WASHINGTON

From the St Memin Crayon in possession of J. Carson Brevoort Esq.

Since the first appearance of this volume, during the winter of 1898–9, the author has considerately regarded all letters and literary comments received by him, as well as other recent works upon the life and times of Washington. His original purpose to treat his subject judicially, regardless of unverified tradition, has been confirmed.

Washington’s sublime conception of America, noticed in Chapter XXXVI., foreshadowed “a stupendous fabric of freedom and empire, on the broad basis of Independency,” through which the “poor and oppressed of all races and religions” might find encouragement and solace.

The war with Spain has made both a moral and physical impress upon the judgment and conscience of the entire world. Unqualified by a single disaster on land or sea, and never diverted from humane and honorable methods, it illustrates the intelligent patriotism and exhaustless resources of our country, and a nearer realization of Washington’s prayer for America.

Looking to the general trend of Washington’s military career, it is emphasized, throughout the volume, that the moral, religious, and patriotic motives that energized his life and shaped his character were so absolutely interwoven with the fibre of his professional experiences, that vithe soul of the Man magnified the greatness of the Soldier.

In connection with Washington’s relations to General Braddock, mentioned in the First Chapter, it is worthy of permanent record that Virginia would not sanction, nor would Washington accept assignment, except as Chief of Staff. He was not a simple Aid-de-Camp, but of recognized and responsible military merit.

The text of this volume, completed in the spring of 1898 and not since modified, requires a different Preface from that first prepared. The events of another war introduce applications of military principles which have special interest. This is the more significant because modern appliances have been developed with startling rapidity, while general legislation and the organization of troops, both regular and volunteer, have been very similar to those of the times of Washington, and of later American wars.

His letters, his orders, his trials, his experiences; the diversities of judgment between civilians and military men; between military men of natural aptitudes and those of merely professional or accidental training, as well as the diversities of personal and local interest, indicate the value of Washington’s example and the character of his time. Hardly a single experience in his career has not been realized by officers and men in these latter days.

A very decided impression, however, has obtained among educated men, including those of the military profession, that Washington had neither the troops, resources, and knowledge, nor the broad range of field service which have characterized modern warfare, and therefore lacked material elements which develop the typical soldier. But more recent military operations upon an extensive scale, especially those of the Franco-Prussian War, and the American Civil War of 1861–1865, have supplied material for better appreciation of the principles that were viiiinvolved in the campaigns of the War for American Independence, as compared with those of Napoleon, Wellington, Marlborough, Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar.

With full allowance for changes in army and battle formation, tactical action and armament, as well as greater facilities for the transportation of troops and army supplies, it remains true that the relative effect of all these changes upon success in war upon a grand scale, has not been the modification of those principles of military science which have shaped battle action and the general conduct of war, from the earliest period of authentic military history. The formal “Maxims of Napoleon” were largely derived from his careful study of the campaigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar; and these, with the principles involved, had specific and sometimes literal illustration in the eventful operations of the armies of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a matter of fact, those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil code became the formative factor in all later civil codes, preëminently those of the English Common Law. The very best civil, police, and criminal regulations of modern enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And in military lines, the organization of regiments by companies, and the combinations of regiments as brigades, divisions and corps, still rest largely upon the same decimal basis; and neither the Roman legion nor the Grecian phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew militia, or reserves, had such well-established comprehension of the contingency of the entire nation being called to the field, or subjected to draft, that as late as the advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to be seated upon the grass for refreshment, “they seated themselves in companies of hundreds and fifties.” The sanitary and police regulations of their camps have never ixbeen surpassed, nor their provision for the cleanliness, health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest childhood they were instructed in their national history and its glorious achievements, and the whole people rejoiced in the gallant conduct of any.

Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only induced modified tactical formation and corresponding movements. The division of armies into a right, centre, and left, with a well-armed and well-trained reserve, was illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its three battalion formation, a miniature brigade, is chiefly designed to give greater individual value to the soldier, and not subject compact masses to the destructive sweep of modern missiles. It also makes the force more mobile, as well as more comprehensive of territory within its range of fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and not of substance, in the scientific conduct of campaigns during a protracted and widely extended series of operations in the field.

Military science itself is but the art of employing force to vindicate, or execute, authority. To meet an emergency adequately, wisely, and successfully, is the expressive logic of personal, municipal, and military action. The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the mental processes may differ by virtue of different applications; but the prime activities are the same. In military studies, as in all collegiate or social preparation, the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must be in the man, and not the necessary product of a certificate or a diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms in military use will elucidate the narrative as its events develop the War for American Independence, under the direction of Washington as Commander-in-Chief.

Six cardinal principles are thus stated:

xI. Strategy.—To secure those combinations which will ensure the highest possible advantage in the employment of military force.

Note.—The strategical principles which controlled the Revolutionary campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspondence in 1861–1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was beyond the Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alleghany Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, with base at Richmond, commanded an interior line westward, so that the same troops could be alternatively used against the Federal right, left, and centre, while the latter must make a long détour to support its advance southward from the Ohio River. Federal superiority on sea and river largely contributed to success. American sea-control in 1898, so suddenly and completely secured, was practically omnipotent in the war with Spain. The navy, was a substantially equipped force at the start. The army, had largely to be created, when instantly needed, to meet the naval advance. Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the commander-in-chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an advisory board, while excluding military men of recent active duty from similar advisory and administrative service.

II. Grand Tactics.—To handle that force in the field.

Note.—See Chapter XVII., where the Battle of Brandywine, through the disorder of Sullivan’s Division, unaccustomed to act as a Division, or as a part of a consolidated Grand Division or Corps, exactly fulfilled the conditions which made the first Battle of Bull Run disastrous to the American Federal Army in 1861. Subsequent skeleton drills below Arlington Heights, were designed to quicken the proficiency of fresh troops, in the alignments, wheelings, and turns, so indispensable to concert in action upon an extensive scale. In 1898 the fresh troops were largely from militia organizations which had been trained in regimental movements. School battalions and the military exercises of many benevolent societies had also been conducive to readiness for tactical instruction. The large Camps of Instruction were also indispensably needed. Here again, time was an exacting master of the situation.

III. Logistics.—The practical art of bringing armies, fully equipped, to the battlefield.

xiNote.—In America where the standing army has been of only nominal strength, although well officered; and where militia are the main reliance in time of war; and where varied State systems rival those of Washington’s painful experience, the principle of Logistics, with its departments of transportation and infinite varieties of supply, is vital to wholesome and economic success. The war with Spain which commenced April 21, 1898, illustrated this principle to an extent never before realized in the world’s history. Familiarity with details, on so vast a scale of physical and financial activity, was impossible, even if every officer of the regular army had been assigned to executive duty. The education and versatile capacity of the American citizen had to be utilized. Their experience furnished object lessons for all future time.

IV. Engineering.—The application of mathematics and mechanics to the maintenance or reduction of fortified places; the interposition or removal of artificial obstructions to the passage of an army; and the erection of suitable works for the defence of territory or troops.

Note.—The invention and development of machinery and the marvellous range of mechanical art, through chemical, electrical, and other superhuman agencies, afforded the American Government an immediate opportunity to supplement its Engineer Corps in 1898, with skilled auxiliaries. In fact, the structure of American society and the trend of American thought and enterprise, invariably demand the best results. What is mechanically necessary, will be invented, if not at hand. That is good engineering.

V. Minor Tactics.—The instruction of the soldier, individually and en masse, in the details of military drill, the use of his weapon, and the perfection of discipline.

Note.—Washington never lost sight of the set-up of the individual soldier, as the best dependence in the hour of battle. Self-reliance, obedience to orders, and confidence in success, were enjoined as the conditions of success. His system of competitive marksmanship, of rifle ranges, and burden tests, was initiated early in his career, and was conspicuously enjoined before Brooklyn, and elsewhere, during the war.

The American soldier of 1898 became invincible, man for man, because of his intelligent response to individual discipline and drill. Failure in either, whether of officer or soldier, shaped character and xiiresult. As with the ancient Hebrew, citizenship meant knowledge of organic law and obedience to its behests. Every individual, therefore, when charged with the central electric force, became a relay battery, to conserve, intensify, and distribute that force.

VI. Statesmanship in War.—This is illustrated by the suggestion of Christ, that “a king going to war with another king would sit down first and count the cost, whether he would be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand.”

Note.—American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appliances than those of immediately available physical force. The costly and insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, elsewhere, would have as long withheld the only remedy. Cuba was dying to be free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable and complete autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war with the United States. The momentum of a supreme moral force in behalf of humanity at large, so energized the entire American people that every ordinary unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of the stroke.

It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones, could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct manifestation of Divine favor.

But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to be determined by the numerical strength of the armies engaged in single battles, nor by the resources and geographical conditions of later times. The same general principles have ever obtained, and ever will control human judgment. Transportation and intercommunication are relative; and the slow mails and travel of Revolutionary times, alike affected both armies, with no partial benefit or injury to either. The British had better communication by water, but not by land; with the disadvantage xiiiof campaigning through an unknown and intricate country, peopled by their enemies, whenever not covered by the guns of their fleet. The American expedition to Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, as well as the beneficiaries of the mighty movement.

Baron Jomini, in his elaborate history of the campaigns of Napoleon, analyzes that general’s success over his more experienced opponents, upon the basis of his observance or neglect of the military principles already outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian campaign were indeed characteristic of a young soldier impatient of the habitually tardy deliberations of the old-school movements. Napoleon discounted time by action. He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and ferocity of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful campaign, did Napoleon strike more suddenly and effectively, than did Washington on Christmas night, 1776, at Trenton. And Napoleon’s following up blow was not more emphatic, in its results, than was Washington’s attack upon Princeton, a week later, when the British army already regarded his capture as a simple morning privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience belong to every age; and often they shorten wars by their determining value.

As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington’s military career, and to avoid tedious episodes respecting the acts and methods of many generals who were associated with him at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will find early notice. The dramatis personæ of the Revolutionary drama are thus made the group of which he is to be the centre; and his current orders, correspondence, and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his valuation of the character and services of each. The single fact, xivthat no general officer of the first appointments actively shared in the immediate siege of Yorktown, adds interest to this advance outline of their personal history.

For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for his early comprehension of the real issues involved in a contest with Great Britain, an outline of events which preceded hostilities is introduced, embracing, however, only those Colonial antecedents which became emotional factors in forming his character and energizing his life as a soldier.

The maps, which illustrate only the immediate campaigns of Washington, or related territory which required his supervision, are reduced from those used in “Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.” The map entitled “Operations near New York,” was the first one drafted, at Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was approved by Washington Irving, then completing his Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the plan of the future work. All of the maps, however, before engravure, had the minute examination and approval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume owes its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his decease, and is completed, with ever-present appreciation of his aid and his friendship.

The boyhood and youth of George Washington were singularly in harmony with those aptitudes and tastes that shaped his entire life. He was not quite eight years of age when his elder brother, Lawrence, fourteen years his senior, returned from England where he had been carefully educated, and where he had developed military tastes that were hereditary in the family. Lawrence secured a captain’s commission in a freshly organized regiment, and engaged in service in the West Indies, with distinguished credit. His letters, counsels, and example inspired the younger brother with similar zeal. Irving says that “all his amusements took a military turn. He made soldiers of his school-mates. They had their mimic parades, reviews, and sham-fights. A boy named William Bustle, was sometimes his competitor, but George was commander-in-chief of the school.”

His business aptitudes were equally exact, methodical, and promising. Besides fanciful caligraphy, which appeared in manuscript school-books, wherein he executed profiles of his school-mates, with a flourish of the pen, as well as nondescript birds, Irving states that “before he 2was thirteen years of age, he had copied into a volume, forms of all kinds of mercantile and legal papers: bills of exchange, notes of hand, deeds, bonds, and the like.” “This self-tuition gave him throughout life a lawyer’s skill in drafting documents, and a merchant’s exactness in keeping accounts, so that all the concerns of his various estates, his dealings with his domestic stewards and foreign agents, his accounts with government, and all his financial transactions, are, to this day, monuments of his method and unwearied accuracy.”

Even as a boy, his frame had been large and powerful, and he is described by Captain Mercer “as straight as an Indian, measuring six feet and two inches in his stockings, and weighing one hundred and seventy-five pounds, when he took his seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1759. His head is well shaped though not large, but is gracefully poised on a superb neck, with a large and straight rather than a prominent nose; blue-gray penetrating eyes, which were widely separated and overhung by heavy brows. A pleasing, benevolent, though a commanding countenance, dark-brown hair, features regular and placid, with all the muscles under perfect control, with a mouth large, and generally firmly closed,” complete the picture. The bust by Houdon at the Capitol of Virginia, and the famous St. Memin crayon, fully accord with this description of Washington.

His training and surroundings alike ministered to his natural conceptions of a useful and busy life. In the midst of abundant game, he became proficient in its pursuit. Living where special pride was taken in the cultivation of good stock, and where nearly all travel and neighborly visitation was upon horseback, he learned the value of a good horse, and was always well mounted. Competition in saddle exercise was, therefore, one of the most pleasing and constant entertainments of himself and 3companions, and in its enjoyment, and in many festive tournaments that revived something of the olden-time chivalry of knighthood, Washington was not only proficient, but foremost in excellence of attainment.

Rustic recreations such as quoits, vaulting, wrestling, leaping, the foot-race, hunting and fishing, were parts of his daily experience, and thoroughly in the spirit of the Old Dominion home life of the well-bred gentleman. The gallantry of the times and the social amenities of that section of the country were specially adapted to his temperament, so that in these, also, he took the palm of recognized merit. The lance and the sword, and every accomplishment of mimic warfare in the scale of heraldic observance, usual at that period, were parts of his panoply, to be enjoyed with keenest relish, until his name became synonymous with success in all for which he seriously struggled. Tradition does not exaggerate the historic record of his proficiency in these manly sports.

Frank by nature, although self-contained and somewhat reticent in expression; unsuspicious of others, but ever ready to help the deserving needy, or the unfortunate competitor who vainly struggled for other sympathy, he became the natural umpire, at the diverting recreations of his times, and commanded a respectful confidence far beyond that of others of similar age and position in society. With all this, a sense of justice and a right appreciation of the merit of others, even of rivals, were so conspicuous in daily intercourse with a large circle of familiar acquaintances, whether of influential families or those of a more humble sphere of life, that he ever bent gracefully to honor the deserving, while never obsequious to gain the favor of any.

Living in the midst of slave labor, and himself a slaveholder, he was humane, considerate, and impartial. Toward his superiors in age or in position, he was uniformly 4courteous, without jealousy or envy, but unconsciously carried himself with so much of benignity and grace, that his most familiar mates paid him the deference which marked the demeanor of all who, in later years, recognized his exalted preferment and his natural sphere of command. The instincts of a perfect gentleman were so radicated in his person and deportment, that he moved from stage to stage, along life’s ascent, as naturally as the sun rises to its zenith with ever increasing brightness and force.

All these characteristics, so happily blended, imparted to his choice of a future career its natural direction and character. Living near the coast and in frequent contact with representatives of the British navy, he became impressed by the strong conviction that its service offered the best avenue to the enjoyment of his natural tastes, as well as the most promising field for their fruitful exercise. The berth of midshipman, with its prospects of preferment and travel, fell within his reach and acceptance. Every available opportunity was sought, through books of history and travel and acquaintance with men of the naval profession, to anticipate its duties and requirements. It was Washington’s first disappointment in life of which there is record, that his mother did not share his ardent devotion for the sea and maritime adventure. At the age of eleven he lost his father, Augustine Washington, but the estate was ample for all purposes of Virginia hospitality and home comfort, and he felt that he could be spared as well as his brother Lawrence. With all the intensity of his high aspiration and all the vigor of his earnest and almost passionate will, he sought to win his mother’s assent to his plans; and then, with filial reverence and a full, gracious submission, he bent to her wishes and surrendered his choice. That was Washington’s first victory; and similar 5self-mastery, under obligation to country, became the secret of his imperial success. Irving relates that his mother’s favorite volume was Sir Matthew Hale’s Contemplations, moral and divine; and that “the admirable maxims therein contained, sank deep into the mind of George, and doubtless had a great influence in forming his character. That volume, ever cherished, and bearing his mother’s name, Mary Washington, may still be seen in the archives of Mount Vernon.”

But Washington’s tastes had become so settled, that he followed the general trend of mathematical and military study, until he became so well qualified as a civil engineer, that at the age of sixteen, one year after abandoning the navy as his profession, he was intrusted with important land surveys, by Lord Fairfax; and at the age of nineteen was appointed Military Inspector, with the rank of Major. In 1752 he became the Adjutant-General of Virginia. Having been born on the twenty-second day of February (February 11th, Old Style) he was only twenty years of age when this great responsibility was intrusted to his charge.

The period was one of grave concern to the people of Virginia, especially as the encroachments of the French on the western frontier, and the hostilities of several Indian tribes, had imperilled all border settlements; while the British government was not prepared to furnish a sufficient military force to meet impending emergencies. As soon as Washington entered upon the duties of his office, he made a systematic organization of the militia his first duty. A plan was formulated, having special reference to frontier service. His journals and the old Colonial records indicate the minuteness with which this undertaking was carried into effect. His entire subsequent career is punctuated by characteristics drawn from this experience. Rifle practice, feats of horsemanship, 6signalling, restrictions of diet, adjustments for the transportation of troops and supplies with the least possible encumbrance; road and bridge building, the care of powder and the casting of bullets, were parts of this system. These were accompanied by regulations requiring an exact itinerary of every march, which were filed for reference, in order to secure the quickest access to every frontier post. The duties and responsibilities of scouts sent in advance of troops, were carefully defined. The passage of rivers, the felling of trees for breastworks, stockades, and block-houses, and methods of crossing swamps, by corduroy adjustments, entered into the instruction of the Virginia militia.

At this juncture it seemed advisable, in the opinion of Governor Dinwiddie, to secure, if practicable, a better and an honorable understanding with the French commanders who had established posts at the west. The Indians were hostile to all advances of both British and French settlement. There was an indication that the French were making friendly overtures to the savages, with view to an alliance against the English. In 1753 Washington was sent as Special Commissioner, for the purpose indicated. The journey through a country infested with hostile tribes was a remarkable episode in the life of the young soldier, and was conducted amid hardships that seem, through his faithful diary, to have been the incidents of some strangely thrilling fiction rather than the literal narrative, modestly given, of personal experience. During the journey, full of risks and rare deliverances from savage foes, swollen streams, ice, snow, and tempest, his keen discernment was quick to mark the forks of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers as the proper site for a permanent post, to control that region and the tributary waters of the Ohio, which united there. He was courteously received by St. Pierre, the French 7commandant, but failed to secure the recognition of English rights along the Ohio. But Washington’s notes of the winter’s expedition critically record the military features of the section traversed by him, and forecast the peculiar skill with which he accomplished so much in later years, with the small force at his disposal.

In 1754 he was promoted as Colonel and placed in command of the entire Virginia militia. Already, the Ohio Company had selected the forks of the river for a trading-post and commenced a stockade fort for their defence. The details of Washington’s march to support these pioneers, the establishment and history of Fort Necessity, are matters of history.

Upon assuming command of the Virginia militia, Washington decided that a more flexible system than that of the European government of troops, was indispensable to success in fighting the combined French and Indian forces, then assuming the aggressive against the border settlements. Thrown into intimate association with General Braddock and assigned to duty as his aid-de-camp and guide, he endeavored to explain to that officer the unwisdom of his assertion that the very appearance of British regulars in imposing array, would vanquish the wild warriors of thicket and woods, without battle. The profitless campaign and needless fate of Braddock are familiar; but Washington gained credit both at home and abroad, youthful as he was, for that sagacity, practical wisdom, knowledge of human nature, and courage, which ever characterized his life.

During these marchings and inspections he caused all trees which were so near to a post as to shelter an advancing enemy, to be felled. The militia were scattered over an extensive range of wild country, in small detachments, and he was charged with the defence of more than four hundred miles of frontier, with an available 8force of only one thousand men. He at once initiated a system of sharp-shooters for each post. Ranges were established, so that fire would not be wasted upon assailants before they came within effective distance. When he resumed command, after returning from the Braddock campaign, he endeavored to reorganize the militia upon a new basis. This reorganization drew from his fertile brain some military maxims for camp and field service which were in harmony with the writings of the best military authors of that period, and his study of available military works was exact, unremitting, and never forgotten. Even during the active life of the Revolutionary period, he secured from New York various military and other volumes for study, especially including Marshal Turenne’s Works, which Greene had mastered before the war began.

Washington resigned his commission in 1756; married Mrs. Martha Custis, Jan. 6, 1759; was elected member of the Virginia House of Burgesses the same year, and was appointed Commissioner to settle military accounts in 1765. In the discharge of this trust he manifested that accuracy of detail and that exactness of system in business concerns which have their best illustration in the minute record of his expenses during the Revolutionary War, in which every purchase made for the government or the army, even to a few horse-shoe nails, is accurately stated.

Neither Cæsar’s Commentaries, nor the personal record of any other historical character, more strikingly illustrate an ever-present sense of responsibility to conscience and to country, for trusts reposed, than does that of Washington, whether incurred in camp or in the whirl and crash of battle. Baron Jomini says: “A great soldier must have a physical courage which takes no account of obstacles; and a high moral courage capable 9of great resolution.” There have been youth, like Hannibal, whose earliest nourishment was a taste of vengeance against his country’s foes, and others have imbibed, as did the ancient Hebrew, abnormal strength to hate their enemies while doing battle; but if the character of Washington be justly delineated, he was, through every refined and lofty channel, prepared, by early aptitudes and training, to honor his chosen profession, with no abatement of aught that dignifies character, and rounds out in harmonious completeness the qualities of a consummate statesman and a great soldier.

In 1755, four military expeditions were planned by the Colonies: one against the French in Nova Scotia; one against Crown Point; one against Fort Niagara, and the fourth, that of Braddock, against the French posts along the Ohio river.

In 1758, additional expeditions were undertaken, the first against Louisburg, the second against Ticonderoga, and the third against Fort Du Quesne. Washington led the advance in the third, a successful attack, Nov. 25, 1758, thereby securing peace with the Indians on the border, and making the fort itself more memorable by changing its name to that of Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh) in memory of William Pitt (Lord Chatham), the eminent British statesman, and the enthusiastic friend of America.

In 1759, Quebec was captured by the combined British and Colonial forces, and the tragic death of the two commanders, Wolfe and Montcalm, made the closing hours of the siege the last opportunity of their heroic valor. With the capture of Montreal in 1760, Canada came wholly under British control. In view of those campaigns, it was not strange that so many Colonial participants readily found places in the Continental Army at the commencement of the war for American Independence, and subsequently urged the acquisition of posts on the northern border with so much pertinacity and confidence.

11In 1761, Spain joined France against Great Britain, but failed of substantial gain through that alliance, because the British fleets were able to master the West India possessions of Spain, and even to capture the city of Havana itself.

In 1763, a treaty was effected at Paris, which terminated these protracted inter-Colonial wars, so that the thirteen American colonies were finally relieved from the vexations and costly burdens of aiding the British crown to hold within its grasp so many and so widely separated portions of the American continent. In the ultimate settlement with Spain, England exchanged Havana for Florida; and France, with the exception of the city of New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, retired behind the Mississippi river, retaining, as a shelter for her fisheries, only the Canadian islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which are still French possessions.

In view of the constantly increasing imposition of taxes upon the Colonies by the mother country, in order to maintain her frequent wars with European rivals, by land and sea, a convention was held at New York on the seventh day of October, 1765, called a Colonial Congress, “to consult as to their relations to England, and provide for their common safety.” Nine colonies were represented, and three others either ratified the action of the convention, or declared their sympathy with its general recommendations and plans. The very brief advance notice of the assembling of delegates, partly accounts for the failure of North Carolina, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Georgia, to be represented. But that convention made a formal “Declaration of Rights,” especially protesting that “their own representatives alone had the right to tax them,” and “their own juries to try them.”

As an illustration of the fact, that the suggestion of 12some common bond to unite the Colonies for general defence was not due to the agencies which immediately precipitated the American Revolution, it is to be noticed that as early as 1607, William Penn urged the union of the Colonies in some mutually related common support. The Six Nations (Indian), whom the British courted as allies against the French, and later, against their own blood, had already reached a substantial Union among themselves, under the name of the Iroquois Confederacy; and it is a historical fact of great interest, that their constitutional league for mutual support against a common enemy, while reserving absolute independence in every local function or franchise, challenged the appreciative indorsement of Thomas Jefferson when he entered upon the preparation of a Constitution for the United States of America.

And in 1722, Daniel Coxe, of New Jersey, suggested a practical union of the Colonies for the consolidation of interests common to each. In 1754, when the British government formally advised the Colonies to secure the friendship of the Six Nations against the French, Benjamin Franklin prepared a form for such union. Delegates from New England, as well as from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, met at Albany on the fourth of July, 1754, the very day of the surrender of Fort Necessity to the French, for consideration of the suggested plan. The King’s council rejected it, because it conceded too much independence of action to the people of the Colonies, and the Colonies refused to accept its provisions, because it left too much authority with the King.

Ten years later, when the Colonies had been freed from the necessity of sacrificing men and money to support the British authority against French, Spanish, and Indian antagonists, the poverty of the British treasury drove George Grenville, then Prime Minister, to a system of 13revenue from America, through the imposition of duties upon Colonial imports. In 1755 followed the famous Stamp Act. Its passage by Parliament was resisted by statesmen of clear foresight, with sound convictions of the injustice of taxing their brethren in America who had no representatives in either House of Parliament; but in vain, and this explosive bomb was hurled across the sea. Franklin, then in London, thus wrote to Charles Thompson, who afterwards became secretary of the Colonial Congress: “The sun of Liberty has set. The American people must light the torch of industry and economy.” To this Thompson replied: “Be assured that we shall light torches of quite another sort.”

The explosion of this missile, charged with death to every noble incentive to true loyalty to the mother country, dropped its inflammatory contents everywhere along the American coast. The Assembly of Virginia was first to meet, and its youngest member, Patrick Henry, in spite of shouts of “Treason,” pressed appropriate legislation to enactment. Massachusetts, unadvised of the action of Virginia, with equal spontaneity, took formal action, inviting the Colonies to send delegates to a Congress in New York, there to consider the grave issues that confronted the immediate future. South Carolina was the first to respond. When Governor Tryon, of North Carolina, afterwards the famous Governor of New York, asked Colonel (afterwards General) Ashe, Speaker of the North Carolina Assembly, what the House would do with the Stamp Act, he replied, “We will resist its execution to the death.”

On the seventh of October the Congress assembled and solemnly asserted, as had a former convention, that “their own representatives alone had the right to tax them,” and “their own juries to try them.” Throughout the coast line of towns and cities, interrupted business, 14muffled and tolling bells, flags at half-mast, and every possible sign of stern indignation and deep distress, indicated the resisting force which was gathering volume to hurl a responsive missile into the very council chamber of King George himself.

“Sons of Liberty” organized in force, but secretly; arming themselves for the contingency of open conflict. Merchants refused to import British goods. Societies of the learned professions and of all grades of citizenship agreed to dispense with all luxuries of English production or import. Under the powerful and magnetic sway of Pitt and Burke, this Act was repealed in 1766; but even this repeal was accompanied by a “Declaratory Act,” which reserved for the Crown “the right to bind the Colonies, in all cases whatsoever.”

Pending all these fermentations of the spirit of liberty, George Washington, of Virginia, was among the first to recognize the coming of a conflict in which the Colonial troops would no longer be a convenient auxiliary to British regulars, in a common cause, but would confront them in a life or death struggle, for rights which had been guaranteed by Magna Charta, and had become the vested inheritance of the American people. Suddenly, as if to impress its power more heavily upon the restless and overwrought Colonists, Parliament required them to furnish quarters and subsistence for the garrisons of towns and cities. In 1768, two regiments arrived at Boston, ostensibly to “preserve the public peace,” but, primarily, to enforce the revenue measures of Parliament.

In 1769, Parliament requested the King to “instruct the Governor of Massachusetts” to “forward to England for trial, upon charges of high treason,” several prominent citizens of that colony “who had been guilty of denouncing Parliamentary action.” The protests of the Provincial 15Assemblies of Virginia and North Carolina against the removal of their citizens, for trial elsewhere, were answered by the dissolution of those bodies by their respective royal governors. On the fifth day of May, 1769, Lord North, who had become Prime Minister, proposed to abolish all duties, except upon tea. Later, in 1770, occurred the “Boston Massacre,” which is ever recalled to mind by a monument upon the Boston Common, in honor of the victims. In 1773 “Committees of Correspondence” were selected by most of the Colonies, for advising the people of all sections, whenever current events seemed to endanger the public weal. One writer said of this state of affairs: “Common origin, a common language, and common sufferings had already established between the Colonies a union of feeling and interest; and now, common dangers drew them together more closely.”

But the tax upon tea had been retained, as the expression of the reserved right to tax at will, under the weak assumption that the Colonists would accept this single tax and pay a willing consideration for the use of tea in their social and domestic life. The shrewd and patriotic citizens, however boyish it may have seemed to many, found a way out of the apparent dilemma, and on the night of December 16, 1773, the celebrated Boston Tea Party gave an entertainment, using three hundred and fifty-two chests of tea for the festive occasion, and Boston Harbor for the mixing caldron.

In 1774, the “Boston Port Bill” was passed, nullifying material provisions of the Massachusetts Charter, prohibiting intercourse with Boston by sea, and substituting Salem for the port of entry and as the seat of government for the Province. It is to be noticed, concerning the various methods whereby the Crown approached the Colonies, in the attempt to subordinate all rights to the 16royal will, that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, until 1692, were charter governments, whereby laws were framed and executed by the freemen of each colony. The proprietary governments were Pennsylvania with Maryland, and at first New York, New Jersey, and the Carolinas. In all of these, the proprietors, under certain restrictions, established and conducted their own systems of rule. There were also the royal governments, those of New Hampshire, Virginia, Georgia, and afterwards Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and the Carolinas. In these, appointments of the chief officers pertained to the Crown.

At the crisis noticed, General Gage had been appointed Governor of Massachusetts Colony, as well as commander-in-chief, and four additional regiments had been despatched to his support. But Salem declined to avail herself of the proffered boon of exceptional franchises, and the House of Burgesses of Virginia ordered that “the day when the Boston Port Bill was to go into effect should be observed as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer.”

The Provincial Assembly did indeed meet at Salem, but solemnly resolved that it was expedient, at once, to call a General Congress of all the Colonies, to meet the unexpected disfranchisement of the people, and appointed five delegates to attend such Congress. All the Colonies except Georgia, whose governor prevented the election of delegates, were represented.

This body, known in history as the First Continental Congress, assembled in Carpenter’s Hall, Philadelphia, on the fifth day of September, 1774. Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was elected president, and Charles Thompson, of Pennsylvania, was elected secretary. Among the representative men who took part in its solemn deliberations must be named Samuel Adams and John Adams, of 17Massachusetts; Philip Livingstone and John Jay, of New York; John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania; Christopher Gadsden and John Rutledge, of South Carolina; Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Washington, of Virginia.

During an address by Lord Chatham before the British House of Lords, he expressed his opinion of the men who thus boldly asserted their inalienable rights as Englishmen against the usurping mandates of the Crown, in these words: “History, my lords, has been my favorite study; and in the celebrated writers of antiquity have I often admired the patriotism of Greece and Rome; but, my lords, I must declare and avow, that in the master states of the world, I know not the people, or senate, who, in such a complication of difficult circumstances, can stand in preference to the delegates of America assembled in General Congress at Philadelphia.” This body resolved to support Massachusetts in resistance to the offensive Acts of Parliament; made a second “Declaration of Rights,” and advised an American association for non-intercourse with England. It also prepared another petition to the King, as well as an address to the people of Great Britain and Canada, and then provided for another Congress, to be assembled the succeeding May. During its sessions, the Massachusetts Assembly also convened and resolved itself into a Provincial Congress, electing John Hancock as president, and proceeded to authorize a body of militia, subject to instant call, and therefore to be designated as “Minute Men.” A Committee of Safety was appointed to administer public affairs during the recess of the Congress. When Captain Robert Mackenzie, of Washington’s old regiment, intimated that Massachusetts was rebellious, and sought independence, Washington used this unequivocal language in reply: “If the ministry are determined to push 18matters to extremity, I add, as my opinion, that more blood will be spilled than history has ever furnished instances of, in the annals of North America; and such a vital wound will be given to the peace of this great country, as time itself cannot cure, or eradicate the remembrance of.”

Early in 1775 Parliament rejected a “Conciliatory Bill,” which had been introduced by Lord Chatham, and passed an Act in special restraint of New England trade, which forbade even fishing on the banks of Newfoundland. New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were excepted, in the imposition of restrictions upon trade in the middle and southern Colonies, in order by a marked distinction between Colonies, to conserve certain aristocratic influences, and promote dissension among the people; but all such transparent devices failed to subdue the patriotic sentiment which had already become universal in its expression.

At that juncture the English people themselves did not apprehend rightly the merits of the dawning struggle, nor resent the imposition by Parliament, of unjust, unequal, and unconstitutional laws upon their brethren in America. Dr. Franklin thus described their servile attitude toward the Crown: “Every man in England seems to consider himself as a piece of a sovereign; seems to jostle himself into the throne with the King; and talks of ‘our subjects in the Colonies.’”

The ferment of patriotic sentiment was deep, subtle, intense, and ready for deliverance. The sovereignty of the British crown and the divine rights of man were to be subjected to the stern arbitrament of battle. One had fleets, armies, wealth, prestige, and power, unsustained by the principles of genuine liberty which had distinguished the British Constitution above all other modern systems of governmental control; while the scattered 19two millions of earnest, patriotic Englishmen across the sea, who, from their first landing upon the shores of the New World had honored every principle which could impart dignity and empire to their mother country, were to balance the scale of determining war by the weight of loyalty to conscience and to God.

British authority, which ought to have gladly welcomed and honored the prodigious elasticity, energy, and growth of its American dependencies, as the future glory and invincible ally of her advancing empire, was deliberately arming to convert a natural filial relation into one of slavery. The legacies of British law and the liberties of English subjects, which the Crown did not dare to infringe at home, had been lodged in the hearts of her American sons and daughters, until resistance to a royal decree had become impossible under any reasonable system of paternal care and treatment. Colonial sacrifices during Indian wars had been cheerfully borne, and free-will offerings of person and property had been rendered without stint, upon every demand. But it seemed to be impossible for George the Third and his chosen advisers to comprehend in its full significance, the momentous fact, that English will was as strong and stubborn in the child as in the parent.

Lord Chatham said that “it would be found impossible for freemen in England to wish to see three millions of Englishmen slaves in America.”

Respecting the attempted seizure of arms rightly in the hands of the people, that precipitated the “skirmish,” as the British defined it, which occurred at Lexington on the nineteenth day of April, 1775, Lord Dartmouth said: “The effect of General Gage’s attempt at Concord will be fatal.”

21Granville Sharpe, of the Ordnance Department, resigned rather than forward military stores to America.

Admiral Keppel formally requested not to be employed against America.

Lord Effingham resigned, when advised that his regiment had been ordered to America.

John Wesley, who had visited America many years before with his brother, and understood the character of the Colonists, at once recalled the appeal once made to the British government by General Gage during November, 1774, when he “was confident, that, to begin with, an army of twenty thousand men would, in the end, save Great Britain both blood and treasure,” and declared, “Neither twenty thousand, forty thousand, nor sixty thousand can end the dawning struggle.”

During the summer of 1774 militia companies had been rapidly organized throughout the Colonies. New England especially had been so actively associated with all military operations during the preceding French and Indian wars, that her people more readily assumed the attitude of armed preparation for the eventualities of open conflict.

Virginia had experienced similar conditions on a less extended and protracted basis. The action of the First Continental Congress on the fifth day of September, 1774, when, upon notice that Gage had fortified Boston, it made an unequivocal declaration of its sympathy with the people of Boston and of Massachusetts, changed the character of the struggle from that of a local incident, to one that demanded organized, deliberate, and general resistance.

Notwithstanding the slow course of mail communications between the widely separated Colonies north and south, the deportment of the British Colonial governors had been so uniformly oppressive and exacting, that the people, everywhere, like tinder, were ready for the first flying spark. A report became current during September, 22after the forced removal of powder from Cambridge and Charlestown, that Boston had been attacked. One writer has stated, that, “within thirty-six hours, nearly thirty thousand men were under arms.” This burst of patriotic feeling, this mighty frenzy over unrighteous interference with vested rights, made a profound impression upon the Continental Congress, then in session at Philadelphia, and aroused in the mind of Washington, then a delegate from Virginia, the most intense anxiety lest the urgency of the approaching crisis should find the people unprepared to take up the gage of battle, and fight with the hope of success. All this simply indicated the depth and breadth of the eager sentiment which actually panted for armed expression.

The conflict between British troops and armed citizens at Lexington had already assumed the characteristics of a battle, and, as such, had a more significant import than many more pronounced engagements in the world’s history. The numbers engaged were few, but the men who ventured to face British regulars on that occasion were but the thin skirmish line in advance of the swelling thousands that awaited the call “To arms.”

Massachusetts understood the immediate demand, having now drawn the fire of the hitherto discreet adversary, and promptly declared that the necessities of the hour required from New England the immediate service of thirty thousand men, assuming as her proportionate part a force of thirteen thousand six hundred. This was on the twenty-second day of April, while many timid souls and some social aristocrats were still painfully worrying themselves as to who was to blame for anybody’s being shot on either side.

On the twenty-fifth day of April, Rhode Island devoted fifteen hundred men to the service, as her contribution to “An Army of Observation” about Boston.

23On the following day, the twenty-sixth, Connecticut tendered her proportion of two thousand men.

Each Colonial detachment went up to Boston as a separate army, with independent organization and responsibility. The food, as well as the powder and ball of each, was distinct, and they had little in common except the purpose which impelled them to concentrate for a combined opposition to the armed aggressions of the Crown. And yet, this mass of assembling freemen was not without experience, or experienced leaders. The early wars had been largely fought by Provincial troops, side by side with British regulars, so that the general conduct of armies and of campaigns had become familiar to New England men, and many veteran soldiers were prompt to volunteer service. Lapse of time, increased age, absorption in farming or other civil pursuits, had not wholly effaced from the minds of retired veterans the memory of former experience in the field. If some did not realize the expectations of the people and of Congress, the promptness with which they responded to the call was no less worthy.

Massachusetts selected, for the immediate command of her forces, Artemas Ward, who had served under Abercrombie, with John Thomas, another veteran, as Lieutenant-General; and as Engineer-in-Chief, Richard Gridley, who had, both as engineer and soldier, earned a deserved reputation for skill, courage, and energy.

Connecticut sent Israel Putnam, who had been inured to exposure and hardship in the old French War, and in the West Indies. Gen. Daniel Wooster accompanied him, and he was a veteran of the first expedition to Louisburg thirty years before, and had served both as Colonel and Brigadier-General in the later French War. Gen. Joseph Spencer also came from Connecticut.

Rhode Island intrusted the command of her troops to 24Nathaniel Greene, then but thirty-four years of age, with Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church, as subordinates.

New Hampshire furnished John Stark, also a veteran of former service; and both Pomeroy and Prescott, who soon took active part in the operations about Boston, had participated in Canadian campaigns.

These, and others, assembled in council, for consideration of the great interests which they had been summoned to protect by force of arms. At this solemn juncture of affairs, the youngest of their number, Nathaniel Greene, whose subsequent career became so significant a factor in that of Washington the Soldier, submitted to his associates certain propositions which he affirmed to be indispensable conditions of success in a war against the British crown. These propositions read to-day, as if, like utterances of the old Hebrew prophets, they had been inspired rules for assured victory. And, one hundred years later, when the American Civil War unfolded its vast operations and tasked to the utmost all sections to meet their respective shares in the contest, the same propositions had to be incorporated into practical legislation before any substantial results were achieved on either side.

It is a historical fact that the failures and successes of the War of American Independence fluctuated in favor of success, from year to year, exactly in proportion to the faithfulness with which these propositions were illustrated in the management and conduct of the successive campaigns.

The propositions read as follows:

In estimating the character of Washington the Soldier, and accepting these propositions as sound, it is of interest to be introduced to their author.

