that saint, obstinately to defend the literal sense of that
passage; another meaning must be sought, consistent with the truth of
the fact, such as the following, “That the phrase _great light_, as
applied to the moon, denotes the greatness of that luminary merely as it
appears in our eyes, and not the magnitude of its body considered in
itself.”

An opposite mode of treatment, so far from procuring respect to the
Scripture, would only expose it to the contempt of infidels; because, as
St. Augustine says, “when they found that we believed, on the authority
of Scripture, in things which they assuredly knew to be false, they
would laugh at our credulity with regard to its more recondite truths,
such as the resurrection of the dead and eternal life.” “And by this
means,” adds St. Thomas, “we should render our religion contemptible in
their eyes, and shut up its entrance into their minds.”

And let me add, father, that it would in the same manner be the
likeliest means to shut up the entrance of Scripture into the minds of
heretics, and to render the pope’s authority contemptible in their eyes,
to refuse all those the name of Catholics who would not believe that
certain words were in a certain book, where they are not to be found,
merely because a pope by mistake has declared that they are. It is only
by examining a book that we can ascertain what words it contains.
Matters of fact can only be proved by the senses. If the position which
you maintain be true, show it, or else ask no man to believe it—that
would be to no purpose. Not all the powers on earth can, by the force of
authority, persuade us of a point of fact, any more than they can alter
it; for nothing can make that to be not which really is.

It was to no purpose, for example, that the monks of Ratisbon procured
from Pope St. Leo IX. a solemn decree, by which he declared that the
body of St. Denis, the first bishop of Paris, who is generally held to
have been the Areopagite, had been transported out of France, and
conveyed into the chapel of their monastery. It is not the less true,
for all this, that the body of that saint always lay, and lies to this
hour, in the celebrated abbey which bears his name, and within the walls
of which you would find it no easy matter to obtain a cordial reception
to this bull, although the pope has therein assured us that he has
examined the affair “with all possible diligence (_diligentissimè_), and
with the advice of many bishops and prelates; so that he strictly
enjoins all the French (_districte præcipientes_) to own and confess
that these holy relics are no longer in their country.” The French,
however, who knew that fact to be untrue, by the evidence of their own
eyes, and who, upon opening the shrine, found all those relics entire,
as the historians of that period inform us, believed then, as they have
always believed since, the reverse of what that holy pope had enjoined
them to believe, well knowing that even saints and prophets are liable
to be imposed upon.

It was to equally little purpose that you obtained against Galileo a
decree from Rome, condemning his opinion respecting the motion of the
earth. It will never be proved by such an argument as this that the
earth remains stationary; and if it can be demonstrated by sure
observation that it is the earth and not the sun that revolves, the
efforts and arguments of all mankind put together will not hinder our
planet from revolving, nor hinder themselves from revolving along with
her.

Again, you must not imagine that the letters of Pope Zachary,
excommunicating St. Virgilius for maintaining the existence of the
antipodes, have annihilated the New World; nor must you suppose that,
although he declared that opinion to be a most dangerous heresy, the
king of Spain was wrong in giving more credence to Christopher Columbus,
who came from the place, than to the judgment of the pope, who had never
been there, or that the Church has not derived a vast benefit from the
discovery, inasmuch as it has brought the knowledge of the Gospel to a
great multitude of souls, who might otherwise have perished in their
infidelity.

You see, then, father, what is the nature of matters of fact, and on
what principles they are to be determined; from all which, to recur to
our subject, it is easy to conclude, that if the five propositions are
not in Jansenius, it is impossible that they can have been extracted
from him; and that the only way to form a judgment on the matter, and to
produce universal conviction, is to examine that book in a regular
conference, as you have been desired to do long ago. Until that be done,
you have no right to charge your opponents with contumacy; for they are
as blameless in regard to the point of fact as they are of errors in
point of faith—Catholics in doctrine, reasonable in fact, and innocent
in both.

Who can help feeling astonishment, then, father, to see on the one side
a vindication so complete, and on the other accusations so outrageous!
Who would suppose that the only question between you relates to a single
fact of no importance, which the one party wishes the other to believe
without showing it to them! And who would ever imagine that such a noise
should have been made in the Church for nothing (_pro nihilo_), as good
St. Bernard says! But this is just one of the principal tricks of your
policy, to make people believe that everything is at stake, when, in
reality, there is nothing at stake; and to represent to those
influential persons who listen to you, that the most pernicious errors
of Calvin, and the most vital principles of the faith, are involved in
your disputes, with the view of inducing them, under this conviction, to
employ all their zeal and all their authority against your opponents, as
if the safety of the Catholic religion depended upon it; whereas, if
they came to know that the whole dispute was about this paltry point of
fact, they would give themselves no concern about it, but would, on the
contrary, regret extremely that, to gratify your private passions, they
had made such exertions in an affair of no consequence to the Church.
For, in fine, to take the worst view of the matter, even though it
should be true that Jansenius maintained these propositions, what great
misfortune would accrue from some persons doubting of the fact, provided
they detested the propositions, as they have publicly declared that they
do? Is it not enough that they are condemned by everybody, without
exception, and that, too, in the sense in which you have explained that
you wish them to be condemned? Would they be more severely censured by
saying that Jansenius maintained them? What purpose, then, would be
served by exacting this acknowledgment, except that of disgracing a
doctor and bishop, who died in the communion of the Church? I cannot see
how that should be accounted so great a blessing as to deserve to be
purchased at the expense of so many disturbances. What interest has the
state, or the pope, or bishops, or doctors, or the Church at large, in
this conclusion? It does not affect them in any way whatever, father; it
can affect none but your Society, which would certainly enjoy some
pleasure from the defamation of an author who has done you some little
injury. Meanwhile everything is in confusion, because you have made
people believe that everything is in danger. This is the secret spring
giving impulse to all those mighty commotions, which would cease
immediately were the real state of the controversy once known. And
therefore, as the peace of the Church depended on this explanation, it
was, I conceive, of the utmost importance that it should be given, that,
by exposing all your disguises, it might be manifest to the whole world
that your accusations were without foundation, your opponents without
error, and the Church without heresy.