The youthful tastes and pursuits of Nathaniel Greene, of Rhode Island, those which shaped his subsequent life and controlled many battle issues, were as marked as were those of Washington. Unlike his great captain, he had neither wealth, social position, nor family antecedents to inspire military endeavor. A Quaker youth, at fourteen years of age he saved time from his blacksmith’s forge, and by its light mastered geometry and Euclid. Providence threw in his way Ezra Stiles, then President of Yale College, and Lindley Murray, the grammarian, and each of them became his fast friend and adviser.

Before the war began, he had carefully studied “Cæsar’s Commentaries,” Marshal Turenne’s Works, “Sharpe’s Military Guide,” “Blackstone’s Commentaries,” “Jacobs’ Law Dictionary,” “Watts’ Logic,” “Locke on the Human Understanding,” “Ferguson on Civil Society,” Swift’s Works, and other models of a similar class of literature and general science.

In 1773, he visited Connecticut, attended several of its militia “trainings,” and studied their methods of instruction and drill. In 1774, he visited Boston, to examine minutely the drill, quarters, and commissary arrangements of the British regular troops. Incidentally, he met one evening, at a retired tavern on India wharf, a British sergeant who had deserted. He persuaded him 26to accompany him back to Rhode Island, where he made him drill-instructor of the “Kentish Guards,” a company with which Greene was identified. Such was the proficiency in arms, deportment, and general drill realized by this company, through their joint effort, that more than thirty of the members became commissioned officers in the subsequent war.

The character of the men of that period, as in the American Civil War, supplied the military service with soldiers of the best intelligence and of superior physical capacities. Very much of the energy and success which attended the progress of the American army was traceable to these qualities, as contrasted with those of the British recruits and the Hessian drafted men.

Greene himself, unconsciously but certainly, was preparing himself and his comrades for the impending struggle which already cast its shadow over the outward conditions of peace. Modest, faithful, dignified, undaunted by rebuffs or failure, and as a rule, equable, self-sacrificing, truthful, and honest, he possessed much of that simple grandeur of character which characterized George H. Thomas and Robert E. Lee, of the American conflict, 1861–5. His patriotism, as he announced his propositions to the officers assembled before Cambridge, was like that of Patrick Henry, of Virginia, who shortly after made this personal declaration: “Landmarks and boundaries are thrown down; distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are no more;” adding, “I am not a Virginian, but an American.”

By the middle of June, and before the Battle of Bunker Hill (Breed’s Hill), the Colonies were substantially united for war. During the previous month of March, Richard Henry Lee had introduced for adoption by the second Virginia Convention, a resolution that “the Colony be 27immediately put in a state of defence,” and advocated the immediate reorganization, arming, and discipline of the militia.

A hush of eager expectancy and an almost breathless waiting for some mysterious summons to real battle, seemed to pervade both north and south alike, when a glow in the east indicated the signal waited for, and even prayed for. The very winds of heaven seemed to bear the sound and flame of the first conflict in arms. In six days it reached Maryland. Intermediate Colonies, in turn, had responded to the summons, “To arms.” Greene’s Kentish Guards started for Boston, at the next break of day. The citizens of Rhode Island caught his inspiration, took possession of more than forty British cannon, and asserted their right and purpose to control all Colonial stores.

New York organized a Committee of Public Safety,—first of a hundred, and then of a thousand,—of her representative men, as a solid guaranty of her ardent sympathy with the opening struggle, declaring that “all the horrors of civil war could not enforce her submission to the acts of the British crown.” The Custom-house and the City Hall were seized by the patriots. Arming and drilling were immediate; and even by candle-light and until late hours, every night, impassioned groups of boys, as well as men, rehearsed to eager listeners the story of the first blood shed at Concord and Lexington; and strong men exchanged vows of companionship in arms, whatever might betide. Lawyers and ministers, doctors and teachers, merchants and artisans, laborers and seamen, mingled together as one in spirit and one in action. An “Association for the defence of Colonial Rights” was formed, and on the twenty-second of May the Colonial Assembly was succeeded by a Provincial Congress, and the new order of government went into full effect.

In New Jersey, the people, no less prompt, practical, 28and earnest, seized one hundred thousand dollars belonging to the Provincial treasury, and devoted it to raising troops for defending the liberties of the people.

The news reached Philadelphia on the twenty-fourth of April, and there, also, was no rest, until action took emphatic form. Prominent men, as in New York, eagerly tendered service and accepted command, so that on the first day of May the Pennsylvania Assembly made an appropriation of money to raise troops. Benjamin Franklin, but just returned from England, was made chairman of a Committee of Safety, and the whole city was aroused in hearty support of the common cause. The very Tory families which afterwards ministered to General Howe’s wants, and flattered Benedict Arnold by their courtesies, did not venture to stem the patriotic sentiment of the hour.

Virginia caught the flying spark. No flint was needed to fire the waiting tinder there. Lord Dunmore had already sent the powder of the Colony on board a vessel in the harbor. Patrick Henry quickly gathered the militia in force, to board the vessel and seize the powder. By way of compromise, the powder was paid for, but Henry was denounced as a “traitor.” The excitement was not abated, but intensified by this action, until Lord Dunmore, terrified, and powerless to stem the surging wave of patriotic passion, took refuge upon the man-of-war Fowey, then in the York river.

The Governor of North Carolina, as early as April, had quarrelled with the people of that Colony, in his effort to prevent the organization of a Provincial Congress. But so soon as the news was received from Boston of the opening struggle, the Congress assembled. Detached meetings were everywhere held in its support, and from all sides one sentiment was voiced, and this was its utterance: “The cause of Boston is the cause of all. Our 29destinies are indissolubly connected with those of our eastern fellow-citizens. We must either submit to the impositions which an unprincipled and unrepresented Parliament may impose, or support our brethren who have been doomed to sustain the first shock of Parliamentary power; which, if successful there, will ultimately overwhelm all, in one common calamity.” Conformable to these principles, a Convention assembled at Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, on the twentieth of May, 1775, and unanimously adopted the Instrument, ever since known as The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence.

In South Carolina, on the twenty-first day of April, a secret committee of the people, appointed for the purpose, forcibly entered the Colonial magazine and carried away eight hundred stands of arms and two hundred cutlasses. Thomas Corbett, a member of this committee, secured and opened a royal package just from England, containing orders to governors of each of the southern Colonies to “seize all arms and powder.” These were forwarded to the Continental Congress. Another despatch, dated at “Palace of Whitehall, December 23d,” stated that “seven regiments were in readiness to proceed to the southern Colonies; first to North Carolina, thence to Virginia, or South Carolina, as circumstances should point out.” These intercepted orders contained an “Act of Parliament, forbidding the exportation of arms to the Colonies,” and stimulated the zeal of the patriots to secure all within their reach. Twenty days later, the tidings from the north reached Charleston, adding fuel to the flame of the previous outbreak.

At Savannah, Ga., six members of the “Council of Safety” broke open the public magazine, before receipt of news from the north, seized the public powder and bore it away for further use. Governor Wright addressed a letter to General Gage at Boston, asking for troops, 30“to awe the people.” This was intercepted, and through a counterfeit signature General Gage was advised, “that the people were coming to some order, and there would be no occasion for sending troops.”

Such is the briefest possible outline of the condition of public sentiment throughout the country, of which Washington was well advised, so far as the Committee of the Continental Congress, of which he was a member, could gather the facts at that time.

Meanwhile, Boston was surrounded by nearly twenty thousand Minute Men. These Minute Men made persistent pressure upon every artery through which food could flow to relieve the hungry garrison within the British lines.

Neither was the excitement limited to the immediate surroundings. Ethan Allen, who had migrated from Connecticut to Vermont, led less than a hundred of “Green Mountain Boys,” as they were styled, to Ticonderoga, which he captured on the tenth of May. Benedict Arnold, of New Haven, with forty of the company then and still known as the Governor’s Guards, rushed to Boston without waiting for orders, and then to Lake Champlain, hoping to raise an army on the way. Although anticipated by Ethan Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga, he pushed forward toward Crown Point and St. John’s, captured and abandoned the latter, organized a small naval force, and with extraordinary skill defeated the British vessels and materially retarded the advance of the British flotilla and British troops from the north.

These feverish dashes upon frontier posts were significant of the general temper of the people, their desire to secure arms and military supplies supposed to be in those forts, and indicated their conviction that the chief danger to New England was through an invasion from Canada. But the absorbing cause of concern was the deliverance of Boston from English control.

The Second Continental Congress convened on the tenth day of May, 1775. On the same day, Ethan Allen captured Ticonderoga, also securing two hundred cannon which were afterwards used in the siege of Boston. Prompt measures were at once taken by Congress for the purchase and manufacture of both cannon and powder. The emission of two millions of Spanish milled dollars was authorized, and twelve Colonies were pledged for the redemption of Bills of Credit, then directed to be issued. At the later, September, session, the Georgia delegates took their seats, and made the action of the Colonies unanimous.

A formal system of “Rules and Articles of War” was adopted, and provision was made for organizing a military force fully adequate to meet such additional troops as England might despatch to the support of General Gage. Further than this, all proposed enforcement by the British crown of the offensive Acts of Parliament, was declared to be “unconstitutional, oppressive, and cruel.”

Meanwhile, the various New England armies were scattered in separate groups, or cantonments, about the City of Boston, with all the daily incidents of petty warfare which attach to opposing armies within striking distance, when battle action has not yet reached its desirable opportunity. And yet, a state of war had been so far 32recognized that an exchange of prisoners was effected as early as the sixth day of June. General Howe made the first move toward open hostilities by a tender of pardon to all offenders against the Crown except Samuel Adams and John Hancock; and followed up this ostentatious and absurd proclamation by a formal declaration of Martial Law.

The Continental Congress as promptly responded, by adopting the militia about Boston, as “The American Continental Army.”

On the fourteenth day of June, a Light Infantry organization of expert riflemen was authorized, and its companies were assigned to various Colonies for enlistment and immediate detail for service about Boston.

On the fifteenth day of June, 1775, Congress authorized the appointment, and then appointed George Washington, of Virginia, as “Commander-in-Chief of the forces raised, or to be raised, in defence of American Liberties.” On presenting their commission to Washington it was accompanied by a copy of a Resolution unanimously adopted by that body, “That they would maintain and assist him, and adhere to him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American Liberty.”

It is certain from the events above outlined, which preceded the Revolutionary struggle, that when Washington received this spontaneous and unanimous appointment, he understood definitely that the Colonies were substantially united in the prosecution of war, at whatever cost of men and money; that military men of early service and large experience could be placed in the field; that the cause was one of intrinsic right; and that the best intellects, as well as the most patriotic statesmen, of all sections, were ready, unreservedly, to submit their destinies to the fate of the impending struggle. He had been upon committees on the State of Public Affairs; was 33constantly consulted as to developments, at home and abroad; was familiar with the dissensions among British statesmen; and had substantial reasons for that sublime faith in ultimate victory which never for one hour failed him in the darkness of the protracted struggle. He also understood that not statesmen alone, preëminently Lord Dartmouth, but the best soldiers of Great Britain had regarded the military occupation of Boston, where the Revolutionary sentiment was most pronounced, and the population more dense as well as more enlightened, to be a grave military as well as political error. And yet, as the issue had been forced, it must be met as proffered; and the one immediate and paramount objective must be the expulsion of the British garrison and the deliverance of Boston. It will appear, however, as the narrative develops its incidents, that he never lost sight of the exposed sea-coast cities to the southward, nor of that royalist element which so largely controlled certain aristocratic portions of New York, New Jersey, and the southern cities, which largely depended upon trade with Great Britain and the West Indies for their independent fortunes and their right royal style of living. Neither did he fail to realize that delay in the siege of Boston, however unavoidable, was dangerous to the rapid prosecution of general war upon a truly military plan of speedy accomplishment.

His first duty was therefore with his immediate command, and the hour had arrived for the consolidation of the various Colonial armies into one compact, disciplined, and effective force, to battle with the best troops of Great Britain which now garrisoned Boston and controlled its waters.

Reënforcements under Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne had already increased the strength of that garrison to nearly ten thousand men. It had become impatient of 34confinement, and restive under the presence of increasing but ill-armed adversaries who eagerly challenged every picket post, and begrudged every market product smuggled, or snatched, by the purveyors or officers and soldiers of the Crown. Besides all this, the garrison began to realize the fate which afterwards befell that of Clinton in Philadelphia, in the demoralization and loss of discipline which ever attach to an idle army when enclosed within city limits. When Burgoyne landed at Boston, to support Gage, he contemptuously spoke of “ten thousand peasants who kept the King’s troops shut up.” Gradually, the peasants encroached upon the outposts. An offensive movement to occupy Charlestown Heights and menace the Colonial headquarters at Cambridge, with a view to more decisive action against their maturing strength, had been planned and was ready for execution. It was postponed, as of easy accomplishment at leisure; but the breaking morning of June 17, 1775, revealed the same Heights to be in possession of the “peasant” militia of America.

The Battle of Bunker Hill followed. Each force engaged lost one-third of its numbers, but the aggregate of the British loss was more than double that of the Colonies. It made a plain issue between the Colonists and the British army, and was no longer a controversy of citizens with the civil authority. The impatience of the two armies to have a fight had been gratified, and when Franklin was advised of the facts, and of the nerve with which so small a detachment of American militia had faced and almost vanquished three times their number of British veterans, he exclaimed, “The King has lost his Colonies.”

Many of the officers who bore part in that determining action gained new laurels in later years. Prescott, who led his thousand men to that achievement, served with 35no less gallantry in New York. Stark, so plucky and persistent along the Mystic river, was afterwards as brave and dashing at Trenton, Bennington, and Springfield. And Seth Warner, a volunteer at Bunker Hill, and comrade of Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga, participated in the battles of Hubbardton and Bennington, and the Saratoga campaign, during the invasion of Burgoyne in 1777.

Of the British participants, or spectators, a word is due. Clinton, destined to be Washington’s chief antagonist, had urged General Howe to attack Washington’s army at Cambridge, before it could mature into a well equipped and well disciplined force. He was overruled by General Howe, who with all his scientific qualities as a soldier, never, in his entire military career, was quick to follow up an advantage once acquired; and soon after, the junior officer was transferred to another field of service.

Percy, gallant in the action of June 17th, was destined to serve with credit at Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, and Newport.

Rawdon, then a lieutenant, who gallantly stormed the redoubt on Breed’s Hill, and received in his arms the body of his captain, Harris, of the British 5th Infantry, was destined to win reputation at Camden and Hobkirk’s Hill, but close his military career in America as a prisoner of war to the French.

The British retained and fortified Bunker Hill, and the time had arrived for more systematic American operations, and the presence of the Commander-in-Chief.

Congress had appointed the following general officers as Washington’s associates in conduct of the war.

Major-Generals.

Some of these have been already noticed.

Artemas Ward.

36Charles Lee, a retired officer of the British Army, a military adventurer under many flags, a resident of Virginia, an acquaintance of Washington, and ambitious to be first in command.

Philip Schuyler, then a member of Congress; a man of rare excellence of character, who had served in the French and Indian War, and took part in Abercrombie’s Ticonderoga campaign.

Israel Putnam.

Brigadier-Generals.

Seth Pomeroy.

Richard Montgomery, who served gallantly under Wolfe before Quebec, in 1759, and in the West Indies, in 1762.

David Wooster.

William Heath, who, previous to the war, was a vigorous writer upon the necessity of military discipline and a thoroughly organized militia.

Joseph Spencer, of Connecticut, also a soldier of the French and Indian War, both as Major and Lieutenant-Colonel.

John Thomas, also a soldier of the French and Indian War, and in command of a regiment at Cambridge, recruited by himself.

John Sullivan, a lawyer of New Hampshire, of Irish blood; a member of the First Continental Congress, and quick in sympathy with the first movement for armed resistance to British rule.

Nathaniel Greene, already in command of the Rhode Island troops.

Congress had also selected as Adjutant-General of the Army, Horatio Gates, of Virginia, who, like Lee, had served in the British regular army; commanded a company in the Braddock campaign, and gained some credit 37for bravery at the capture of Martinique, in the West Indies. He was also known to Washington, and shared with Lee in aspiration to the chief command.

If Washington had possessed prophetic vision, even his sublime faith might have wavered in view of that unfolding future which would leave none of these general officers by his side at the last conflict of the opening war.

Ward, somewhat feeble in body, would prove unequal to active service; lack the military acuteness and discernment which the crisis would demand, and retire from view with the occupation of Boston.

Lee, so like Arnold in volcanic temper, would be early detached for other service, in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina; would become a prisoner of war at New York; would propose to the British authorities a plan for destroying the American army; would escape execution as a British deserter, on exchange; and afterwards, at the Battle of Monmouth, so nearly realize his suggestion to General Howe, as to show that his habitual abuse of Congress and his jealousy of his Commander-in-Chief were insufficiently atoned for by dismissal from the army, and the privilege of dying in his own bed, unhonored and unlamented.

Schuyler, devoted to his country, with rare qualities as a gentleman and with a polish of manner and elegance of carriage that for the time made him severely unpopular with the staid stock of New England, would serve with credit in Canada; organize the army which Gates would command at Saratoga; be supplanted by that officer; retire from service because of poor health; but ever prove worthy of the confidence and love of his commander-in-chief. Of him, Chief Justice Kent would draw a pen-picture of “unselfish devotion, wonderful energy, and executive ability.” Of him, Daniel Webster would speak, in an august presence, in these terms: “I 38was brought up with New England prejudices against him; but I consider him second only to Washington in the service he rendered to his country in the War of the Revolution.”

Putnam, who had been conspicuously useful at Bunker Hill, would, because of Greene’s illness, suddenly succeed that officer in command on Long Island, without previous knowledge of the works and the surrounding country; would, feebly and without system, attempt to defend the lines against Howe’s advance; would serve elsewhere, trusted indeed, but without battle command, and be remembered as a brave soldier and a good citizen, but, as a general officer, unequal to the emergencies of field service.

Pomeroy, brave at Bunker Hill, realizing the responsibilities attending the consolidation of the army for active campaign duty, would decline the proffered commission.

Montgomery, would accompany Schuyler to Canada, full of high hope, and yet discover in the assembled militia such utter want of discipline and preparation to meet British veterans, as to withhold his resignation only when his Commander-in-Chief pleaded his own greater disappointments before Cambridge.

The perspective-glass will catch its final glimpse of Montgomery, when, after the last bold dash of his life, under the walls of Quebec, his body is borne to the grave and buried with military honors, by his old comrade in arms, Sir Guy Carleton, the British general in command.

Wooster, then sixty-four years of age, would join Montgomery at Montreal; waive his Connecticut rank; serve under his gallant leader; be recalled from service because unequal to the duties of active command; would prove faithful and noble wherever he served, and fall, 39defending the soil of his native State from Tryon’s invasion, in 1777.

Heath, would supplement his service on the Massachusetts Committee of Safety by efficient duty at New York, White Plains, and along the Hudson, ever true as patriot and soldier; but fail to realize in active service that discipline of men and that perception of the value of campaign experience which had prompted his literary efforts before he faced an enemy in battle.

Spencer, would discharge many trusts early in the war, with fidelity, but without signal ability or success, and transfer his sphere of patriotic duty to the halls of Congress.

Thomas, would prove efficient in the siege of Boston, and serve in Canada.

Sullivan, would also enter Canada; become a prisoner of war at Long Island; be with Washington at White Plains; succeed to the command of Lee’s division after the capture of that officer; distinguish himself at Trenton; serve at Brandywine; do gallant service at Germantown; attempt the capture of Staten Island and of Newport; chastise the Indians of New York, and resign, to take a seat in Congress.

Greene, would attend his chief in the siege of Boston; fortify Brooklyn Heights; engage in operations about Forts Washington and Lee; take part in the battles of Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, Newport, and Springfield; would then succeed Gates at the south, fight the battles of Guilford Court-House, Hobkirk Hill, and Eutaw Springs, and close his life in Georgia, the adopted home of his declining years.

But, during the midsummer of 1775, the beleaguered City of Boston, astounded by the stolid and bloody resistance to its guardian garrison, began to measure the cost 40of loyalty to the King, in preference to loyalty to country and duty; while the enclosed patriots began to assure themselves that deliverance was drawing near. Burgoyne, after watching the battle from Copp’s Hill, in writing to England of this “great catastrophe,” prepared the Crown for that large demand for troops upon which he afterwards conditioned his acceptance of a command in America.

The days of waiting for a distinct battle-issue had been fulfilled. The days of waiting for the consolidation of the armies about Boston, under one competent guide and master, also passed. Washington had left Philadelphia and was journeying toward Cambridge.

WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER.

[Etching from H. H. Hall’s Sons’ engraving.]

On the twenty-first day of June, 1775, Washington left Philadelphia for Boston, and on the third day of July assumed command of the Continental Army of America, with headquarters at Cambridge.

At this point one is instinctively prompted to peer into the closed tent of the Commander-in-Chief and observe his modest, but wholly self-reliant attitude toward the grave questions that are to be settled, in determining whether the future destiny of America is to be that of liberty, or abject submission to the Crown.

For fully two months the yeomanry of New England had firmly grasped all approaches to the City of Boston. This pressure was now and then resisted by efforts of the garrison to secure supplies from the surrounding country farms; which only induced a tighter hold, and aroused a stubborn purpose to crowd that garrison to surrender, or escape by sea. The islands of the beautiful bay and of the Nantasket roadstead had become miniature fields of daily conflict; and persistent efforts to procure bullocks, flour, and other needed provisions, through the boats of the British fleet, only developed a counter system of boat operations which neutralized the former, and gradually restricted the country excursions of the troops within the city to the range of their guns.

And yet the beleaguering force had fluctuated every day, so that but few of the hastily improvised regiments 42maintained either identity of persons, or permanent numbers. Exchanges were frequent between those on duty and others at their homes. The sudden summons from so many and varied industrial pursuits and callings was like the unorganized rush of men at an alarm of fire, quickened by the conviction that some wide, sweeping, and common danger was to be withstood, or some devouring element to be mastered. The very independence of opinion and sense of oppression which began to assert a claim to absolutely independent nationality, became impatient of all restraint, until military control, however vital to organized success, had become tiresome, offensive, and sharply contested. Offices also, as in more modern times, had been conferred upon those who secured enlistments, and too often without regard to character or signal merit; while the familiarities of former neighborhood friends and acquaintances ill-fitted them to bear rigid control by those who had been, only just before, companions on a common level.

Jealousies and aspirations mingled with the claims of families left at home, and many local excitements attended the efforts of officers of the Crown to discharge their most simple duties. After the flash of Lexington and its hot heat had faded out, it was dull work to stand guard by day, lie upon the ground at night, live a life of half lazy routine, receive unequal and indifferent food, and wonder, between meals, when and how the whole affair would end. The capture of Ticonderoga, so easily affected, inclined many to regard the contest before Boston as a matter of simple, persistent pressure, with no provident conception of the vast range of conflict involved in this defiance of the British Crown, in which all Colonies must pass under the rolling chariot of war.

And yet, all these elements were not sufficiently relaxing to permit the enclosed garrison to go free. 43While thousands of the Minute Men were apparently listless, and taking the daily drudgery as a matter-of-course experience, not to be helped or be rid of,—there were many strong-willed men among them who held settled and controlling convictions, so that even the raw militia were generally under wise guardianship. Leading scholars and professional men, as well as ministers of the Gospel and teachers of the district schools, united their influence with that of some well-trained soldiers, to keep the force in the field at a comparatively even strength of numbers. The idle were gradually set to work, and occupation began to lighten the strain of camp life.

At the date of Washington’s arrival to take command, there was a practical suspension of military operations over the country at large; and this condition of affairs, together with the large display of Colonial force about Boston, gave the other Colonies opportunity to prepare for war, and for Washington to develop his army and test both officers and men.

In his tent at Cambridge, he opened the packages intrusted to his care by Congress, and examined the commissions of the officers who were to share his councils and execute his will. His own commission gave him all needed authority, and pledged the united Colonies to his hearty support. Confidence in his patriotism, his wisdom, and his military capacity was generous and complete. He represented Congress. He represented America. For a short time he withheld the delivery of a few of the commissions. Some officers, hastily commissioned, although formerly in military service, had been entirely isolated from opportunities for knowledge of men and of questions of public policy. The emergency required such as were familiar with the vast interests involved in a struggle in arms with Great Britain; men who would heartily submit to that strict discipline which 44preparation for a contest with the choicest troops of the mother country must involve.

Washington’s constitutional reticence deepened from his first assumption of command. Frederick the Great once declared that “if he suspected that his nightcap would betray his thoughts while he slept, he would burn it.” Washington, like Frederick, and like Grant and Lee, great soldiers of the American Civil War, largely owed his success and supremacy over weak or jealous companions in arms to this subtle power. And this, with Washington, was never a studied actor’s part in the drama of Revolution. It was based upon a devout, reverential, and supreme devotion to country and the right. His moral sense was delicate, and quick to discern the great object of the people’s need and desire. He was also reverential in recognition of an Almighty Father of all mankind, whose Providence he regarded as constant, friendly, and supervising, in all the struggle which America had undertaken for absolute independence. Under this guidance, he learned how to act with judicial discretion upon the advice of his subordinates, and then,—to execute his own sentence. Baron Jomini pronounced Napoleon to have been his own best chief of staff; and such was Washington. Congress discovered as the years slipped by, and jealousies of Washington, competitions for office and for rank, and rivalries of cities, sections, and partisans, endangered the safety of the nation and the vital interests involved in the war, to trust his judgment; and history has vindicated the wisdom of their conclusion. And yet, with all this will-power in reserve, he was patient, tolerant, considerate of the honest convictions of those with contrary opinions; and so assigned officers, or detailed them upon special commissions, that, when not overborne by Congress in the detail of some of its importunate favorites, he succeeded in placing officers 45where their weaknesses could not prejudice the interests of the country at large, and where their faculties could be most fruitfully utilized.

If the thoughtful reader will for a moment recall the name of some battlefield of the Revolution, or of any prominent military character who was identified with some determining event of that war, he will quickly notice how potentially the foresight of Washington either directed the conditions of success, or wisely compensated the effects of failure.

Washington never counted disappointments as to single acts of men, or the operations of a single command, as determining factors in the supreme matter of final success. The vaulting ambition, headstrong will, and fiery daring of Arnold never lessened an appreciation of his real merits, and he acquired so decided an affection for him, personally, and was so disappointed that Congress did not honor his own request for Arnold’s prompt promotion, at one time, that when his treason was fully revealed, he could only exclaim, with deep emotion, “Whom now can we trust?”

Even the undisguised jealousy of Charles Lee, his cross-purposes, disobedience of orders, abuse of Congress, breaches of confidence, and attempts to warp councils of war adversely to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief did not forfeit Washington’s recognition of that officer’s general military knowledge and his ordinary wisdom in council.

These considerations fully introduce the Commander-in-Chief to the reader, as he imagines the Soldier to be in his tent with the commissions of subordinate officers before him.

He began his duties with the most minute inspection of the material with which he was expected to carry on a contest with Great Britain. Every company and regiment, their quarters, their arms, ammunition, and food 46supplies, underwent the closest scrutiny. He accepted excuses for the slovenliness of any command with the explicit warning that repetition of such indifference or neglect would be sternly punished.

The troops had hardly been dismissed, after their first formal parade for inspection, before a set repugnance to all proper instruction in the details of a soldier’s duty became manifest. The old method of fighting Indians singly, through thickets, and in small detachments, each man for himself, was clung to stubbornly, as if the army were composed of individual hunters, who must each “bag his own game.” Guard duty was odious. Superiority by virtue of rank was questioned, denied, or ignored. The abuses of places of trust, especially in the quartermaster and commissary departments, and the prostitution of these responsibilities to private ends were constant. “Profanity, vulgarity, and all the vices of an undisciplined mass became frightful,” as Washington himself described the condition, “so soon as any immediate danger passed by.” To sum up the demoralization of the army, he could only add, “They have been trained to have their own way too long.”

But the good, the faithful, and the pure were hardly less restive under the new restraint, and few appreciated the vital value of some absolutely supreme control. The public moneys and public property were held to belong to everybody, because Congress represented everybody. Commands were considered despotic orders, and exact details were but another system of slavery.

Nor was this the whole truth. Even officers of high position, whether graded above or below their own expectations, found time to indulge in petty neglect of plain instructions, and in turn to usurp authority, in defiance of discipline and the paramount interests of the people at large.

47The inspection of the Commander-in-Chief had been made. Immediately, the troops were put to work perfecting earthworks, building redoubts, and policing camp. “Observance of the Sabbath” was enforced. Officers were court-martialed, and soldiers were tried, for “swearing, gambling, fraud, and lewdness.” A thorough system of guard and picket duty was established, and the nights were made subservient to rest, in the place of dissipation and revelry. Discipline was the first indication that a Soldier was in command.

These statements, which are brief extracts from his published Orders, fall far below a just review of the situation as given by Washington himself. From some of his reports to Congress it would seem as if, for a moment, he almost despaired of bringing the army to a condition when he might confidently take it into an open field, and place it, face to face, against any well-appointed force of even inferior numbers. That he was enabled so to discipline an army that, as at Brandywine, they willingly marched to meet a British and Hessian force one-half greater than his own in numbers, became a complete justification of the patience and wise persistence with which he handled the raw troops in camp about Cambridge, in the year 1775.

His next care was “the practical art of bringing the army fully equipped to the battlefield,” known as the “Logistics of War.” The army was deficient in every element of supply. The men, who still held their Colonial obligation to be supreme, came and went just as their engagements would permit and the comfort of their families required. Desertion was regarded as nothing, or at the worst but a venial offence, and there were times when the American army about Boston, through nine miles of investment, was less in number than the British garrison within the city.

48But the deficiency in the number of the men was not so conspicuous and disappointing as the want of powder, lead, tools, arms, tents, horses, carts, and medical supplies. Ordinary provisions had become abundant. The adjacent country fed them liberally and supplied many home-made luxuries, not always the best nourishment for a soldier’s life; but it was difficult to persuade the same men that all provisions must enter into a general commissariat, and be issued to all alike; and that such stores must be accumulated, and neither expended lavishly nor sold at a bargain so soon as a surplus remained unexpended. Such articles as cordage, iron, horseshoes, lumber, fire-wood, and every possible thing which might be required for field, garrison, or frontier service, were included in his inventory of essential supplies.

In his personal expenditures of the most trivial item of public property, Washington kept a minute and exact account. Of the single article of powder, he once stated that his chief supply was furnished by the enemy, for, during one period, the armed vessels with which he patrolled the coast captured more powder than Congress had been able to furnish him in several months.

Delay in securing such essential supplies increased the difficulty of bringing the troops themselves to a full recognition of their military needs and responsibilities, so that the grumbling query, “What’s the use of copying the red-coats’ fuss and training?” still pervaded camp. Plain men from the country who had watched the martinet exactness of British drills in the city, where there was so much of ornament and “style,” had no taste for like subjection to control over their personal bearing and wardrobe. A single order of General Howe to the Boston garrison illustrates what the Yankees termed the “red-coats’ fuss.” He issued an order, reprimanding soldiers “whose hair was not smooth but badly powdered; who 49had no frills to their shirts; whose leggings hung in a slovenly manner about their knees, and other soldierly neglects, which must be immediately remedied.” This seemed to the American soldier more like some “nursing process;” and while right, on general principles, was not the chief requirement for good fighting zeal.

For many weeks it had been the chief concern of the American Commander-in-Chief how to make a fair show of military preparation, while all things were in such extreme confusion. Washington, as well as Howe, had his fixed ideas of military discipline, and he, also, issued orders respecting the habits, personal bearing, and neatness of the men; closing on one occasion, thus emphatically: “Cards and games of chance are prohibited. At this time of public distress, men may find enough to do in the service of their God and country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality.” In anticipation of active service, and to rebuke the freedom with which individuals inclined to follow their own bent of purpose, he promulgated the following ringing caution:

“It may not be amiss for the troops to know, that if any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat from the enemy without the orders of his commanding officer, he will be instantly shot down as an example of cowardice; cowards having too frequently disconcerted the best troops by their dastardly behavior.”

Amid all this stern preparation for the battlefield and its incidents, the most careful attention was given to the comfort and personal well-being of the privates in the ranks. While obedience was required of all, of whatever grade or rank, the cursing or other abuse of the soldier was considered an outrage upon his rights as a citizen, and these met his most scorching denunciation and punishment.

A Soldier was in command of the Continental Army of America.

The Continental Army about Boston was largely composed of New England troops. This was inevitable until the action of Congress could be realized by reënforcements from other Colonies. The experience of nearly all veteran soldiers in the Cambridge camps had been gained by service in Canada or upon its borders. British garrisons at Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal, as well as at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John’s, offered an opportunity for British aggression from the north. The seizure of the nearer posts, last named, temporarily checked such aggressions, but seemed to require adequate garrisons, and a watchful armed outlook across the border.

There had been very early urged upon the Massachusetts Committee of Safety more extensive operations into Canada, especially as the “Canadian Acts of Parliament” had become nearly as offensive to Canadians as other Acts which had alienated the American Colonies from respect for the common “Mother Country.” The Canadian Acts, however, had not been pressed to armed resistance; and differences of race, language, and religious forms were not conducive to those neighborly relations which would admit of combined action, even in emergencies common to both sections. But the initiative of a general movement into Canada had been taken, and Congress precipitated the first advance, before Washington became Commander-in-Chief. In order to appreciate the 51action of Washington when he became more directly responsible for the success of these detachments from his army, for service in Canada, they must be noticed.

The adventurous spirit of Arnold prompted the suggestion that the conquest of Canada would bring disaster to Great Britain and fend off attacks upon the other Colonies. He once traded with its people, was familiar with Quebec, and after his adventure at Crown Point, in June, had written from that place to the Continental Congress that Gen. Sir Guy Carleton’s force in Canada was less than six hundred men, promising to guarantee the conquest of Canada if he were granted the command of two thousand men for that purpose. On the second day of June, Ethan Allen, who had anticipated Arnold in the capture of Ticonderoga, had made a similar proposition to the Provincial Congress of New York. Both Allen and Seth Warner had visited Congress, and requested authority to raise new regiments. Authority was not given, but a recommendation was forwarded to the New York Provincial Congress, that the “Green Mountain Boys” should be recognized as regular forces, and be granted the privilege of electing their own officers.

It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that when Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found that Warner had anticipated his projected capture of Crown Point, as Allen had that of Ticonderoga, he was greatly offended, usurped command of that post and of a few vessels which he styled his “Navy,” and upon finding that his assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by Massachusetts nor Connecticut, discharged his force and returned to Cambridge in anger. This same navy, however, chiefly constructed under his skilful and energetic direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly postponed movements from Canada southward, for many months.

52Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against Montreal, and Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. This force, consisting of three thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous during the month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner also joined it.

During the same month a committee from Congress visited Washington at Cambridge, and persuaded him to send a second army to Canada, via the Kennebec river, to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant these demonstrations which, under other circumstances, might have proved fatal to success at Boston. The theory upon which Washington concurred in the action of Congress is worthy of notice, in estimating his character as a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively “drawn game” between the patriots and British regulars at Breed’s Hill, would involve on the part of the British government much time and great outlay of money, in order to send to America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any extended scale; and that the control of New York and the southern coast cities must be of vastly more importance than to harass the scattered settlements adjoining Canada. Inasmuch, however, as New York and New England seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were almost destitute of regular troops, and the season of the year would prevent British reënforcements by sea, it might prove to be the best opportunity to test the sentiment of the Canadian people themselves as to their readiness to make common cause against the Crown. If reported professions could be realized, the north would be permanently protected.

Taking into account that General Carleton would never anticipate an advance upon Quebec, but concentrate his 53small force at Montreal, with view to the ultimate recapture of St. John’s, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga, and estimating, from advices received, that Carleton’s forces numbered not to exceed eight hundred regulars and as many Provincials, he regarded the detail of three thousand men as sufficient for the capture of Montreal. This estimate was a correct one. Its occupation was also deemed practicable and wise, because it was so near the mouth of Sorel River and Lake Champlain as to be readily supported, so long as the British army was not substantially reënforced along the Atlantic coast.

There was one additional consideration that practically decided the action of Washington. The mere capture of Montreal, on the north bank of the St. Lawrence river, and so easily approached by water from Quebec, would be of no permanent value so long as Quebec retained its place as the almost impregnable rendezvous of British troops and fleets. This view of the recommendation of Congress was deemed conclusive; provided, that the movement against Quebec could be immediate, sudden, by surprise, and involve no siege. Under the assumption that Congress had been rightly advised of the British forces in Canada, and of the sentiments of the Canadians themselves, the expedition had promise of success.

There was a variance of religious form and religious faith which did not attract all the New England soldiers in behalf of Canadian independence. This was sufficiently observed by Washington’s keen insight into human nature to call forth the following order, which placed the Canadian expeditions upon a very lofty basis. The extract is as follows: “As the Commander-in-Chief has been apprised of a design formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that 54there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void of common-sense as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are soliciting, and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause—the defence of the general liberty of America.... At such a juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks to those our brethren, as to them we are so much indebted for every late happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”

Washington, however, hinged his chief objection to these distant enterprises, which he habitually opposed throughout the war, upon the pressing demand for the immediate capture of Boston, and an immediate transfer of the Headquarters of the Army to New York, where, and where only, the Colonies could be brought into close relation for the organization and distribution of an army adequate to carry on war, generally, wherever along the Atlantic coast the British might land troops.

As early as June, Congress had disclaimed any purpose to operate against Canada, and Bancroft says that the invasion was not determined upon until the Proclamation of Martial Law by the British Governor, his denunciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of savages to raids against New York and New England had made the invasion an act of self-defence. But there had been no such combination of hostile acts when these expeditions were planned, and Mr. Bancroft must have associated those events with the employment of Indian allies during the subsequent Burgoyne campaign of 1777.

The details of the two contemporary expeditions to Canada are only sufficiently outlined to develop the relations 55of the Commander-in-Chief to their prosecution, and to introduce to the reader certain officers who subsequently came more directly under Washington’s personal command. The substantial failure of each, except that it developed some of the best officers of the war, is accepted as history. But it is no less true that when Great Britain made Canada the base of Burgoyne’s invasion, his feeble support by the Canadians themselves proved a material factor in his ultimate disaster. He was practically starved to surrender for want of adequate support in men and provisions, from his only natural base of supply.

It is sufficient, at present, to notice the departure of the two expeditions, that of Schuyler and Montgomery, assembling at Ticonderoga, August 20, and that of Arnold, consisting of eleven hundred men, without artillery, which left Cambridge on the seventeenth day of September and landed at Gardiner, Me., on the twentieth. Several companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia which had reported for duty were assigned to Arnold’s command. Among the officers were Daniel Morgan and Christopher Greene. Aaron Burr, then but nineteen years of age, accompanied this expedition.

As the summer of 1775 drew near its close, and the temporary excitement of Arnold’s departure restored the routine of camp life and the passive watching of a beleaguered city, the large number of “Six Months” men, whose term of enlistment was soon to expire, became listless and indifferent to duty. Washington, without official rebuke of this growing negligence, forestalled its further development by redoubling his efforts to place the works about Boston in a complete condition of defence. None were exempt from the scope of his orders. Ploughed Hill and Cobble Hill were fortified, and the works at Lechmere Point were strengthened. (See map, 56“Boston and Vicinity.”) Demonstrations were made daily in order to entice the garrison to sorties upon the investing lines. But the British troops made no hostile demonstrations, and in a very short time the American redoubts were sufficiently established to resist the attack of the entire British army.

A Council of War was summoned to meet at Washington’s headquarters to consider his proposition that an assault be made upon the city, and that it be burned, if that seemed to be a military necessity. Lee opposed the movement, as impossible of execution, in view of the character of the British troops whom the militia would be compelled to meet in close battle. The Council of War concurred in his motion to postpone the proposition of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee’s want of confidence in the American troops, then for the first time officially stated, had its temporary influence; but, ever after, through his entire career until its ignominious close, he opposed every opportunity for battle, on the same pretence. The only exception was his encouragement to the resistance of Moultrie at Charleston, against the British fleet, during June, 1776, although he was not a participant in that battle.

Meanwhile, the citizens of the sea-coast towns of New England began to be anxious as to their own safety. A British armed transport cannonaded Stonington, and other vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All of these towns implored Washington to send them troops. Governor Jonathan Trumbull, of Connecticut (the original “Brother Jonathan”), whose extraordinary comprehension of the military as well as the civil issues of the times made him then, and ever, a reliable and constant friend of Washington, consulted the Commander-in-Chief as to these depredations, and acquiesced in his judgment as final.

57Washington wrote thus: “The most important operations of the campaign cannot be made to depend upon the piratical expeditions of two or three men-of-war privateers.” This significant rejoinder illustrated the proposition to burn Boston, and was characteristic of Washington’s policy respecting other local raids and endangered cities. It is in harmony with the purpose of this narrative to emphasize this incident. Napoleon in his victorious campaign against Austria refused to occupy Vienna with his army, and counted the acquisition of towns and cities as demoralizing to troops, besides enforcing detachments from his fighting force simply to hold dead property. Washington ignored the safety of Philadelphia, the Colonial capital, repeatedly, claiming that to hold his army compactly together, ready for the field, was the one chief essential to ultimate victory. Even the later invasions of Virginia and Connecticut, and the erratic excursions of Simcoe and other royalist leaders into Westchester County, New York, and the country about Philadelphia, did not bend his deliberate purpose to cast upon local communities a fair share of their own defence. In more than one instance he announced to the people that these local incursions only brought reproach upon the perpetrators, and embittered the Colonists more intensely against the invader.

As the siege of Boston advanced without decisive result, orders from England suddenly relieved Gage from command, and assigned General Sir William Howe as his successor. That officer promulgated a characteristic order “assuming command over all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia to the West Indies.” He made his advent thus public, and equally notorious. Offensive proclamations, bad in policy, fruitless for good, and involving the immediate crushing out of all sympathy from those who were still loyal to the Crown, were the types of his character, both as governor and soldier. He threatened with military execution any who might leave the city without his consent, and enjoined upon all citizens, irrespective of personal opinion, to “arm for the defence of Boston.”

This action imposed upon Washington the issue of a reciprocal order against “all who were suffered to stalk at large, doing all the mischief in their power.” Hence, between the two orders, it happened that the royalists in the city had no opportunity to visit their friends and see to their own property outside the British lines, and the royalists of the country who sought to smuggle themselves between the lines, to communicate with those in the city, were compelled to remain outside the American lines, or be shot as “spies.”

Up to this time, the British officers and neutral citizens 59had not been interfered with in the prosecution of their business or social engagements; and the operations of the siege had been mainly those of silencing British action and wearing out the garrison by constant surveillance and provocations to a fight.

Supplies became more and more scarce within the British lines. Acting under the peremptory orders of General Howe, Admiral Graves resolved to make his small fleet more effective, and under rigid instructions to “burn all towns and cities that fitted out or sheltered privateers,” Lieutenant Mowatt began his work of desolation by the destruction of Falmouth, now Portland, Me.

In contrast with this proceeding was the action of Washington. When an American privateer, which had been sent by him to the St. Lawrence river, to cut off two brigantines which had left England with supplies for Quebec, exceeded instructions, and plundered St. John’s Island, he promptly sent back the citizen-prisoners, restored their private effects, and denounced the action of the officer in command and his crew, as “a violation of the principles of civilized warfare.”

Crowded by these immediate demands upon his resources, and equally confident that there soon would be neither army, nor supplies, adequate for the emergency, Washington made an independent appeal to Congress, covering the entire ground of his complaint, and stating his absolute requirements. He wanted money. He demanded a thoroughly organized commissariat, and a permanent artillery establishment. He asked for more adequate control of all troops, from whatever Colony they might come; a longer term of enlistment; enlargement of the Rules and Articles of War, and power to enforce his own will. He also demanded a separate organization of the navy, in place of scattered, irresponsible privateers, and that it be placed upon a sound footing, as to both men and vessels.

60Congress acted promptly upon these suggestions. On the fourth of October, a committee, consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, and Benjamin Harrison, started for Washington’s headquarters with three hundred thousand dollars in Continental money, and after a patient consideration of his views, advised the adoption of all his recommendations.

A council of all the New England Governors was also called to meet this committee. As the result of the conference a new organization of the army was determined upon, fixing the force to be employed about Boston at twenty-three thousand three hundred and seventy-two officers and men. Washington also submitted to this committee his plan for attacking Boston. It was approved; and soon after, Congress authorized him to burn the city if he should deem that necessary in the prosecution of his designs against the British army. In all subsequent military operations the same principle of strategic action was controlling and absolute with him.

On the thirteenth day of October, Congress authorized the building of two small cruisers, and on the thirtieth, two additional vessels, of small tonnage. A naval committee was also appointed, consisting of Silas Dean, John Langdon, Joseph Hewes, Richard Henry Lee, and John Adams. On the twenty-eighth of November, a naval code was adopted; and on the thirteenth of December, the construction of thirteen frigates was authorized. Among the officers commissioned, were Nicholas Biddle as captain and John Paul Jones as lieutenant. Thus the American Navy was fully established.^[1]

On the twenty-ninth day of November, Captain John Manly, who was the most prominent officer of this improvised navy, captured a British store-ship, containing a large mortar, several brass cannon, two thousand 61muskets, one hundred thousand flints, eleven mortar-beds, thirty thousand shot, and all necessary implements for artillery and intrenching service.

As the year drew to its close, the British levelled all their advanced works on Charlestown Neck, and concentrated their right wing in a strong redoubt on Bunker Hill, while their left wing at Boston Neck was more thoroughly fortified against attack.

Congress now intimated to Washington that it might be well to attack the city upon the first favorable occasion, before the arrival of reënforcements from Great Britain. The laconic reply of the Commander-in-Chief was, that he “must keep his powder for closer work than cannon distance.”

On the nineteenth of November, Henry Knox was commissioned as Colonel, vice Gridley, too old for active service. Two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and twelve companies of artillery were authorized, and thus the American regular Artillery, as well as the navy, was put upon a substantial basis, with Knox as Chief of Artillery.

The closing months of 1775 also developed the progress of the expeditions for the conquest of Canada. The reënforcements required for the actual rescue of the detached forces from destruction, increased the burdens of the Commander-in-Chief. This period of Washington’s military responsibility cannot be rightly judged from the general opinion that Montgomery’s nominal force of three thousand men represented an effective army of that strength: in fact, it was less than half that number.

Montgomery reached Ticonderoga on the seventeenth of August. Schuyler, then negotiating a treaty with the Six Nations, at Albany, received a despatch from Washington, “Not a moment of time is to be lost,” and at once joined Montgomery. They pushed for the capture 62of St. John’s, under the spur of Washington’s warning; but on the sixth of September and again on the tenth, were compelled to suspend operations for want of artillery, having at the time a force of but one thousand men present, instead of the three thousand promised. Schuyler’s ill-health compelled him to return to Ticonderoga; but with infinite industry, system, and courage he was able to forward additional troops, increasing Montgomery’s force to two thousand men.

Ethan Allen, who had been succeeded in command of the “Green Mountain Boys” by Seth Warner, was across the line, endeavoring to recruit a regiment of Canadians. After partial success, regardless of order, he dashed forward, hoping to capture Montreal, as he had captured Ticonderoga. He was captured, and sent to England to be tried on the charge of treason. In a letter to Schuyler, Washington thus notices the event:

“Colonel Allen’s misfortune will, I hope, teach a lesson of prudence and subordination in others who may be too ambitious to outshine their general officer, and regardless of order and duty, rush into enterprises which have unfavorable effects on the public, and are destructive to themselves.”

On the third of November, after a siege of fifty days, St. John’s was captured, with one hundred Canadians and nearly five hundred British regulars, more than half the force in Canada. John André was among the number. General Carleton, who attempted to cross the St. Lawrence river, and come to the aid of St. John’s, was thrust back by the “Green Mountain Boys” and a part of the 2d New York Regiment.

The treatment of prisoners illustrates the condition of this army. It was not a part of the Cambridge army, as was Arnold’s, but the contributions promised largely by New York, and directly forwarded by Congress. One 63regiment mutinied because Montgomery allowed the prisoners to retain their extra suit of clothing, instead of treating it as plunder. Schuyler’s and Montgomery’s Orderly Books and letters show that even officers refused to take clothing and food to suffering prisoners until peremptorily forced to do it. Washington was constantly advised of the existing conditions; and when both Schuyler and Montgomery regarded the prosecution of their expeditions as hopeless, with such troops, and proposed to resign, the Commander-in-Chief thus feelingly, almost tenderly, wrote: “God knows there is not a difficulty you both complain of which I have not in an eminent degree experienced; that I am not, every day, experiencing; but we must bear up against them, and make the best of mankind as they are, since we cannot have them as we wish. Let me therefore conjure you both, to lay aside such thoughts; thoughts injurious to yourselves, and extremely so to your country, which calls aloud for gentlemen of your abilities.”

On the twelfth of November, Montgomery reached the open city of Montreal; and the larger of the two Canadian expeditions reached its proposed destination. But before the month of November closed, the American force “wasted away,” until only about eight hundred men remained. Expiration of enlistments was at hand. Men refused to re-enlist. Even the “Green Mountain Boys” returned home. This was not the total loss to Montgomery. Officers and men were all alike fractious, dictatorial, and self-willed. They claimed the right to do just as they pleased, and to obey such orders only as their judgment approved. General Carleton escaped from the city in disguise, and reached Quebec on the nineteenth. There was no possibility of following him; and the work laid but for Montgomery, had been done, although at great cost and delay.

64Prof. Charles G. D. Roberts, of King’s College, Nova Scotia, in his “History of Canada” (1897),^[2] uses this language: “General Carleton fled in disguise to Quebec, narrowly escaping capture, and there made ready for his last stand. In Quebec he weeded out all those citizens who sympathized with the rebels, expelling them from the city. With sixteen hundred men at his back, a small force indeed, but to be trusted, he awaited the struggle.”

Meanwhile Arnold, after unexampled sufferings and equal heroism, had reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on the ninth of November, only to find that the garrison had been strengthened, and that he was stranded, in the midst of a severe winter, upon an inhospitable, barren bluff. The strongest fortress in America, defended by two hundred heavy cannon, and the capture of which had been the inspiration of his adventurous campaign, was in full sight. Every condition which Washington had declared to be essential to success had failed of realization. On the fifth of October Washington wrote to Schuyler: “If Carleton is not driven from St. John’s, so as to be obliged to throw himself into Quebec, it must fall into our hands, as it is left without a regular soldier, as the captain of a brig from Quebec to Boston says. Many of the inhabitants are most favorably disposed to the American cause, and that there is there the largest stock of ammunition ever collected in America.” On the same day he also writes “Arnold expected to reach Quebec in twenty days from September twenty-sixth, and that Montgomery must keep up such appearances as to fix Carleton, and prevent the force in Canada from being turned on Arnold; but if penetration into Canada be given up, Arnold must also know it, in time for retreat.” And again: “This detachment (Arnold’s) was to take 65possession of Quebec, if possible; but at any rate, to make a diversion in favor of Schuyler.”

But Arnold, on the sixteenth day of October, when, as he advised Washington, he expected to advance upon Quebec, was struggling with quagmires, swamps, fallen trees, rain and mud, snow and ice, about Deer river, and had not even reached Lake Megantic. Men waded in icy water to their armpits; some froze to death: others deserted. Enos, short of provisions, as he claimed, marched three hundred men back to Cambridge. And Arnold, himself, twenty-five days too late, stood upon Point Levi, in the midst of a furious tempest of wind, rain, and sleet, only to realize the substantial failure of his vaunted expedition. Most of his muskets were ruined, and but five rounds of ammunition remained for the few men that were with him in this hour of starvation and distress. Two vessels-of-war lay at anchor in the stream. And yet, such was his indomitable energy, with thirty birch-bark canoes he crossed the river, gained a position on the Heights of Abraham, and sent to the fortress an unnoticed demand for surrender. Then, retiring to Point Aux Trembles, he sent a messenger to Montgomery asking for artillery and two thousand men, for prosecution of a siege. Montgomery, leaving in command General Wooster, who arrived at Montreal late in November, started down the river with about three hundred men and a few pieces of artillery, and clothing for Arnold’s men; landing at Point Aux Trembles about December first, making the total American force only one thousand men. On the sixth day of December, a demand for surrender having been again unanswered, the little army advanced to its fate. Four assaulting columns were organized. All failed, and Montgomery fell in a gallant but desperate attempt to storm the citadel itself. Morgan and four hundred and twenty-six men, nearly 66half of the entire command, were taken prisoners. Only the grand nerve of Montgomery brought the army to the assault in this forlorn-hope affair,—for such it was. Three of Arnold’s captains refused to serve under him any longer; and mutiny, or the entire ruin of the army, was the alternative to the risks of ruin in battle. Arnold had a knee shattered by a bullet, and the remnants of the army fell back, harmless, to the garrison, and amid snow, ice, and proximate starvation, awaited future events.

The treatment of the prisoners by General Carleton, and the burial, with honors of war, of his old comrade under Wolfe, the brave Montgomery, savors of the knightly chivalry of mediæval times. When his officers protested at such treatment of rebels, his response, lofty in tone and magnanimous in action, was simply this: “Since we have in vain tried to make them acknowledge us as brothers, let us at least send them away disposed to regard us as cousins.”

Almost at the same hour of the day when Carleton passed through Point Aux Trembles, on his escape to Quebec, Washington having heard of Montgomery’s arrival at Montreal, was writing to Congress, as follows: “It is likely that General Carleton will, with what force he can collect after the surrender of the rest of Canada, throw himself into Quebec, and there make his last effort.”

With Arnold three miles from Quebec, intrenched as well as he was able to intrench, confining his operations to cutting off supplies to the city and keeping his five hundred survivors from starving or freezing, and Carleton preparing for reënforcements as soon as the ice might break up in the spring, the invasion of Canada for conquest came to a dead halt. The invasion of the American Colonies was to follow its final failure.

67There were heroes who bore part in those expeditions, and their experience was to crown many of Washington’s later campaigns with the honors of victory. Meanwhile, about Boston, enlistments were rapidly expiring, to be again replaced with fresh material for the master’s handling into army shape and use; and the American Commander-in-Chief was beginning to illustrate his qualities as Soldier.

On the thirty-first day of December, 1775, Admiral Shuldham reached Boston with reënforcements for its garrison, and relieved Admiral Graves in command of all British naval forces. The troops within the lines were held under the most rigid discipline, although amusements were provided to while away the idle hours of a passive defence.

The winter was memorable for its mildness, so that the American troops, encamped about the city in tents, did not suffer; but the in-gathering of recruits, to replace soldiers whose enlistments had just expired, involved the actual creation of a new army, directly in the face of a powerful, well-equipped, and watchful adversary. And yet, this very adversary must be driven from Boston before the American patriot army could move elsewhere, and engage actively against the combined armies and navy of the British crown.

Indications of increasing hostilities on the part of royal governors of the South were not wanting to stimulate the prosecution of the siege to its most speedy consummation; and although unknown to Washington at the time, the city of Norfolk, Va., had been bombarded on New Year’s day by order of Lord Dunmore.

69Impressed by the urgency of the crisis, Washington, on the same day, was writing to Congress in plain terms, as follows, leaving the last word blank, lest it might miscarry: “It is not, perhaps, in the power of history to furnish a case like ours; to maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy, within that distance of twenty, old British regiments without——”

General Greene kept his small army well in hand, watchful of the minutest detail, inspecting daily each detachment, as well as all supplies of ammunition and food; and on the fourth of January, writing from Prospect Hill (see map of Boston and Vicinity), thus reported his exact position to the Commander-in-Chief: “The night after the old troops went off, I could not have mustered seven hundred men, notwithstanding the returns of the new enlisted men amounted to nineteen hundred and upwards. I am strong enough to defend myself against all the force in Boston. Our situation has been critical. Had the enemy been acquainted with our situation, I cannot pretend to say what might have been the consequences.”

The reader will appreciate at a glance the real opinion of the American Commander-in-Chief as to his own immediate future, and the general scope of operations which he regarded as supremely important in behalf of American Independence. He understood thoroughly, that Lord Dartmouth originally opposed the military occupation of Boston in order to prevent a collision between British troops and the excited people, which he regarded as an inevitable result. That distinguished and far-sighted statesman, in order to prevent any overt acts of resistance to the established representatives of the crown at business or social centres, wrote to Lord Howe as early as October 22, 1775, to “gain possession of some respectable port to the southward, from which to make sudden and unexpected attacks upon sea-coast towns during the winter.” But British pride had forced the increase of the army in Massachusetts Colony, and 70initiated a disastrous campaign. Lord Dartmouth never wavered in the opinion that New York was the only proper base of operations in dealing with the Colonies at large. Lord Howe himself had advised that New York, instead of Boston, should be made the rendezvous and headquarters of all British troops to be sent to America. Only the contumacy of General Gage had baffled the wiser plans of superior authority.

During the first week of the new year, and while the American army was under the stress of reconstruction, Washington learned that General Clinton had been promised an independent command of a portion of the fresh troops which accompanied Admiral Shuldham to America, and would be detailed on some important detached service remote from New England waters. As a remarkable fact, not creditable to the king’s advisers, the Island of New York, at that time, was practically without any regular military garrison; but its aristocratic tory circles of influence could not conceive of a popular uprising against the supremacy of George III. within their favored sphere of luxury and independence.

Washington appreciated the situation fully. He recognized the defenceless condition of New York and its adaptation for the Headquarters of the Army of America. He was also thoroughly convinced that General Clinton’s proposed expedition would either occupy New York, or make the attempt to do so. He acted without delay upon that conviction, although reserving to himself the responsibility of first reducing Boston with the least possible delay. General Lee, then upon detached service in Connecticut, had written to him, urging, in his emphatic style, “the immediate occupation of New York; the suppression or expulsion of certain tories of Long Island; and that not to crush the serpents before their rattles were grown, would be ruinous.”

71Washington was as prompt to reply; and ordered Lee to “take such Connecticut volunteers as he could quickly assemble in his march, and put the city in the best possible posture of defence which the season and circumstances would admit of.”

Meanwhile, every immediate energy of the Commander-in-Chief was concentrated upon a direct attack of the British position. The business capacity of Colonel Knox had already imparted to the Ordnance Department character and efficiency. Under direction of Washington he visited Lake George, during December, 1775, and by the last of February hauled upon sleds, over the snow, more than fifty pieces of artillery to the Cambridge headquarters. This enabled him to make the armament of Lechmere Point very formidable; and by the addition of several half-moon batteries between that point and Roxbury, it became possible to concentrate upon the city of Boston the effective fire of nearly every heavy gun and mortar which the American army controlled.

It had been the intention of Washington to march against Boston, across the ice, so soon as the Charles river should freeze sufficiently to bear the troops. Few of the soldiers had bayonets, but “the city must be captured, with or without bayonets,” and his army released for service elsewhere. In one letter he used this very suggestive appeal: “Give me powder, or ice, and I will take Boston.” Upon the occasion of “one single freeze and some pretty strong ice,” he suddenly called a council of war, and proposed to seize the opportunity to cross at once, and either capture or burn the city. Officers of the New England troops who were more familiar with the suddenness with which the tides affect ice of moderate thickness, dissuaded him from his purpose; but in writing to Joseph Reed, for some time after his Adjutant-General, he thus refers to the incident: “Behold, while we have 72been waiting the whole year for this favorable event, the enterprise was thought too hazardous. I did not think so, and I am sure yet, that the enterprise, if it had been undertaken with resolution, would have succeeded; without it, any would fail.” “P.S.—I am preparing to take post on Dorchester Heights, to try if the enemy will be so kind as to come out to us.” This postscript is an illustration of Washington’s quick perception of the strategic movement which would crown the siege with complete success. He added another caution: “What I have said respecting the determination in Council, and the possession of Dorchester, is spoken sub-rosa.”

The month of February drew near its close, when Washington, in the retirement of his headquarters, decided no longer to postpone his attack upon the city and its defences. Two floating batteries of light draught and great strength were quickly constructed, and forty-five batteaux, like the modern dredge-scow, each capable of transporting eighty men, were assembled and placed under a special guard. In order to provide for every contingency of surmounting parapets, or improvising defences in streets, or otherwise, fascines, gabions, carts, bales of hay, intrenching-tools, two thousand bandages, and all other contingent supplies that might, under any possible conditions, be required, were also gathered and placed in charge of none but picked men. Gen. Thomas Mifflin, his Quartermaster-General, who had accompanied him from Philadelphia, shared his full confidence, and was unremitting by night and by day in hastening the work intrusted to his department.

The inflexibility of purpose which marked Washington’s career to its close, asserted its supremacy at this crucial hour of the Revolutionary struggle, when, for the first time, America was to challenge Britain to fight, and fight at once. It had begun to appear as if his submission 73of a proposition to a council of officers implied some doubt of its feasibility, or some alternate contingency of failure. Washington discounted all failure, by adequate forethought. Jomini, who admitted that Napoleon seemed never to provide for a retreat, very suggestively added: “When Napoleon was present, no one thought of such a provision.” In like manner Washington had the confidence of his troops.

It certainly is not anticipating the test of Washington, as Soldier, to state some characteristics which were peculiarly his own. His most memorable and determining acts were performed when he was clothed with ample authority by Congress, or the emergency forced him to make his own will supreme. In the course of this narrative it will appear that Congress did at last formally emancipate him from the constraint of councils. Whenever he doubted, others doubted. Whenever he was persistent, he inspired the nerve and courage which realized results, even though in a modified form of execution. Partial disappointments or deferred realization did not shatter nor weaken his faith. Washington, the American Commander-in-Chief, was in such a mood on the first day of March, 1776. He had a plan, a secret plan, and kept his secret well, until the stroke was ready for delivery.

And yet, the progress of the siege up to this date, and through two long winter months, had not been wholly spent in details for its certain success. Even after the first day of January, when he became acquainted with the proposed movement of General Clinton, he began to anticipate such a movement as an indication of his own future action. A selection of guns for field service was carefully made; batteries were organized and thoroughly drilled. Then, as ever after, during the war, artillerists were few in number, and the service was never popular. The hauling of heavy guns by hand, then with rare 74exceptions habitual, made the service very hard; and accuracy of fire cost laborious practice, especially where powder was scarce, even for exigent service. Wagons were also provided. Medical supplies were collected and packed in portable chests. He also inquired into the nature of the New England roads when the frosts of spring first tweak the soil, and was informed that they would be almost impassable for loaded wagons and heavy artillery.

During the same months the condition of Canada had become seriously critical, through the activity of General Carleton who expected reënforcements from England, and had already threatened the northern border. It seemed to Washington that Congress might even divert a part of his own army to support the army in Canada, upon the acquisition of Boston and the retirement of its British garrison. The ultimate destination of that garrison, in whole or in part, was full of uncertain relations to his own movements. The disposition of the large royalist element in Boston was also an object of care; but looming above all other considerations was the supreme fact that the war now begun was one which embraced every Colony, every section; and that the conflict with Great Britain was to be as broad and desperate as her power was great and pervasive.

And yet, under so vast and varied responsibilities, he matured and withheld from his confiding troops the secret of his purpose to capture Boston suddenly and surely, until the day of its crowning fulfilment arrived.

Just after sunset, on that New England spring evening, from Lechmere Point, past Cobble Hill, and through the long range of encircling batteries, clear to the Roxbury line on the right, every mortar and cannon which could take Boston in range opened fire upon the quiet city.

But this was only a preliminary test of the location, range, and power of the adversary fire. The British guns 75responded with spirit, and equally well disclosed to competent artillery experts distributed along the American lines, the weight, efficiency, and disposition of their batteries so suddenly called into action.

At sunrise of March 2d, the American army seemed not to have heard the cannonading of the previous night; or, wondering at such a waste of precious powder, shot, and shell, rested from the real experience of handling heavy guns against the city and an invisible foe, at night. And through the entire day the army rested. No parades were ordered. Only the formal calls of routine duty were sounded by fife and drum. No heads appeared above the ramparts. The tents were crowded with earnest men, tilling powder-horns, casting or counting bullets, cleaning their “firelocks,” as they were called in the official drill manual of those times, and writing letters to their friends at home. The quiet of that camp was intense, but faces were not gloomy in expression, neither was there any sign of special dread of the approaching conflict, which everybody felt to be immediately at hand. As officers went the rounds to see that silence was fully observed, it was enough to satisfy every curious inquirer as to its purpose,—“It is Washington’s order.” And all this time, behind the American headquarters, Rufus Putnam, civil engineer, Knox, Chief of Artillery, Mifflin, Quartermaster-General, and General Thomas, were ceaselessly at work, studying the plans and taking their final instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.

On the night of the third of March, soon after that evening’s sunset-gun had closed the formal duties of the day, and seemingly by spontaneous will, all along the front, the bombardment was renewed with the same vigor, and was promptly responded to. But some of the British batteries had been differently disposed, as if 76the garrison either anticipated an attack upon their works on Bunker Hill, or a landing upon the Common, where both land and water batteries guarded approach. (See map.)

This second bombardment had been more effective in its range. One solid shot from the city reached Prospect Hill, but no appreciable damage had been done to the American works; but some houses in Boston had been penetrated by shot, and in one barrack six soldiers had been wounded. Places of safety began to be hunted for. Artificial obstructions were interposed in some open spaces for protection from random shot and shell. No detail under orders, and no call for volunteers, to break up the investment of the city, had been made. No excited commander, as on the seventeenth of June, 1775, tendered his services to lead British regulars against Cambridge, to seize and bring back for trial, as traitor, the arch-rebel of the defiant Colonists. Red uniforms were indeed resplendent in the sunlight; but there was no irrepressible impulse to assail earthworks, which had been the work of months, and not of a single night, and behind which twenty thousand countrymen eagerly awaited battle. And on this day, as before, the quiet of the graveyard on Beacon Hill was no more solemn and pervasive than was the calm and patient resting of the same twenty thousand countrymen, waiting only for some call to duty from the lips of their silent Commander-in-Chief.

The fourth of March closed, and the night was mild and hazy. The moon was at its full. It was a good night for rest. Possibly such a whisper as this might have pervaded the Boston barracks, and lulled anxious royalists to slumber. “Surely the rebels cannot afford further waste of powder. They impoverish themselves. Sleep on! Boston is safe!” Not so! As the sun went down, the whole American camp was alive with its teeming 77thousands; not ostentatiously paraded upon parapet and bastion, but patiently awaiting the meaning of a mysterious hint, which kept even the inmates of hospital tents from sleeping, that “Washington had promised them Boston on the morrow.”

From “early candle-lighting” to the clear light of another dawn, incessant thunder rolled over camp and city. The same quick flashes showed that fire ran all along the line; and still, the occupants of camp and city, standing by their guns, or sheltered from their fire, dragged through the night, impatiently waiting for daylight to test the night’s experience, as daylight had done before.

At earliest break of day it was announced to General Howe that “two strong rebel redoubts capped Dorchester Heights.” The news spread quickly, after the excitements of the night. There was no more easy slumber in the royal bed-chamber of British repose, nor in the luxurious apartments of the favored subjects of George III., in the city of Boston, on that fifth day of March, 1776.

“If the Americans retain possession of the Heights,” said Admiral Shuldham, “I cannot keep a vessel in the harbor.”

General Howe advised Lord Dartmouth that “it must have been the employment of at least twelve thousand men.”

Another British officer said, “These works were raised with an expedition equal to that of the genii belonging to Aladdin’s lamp.”

Lord Howe said, further, “The rebels have done more in one night than my whole army would have done in a month.”

“Perhaps,” said Heath, “there never was as much done in so short a space.”

The reader of this narrative, whether citizen or soldier, 78cannot fail to be interested in some account of the extreme simplicity with which the construction of these works had been carried on. The earth, at that time, was frozen to the depth of eighteen inches, rendering the use of pick-axe and shovel, and all intrenching-tools, of little use; besides, the noise of their handling would have betrayed the workmen. The secret of Washington’s silent preparatory work, and the accumulation of such heaps of material behind his headquarters, is revealed. Hoop-poles, for hurdles and fascines,—branches cut from apple orchards, and along brooks, for abatis, even as far out as the present suburban towns of Brookline, Milton, Mattapan, and Hyde Park, had been accumulated in great quantities. Large bales of compressed hay, which were proof against any ordinary cannon-ball, had been procured also, so that the merely heaping up and arranging these under the personal direction of Engineer Putnam, according to a plan fully digested in advance, was but easy work for a class of country soldiers peculiarly “handy” with all such materials. Then, on the tops of the improvised redoubts, were barrels filled with stones. These, at the proper time, were to be rolled down the hill, to disconcert the formal array of steadily advancing British regulars.

The management of the whole affair was hardly less simple. Eight hundred soldiers, not needed during the cannonading, quietly marched out of camp the night before,—some between Boston and Dorchester Heights, and others at the east end of the peninsula, opposite Castle Island; while still others, with tools, and a supporting party of twelve hundred soldiers under General Thomas, followed the advance. Three hundred carts, loaded with suitable material, followed.

All this movement was liable to be discovered in spite of the incessant roar of heavy ordnance over the works 79of besiegers and besieged. The flash of heated guns or bursting bombs might light up the trail of this slowly crawling expedition, and vast interests were staked upon the daring venture. But, along the most exposed parts of the way, the bales of pressed hay had been placed as a protecting screen; and behind its sufficient cover, the carts passed to and fro in safety. Even the moon itself only deepened the shadow of this artificial protector, while in position to light, as by day, the steps of the advancing patriots. And there was, also, a brisk north wind which bore away from the city, southward, all sounds which were not already lost in the hurricane of war that hushed all but those of battle.

But the American Commander-in-Chief had fully anticipated the possible incident of a premature discovery of his design against Dorchester. The success of his plans for the night did not wholly depend upon the undisturbed occupation and fortification of Dorchester Heights. That silent procession of two thousand countrymen was not, as at Bunker Hill, a sort of “forlorn-hope” affair. It was not hurried, nor was it costly of strength or patience. Reliefs came and went; and the system, order, and progress that marked each hour could not have been better realized by day. Instructions had been explicit; and these were executed with coolness and precision, as a simple matter of fact, to be done as ordered by Washington.

The silent preparations of the preceding day had provided for the main body of the American army other employment than a listless watch of a vigorous bombardment and its pyrotechnic illumination of the skies. At battery “Number Two,” the floating batteries and batteaux were fully manned, for crossing to Boston. Greene and Sullivan, with four thousand thoroughly rested troops, and these carefully picked men, were ready to 80move on the instant, if the garrison attempted to interfere with Washington’s original purpose.

An eminent historian thus characterized the event: “One unexpended combination, concerted with faultless ability, and suddenly executed, had, in a few hours, made General Howe’s position at Boston untenable.”

As soon as General Howe appreciated the changed conditions of his relations to the besieging rebels, he despatched Earl Percy, who had met rebels twice before, with twenty-four hundred troops to dislodge the enemy from Dorchester Heights. The command moved promptly, by boats, to Castle Island, for the purpose of making a night attack. Sharp-shooting, by the American “Minute Men,” in broad daylight, behind breastworks, was not courted by Percy on this occasion, nor desired by General Howe. During the afternoon a storm arose from the south, which increased to a gale, followed at night by torrents of rain. Some boats were cast ashore, and the entire expedition was abandoned.

By the tenth of March, the Americans had fortified Nook’s Hill; and this drove the British from Boston Neck. During that single night, eight hundred shot and shell were thrown into the city from the American lines.

On the seventeenth of March, the British forces, numbering, with the seamen of the fleet, not quite eleven thousand men, embarked in one hundred and twenty transports for Halifax. The conditions of this embarkation without hindrance from the American army had been settled by an agreement on the part of the British authorities that the city should be left intact from fire, or other injury, and that the property of royalists, of whom nearly fifteen hundred accompanied the troops, should be also safe from violation by the incoming garrison. As the last boats left, General Ward occupied the city with a garrison of five thousand troops.

WASHINGTON AT BOSTON.

[From Stuart’s painting.]

81Of two hundred and fifty cannon left behind, nearly one-half were serviceable. Other valuable stores, and the capture of several store-vessels which entered the harbor without knowledge of the departure of the British troops, largely swelled the contributions to the American material of war.

The siege of Boston came to an end. New England was free from the presence of British garrisons. The mission of Washington to Massachusetts Colony, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army of America, had fulfilled its purpose.

Within twenty-four hours after General Howe embarked his army, the American Commander-in-Chief developed his matured plan to anticipate any design of General Clinton to occupy New York City. The great number of fugitive royalists who accompanied Howe’s fleet and encumbered even the decks of battleships with their personal effects, and the necessity of consulting the wishes of very influential families among their number, were substantial reasons for the selection of Halifax as the destination of the ships. But of still greater importance was the reorganization of his army, and a new supply of munitions of war, in place of those which had been expended, or abandoned on account of the siege of Boston. Time was also required for the preparation and equipment of any new expedition, whether in support of Carleton in Canada, or to move southward.

Washington did not even enter Boston until he started General Heath with five regiments and part of the artillery for New York. On the twentieth the Commander-in-Chief entered the city.

The British fleet was weatherbound in Nantasket Roads for ten days; but on the twenty-seventh day of March, when it finally went to sea, the entire American army, with the exception of the Boston garrison, was placed under orders to follow the advance division. General Sullivan marched the same day upon which he received 83orders; another division marched April 3d, and on the 4th General Spencer left with the last brigade, Washington leaving the same night.

In order to anticipate any possible delay of the troops in reaching their destination, he had already requested Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, to reënforce the New York garrison with two thousand men from Western Connecticut; and he also instructed the commanding officer in that city to apply to the Provincial Convention, or to the Committee of Safety of New Jersey, to furnish a thousand men for the same purpose. In advising Congress of this additional expense, incurred through his own forethought, but without authority of Congress, he wrote thus discreetly: “Past experience and the lines in Boston and on Boston Neck point out the propriety and suggest the necessity of keeping our enemies from gaining possession and making a lodgment.”

The Continental Army had entered upon its first active campaign; but before Washington left Cambridge he arranged for the assembling of transports at Norwich, Conn., thereby to save the long coastwise march to New York; and digested a careful itinerary of daily marches, by which the different divisions would not crowd one upon another. Quartermaster-General Mifflin was intrusted with the duty of preparing barracks, quarters, and forage for the use of the troops on their arrival, and all the governors of New England were conferred with as to the contingencies of British raids upon exposed sea-coast towns, after removal of the army from Boston. A careful system of keeping the Pay Accounts of officers was also devised, and this, with the examination of an alleged complicity of officers with the purchase of army supplies, added to the preliminary work of getting his army ready for the best of service in garrison or the field. Two companies of artillery, 84with shot and shell, were detailed to report to General Thomas, who had been ordered by Congress to Canada, vice General Lee ordered southward.

Washington’s journey to New York was via Providence, Norwich, and New London, in order to inspect and hasten the departure of the troops.

A reference to the situation in that city is necessary to an appreciation of the development which ensued immediately upon the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief.

William Tryon, who subsequently invaded Connecticut twice, and left his devastating impress upon Danbury, Ridgefield, New Haven, Fairfield, Norwalk, and Green Farms, was the royal Governor of New York. It is interesting to recall the antecedents of this governor. He had been Governor of North Carolina once, and attempted a part similar to that so foolishly played by Governor Gage at Lexington and Concord. Until this day, the people of North Carolina will cite the “Battle of Alamance,” which was a pretty sharp fight between Tryon’s forces and the yeomanry of the “Old North State,” on the sixteenth day of May, 1771, as the first blood shed in resistance to the usurpations of the royal prerogative. It was the same William Tryon, in person, temperament, and methods, who governed New York City in 1776, and Washington knew him thoroughly. The royalists and patriots of New York City, in the absence of a controlling force of either British or Continental troops, commingled daily. A few British men-of-war really controlled its waters; but the city was practically at rest. There prevailed a general understanding that each party should retain its own views; that the officers of the Crown should keep within the technical line of their official duty, and that the citizens would not interfere. Congress had no troops to spare, and there was quite a general suspension of arming, except to supply the regiments already in the field.

85An extraordinary coincidence of the arrival of General Clinton from Halifax, with a small force, and the arrival, on the same day, of General Lee, from Connecticut, with about fifteen hundred volunteers, brought this condition of armed neutrality to an end. Clinton had positive orders to “destroy all towns that refused submission.” When Clinton cast anchor at Sandy Hook and communicated with Governor Tryon, and learned the facts, he judiciously made the official courtesy due to the governor his plausible excuse for entering the harbor at all, “being ordered southward.” Lee, doubtful of Clinton’s real purpose, fortified Brooklyn Heights back of Governor’s Island, and began also to fortify the city, at the south end of the island, still called “The Battery.” Clinton followed his orders, sailed southward, visited Lord Dunmore in Chesapeake Bay, joined Earl Cornwallis at Wilmington, N.C., in May, on the arrival of that officer from Ireland, and took part with him in the operations against Fort Sullivan (afterwards Fort Moultrie) near Charleston, during the succeeding summer.

Lee, ever arrogating to himself supreme command, whenever detached, placed the Connecticut volunteers whom he accompanied to New York upon a Continental basis of service. In this he deliberately exceeded his authority and came into direct collision with Congress, which had ordered one of the regiments to be disbanded; and offended the New York patriots, whom he characterized as the “accursed Provincial Congress of New York.” His action received the official disapproval of Washington; and the visit of a Committee of Congress accommodated the formal occupation by the Colonial troops to the judgment of all well-disposed citizens. In no respect was the episode of Lee’s temporary command a reflection upon the patriotism of the citizens. He was ordered to the south; and in the attack upon Fort Sullivan and the 86preparation of Charleston for defence he gave much good advice, but had to be repressed and controlled all the time by President Rutledge, who was as resolute as Washington himself in the discharge of public duty once confided to his trust. The attitude of South Carolina, at this time, deserves special mention, and it has hardly received sufficient recognition in the development of the United States. Without waiting for the united action of the Colonies this State declared its own independence as a sovereign republic. John Rutledge was elected as President, with Henry Laurens as Vice-President, and William H. Drayton as Chief Justice. An army and navy were authorized; a Privy Council and Assembly were also elected; the issue of six hundred thousand dollars of paper money was authorized, as well as the issue of coin. It was the first republic in the New World to perfect the organization of an independent State.

When Lee was ordered southward, General Thomas had been ordered to Canada; and the first act of Washington, after his arrival at New York, was the enforced depletion of his command by the detail of four battalions as a reënforcement to the army in Canada. These he sent by water to Albany, “to ease the men of fatigue.” He also sent five hundred barrels of provisions to Schuyler’s command on the twenty-second.

The activity of the army about headquarters aroused the royalist element and prompt action became necessary. Washington addressed a letter to the New York Committee of Safety, directing that further correspondence with the enemy must cease, closing as follows: “We must consider ourselves in a state of war, or peace, with Great Britain.” He enforced these views with emphasis.

Late at night, on the twenty-fifth, an order was received from Congress directing him to send six additional battalions to Canada, requesting also an immediate report as 87to “whether still additional regiments could be spared for that purpose.” General Sullivan accompanied this division; and with him were such men as Stark, Reed, Wayne, and Irvine. In reply to Congress, Washington stated that “by this division of forces there was danger that neither army, that sent to Canada and that kept at New York, would be sufficient, because Great Britain would both attempt to relieve Canada and capture New York, both being of the greatest importance to them, if they have the men.”

On the twenty-eighth day of April the whole army in New York amounted to ten thousand two hundred and thirty-five men, of whom eight thousand three hundred and three were present and fit for duty. Washington’s Orderly Book, of this period, rebukes certain disorderly conduct of the soldiers in these memorable words: “Men are not to carve out remedies for themselves. If they are injured in any respect, there are legal ways to obtain relief, and just complaints will always be attended to and redressed.”

At this time, Rhode Island called for protection of her threatened ports, and two regiments of her militia were taken into Continental Pay. Washington was also advised that Great Britain had contracted with various European States for military contingents; that the sentiment in Canada had changed to antipathy, and that continual disaster attended all operations in that department. On the twenty-fourth he wrote to Schuyler: “We expect a very bloody summer at Canada and New York; as it is there, I presume, that the great efforts of the enemy will be aimed; and I am very sorry to say that we are not, in men and arms, prepared for it.”

General Putnam was placed in command at New York, and General Greene took charge of the defences on Brooklyn Heights and of their completion. On the first 88day of June Congress resolved that six thousand additional troops should be employed from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York, to reënforce the army in Canada, and that two thousand Indians should be hired for this same field of service. To this proposition General Schuyler keenly replied: “If this number, two thousand, can be prevented from joining the enemy, it is more than can be expected.”