Such, father, is the end which it has been my desire to accomplish; an
end which appears to me, in every point of view, so deeply important to
religion, that I am at a loss to conceive how those to whom you furnish
so much occasion for speaking can contrive to remain in silence.
Granting that they are not affected with the personal wrongs which you
have committed against them, those which the Church suffers ought, in my
opinion, to have forced them to complain. Besides, I am not altogether
sure if ecclesiastics ought to make a sacrifice of their reputation to
calumny, especially in the matter of religion. They allow you,
nevertheless, to say whatever you please; so that, had it not been for
the opportunity which, by mere accident, you afforded me of taking their
part, the scandalous impressions which you are circulating against them
in all quarters would, in all probability, have gone forth without
contradiction. Their patience, I confess, astonishes me; and the more
so, that I cannot suspect it of proceeding either from timidity or from
incapacity, being well assured that they want neither arguments for
their own vindication, nor zeal for the truth. And yet I see them
religiously bent on silence, to a degree which appears to me altogether
unjustifiable. For my part, father, I do not believe that I can possibly
follow their example. Leave the Church in peace, and I shall leave you
as you are, with all my heart; but so long as you make it your sole
business to keep her in confusion, doubt not but that there shall always
be found within her bosom children of peace, who will consider
themselves bound to employ all their endeavors to preserve her
tranquillity.

-----

Footnote 338:

  Decrees of the pope.

Footnote 339:

  The papal constitution formerly referred to.

Footnote 340:

  The Council of Trent is meant, when Pascal speaks of _the council_,
  without any other specification.

Footnote 341:

  The reader may well be at a loss to see the difference between this
  and the Reformed doctrine. Some explanations will be found in the
  Historical Introduction.

Footnote 342:

  This sentiment was falsely ascribed to Luther by the Council.
  (Leydeck, De Dogm. Jan. 275.)

Footnote 343:

  Diego (or Didacus) Alvarez was one of the most celebrated theologians
  of the order of St. Dominick; he flourished in the sixteenth and
  seventeenth centuries, and died in 1635. He was brought from Spain to
  Rome, to advocate there, along with Father Thomas Lemos the cause of
  the grace of Jesus Christ, which the Jesuit Molina weakened, and
  indeed annihilated. He shone greatly in the famous Congregation _de
  Auxiliis_. (Nicole’s Note.)

Footnote 344:

  His Treatise _passim_, and particularly tom. 3, l. 8, c. 20.

Footnote 345:

  “It may be proper here to give an explanation of the hatred of the
  Jesuits against Jansenius. When the _Augustinus_ of that author was
  printed in 1640, Libertus Fromond, the celebrated professor of
  Louvain, resolved to insert in the end of the book of his friend, who
  had died two years before, a parallel between the doctrine of the
  Jesuits on grace, and the errors of the Marseillois or demi-Pelagians.
  This was quite enough to raise the rancor of the Jesuits against
  Jansenius whom they erroneously supposed was the author of that
  parallel. And as these fathers have long since erased from their code
  of morals the duty of the forgiveness of injuries, they commenced
  their campaign against the book of Jansenius in the Low Countries, by
  a large volume of Theological Theses (in folio, 1641), which are very
  singular productions.” (Note by Nicole.)

Footnote 346:

  On the Book of Job, lib. viii., cap. 1.

Footnote 347:

  _Surprise_ is the word used to denote the case of the pope when taken
  at unawares or deceived by false accounts.

Footnote 348:

  Lib. i., in Dial.

Footnote 349:

  De Consid. lib. ii., c. ult.

Footnote 350:

  Alas! alas!

Footnote 351:

  I. p. q. 68, a. l.




                              LETTER XIX.

  FRAGMENT OF A NINETEENTH PROVINCIAL LETTER, ADDRESSED TO PERE ANNAT.


REVEREND SIR,—If I have caused you some dissatisfaction, in former
Letters, by my endeavors to establish the innocence of those whom you
were laboring to asperse, I shall afford you pleasure in the present, by
making you acquainted with the sufferings which you have inflicted upon
them. Be comforted, my good father, the objects of your enmity are in
distress! And if the Reverend the Bishops should be induced to carry
out, in their respective dioceses, the advice you have given them, to
cause to be subscribed and sworn a certain matter of fact, which is, in
itself, not credible, and which it cannot be obligatory upon any one to
believe—you will indeed succeed in plunging your opponents to the depth
of sorrow, at witnessing the Church brought into so abject a condition.

Yes, sir, I have seen them; and it was with a satisfaction
inexpressible! I have seen these holy men; and this was the attitude in
which they were found. They were not wrapt up in a philosophic
magnanimity; they did not affect to exhibit that indiscriminate firmness
which urges implicit obedience to every momentary impulsive duty; nor
yet were they in a frame of weakness and timidity, which would prevent
them from either discerning the truth, or following it when discerned.
But I found them with minds pious, composed, and unshaken; impressed
with a meek deference for ecclesiastical authority; with tenderness of
spirit, zeal for truth, and a desire to ascertain and obey her dictates:
filled with a salutary suspicion of themselves, distrusting their own
infirmity, and regretting that it should be thus exposed to trial yet
withal, sustained by a modest hope that their Lord will deign to
instruct them by his illuminations, and sustain them by his power; and
believing, that that peace of their Saviour, whose sacred influences it
is their endeavor to maintain, and for whose cause they are brought into
suffering, will be, at once, their guide and their support! I have, in
fine, seen them maintaining a character of Christian piety, whose
power....

                  *       *       *       *       *

I found them surrounded by their friends, who had hastened to impart
those counsels which they deemed the most fitting in their present
exigency. I have heard those counsels; I have observed the manner in
which they were received, and the answers given: and truly, my father,
had you yourself been present, I think you would have acknowledged that,
in their whole procedure, there was the entire absence of a spirit of
insubordination and schism; and that their only desire and aim was, to
preserve inviolate two things—to them infinitely precious—peace and
truth.