As early as the fifteenth of February Congress had appointed Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll, as Commissioners to visit Canada and learn both the exact condition of the army and the temper of the people. Rev. John Carroll, afterwards Archbishop of Maryland, accompanied them, and reported that “negligence, mismanagement, and a combination of unlucky incidents had produced a disorder that it was too late to remedy.” Ill-health compelled the immediate return of Franklin, but the other Commissioners remained until the evacuation of Canada. The scourge of small-pox, to which General Thomas became a victim, and other diseases, together with the casualties of the service, had cost more than five thousand lives within two months, and the constant change of commanders, ordered by Congress, hastened the Canadian campaign to a crisis. Scattered all the way from Albany to Montreal there could have been found companies of the regiments which Congress had started for Canada, and which Washington and the country could so poorly spare at such an eventful and threatening period. General Sullivan had been succeeded by General Gates, but with no better results. Sullivan had under-estimated the British forces, and when apprised of the facts, of which the American Commander-in-Chief had not been advised in time, he wrote: “I now only think of a glorious death, or a victory obtained against superior numbers.” The following letter of Washington 89addressed to Congress, enclosing letters intimating the desire of General Sullivan to have larger command, indicates Washington’s judgment of the situation, and is in harmony with his habitual discernment of men and the times throughout the war. He says: “He (Sullivan) is active, spirited, and zealously attached to our cause. He has his wants and his foibles. The latter are manifested in his little tincture of vanity which now and then leads him into embarrassments. His wants are common to us all. He wants experience, to move on a large scale; for the limited and contracted knowledge which any of us have in military matters, stands in very little stead, and is quickly overbalanced by sound judgment and some acquaintance with men and books, especially when accompanied by an enterprising genius, which I must do General Sullivan the justice to say, I think he possesses. Congress will therefore determine upon the propriety of continuing him in Canada, or sending another, as they shall see fit.”

Already the St. Lawrence river was open to navigation. On the first of June, General Riedesel arrived with troops from Brunswick, and General Burgoyne with troops from Ireland, swelling the command of General Carleton to an aggregate of nine thousand nine hundred and eighty-four effective men; and British preparations were at once made to take the offensive, and expel the American force from Canada. Before the last of June the “invasion of Canada” came to an end, and the remnants of the army, which had numbered more than ten thousand men, returned, worn out, dispirited, and beaten.

Washington had been stripped of troops and good officers at a most critical period, against his remonstrance; and Congress accounted for the disaster by this brief record: “Undertaken too late in the fall; enlistments 90too short; the haste which forced immature expeditions for fear there would be no men to undertake them, and the small-pox.”

Gradually the principal officers and many of the returning troops joined the army at New York. The occupation of New York, the fortification and defence of Brooklyn Heights, the tardy withdrawal of the army to Harlem Heights, with a constant and stubborn resistance to the advancing British army and its menacing ships-of-war, have always been treated as of questionable policy by writers who have not weighed each of those incidents as did Washington, by their effect upon the Continental army, as a whole, and in the light of a distinctly framed plan for the conduct of the war. This plan was harmonious and persistently maintained from his assumption of command until the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, in 1781.

Operations in Massachusetts, and elsewhere, south as well as north, from the first, proved that the heat of patriotic resistance must be maintained and developed by action; that, as at Bunker Hill and before Boston, passive armies lose confidence, while active duty, even under high pressure, nerves to bolder courage and more pronounced vigor.

The correspondence of Washington and his Reports, as well as letters to confidential friends which have been carefully considered in forming an estimate of his career as a Soldier, evolve propositions that bear upon the operations about New York. The prime factor in the Colonial resistance was, to fix the belief irrevocably in the popular mind, in the very heart of the Colonists, that America could, and would, resist Great Britain, with confidence in success. The inevitable first step was to challenge her mastery of the only base from which she could conduct a successful war. To have declined this 91assertion of Colonial right, or to have wavered as to its enforcement, would have been a practical admission of weakness and the loss of all prestige thus far attained.

It was well known to Washington that the British Government was so related to Continental rivals that about forty thousand troops would be the extreme limit of her contributions to subdue America. It will appear from official tables, appended to this narrative, that, during the entire war, the British force of every kind, throughout America, exceeded this number slightly in only one year; and that Washington’s plans, from time to time submitted to Congress, were based upon requisitions fully competent to meet the largest possible force which could be placed in the field by Great Britain.

It was further evident that resistance of the first attempt of the British to land, and the reduction of their numbers and supplies, by constant, persistent, and confident battle, would not only dispirit that army, but equally arouse the spirit of the American army, assure its discipline, and stimulate both Congress and the people to furnish adequate men and means to prosecute the war to success. Prolonged face to face hostilities in and about New York, therefore, indicated not only Washington’s faith in success, but prolonged the restriction of British operations to a very limited field.

The Declaration of American Independence, on the Fourth Day of July, 1776, was an emphatic act that enlarged his faith and inspired resistance, upon the plans so carefully matured before that event. And, even if there be taken into account the peculiar circumstances which facilitated the eventual retreat from Brooklyn Heights, it is no less true that the Battle of Long Island, the resistance at Pell’s Point, Harlem Heights, White Plains, and about Fort Washington, were characterized by a persistency of purpose and a stubbornness of hand-to-hand 92fighting, which kept his main army practically intact, and enabled him to terminate the campaign of 1776 with a master stroke that astounded the world, and challenged the admiration of the best soldiers of that period.

In order rightly to measure the American War for Independence by fixed standards, it is both interesting and instructive to notice the systematic method adopted by Great Britain to suppress revolution and restore her supremacy over the revolting Colonies. The recovery of Boston was no longer to be seriously considered; but New England, as a strong and populous centre of disaffection, must still be so restricted through her coast exposure as to prevent her proportionate contribution to the Continental army at New York. If threatened from the north, New York also would be compelled to retain a large force of fully equipped militia for frontier defence. The occupation of Newport, R.I., which was only one day’s forced march from Boston, together with the patrol of Long Island Sound by ships-of-war, would therefore be positive factors in both limiting a draft and the transportation of troops from Massachusetts. If to this were added the control of the Hudson River, by a competent fleet, the whole of New England would be cut off from actively supporting the forces to be raised in the Middle Colonies.

The fiery spirit and patriotic fervor of Virginia, as well as the lusty vigor of North Carolina and other Southern patriots, must also be subjected to a military surveillance and pressure from the sea, and thus, equally with New England, be deprived of a free and full contribution of its proper quota to the American army.

94The three sections named, using New York as the base of all British demonstrations in force, represented so many radiating belts, or zones, of military operation; and to secure ultimate British success, each of these zones must be so occupied in its own defence that a force from New York could be thrown with overwhelming effect upon each, in turn, and thus render it practically impossible for Washington to concentrate an effective army of resistance to each assailing column. To the southward, the waters of Delaware and Chesapeake bays, if once occupied by a sufficient fleet, would sever the lower Colonies from the American centre of service, as effectively as those of Long Island and the Hudson River would isolate New England. This was a sound military policy, and had been fully adopted so soon as Lord Howe received reënforcements and recovered breath after his severe punishment at Boston.

The adoption of New York as the base of all British supply, as well as service, not only had its central and dominating site for the rendezvous, equipment, and despatch of troops, but through its auxiliary naval stations at Halifax and the West Indies, afforded opportunities for expeditions where large land forces were not required, and still keep such threatened localities under constant terror of assault.

These considerations will have their better appreciation as the progress of the narrative unfolds successive campaigns.

Sooner or later, in order to achieve absolute independence, and vanquish Great Britain in the fight, the American army must so neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation by either army would cease to be the determining factor in the final result of the war.

The prestige of Great Britain was overshadowing; but could its arm reach the range of its shadow? Her 95fleets were many and mighty, but so were those of her jealous foes across the British Channel. Her armies in America must be adequate for operations in each of the zones mentioned, and be constantly supplied with munitions of war and every other accessory of successful field service. And, on the other hand, the American army, almost wholly dependent upon land transportation and hard marching, must have a correspondingly larger force, or fail to concentrate and fight upon equal terms with its adversary.

The British Government having adopted a sound military policy, so soon as the object lessons of Lexington, Bunker Hill, and their expulsion from Boston unveiled their dull vision, did not fail to realize the necessity for an army strong enough to meet the full requirements of that policy. Forty regiments were assigned to the American service.^[3] But the militia of New England had already driven twenty battalions (half the number) from its coast. Washington was no careless observer of European conditions, nor of the straitened nature of the British army organization, however superior to rivals on the sea. His deliberate conviction, ever a rallying force to his faith in deepest peril, that Britain could never spare more than one more army as large as the garrison of Boston, was the result of almost literal insight of the practical resources at her command. Hence, that Government contracted with petty European principalities for seventeen thousand men, for immediate delivery. These men were impressed and paid wages by their own local princes who speculated on the greater sums to be paid them, per capita, by Great Britain. The former estimate of General Gage, at twenty thousand men, and his significant hint as to the need of more than that force, was no longer ridiculed; but forty thousand was 96decided to be the minimum number required for the immediate prosecution of the war. Taking into account the foreign troops, the British ministry estimated as available for the American service a total, on paper, of fifty-five thousand men. To this was to be added, upon their hopeful estimate, four thousand Canadians, Indians, and royalists. Allowing for every possible shrinkage, on account of weakened regiments and other contingencies, the effective force was officially placed at forty thousand men.

Two facts are significant in connection with this specious estimate of the British army. If the drain of this forcible conscription upon the industry of Hesse-Cassel and Hanau had been applied to England and Wales, at that date, it would have raised an army of four hundred thousand men; and yet, Britain did not venture to draw from her own subjects, at home, for the defence of her own Crown.

Washington rightly conceived that the whole scheme would divide the sentiment of the British people, and that the success even of these mercenary troops, against their own blood in America, would prove no source of pride or congratulation. It was his intense love of English liberty, exhibited in its history, that undergirded his soul with sustaining faith in American liberty; and he read the hearts of the English people aright.

He did not wait long for its echo. The Duke of Richmond used this emphatic and prophetic utterance: “An army of foreigners is now to be introduced into the British dominion; not to protect them from invasion, not to deliver them from the ravages of a hostile army, but to assist one-half of the inhabitants in massacring the other. Unprovided with a sufficient number of troops for the cruel purpose; or, unable to prevail upon the natives of the country [England] to lend their hands 97to such a sanguinary business, Ministers have applied to those foreign princes who trade in human blood, and have hired mercenaries for the work of destruction.” His closing sentence foreshadowed the alliance of America with Louis XVI., of France. It reads thus: “The Colonies themselves, after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance.”

This British army was designed for four distinct, and as nearly as possible, concurrent, operations: one through Canada, down the Hudson River to Albany and New York, with divergent pressure upon New England and central New York; one to occupy Newport, R.I.; the third to control New York City and its related territory in New Jersey; and the fourth against representative centres at the South.

Reference has been made to the anxiety expressed by Washington as early as February, 1776, lest the siege of Boston might be protracted until Britain could invade the other colonies, particularly New York, with an overwhelming retentive force. As a fact, only surmised and not known by him for weeks, Sir Peter Parker and Earl Cornwallis were ready to start from Cork, Ireland, by the twentieth of January; but did not sail until the thirteenth of February, and then the transports and ships were so buffeted by storms, and driven back for refitting, as not to reach Wilmington, N.C., until the third day of May. Here, as before indicated, he was joined by General Clinton, and both had the suggestive lesson of American courage in their repulse by the brave Moultrie, at Charleston, on the twenty-eighth of June.

And now we are to consider Washington’s reception of the most formidable of these expeditions.

General Howe sailed from Halifax on the tenth of June with one hundred and twenty square-rigged vessels besides smaller craft; and on the fifth day of July the entire 98force, amounting to nine thousand two hundred men, was landed upon Staten Island, in the lower bay of New York. During the voyage two transports were captured by American privateers, and General Sir William Erskine, with a part of the seventy-first Highland Regiment, were made prisoners. The incident is worthy of notice as materially affecting the correspondence between Washington and General Howe, shortly after the event.

General Howe reached Sandy Hook in the despatch frigate “Greyhound,” on the twenty-fifth of June, and held a secret conference with Governor Tryon, on shipboard. His fleet first cast anchor at Gravesend Cove, July 1st, but after conference with Governor Tryon, he changed his purpose. He would be too near Washington. He wrote to Lord Germaine on July 8th as follows: “He declined to land, as being so near the front of the enemy’s works. It would be too hazardous, until the arrival of the troops with Commodore Holtham, daily expected. He was also waiting for the return of General Clinton, and deemed it best to defer the possession of Rhode Island until the arrival of the second embarkation from Europe, unless Carleton should penetrate early into this province [New York].” The letter thus closes: “As I must esteem an impression upon the enemy’s principal force collected in this quarter to be the first object of my attention, I shall hold it steadily in view without losing sight of those which may be only considered collateral.”

Admiral Lord Richard Howe arrived on July 12th with a powerful squadron and one hundred and fifty transports filled with troops. On the thirteenth a communication was despatched to George Washington, Esqr., on behalf of the Brothers Howe, Commissioners, proposing terms of peace. Washington, in a letter to Schuyler, facetiously 99styled these gentlemen “Commissioners to dispense pardon to repenting sinners.” Howe’s Adjutant-General, Patterson, called upon General Washington, on the twentieth of July, respecting the exchange of prisoners, especially General Erskine, and, “purely to effect, the exchange of these prisoners,” addressed Washington by his military title.

Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, repulsed at Charleston, arrived August first, and Commodore Holtham, having arrived on the twelfth, landed twenty-six hundred British troops, eight thousand four hundred Hessians, and camp equipage for the entire army. On the fifteenth Sir Peter Parker arrived with twenty-four sail from the south.

The British army thus encamped on Staten Island numbered, all told, thirty-one thousand six hundred and twenty-five men. The effective force, for duty, was twenty-six thousand nine hundred and eight, of which number twenty thousand accompanied General Howe to the attack upon Brooklyn Heights. This was the largest army under one command during the war.

Washington was fully advised of every movement, and the Proclamation of Commissioner Howe to the people was circulated with his full approval. Sensational rumors were as common then as in modern times. As late as the nineteenth of August General Roberdeau notified Washington, in all seriousness, that “a post-rider had told him, with great confidence, that General Howe had proposed to retire with the fleet and army, and was willing to settle the present dispute on any terms asked by Washington: that this came from an officer who was willing to swear to it; but as it might have a tendency to lull the inhabitants, he made it the subject of an express.” This was based upon another false rumor, that England and France were at war. Such “recklessness of gossip-mongers” 100received from Washington a scorching rebuke which he declared to be the “more important, since many of those who opposed the war, on account of business relations with the British authorities, were most active in words, while lacking in courage to take up arms on either side.”

Only a summary analysis of the Battle of Long Island is required for explanation of the general operations indicated upon the map. Almost every hour had its incidents of eventful interest, and few historic battles, from its first conception to the ultimate result, more strikingly illustrate the influence of one regardful judgment which could convert unpromising features into conditions of final benefit. The value of military discipline, of presence of mind, and the subordination of every will to one ruling spirit, never had a more definite illustration.^[4] The infinite value of small details, in preparation for and the conduct of so serious a venture as to meet this great British army, is exhibited at every phase of its progress.

The American army contrasted unfavorably with its adversary in every respect. Although the British forces, and generally the American forces employed during the years of the war, are to be found stated in the Appendix, the official roll of Washington’s army, on this occasion, will add interest to the event.

On the third of August its strength was as follows: Commissioned officers and staff, twelve hundred and twenty-five; non-commissioned officers, fifteen hundred and two; present for duty, ten thousand five hundred and fourteen; sick, present and absent, three thousand six hundred 102and seventy-eight: making a total of seventeen thousand two hundred and twenty-five men.

Less than one-third of this force had served from the beginning of the war. The artillery battalion of Colonel Knox numbered less than six hundred men, and the guns themselves were of various patterns and calibre, to be handled by men who knew little of their use or range. On the fifth of August Governor Trumbull of Connecticut assured Washington that “he did not greatly dread what the enemy could do, trusting Heaven to support us, knowing our cause to be righteous.” Washington’s reply, dated the seventh, was characteristic and practical: “To trust in the justice of our cause, without our utmost exertion, would be tempting Providence.” Although Trumbull had already sent five regiments forward, he soon sent nine additional regiments, averaging about three hundred men each, in time to be present when the British eventually landed in Westchester County.

Two regiments under Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill fame, were on duty upon Governor’s Island. The works on Long Island, begun by General Lee, had been completed by General Greene, who had explored the country thoroughly and knew the range of every piece. A redoubt with seven guns crowned the Heights. The exposed point of Red Hook, a combination of marsh and solid land, was supplied with five guns. The intrenchments, more than a half mile in length, were protected by abatis and four redoubts which mounted twenty guns. Greene occupied these redoubts and lines with two regiments of Long Island militia and six regiments of Continental troops, not one of which exceeded four hundred men, for duty. The line extended from Wallabout, the present Navy Yard, to Gowanus Bay.

The total nominal strength of the American army about New York on the twenty-sixth of August, including the 103sick, non-effectives, and those without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men. The Connecticut regiments which had just joined brought such arms as they could provide for themselves, and were simply that many citizens with nominal organization, but without drill.

Meanwhile, the entire line from Brooklyn to King’s Bridge, fifteen miles, with the navigable waters of the Hudson, the Harlem, and East rivers, and their shore approaches, had to be guarded. It was not entirely certain but that Howe simply feigned an attack upon the intrenched position upon the Heights, to draw thither Washington’s best troops, and take the city by water approach. Paulus Hook, then an island, was fortified in a measure, but was unable to prevent the passage of two vessels which at once cut off water communication with Albany and the northern American army.

Washington had previously issued orders for the government of sharp-shooters; and particularly, “not to throw away fire. To fire first with ball and shot.” This order had its specific significance, and was illustrated in the Mexican War, and early in 1861, in America. “Buck-and-ball” scattered its missiles, and wounded many who would be missed by a single rifle-shot; and the wounded required details of others for their care or removal. “Brigadiers were ordered to mark a circle around the several redoubts, by which officers are to be directed in giving orders for the first discharge.” He also ordered “small brush to be set up, to mark the line more distinctly, and make it familiar to the men, before the enemy arrive within the circle.”

The reader will recall the experience of Washington in his early career, when similar methods made his success so emphatic.

When advised of the landing of the British on the twenty-second, 104and that Colonel Hand had retired to Prospect Hill (now Prospect Park), Washington sent six regiments to reënforce the garrison of the Heights. Orders were also sent to General Heath, then at the head of Manhattan Island, to be prepared to forward additional troops; and live regiments from the city force were ready to cross East River so soon as it should be determined whether the attack was to be made, in force, against the Heights.

General Greene, prostrated with fever, had written on the fifteenth, that “he hoped, through the assistance of Providence, to be able to ride before an attack should be made, but felt great anxiety as to the result.” On the twenty-third, Washington was compelled to write to Congress, “I have been compelled to appoint General Sullivan to the command of the island, owing to General Greene’s indisposition.” In a letter written by Sullivan, on the twenty-third, respecting a minor skirmish after the British landing, when Hand retired, he said: “I have ordered a party out for prisoners to-night. Things argue well for us, and I hope are so many preludes to victory.” This confidence was hardly less unfounded than his faith in the success of operations in Canada. It was the inverse of sound reason, and made the “less include the greater.” He was immediately superseded, and General Putnam was placed in command.

The following are some of Washington’s orders issued to General Putnam on the twenty-sixth of August, when it seemed as if only his omnipresence could compel even general officers to understand their responsibility for the good behavior of the troops:

“Stop the scattering, unmeaning, and wasteful firing, which prevents the possibility of distinguishing between a real and a false alarm, which prevents deserters from approaching our lines, and must continue, so long as every soldier conceives himself at liberty to fire when, and at what, he pleases.”

105“Guards are to be particularly instructed in their duty.”

“A ‘brigadier of the day’ is to remain constantly on the lines, that he may be upon the spot, and see that orders are executed.”

“Skulkers must be shot down upon the spot.”

“The distinction between a well-regulated army and a mob, is the good order and discipline of the former, and the licentiousness and disorderly behavior of the latter.”

“The men not on duty are to be compelled to remain at, or near, their respective camps or quarters, that they may turn out at a moment’s warning; nothing being more probable than that the enemy will allow little time enough for the attack.”

“Your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy passing the woods and approaching your works.”

These orders were preëminently adapted to the character of the American troops. Their neglect disconcerted the entire plan of the Commander-in-Chief for an efficient defence of the works.

The American force on the Heights, including Stirling’s Brigade, which crossed over the river to Brooklyn on the day of the battle, was not quite eight thousand men; but included Atlee’s Pennsylvania Rifles, Smallwood’s Maryland and Haslet’s Delaware regiments, which then, and ever after, were among Washington’s “Invincibles.” But notwithstanding Greene’s designation of suitable outposts, and Washington’s orders, the disposition of the American advance outposts was of the feeblest kind. At the time of the first landing on the twenty-second, when Colonel Hand fell back to Prospect Hill (see map), it 106does not appear from any official paper, or record, that he gave notice of the landing of the second British division, or established scouts to ascertain and report subsequent British movements. Their landing, division after division, had been as impressive as it was successful, and deserves notice. Four hundred transports were escorted by ten line-of-battle ships and twenty frigates. Seventy-five flat-boats, besides batteaux and galleys, moving in ten distinct, well-ordered divisions, simultaneously touched the beach near the present site of Fort Hamilton, and landed four thousand men in just two hours, according to the Admiral’s “log-book,” after the signal reached the topmast of the “flag-ship.” Five thousand additional troops were landed with equal celerity and order, a little lower down the bay. Before twelve o’clock, fifteen thousand men, with artillery, baggage, and stores, were landed without hindrance or mishap. On the twenty-fifth, De Heister’s Hessian command landed with equal skill at Gravesend.

A glance at the map indicates that the long range of hills between Brooklyn and the sea had four openings available for approach by the British troops; the first, and shortest, along the bay by Martense Lane; the second, in front of Flatbush and the American intrenchments; the third, by road northward from Flatbush, to Bedford and Newtown; and a fourth, by road past Cypress Hill, which extended to Flushing, but crossed the Bedford and Jamaica road about three miles eastward from Bedford.

General Stirling, who had been awakened at three o’clock on the morning of the twenty-seventh, commanded the extreme American right. In front of Flatbush there were intrenchments, and one redoubt, with one howitzer and three field-pieces. General Sullivan, second in command, was, he stated after his capture, “to have commanded 107within the lines; but went to the hill near to Flatbush, to reconnoitre, with a picket of four hundred men, when he was surrounded by the enemy who had advanced by the very road he had paid horsemen fifty dollars for patrolling by night, while he was in command.” Miles’ Pennsylvania Rifles and Wylie’s Connecticut were at, or near, the Bedford Pass. The Jamaica road had been overlooked, or neglected. Putnam, already somewhat impaired in physical vigor, and wholly unacquainted with the outposts, made neither reconnoissance nor change of pickets, upon receipt of Washington’s orders. Instead of feeling for, and finding, the enemy, he awaited their arrival.

Without full details, the following incidents occurred before Washington arrived and took command in person. The British left wing, under General Grant, crowded Stirling and his small command of seventeen hundred men back nearly to the Cortelyou House; but they made a gallant fight near the present Greenwood Cemetery. The battalions of Smallwood, Haslet, and Atlee covered themselves with honors. Stirling heard the firing at Flatbush, and hastened his retreat.

Cornwallis, upon his first landing, on the twenty-second, moved toward Flatbush, but finding it held by the American advance works, dropped down to Flatlands. De Heister, however, moved directly upon Flatbush, and commenced cannonading the redoubt and intrenchments, where Sullivan, being incidentally present, was in command. This advance of De Heister was in effect a feint attack, to be made real and persistent at the proper time.

On the British right, General Howe, with Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis, gained the Jamaica road undiscovered, rested their forces until half-past eight in the morning, and were soon directly in front of the American works, in the rear of Sullivan and cutting off his retreat. Cornwallis 108gained position near the Cortelyou House, in the line of Stirling’s retreat. De Heister, advised by Clinton’s guns that the British right had accomplished its flank movement, advanced promptly upon both Sullivan and Stirling, and captured both, with a considerable portion of their commands.

The Battle of Long Island had been fought. Washington had declared that he would make the acquisition of Brooklyn Heights by the British, if realized, “as costly as possible.” It had been his expectation that by the advance posts ordered, and careful pickets, he could prolong resistance, if not winning full success. He had taken pains to convince the troops that the resistance at Bunker Hill and Fort Moultrie was a fair indication of their ability, and that the British troops understood it well. When John Jay proposed to burn New York and leave it in ruins, Washington insisted that it would tend to demoralize his army, and offer to the people and to the world a painful contrast with the successful restoration of Boston to her own people.

The Battle of Long Island had to be fought. As soon as it began, Washington crossed the river with three regiments. If Howe had made immediate advance, Washington would have resisted, with quite as large a force as Howe could have handled, in an assault.

Washington immediately, and in person, examined every phase of the situation. His first act was to organize a strong detachment to support Stirling who was opposing the advance by the harbor road; but the swift advance of the British Grenadiers across the very face of the intrenchments, defeated his purpose. Every man was summoned to roll-call and kept on the alert. At early dawn the next morning he went through all the intrenchments, encouraging the men. Before noon, General Mifflin arrived with the well-drilled regiments of Glover, 109Shaw, and Magee. These organizations, which had been sneered at as “proud of line arms and fine feathers,” as they marched up the ascent with solid ranks and steady step, supplied with knapsacks, and trim as if on special parade, were received by the garrison with cheers and congratulations. The garrison was now nine thousand strong. But a “north-easter” set in. The rain fell in torrents, tilling the trenches, and compelling even the British regulars to keep to the shelter of their tents. Washington was everywhere, and took no sleep. The British opened trenches six hundred yards from the face of Fort Putnam (now Washington Park), not daring to storm the position; but could work only during intervals in the tempest.

Washington held his enemy at bay. But upon the same reasoning which enforced his first occupation of Brooklyn Heights, boldly facing the British army at its first landing, he resolved to evacuate the position without decisive battle. His fixed policy,—to avoid positively determining issues which were beyond his immediate mastery, so as to wear out his adversary by avoiding his strokes, and thereby gain vantage-ground for turning upon him when worn out, over-confident, and off his guard,—had its illustration now. His army was not versed in tactical movements upon a large scale, and was largely dependent for its success upon the supervising wisdom with which its undoubted courage could be made available in the interests of the new Nation.

The retreat from Brooklyn was a signal achievement, characteristic of Washington’s policy and of the men who withdrew under his guidance. They were kept closely to duty, as if any hour might command their utmost energies in self-defence; but their Commander-in-Chief had his own plan, as before Boston, which he did not reveal to his officers until it was ripe for execution. How 110well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his action. The military ruse by which he achieved the result had its climax five years later, when he so adroitly persuaded Sir Henry Clinton of immediate danger to New York, that the capture of Cornwallis closed the war, and the surrender of New York followed. And as the month of August, 1776, was closing, Generals Clinton and Cornwallis were reckoning, by hours, upon the capture of Washington’s army and the restoration of British supremacy over the American continent.

Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of August, the following private note was placed in the hands of General Heath, then commanding at Kingsbridge, by General Mifflin, the confidential messenger of the American Commander-in-Chief:

Dear General: We have many battalions from New Jersey which are coming over to relieve others here. You will therefore please to order every flat-bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting troops, down to New York, as soon as possible. They must be manned by some of Colonel Hutchinson’s men, and sent without the least delay. I write by order of the General.

Commissary-General Trumbull, also, at the same time, bore orders to Assistant Quartermaster-General Hughes, instructing him “to impress every craft, on either side of New York, that could be kept afloat, and had either oars, or sails, or could be furnished with them, and to have them all in the East River by dark.” The response to these orders was so promptly made that the boats reached the foot of Brooklyn Heights just at dusk that afternoon. An early evening conference of officers was ordered, and Washington announced his plan for immediate return to New York. The proposition was 111unanimously adopted. The Commander-in-Chief acted instantly. By eight o’clock the troops were under arms. The fresh and experienced regiments were sent to man the advance works, to relieve the weary troops, including the militia. The sick were promptly gathered for the earliest removal. Every indication promised immediate action; and intimations were disseminated among the troops that as soon as the sick and inefficient troops were withdrawn, a sortie would be made, in force, against Howe’s investing works. The ruse of anticipated reënforcements from New Jersey, upon removal of the invalids, cheered both sick and well. No possible method of inspiring self-possession and courage for any endeavor could have been more wisely designed.

Colonel Glover, of Marblehead, Mass., whose regiment was composed of hardy fishermen and seamen, had charge of the boats. The regiments last recruited, and least prepared for battle, and the sick, were the first to be withdrawn. As early as nine o’clock, and within an hour after the “general beat to arms,” the movement began,—systematically, steadily, company by company, as orderly as if marching in their own camp. A fearful storm still raged. Drenched and weary, none complained. It was Washington’s orders. Often hand-in-hand, to support each other, these men descended the steep, slippery slopes to the water’s edge, and seated themselves in silence; while increasing wind and rain, with incessant violence, constantly threatened to flood, or sink, the miserable flat-boats which were to convey them to the city, only a few hundred yards away. And thus until midnight. At that hour the wind and tide became so violent that no vessel could carry even a closely reefed sail. The larger vessels, in danger of being swept out to sea, had to be held fast to shore; dashing against each other, and with difficulty kept afloat. Other boats, with muffled 112oars, were desperately but slowly propelled against the outgoing tide. A few sickly lanterns here and there made movement possible. The invisible presence of the Commander-in-Chief seemed to resolve all dangers and apparent confusion into some pervasive harmony of purpose among officers and men alike, so that neither leaking boats nor driving storm availed to disconcert the silent progress of embarking nearly ten thousand men.

Just after midnight, both wind and tide changed. The storm from the north which had raged thus long, kept the British fleets at their anchorage in the lower bay. At last, with the clearing of the sky and change of wind, the water became smooth, and the craft of all kinds and sizes, loaded to the water’s edge, made rapid progress. Meanwhile, strange to relate, a heavy fog rested over the lower bay and island, while the peninsula of New York was under clear starlight.

For a few moments, toward morning, a panic nearly ensued. An order to hasten certain troops to the river was misunderstood as applying to all troops, including those in the redoubts; and a rumor that the British were advancing, and had entered the works, led even the covering party to fall back. Washington instantly saw the error, restored the men to their places, and the British pickets never discovered their temporary absence.

The military stores, and such guns as were not too heavy to be taken through the mud, were safely placed on the transports. With the last load, Mifflin, and last of all, Washington, took passage.

During the day, the troops and stores on Governor’s Island were also removed; and the evacuation was complete. If the landing of ten thousand disciplined troops by General Howe, on the twenty-second, over a placid sea, and in bright sunlight, was magnificent for its beauty and system, the safe embarkation of ten thousand men 113by Washington, on the night of the twenty-ninth, was sublime for the implicit faith of the soldiers and the supreme potency of his commanding will.

The Italian historian Botta says of this event: “Whoever will attend to all the details of this retreat, will easily believe that no military operation was ever conducted by great captains with more ability and prudence, or under more favorable auspices.”

At daybreak of the thirtieth, British pickets entered the American works; and the most advanced were enabled to fire a few shots at the last American detachment as it landed safely upon the New York side.

Washington’s labors were neither lessened nor interrupted when he assembled his army on the thirtieth day of August, 1776. He had been in the saddle or on foot, without sleep, for more than forty-eight hours; and it would require a large volume even to outline the mass of minute details which had to receive his attention. His own account, as contained in private letters, can be summed up in suggestive groups—such as, “tools carelessly strewn about”; “cartridges exposed to the rain”; and, “the soldiers, too often the officers, ignorant as children of the responsibility of a single sentry or gunner, wherever located, along rampart or trench.”

On the evening of the thirtieth, he thus described the situation: “The militia are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return home. Great numbers have gone off; in some instances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies, at a time. With the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence with the generality of the troops.”

He urged Congress to establish a regular army at once; to enlist men for the war; pressed the immediate abandonment of the city, and put the plain question, whether it “should be left standing for British headquarters.”

On the second day of September, the number of men present for duty was less than twenty thousand. On the same day he reorganized its formation into three grand 115divisions, or corps: one under Putnam, in command of the city; one under Spencer, in the absence of Greene, at Harlem, to prevent a British landing there; and the third under Heath, at King’s Bridge.

On the third of September, Congress ordered two North Carolina battalions, under General Moore, to march with all possible expedition to reënforce the army at New York; also a Continental battalion from Rhode Island; and urged Virginia to forward all the troops within her power to furnish. On the same day, Putnam urged the fortification of Harlem Heights, Mount Washington, and the Jersey shore; if possible, to prevent Howe’s ascending the Hudson River to attack the northern army. On the next day, the fourth, Washington was again compelled to occupy himself with such minute details as belonged to officers of the lowest rank. Such “diabolical practices as robbing apple orchards and gardens, and straggling without aim or purpose, instead of drilling and preparing for their country’s safety,” were officially reprimanded, and three roll-calls per day were advised, to keep the men near their duty. On the fifth of September, Greene advised a general and speedy retreat from the city, and a council was called to meet on the day succeeding, for consideration of the proposition. The council did convene on the sixth, and Washington thus announces to Congress its action: “The Council was opposed to retiring from New York, although they acknowledged that it would not be tenable if attacked by artillery”; and adds significantly: “Some, to whom the opinion of Congress was known, were not a little influenced in their opinions, as they were led to suspect that Congress wished it to be retained at all hazards.” General Putnam, in concurring with his Commander-in-Chief, shrewdly observed: “This dooms New York to destruction; but what are ten or twenty cities, to the grand object?”

116On the eighth of September, Washington reported the militia of Connecticut as reduced from six thousand to two thousand men; and in a few days their number was but nominal, twenty or thirty in some regiments. The residue were discharged and sent home with a recommendation to Governor Trumbull, “that it was about time to begin dealing with deserters.”

Although Washington concurred in Putnam’s general idea of strengthening the Hudson River shore by earthworks and redoubts, he anticipated failure to make them adequate for control of its waters, because of the limited power and range of his guns. The British had already extended their right wing as far as Flushing (see map), with posts at Bushwick, Newtown, and Astoria, and had also occupied Montressor and Buchanan’s, now Ward’s and Randall’s islands.

Upon appeal to Massachusetts, that Colony made a draft of one-fifth of her population, excepting only certain exposed localities and certain classes. Connecticut was no less patriotic, and Governor Trumbull made earnest effort to place the Colony foremost in support of the cause in peril. That Colony, so closely adjoining New York on the west, and exposed on its entire southern boundary to maritime excursions, was peculiarly in danger. On the fourteenth, Congress at last authorized eighty-five regiments to be enlisted for five years; and the advice of Greene, when he first joined the army in 1775, and of Washington, after assuming command at Cambridge, began to be accepted as sound policy and essential to ultimate success.

At this stage of the narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, it is interesting to consider his own views of the situation as expressed in a letter to the Continental Congress. He thus wrote: “Men of discernment will see that by such works and preparations we have delayed the 117operations (British) of the campaign till it is too late to effect any capital incursions into the country. It is now obvious that they mean to enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in my rear, while their shipping secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion.”

Again, “Every measure is to be formed with some apprehension that all of our troops will not do their duty. On our side the war should be defensive. It has even been called a ‘war of posts.’ We should, on all occasions, avoid a general action, and never be drawn into the necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be presumptuous to draw out our young troops into open ground against their superior numbers and discipline, I have never spared the spade and the pick-axe; but I have never found that readiness to defend, even strong posts, at all hazards, which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them.”

Again, “I am sensible that a retreating army is encircled with difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a general to reproach; but when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, we should protract the war, if possible. That they can drive us out is equally clear. Nothing seems to remain but the time of their taking possession.”

The thoughtful reader will find these quotations to be very suggestive of some future offensive action on the part of Washington whenever the British might be shut up in winter quarters; and the reply of Congress, whereby they authorize him “not to retain New York longer than he thought proper for the public service,” was accompanied by the following Resolution: “That General Washington be acquainted that Congress would have special care taken, in case he should find it necessary to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said 118city by his troops, on their leaving it; the Congress having no doubt of their being able to recover the same, though the enemy should, for a time, have possession of it.”

The experience of the Continental army before Boston was now repeated. New recruits came in daily, to fill the places made vacant by expiring enlistments; but again the army seemed to be “fast wasting away.”

The interval is significant because of another effort on the part of General Howe and his brother, Admiral Howe, special commissioners, to settle the controversy upon terms alike satisfactory to the American people and the British crown; but John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Benjamin Franklin, commissioners appointed by Congress, insisted first upon Independence, and a subsequent alliance between the two nations as friendly powers. This ended the negotiations. Such a settlement, if it had been realized, might have imparted to Great Britain even a prouder destiny than the succeeding century developed.

At that juncture of affairs, however, and as a key to General Howe’s importunity in securing at least “a suspension of hostilities,” he was urging upon the British Government, with the same pertinacity as Washington besought Congress, to increase his army. His figures were large, and worthy of notice. He wanted ten thousand men for the occupation of Newport, R.I., that he might threaten Boston, and make incursions into Connecticut. He demanded for the garrison of New York twenty thousand men; of which number, seventeen thousand should be available for field service. He asked for ten thousand more, for operations into New Jersey, where Washington had established a general Camp of Instruction for all troops arriving from the south; and still another ten thousand for operations in the Southern Colonies. It is not improbable that much of General 119Howe’s tardiness in following up temporary success, in all his subsequent campaigns, was based upon the conviction—embodied in these enormous requisitions for troops—that the war had already assumed a character of very grave importance and a corresponding uncertainty of the result.

Events crowded rapidly. On the tenth of September. Washington began the removal of valuable stores. He acted as quickly as if he were in Howe’s place, seeking the earliest possible possession of New York. On the twelfth, a Council of War decided that a force of eight thousand men should be left for the defence of Fort Washington and its dependencies. Of eight regiments of the very best troops, reporting three thousand three hundred and twenty-two present, the sick-roll reduced the effective strength twelve hundred and nine men. On the fourteenth, additional British vessels passed up East River, landing troops at Kipp’s Bay on the sixteenth. Then occurred one of the most stirring incidents of the war. One of the best brigades in the army, and one which had previously fought with gallantry and success, gave way. Washington, advised of the panic, denounced their behavior as “dastardly and cowardly.” He dashed among them, and with drawn sword mingled with the fugitives, to inspire them with courage. In his report he says: “I used every means in my power to rally them to the fight, but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual: and on the appearance of not more than sixty or seventy of the enemy they ran away without firing a shot.” In the strong language of General Greene: “Washington, on this occasion, seemed to seek death, rather than life.” These same troops, a part of Parsons’ Brigade, afterwards redeemed themselves; and Washington was wise enough to give them opportunity, under his own eye, as especially trustworthy troops. This incident found its counterpart 120in the career of Napoleon. At the siege of Toulon, one demi-brigade fled before a sally of less than one-fourth its numbers: but afterwards lost nearly half its strength in storming and entering the same fortress.

Immediately upon this unfortunate affair, the whole army was withdrawn to Harlem Heights. This position was regarded as impregnable; but the following extract, from Washington’s report to Congress exposes the deep anguish of his soul: “We are now encamped with the main body of the army upon the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet with a retreat, in case of attack, but experience, to my great affliction, has convinced me that this is a matter to be wished, rather than expected.”

The British lines were advanced, and extended from Bloomingdale across to Horn’s Hook, near Hell Gate; and General Howe made his headquarters at the Beekman Mansion, not far from those just vacated by Washington on Murray Hill.

And just then and there occurred an incident of the war which made an indelible impress upon the great heart of the American Commander-in-Chief; and that was the execution of one of his confidential messengers, who had been sent to report upon the British movements on Long Island—young Nathan Hale. The Rev. Edward Everett Hale, of Roxbury, Boston, furnishes the following outline of service which had greatly endeared Captain Hale to Washington:

“Just after the Battle of Lexington, at a town-meeting, with the audacity of boyhood, he cried out, ‘Let us never lay down our arms till we have achieved independence!’ Not yet two years out of Yale College, he secured release from the school he was teaching in New London; enlisted in Webb’s Regiment, the 7th Connecticut; by the first of September was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain; 121and on the fourteenth, marched to Cambridge. He shared in the achievement at Dorchester Heights, and his regiment was one of the first five that were despatched to New London, and thence to New York, by water. On the twenty-ninth of August, 1776, while the garrison of Brooklyn Heights was being hurried to the boats, Hale, with a sergeant and four of his men, attempted to burn the frigate Phœnix; and did actually capture one of her tenders, securing four cannon. At a meeting of officers, Washington stated that ‘he needed immediate information of the enemy’s plans.’ When dead silence ensued, Hale, the youngest of the Captains, still pale from recent sickness, spoke out: ‘I will undertake it. If my country demands a peculiar service, its claims are imperious.’ During the second week in September, taking his Yale College diploma with him, to pass for a school-master, he procured the desired information; but his boat failed to meet him. A British boat answered the signal, and his notes, written in Latin, exposed him. He was taken to New York on that eventful twenty-first of September, when five hundred of its buildings were burned; was summarily tried, and executed the next day at the age of twenty-one. His last sentence, when in derision he was allowed to speak as he ascended the gallows, was simply this: ‘I only regret that I have but one life to give to my country.’”

He had become a member of Knowlton’s Connecticut Rangers; and the Beekman House and Rutger’s apple orchard, where he was hanged from a tree, located by Lossing near the present intersection of East Broadway and Market streets, were long regarded with interest by visitors in search of localities identified with the Revolutionary period of Washington’s occupation of New York.

In resuming our narrative, we find the American army spending its first night upon Harlem Heights. Rain fell, but there were no tents. The men were tired and 122hungry, but there were no cooking utensils; and only short rations, at best. They realized that through a perfectly useless panic they had sacrificed necessaries of life. For four weeks the army remained in this position, not unfrequently engaging the British outposts, and on several occasions, with credit, making sallies or resisting attack; but the fresh troops, as ever before, had to mature slowly, under discipline. After a brilliant action on the sixteenth, in which Colonel Knowlton, who had distinguished himself at Bunker Hill, was killed, as well as Colonel Leich, and where Adjutant-General Reed, of Washington’s staff, equally exposed himself—“to animate,” as he said, “troops who would not go into danger unless their officers led the way,” the Commander-in-Chief issued an order of which the following is an extract: “The losses of the enemy, yesterday, would undoubtedly have been much greater if the orders of the Commander-in-Chief had not in some instances been contradicted by inferior officers, who, however well they meant, ought not to presume to direct. It is therefore ordered, that no officer commanding a party, and having received orders from the Commander-in-Chief, depart from them without orders from the same authority; and as many may otherwise err, the army is now acquainted that the General’s orders are delivered by his Adjutant-General, or one of his aides-de-camp, Mr. Tighlman, or Colonel Moylan, the Quartermaster-General.”

At this time, Massachusetts sent her drafted men under General Lincoln. General Greene assumed command in New Jersey. Generals Sullivan and Stirling, exchanged, resumed their old commands.

The army Return of October fifth indicated a total rank and file of twenty-seven thousand seven hundred and thirty-five men, of whom eight thousand and seventy-five were sick, or on a furlough; and requiring to complete 123these regiments, eleven thousand two hundred and seventy-one men. On the eighth of October, General Moore, commanding the Camp of Instruction (called the “Flying Camp,” because of its changeable location) in New Jersey, reported a total force of six thousand five hundred and forty-eight men.

On the ninth of October, the frigates Phœnix and Roebuck safely passed the forts as far north as Dobb’s Ferry. It became evident that General Putnam’s methods would not control the Hudson River route of British advance. Sickness increased in the camps. The emergency forced upon Washington the immediate reorganization of the medical department; and he ordered an examination of applicants before allowing a commission to be issued and rank conferred. Such had been the laxity of this necessary class of officers, that General Greene reported his surgeons as “without the least particle of medicine”; adding: “The regimental surgeons embezzle the public stores committed to their care, so that the regimental sick suffer, and should have the benefit of a general hospital.” Washington issued an order, after his own very lucid style, deploring the fact that “the periodical homesickness, which was common just before an anticipated engagement, had broke out again with contagious virulence.”

The want of discipline, however, was not wholly with the rank and file. Adjutant-General Reed, in writing to his wife, expressed his purpose to resign, for he had seen a captain shaving one of his men before the house; and added: “To enforce discipline in such cases, makes a man odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose.” And Colonel Smallwood, afterwards General, and one of the best soldiers of the war, in writing to the Maryland Council of Safety, complains of “the ignorance and inattention of officers who fail to realize the importance of that discipline which is so excellent in the Commander-in-Chief”; 124adding: “It would be a happy day for the United States if there was as much propriety in every department under him.”

At this period, General Howe again wrote to Lord Germaine, that he “did not expect to finish the campaign until spring”; “that the Provincials would not join the British army”; and called for more foreign troops, and eight additional men-of-war. The monotony of these frequent requisitions of the British Commander-in-Chief makes a tiresome story; but like the successive appeals of Washington—to Congress, Provincial Councils and Committees of Safety—they form an indispensable part of the narrative of those facts which tested Washington’s character as a Soldier.

Having observed increased activity of the British shipping in the East River, and indications that Howe would abandon a direct attack upon his fortified position upon Harlem Heights, Washington prepared for the contingency of more active duty elsewhere, and announced October eleventh as the day for a personal inspection of every company under his command.

The steady hold of Harlem Heights against Howe’s advance on the sixteenth day of September, sometimes called the Battle of Harlem Heights, was another “object lesson” for General Howe’s improvement, and he observed its conditions. His adversary invited and he declined the invitation to attack the American position. His next plan was self-suggestive, to cut the American army from its Connecticut supplies, since his fleet controlled the Hudson River, and by a flank and rear movement to pen it up for leisurely capture. He began this movement October twelfth.

The Guards, Light Infantry, Reserve, and Donop’s Hessians, landed at Throgg’s Neck (see map). But Hand’s American Rifles had already destroyed the bridge to the mainland; and even at low tide the artillery could not safely effect a crossing. Colonel Prescott, with others, especially detailed by Washington, watched every movement, and held firmly their posts without flinching; so that Howe placed his troops in camp, “awaiting reënforcements.” On the sixteenth and seventeenth, several brigades from Flushing, with the Grenadiers, landed at Pell’s Point. Even here, Washington had anticipated his advance; for Colonel Glover made such resistance from behind stone fences, then common to that region, that this last command also went into camp, “waiting for 126reënforcements.” On the twenty-first, Howe advanced his right and centre columns beyond New Rochelle, where he again went into camp, “waiting for reënforcements.”

During the week, General Knyphausen reached Staten Island from Europe with additional Hessian troops; and these, with the British Light Dragoons, landed at Myer’s Point near New Rochelle. De Heister also came up from Howe’s first camping-ground, and the entire army advanced parallel with the River Bronx, to within four miles of White Plains.

Much had been expected of the Light Dragoons and their charges on horseback, with drawn sabres, to cut to pieces the undisciplined rebels. But they inspired no terror. It was the rebels’ opportunity. Washington reminded the army, “that in a country where stone fences, crags, and ravines were so numerous, the American riflemen needed no better chance to pick off the riders and supply the army with much-needed horses.” He offered a “reward of one hundred dollars to any soldier who would bring in an armed trooper and his horse.” Colonel Haslet crossed the Bronx and attacked the Queen’s Rangers, captured thirty-six, and left as many on the field, besides carrying away sixty muskets. Colonel Hand next had a lively skirmish with the Hessian Yagers, who, accustomed to marching in close array, met an experience similar to that of Braddock’s command years before.

Besides all that, it was a constant inspiration to the American troops, and not least to the Militia, thus to distribute themselves along the extended British columns, and shoot, when they pleased, at some live target. Howe had already sent ships-of-war up the Hudson, and proposed to swing to the left at White Plains, and sweep the entire American army back upon the Harlem.

When Washington learned from his scouts that the 127British army was thus extended along the Sound, he hurried all supplies forward to White Plains; pushed forward his own army, division by division, along the west hank of the Bronx, always on high ground; established earthworks at every prominent point, and made a small chain of communicating posts throughout the entire distance. His purpose was to crowd the British army upon the coast, where innumerable sea-inlets made progress difficult; and by using the shorter, interior line to White Plains, to place himself in position to fight to advantage, upon ground of his own selection. Of course time became an element of determining value. Howe gained a start on the twelfth; but lost five days at Throgg’s Neck, and four days more at New Rochelle. As Washington already had a depot of Connecticut supplies at White Plains, he advanced to that point with vigor, so soon as he perceived that Howe would not attack from the east, as he had declined to attack from the south.

On the twelfth, General Greene asked permission to join from New Jersey, and on the fourteenth General Lee reported for duty. Some reference to this officer is of immediate interest. On that very morning he had written a letter to General Gates, who, as well as himself, had seen military service in the British army, each holding commissions in the American army subordinate to Washington,—Lee, as senior Major-General. The insubordination and arrogance of this letter are patent. The following is an extract:

My dear General Gates: I write this scroll in a hurry. Colonel Wood will describe the position of our army, which in my breast I do not approve. Inter nos, the Congress seems to stumble at every step. I don’t mean one or two of the cattle, but the whole stable. I have been very free in delivering my opinions, and in my opinion General Washington is much to blame in not menacing ’em with resignation, unless they refrain from unhinging the army in their absurd interference.

128On the twenty-second of October, while General Howe was still awaiting reënforcements two miles above New Rochelle, General Heath’s division made a night march, reached Chatterton Hill at daylight, and began to strengthen the defences at White Plains. Sullivan’s division arrived the next night, and General Lord Stirling’s immediately after. On the twenty-third, Lee’s Grand Division joined from New Jersey, and the entire American army, with its best officers and troops, awaited the action of General Howe. McDougall’s Brigade and Lieutenant Alexander Hamilton, with two guns, occupied Chatterton Hill. (See map.)

Washington’s position was not, intrinsically, the best for final defence; but he had selected an ultimate position which Howe could not assail without loss of communication with New York.

The American left was protected by low ground, accessible only with difficulty. The right was met by a bend in the River Bronx. One line of breastworks controlled the Connecticut road. Two successive lines in the rear were upon a gradual ascent, capable of vigorous defence. Washington also controlled all roads that lead westward to the Hudson River. But more important than all, somewhat advanced to the south-west, was Chatterton Hill, commanding the L of the river, in which angle the army of Howe had taken position. Behind the American army was still higher ground, which commanded the passes through the hills by the Peekskill and upper Tarrytown roads.

Washington was now superior to his adversary in respect of numbers, and was in one of his moods when he invited attack. On the twenty-eighth of October, the two armies confronted each other. But a direct advance by Howe required first that he dislodge the Americans from Chatterton’s Hill. Otherwise, Howe would leave his 129supplies exposed, as well as his left wing, to an attack from the rear. He decided to storm the hill. The guns of Hamilton and the steepness of the ascent foiled the first attempt. Then Colonel Rahl, afterwards killed at Trenton, and Donop, with their Hessian brigades, turned the American right by another route, and the Americans retired just as General Putnam was starting other troops to their support. The British brigade of General Leslie lost one hundred and fifty-four men, and the Hessian casualties increased the entire loss to two hundred and thirty-one. The American casualties were one hundred and thirty.

On the twenty-ninth, both armies rested. On the thirtieth, Lord Percy arrived with his division, and the next day was designated for the advance. But the day was stormy and the movement was suspended. The next day following, was named in Orders for advance all along the lines, “weather permitting,” the British improving their time by strengthening their own position.

The next day came. The British army was by itself. During the night, Washington had retired in good order, five miles, to North Castle Heights, from which the entire British army could not dislodge him. Such was the historical battle of White Plains, more properly, the Battle of Chatterton’s Hill, where the fighting took place.

Howe immediately abandoned New Rochelle as his base, left White Plains on the fifth, encamped at Dobb’s Ferry on the sixth, and thus gained communication with his ships on the Hudson.

On the same day, the sixth, Washington advised Congress that “he expected a movement of General Howe into New Jersey.” He called a Council of War, under that conviction, the same afternoon, and decided to throw a considerable body of troops into that Province.

The retention of Fort Washington was a question of 130much embarrassment. Even its capture by Howe would not be a compensation to him, or to Great Britain, for the escape of Washington’s army. On the twenty-ninth of October, General Greene prepared a careful itinerary for a march through New Jersey, minutely specifying the proposed distance for each day’s progress, and the requisite supplies for each. That itinerary furnishes a remarkable model of good Logistics. Washington wrote to Congress, that “General Howe must do something to save his reputation; that he would probably go to New Jersey”; and then urged, “that the militia be in readiness to supply the places of those whose terms of service would soon expire.” To Greene he wrote: “They can have no other capital object, unless it be Philadelphia.” It was then known that General Carleton retired from Crown Point November second, so that there was no danger of a British movement up the Hudson. He again wrote to Greene as to Fort Washington: “If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are in possession of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Fort Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as you deem best, and, so far revoking the order to Colonel McGee, to defend it to the last.”

At this time, more than half of the enlistments of the army were on their extreme limit of service. Howe promised the militia of New York, many of whom were in the garrison of the fort, that “he would guarantee to them their liberties and properties, as well as a free and general pardon.” Many decided not to reënlist. On the ninth of November, having in mind the eventualities of a New Jersey campaign, Washington moved one division of the army across the Hudson at Peekskill, 131and ordered a second to move the day following. On the tenth he placed General Lee in charge of the general camp, with careful instructions as to the discipline of the men; and notified him, in case the enemy should remove the whole or the greater part of their force to the west side of the Hudson, to follow with all possible despatch, leaving the militia to cover the frontiers of Connecticut, in case of need.

On the eve of his own departure he also notified Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, that “the campaign into New Jersey would withdraw Lee and his division from the Hudson”; and made arrangements for the “care and storage for the winter, of all tents and stores that might remain on hand after the discharge of enlisted men whose term should expire.”

The following terse order was then issued to all the divisions which were to accompany him in this, his “First New Jersey campaign”:

“Colonels will examine the baggage of troops under marching orders; tents and spare arms, to go in the first wagons, then the proper baggage of the regiment; no chairs, tables, or heavy chests, or personal baggage, to be put in, as it will certainly be put off and left. No officer of any rank to meddle with a wagon or a cart appropriated for any other regiment, or use; that no discharged man be allowed to carry away arms, camp kettles, utensils, or any other public stores; recruiting officers, as detailed, to proceed with their duty; no boys, or old men, to be enlisted, and if so, to be returned at the hands of the officer, with no allowance for any expense he may be at.”

On the twelfth of November, before crossing the Hudson River, Washington placed General Heath in command of the Highlands, and proceeded to Fort Lee, opposite Fort Washington. The British army had already 132removed from Dobb’s Ferry to King’s Bridge. At this time, three hundred British transports with a large force on board, lay at Sandy Hook, and their destination was suspected to be either Newport, Rhode Island, Philadelphia, or South Carolina.

Washington established his headquarters about nine miles from Fort Lee. It is not desirable to burden the narrative with the details of the capture of Fort Washington. The fort had been built to control the river, and it was weak, landward; depending upon the river, even for water, having no well. The ground fell off rapidly; but there were neither trenches nor regular bastions, and only one redoubt. Washington wrote to Congress, after reaching Fort Lee: “It seems to be generally believed that the investing of Fort Washington, is one object they have in view. I propose to stay in this neighborhood a few days; in which time I expect the design of the enemy will be more disclosed, and their incursions made in this quarter, or their investure of Fort Washington, if they are intended.” While the assault was in preparation, Washington took boat to cross and examine for himself the condition of the works; but meeting Generals Putnam and Greene, who satisfied him that there would be a stout defence, he returned without landing. Three assaults were made, Generals Knyphausen, Percy, Cornwallis and Matthews commanding divisions. These repeated charges up the very steep ascents from the rear, and from the open face of the work northward, were very costly to the British and Hessian columns. When their forces first gained the interior lines, surrender, or rescue, was inevitable. To the demand for surrender Magaw replied with a request for five hours’ delay. A half hour only was granted. Magaw received a billet from Washington stating that if he could hold out awhile, he would endeavor to bring off the garrison at night; but no delay was permitted, and the garrison surrendered. It was for many years an unexplained fact, how the British troops appeared so suddenly at the open face of the fort, northward, below which was a deep ravine, itself almost a protection. But William Dumont, Magaw’s Adjutant, deserted, two weeks before the investment, and placed detailed drawings of all the defences in the hands of General Howe. This fact affords the key to General Howe’s otherwise very singular excuse to the British Government for not following Washington’s army from White Plains to North Castle Heights,—“political reasons” having been assigned by General Howe, as “controlling his action.”

133The British loss in the assault was one hundred and twenty-eight; and that of the Hessian troops, three hundred and twenty-six. The American loss was one hundred and twenty, killed and wounded, and two thousand six hundred and thirty-four, prisoners. The loss in cannon, tents, arms and military stores, was very severe.

Fort Lee was of necessity abandoned, its powder and principal supplies being first removed in safety.

The first New Jersey campaign immediately ensued.

Historical accuracy must recognize the First Campaign of Washington in New Jersey, as a masterly conduct of operations toward American Independence. The loss of Fort Washington has been a frequent topic of discussion, as if its retention or loss had determining value. As already indicated by Washington’s letters, there was no substantial benefit to be realized by the detachment of troops to retain it, so long as British ships controlled its water-front. Behind it was New England, which could furnish no base of American operations for a general war; and yet, in order to prosecute the war to success, the American army must be established where it could harass and antagonize British operations at and out from New York. Fort Washington could do neither, but, so long as held, must drain resources which were more valuable elsewhere.

It has already been noticed, that Washington prepared New England for its own immediate defence; and the assembling of supplies ordered was in anticipation of the campaign of 1777. The new system of enlistments, also, provided for five years of contingent service. The rapid organization of regiments at the South, and the authorized increase of the army, in excess of any possible British accessions from Europe, had induced the establishment of the Camp of Observation before alluded to, and indicated New Jersey as the essential centre of operations for all 135general military purposes. British operations from Canada, or against the Southern Colonies, could be successfully met only by a closely related and compactly ordered base of operation and supply.

It is therefore a misnomer to dwell with emphasis upon Washington’s next movement, as simply a “masterly retreat.” The extracts, few out of many available, already cited, are declarations of a clearly defined strategic system, which would admit of no permanent failure so long as Congress and the American people completely filled the measure of his demands for men and money.

A glance at the disposition of both armies is invited. All operations in the northern department were practically suspended with Carleton’s withdrawal to Canada. But on the ninth of November, the official returns of that northern army showed a force of seven thousand three hundred and forty-five rank and file, present for duty; with three thousand nine hundred and sixty-one sick, present, and absent. Enlistments were to expire with the year, but weeks were to intervene. Lee’s Grand Division, at North Castle Heights, at date of the loss of Fort Washington, and as late as November, reported “seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-four of effective rank and file, present for duty and on command.” Enlistments here, also, were near their limit; but Lee ultimately crossed into New Jersey with thirty-four hundred effective troops. Washington had the right to expect, and did expect, that this force was available upon call. The division of General Heath, commanding upon the Hudson, with headquarters at Fishkill, numbered, on November twenty-fourth, five thousand four hundred and ten men for duty. Leaving to the governors of New England and New York the responsibility of maintaining their quotas when enlistments should expire, the time had come for American operations in the middle zone of military action.

136Cornwallis was detached from his immediate command and sent into New Jersey, with a strong force, to attack Washington. The American army abandoned the space between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; crossed the latter at Aquackonock on the twenty-first of November; burned the bridge after a slight skirmish, and followed the right bank of the Passaic to Newark, reaching that city on the twenty-third. At this point, a muster of the army was ordered by Washington, and five thousand four hundred and ten reported for duty. New Brunswick was reached on the twenty-ninth. Here another skirmish with the army of Cornwallis took place. But Cornwallis halted his command under orders of Howe to “proceed no further than New Brunswick.”

Washington moved on to Princeton, and then to Trenton, where he arrived on the third day of December. He immediately gathered from Philadelphia all available boats, and for a stretch of seventy miles cleared both banks of the Delaware River of everything that could float, and took them into his own charge.

The reader should appreciate that these movements were not in the original design of the American Commander-in-Chief. He would have made a stand at both Hackensack and New Brunswick, if Lee’s Division, confidently expected, had joined him as ordered; and at least, the enemy’s progress would have been retarded.

Having left the Delaware regiment and five Virginia regiments at Princeton, under Lord Stirling, he moved all heavy military stores behind the Delaware, and returned to Princeton. Meeting Lord Stirling, who was falling back before a superior force of the enemy, he recrossed the Delaware at Trenton, established headquarters, and fixed the base for future action.

In writing to Congress on the fifth, he used this language: “As nothing but necessity obliged me to retire before 137the enemy and leave so much of New Jersey unprotected, I conceive it my duty, and it corresponds with my inclination, to make head against them so soon as there shall be the least probability of doing so with propriety.”

On the twelfth, he learned that General Lee had entered New Jersey with his division. As early as November twenty-fifth, he had ordered General Schuyler to forward to him all Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops then in the Northern Department.

A glance at the plans and movements of the British army is now of interest. Howe reported his movements as follows: “My first design extended no further than to get, and keep possession of, East New Jersey. Lord Cornwallis had orders not to advance beyond Brunswick; but, on the sixth, I joined his lordship with the Fourth Brigade of British, under General Grant. On the seventh, Cornwallis marched with his corps, except the Guards who were left at Brunswick, to Princeton, which the Americans had quitted the same day. He delayed seventeen hours at Princeton, and was an entire day in marching to Trenton. He arrived there, just as the rear-guard of the enemy had crossed; but they had taken the precaution to destroy, or secure to the south side, all the boats that could possibly have been employed for crossing the river.”

Cornwallis remained at Pennington until the fourteenth, when the British army was placed in winter quarters; “the weather,” says General Howe, “having become too severe to keep the field.”

On the previous day, the thirteenth, General Charles Lee, next in rank to Washington, while leisurely resting at a country house at Baskenridge, three miles from his troops, was taken prisoner by a British scouting detachment. It may be of interest to the reader to be reminded, that this Major-General required from Congress an 138advance of thirty thousand dollars, to enable him to transfer his English property to America, before he accepted his commission, and was disappointed that he was made second, instead of first, in command. When captured, he was in company with Major Wilkinson, a messenger from his old Virginia friend, General Horatio Gates, who had just been ordered by Washington to accompany certain reënforcements from the northern army, to increase the force of the Commander-in-Chief. This Major Wilkinson escaped capture, but the British scouts used his horse for Lee’s removal. On the table was a letter, not yet folded, which the messenger was to convey to General Gates. It reads as follows (omitting the expletives),—

My Dear Gates: The ingenious manœuvre of Fort Washington has completely unhinged the goodly fabrick we had been building. There never was so —— a stroke. Entre nous, a certain great man is —— deficient. He has thrown me into a position where I have my choice of difficulties. If I stay in the Province, I risk myself and my army; and if I do not stay, the Province is lost forever.... Our councils have been weak, to the last degree. As to what relates to yourself, if you think you can be in time to aid the general, I would have you, by all means, go. You will at least save your army.

No comment is required, except to state that repeated orders had been received and acknowledged by Lee, to join Washington; but he had determined not to join him, and to act independently with his division, regardless of the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, and of Congress. Two extracts only are admissible. Washington had reprimanded Lee for interfering with the independent command of General Heath, on the Hudson. On the twenty-sixth of November, Lee wrote to Heath: “The Commander-in-Chief is now separated from us. I, of course, command on this side the water; for the future I will, and I must, be obeyed.” On the twenty-third of 139November, in order to induce New England to trust him, and distrust Washington, he wrote the following letter to James Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts Council:

Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington, it was my opinion, that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west side of the North River, must rest, each, on its own bottom; that the idea, of detaching and reënforcing from one side to the other, on every motion of the enemy, was chimerical; but to harbor such a thought, in our present circumstances, is absolute insanity.... We must therefore depend upon ourselves. Should the enemy alter the present direction of their operation, I would never entertain the thought on being succored from the western army (that across the Hudson, with Washington). Affairs appear in so important a crisis, that I think even the resolves of Congress must be no longer nicely weighed with us. There are times when we must commit treason against the laws of the State, for the salvation of the State. The present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of treason. For my part, and I flatter myself my way of thinking is congenial with that of Mr. Bowdoin, I will stake my head and reputation on the measure.

James Bowdoin loved Massachusetts; but no selfish or local considerations, such as were those of Lee, could impair his confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the American Commander-in-Chief.

The capture of Lee was thus mildly noticed by Washington: “It was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he was taken.”

General Sullivan succeeded to the command of Lee’s Division. Gates joined from the northern army, and on the twentieth of December, the Continental Army was reorganized for active service.

General Howe had returned to New York December 20th. The British cantonments for the winter embraced Brunswick, Trenton, Burlington, Bordentown, and other places; with the Hessian, Donop, in command at Bordentown, and Rahl at Trenton.

140The month had been one of great strain upon the American Commander-in-Chief. He was, practically, on trial. The next in command, who, by virtue of previous military training, largely commanded public confidence, had failed him, simply because Washington, with the modesty of a true aspirant for excellence in his profession, would not pass judgment, and enforce his own will, in disobedience of the will of Congress. But, by this time Congress itself began to realize that a deliberate civil body was not the best Commander-in-Chief for field service, and that it would have to trust the men who did the fighting. It adjourned on the twelfth of December, quite precipitately, but Resolved “That, until Congress shall otherwise order, General Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations of war.”

Repair of bridges below Trenton, by the British troops, led Washington to suspect that some move might be made against Philadelphia, from the east side of the Delaware River. He therefore divided the entire river front into divisions under competent commanders, on the day of the adjournment of Congress. Light earthworks were thrown up, opposite all ferries and places of easy landing, with small guards at frequent intervals; and constant patrols were ordered to be in motion, promptly to report any suspicious signs of British activity, or the movement of other persons than soldiers of the army. Points of rendezvous were also established, to resist any sudden attempt of persons to cross; all boats were kept in good order, and under guard; and rations for three days were distributed and required to be kept up to that standard, by night and by day. On the same day he promulged an order that affected Philadelphia itself; viz., “requiring all able-bodied men in the city, not conscientiously scrupulous as to bearing arms, to report 141at the State House yard the next day, with arms and equipments; that all persons who have arms and accoutrements, which they cannot, or do not mean to employ in defence of America, are hereby ordered to deliver the same to Mr. Robert Tower, who will pay for the same; and that those who are convicted of secreting any arms, or accoutrements, will be severely punished.”

On the fourteenth, he also definitely resolved to “face about and meet the enemy,”—a purpose which only the conduct of General Lee had made impracticable before. He wrote to Governor Trumbull, General Gates, and General Heath, in confidence, of his purpose, “to take the offensive.” To Congress, he wrote sternly, stating that “ten days will put an end to the existence of this army”; adding: “This is not a time to stand upon expense. A character to lose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable blessing of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse.”

At this juncture, Washington definitely resolved to establish his permanent base, as against New York; and selected Morristown, which had already been made the rendezvous of the New Jersey troops. General Maxwell, who was familiar with the country, was assigned to the command of this new position. Three regiments from Ticonderoga were ordered to halt at the new post. On the twenty-third of December, Washington sent a confidential communication to Adjutant-General Reed, then with General Cadwallader, in which he designated “Christmas night, an hour before day, as the time fixed for an attack upon Trenton.” Reed had fully shared in the desire for active, offensive duty, and in one letter thus concurred in the Commander-in-Chief’s opinion, that “to repossess ourselves of New Jersey, or any part of it, would have more effect than if we had never left it.” The purpose of Washington was so to combine the 142movements of various divisions, including one under Putnam from Philadelphia, as practically to clear the east bank of the Delaware of all Hessian garrisons. Putnam feared that the Tory element would rise during his absence, and that order was suspended. The right wing, under Cadwallader, was to cross at Bristol (see map); but owing to ice, which prevented the landing of artillery, he returned to Bristol, and reported to Washington. After expressing regret over his failure, he thus closes: “I imagine the badness of the night must have prevented you from passing over as you intended.” Ewing was to cross over just below Trenton, to intercept any reënforcements that might approach the garrison from Bordentown; but the violence of the storm prevented that movement also. Washington took charge of the left wing, consisting of twenty-four hundred men, which was to cross at McConkey’s Ferry, nine miles above Trenton, accompanied by Sullivan and Greene as division commanders. When preparations were complete, and Washington in his saddle, Major Wilkinson, of the staff of Gates, notified him that General Gates had gone to Baltimore to visit Congress. This was a deliberate “absence, without leave,” at an hour when he knew, and in advance, that Washington intended to force a battle; but Stark, of Breed’s Hill, was there. Glover, the man of Marblehead and hero of the Long Island retreat, was there; and William Washington, and James Monroe, were there!

WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON.

[From Dael’s painting.]

143The Hessian garrison of fifteen hundred and forty men had enjoyed a right “merry Christmas,” after the style of their own “old country” fashion; and the night, inclement without, was bright within, as dance and song with every cheery accompaniment dispelled thoughts of watchfulness of ice-bound Delaware and driving tempest. It was indeed a night for within-door relish, and the season of the year was most conducive to the abandonment of all care and worry. “Toasts were drank” with gleesome delight; and the hilarity of the happy Hessian soldiers, officers and men, only ceased when the worn-out night compelled them to seek relief in rest. The garrison were sleeping as soundly when the stormy morning broke into day, as if they had compassed a hard day’s march during the night hours. The usual detail for guard was distributed, but no other sign of life appeared on the streets of Trenton. Before Colonel Rahl’s headquarters, two guns, stationed there more as a recognition of his commanding position than for use, were partly buried in snow. A battery of four guns was in open ground, not far from the Friends’ Meeting house; but neither earthworks nor other defences had been deemed essential to the security of the British winter quarters.

General Grant had indeed written from Brunswick on the twenty-fourth: “It is perfectly certain there are no more rebel troops in New Jersey; they only send over small parties of twenty or thirty men. On last Sunday, Washington told his assembled generals that the ‘British are weak at Trenton and Princeton.’ I wish the Hessians to be on guard against sudden attack; but, at the same time, I give my opinion that nothing of the kind will be undertaken.” General Grant did, it would seem, compliment Washington’s sagacity, without comprehending his will-power to realize in action every positive conviction of possible duty. And so it was, that the garrison of Trenton on that Christmas night slept at ease, until morning dawned and Washington paid his unexpected visit.

Under cover of high ground, just back of McConkey’s Ferry, on Christmas afternoon, 1776, Washington held a special evening parade. Neither driving wind nor benumbing cold prevented full ranks and prompt response to “roll-call,” as company after company fell into line; 144and when darkness obscured the closing day, all was in motion. It had been his design to complete the crossing by midnight, and enter Trenton at five o’clock in the morning. He was to lead, in person, and announced as the countersign, “Victory or Death!” The order to march to the river bank, by divisions and sub-divisions, each to its designated group of boats, was communicated by officers especially selected for that duty, so that the most perfect order attended each movement. The few days of mild weather which had opened the ice, had been succeeded by a sudden freeze, and a tempest of hail and sleet that checked the swift current and made a safe passage of daring and doubtful venture. The shore was skirted with ice, while the floating blocks of old ice twisted and twirled the fragile boats as mere playthings in their way. But no one grumbled at cold, sleet or danger. The elements were not the patriot’s foe that night of nights. All faces were set against their country’s foes. They were, at last, to pursue their old pursuers. The “man of retreats,” as Washington had been called in derision by such men as Gates and Lee, was guiding, and leading to “Victory or Death!”

The landing of the artillery was not effected until three o’clock in the morning, with nearly nine miles yet to march. At four o’clock the advance was ordered. The snow ceased, but the hail and sleet returned, driven by a fierce wind from the north-east. A mile and a quarter brought them to Bear Tavern (see map). Three and a half miles more brought them to Birmingham. Here a messenger from General Sullivan informed Washington that his men reported “their arms to be wet.” “Tell your general,” replied Washington, “to use the bayonet, and penetrate into the town. The town must be taken. I am resolved to take it.”

145From this point Sullivan took the river road. Washington and Greene, bearing to the left, crossed to the old Scotch road, and then entered the Pennington road, only one mile from Trenton. The distance by each road was about the same, four and one-half miles. Washington moved at once to the head of King and Queen streets, where they joined at a sharp angle; and here, under direction of General Knox, Forrest’s Battery was placed in position, to sweep both streets, even down to the river. “It was exactly eight o’clock,” says Washington, “and three minutes after, I found from the firing on the lower road that that division had also got up.” The entire movement was with the utmost silence, to enable Sullivan and Stark to pass through the lower town and take the Hessians in the rear and by surprise.

The battle was over in an hour. The Hessian troops burst from their quarters, half dressed, but in the narrow streets already swept by Forrest’s guns, any regular formation was impossible. The two guns before Rahl’s headquarters were manned; but before they could deliver a single round Capt. William Washington and Lieut. James Monroe (subsequently President Monroe), with a small party, rushed upon the gunners and hauled the guns away for use elsewhere. Sullivan had entered the town by Front and Second streets. Stark led his column directly to the Assanpink Bridge, to cut off retreat to Bordentown; and then swung to the left, and attacked the Hessians, who were gallantly attempting to form in the open ground between Queen Street and the Assanpink. Hand’s Rifles and Scott’s and Lawson’s Virginia regiments were conspicuous for gallantry. All did well.

The American casualties were two killed and three wounded,—Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe being among the latter. The Hessian loss in killed and wounded, besides officers, was forty-one. The number of prisoners, including thirty officers, was one thousand 146and nine. Colonel Rahl fell, mortally wounded, while using his bravest energies to rally his men for an attack on Washington’s position at the head of King Street; but the surprise was so complete, and the coöperation of the American divisions was so timely and constant, that no troops in the world could have resisted the assault. Six bronze guns, over a thousand stand of arms, four sets of colors, twelve drums, and many valuable supplies were among the trophies of war.

The American army countermarched during the night after the battle, reaching the old headquarters at Newtown with their prisoners before morning; having made the entire distance of fully thirty miles under circumstances of such extreme hardship and exposure, that more than one thousand men were disabled for duty through frozen limbs and broken-down energies.

The Hessian troops were proudly escorted through Philadelphia, and the country began to realize the value of a Soldier in command. Fugitives from Trenton reached Bordentown, where Colonel Donop had already been so closely pressed by Colonel Griffiths in an adventurous skirmish, as to require the services of his entire garrison to meet it. He abandoned Bordentown instantly, leaving the sick and wounded, and the public stores; marched with all haste to Princeton, via Crosswicks and Allentown, and started the next day for South Amboy, the nearest port to New York.

On the twenty-seventh, Cadwallader crossed at Bristol with eighteen hundred men, not knowing that Washington had recrossed the Delaware. Generals Mifflin and Ewing followed with thirteen hundred men; but Mt. Holly and Black Horse had also been abandoned by the Hessian garrisons.

While the American army rested, its Commander-in-Chief matured his plans for further offensive action. A 147letter from Colonel De Hart, at Morristown, advised him that the regiments of Greaton, Bond, and Porter would extend their term of service two weeks. The British post at Boundbrook and vicinity had been withdrawn to Brunswick. Generals McDougall and Maxwell, then at Morristown, were instructed by Washington “to collect as large a body of militia as possible, and to assure them, that nothing is wanting but for them to lend a hand, and drive the enemy from the whole Province of New Jersey.” On the twenty-eighth, he wrote thus to Maxwell: “As I am about to enter the Jerseys with a considerable force, immediately, for the purpose of attempting a recovery of that country from the enemy; and as a diversion from your quarter may greatly facilitate this event, by dividing and distracting their troops, I must request that you will collect all the forces in your power, and annoy and distress them by every means which prudence may suggest.”

To General Heath, he wrote: “I would have you advance as rapidly as the season will permit, with the eastern militia, by the way of the Hackensack, and proceed downwards until you hear from me. I think a fair opportunity is offered of driving the enemy entirely from, or, at least to the extremity of New Jersey.”

On the thirtieth, having again crossed to Trenton, Washington was able to announce that “the eastern Continental troops had agreed to remain six weeks longer, upon receipt of a bounty of ten dollars; and the services of eminent citizens were enlisted in an effort to use the success at Trenton, as a stimulus to recruiting,” and, “to hasten the concentration of the militia.” Washington intensely realized that in a few weeks, at furthest, he was to begin again the instruction of a new army; and determined to get the largest possible benefits from the presence of four thousand veterans who had consented to remain for a short period beyond their exact term of enlistment.

148On the twenty-seventh of December, Congress clothed Washington with full dictatorial authority in the matter of raising troops, and in all that pertained to the conduct of the war, for the period of six months; reciting as the foundation of such action, that affairs were in such a condition that the very existence of civil liberty depended upon the right exercise of military powers; and, “the vigorous, decisive conduct of these being impossible in distant, numerous, and deliberative bodies, it was confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George Washington.”

It was under the burden of this vast responsibility that Washington rested, when he closed the year 1776 in camp near Trenton. He responded to this confidence on the part of the Continental Congress, in this simple manner: “Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil obligation, I shall immediately bear in mind that as the sword was the last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so it ought to be the first thing laid aside, when those liberties are finally established. I shall instantly set about making the most necessary reforms in the army.”

Thus rapidly, in as natural and orderly sequence as seemed desirable, omitting incidents, correspondence, and names of persons that do not seem essential in the illustration of qualities which attach to the career of Washington as a Soldier, the reader is brought to the midnight hour of December 31, 1776.

All his struggles in camp, in field, on the march, have closed with one tremendous blow struck at British prestige and British power. The greatest soldiers and statesmen of that period recognized its significance, and rendered unstinted praise to the “wisdom, constancy, and intrepidity of the American Commander-in-Chief.”

But, at that midnight hour, the Soldier who had been the kind and faithful guardian of the humblest men in the 149ranks, as well as the example and instructor of the proudest veteran, waited with swelling breast and aching heart for the morning’s dawn; realizing the solemnity of its certain ordeal, when the organization of a new army, and more herculean efforts of the British crown, were to test not only his own capacity and will, but test the readiness and fitness of the American people to rise to the emergencies of one supreme issue—“Victory or Death!”

Washington’s surprise of the garrison of Trenton, equally surprised General Howe at New York; and he made immediate requisition for twenty thousand additional troops. His last previous requisition for foreign auxiliaries met with little favor on the Continent, and only thirty-six hundred men were secured for service, both in Canada and other American Colonies. In the meantime, Clinton made no demonstration from Newport; and Massachusetts had recovered from the temporary effect of his occupation of that post. Under the impulse of the success at Trenton, new foundries were established; and systematic effort was made to secure a complete artillery outfit for the army, on the new basis of eighty-eight battalions.

151But on the first day of January, 1777, the Commander-in-Chief did not pause in the use of the means just at hand. He realized that General Howe could not afford to remain passive under the new conditions which his own offensive movement had imposed upon the British army. Lord Cornwallis, on the eve of returning to England, was at once sent with a strong division to reoccupy Trenton. But Washington, instead of retaining his former position on the west bank of the Delaware, established himself behind the small river Assanpink, which enters the Delaware just south of Trenton, on the New Jersey side. It was a bold act. Below him, toward Philadelphia, were the forces of Cadwallader and Mifflin; and these he ordered to his support. Their arrival, thirty-six hundred strong, on the morning of January second, increased his command to about five thousand men. This little Assanpink River, swollen by the melted snow, was impassable except by a bridge near its junction with the Delaware. Along its steep and wooded banks, the American army was distributed for a distance of two miles. Watchful guards and several pieces of artillery were stationed at every available fording-place, and these were supported by some of the most reliable Continental troops. Behind the first line, and on a little higher ground, a second line was established.

In order to secure ample warning of the arrival of the enemy and delay their approach, Washington established several small posts along the road to Princeton. The first, about a mile advanced, occupied rising ground well flanked by woods and supported by two pieces of artillery. Colonel Hand’s Rifles were pushed forward as far as Five Mile Creek; and even, off the road, a small supporting party held a defensive position at Shebakonk Creek, where heavy timber and broken ground afforded a good position for skirmishers to annoy an advancing force. General Greene was placed in command of these outposts. (See map.)

So many writers have worried themselves and their readers in dealing with Washington’s movements during the first week in January, 1777, as so many revolutions of a lottery wheel of chance in which he was remarkably lucky, that it is desirable to understand his own plans, and how far he anticipated the contingencies which actually happened. His mind not only grasped possibilities which aroused confidence, at home and abroad; but embraced strategic conceptions which affected the entire war.