For, after due representations had been made to them of the penalties
they would draw upon themselves by their refusal to sign the
Constitution, and the scandal it might cause in the Church, their reply
was....

                  *       *       *       *       *

                                THE END

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          CARTERS’ CATALOGUE.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                REMOVAL.

_Robert Carter & Brothers have removed from No. 285, to No. 530
Broadway, corner of Spring-street._

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                 530 Broadway, New York,
                                                      August, 1856.


                       ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS’
                           New Publications.

                  ------------------------------------

                         The Gospel in Ezekiel,
                  By Thomas Guthrie, D.D. 12mo. $1 00.

              Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation.
          By James McCosh, LL.D., and Dr. Dickie. 8vo. $2 00.

“Those who have read McCosh’s great work on the Divine Government, will
 not wait for any favorable testimony to any thing that comes from his
 pen, but will regard his name on the title-page as a sufficient voucher
 for all that is to follow. The present work fulfills any expectations,
 even the highest, that could have been awakened by the preceding one.
 It is alike comprehensive in its range, accurate and minute in its
 details, original in its structure, and devout and spirited in its tone
 and tendency. It illustrates and carries out the great principle of
 analogy in the Divine plans and works, far more minutely and
 satisfactorily than it has been done before; and while it presents the
 results of the most profound scientific research, it presents them in
 their higher and spiritual relations.”—_Argus._

                    Dr. Williams’s Sermon on Missions.
                    18mo, cloth, gilt edge. 25 cents.

                     Dr. Rice’s Sermon on Preaching.
                    18mo, cloth, gilt edge. 25 cents.

                     Caird’s Sermon before the Queen.
                    18mo, cloth, gilt edge. 25 cents.

 The Theology of Inventions; or, Manifestations of Deity in the works of
                                   Art.
                By the Rev. John Blakely. 12mo. 75 cents.

                            Emblems from Eden.
                 By James Hamilton, D.D. 18mo. 30 cents.

                     The Christian’s Great Interest.
    By the Rev. William Guthrie, with Introd. by Dr. Chalmers. 50 cts.


                             Evening Incense.
       By the author of the “Morning and Night Watches.” 40 cents.

       Lectures to Young Men Delivered, in London for 1856. $1 00.

                       Evenings with the Romanists.
                   By Rev. Hobart Seymour. 12mo. $1 00.

                        Dr. Sprague’s great work.
                    The Annals of the American Pulpit.
      By W. B. Sprague, D.D. Vols. 1 and 2, CONGREGATIONALISTS. 8vo.

 The first volume commences with John Robinson, the first New England
 Pastor, and extends to 1770; and the second volume from this period to
 the close of 1855.

 These volumes contain sketches of about three hundred Congregational
 ministers, including every one who has been considerably distinguished,
 with contributions by a large proportion of the most prominent
 clergymen of different denominations, as well as from many of the most
 distinguished statesmen now on the stage. In all cases in which there
 is any person living to testify concerning the character, there are
 original letters of personal recollection; and in all other cases the
 author has appropriated what has been written and published by the
 cotemporaries of the subjects who could speak from actual knowledge.
 These volumes contain the most complete, as well as most interesting
 history of this branch of the Christian Church that has yet been
 published.

      The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the
                    Constitution of the Human Soul,
            A Course of Lectures by R. S. Storrs, D.D. 8vo.

                       Africa’s Mountain Valley.
        By the author of “Ministering Children.” 16mo. 60 cents.

                       The Christian Philosopher.
 By Thomas Dick, D.D. Re-written and enlarged, with 170 illustrations.

                           Trade and Letters.
               Three Lectures by W. A. Scott, D.D. 16mo.

            Lee on the Inspiration of Holy Scripture. 8vo. $

                 Essays; Theological and Miscellaneous.
                      By Charles Hodge, D.D. 8vo.

                            Sacred Classics.

A series of the choicest productions of the great Divines of the
  seventeenth century, such as Jeremy Taylor, Bates, Beveridge, Bishop
  Hall, Butler, Howe, Baxter, Leighton, and others. The volumes will be
  in neat 12mo form, large type, and uniformly bound in cloth.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          NEW JUVENILE BOOKS.

              Edward Clifford; or, Memories of Childhood,
                With six illustrations. 16mo. 75 cents.

“From the first page to the last, we read this beautiful and impressive
 story with increasing interest, and do not hesitate to commend it to
 every family and Sunday-school library in our land. It bears internal
 evidence of being the work of a finished writer, who, endowed with a
 sensitive temperament, and bereft in early infancy of a dear mother’s
 tender sympathies and care, felt deeply the cold indifference of those
 who could not appreciate the chords of a mind so delicately
 strung.”—_Christian Observer._

                   Tales of Sweden and the Norsemen.
                      Illustrated. 16mo. 75 cents.

 These sketches interest the mind with historic truth made winning and
 lively by a style of beautiful simplicity.

                      Tales from English History.
                      By the same. 16mo. 75 cents.

“Prepared for young readers, and admirably done. In simple, yet
 appropriate style, some of the more prominent and romantic episodes are
 detailed, in a way at once to convey valuable information, and to
 excite a desire for further acquaintance with history. When truth is so
 attractive, and there is so much of it, there is but little need to
 resort to fiction for the instruction of the young.”—_Evangelist._

                         Tales from Travelers.
              By Maria Hack. Illustrated. 16mo. 75 cents.

“The contents of this volume will prove more attractive to ingenuous
 youth than stories of giants and castles, and more wonderful than
 fiction.”—_Observer._

                   The Adopted Son, and other Tales.
        By the author of the “Claremont Tales.” 18mo. 50 cents.

              Aunt Edith; or, Love to God the Best Motive.
          By the author of “Florence Egerton.” 18mo. 50 cents.