152The Delaware was still filled with floating ice. Large masses were banked within its curves, so that retreat across the river, in the presence of a powerful adversary, would be impracticable. And yet, he had not hesitated to take position at Trenton, on the east bank of the river. To have remained on the west bank would have made it impossible for him to prevent Cornwallis from passing down the east bank to Philadelphia, or at least from driving both Cadwallader and Mifflin to that city, in disorder. To have retired his own army to Philadelphia, would have been the abandonment of New Jersey, and of all the prestige of his exploit on Christmas night. He resolved to save his army; and leave Philadelphia to the contingencies of the campaign. If compelled to fight, he would choose the ground; but he did not intend to fight under conditions that would force him to abandon the aggressive campaign which he had planned. During December, he had secured a careful reconnoissance of the roads to Brunswick, had learned the strength of its garrison, and formed an estimate of the value of the large magazines which General Howe had located at that post. He believed that a quick dash would secure their destruction or capture.

While awaiting the advance of Cornwallis, he called a council of officers, and this bold strategic movement was fully indorsed by them. But no time was to be lost. The initiative must be taken before the armies were brought to a deadly struggle for the very ground already occupied by his camp. Battle must be deferred until another day. The baggage-wagons which accompanied the commands of Cadwallader and Mifflin, now parked in the rear of the army, were moved to its extreme right, toward Princeton, and the army waited.

Washington visited the advance posts, where Greene was on the alert, and being advised by him that he could keep Cornwallis back until late in the afternoon, or until 153night, returned to headquarters. The advance of Cornwallis was so successively annoyed by the outposts, that he halted until additional regiments joined him. Greene opened fire with his two guns, under orders from Washington to “so check the enemy as to prevent battle until the next day”; and Cornwallis again came to a halt. He knew that the Delaware River was behind Washington, and felt sure of his prey. Already the British had made a tiresome march; and at this second halt, orders were sent back to Princeton to bring up a part of the force left at that place. Cornwallis had not been neglectful of his flanks, however, but sent skirmishers along the Assanpink, and even threw both shot and shell into the woods in the direction of the American lines.

When the day closed, and Cornwallis encamped on the north bank of the Assanpink, his pickets could see the Americans at work throwing up intrenchments behind the bridge, and at one point further up the stream. All along the American lines immense camp-fires burned, and these were abundantly replenished, during the night, by fence-rails from the country near by. The British and Hessians also maintained their camp-fires. A sudden freeze made these fires comfortable. It also hardened the ground, so that the American artillery and baggage-wagons could move more readily than on the previous day.

Washington hurried a messenger to General Putnam, at Philadelphia, advising him of his proposed movement, and instructing him to send troops to occupy Crosswicks, a short distance above Bordentown, and thus take charge of some baggage which has been sent in that direction. All this time, the army, except its wide-awake and conspicuous sentries at the bridge, and its active fire-builders along the Assanpink, was on the march for Princeton. When the vanguard reached Stony Brook, Washington 154re-formed his columns, and sent General Mercer, who had served with him in the Indian War of 1756–66, to the left, by the Quaker Road, intending to advance with the main army directly to the village, by a lower road, under cover of rising ground, and thus expedite his march upon Brunswick, now weakened in its garrison by the presence of Cornwallis at Trenton. But General Mercer’s small command was suddenly confronted by a part of Colonel Mawhood’s British regiment hastening to reënforce Cornwallis. This precipitated the action, known as the “Battle of Princeton.” As soon as firing was heard, Washington hastened to the scene and took part in the fight. A British bayonet charge was too much for the American advance guard. The officers in vain attempted to rally the men. Washington at once appreciated the ruin that would result from protracted battle; and, as at Kipp’s Bay, dashed into the thickest of the fight, and with bared head urged the men to rally. He passed directly across the fire of the British troops, and the Americans responded to his appeal. Stirling, St. Clair, Patterson and others promptly brought their troops into action; cut off the retreat of a portion of the enemy to Princeton, and fought them again, just south of Nassau Hall, Princeton College.

The short action was costly in precious lives. Colonel Haslet and General Mercer both fell, while endeavoring to rally their men, and the total American loss was about one hundred. The British loss was more than one hundred, besides two hundred and twenty prisoners. The part taken by Washington in the action requires no further details of its incidents than its result. But the day was not over. At early dawn, at Trenton, the “All’s well!” which had been echoed across the little Assanpink and along its banks the night before, ceased. The fires still crackled and blazed with fresh wood added to the 155glowing coals; but no pacing sentry, nor picketed horses, nor open-mouthed cannon were in view from the British outposts. And yet, the sullen boom of cannon far in their rear, from the direction of Princeton, caught the quick ear of Gen. Sir William Erskine. In an instant he was in the presence of Cornwallis, with the sharp cry, “Washington has escaped us!” The beat “To arms!” was immediate. There was no time even to pack supplies already unloaded for battle. The troops were resting, after hard marching at the dead of winter, but the presence of Washington’s army at the head of King Street would not have more thoroughly awakened them to duty. The distance was only ten miles; while Washington, by his circuit, had marched sixteen miles. But every moment of delay imperilled their great magazines of supply for the whole winter at Brunswick. All that had been stored in the Trenton depot passed into Washington’s possession on Christmas night. They brought with them, the day before, only sufficient for a short morning’s capture of their American adversary. Battalions marched toward Trenton singly, as formed; artillery following so soon as ready.

The British vanguard reached Stony Brook just as the Americans disappeared up the road, after destruction of the bridge. Cornwallis halted, to bring up artillery. Washington, however, had already reached Kingston, three miles beyond Princeton, and had crossed Millstone River. Here, a council was held as to future action. British fugitives in the direction of Brunswick had, most assuredly, warned the garrison of its danger. At this moment, the sound of cannon at Stony Brook showed that Cornwallis was pressing forward with despatch. The rear-guard left at Stony Brook was not yet in sight; but the entire army was put in marching order, and General Greene led the advance up the Millstone. As 156soon as the rear-guard joined, the British not appearing, the bridge was destroyed, and the army moved through woods, thickets, and improvised openings, under the lead of well-posted scouts, for the hilly country to the northward. When Cornwallis reached the Millstone, he had another bridge to build. A few horsemen toward Brunswick were all that indicated the presence or whereabouts of Washington’s army. He pushed his men by a forced march, to save Brunswick, and fight Washington. He did indeed save Brunswick; but Washington and his army were resting in a strong position near Pluckemin, beyond his reach.

The American soldiers were foot-sore, unshod, weary and hungry. There had not been time to distribute rations, after breaking camp at Trenton. More than one-half of the troops had only just arrived with Cadwallader from Bordentown, when the night march began. The imagination falters and cannot conceive the experiences of these faithful men, so many of whom instead of returning immediately home after New Years day, were voluntarily serving beyond their enlistment, at the simple request of their heroic Commander-in-Chief.

On the fifth of January, Washington sent his report to Congress, and despatches to others elsewhere in command. Two of these despatches are to be noticed. He ordered Putnam, then at Philadelphia: “Give out your strength twice as great as it is. Keep out spies. Put horsemen in the dress of the country, and keep them going backwards and forwards for that purpose. Act with great circumspection, so as not to meet with a surprise.” He ordered General Heath, then on the Hudson, “to collect boats, for the contingency of the detail of a part of his forces to New Jersey”; and also instructed him, that “it had been determined in council that he should move down toward New York with a considerable 157force, as if with a sudden design upon that city.”

On the seventh of January, the American army reached Morristown; where huts were erected and the Headquarters of the Continental Army of the United States were established. That army was resting, and working; working, and resting,—but its Commander-in-Chief knew no rest. On the same day, additional orders were issued to General Heath; to General Lincoln, who had reached Peekskill with four thousand New England militia; and to other officers, north and south, in anticipation of ulterior movements through every probable field of the rapidly expanding war. This was also the first occasion for Washington’s exercise of the high prerogative conferred by Congress,—full control of all military operations without consultation with that body.

Washington could reprimand, when necessary; while always prompt to commend, when commendation was both deserved and timely. Heath was before Fort Independence on the eighteenth day of January. General Lincoln advanced by the Hudson River road; General Scott by White Plains; and Generals Wooster and Parsons, from New Rochelle and Westchester. A few prisoners were taken at Valentine’s Hill. General Heath, with grave dignity, announced to the Hessian garrison of two thousand men that he would allow them “twenty minutes in which to surrender,” or they must “abide the consequences.” Twenty minutes, thirty minutes, and gradually, ten days elapsed. This large American force, half-organized, as they were—without barracks, in midwinter, under conditions of terrible exposure—endured it all, without flinching, and hardest of all, unrelieved by fighting. Suddenly, the Hessians made a sortie upon the advanced regiment, and the whole army was retired. Its fighting pluck had been frittered away. The combined 158divisions had arrived with admirable concert of time. The plan was well-conceived and well-initiated; but failed, because a soldier was not in immediate command. As a demonstration toward New York, it did affect Howe’s movements, and compelled him to keep his forces well in hand; but its chief purpose was not realized.

On the third day of February, the American Commander-in-Chief again wrote to General Heath, as follows: “This letter is additional to my public one of this date. It is, to hint to you, and I do it with concern, that your conduct is censured, and by men of sense and judgment who have been with you in the expedition to Fort Independence, as being fraught with too much caution; by which the army has been disappointed and in some degree disgraced. Your summons, as you did not attempt to fulfil your threats, was not only idle, but farcical, and will not fail of turning the laugh exceedingly upon us.”

During the winter and spring, the skirmishes were frequent, and often with benefit to the American troops. They began to acquire confidence, and the conviction that, man for man, on fair terms, they were a match for either British or Hessians, and did not care which invited a fight. Washington issued a counter-proclamation to that which Howe promulged when the American army advanced into New Jersey; and then, all offensive operations of the British army came to a sudden halt.

The eminently impartial Italian historian, Botta, thus sums up his description of this offensive movement:

“Washington, having received a few fresh battalions, and his little army having recovered from their fatigue, soon entered the field anew, and scoured the whole country as far as the Raritan. He even crossed the river and entered the county of Essex; made himself master of Newark, of Elizabethtown, and finally of Woodbridge; so that he 159commanded the entire coast of New Jersey in front of Staten Island.

“He so judiciously selected his positions, and fortified them so formidably, that the royalists shrunk from all attempts to dislodge him from any of them.”... “But the British army, after having overrun, victoriously, the State of New Jersey quite to the Delaware, and caused even the City of Philadelphia to tremble for its safety, found itself now restricted to the only posts of Brunswick and Amboy, which, moreover, could have no communication with New York, except by sea.

“Thus, by an army almost reduced to extremity, Philadelphia was saved; Pennsylvania protected; New Jersey nearly recovered; and a victorious army laid under the necessity of quitting all thoughts of acting offensively, in order to defend itself.”

The narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, up to the time when he foiled the best efforts of Howe and Cornwallis to capture his weary band of Continentals and militia, has been a continuous story of love of country and devotion to her brave defenders. The most assiduous care for their discipline, their health, their moral deportment, and their loyalty to duty, has been the burden of his soul. Pleading, remonstrance, and even reprimand, however earnest and pungent, have never worn a selfish garb, nor breathed of arrogance or fitful temper. Presumptuous denunciations by his chief antagonist have never impaired the dignity of his carriage, his felicity of utterance, nor the serenity of his faith.

The indiscretions of his subordinates, their jealousies, and their weaknesses, have been so condoned, or accommodated to the eventful hours of camp or field service, that while he rests in camp, during the opening week of the second year of battling with the might of Britain, he has in mind, only words of thanksgiving for mercies realized, and a bold challenge to the American Congress and the American people for men and means whereby to make their sublime Declaration of Independence a realized fact.

161And yet, never before has there gathered about his pathway such ominous mutterings of a threatening tempest. It is no longer the spectacle of a half-organized army parrying the strokes of a compact enemy, well equipped for war. He has halted, faced the foe, and assumed the aggressive. Washington has been fencing. His first lunge in return draws blood. He will fight to the finish.

Already, he understands that his first New Jersey campaign indicates the real field of endeavor in which the fate of his country is to be settled. Whatever may be in store of sacrifice, or battle, he must now plan for victory; and to ensure its happy realization, he must so neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation, whether by himself or Great Britain, will cease to be a controlling factor in the momentous struggle.

Even the battle-issue is no longer to be with its strong garrison; but from Lake Champlain to Savannah, along the entire Atlantic coast, and wherever great cities or seaboard towns fight strongest for liberty, he is to be their standard-bearer; and there the people are to bleed and triumph. Like Habib in the Arabian tale, when he drew from its scabbard the talismanic sword of Solomon, and there flashed upon the glittering steel the divine word “Power,” so he had the faith to know that “the substance of things hoped for” was to be the trophy won.

Thus far, the recital of marchings and fightings has proved his ability to command the confidence of his countrymen, of Congress, and of disinterested mankind. Hereafter, the details of battles must be relegated to fuller records; and this account will be more closely restricted to the potential part borne by him in their conduct, general management, and improvement.

A reference to the accompanying map will furnish a simple key to the progress of the War for American Independence. Concentric circles about New York, as a radius point, indicate the immediate sweep of the British arm of offence. Similar circles about Morristown and 162Middlebrook indicate, that as a fortified centre this section, like the hub of a wheel, would endanger along its divergent spokes all operations out from New York as far up the Hudson River as West Point, and throughout the Province of New Jersey. It would compel Great Britain to maintain a permanent garrison of sufficient strength for all such excursions; and a correspondingly large, half-idle force for the protection of its own headquarters and its general depot of supplies. It was like a mountain peak for an observatory; and such was the systematic organization of scouts, messengers and runners, in the confidence and pay of the American Commander-in-Chief, that almost daily information was furnished him of the minutest occurrence in and about the British headquarters; and a regular Shipping List was supplied by competent spies, of every movement of British men-of-war, transports, and tenders, as far out as Sandy Hook.

One of the most noteworthy facts connected with the American civil conflict of 1861–’65, was the measurement of generals on either side by knowledge of their antecedent education, qualities and characteristics. McClellan would have taken Vicksburg, as surely as did General Grant: the mathematics of a siege are irresistible. But he never could have marched to the sea, as did Sherman, or swept like a tornado to the rear of Lee, as did Sheridan. It appears from the correspondence of Washington, that he carefully studied the antecedents and followed the operations of his chief antagonists; that in several of the most critical periods of the war he anticipated their plans as fully as if he had shared their confidence in advance. But he did not merely interpret the lessons of campaigns as objectives for his own action. He penetrated the secret chambers of Howe’s brain. He cross-examined himself: “If I were in Howe’s place 163what would I do?” “In his own place, what will Howe do?” “What must the British Ministry do, to conquer America—in the way of ships, men, and money?” “Can they do it?” “Can they risk their West India Colonies, by the diversion of adequate means to conquer America?” The expectancies of aid from France, partly realized through the purchase of arms and munitions of war as early as 1776, were never out of his thought. To maintain one central army intact, and wear out his adversary, was the pivot on which hinged American destiny. In the hills of New Jersey he worked this problem to its solution.

Washington remained at the Morristown headquarters until the twenty-fourth of May.

On the twenty-first day of January, Howe withdrew two thousand troops from Newport, R.I., to reënforce the garrison of New York. Generals Spencer and Arnold, then at Providence, R.I., with about four thousand troops, were ordered by Washington, whenever practicable, to attempt the capture of Newport; but they regarded their force as inadequate for the purpose. General Parsons, then upon recruiting service in Connecticut, was also instructed to make a descent upon Long Island; but his force was hardly equal to the movement, for want of suitable boats. All these external signs of American watchfulness and activity were as nettles to irritate the British Commander-in-Chief, while he sat, powerless, in his sumptuous headquarters at New York.

Knox was sent by Washington to Massachusetts to enlist a battalion of artillery, and during his trip mentioned Springfield as the proper site for the establishment of a laboratory and gun-factory. General Schuyler, of the northern army, was instructed to draw from New England the entire force required to resist the anticipated advance of Carleton from Canada. Washington assigned as a special reason for this limitation, that “troops of extreme 164sections could not be favorably combined.” Besides this, he proportionately relieved New England from sending troops of her own from her borders, which would be most exposed in case the invasion from Canada materialized. General Maxwell was stationed at Elizabethtown to watch tories and the movements of the British. Orders were issued repressing plundering done by the militia, of which complaint had been made. Similar outrages had been perpetrated by British and Hessian troops in the vicinity of New York; and Washington followed up his own ideas of civilized warfare, by sending to General Howe a protest, and a demand for similar remedial action on his part.

At this period, a correspondence occurred as to the position of General Charles Lee, then a prisoner of war in General Howe’s custody. It was for a time quite in doubt whether Lee would be treated as a prisoner of war, or be shot as a deserter from the British army. The pledge of Washington, that he would hang an officer of equal rank if Lee were executed, ultimately secured Lee’s exchange.

During the month of March, a ship from France landed at Portsmouth, N.H., another invoice of military supplies; and a second soon after reached Philadelphia with a large cargo. These timely accessions of material of war amounted to twenty-three thousand fusees, one thousand barrels of powder, and blankets and other stores.

On the second of March, Washington communicated to Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, some of his personal studies of General Howe and his plans. The following are pertinent extracts:

“General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have been able to get, have less than ten thousand men in New Jersey, and on board of transports at Amboy. Our number does not exceed four thousand. His are well-disciplined, 165well-officered and well-supplied; ours, raw militia, badly officered and under no government. His numbers cannot be, in short time, augmented; ours must be, very considerably, and by such troops as we can have some reliance on, or the game is at an end. His situation as to horses and forage is bad, very bad; but will it be better? No, on the contrary, worse; and therefore, if for no other, to shift quarters. General Howe’s informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted, to suffer him to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, then, can he miss so favorable an opportunity of striking a capital stroke against a city from which we draw so many advantages, the carrying of which would give such éclat to his arms, and strike such a damp to ours. Nor is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined. All the heavy baggage of the army, their salt provisions, flour and stores, might go round by water, while their superior numbers would enable them to make a sweep of the horses for many miles around them, not already taken off by us.”

The separate movements suggested by Washington, some of which have been referred to, indicated his purpose to keep officers in the field wherever there promised opportunity for aggressive action, while at the same time enuring the militia to active field service.

Although Congress had granted the Commander-in-Chief full powers for the conduct of the war, it did assert its general prerogatives very freely in the matter of promotions and appointments without consulting him. Ambition for rapid promotion and honorable commands was as conspicuous then as since. The promotions made during the month of March were a source of much jealousy and bitter conflict. Among the new Major-Generals, much to Washington’s disgust, the name of Arnold was omitted. General Wooster was at home in command of the Connecticut 166militia, having resigned his commission in the regular service. Gen. George Clinton was assigned to command the forts in the Highlands; and General McDougall succeeded General Heath at Peekskill. General Sullivan considered these details as so many independent commands; and fretted over it so constantly and freely, that Washington administered a rebuke which illustrates the directness and frankness with which he handled such provoking interruptions of the domestic harmony of the army. He writes as follows: “Why these unreasonable and unjustifiable suspicions, which can answer no other end than to poison your own happiness and add vexation to that of others? I know of but one separate command, properly so-called, and that is in the Northern Department; and General Sullivan, General St. Clair, or any other general officer at Ticonderoga, will be considered in no other light, while there is a superior officer in the department, than if he were placed at Chatham, Baskenridge or Princeton. I shall quit, with an earnest expostulation that you will not suffer yourself to be teased with evils that only exist in the imagination, and with slights that have no existence at all; keeping it in mind, that if there are to be several distinct armies to be formed, there are several gentlemen before you in point of rank who have a right to claim preference.”

General Greene was sent to Congress to urge relief for the suffering army; and all governors were urged to furnish supplies and troops for the ensuing campaign.

On the twenty-fifth of April, Governor Tryon of New York made an incursion into Connecticut with two thousand men, and fought with Wooster and Arnold at Ridgefield; where Arnold distinguished himself, and Wooster was mortally wounded. The loss of sixteen hundred tents was also a serious affair at the time. General Greene was despatched to inspect the Highlands and its defences. A 167British fleet had ascended the Hudson as far as Peekskill; and as spring advanced, every possible preparation was made for active duty, in all departments where British troops could gain access by land or sea. On the twenty-third of May, Colonel Meigs crossed from Guilford to Long Island, and destroyed twelve brigs and sloops, one of them carrying twelve guns, and a large quantity of British stores, the small detachment guard having been recalled to New York two days before.

It had become apparent to Washington that General Howe, having withdrawn so many troops from advanced posts, would enter New Jersey in force; and on the twenty-ninth of May, he moved his headquarters to the well-fortified position at Middlebrook. On the seventh of June, Arnold was placed in command at Philadelphia, to act with General Mifflin in anticipation of Howe’s possible movement in that direction. On the twelfth, General Howe, reënforced by two additional regiments recalled from Newport, R.I., marched from Brunswick towards Princeton with an aggregate force of seventeen thousand men.

This second New Jersey campaign was short in duration, and of small results. Howe intrenched near Somerset Court House, where the Raritan River was not fordable; and neither army could attack the other. He was between Washington and Philadelphia. It was a challenge to the abandonment of Middlebrook, risking an open, circuitous march, if the American army intended to prevent a British movement upon the American capital. Howe expected to cut off the division of Sullivan, which was at Princeton, but that officer had moved to the hills to the north-west, near Flemington. Cornwallis advanced as far as Hillsborough, when he found that no enemy remained at Princeton. The British left was on the Millstone, and their right rested at Brunswick. A glance 168at the map—“Operations in New Jersey”—will show that any movement of the American army to the west or south-west would uncover their defences at Middlebrook to any attack by the road running due north from Brunswick. Washington, anticipating the possibility of a general action, and resolved to select a good opportunity to bring it on, ordered all of the Continental troops at Peekskill, except one thousand effective men, to march in three divisions, at one day’s interval, under Generals Parsons, McDougall and Glover, to his support; the first two columns to bring, each, two pieces of artillery.

It certainly was General Howe’s impression that Washington would have such fears for the safety of Philadelphia as to risk an action south of the Raritan. On the succeeding fifth of July he wrote to Lord Germaine, that his “only object was to bring the American army to a general action.” But Washington only strengthened his works, and never believed that Howe was making Philadelphia the object of his movement. The following letter explains his views: “Had they designed for the Delaware, on the first instance, they probably would have made a secret, rapid march of it, and not have halted as they have done, to awaken our attention and give us time for obstructing them. Instead of this, they have only advanced to a position to facilitate an attack on our right: which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of injuring us in. In addition to this consideration, they have come out as light as possible, in leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges, at Brunswick, which plainly contradicts the idea of their pushing for the Delaware.”

On the morning of the nineteenth, Howe suddenly returned to Brunswick. Greene and Maxwell were advanced by Washington to a position between Brunswick and Amboy. Howe marched early in the morning of the 169twenty-second. Morgan and Wayne drove in the Hessian rear-guard upon the main army, after a spirited skirmish. It had been Greene’s intention to have Maxwell strike the column near Piscataway. Washington advanced his entire army as far as Quibbletown, now Newmarket, upon the advice of his officers that the retreat was genuine; yet not without a suspicion, afterward verified, that the whole was a ruse to entice him from his stronghold.

On the twenty-sixth, Howe put his whole army in motion to resume the offensive. Cornwallis, with the extreme right, was to gain the passes to Middlebrook. Four battalions, with six pieces of artillery, were to demonstrate on Washington’s left. Without further details, the action is outlined as follows: Cornwallis found himself confronted by Stirling. A lively skirmish ensued, near Westfield, now Plainfield. The Americans were overmatched in numbers, and lost nearly two hundred men in casualties and prisoners, besides three brass guns, but steadily fought on, while slowly retiring. Washington, comprehending the whole movement, retired Maxwell’s Division, without loss, and regained the passes threatened; and the prolonged resistance of Stirling delayed Cornwallis until too late for him to gain the American rear. On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, Cornwallis, after a loss of seventy men, passed through Sampton unopposed, and joined Howe who had already retired from Washington’s front. The American Commander-in-Chief dictated the choice of battlefield. Howe, representing Great Britain, declined his terms. On the thirtieth, Howe crossed to Staten Island, and his last military operations in New Jersey came to an end. He afterwards claimed that his forces were numerically inferior to those of Washington; but both friends and critics, in the protracted controversy which afterwards arose as to this 170costly and fruitless march into New Jersey, admit that the disparity of force, in all respects, was with the American army.

The simple fact remains unobscured, that as General Howe’s acquaintance with Washington’s methods matured, he better appreciated his qualities as a Soldier.

On the twentieth of June, Washington learned that Burgoyne was approaching St. John’s; and that a detachment of British and Canadian troops, accompanied by Indians, had been organized for the occupation of the Mohawk Valley, west of Albany, under Colonel St. Leger. This would enable them to court the alliance of the “Six Nations,” and to suppress the enlistment into the American army of the scattered white population of that region. On the same day, he ordered General Putnam to hold in readiness to move up the river, at a moment’s notice, four regiments of Massachusetts troops which were then at his headquarters at Peekskill, and also to hire sloops at Albany for their transportation northward.

The briefest possible history of these expeditions is all that can find space in this narrative. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne left London on the twenty-ninth day of March, and reached Quebec on the sixth day of May. He promptly notified General Howe of his instructions, and recognized Albany as his chief objective point, so soon as he might recapture the posts on Lake Champlain, then occupied by the American forces. The organization and strength of the force with which he undertook his memorable campaign is noticed elsewhere.^[5] His confident 172expectation of obtaining an adequate Canadian force of teams, teamsters, axe-men, horses, wagons, and guides familiar with the country, proved unwarranted. Instead of two thousand, less than two hundred reported for duty. This was not the fault of General Carleton, for of him Burgoyne said, “He could not have done more for his own brother”; but the Canadians themselves were more desirous of peace with their New England neighbors than to be involved in war with them. The proclamation of Burgoyne to the people of New England and New York was arrogant and repellant, instead of being sympathetic and conciliatory. Washington at once furnished the antidote by the following: “Harassed as we are by unrelenting persecution; obliged by every tie to repel violence by force; urged by self-preservation to exert the strength which Providence has given us, to defend our natural rights against the aggressor, we appeal to the hearts of all mankind for the justice of our course; its event we leave with Him who speaks the fate of nations, in humble confidence that as His omniscient eye taketh note even of a sparrow that falleth to the ground, so He will not withdraw His confidence from a people who humbly array themselves under His banner, in defence of the noblest principles with which He has adorned humanity.”

General Burgoyne was equally infelicitous in his negotiations with the Iroquois, Algonquins, Abenagies and Ottawa Indians, whom he met on the twenty-second day of June. In fact, General Burgoyne had no sympathy with the British policy which ordered the hire of Indian allies. The following declaration stands to his perpetual credit, and should appear in every volume that may ever be published which refers to his campaign in America. His words were these: “The Indian principle of war is at once odious and unavailing, and if encouraged, I will 173venture to pronounce its consequences, will be sorely repented by the present age and be universally abhorred by posterity.” And afterwards, in the presence of the Earl of Harrington, when St. Luc claimed that “Indians must fight their own way, or desert,” Burgoyne answered: “I would rather lose every Indian than connive at their enormities.” And still another incident is to be noticed, especially as it places before the reader a very characteristic utterance of General Gates, his adversary in that campaign. The latter wrote to General Burgoyne as follows: “The miserable fate of Miss McCrea, massacred by Indians, was peculiarly aggravated by her being dressed to receive her promised husband, but met her murderers instead, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, women and children, have perished by the hands of ruffians to whom it is asserted you have paid the price of blood.” To this, the gallant general replied: “I would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to me, for the whole continent of America; though the wealth of worlds was in its bowels, and a paradise upon its surface.”

On the twenty-fifth of March, General Gates relieved General Schuyler from command of the Northern Department; but the latter was promptly restored, after presenting his case before Congress. General Schuyler promptly tendered to General Gates the command of Ticonderoga; but it was sneeringly and disrespectfully declined. To a requisition upon Washington for tents, made by Gates, Washington replied: “As the northern troops are hutted, the tents must be used for southern troops until a supply can be obtained.” The reply of Gates is an illustration of his ambition and jealousy, and points the trend of his subsequent career. It reads as follows: “Refusing this army what you have not in your power, is one thing; but saying that this army has not the same necessities as the 174southern army, is another. I can assure your excellency, the services of the northern army require tents as much as any service I ever saw.” To Mr. Lovell, of the New England delegation in Congress, Gates wrote: “Either I am exceedingly dull, or unreasonably jealous, if I do not discover by the style and tenor of the letters from Morristown, how little I have to expect from thence. Generals are like parsons, they are all for christening their own child, first; but let an impartial, moderating power decide between us, and do not suffer southern prejudice to weigh heavier in the balance than the northern.” Washington, of course, used the term “southern” simply in its geographical sense; but this subtle appeal to Congressmen by Gates was exactly the counterpart of that of his most intimate friend General Charles Lee; and both alike, ultimately, paid the penalty of their unsoldierly conduct. On the ninth of June, Gates took a “leave of absence” and left the department.

Schuyler ordered all forts to be put in condition for service; appealed to the States to forward militia; and on the twentieth proceeded to inspect each post for himself. Although the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga consisted of only twenty-five hundred and forty-six Continental troops and nine hundred militia, it was deemed advisable to “protract defence until reinforcements could arrive, or the stores be removed.” St. Clair “did not consider it practicable to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill,” which, subsequently occupied by Burgoyne, placed the garrison at his mercy. Meanwhile, the personal inspection by Schuyler realized his worst apprehensions as to the actual condition of the troops in the Northern Department. Supplies, other than pork and flour, had not been accumulated, and there was nothing to sustain the belief of the American people that Ticonderoga had been made a real fortress. Schuyler hastened to Albany, to forward troops and supplies. 175St. Clair wrote as late as the last of June: “Should the enemy attack us, they will go back faster than they came.” But on the first day of July, Burgoyne was before Ticonderoga, and St. Clair abandoned the post without prolonged resistance. The absence of General Schuyler at so critical a time was the subject of a Court of Inquiry, called at his own request, in view of very harsh criticisms, chiefly from New England; but he was acquitted, with “the highest honor for services already rendered.”

The close observation of the American Commander-in-Chief, and the movements of Burgoyne’s army, drew from him, when so many were despondent, the following extraordinary prophetic letter to General Schuyler, dated July 22d: “Though our affairs have for some days past worn a dark gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trust General Burgoyne’s army will meet, sooner or later, an important check; and as I have suggested before [letter of July 15th], that; the success he has had, will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which of all others is most favorable to us:—I mean, acting in detachments. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do away much of this present anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and, urged at the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms and afford every aid in their power.” This forecast of the Battle of Bennington was realized in its best promise; That battle, fought on the sixteenth day of August, in which General Stark and Colonel Warner won enviable renown, brought to the former his well-earned promotion. Other nearly concurrent 176events in the Mohawk Valley—the gallant defence of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany, aroused the militia to action; and General Schuyler succeeded in organizing and preparing for the field a force fully adequate to meet Burgoyne’s entire force, with the assurance of victory. That he was superseded by Gates, and lost the command of the northern army on the eve of its anticipated triumph, was no discredit to him, but an incident of political management which Washington himself, at that period, was powerless to control.

On the seventeenth day of October, Burgoyne surrendered his army, numbering five thousand seven hundred and fifty-three men. The total strength of the American army opposed to him was eighteen thousand six hundred and twenty-four; of which number nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-three Continental troops, besides militia, were present.

Of the incidents most memorable in the entire campaign, was the monumental daring of Arnold on the seventeenth of September. Tedious discussions have in vain attempted to deny him due credit for bravery at a critical hour of that battle-issue; as if his subsequent treason were to be reflected back to his discredit. His eventual promotion, and the congratulations of Washington when it was attained, and the latest duly authenticated documents, are conclusive in his favor.

This brief outline of the invasion of Burgoyne only intensifies the interest with which the mind returns to the headquarters of the American Commander-in-Chief. Every possible effort had been made by him, and with success, to supply the northern army with men and means to meet that invasion. The side issues, especially that of Bennington, had, as Washington predicted, imparted courage to other Colonies than those which were immediately affected; for the cause was the common cause of all. 177The location of Washington’s headquarters in the fastnesses of New Jersey had already so restricted the movements of the garrison at New York, and threatened the city itself, as to prevent the promised support which Burgoyne had regarded as essential to the success of his invasion. A careful perusal of his evidence before the House of Commons, his field-notes, itineraries, and correspondence with General Howe and the British War Office, leave no doubt that he regarded his movement as having for its ultimate result the entire control of the Hudson River and the practical conquest of New England. But General Howe, having in vain attempted to force the American Commander-in-Chief to abandon New Jersey and his perpetual menace to New York, or engage in a general action without choice of time and place, resolved to move by sea to Philadelphia and force him to fight for, or lose without battle, the American seat of government itself. His own views as to such an expedition are worthy of notice. While practically ready to sail for the capture of Philadelphia, he made other demonstrations, and wrote a specious autograph letter, which was designed to reach Washington, and put him off his guard. Washington was not deceived by it. It reads as follows, addressed to General Burgoyne:

Dear Sir: I received your letter of the 14th of May from Quebec, and shall fully observe its contents. The expedition to B—— [Boston] will take the place of that up the North River. If, according to my expectations, we may succeed rapidly in the possession of B—— [Boston], the enemy having no force of consequence there, I shall, without loss of time, proceed to coöperate with you in the defeat of the rebel army opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong to amuse Washington and Putnam. I am now making a demonstration southward, which I think will have the full effect in carrying our plan into execution. Success attend you.

178The allusion of Howe to General Putnam indicated a better knowledge of the methods of that officer than appreciation of the character of Washington. The headquarters of General Putnam, who then commanded the Highland range of the defences of the Hudson, were at Peekskill. Forts Clinton and Montgomery were located upon a high spur of the range, on the west side of the river, separated by the Poplen, a small creek. Both were above the range of guns from ships-of-war, and so surrounded by ravines and crags as to be difficult of approach, even by land. A boom and heavy chain extended from the foot of the cliff to a sharp promontory opposite, known as “St. Anthony’s Nose.” So many troops had been sent to the support of Gates, that the garrison consisted mainly of militia. Advices had already been received that an expedition had been organized at New York for a diversion of troops from any further reënforcement of the American Northern army. Governor Clinton therefore ordered a considerable militia force to report to General Putnam for strengthening the garrisons of the river posts. But General Putnam furloughed the men during harvest and seeding, because the New York garrison seemed to rest so peacefully in their city quarters. Hearing of this extensive furlough, Governor Clinton promptly modified his own order, allowing one-half to remain upon their farms; but for the other half to report at Peekskill and the forts named. Before this modified order could take effect, the expedition of Clinton was under way; while the entire force assembled at the two forts was less than six hundred and fifty men.

179Clinton’s expedition left New York on the third of October, and intentionally “made every appearance of their intention to land only at Fort Independence and Peekskill.” Putnam and his army, and his immediate surroundings, on the east bank of the Hudson, were ostentatiously announced as Clinton’s objective, and Putnam acted upon that basis. Governor Clinton was not so deceived, but adjourned the Legislature, then in session at Kingston, and hastened to Fort Montgomery to assist in its defence, and advise its garrison as to the available approaches to the post through the mountains, with which he was familiar. (See map, “Attacks of Forts Clinton and Montgomery.”)

Both Governor Clinton at Montgomery and Gen. James Clinton at Fort Clinton distinguished themselves by a stubborn resistance and great gallantry; but both posts were taken on the night of the fifth. The American loss was nearly three hundred—killed, wounded and missing; and two hundred and thirty-seven were taken prisoners. The British loss was forty killed and one hundred and fifty-one wounded. General Clinton was wounded in a bayonet charge, but escaped to the mountains; and Governor Clinton escaped by a skiff and joined Putnam. That officer was so confident of attack upon his own position that he had fallen back to the heights behind Peekskill. He thought it impracticable to leave that position to attack General Clinton, who first landed upon the east side of the river, but did make a reconnoissance southward when too late. He says, in his Report: “On my return from this reconnoissance with General Parsons we were alarmed by a very heavy and hot firing, both of small-arms and cannon, at Fort Montgomery. Upon which, I immediately detached five hundred men to reënforce the garrison; but before they could possibly cross to their assistance, the enemy, superior in numbers, had possessed themselves of the fort.”

The British advanced above Peekskill and destroyed some stores at Connecticut Village, and General Vaughan destroyed Esopus (Kingston). The forts were dismantled, and General Clinton returned to New York.

180General Putnam, reënforced by militia from Connecticut, New York and New Jersey, soon reoccupied Peekskill; where he was shortly afterwards strengthened by Continental troops from the northern army. The presence of an intelligent commanding officer of reasonable military skill, or the absolute control of both posts by Governor Clinton, would have prevented their loss. The limited range of this expedition of Sir Henry Clinton confirms Stedman’s statement, that he had no intention of pressing north to the aid of General Burgoyne.

The British Commander-in-Chief entertained no doubts of the success of Burgoyne’s invasion from Canada. His reiterated appeals to Britain for reënforcements were not heeded, and he certainly knew that troops could not be furnished up to his demand. But he still hoped that the invasion from the north would so drain New England and New York of their able-bodied militia, as to render it impossible for either section to forward its respective full quota to the Continental army of Washington. Two campaigns into New Jersey had sufficiently satisfied him that he never could bend Washington to his knees; and yet he must get Washington away from his position near New York, and then defeat that army utterly, before British supremacy could be restored. This conviction, once before noticed, was reflected in a letter to Lord Germaine, from which extracts have interest. He had “not overlooked New England,” but says in this letter, that “Burgoyne’s movement would draw Washington’s army northward, where the population was dense and the spirit of defence was animated.” “In Connecticut,” he continues, “there was no object for which he would be willing to risk a general action; and only two or three places upon the coast of Long Island Sound could be kept in the winter.” But he adds that, if his “reënforcements had been forthcoming, New England would have had a share in the general operations of the campaign, 182while the main army acted toward the southward.” “To have moved up the Hudson, in force, would have imperiled New York, or sacrificed all other operations to a union with Burgoyne, who was expected to force his own way to Albany.” “To enter Pennsylvania, was not only to assail the capital, but attempted the surest road to peace, the defeat of the rebel army.”

All these considerations, thus tersely communicated to the British Government, were sound in military policy; and yet all of them had been anticipated by the American Commander-in-Chief, as prudent on the part of General Howe. Even very insignificant incidents were weighed by him, as of determining value in a nearly balanced scale; so that the number, character and distribution of pickets from the New York garrison became valuable indications to the keen espionage with which Washington conducted his search for the real intent of General Howe’s published or unpublished designs.

The British fleet had actually sailed from New York before Washington received Howe’s letter of the second. Clinton returned to the city on the tenth. On the fifteenth, an express from Burgoyne informed General Howe of the capture of Ticonderoga, and stated, that “his army was in good health, and [which was never realized] that Ticonderoga would be garrisoned by troops from Canada, which would leave his force complete for further operations.” Howe’s expedition southward left New York on the twenty-third of July, and did not arrive off the Delaware until the thirtieth.

Upon the first disappearance of the fleet, Washington, suspecting some ruse—its possible return and a movement in support of Burgoyne, or a descent upon New England, or even New Jersey, started his army for Coryell’s Ferry; to be ready to march northward, or eastward, in the prospect of an active campaign. When 183assured that the entire fleet had positively sailed southward, he marched with exceeding celerity to Philadelphia. Active measures were initiated for gathering the militia, sinking obstructions in the Delaware, and picketing every spot along the river which might be utilized for the landing of troops. But the appearance of the British fleet in Delaware Bay, its speedy withdrawal, and its long absence due to contrary winds, foiled all calculations of Washington as to its ultimate destination. At a Council of War, held on the twenty-first of August, it was unanimously concluded that Howe had sailed for Charleston, S.C. But, on the twenty-second, at half-past one in the afternoon, Washington received the following despatch from President Hancock: “This moment an express arrived from Maryland with an account of near two hundred sail of General Howe’s fleet being anchored in Chesapeake Bay.”

This information was received with the most intense interest. In the face of slow enlistments, scarcity of funds, and deficiencies in clothing and all military supplies, the transfer of British military operations from the Hudson was regarded as an indication that New Jersey had been substantially recovered from British aggression, and that Washington had outgeneraled his adversary. The operations of Burgoyne northward could be taken care of by the rapidly increasing flow of New England militia to resist his advance; and the Pennsylvania people were wide awake.

The army of Washington paraded through Philadelphia, gayly decorated with evergreens. The enthusiasm of the soldiers, rank and file, received fresh inspiration from the almost wild demonstrations of thousands who bordered their course of march. Incessant cheering, loud greetings of encouragement, as well as bountiful gifts of delicacies and of useful conveniences for the camp or march, sent them forward hopeful and happy.

184The American army which finally marched against General Howe’s well equipped force of nearly eighteen thousand men was of the nominal strength of fourteen thousand; but the entire roster added up not quite eleven thousand “effectives, present for duty.”

The thoughtful reader, of whatever age or training, is prompted to linger here a moment, and catch a parting view of this column of earnest men, so proudly and joyfully marching to meet in battle the magnificent array of Britain’s chief captains and most honored battalions, the famous Grenadiers of Hanau, and the dragoons and lancers of Hesse. When all are waiting for the advance, who is that man who swiftly rides past the column to its front, erect in saddle, calm, self-reliant, imposing in presence, and with face radiant in confidence and trust? What sort of faith is that which inspires the utterance, which rings like that of the Hebrew Captain when about to face the horsemen and chariots of the Egyptian Pharaoh: “Tell the people that they go forward”? How dare this American soldier reckon upon chances for victory in such an unequal measurement of physical force, unless he discern, through plainest garb, the proof-panoply of those whose cause is just? And whence the inspiration of those men of brawn, whose nerves seemed turned to steel, that they are so firmly and confidently ready to enter into the trying ordeal of battle.

It is the Continental Army of America, with Washington in command!

Only short halts at Derby, Chester and Wilmington delayed their march; and after each halt, that single word, “Forward!” as it ran down the lines, brigade after brigade, again brought shouts from spectators and soldiers alike.

General Sullivan, who had been detained in New Jersey to make an attack upon the British posts on Staten Island which failed of its anticipated success joined the command 185just in time for Brandywine. There was no timidity in this advancing army. Every heart beat with steady cadence. Maxwell, with a selected corps of one hundred men from each brigade, supplied the place of Morgan’s Rifles, then with the northern army. He pushed forward even to Elk River, accompanied by the youthful Lafayette, hoping to save some stores gathered there before the British could effect a landing, and possibly to obstruct the landing itself.

This was on September third; but too late to save the stores, for the British were already encamped. A sharp skirmish with Cornwallis was reported by General Howe to have resulted in a British loss of two officers and twenty-two men, killed or wounded.

On the seventh, the entire army reached Newport, and took position along Red Clay Creek. On the same day, General Howe occupied Iron Hill, within eight miles of Red Clay, and again the American Rifles had a skirmish with the British advance. These picked men deliberately took up position after position, and only yielded to superior force as they slowly retired. The confidence of Washington was everywhere fully realized. On the eighth, the British army demonstrated in force; with view to turning the right of Washington, and to cut him off from communication with Philadelphia. At half-past nine of the morning of the ninth, pursuant to the unanimous vote of a council of officers, Washington took up a new position, selected by General Greene, on the east bank of the Brandywine and on high ground, just back of Chadd’s Ford, and commanding the Chester and Philadelphia road. The Battle of Brandywine followed. The space which has been allowed for this narrative can admit only such leading incidents as unfold Washington’s general management, and the ultimate results.

A reference to the map will aid the reader to understand 186the relative positions of the opposing armies. The American army was on the eastern bank of the river, which was quite rugged of approach and easily defended. Its left wing, southward, began with Armstrong’s Pennsylvania militia. At the next ford, Chadd’s, and nearly as far as Brinton’s, are Weedon, Muhlenburg and Wayne, with Proctor’s artillery in their rear, behind light earthworks thrown up in haste. In their rear, on still higher ground, is the reserve division of General Greene, with Washington’s headquarters. Next in order, up the river, are the divisions of Sullivan, Stephen and Stirling, each of two brigades—with Sullivan in virtual command, and Stirling, next in rank, commanding the right division—and practically reaching Jones’ Ford. Major Spear had charge of scouts extended as far as the forks of the Brandywine and the adjacent fords, both below and above the forks. The upper ford, Jeffries, was not thoroughly watched, and its distance almost precluded the liability of its use. A road from Jones’ Ford runs perpendicularly to the river, over to the Dilworth and Winchester road, and just before reaching the Birmingham Meeting House, passes high, rough and wooded ground, where the chief fighting took place. The British encampment on the tenth is indicated at the left of the map.

187On the morning of the eleventh, Maxwell crossed at Chadd’s Ford; advanced to Kennett Meeting House, and skirmished with Knyphausen, until compelled by a superior force to fall back to high ground near the river. Porterfield and Waggoner crossed at his left and attacked Ferguson’s Rifles. Knyphausen brought up two brigades, with guns; and this force, with the Queen’s Rangers, on Knyphausen’s extreme right, compelled both American detachments to recross the river. The American casualties were sixty, and those of the Hessian and British troops about one hundred and thirty. A fog along the river had facilitated Maxwell’s operations; but it prevented the American scouts from gaining accurate data as to the movements of the British. While Knyphausen was demonstrating as if to force a crossing at Chadd’s Ford, Cornwallis was reported to be moving with five thousand men and artillery toward a ford near the forks of the Brandywine. Bland had crossed at Jones’ Ford, between nine and ten in the morning, and reported this movement of Cornwallis. Washington ordered Sullivan to cross and attack Cornwallis, while he intended to cross at Chadd’s Ford, in person, and attack Knyphausen, assigning to General Greene an intermediate crossing, to strike the left of the Hessian general. When the fog disappeared, there was no evidence of the whereabouts of the British column. It seemed hardly possible that it had gone further up the river; while, if it had joined Knyphausen, the force was too strong to be attacked. Washington therefore revoked his orders, and withdrew the skirmish party that had already made the crossing. As a matter of fact, the movement of Cornwallis was but a flanking support to the advance of the entire British army; while Knyphausen’s advance towards Chadd’s Ford, although prepared to cross, if opportunity favored, was a ruse to draw attention from General Howe’s splendid manœuvre. That officer left Kennett Square at daylight, marched seventeen miles, and by two o’clock had crossed the upper fork of the Brandywine, and was moving down upon the right of the entire American army.

As soon as advised that the British were advancing, Washington ordered Sullivan to bring the entire right wing into position to oppose their progress. The woods were dense and the surface was rocky, so that three divisions must swing back and present to the British advance a new front, almost perpendicular to that with which they 188had previously faced the river. But it would bring them to the high ground, before noticed, between Birmingham Meeting House and the river. This movement, which practically involved one of the most difficult elements of Grand Tactics,—defined in the Preface as the “Art of handling force on the battlefield,”—was not within General Sullivan’s capacity. The best troops in the world would have found it slow of execution, while no less vital to success in the existing emergency. It required of the division commanders just that kind of familiarity with combined movements of brigades and divisions, which is required of regiments in a single brigade, or of companies in a regiment. Sullivan could not at the same time command the Grand Division, or Corps, and his own division proper, unless able to place that division in charge of a brigadier-general who was fully competent to command a division. It is also to be borne in mind that the woods, rocks, undergrowth, and suddenness of the order complicated the movement. Stirling and Stephen succeeded in gaining the new position, barely in time to meet the assault of Cornwallis, without time for intrenching to any effect. Sullivan’s Division fell into such disorder, that after sending four aides, and then a personal appeal, he gave up the attempt to rally his division. He says: “Some rallied, others could not be brought even by their officers to do anything but fly.” Only three of his regiments—those of Hazen, Dayton and Ogden, ever reliable—gained and firmly held the new position throughout the battle.

The enemy, which had formed behind Osborne’s Hill, advanced rapidly, Cornwallis in the lead. The resistance was stubborn and well maintained, as General Howe admitted, from three o’clock until sunset. Sullivan, upon finding himself powerless to rally and move his own division, while he was responsible for the entire combined 189movement, went to the battlefield and was conspicuous for bravery during the day. The resistance of Stirling and Stephen was admirable; but the brigade of Deborre, a French general, broke and fled, in wild disorder. The absence of Sullivan’s Division left a gap on the American left of nearly half a mile, and Deborre’s cowardice shattered the right wing.

As soon as the right wing gave way, Washington hastened, with Greene, to the front. There was no retreat except toward Dilworth. By a direct march of nearly four miles in fifty minutes, and a wheel to the left, of half a mile, Washington was enabled to occupy a defile from which to open a passage for the retreating battalions. He then closed in upon their rear, and prolonged the resistance with vigor. In an orchard beyond Dilworth, three regiments made another stand. Night separated the two armies. Stirling and Stephen saved both artillery and baggage. Armstrong’s brigade, on the extreme left, below Chadd’s Ford, was not engaged: but, together with Maxwell’s, and Wayne, who was compelled to abandon his guns, joined the main army, without further loss. They had, however, kept Knyphausen beyond the river. The entire army fell back to Chester. The American casualties were seven hundred and eighty, and those of the British were six hundred. Lafayette lost a horse, and was himself wounded, in this his first service after receipt of his commission.

Deborre was dismissed for cowardice. Conflicts as to the defective reconnoissance that nearly sacrificed the army arose, which need not be discussed. In justice to General Sullivan, Washington wrote a letter responsive to his request for some testimonial to submit to Congress, which is here given in part: “With respect to your other query, whether your being posted on the right was to guard that flank, and whether you had neglected it, I can 190only observe that the only obvious if not the declared purpose of your being there, implied every necessary precaution for the security of that flank. But it is at the same time to be remarked, that all the fords above Chadd’s from which we were taught to apprehend danger were guarded by detachments from your division, and that we were led to believe by those whom we had every reason to think well acquainted with the country, that no ford above our picket-lines could be passed without making a very circuitous march.” The British army remained on the field; and the wounded of both armies were properly cared for by General Howe. His skill as a scientific soldier was again illustrated, as well as his habitual failure to follow up a first success; but he was under peculiar conditions which must have influenced his judgment. His army had left its ships, which had been ordered to go to the Delaware; as his objective was the capture of Philadelphia, after first destroying the American army. That army had retreated in remarkable order and under good control. Humanity alone would have persuaded Howe to care for the wounded, and a night pursuit, of the Americans through that country, would have been a wild venture.

Washington’s despatch to President Hancock announcing his retreat to Chester, was dated from that place at midnight, September 11, 1777. The wonderful presence of mind of the American Commander-in-Chief, his aptitude for emergencies, and his extraordinary capacity for making the most of raw troops, were never more thoroughly evinced during his entire public career. The uneven ground, dense woods, and facilities for good rifle-practice, were features favorable to inspire his troops with special resisting capacity; and it is not beyond a fair presumption to suggest that, if the main army had been allowed two hours for fortifying their position, the British, accustomed 191to lighting in close order, would have been repulsed. It is certain that General Howe had skilful as well as willing guides, to secure to him, by so long a détour, his surprise of Sullivan’s right wing. That was part of the same toryism of that period which a few days later, and not far away, betrayed Wayne’s forces, with great loss. But with all the mistakes, and the retreat of the American army, there was much of hope in the experience and in the sequel of the Battle of Brandywine.

Note.—Lafayette, or LaFayette, makes his first appearance in this battle. At that period “affix-names,” derived from fiefs, seigniories, or estates, long held by families, were emphasized. Hence, La villa Faya, in Auvergne, when acquired, was added to the family name Motier. In the parish register, now in the war archives of France, the name is thus recorded: “Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Rock-Gilbert Dumotier Lafayette.” He signed his name Lafayette, and his grandsons, Senators Oscar and Edmond Lafayette, followed his example. The permanent acceptance of the spelling Lafayette is therefore fully warranted, and harmonizes with its use for counties and cities in many of the States.

This gallant young volunteer in the cause of American Independence, attended by Baron John De Kalb, and nine others, came to America in the ship Victoire, chartered by himself; and on the 19th of June, Lafayette wrote to his wife of his enthusiastic welcome at Charleston, S.C. On the 27th of July, he reached Philadelphia. He was commissioned Major-General by the American Congress, and took his first seat at a Council of War, August 21st, when the movement of the American army against Howe was under advisement.

Washington marched directly to Philadelphia to refit his army and secure ammunition and provisions, and thence marched to Germantown, “for one day of rest.” His confidence was not abated. The brave soldiers who had left Philadelphia with such jubilant anticipations of victory, were conscious of having fought well against a superior force, and were never more willing to honor the confidence of their Commander-in-Chief. And Washington himself was not hurried, but systematic and constantly in motion. On the thirteenth he ordered Monsieur de Coudray to complete defensive works along the Delaware River; General Putnam, to forward fifteen hundred Continental troops; and General Armstrong, to occupy the line of the Schuylkill, as well as to throw up redoubts near its fords, in case he should find it desirable to cross that river.

The left wing of General Howe’s army demonstrated toward Reading and Philadelphia. The right wing, under Generals Grant and Cornwallis, reached Chester on the thirteenth. General Howe had taken care of the wounded of both armies, but was compelled to obtain surgeons from Washington to assist in that duty. At Wilmington, he captured the governor, and considerable coin which he proposed to use for the benefit of the wounded of both armies. Inasmuch as Grant and Cornwallis were practically 193in the rear of the American army, he proposed to march to Philadelphia via Germantown; and both threaten the city, and cut off Washington from retreat northward or westward. But, on the fifteenth, Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Swede’s Ford; so that Howe’s halt, even of a single day, on the battlefield, rendered it useless for him to make a forced march to the city; and his opportunity was lost.

Washington moved out on the Lancaster road as far as Warren tavern. Howe, watching his keen adversary, advanced toward Westchester, and both armies prepared for battle. Howe made a partly successful attempt to throw the American army back upon the Schuylkill River, and both armies were prepared for action; when a heavy rain which nearly ruined the ammunition of the Americans, and “directly in the faces of the British troops,” as reported by Howe, averted battle. Washington left Wayne, however, with fifteen hundred troops, in a strong position at Paoli (Wayne’s birthplace), with orders to fall upon the British rear so soon as it should break camp, and then moved to Yellow Springs and Warwick; but upon finding that Howe did not intend to attack Reading, recrossed the Schuylkill at Parkes’ Ford, and encamped on the Perkiomy, September seventeenth. On the twentieth, Wayne allowed himself to be surprised at night, through the treachery of the country people, his old neighbors; and left more than three hundred of his force as prisoners in the hands of General Gray, although saving his guns and most of his baggage. General Smallwood’s brigade, left by General Washington for Wayne’s support, and encamped but a mile distant, failed to be in time to render aid during the night attack. This disaster took all pressure from Howe’s army, and he moved on. Washington reports as to Howe’s movement: “They had got so far the start before I received certain intelligence that 194any considerable number had crossed, that I found it in vain to think of overtaking their rear, with troops harassed as ours had been by constant marching since the Battle of Brandywine.” Colonel Hamilton was sent to Philadelphia to force a contribution of shoes from the inhabitants, as “one thousand of his army were barefooted.”

The simplest possible recital of these days of active marching, sufficiently indicates the character of those brave troops whose confidence in Washington seemed as responsive to his will as if his nervous activities embraced theirs as well.

A small portion of the British left wing crossed at Gordon’s Ford on the twenty-second, and the main body at Flatland Ford, on the twenty-third, reaching Germantown on the twenty-fifth. On the twenty-seventh, Cornwallis entered Philadelphia. Colonel Sterling of the British army was sent to operate against the defences of the Delaware,—and the fleet of Admiral Howe was already on its way to Philadelphia.

The boldness of Washington’s attempt on the rear of Howe’s army, and all his action immediately after the Battle of Brandywine, were a striking indication of his purpose to retain the gage of battle in his own hands. He sent a peremptory order to General Putnam, who was constantly making ill-advised attempts upon the outposts of New York, to send him twenty-five hundred men without delay; and most significant of all, directed him “so to use militia, that the posts in the Highland might be perfectly safe.” Congress immediately adjourned to Lancaster,—and then to York,—after enlarging Washington’s powers; and General Gates was ordered to send Morgan’s riflemen to headquarters. This, however, he delayed to do until after the close of the northern campaign.

General Howe established his headquarters at Germantown, 195having been one month in marching from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, a distance of fifty-four miles.

The town of Germantown consisted of a single street, not so straight that a complete range of fire could reach its entire length, nor so uniform in grade that a gun at Mt. Aury, its summit, could have a clean sweep. The headquarters of Washington were near Pennebeck Mills, twenty miles from Philadelphia. At seven o’clock of the evening of October third, he moved with two-thirds of his army by four roads which more or less directly approached the British encampments, intending to gain proximate positions, rest his troops, and attack the entire British line at daybreak. The plan of the movement is of interest for its boldness and good method. The incidents of the morning, which by reason of fog and other mishaps rendered the battle less decisive, will not be fully detailed.^[6] The woods, ravines, and difficulties in the way of clear recognition between friend and foe, in that engagement, only enhance the value of the general plan, and of the cool self-possession and control of his army which enabled Washington to terminate the action without greater loss.

Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway in advance as a flanking corps, were to move directly over Chestnut Hill and enter the town. Maxwell and Nash, under Major-General Stirling, were to follow this column as a reserve. Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was sent down the Manatawny River road, to cross the Wissahickon Creek, and fall upon the British left wing and rear. Greene and Stephen, led and flanked by McDougall’s Brigade, were to move by the Limestone Road, enter the village at the Market House, and attack the British right wing. Generals Smallwood and Forman, with the Maryland and New Jersey militia, were to follow the old York road until 196a convenient opportunity should bring them to the extreme right and rear of the enemy. (See map.)

Washington accompanied Sullivan’s command; and was able, from his advanced position, early in the fight, to appreciate that by the failure of an identity of support on the part of the most remote divisions, the withdrawal of the army had become necessary. The occupation of the stone building, known as the Chew House, on the main street, had little significance; except that it misled the outlying divisions as to the real centre of conflict, and detained the rear-guard and reserve longer than necessary. The concurrent action of all the assailing columns, in the directions indicated by their orders, would have made the issue a well-balanced question of victory or failure. One single incident is mentioned. General Stephen left Greene’s command without orders, and moved toward the sound of firing at the Chew House, only to find himself firing into Wayne’s command, which was in its right place. He was dismissed, on charges of intoxication.

General Sullivan was in his best element when under superior command; and his conduct on this occasion was admirable. His two aides were killed, and his division rendered most efficient service. General Nash was among the killed, and the American casualties numbered six hundred and seventy-three, besides four hundred and twelve prisoners.

The British casualties were five hundred and thirty-five, but among the killed were General Agnew and Lieutenant-Colonel Bird.

Washington regained Metuchen Hill, very little disturbed by the small detachments that hung upon his rear; and Howe returned to Philadelphia, abandoning his encampment beyond the city limits.

197The Battle of Germantown is a signal illustration of a skilful design, and, at the same time, of the ease with which a victory almost achieved can be as quickly lost. Its effect upon European minds was signally impressive, as will hereafter more fully appear. Count de Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in speaking of the report of this battle which reached him December 12th, said: “Nothing has struck me so much, as General Washington’s attacking and giving battle to General Howe’s army. To bring troops raised within the year, to do this, promises everything.”

The struggle for American independence and the career of the American Commander-in-Chief very minutely foreshadowed the experience of most successful soldiers with the political manipulations of partisans in Congress ever since. The “On to Richmond,” and the “On to Washington” cries of 1861, and the fluctuations of the popular pulse with the incidents of successive campaigns in the civil war, were used by demagogues for selfish ends. But the same spirit had shown itself in a degree quite as repugnant to devoted sons of liberty, during the throes which accompanied this nation’s birth.

Nothing seemed too exacting as a test of the American Commander-in-Chief. As the war enlarged its scope, and the prospects of success brightened for the moment, clamorous aspirants for office multiplied. The personal bravery of the soldier was magnified at the expense of discipline. The slow progress of the army was charged to excessive caution. Nothing, so far as politicians were concerned, was deemed too hard for the American militia, if only the right sort of a quack administered their action, and led them to its tests. But the consciousness of unselfish devotion to duty, never boldly impeached, and ever unimpeachable, sustained Washington. Amid these clamors for office and preferment from Congressmen and politicians, his faith in righteous methods, in patient training, in kind and considerate treatment of 199all who took part in the struggle, whatever their antecedents or rank, never for a moment swerved. His purpose and his self-control matured, until he attained such calm contempt for jealousy and intrigue that he could move on through the deepest waters, regardless of restless, dashing wave-crests.

The Battle of Germantown, and Howe’s abandonment of his suburban encampment, naturally suggested the immediate occupation of Philadelphia by the American army. It, like Boston, “must be seized” at once. The “almost” victory on the fourth of October, blinded the vision of many to the broader range of national activity which Washington’s supervision embraced. News of the surrender of Burgoyne reached his headquarters on the eighteenth day of October. He promptly congratulated General Gates and the northern army, in terms of most, gracious sincerity and emphasis. And yet, General Gates presumed to send his Report to Congress direct, and not to his Commander-in-Chief. Then, the “almost” victory of Washington over Howe, at Germantown, was contrasted with the complete victory of Gates over Burgoyne. The fact that Washington fought with fewer numbers, and these, of hungry, poorly armed men, nearly worn out by marches and counter-marches, while the northern army, three to one of their adversaries, simply penned up first, and then starved out, a force that had not rations for another day, counted little with these pseudo-scientific experts. And yet, let it ever be remembered, that the British garrison of Philadelphia was not panting for any more field service. The very restriction of that garrison to city limits and the immediate suburbs, proved not only subversive of their discipline and efficiency, but ultimately vindicated the wisdom of Washington. He saw distinctly, just how its partial inaction afforded him time to mature his own army 200organization; while the garrison of New York must, of necessity, be kept equally passive, for lack of this very strong detachment which idled in barracks, on the banks of the Delaware.

But while the garrison of Philadelphia limited its excursions to plundering farms and the country adjacent for wood, forage and provisions generally, both commanding generals were studying the relations of the Delaware River to the conduct of all future operations upon any decisive scale. The river had been so obstructed that the fleet of Admiral Howe, which had been compelled to land his army at the head of the Chesapeake in September, could not yet communicate with the army since it gained the city. He arrived off Newcastle on the sixth day of October. Washington realized that by retaining control of the Delaware he not only restricted the supply of provisions and military stores to the garrison, but retained easy communications with New Jersey and the Camps of Instruction and rendezvous at the adequately fortified posts of Morristown and Middlebrook.

At Billingsport, chevaux-de-frise obstructed the channel. Just below the mouth of the Schuylkill was Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island. On the opposite shore, at Red Bank, was Fort Mercer. Washington determined to maintain these posts, or make their acquisition by the enemy most costly in men and materials. His foresight grasped, as if in hand, the rapidly maturing facts, that Britain could not much longer meet the drain of the American war and at the same time hold her own against her European foes; and that America needed only a thoroughly concerted effort to consummate her independence.

Colonel Christopher Green, courageous at Bunker Hill and during Arnold’s expedition to Canada, was assigned to command Fort Mercer, with troops from his own State, Rhode Island. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, 201with Maryland troops, was stationed at Fort Mifflin. These little garrisons were strengthened by the detail of four hundred Continental troops to each. In these details, the same wisdom marked Washington’s choice; as Angel’s Rhode Island regiment reported to Greene, and a portion of Greene’s Virginia regiment reported to Smith.

The British army was not an idle observer of these movements. On the twenty-second of October, the two Grenadier regiments of Donop and Minnigerode, and two regiments of the line, with the Infantry Chasseurs (all Hessian), with eight 3–pounders and two howitzers, approached Fort Mercer and demanded its surrender. They had crossed at Coopers Ferry on the twenty-first, slightly interrupted by skirmishers, and on the following morning suddenly emerged from the woods, expecting an easy and an immediate victory. Defiance was returned to their demand. Two assaulting columns, already formed, made an immediate and simultaneous advance upon the north and south faces of the fort. The garrison, however, knowing that it could not hold the exterior works, which were still incomplete, retired to the interior defences; but still occupied a curtain of the old works, which afforded an enfilading fire upon any storming party which should attempt the inner stockade. The withdrawal of the garrison from the exterior works was misunderstood. The assault was bold, desperate, and brilliant. The resistance was incessant, deadly, overwhelming. Colonel Donop fell, mortally wounded, and near him, Lieutenant-Colonel Minnigerode. These confident assailants lost, in less than sixty minutes, four hundred men—being one-third of their entire force. And still, one more attempt was made at the escarpment near the river; but here also the Americans were on the alert. Armed galleys in the stream opened a raking fire at 202short range, and dispersed the assailants. Two British ships—the Augusta (64–gun man-of-war), and the Merlin (frigate), which had been so disposed as to aid the assault, grounded. On the next day, the former took fire from a hot shot, and blew up, before her entire crew could escape; and the Merlin was burned, to avoid capture. The American loss was fourteen killed and twenty-one wounded. Colonel Donop was buried carefully by Major Fleury, a French officer in the American service, and his grave at the south end of the old works is still an object of interest to visitors. Colonel Greene, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazlewood of the galley service, received from Washington and from Congress worthy testimonials for “gallant conduct.”

In the meantime, the British had found two solid points of land amid the marshy ground at the mouth of the Schuylkill River, within cannon-range of Fort Mifflin, where they constructed two heavy batteries bearing upon that fort. Four 32–pounders from the Somerset and six 24–pounders from the Eagle, with one 13–inch mortar, were added to works erected on Province Island, to bring a more direct fire upon the fort than could be secured from the batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill River. (See map.)

In order to anticipate a possible movement of troops into New Jersey, in case of a successful assault upon Fort Mifflin, Washington ordered General Varnum’s brigade to take post at Woodbury, near Red Bank, and General Forman to rally the New Jersey militia to his support. But the British made no attempt to land. The later assault upon the fort, made on the tenth, was successful. Seven ships of the British fleet joined in the attack; among them the Somerset, the Roebuck, and the Pearl, which had taken part in operations before Boston and New York. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith was wounded early in the action and removed to Fort Mercer, Major Thayer succeeding to the command. Major Fleury, who planned the works, was also wounded; and after a loss of two hundred and fifty men, the remnant of the garrison, on the night of the fifteenth, retired to Fort Mercer. At dawn of the sixteenth, the Grenadiers of the Royal Guards occupied the island.

203The Report of Washington upon this action thus honors the brave defenders of Fort Mifflin: “The defence will always reflect the highest honor upon the officers and men of the garrison. The works were entirely beat down; every piece of cannon was dismounted, and one of the enemy’s ships came so near that she threw grenades from her tops into the fort, and killed men upon the platforms, before they quitted the island.”

On the eighteenth, General Cornwallis landed at Billingsport in force, and Washington sent General Greene to take command of the troops in New Jersey and check his progress; but the demonstration was so formidable that the garrison evacuated the works. The Americans, unable to save their galleys, set fire to them near Gloucester Point; and the British fleet gained the freedom of the Delaware River.

During this movement, Lafayette, intrusted with a detachment of troops by General Greene, had several skirmishes with the enemy, and on the first of December was assigned to command of the division left without a commander by the dismissal of Stephen. While Cornwallis was on this detached service, four general officers of Washington’s army against eleven dissenting voted to attack General Howe. The incident, occurring at such a period, is noteworthy.

Late in October, the American army advanced from Perkiomy to White Marsh; General Varnum’s Rhode Island Brigade, twelve hundred strong, reported for 204duty, as well as about a thousand additional troops from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. Generals Gates and Putnam still retained troops for their semi-independent commands; and General Gates, in particular, only grudgingly sent such as were peremptorily ordered to report to Washington. It was not until Colonel Hamilton, Aide-de-camp, visited him in person, that Gates sent the troops which were absolutely indispensable at army headquarters, and as absolutely useless at Albany. His ostentatious proclamation of his military success over Burgoyne, and his criticism of the tardiness and non-efficiency of his Commander-in-Chief, began to expose his renewed aspirations to succeed to the chief command.

On the fourth of December, General Howe with a force of fourteen thousand men, accompanied by Generals Knyphausen and Cornwallis, advanced to Chestnut Hill, within three miles of the right of the American army, and slight skirmishing ensued. On the seventh, the British troops left Chestnut Hill, and took a position at Edge Hill near the American left. Morgan, just arrived from the northern army, and the Maryland militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist (subsequently Brigadier-General) had a sharp skirmish with Cornwallis, losing forty-four men and indicting an equal loss upon the enemy. Major-General Gray and the Queen’s Rangers indicted a loss of about fifty men upon an advance post of the American left; and when night came on, the British pickets were within a half mile of the American lines, where battle was awaited with satisfaction and hopeful expectancy. But on the morning of the eighth, the British camp disappeared, for Howe had suddenly returned to Philadelphia.

205Howe’s Report, dated December 13th, reads as follows: “Upon the presumption that a forward movement might tempt the enemy, after receiving such a reënforcement [reported afterwards as four thousand men], to give battle for the recovery of this place [Philadelphia]; or, that a vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack upon their camp; the army marched out on the night of the fourth instant.” It was afterwards learned that Howe had full knowledge of the jealous spirit then existing towards Washington, and that several of his generals favored an attack upon Philadelphia, against his better judgment. Washington, in noticing Howe’s movement, says: “I sincerely wish that they had made the attack; as the issue, in all probability, from the disposition of our troops and the strong position of our camp, would have been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must add, that reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbid us quitting our post to attack them. Nothing but success would have justified the measure; and this could not be expected from their position.”

The army of Washington, nominally eleven thousand strong, had, says Baron De Kalb, but seven thousand effective men for duty, so general was the sickness, from extreme cold and the want of sufficient clothing and other necessaries of a campaign. And yet, under these conditions, Congress placed in responsible positions those officers who were most officiously antagonistic to the American Commander-in-Chief. On the sixth of November, Gates had been made President of the Board of War. Mifflin, withdrawn from duty as Quartermaster-General, was also placed upon the Board, retaining his full rank. On the twenty-eighth of December, Congress appointed Conway Major-General and Inspector-General, and placed him in communication with the Board of War, to act independently of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee, then a prisoner of war, through letters addressed to Gates, Mifflin, Wayne and Conway, united with them in concerted purpose to oppose the policy of Washington, and to dictate his action; and more than this, there was a 206strong influence brought to bear upon Congress to force Washington’s resignation, or removal from command.

Washington, however, established his headquarters at Valley Forge, twenty-one miles from Philadelphia; and on the nineteenth of December announced his winter quarters by a formal order. On the same day he sent General Smallwood to Wilmington, to occupy the country south of Philadelphia and cut off supplies for that city and its garrison. McDougall was established at Peekskill. Putnam was on the shore of Long Island Sound until the middle of December, when he was ordered back to the Highlands. The absence of General Mifflin from the army, and his total neglect of duty as Quartermaster-General, in which he had once been so efficient, “caused,” says Washington, “the want of two days’ supply of provisions, and thereby cost an opportunity scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy.”

It was an hour of deep distress to Washington, when, on the twenty-third day of December, 1777, he felt compelled to advise Congress of the condition of his army: “The numbers had been reduced since the fourth of the month, only three weeks, two thousand men, from hardship and exposure. Two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight were unfit for duty, because barefoot and otherwise naked. Only eight thousand two hundred men were present for duty.” He added: “We have not more than three months in which to prepare a great deal of business. If we let them slip, or waste, we shall be laboring under the same difficulties in the next campaign as we have in this, to rectify mistakes and bring things to order. Military arrangements and movements, in consequence, like the mechanism of a clock, will be imperfect and disordered by the want of any part.” The concluding clause, italicized, illustrates one of his peculiar characteristics—never to slight the humblest man or agency in his country’s service, and never to count any duty too small to be done well.

WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE

[From the painting by Scheuster.]

207At this time, the Assembly of Pennsylvania began to snuff up some of the malarious odors of selfish and senseless gossip. They even remonstrated against his going into winter quarters at all. His reply was not wanting in directness and clearness. It reads as follows: “Gentlemen reprobate the going into winter quarters as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of sticks, or stones. I can assure those gentlemen that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to remonstrate in a comfortable room, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothing or blankets. However, as they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul I pity their miseries which it is neither in my power to relieve, or prevent.”

On the twenty-sixth, General Sullivan, who generally kept aloof from active participation in the movements of the intriguing class of officers, urged Washington to “make an attempt upon Philadelphia, and risk every consequence, in an action.” General Sullivan meant well; but the reader will recognize the characteristic style of this officer under circumstances of special doubt as to “what is to be done next.” But Washington never wavered in his purpose. On the thirtieth of December, Baron De Kalb was appointed Inspector-General, vice Conway, resigned. Washington closed the year at Valley Forge. The twelve months since he recrossed the Delaware at Trenton and outgeneraled Lord Cornwallis, had indeed been eventful. Once more, amid snow and cold, surrounded by faithful but suffering thousands, he plans for other perils and exposure; before the goal of his desire, substantial victory, could bring 208to them and to his beloved country the boon of realized independence. And yet, unknown to him, two days before he occupied the barren site of Valley Forge a thrilling event occurred beyond the Atlantic Ocean, and one which was, in the providence of God, to verify the soldier’s faith, and secure for him final victory.

As early as December 2d, the tidings of Burgoyne’s disaster reached the royal palace of George III. Fox, Burke, and Richmond favored immediate peace, and such an alliance, or Federal Union, as would be for the material interests of both countries. Burke solemnly declared that “peace upon any honorable terms was in justice due to both nations.” But the king adjourned Parliament to the twentieth of January, 1778.

Meanwhile a speedy ship from Boston was on the high seas, bound for France, and the account of Burgoyne’s surrender was received by the American Commissioners. On the twelfth of the month it was announced to the Count de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the French Court. The sensation throughout Paris was intense. “Europe need no longer dread the British power, since her very Colonies have successfully defied unjust laws, and equally defied her power to enforce them.” This was the public utterance. One pregnant sentence already cited, that of Count de Vergennes, proved the incentive to immediate action. “Saratoga” and “Germantown” were coupled in a message sent to Spain, to solicit her co-operation. Without any real sympathy with America, Spain had already discriminated in favor of American privateers which took prizes to her ports.

But France did not await reply before announcing her own action. And just when Washington was gathering his weary army into humble huts for partial shelter and rest, and while his tired spirit was pained by the small jealousies which impaired the value of his personal service 209and sacrifice, and threatened the harmony of his entire command, a new ally and friend had taken him to heart; and Louis XVI. was dropping into the scales both the prestige and the power of France, to vindicate and accomplish American liberty. On that day, December 17, 1777, Gerard, one of the secretaries of Count de Vergennes, announced to Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane, two American Commissioners, “by the King’s order,” “that the King of France, in Council, had determined not only to acknowledge, but to support American independence.”

The declaration of the Duke of Richmond, already cited, which predicted “the application of the Colonists to strangers for aid, if Parliament authorized the hire of Hessians,” had been realized.

Mr. Charles Stedman, who served on the staffs of Generals Howe, Clinton and Cornwallis, during the Revolutionary War, in an interesting historical narrative states that “the British army enlivened the dull times of their winter residence in Philadelphia, with the dance-house, the theatre, and the game of faro.” But it is equally true that this large license which relieved the monotony of garrison life, gradually aroused disgust and positive hatred on the part of the citizens of that city. No diversions in force against the American position, or their chief outposts, were possible, since the garrison must be alert for any sudden attack upon the city. The large number of wealthy royalist families had much to dread from the possible capture of their dwelling-place. Scouting parties from Washington’s army pressed so closely to the city limits, at times, that occasional efforts of small detachments to secure wood for fuel and cooking purposes, were admonished, that the limit of their picket-lines was their boundary of possession and safe enjoyment. Carriage drives and daily saddle exercise, which were favorite recreations, had to be abandoned. They were unsafe; as Washington’s cavalry, scouts and artillery needed all the horses that were not needed by the farmers for farm use.

The American army drilled daily, under the patient instruction of Baron Steuben, so far as they had clothing and shoes for that purpose; while their comrades sat down or laid themselves down by log fires and burning stumps, to avoid freezing to death.

211After the camp was fully established, and Washington had asserted his purpose to command, and allow no interference by civilians of whatever pretension, or by military men of whatever rank, the antagonism of the previous months gradually retired from public exhibition. It never drew breath from popular sympathy, and the soldiers regarded his censors as their enemies. And so it was, that in spite of sickness, wretchedness, inevitable desertions and frequent deaths, the soldiers were kept to duty, and acquired toughness and knowledge for future endeavor. A calm reliance upon the future, and a straightforward way of dealing with men and measures, were still vindicating the fitness of Washington for the supreme command.

To the demand of the British Government for the reasons of the inactivity of the British army, General Howe replied that, he “did not attack the intrenched position at Valley Forge, a strong point, during the severe season, although everything was prepared with that intention, judging it imprudent until the season should afford a prospect of reaping the advantages that ought to have resulted from success in that measure; but having good information in the spring that the enemy had strengthened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving him from thence when the campaign should open, he dropped thought of attack.”

During the winter, a proposition for the invasion of Canada was again under consideration; and General Lafayette, with other officers, visited Albany and the northern army to see what arrangements were both available and desirable for that purpose. It was soon dropped; and was never fully favored by Washington.^[7]

212During January, Congress sent a committee to visit Valley Forge. As the result, Washington’s whole policy was indorsed and their support was pledged. Baron Steuben, recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, was confirmed as Major-General without a dissenting vote. Conway started for France early in April. The historical “Conway cabal” had lost its most unprincipled abettor. On the fourth of April, Congress authorized Washington to call upon Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey, for five thousand additional militia. On the ninth, General Howe received his recall to England. On the tenth, Lafayette returned to camp. On the thirteenth, General McDougall accompanied Count Kosciusko to West Point, to perfect the fortifications at that post. On the fifteenth, Gates was placed in command at Peekskill.

When the spring opened at Valley Forge, the propositions of the many generals, respecting the approaching campaign, were as diverse and varied as the leafage of the forest. As the mind recalls the relations of these officers to earlier campaigns, it will be seen how essential to any real success was the presence of a strong-willed Commander-in-Chief. It is especially to be noticed, that men whose judgment had been accredited as uniformly conservative and yet energetic radically differed as to the immediate objective of army action. It settles beyond question the principle that the entire war, and the entire country, had to be made of paramount consideration, in the decision of any important movement.

Wayne, Patterson and Maxwell recommended an immediate attack upon Philadelphia. Knox, Poor, Varnum and Muhlenburg advised an attack upon New York, with four thousand regulars and Eastern militia, Washington in command; leaving Lee to command in Pennsylvania, while the main army should remain at Valley Forge. 213Stirling recommended operations against both Philadelphia and New York. Lafayette, Steuben and Du Portail expressed doubts as to making any aggressive movement whatever, until the army should be strengthened or the British unfold their plans. This wise suggestion was also the opinion of Washington.

On the seventh of May, the British ascended the Delaware and destroyed public stores at Bordentown. Maxwell and Dickenson had been sent across the river for the protection of these stores; but heavy rains delayed their march, and forty-four vessels, including several frigates on the stocks, were burned.

But the seventh day of May, 1778, was not a day of gloom at Valley Forge. Spring had fairly opened, and the forest began to don its new attire for a fresh summer campaign. At nine o’clock in the morning, the entire army was on parade, with drums beating, colors flying and salutes echoing among the hills. The brigades were steady in their ranks. No brilliant uniforms were conspicuous anywhere, and many had neither coats nor shoes. The pomp and circumstance of war were missing. There was no display of gold lace, or finery of any kind. Strongly marked faces and tough muscles showed the fixedness of purpose of these troops. But it was an occasion of rare interest. This American army was in line, for the reception of a visitor from over the sea. The visitor was a herald sent by Louis XVI., King of France, to announce to Washington and the American people that an armed alliance between France and the United States of America had been consummated. The French frigate Le Sensible had landed at Falmouth (Portland), Me., with this messenger, and the American army was drawn up in battle array to receive his message. The chaplain of each brigade proclaimed the treaty and read its terms. It was one of those occasions, not infrequent during the 214war, and habitual to Washington throughout his mature life, when he had no way through which to express his deepest anxieties or profoundest sense of gratitude, other than that of communion with God. And now, the listening army was called upon to unite in one “grand thanksgiving to Almighty God that He had given to America this friend.” The scene that followed can never be described. It can only be imagined and felt. Huzzas for the King of France mingled with shouts for Washington, whose face, as described by one, “shone as did that of Moses, when he descended from the Mount.” Caps were tossed high in air. Hand-shaking, leaping, clapping of hands, and every homely sign of joy and confident expectation, followed. Washington had dismounted. He stood with folded arms—calm, serene, majestic, silent. For several moments the whole army stood, awaiting his action. He remounted his horse, and a single word to his assembled staff quickly ran through the lines—that the Commander-in-Chief proposed that all should speak together, by the soldier’s method, through powder. No matter if powder were scarce. Every cannon, wherever mounted about the long circuit of intrenchments, roared; and the hills carried the echoes to British headquarters. Throughout the lines of division and brigade, to the remotest picket post, a running fire at will closed with one grand volley; and then the camp of Valley Forge resumed the “business” of preparing for battle.