                   New Editions, in cheaper form, of

          FLORENCE EGERTON.                      18mo. 50 cts.
          EMILY VERNON.                            ”   50  ”
          JEANIE MORRISON.                         ”   50  ”
          KATE KILBORN. By the same author.      18mo. 50  ”
          SOUTHERN CROSS AND SOUTHERN CROWN.       ”   50  ”
          CONTRIBUTIONS OF Q. Q. BY JANE TAYLOR. 18mo. 50  ”
          ABEOKUTTA. BY MISS TUCKER.               ”   50  ”
          MAY DUNDAS. BY MRS. GELDART.             ”   50  ”
          FRITZ HAROLD; OR, THE TEMPTATION.        ”   40  ”
          ASHTON COTTAGE, A TALE.                  ”   40  ”

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           EXPOSITORY WORKS.

                  Dr. Hodge’s Commentary on Ephesians.
                              8vo. $2 00.

“This is a work for the minister, for biblical scholars, and for all who
 can appreciate the mature results of thorough study and sacred learning
 in the lucid exposition of a very interesting portion of the Word of
 God. It is not a hasty production, but an elaborate commentary, giving
 in a condensed style, with great clearness, the precise meaning of
 every passage in this rich Epistle, exhibiting, as understood by the
 author, the glowing thoughts that warmed and kindled the affections of
 the inspired Apostle while composing it.”—_Chn. Observer._

               Dr. Jacobus’s Notes on the Gospel of John.
                            12mo. 75 cents.

“The Author, by his learning, taste, and skill, is eminently qualified
 for the responsible work of an annotator on the Holy Scriptures. In his
 Notes, he combines the marrow and fatness of many commentators with his
 own ideas, and associates his comments with a Harmony of the Gospels,
 in a very impressive manner.”—_Zion’s Herald._

⁂ This volume completes Dr. Jacobus’s Commentary on the Gospels—Vol. I.
 being Matthew—Vol. II., Mark and Luke—Vol. III., John. The volumes are
 all uniform, price $2 25 for the set.

              Dr. Moore on Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi.
                              8vo. $2 00.

“This volume we regard as a substantial and highly valuable contribution
 to the biblical literature of the country. The prophecies which form
 the subject of it, are the more interesting from the fact that they
 were the last which were delivered previous to the Messiah’s advent.
 The work is not so critical as to be above the popular mind, while yet
 it shows a familiar acquaintance with the rules of Scripture
 interpretation, and is evidently the production of a mind at once well
 balanced and trained to thorough research.”—_Argus._

            * Dr. Sampson on the Greek Text of the Hebrews.
                              8vo. $2 50.

“This is an eminently learned work, and is designed especially to aid in
 a critical investigation of this portion of Scripture, while yet there
 is no ostentatious display of erudition, nor any thing that approaches
 an affectation of originality. The introduction is at once clear,
 concise, and comprehensive. In the body of the work, the author gives
 us rather the results of his inquiries than the processes by which he
 arrived at them. His analyses show much patient labor, as well as
 accurate discrimination.”—_Puritan Recorder._

                           * Owen on Hebrews.
                          8 vols. 8vo. $12 00.

“Few and far between, and among the richest gifts of God to man, are
 such great and good theologians as John Owen. * * * It is mentioned as
 a matter of thankfulness that Dr. Owen was led to concentrate all his
 rare endowments and vast resources on the exposition of the Epistle to
 the Hebrews.”—_N. Y. Observer._

                       * Dr. Eadie on Colossians.
                              8vo. $2 00.

“A work of great learning and skill, pervaded with a truly Christian
 spirit.”—_Evangelist._

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       COMMENTARIES ON THE BIBLE.

                         * Pool’s Annotations.
    New edition, on larger paper, 3 vols. royal 8vo. Sheep. $10 00.

“Of the general character of this work, it is sufficient to say that it
 brings out in a felicitous and concise manner the meaning of the text,
 without connecting with it any extended practical remarks. It contains
 not only the whole of the sacred text, as many commentaries of that day
 did not, various readings also, together with parallel passages; and
 though it never transcends the capacity of an ordinary English reader,
 yet it evidently comes from a rich store-house of biblical learning. It
 disposes of difficult passages, not by gathering all the opinions that
 have been put forth concerning them, but by stating the writer’s own
 mature judgment, with the grounds on which it has been formed. The
 notes are generally brief, condensed, perspicuous, and easily
 remembered.”—_Puritan Recorder._

                         * Henry’s Commentary.
                     5 vols. quarto. Sheep. $15 00.

“It is becoming more and more the standard commentary of the Church.
 Christians of all denominations, and of all grades of intellectual
 attainment, find it their refreshment, their food, and their pleasure
 to peruse it steadily, and in so doing they can reap a great reward. We
 knew, some years ago, a lady in humble life, more than sixty years of
 age, who borrowed the folio edition of Henry’s Commentary, and keeping
 it always open on her bed, was accustomed to run to it whenever a
 single moment of leisure offered itself; so that, by patient
 continuance in well-doing, even at that late period of life, she
 traveled through the successive volumes, to her own great spiritual and
 intellectual improvement; and in her latest hours, when on her dying
 bed, she expressed her gratitude for the opportunity which she had thus
 enjoyed of becoming better acquainted than ever before with the meaning
 of God’s Holy Word.”—_Observer._

                        * Doddridge’s Expositor.

The Family Expositor; or, a Paraphrase and Version of the New Testament,
  with Critical Notes and a Practical Improvement of Each Section, by
  Philip Doddridge, D.D. Royal octavo. $

The late Bishop of Durham (Dr. Barrington), in addressing his clergy on
  the choice of books, says:

“In reading the New Testament, I recommend Doddridge’s Family Expositor,
 as an _impartial_ INTERPRETER AND FAITHFUL _monitor_. Other Expositions
 might be mentioned, greatly to the honor of their respective authors,
 for their several excellences; such as, elegance of exposition,
 acuteness of illustration, and copiousness of erudition; but I know of
 no Expositor who unites so many advantages as Doddridge; whether you
 regard the fidelity of his version, the fullness and perspicuity of his
 composition, the utility of his general and historical information, the
 impartiality of his doctrinal comments, or, lastly, the piety and
 pastoral earnestness of his moral and religious applications. He has
 made, as he professes to have done, ample use of the commentators that
 preceded him; and in the explanation of grammatical difficulties, he
 has profited much more from the philological writers on the Greek
 Testament than could almost have been expected in so multifarious an
 undertaking as the _Family Expositor_. Indeed for all the most valuable
 purposes of a Commentary on the New Testament, the Family Expositor can
 not fall too early into the hands of those intended for holy orders.”

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       NEW RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHIES.

                     Dr. Cheever’s Life of Cowper.
                       12mo. Illustrated. $1 00.

“The author of this work could scarcely have selected a subject better
 adapted to his own peculiar genius, than this which he has here chosen.
 He has treated it at once philosophically, practically, and
 spiritually; has evinced a profound insight into the mysteries of human
 nature, the nicest discrimination in respect both to intellectual and
 moral qualities, and a deep sympathy with the sublimity and tenderness,
 the joys, and griefs, and hopes of the exalted character he
 commemorates.”—_Puritan Recorder._

                    * Memoirs of John M. Mason, D.D.
                    By Dr. Van Vechten. 8vo. $2 00.

“This delightful memoir of a great captain in Israel will be hailed as a
 valuable addition to the religious biography of our country. The
 literary execution of the work is equally creditable to the talents and
 taste of the author, and the most ardent admirers of Dr. Mason will
 admit that while a spirit of fulsome eulogy is avoided, there is ample
 justice done to the memory of a great and a good man.”—_Pbn. Banner._

                      Memoirs of John Kitto, D.D.
    Author of “Daily Bible Illustrations,” etc. 2 vols. 12mo. $2 00.

“We have rarely heard of a more remarkable instance of the triumph of
 talent and energy over circumstances the most adverse. He began life
 struggling with the evils of poverty, and the baleful influence of an
 intemperate father. A dangerous fall from a ladder, when he was a
 mason’s boy, rendered him hopelessly deaf. Being considered unable to
 support himself, he was put into the workhouse; and after a series of
 vicissitudes which would have overwhelmed an ordinary boy—at one time
 working as a shoemaker, at another as a barber’s apprentice, and by
 various shifts managing to toil along his rugged pathway—he at length,
 through a kind Providence, struck the highway on which he afterwards
 traveled successfully to distinction and usefulness.”—_Presbyterian._

             Memoirs of Capt. Vicars of the 97th Regiment.
                            16mo. 75 cents.

“The subject of these memoirs, was generous and noble in his natural
 disposition, in all his intercourse with his fellows. As a soldier he
 was brave, and as an officer skillful and prompt; but all these things
 were eclipsed by the ardor and devotedness of his piety. Among the
 soldiers in the Crimea he spent his leisure hours, in ministering
 spiritual consolation to the sick and dying in the hospital. In the
 lives of missionaries which we have read, none have proved by their
 works a better right to be called a missionary than he.”—_Witness._

                            The Victory Won.
           By the Author of “Captain Vicars,” 18mo. 25 cents.

                   Memoirs of Adelaide Leaper Newton.
                  By the Rev. John Baillie. 75 cents.

“This is certainly a rare specimen of female biography. The subject of
 it was among the most gifted and cultivated of her sex. The Word of God
 was not only the light, but the food of her soul; and the enjoyments of
 heaven seem to have been in no small degree vouchsafed to her before
 she left the world.”—_Puritan Recorder._

                         The Martyr of Sumatra.
                        A Memoir of Henry Lyman.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

=BICKERSTETH=, Rev. Edward.

    =* Complete Works.= 16 vols. $10 00.

    =Exposition of the Epistles of John and Jude.= 60 cents.

=BINNEY=, Rev. Thomas.

    =Is it possible to make the Best of Both Worlds?= 60 cts.

=BRIDGES=, Rev. Charles.

    =A Manual for the Young.= 16mo. 50 cents.

=CHART=

    =Of the Sacred History of the World=. $1 50.

=DA COSTA=, Dr. Isaac.

    =Israel and the Gentiles.= 12mo. $1 25.

    =The Four Witnesses.= $2 00.

=FLETCHER=, Rev. Alexander.

    =Addresses to the Young.= 16mo. 60 cents.

=HEWITSON=, Rev. W. H.

    =Letters and Remains.= 2 vols. $2 00.

=HOWELS=, Rev. William.

    =Remains and Extracts from Sermons.= 75 cents.

=LECTURES TO YOUNG MEN.=

    Delivered in London. Series of 1854–5–6. Each $1 00.

=RYLE=, Rev. J. C.

    =Expository Thoughts on the Gospels=; for Family and Private Use.
    12mo.

=SMITH=, Rev. John Pye.

    =* Scripture Testimony to the Messiah.= 2 vols., 8vo. $5 00.

=* SELF-EXPLANATORY REFERENCE BIBLE.=

    8vo. Half-calf, $4 50; Turkey morocco, $6 00.

=SWETE=, Rev. John.

    =Family Prayers.= 16mo. 60 cents.

=VILLAGE CHURCHYARD.=

    40 cents.

=VILLAGE PASTOR.=

    40 cents.

=VILLAGE OBSERVER.=

    30 cents.

=WORDS TO WIN SOULS.= 75 cents.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           FIRESIDE LIBRARY.

                             FIRST SERIES.
                          50 cents per volume.

 ADOPTED SON.
 AUNT EDITH.
 BALLANTYNE’S MABEL GRANT.
 BLOSSOMS OF CHILDHOOD.
 BRETT’S INDIAN TRIBES.
 BROTHER AND SISTER.
 BUNYAN’S PILGRIM’S PROGRESS.
 CLARA STANLEY.
 CLAREMONT TALES.
 DRUMMOND’S EMILY RENON.
 DUNCAN’S CHILDREN OF MANSE.
 DUNCAN’S SCOTTISH PEASANTRY.
 FAR OFF.
 FLORENCE EGERTON.
 GELDART’S MAY DUNDAS.
 HAMILTON’S HAPPY HOME.
 INFANT’S PROGRESS.
 JAMIE GORDON.
 JEANIE MORRISON.
 KATE KILBORN.
 LOUIS AND FRANK.
 MACKAY’S FAM. HEATHERDALE.
 M‘CRINDELL’S CONVENT.
 MY SCHOOL DAY’S AND COMPAN.
 NEAR HOME.
 OSBORNE’S WORLD OF WATERS.
 POLLOK’S TALES OF COVENANT.
 SIGOURNEY’S OLIVE LEAVES.
 SIGOURNEY’S LETTERS TO PUPILS.
 SINCLAIR’S HOLIDAY HOUSE.
 TAYLOR’S CONTRIB. OF Q. Q.
 TUCKER’S ABBEOKUTA.
 TUCKER’S RAINBOW IN NORTH.
 TUCKER’S SOUTHERN CROSS.
 WEEK, THE.
 WILLIAM WILBERFORCE.
 WOODCUTTER AND EXILES.

                             SECOND SERIES.
                          40 cents per volume.

 ASHTON COTTAGE.
 CHARLES ROUSSELL.
 COMMANDMENT WITH PROMISE.
 DUNCAN’S COTTAGE FIRESIDE.
 FRANK NETHERTON.
 FRITZ HAROLD.
 JOHNSON’S RASSELAS.
 MICHAEL KEMP.
 OPIE ON LYING.
 RICHMOND’S ANNALS OF POOR.
 SIGOURNEY’S BOY’S BOOK.
 SIGOURNEY’S GIRL’S BOOK.
 TAYLOR’S ORIGINAL POEMS.

                             THIRD SERIES.
                          30 cents per volume.

 CAMERON’S FARM. DAUGHTER.
 FRANK HARRISON.
 GREAT JOURNEY.
 KENNEDY’S ANNA ROSS.
 KENNEDY’S PROF. NOT PRINCIPLE.
 KENNEDY’S FATHER CLEMENT.
 KENNEDY’S PHILIP COLVILLE.
 MY SCHOOL-BOY DAYS.
 MY YOUTHFUL COMPANIONS.
 SINCLAIR’S CHARLIE SEYMOUR.
 STORIES ON LORD’S PRAYER.
 THREE MONTHS UNDER SNOW.
 TAYLOR’S DISPLAY. A Tale.

                             FOURTH SERIES.
                          25 cents per volume.

 AUSTRALIA, LOSS OF THE.
 BUNBERY’S GLORY, GLORY.
 COLLIER’S TALE.
 FISK’S ORPHAN TALE.
 KENNEDY’S DECISION.
 KENNEDY’S JESSY ALLAN.
 PASTOR’S FAMILY.
 POLLOK’S HELEN OF GLEN.
 POLLOK’S PERSECUTED FAMILY.
 POLLOK’S RALPH GUNMEL.
 TRUE HEROISM.
 WALTER BINNING.
 WINGS AND STINGS.

                  *       *       *       *       *

                           JUVENILE LIBRARY.
                         Square, 50 cents each.

 CLEVER STORIES.
 LITTLE LESSONS.
 RHYMES FOR THE NURSERY.
 MAMMA’S BIBLE STORIES.
 SEQUEL TO BIBLE STORIES.
 HUNDRED SHORT TALES.
 TENDER GRASS.
 CALL TO THE LAMBS.
 FANNY AND HER MAMMA.
 CHILD’S OWN STORY-BOOK.
 LIMED TWIGS.
 NEW COBWEBS.

                  *       *       *       *       *
 ANNIE’S FIRST BOOK. 35 cents.
 ANNIE’S SECOND BOOK. 40 cents.
 DUTY IS SAFETY. 25 cents.
 JACK THE SAILOR BOY. 25 cents.
 THINK BEFORE YOU ACT. 25 cts.
 HYMNS FOR INFANT MINDS. 40 cts.
 VERY LITTLE TALES. 2 vols. 75 cts.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         CARTERS’ PUBLICATIONS.

                           The Rich Kinsman.
 The History of Ruth the Moabitess, by Stephen H. Tyng, D.D. 16mo. $1.

“The author presents this work in the hope that it will be found adapted
 to enlighten the minds of the young in some of the great subjects of
 Scriptural instruction.... The author has been long impressed with the
 feeling that neither commentaries nor sermons have yet made that simple
 and practical use of the fullness of Scripture truth for which it is
 adapted—perhaps he might say for which it is designed. The young mind
 certainly can be interested in the word of God, as a book full of
 attraction as well as full of truth. Whoever can be made in any degree
 the instrument of leading to this result, by bringing out to view the
 real attractions of Scripture, confers so far an invaluable benefit
 upon others.”—_Extract from the Preface._

                          The Truth and Life.
     A SERIES OF DISCOURSES. By Bishop McIlvaine, of Ohio. 8vo. $2.

“We have seldom met with a more admirable volume of Sermons than the one
 now lying before us. * * * The subjects are varied, but in all there is
 the same clearness, and fullness of Gospel truth. * * * We can assure
 our readers that there is a freshness and power pervading the work,
 which is most delightful to find in this age of flimsy sentiment and
 idealistic abstractions.”—_Banner._

                     The Saints’ Everlasting Rest.
   By Richard Baxter. The ONLY COMPLETE EDITION ever published in the
                United States. One volume royal 8vo. $2.

“There are no religious works which have had, next to John Bunyan’s
 “Pilgrim’s Progress,” so extensive, increasing, and continued
 circulation, as those of Richard Baxter. ‘The Saints’ Rest’ is
 eminently a favorite with Christians, and has been richly blessed. The
 volume in general use is an abridgment, well executed, of the original,
 and is not as much as one-half of its compass. However well condensed,
 an abridgment can not retain and exhibit all the merits of the
 original, and very many of the lovers of the smaller volume will hail
 and embrace the opportunity of obtaining the original work, in the
 present neat and acceptable form.”—_Christian Intelligencer._

                          Discourses on Truth.
   By J. H. Thornwell, D.D., President of the South Carolina College,
                       Columbia, S. C. 12mo. $1.

“The Ethics are of the loftiest standard, breathing a pure theology, and
 informed by a sound psychology, and presented in a form of compacted
 logic. It is a tonic for both mind and heart to read these able
 expositions of the moral system of Christianity. * * * To those who
 _think_, it will be found a dish of strong meat, the inward digestion
 of which will give vigor to both the mental and spiritual
 man.”—_Watchman and Observer._

                   Fritz Harold; or, the Temptation.
         By Mrs. Sarah A. Meyers. 16mo. Illustrated. 40 cents.

               May Dundas; or, Passages from Young Life.
          By Mrs. Thomas Geldart. Illustrated. 16mo. 50 cents.

                         The Christian Patriot.
               A Memoir of William Wilberforce. 75 cents.

This new Memoir of the Christian, the patriot, and philanthropist, is
  from the pen of a gifted American lady, and will be read with intense
  interest by all classes of readers.

        The Autobiography and Reminiscences of the Rev. Wm. Jay.
                       2 vols. royal 12mo. $1 25.

“Few names are so extensively known in the Christian communities of
 Great Britain and the United States as that of William Jay. His
 ‘Morning and Evening Exercises’ is in the great majority of Christian
 families. The Autobiography is written in a style of great simplicity
 and pleasantness. The reminiscences by Mr. Jay of prominent individuals
 with whom he was well acquainted—as John Newton, Richard Cecil, Robert
 Hall, William Wilberforce, and others, are graphic and entertaining,
 and replete with anecdote.”—_Christian Intelligencer._

“This is a delightful work. The autobiography is a simple story of
 his life, in letters addressed to his children, beginning with
 bricklayer boy at Beckford’s Abbey, whose sweet face attracted the
 attention of Cornelius Winter, and led to the bringing out of the
 ‘boy preacher,’ and ending with the venerable patriarch of Bath,
 whose name and writings were known and loved all over Protestant
 Christendom.”—_Watchman._

“As an autobiography, this will do to go along with that of Hugh
 Miller.”—_Journal._

                          By the same author.

                   I. Morning and Evening Exercises.
                A new edition in 4 royal 12mo vols. $4.

“This edition of the Exercises is in four large 12mo volumes. It is
 remarkably well printed in large, clear type, and on clear, white
 paper, so that the old and those of weak sight can enjoy the good
 things prepared for them by one of the most pious and best writers
 which the world has produced.”—_Christ. Advocate._

                    II. Female Scripture Characters.
                               12mo. $1.

“By all sincere Christian women, the world over, this volume will be
 regarded as a spiritual treasure.”—_Presbyterian._

                   Paley’s Evidences of Christianity,
 With Notes and Additions. By Charles Murray Nairne, M.A. 12mo. $1.25.

“It would be a work of supererogation, at this late day, to dwell on the
 peculiar excellences of Paley’s treatise on the Evidences of
 Christianity. It is not probable it will ever be superseded. Its
 learning, its exactness, its wonderful clearness of thought, its
 logical force, are incomparable. * * * * * * * The American editor has
 fortified the points in which Paley has failed, and, by his additional
 matter, has unquestionably furnished the best, as well as the safest
 edition of Paley extant.”—_Presbyterian._

“The Editor of this work, we hesitate not to say, is a man of
 extraordinary intellect and acquirements, and he has done what it
 may safely be said that few are capable of doing, has given
 additional attraction and value to Paley’s Evidences of
 Christianity. The introductory article, entitled ‘Claims of Divine
 Revelation,’ could never have been the production of any other than
 a master-mind.”—_Puritan Recorder._

“As one of the impregnable defences of the historical verity of the
 facts of Christianity, the work of Paley stands unrivaled and complete.
 * * * The notes and additions of Prof. Nairne make it more valuable
 than any edition hitherto published. The labors of Chalmers, Hill,
 Wardlaw, Campbell, Alexander, Hitchcock, Miller, Birks, and many
 others, are here put under contribution.”—_Presbyterian of the West._

                       The Footsteps of St. Paul.
  By the author of the “Morning and Night Watches.” 12mo. Illustrated.
                                 $1 00.

“‘The Footsteps of St. Paul’ is the title of an able and instructive
 work, presenting a consecutive history of the life, labors, and
 teachings of the great Apostle. It interweaves, in the narrative, all
 the direct disclosures of the Acts, the incidental intimations of the
 Epistles, all the outside information extant, and many conjectural
 statements derived from a comparison of different parts of Scripture.
 But he has written it in an animated and graphic style, and imbued it
 with a fine spirit. It leaves a strong impression on the reader’s mind.
 It is copiously illustrated with maps and engravings, and is every way
 a scholarly performance.”—_Evangelist._

“The Carters have published a multitude of good books, but, unless we
 greatly mistake, this will be reckoned among the best of
 them.”—_Puritan Recorder._

                          By the same author.

                         I. The Words of Jesus.
                            16mo. 40 cents.

“This admirable little volume illustrates and applies some of the
 precious utterances of the blessed Saviour, in language chaste, simple,
 affectionate, and urgent, enlightening the thoughts, exciting the
 affections, subduing the passions, guiding the soul, like the star of
 Bethlehem, to the meek and lowly Saviour.”—_Watchman._

                         II. The Mind of Jesus.
                            16mo. 40 cents.

                    III. Morning and Night Watches.
                            16mo. 60 cents.

“A precious volume of religious truth most pleasingly and scripturally
 presented for the comfort and edification of the people of
 God.”—_Observer._

                          IV. Family Prayers.
                            16mo. 75 cents.

“Simple, evangelical, earnest, and well-adapted to prove a devotional
 help.”—_Christian Herald._

“Direct, fervent, and comprehensive.”—_Evangelist._

                    V. The Woodcutter, and The Exiles.
                             18mo. 50 cents.

                          VI. The Great Journey:
 A PILGRIMAGE THROUGH THE VALLEY OF TEARS TO MOUNT ZION, THE CITY OF THE
                 LIVING GOD. Illustrated. 16mo. 50 cents.

                             Family Prayers.
               By the Rev. John Swete, D.D. 16mo. 60 cents.

                   Family Expositions of John and Jude.
             By the Rev. Edward Bickersteth. 16mo. 60 cents.

     The Young Man’s Friend and Guide through Life to Immortality.
             By the Rev. John Angel James. 16mo. 75 cents.

“The young men of our land have in this book a rare treasure. Every page
 is fraught with instruction of momentous interest. No young man who
 would prepare for the life that now is, and for that which is to come,
 should fail to read it.”—_Advocate._

           Preces Paulinæ; or, Devotions of the Apostle Paul.
                            16mo. 75 cents.

“A gem of no ordinary worth. * * * We may briefly describe it, and
 this because we think its title fails to do so, as a Treatise on
 Prayer, founded on the instances of prayer recorded of, and by, the
 Apostle Paul. It is searching, devotional, practical, and
 profitable.”—_Christian Annotator._

                 Philip Colville, a Covenanter’s Story.
         By Grace Kennedy, author of “Anna Ross.” 18mo. 30 cts.

          The Dead in Christ; their State, Present and Future.
                  By John Brown, D.D. 16mo. 50 cents.

 Memoir of John Frederick Oberlin, Pastor of the Waldbach in the Ban De
                               La Roche.
                            18mo. 40 cents.

“The mind that does not rise from this memoir excited and mightier for
 God, has a heartlessness and apathy none will covet.”—_Halsey._

                        Israel and the Gentiles.
 Contributions to the History of the Jews from the earliest time to the
               present day. By Dr. Isaac Da Costa. $1.25.

                             Stray Arrows.
  By the Rev. T. L. Cuyler, new and enlarged edition. 18mo. 40 cents.

              Emily Vernon; or, Filial Piety Exemplified.
                      By Mrs. Drummond. 50 cents.

“Most cordially do we recommend it as a gift to young ladies who have
 passed their sixteenth birthday.”—_British Mothers’ Magazine._

“The story is simple, but beautiful in its simplicity; while here and
 there we meet with passages of exquisite grace and pathos. It has our
 hearty recommendation.”—_Commonwealth._

  A Chart of the Sacred History of the World from the Creation to the
                            Birth of Christ,

Being a Synchronical arrangement of the leading events of sacred and
  profane history; subdivided into periods, embellished by pictorial
  illustrations, and accompanied by a concise Introductory Sketch, and
  copious notes. Folio. $1.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         =Transcriber’s Notes=

Some inconsistencies in spelling, hyphenation, and punctuation have been
retained.

This file uses _underscores_ to indicate italic text and =equals signs=
to indicate bold text.

Itemized changes from the original text:

 ● p. ix: changed “Protestanism” to “Protestantism” (Protestantism, like
   the primitive Church,)
 ● p. xxxiii:
     ○ changed “Sarbonne” to “Sorbonne” (Expelled from the Sorbonne,)
     ○ changed “be” to “he” (for the eucharist, he insinuated)
     ○ changed “Sarbonne” to “Sorbonne” (expulsion from the Sorbonne,)

 ● p. xxxv: changed “Sarbonne” to “Sorbonne” (before the Sorbonne was in
   dependence,)
 ● p. 94: changed “perfeet” to “perfect” (the most perfect harmony)
 ● p. 103: added missing quote mark based on context and 1875 Chatto &
   Windus edition (written in letters of gold.”)
 ● p. 104: changed “terrribly” to “terribly” (I am terribly afraid)
 ● p. 110: changed “nnmber” to “number” (the number of our offences)
 ● p. 143: changed “Filiutus” to “Filiutius” (as Filiutius says.)
 ● p. 146: added missing quote mark based on context and 1875 Chatto &
   Windus edition (gone into desuetude’)
 ● p. 168: changed “sylllogism” to “syllogism” (a syllogism in due
   form,)
 ● p. 204: added missing quote mark based on context and 1875 Chatto &
   Windus edition (than to live well.’)
 ● p. 209: inserted missing opening quote mark (‘if the confessor
   imposes) based on context as well as 1847 John Johnstone edition,
   1875 & 1898 Chatto & Windus editions
 ● p. 211: changed “was” to “has” (who has probed this question)
 ● p. 218: added missing quote mark based on context (sufficient with
   the sacrament.’)
 ● p. 286: changed “surmont” to “surmount” (to surmount external
   obstacles)
 ● p. 322: removed extraneous closing quote mark based on context and
   1875 Chatto & Windus edition (adored in the sanctuary)
 ● p. 340: removed extraneous closing quote mark based on context and
   1875 Chatto & Windus edition (you may profit by my example.)
 ● p. 345: removed extraneous closing quote mark based on context and
   1875 Chatto & Windus edition (any more than his book?)
 ● p. 347: changed “M. de l aLane” to “M. de la Lane” based on 1890
   Houghton, Osgood And Company edition.
 ● p. 349: added missing closing quote based on context and 1875 Chatto
   & Windus edition (purgare, sed facere”.)

In the end-of-book publisher’s catalog, some repeated words were
indicated by quote marks (”). These were replaced with the repeated
word, for formatting reasons.





*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS OF BLAISE PASCAL ***


    

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.


START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works

1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when
you share it without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:

    This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
    other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
    whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
    of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
    at www.gutenberg.org. If you
    are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
    of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
  
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:

    • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
        the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method
        you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
        to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has
        agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
        Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
        within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
        legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
        payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
        Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
        Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
        Literary Archive Foundation.”
    
    • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
        you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
        does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
        License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
        copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
        all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
        works.
    
    • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
        any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
        electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
        receipt of the work.
    
    • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
        distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
    

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™

Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,
Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works

Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.