With the opening of the spring of 1778, General Howe also was moved to action. His winter supplies, as well as those procurable from the fleet and the city, had been expended. “The storehouses were empty.” Detachments, large and small, were sent to scour the country. To cut off and restrict these detachments, General Lafayette was intrusted with a special command of twenty-four 215hundred men, and advanced to Barren Hill, about half the distance to Philadelphia. It also formed a corps of observation, and was the first independent command of that officer under his commission as Major-General. He was especially instructed to note signs of the evacuation of Philadelphia, which Washington regarded as a military necessity on the part of General Howe. The American Commander-in-Chief, although reticent of his own opinions, rarely failed to read other men accurately, and rightly read Lafayette. With singular enthusiasm, great purity of character, unswerving fidelity to obligation, and a thorough contempt for everything mean or dishonorable, this young French gentleman combined a keen sagacity, sound judgment, prompt execution, and an intense love for liberty.

Having taken position at Barren Hill, Lafayette at once introduced a system of communication with parties in the city of Philadelphia. He had with him fifty Indian scouts, and Captain McLean’s Light troops. A company of dragoons had also been ordered to join him. General Howe had been relieved from duty on the eleventh, by General Clinton; who signalized his accession to command by a series of brilliant fêtes in honor of his predecessor, on the eve of his departure for England. A regatta on the Delaware; a tournament on land; triumphal arches; decorated pavilions; mounted ladies, with their escorts in Turkish costume; slaves in fancy habits; knights, esquires, heralds, and every brilliant device, made the day memorable from earliest dawn until dark. And after dark, balls, illuminations both upon water and land, fireworks, wax-lights, flowers and fantastic drapery, cheered the night hours, “exhibiting,” as described by André himself, master of ceremonies, “a coup d’œil, beyond description magnificent.” The procession of knights and maidens was led by Major André and Miss 216Shippen, the beautiful daughter of one of the wealthiest royalists in Philadelphia. She long retained the title of the “belle of the Michianza fêtes.” She subsequently became the wife of General Arnold; and the incidents thus grouped show how felicitous was Clinton’s subsequent choice of André to negotiate with Arnold the exchange of West Point, for “gold and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British army.”

During the evening of this luxurious entertainment, and while at supper, General Clinton announced to his officers his intention to march at daybreak to Barren Hill, and bring back for their next evening’s guest, the distinguished French officer, Marquis de Lafayette. At four o’clock on the morning of the nineteenth, when the twenty hours of hilarity, adulation and extravagance closed, General Clinton, accompanied by Generals Grant, Gray, and Erskine, and five thousand picked troops, marched to capture Lafayette. General Gray crossed the Schuylkill with two thousand men to cut off Lafayette’s retreat, in case Clinton successfully attacked in front. Washington advanced sufficiently to observe the movement of General Gray, and signalled with cannon to Lafayette of his danger; but Lafayette, by occupying a stone church and other buildings, and showing false fronts of columns as if about to take the offensive, caused the advance column of Grant to halt for reënforcements; and then retired safely with the loss of but nine men. Lafayette gives an amusing account of portions of the skirmish: “When my Indian scouts suddenly confronted an equal number of British dragoons, the mutual surprise was such that both fled with equal haste.” The officers and men of Lafayette’s command were greatly elated by his conduct of the affair, especially as he was at one time threatened by a force more than twice that of his entire division; and the confidence thus acquired followed his 217service through the entire war. The congratulations of Washington were as cordial upon his return, as those of the officers of the Philadelphia garrison were chilling upon the return of Clinton, without Lafayette as prisoner.

On the same day, General Mifflin rejoined the army. In writing to Gouverneur Morris of New York, the American Commander-in-Chief, noticing the event, expresses his surprise “to find a certain gentleman who some time ago, when a heavy cloud hung over us and our affairs looked gloomy, was desirous of resigning, to be now stepping forward in the line of the army”; adding: “If he can reconcile such conduct to his own feelings as an officer, and a man of honor, and Congress have no objection to his leaving his seat in another department, I have nothing personally to oppose to it. Yet, I must think that gentleman’s stepping in, and out, as the sun happens to beam out, or become obscure, isn’t quite the thing, nor quite just, with respect to those officers who take the bitter with the sweet.”

By this time, the movements of shipping, and within the city, clearly indicated the design of the British to abandon Philadelphia without battle. A Council of War was convened on the twentieth, to hear reports upon the condition of the various American armies; and Generals Gates, Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, Armstrong, Steuben and de Kalb were present. The opinion was unanimous that the army should remain on the defensive, and await the action of the British commander. On the twentieth, also, General Lee rejoined the army. He had been exchanged on the twenty-first of April for Major-General Prescott, who had been captured five miles above Newport, R.I., on the night of July 20, 1777. Lee had been placed on his parole as early as the twenty-fifth of March, and he actually visited York, where Congress was in session, on the ninth of April.

218The relations of Charles Lee to the war were as marked as were those of Arnold, except that Arnold rendered valuable service until he turned traitor. During the month of February, 1777, Lee secured permission from General Howe to write letters to Congress, urging that body to “send commissioners to confer confidentially concerning the national cause.” On the twenty-first of February, Congress declined to send such commissioners, as “altogether improper”; and they could “not perceive how compliance with his wish would tend to his advantage, or the interests of the public.” Letters were also written in March; and in one addressed to Washington on the fifth of April, 1777, Lee had written: “I think it a most unfortunate circumstance for myself, and I think no less so for the public, that the Congress have not thought proper to comply with my request. It could not possibly have been attended with any ill consequences, and might have been with good ones. At least, it was an indulgence which I thought my situation entitled me to. But I am unfortunate in everything, and this stroke is the severest I have ever experienced. God send you a different fate.” The answer of Washington was as follows: “I have received your letter of this date, and thank you, as I shall any officer, over whom I have the honor to be placed, for their opinions and advice in matters of importance; especially when they proceed from the fountain of candor, and not from a captious spirit, or an itch for criticism; ... and here, let me again assure you, that I shall always be happy to be in a free communication of your sentiments upon any important subject relative to the service, and only beg that they may come directly to myself. The custom which many officers have, of speaking freely of things, and reprobating measures which upon investigation may be found to be unavoidable, is never productive 219of good; but often, of very mischievous consequences.”

During the year 1872 George H. Moore, of the New York Historical Society, brought to light a certain paper indorsed, “Mr. Lee’s Plan, 29th March, 1777,” which was found among the papers of the brothers Howe, British Commissioners at New York. Lee was at that date a prisoner of war, but at the same time a British officer who had been taken in rebellion to the British crown. This letter is noticed, in order to make more intelligible the subsequent relations of Lee to the American Commander-in-Chief. The following is an extract: “It appears to me, that by the continuance of the war, America has no chance of obtaining its ends. As I am not only persuaded, from the high opinion I have of the humanity and good sense of Lord and Admiral Howe, that the terms of accommodation will be as moderate as their powers will admit; but that their powers are more ample than their successor would be tasked with, I think myself not only justifiable, but bound in conscience, in furnishing ’em all the light I can, to enable ’em to bring matters to a conclusion in the most commodious manner. 1 know the most generous use will be made of it in all respects. Their humanity will incline ’em to have consideration for individuals who have acted from principle.” Then follow hypothetical data as to troops required on the part of Britain, and these passages: “If the Province of Maryland, or the greater part of it, is reduced, or submits, and the people of Virginia are prevented, or intimidated, from marching aid to the Pennsylvania army, the whole machine is divided, and a period put to the war; and if the plan is adopted in full, I am so confident of success, that I would stake my life on the same. Apprehensions from Carleton’s army will, I am confident, keep the New Englanders at home, or at least, confine 220’em to that side of the river. I would advise that four thousand men be immediately embarked in transports, one-half of which should proceed up the Potomac and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesapeake Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis.” The relations of various posts to the suggested movement, and the character of the German population of Pennsylvania who would be apprehensive of injury to their fine farms, were urged in favor of his “plan” for terminating the war on terms of “moderate accommodation.”

The reply of Washington to General Lee’s letter is a very distinct notice that he was advised of the letters written by him to Gates and others, derogatory of the action of his superior officer, the Commander-in-Chief.

The return of Lee to duty found the American army in readiness to bid its last farewell to the camp at Valley Forge; but the ordeals through which so many brave men passed, for their country’s sake, were hardly more severe than were those through which their beloved Commander-in-Chief passed into a clearer future, and the well-earned appreciation of mankind.

The abandonment of Philadelphia by the British army, as anticipated by Washington, had become a military necessity. The city was too remote from the coast, unless its army of occupation could be so reënforced as to be independent of support from the British base at New York. The reënforcements of troops called for by General Howe had not been and could not have been furnished. The recommendation of General Amherst, military adviser of George III., “that forty thousand men be sent to America immediately,” had been positively disapproved. It was therefore of vital importance that General Clinton should reach New York with the least possible delay. Any attempt to return by sea was obviously impracticable.

The incidents of the evacuation of Philadelphia were similar to those which marked the departure of Howe from Boston. The embarkation of three thousand citizens with their families, their merchandise, and their personal effects, upon vessels, to accompany the retiring fleet, was a moral lesson of vast significance. This withdrawal of the British garrison was no ruse, to entice the American army from its camp, for battle, but a surrender of the field itself, without a struggle. It announced to America and to the world, that the British army lacked the ability to meet the contingencies of field service, 222either in Pennsylvania or New Jersey; and that loyalists would be left to their own resources for protection and safety.

Other considerations precipitated the action of Clinton. Congress had publicly announced the impending arrival of a formidable French fleet from the West Indies; and, as a matter of fact, so immediate was its advent, that the advance frigates entered the Delaware Bay, just after Admiral Howe turned Cape May, on his return to New York. Meanwhile, every movement in the city was hourly reported to Washington by his secret messengers, and by families who kept constantly in touch with all movements of the garrison. Hardly a ball or social dinner, during the entire winter, was without the presence of one or more of his representatives, who as promptly reported the secret influences which were making of the city a deadly prison-house for the British troops. Even at the playhouses, comedians had begun to jest upon the “foraging of the rebel scouts”; and it is said to have been hinted, on one occasion, that “there were chickens and eggs in abundance outside the lines, if the soldiers would take the trouble to go after them,” and that “it was hardly the right thing to let Washington’s ragged army have the pick of all country produce.”

The actual evacuation began at three o’clock on the morning of June eighteenth, and the entire British army was on the New Jersey side of the Delaware by ten o’clock. Washington had so closely calculated the movement, that General Maxwell’s brigade and the New Jersey militia were already at work burning bridges and felling trees across the roads, in order to delay Clinton’s march and afford an opportunity for attacking his retiring columns. General Arnold, whose wound still prevented field service, entered the city with a strong detachment as the 223British rear-guard left. Twelve miles of baggage-train, loaded with everything of army supplies that could be heaped upon wagons, formed the long extended caravan which accompanied nearly eighteen thousand British veterans as they returned to New York, whence they had started only eleven months before. The capture of the American capital and the destruction of the American army had been their fondest desire. Now, they shrunk away from the same American capital as from a pest-house. There was no longer an eager search to find Washington. To make the earliest safe distance from his presence, or his reach, was the incentive to the speediest possible travel. It was no longer the destruction of that one principal American army that engrossed thought and stimulated energy; but how to save the British army itself, for efficient service elsewhere. And Washington, although fully appreciating the British situation, did not know the fact that the British cabinet were actually discussing, at that very time, the propriety of transferring all active operations to the more sparsely settled regions of the South.

The movements in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as well as those of Burgoyne, away from the sea-coast, recall an emphatic communication from General Howe, which contained this practical statement: “Almost every movement in America was an act of enterprise, clogged with innumerable difficulties. A knowledge of the country, intersected, as it everywhere is, by woods, mountains, water or morasses, cannot be obtained with any degree of precision necessary to foresee and guard against the contingencies that may occur.”

Washington was also fully advised of the character and extent of Clinton’s retiring column, and of the opportunity which the country afforded for breaking it up. Haste was the need of Clinton. His delay, however slight, was 224Washington’s opportunity. Clinton reached Haddonfield the same day. The militia of Maxwell made a short resistance, and then retired to Mount Holy Pass. The increased British vanguard compelled him to fall back; but the destruction of bridges and interposed obstructions, together with the excessive summer heat, made the march of the British troops one of intense strain and exhaustion. And yet, Clinton used such vigor in pressing forward to anticipate more formidable obstructions, that he reached Crosswicks before the destruction of the bridge at that point was complete; and on the morning of the twenty-fourth, his army crossed the creek. The column of Lieutenant-General Knyphausen went into camp at Imlay’s Town; while that of Clinton occupied Allentown, and thereby effectively covered the advance division in case of an American attack from the north. At this point, he learned that Washington had already crossed the Delaware, and that the northern army was expected to unite with that of the American Commander-in-Chief. Such a combination, just then, would render a direct retreat to New York, via Princeton and Brunswick, extremely hazardous, if not impossible. With the promptness which characterized him, Sir Henry Clinton consolidated his baggage and sent it in advance under Lieutenant-General Knyphausen; placed the second division in light marching order, under his own personal command, in the rear, and took the Monmouth route to the sea. (See map.)

Washington was quickly advised of this organic change in the British formation, and acted instantly. He had crossed the Delaware River at Coryell’s Ferry, forty miles above Philadelphia, without assurance of the definite purpose of his adversary. Any other route of march by Clinton than by Brunswick, would prevent him from receiving military support from New York, and hold him to the limit of supplies with which he started from Philadelphia. When, therefore, couriers from Maxwell notified Washington of Clinton’s diversion eastward, from Crosswicks, it was evident that Clinton would take no risks of battle in reaching New York, or some port on the coast accessible by a British fleet.

225Colonel Morgan was sent with five hundred men to reënforce Maxwell. On the twenty-fourth, General Scott, with fifteen hundred chosen troops, was despatched to reënforce those in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, more effectually to retard their retreat. On the twenty-sixth, Washington moved the entire army to Kingston; and learning that the British army was moving directly toward Monmouth, advanced an additional force of one thousand men under General Wayne, placing General Lafayette in command of the entire corps, including the brigade of Maxwell and Morgan’s Light Infantry. Orders were also sent to Lafayette: “Take the first opportunity to strike the rear of the enemy.”

Some writers have involuntarily followed Lee’s theory, that the attempt by Washington to stop Clinton’s retreat and to defeat so large and so well-appointed an army as that of the British general, was folly from the start; but such critics overlook the determining facts of the situation. Washington never counted numbers so much as conditions. He never swerved from a steady purpose to wear out superior numbers by piecemeal, until they were at his mercy or so benumbed by his strokes as to yield the field. Hence it is seen, that with all his approaches to the retiring columns of Clinton, he never failed to hold in complete reserve and mastery every conceivable contingency of a general engagement. Moreover, as a matter of fact, his army, reënforced from the north, was not inferior in numbers; was unencumbered with baggage, and was not exposed to attack. A fight was a matter of choice, and not at the option of the 226enemy. It is therefore of essential interest to notice how systematically Washington advanced in this memorable campaign of Clinton’s March to the Sea. It is of equal interest to notice the development of the career of Lafayette, under Washington’s supervision and confidence; since America is more indebted to this discreet and gallant officer than to any other, for the immediate service which assured the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, three years later in the war.

At half-past four of the afternoon of June 26th, Lafayette and Wayne were at Robin’s tavern. Lafayette thus wrote to the Commander-in-Chief: “I have consulted the general officers of this detachment, and the general opinion seems to be, that I should march in the night, near them [the enemy], so as to attack the rear-guard on the march. Your excellency knows that by the direct road you are only three miles further from Monmouth than we are in this place. Some prisoners have been made, and deserters are coming in very fast.”

Second despatch, 5 o’clock P.M.: “General Forman is firmly of opinion, that we may overtake the enemy. It is highly pleasant to be followed and countenanced by the army; that, if we stop the enemy and meet with some advantage, they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we overtake them, we possess a very happy chance.”

Third despatch, dated Ice Town, 26th June, 1778, quarter before seven: “When I got there [referring to a previously expressed purpose to go to Ice Town for provisions], I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamilton [Colonel Alexander Hamilton of Washington’s staff], who had been riding all night, had not been able to find any one who could give him certain intelligence: but by a party who came back, I hear the enemy are in motion and their rear about one mile off the place they had occupied 227last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I immediately put General Maxwell’s and Wayne’s brigades in motion, and I will fall lower down, with General Scott’s and Jackson’s regiments and some militia. I should be very happy if we could attack them before they halt. If I cannot overtake them, we could lay at some distance and attack them to-morrow morning.... If we are at a convenience from you, I have nothing to fear in striking a blow, if opportunity is offered.”

“Special.—If you believe it, or if it is believed necessary, or useful, to the good of the service and the honor of General Lee, to send him down with a couple of thousand men, or any greater force, I will cheerfully obey and serve him, not only out of duty, but what I owe to that gentleman’s character.”

The explanation of this passage is of interest, as it happily illustrates the spirit with which Washington and Lafayette operated in this important engagement, where very grave discretionary responsibility devolved upon so young an officer as the French Marquis.

Daily conferences were held by Washington with his officers after leaving Valley Forge, and especially after leaving Kingston. The official Reports of Washington show that Lee positively declined the command of this advance corps, until its large increase rendered it certain that it held a post of honor, and would be pushed upon the enemy. Lafayette was first assigned to this command after a hot debate in council as to the propriety of attacking Clinton’s army at all; and General Lee used the following language, when the assignment of Lafayette was made with his concurrence, that “he was well pleased to be freed from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would fail.” But when Lafayette gladly accepted the detail, and was so constantly reënforced as to have under his command nearly one-third of the army, 228with the pledge of support by the entire army, General Lee, as next in rank to Washington, immediately realized his grave mistake, and when too late, claimed the command by virtue of his rank. He then wrote to General Lafayette as follows: “It is my fortune and my honor that I place in your hands; you are too generous to cause the loss of either.” Lafayette, in his Memoirs, thus alludes to this surrender by Lee of claim to command by virtue of rank, after having peremptorily and scornfully declined it: “This tone suited me better”; and the letter already cited was his response. Washington’s reply to this magnanimous waiver by Lafayette of so honorable a command is as follows: “General Lee’s uneasiness on account of yesterday’s transaction, rather increasing than abating, and your politeness in wishing to ease him of it, have induced me to detach him from this army with a part of it, to reënforce, or at least to cover the several detachments at present under your command. At the same time, I have an eye to your wishes; and have therefore obtained a promise from him, that when he gives you notice of his approach and command, he will request you to prosecute any plan you may have already concerted for the purpose of attacking, or annoying, the enemy. This is the only expedient I could think of, to answer the views of both. General Lee seems satisfied with this measure.”

On the evening of the twenty-sixth, the entire army moved forward, leaving all superfluous baggage, so as best to support the advance. On the twenty-seventh, a severe rain-storm suspended the march for a few hours. But the advance corps had been strengthened, as suggested by Lafayette; and when Lee assumed command it numbered fully five thousand effective troops. The main army also advanced within three miles of English Town and within five miles of the British army. The American forces, now eager for battle, were equal in numbers to 229the enemy, with the advantage of being on the flank of the long extended British columns which could not be consolidated for action with their full strength.

A general idea of the skirmishes of the morning, without elaboration of details, can be obtained from the map.

At the extreme right, on the Middletown road, Knyphausen conducts the accumulated baggage-train, which, on the night of June twenty-seventh, is shown to have been distributed along the road approaching Freehold (Monmouth). Upon the high ground, below, Clinton gathered his forces as they arrived from the march. Lafayette was near the Court-House, and had a sharp skirmish with the Queen’s Rangers. He disposed his army northward, with skirmishers as far advanced as Bryar Hill—even threatening the pass by which Knyphausen had retired toward New York. The baggage column, as early as seven o’clock, had passed the Court-House. Lee appeared upon the field and practically took command, but exercised no direction over movements; gave contradictory orders when he gave any; and brigade after brigade failed to obtain from him instructions as to their movements, or their relations to other brigades. At first, Lee announced that the “entire British army was in retreat.” When Clinton, after eight o’clock, descended from his position to attack the scattered and irregular formation of the American army, Lafayette, full of hope, was first advised that a retreat had been ordered by General Lee. He protested in vain. The brigades were allowed each to seek its own choice of destination; and all fell back under a general impression, rather than specific orders, that all were to retreat and simply abandon demonstration against the British army. Clinton’s continued advance, even so far as Wenrock Creek, is indicated on the map.

The truth of history requires a statement which has never been sufficiently defined, as to the antecedents of 230this overestimated officer, Charles Lee. As a subaltern in the British army, he had been uniformly insubordinate, and was in discredit when he was allowed to go abroad and fight under various flags as a military adventurer. He knew nothing of handling a large command, or combined commands. Before the Battle of Monmouth, if then, he had never been under fire in the lead of American troops. He was cool enough and brave enough at Monmouth, to retreat with his division; but it was saved chiefly by the self-possession of its officers, and the wonderful endurance of the rank and file. He was unequal to the command, even if he had desired battle. To have fought the battle, with any chance of being taken prisoner, would have exposed him to a double penalty for treason at the hands of General Howe. He was in the attitude of defeating his “plan” (before alluded to), and defeating the very invasion which he had so ingeniously advised.

The increasing cannonading, before noon, aroused Washington to his full fighting capacity. The return of an aid-de-camp, with the information that General Lee had “overtaken the British army and expected to cut off their rear-guard,” was regarded as an omen of complete success. The soldiers cast off every encumbrance and made a forced march. Greene took the right, and Stirling the left; while Washington in person, conducting the vanguard, moved directly to the scene of conflict.

All at once, the animation of the Commander-in-Chief lost its impulse. A mounted countryman rode by in fright, a wild fugitive. A half-distracted musician, fife in hand, cried “All’s lost!” A few paces more, and over the brow of a small rise of ground overlooking the creek and bridge, toward which scattered fragments of regiments were pressing, the bald fact needed no other appeal to the American Commander-in-Chief to assure him of the 231necessity for his immediate presence. Harrison and Fitzgerald, of his staff, were despatched to learn the cause of the appearances of fugitives from their respective commands. They met Major Ogden, who replied to their excited demands, with an expletive: “They are fleeing from a shadow.” Officer after officer, detachment after detachment, came over the bridge, ambiguous in replies, seemingly ignorant of the cause of retreat, only that retreat had been ordered. Neither was the movement in the nature of a panic. Hot and oppressive as was the day, there was simply confusion of all organized masses, needing but some competent will to restore them to place and duty.

Washington advanced to the bridge, and allowed neither officer nor man to pass him. In turn, he met Ramsey, Stewart, Wayne, Oswald, and Livingston. To each he gave orders, assigned them positions, and directed them to face the enemy. Leading the way, he placed Ramsey and Stewart, with two guns, in the woods to the left, with orders to stop pursuit. On the right, back of an orchard, he placed Varnum, Wayne, and Livingston; while Knox and Oswald, with four guns, were established to cover their front. When Maxwell and other generals arrived, they were sent to the rear to re-form their columns and report back to him for orders. Lafayette was intrusted with the formation of a second line until he could give the halted troops a position which they might hold until he could bring the entire army to their support.

It was such an hour as tests great captains and proves soldiers. The ordeal of Valley Forge had made soldiers. In the presence of Washington they were knit to him as by bands of steel. Company after company sprang into fresh formation as if first coming on parade.

232With the last retreating detachment, Lee appeared, and to his astonished gaze, there was revealed a new formation of the very troops he had ordered to seek safety in retreat. Tn reply to his demand for the reason of this disposition of the troops, he was informed that Washington, in person, located the troops. He understood that his personal command ceased with the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, and he reported for orders. He had no time to speak, when he met this stern peremptory demand, “What does this mean, sir? Give me instantly an explanation of this retreat!” Appalled by the wrathful manner and awfully stern presence of Washington, as with drawn sword he stood in his stirrups, towering above the abashed officer, Lee could only answer mechanically, “Sir? Sir?” The demand was repeated with an emphasis that hushed every observer. Washington’s manner, bearing and tone, are described by those who stood awe-bound by the scene, as “more than human.” It was as if Liberty herself had descended to possess the form of her champion!

All who felt his presence bent their wills as rushes yield to the tempest,—so immediate, so irresistible was his mastery of the occasion. When the half suppliant officer ventured to explain that “the contradictory reports as to the enemy’s movements brought about a confusion that he could not control,” and ventured farther to remind his Commander-in-Chief that he “was opposed to it in council, and while the enemy was so superior in cavalry we could not oppose him,” Washington, with instant self-control, replied: “You should not have undertaken it unless prepared to carry it through; and whatever your opinions, orders were to be obeyed.” Again turning to the silent officer, he asked one single question. It was this: “Will you remain here in front, and retain command while I form the army in the rear; or 233shall I remain?” Lee remained, until ordered to return to English Town and assist in rallying the fugitives that assembled there. It requires more time to outline the events of a few precious moments at such a crisis than the events themselves occupied. The map discloses the final position. Greene was on the right, Stirling was on the left—where an admirable position of artillery prepared him to meet the British columns. Lafayette occupied a second line, on slightly higher ground in the rear. Greene sent six guns to McComb’s Hill, where they could direct enfilading fire upon the British columns, already advancing against the position in which Washington had placed Wayne, Varnum and Livingston.

The real Battle of Monmouth had begun. The British forces were repulsed at every point. At the hedge-row, three brilliant charges were made, and Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton of the British Grenadiers was among the killed. As the day advanced, Lee reported in person, and again requested “his excellency’s pleasure,” whether to form his division “with the main body, or draw them up in the rear.” He was ordered to re-form them in the rear of English Town, three miles distant. Baron Steuben was also on duty at that point. When, about five o’clock, all cannonading ceased in the direction of the battlefield, Colonel Gimât, of Washington’s staff, arrived at English Town with an order for the advance of the troops which had been re-formed under Lee’s supervision; announcing that the British were in confusion. Colonel Gimât stated in his evidence before the court-martial which subsequently tried Lee, that when he communicated this order to that officer Lee replied, that “they were only resting themselves, and there must be some misunderstanding about your being ordered to advance with these troops”; “and it was not until General Muhlenburg halted, and the precise orders of Washington were repeated, that Lee 234could understand that the cessation of firing was occasioned by the retreat of Clinton, and not by the defeat of Washington.”

During the evening, the American army advanced, ready for a general attack upon the British troops, at daybreak. Washington, with a small escort, visited every picket. The position was made impregnable, and the army was in the best possible spirits for a complete victory, and expected victory.

At 10 o’clock at night, Clinton silently broke camp and departed for Middletown, where he joined Knyphausen, reaching New York on the last day of June. The British and the American casualties were each about three hundred, some of these being deaths from excessive heat. It appeared afterwards, that the desertions from the British army numbered nearly two thousand men.

European comments upon this battle were as eulogistic of the American Commander-in-Chief as after the battles of Trenton, Princeton, and Germantown. The historian Gordon says of Washington, upon his reaching the battlefield: “He animated his forces by his gallant example, and exposed his person to every danger common to the meanest soldier; so that the conduct of the soldiers in general, after recovering from the first surprise occasioned by the retreat, could not be surpassed.”

General Lee was tried for disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy; for misbehavior before the enemy; a disorderly retreat; and insolent letters sent to the Commander-in-Chief, after the battle, and was sentenced to “suspension from command for twelve months.” A reasonable self-control, which he never had exercised, might, even at this crisis of his history, have saved him his commission. He died ignominiously, and even in his will perpetuated his hatred of religion and his Maker. An abstract of the testimony taken upon his 235trial shows that the adjustment of the advance troops by General Lafayette was admirable; that up to the time when Lee ordered a retreat without consulting him, all the troops were steady in their positions, awaiting some systematic orders from Lee, who had just taken command; that Lee did not intend to force the battle which Lafayette had organized; that brigades and detachments had no information of adjoining commands, or supports; that when Lee’s orders for a general retreat reached brigades, each brigade moved more through example than instructions, without direction or intimation of any new formation, or any reason for the retreat.

Recent writers have revived the tradition as to Washington’s alleged profanity at the Battle of Monmouth. It would seem that either Charles Lee, or his witnesses, or the witnesses of the United States, under cross-examination, immediately after the occurrence, would have testified to such words, if spoken, for the sake of vindicating Lee, when his commission and honor were in jeopardy. Every witness agrees with Lee as to language used; but none imply profanity. Silence in this respect is, prima facie, the strongest possible legal evidence in disproval of the charge.

One of the most eminent of American historians, in a footnote, thus attempts to verify this vague tradition respecting Washington: “It is related that when Lafayette visited this country in 1825, he was the guest of Chief Justice Hornblower at Newark, N.J., and that while seated on his front porch, one evening, Lafayette remarked that the only time when he ‘ever heard Washington swear, was when he rebuked Lee at meeting him on his retreat at Monmouth.’” The late Justice Bradley, who married a daughter of Judge Hornblower, in a letter, thus meets this statement: “Nothing of the kind ever occurred. Lafayette did not stay at Mr. Hornblower’s, but at the 236principal public house of the city. There he was visited; but the subject of the Battle of Monmouth was not mentioned.”

Lafayette does not, in his Memoirs, make such a charge; nor in letters to his wife, which were voluminous in sketches of his beloved commander. Invariably, he exalts the character of Washington, as “something more divine than human.”

An additional statement, however, is given, to indicate the intensity of feeling and excitement of manner which characterized Washington’s deportment on the occasion referred to. The late Governor Pennington, of New Jersey, afterwards Speaker of the American House of Representatives, was a pupil of Dr. Asahel Green, President of Princeton College, and related this incident of his college career: “Dr. Green lectured on Moral Philosophy, and used as his text-book Paley’s work on that subject. When engaged on the chapter relative to profane swearing, after Dr. Green had dilated on the subject, expanding Paley’s argument on the uselessness and ungentlemanliness of the vice, and the entire absence of any excuse for it, some roguish student put to him this question: ‘Dr. Green, did not Washington swear at Lee, at the Battle of Monmouth?’ Now, the doctor was present during the battle, in fact, a chaplain in the service, although a young man, and was an enthusiastic admirer, almost worshipper, of General Washington. When the question was put to him, he drew himself up with dignity and said: ‘Young man, that great man did, I acknowledge, use some hasty and incautious words at the Battle of Monmouth, when Lee attempted to excuse his treacherous conduct: but, if there ever was an occasion on which a man might be excused for such forgetfulness, it was that occasion!’”

In reply to an insolent letter written by General Lee immediately after the battle, in which he protested against 237“very singular expressions used on the field, which implied that he was either guilty of disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or want of courage,” Washington replied: “I received your letter, expressed, as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not conscious of any very singular expressions at the time of my meeting you, as you intimate. What I recollect to have said, was dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion.”

As at Kipp’s Bay, when Washington denounced the panic as “dastardly and cowardly,” and tradition called that “profanity,”—thus, at Monmouth, Washington rebuked Lee’s conduct. Lee’s letter, just cited, conveys his estimate of Washington’s words and manner. He also testified, that it was “manner rather than words” that gave him offence.

The Battle of Monmouth, from first to last, was a supreme test of Washington the Soldier. From Monmouth, he marched to Brunswick, where he rested his troops; thence to Haverstraw Bay; and finally, on the twenty-second day of July, he established his summer headquarters at White Plains.

Note.—Washington’s Military Order Book, from the 22nd of June to 8th of August, 1779, in his own hand-writing, contains the following General Order.

“Many and pointed Orders have been issued against that unmeaning and abominable custom of swearing,—notwithstanding which, with much regret the General observes that it prevails if possible, more than ever. His feelings are continually wounded by the oaths and imprecations of the soldiers whenever he is in hearing of them. The name of that Being from whose bountiful goodness we are permitted to exist and enjoy the Comforts of life is incessantly imprecated and profaned in a manner as wanton as it is shocking. For the sake therefore of religion, decency and order, the General hopes and trusts that officers of every rank will use their influence and authority to Check a vice which is as unprofitable as it is wicked and shameful. If officers would make it an invariable rule to reprimand and, if that does not do—punish soldiers for offences of the kind, it would not fail of having the desired effect.”

Upon the return of General Clinton to New York as the successor to General Howe in command of “all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia to West Indies, inclusive,” his outlook over the territories which fell under his guardianship must have been that of faith rather than of sight. With the exception of Staten Island and the British supply depot, practically a part of New York, only one other post in the Northern Department, that of Newport, R.I., retained a British garrison. It is very certain that Clinton did not regard his exodus from Philadelphia and his collision with Washington’s army at Monmouth with as much enthusiasm as did Charles Lee, who, shortly after that battle, when demanding a speedy court-martial, informed Washington that “this campaign would close the war.” At any rate, Clinton was hardly settled in his quarters, before tidings reached him that, on the eighth, a formidable French fleet of twelve line-of-battle ships and four frigates had made the Delaware Capes; and that one of them, the Chinier, had conveyed to the American capital Monsieur Conrad A. Gerard, the first French Ambassador to the United States of America. Silas Deane, one of the American Commissioners at Paris, accompanied Monsieur Gerard. Clinton had reason to rejoice in this tardy arrival. The fleet sailed from Toulon, April thirteenth; but on account 239of contrary winds did not pass Gibraltar until the fifteenth day of May. A voyage of ordinary passage would have imperiled both Howe and Clinton; as four thousand troops accompanied the squadron, and its naval force was, just at that time, superior to that of Great Britain in American waters.

In order rightly to appreciate the campaign which almost immediately opened, it is interesting to observe how the operations of both America and Britain were controlled by incidents over which neither had control. They also illustrate the contingencies which shape all military and naval operations over a broad theatre of war. A superior British squadron, under Admiral Byron, sailed from Portsmouth, England, as soon as it was known that France would actively support the United States. This was on the twentieth day of May. Upon receipt of news, supposed to be trustworthy, that the French fleet had been ordered to the West Indies only, the order was suspended in time for his return. Admiral Byron, who had been ordered to relieve Admiral Howe, returned to Plymouth. He did not actually sail with his fine fleet of twenty-two ships until the fifth of June. Even then, the ships were scattered by storms; and four of them, reaching New York separately, narrowly escaped capture by the French just after Count d’Estaing left that port for Newport.

The French fleet, when advised of the evacuation of Philadelphia, immediately sailed for New York. Its arrival produced intense excitement. The Annual Register (British) of that period reflects the sentiment very fully. The British ships, then in port, were inferior in number and weight of metal to those of France. Every available vessel of sufficient capacity to carry heavy guns was immediately subsidized for defence. The entire city was exposed to attack as when occupied by the American 240army after its retreat from Long Island. It was a strange change in the relations of the British and American forces in that vicinity.

Washington, fully satisfied that Clinton could have no possible inducement again to enter New Jersey, hoped, that through the presence of the French ships and the accompanying troops he might wrest Newport from British control, and planned accordingly. He did not, however, overlook the possibility of even striking New York. He had been advised by the French Ambassador of the very perilous relations of France in the West Indies; and that the fleet which accompanied him to Philadelphia, with the expectation of a decisive action there, must soon be released for service elsewhere. Its change of destination to the port of New York involved an unexpected delay upon the American coast, and contingencies of a very serious character. American critics constantly complained that the French fleet did not at once bombard New York City. Even some military men of that period, and some historical speculators since that time, would denounce the statement of the French Admiral, that the depth of water was insufficient for his ships to approach the city, as a mere excuse for not doing so. Washington sent Colonels Laurens and Hamilton, confidential members of his staff, to learn the facts; and the most experienced pilots were offered fifty thousand dollars if they would agree to conduct the ships to the city. Hamilton’s Report read as follows:

“These experienced persons unanimously declared, that it was impossible to carry us in. All refused; and the particular soundings which I caused to be made myself, too well demonstrated that they were right.”

Washington immediately turned his attention to Newport; and the French fleet sailed at once to Rhode Island. Count d’Estaing cast anchor off Point Judith, only five 241miles from Newport, on the twenty-ninth day of July. As an indication of the condition of affairs at New York after his departure, the following despatch of General Clinton to Lord Germaine, bearing the same date, July twenty-ninth, is of interest, declaring: “I may yet be compelled to evacuate the city and return to Halifax.”

The reader will involuntarily recall the events of July and August, 1776, only two years prior to the date of this despondent letter. Then General Howe and Admiral Howe superciliously addressed communications to “George Washington, Esqr.” Now, General Howe was homeward bound, relieved from further service in America, because the same Washington had outgeneraled him as a Soldier. And his brother, Admiral Howe, had been granted his request to be transferred to some other sphere of naval service.

As soon as the French squadron of Count d’Estaing sailed from New York, Washington instructed General Sullivan, then in command at Providence, R.I., to summon the New England militia to his aid for a combined attack upon Newport; assigned Generals Greene and Lafayette to the command of divisions; and ordered the brigades of Varnum and Glover to report to Lafayette. These officers had served with Greene before Boston, and Varnum was a member of Greene’s old company, the Kentish Guards, which marched with him to Boston at the outbreak of war. The proposed coöperation of French troops also made the assignment of General Lafayette equally judicious.

The British garrison consisted of six thousand troops under Major-General Pigot. On the fifth of August two French frigates entered the harbor, and the British burned seven of their own frigates with which they had controlled the waters, to avoid their capture. Details of the siege of Newport, except as Washington bore relations 242to its progress and its ultimate failure, are not within the purpose of this narrative. It was unfortunate that General Sullivan so long detained the French troops on shipboard; where, as one of their officers wrote, they had been “cooped up” for more than five months. Their prompt landing would certainly have averted the subsequent disaster; as storms of unprecedented fury soon after swept the coast, with almost equal distress to the land forces and those on the sea. In General Washington’s letter, advising of the departure of Admiral Howe from New York for Newport, he thus forecast the future: “Unless the fleet have advices of reenforcements off the coast, it can only be accounted for on the principle of desperation, stimulated by a hope of finding you divided in your operations against Rhode Island.”

The American force was about ten thousand men. The tenth of the month had been specifically designated for a joint movement; but General Sullivan, without notifying the Count d’Estaing, anticipated it by a day, and failed. Count d’Estaing was a lieutenant-general in the French army; but agreed to waive his rank, and serve under Lafayette. The report was current at that time, that ill-feeling arose between General Sullivan and Count d’Estaing because of the precipitate action of General Sullivan on this occasion. On the contrary, Count d’Estaing understood that but two thousand troops were in the movement. He promptly called upon General Sullivan to consult as to further operations; and in a Report to Congress used this language, alike creditable to his judgment and his candor: “Knowing that there are moments which must be eagerly seized upon in war, I was cautious of blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless astonished me, and which, in fact, merits in my opinion only praise; although accumulated circumstances 243might have rendered the consequences very unfortunate.”

When he made his visit to General Sullivan, he left orders for the troops that were to join in the land expedition to follow. He had no knowledge, at that time, that Admiral Howe had received reënforcements, and had left New York to attack the French fleet then at Newport. A large number of the French seamen were upon Connanicut Island, on account of scurvy, and the fleet was scattered, without apprehension of an attack from the sea. A fog prevailed on the morning of the visit. D’Estaing returned to his flag-ship, and as the fog lifted, there appeared in the offing a British fleet of thirty-six sail. Admiral Howe had been reënforced by a portion of Admiral Byron’s fleet, which arrived in advance of its commander; and this force was superior to that of his adversary. D’Estaing was alert. Quickly gathering his ships, in spite of a rising gale, he succeeded in gaining and holding the “weather-gauge” of Howe, who did not dare press toward the land against such an advantage in D’Estaing’s favor. Both fleets were dispersed by the tempest over fifty miles of ocean, repeatedly meeting with collisions, and after several of his ships had been dismasted, Howe ran the gauntlet of a part of the French squadron, and returned to New York.

On the twentieth, Count d’Estaing returned to Newport; and on the twenty-second sailed for Boston to refit. A protest, signed by General Sullivan and others, including John Hancock, who took an active part in the operations of the siege, did not change his purpose. He had no alternative. It is true that much bad feeling, soon proven to have been absolutely unjustifiable, existed among Americans at the date of his departure. Sullivan himself issued an intemperate order, which he speedily modified, but not until it had gone to the public; in which he 244used these words: “The general yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining.”

Just at this time, a courier from Washington reached Sullivan’s headquarters with the information that General Clinton had sailed from New York with four thousand troops to reënforce the garrison of Newport; and strongly intimated “the importance of securing a timely retreat from the Island.” The suggestion was heeded. On the twenty-sixth, the heavy baggage was removed. On the twenty-eighth, a council of officers decided to withdraw to the north end of the island, until a messenger could be sent to Boston to urge the return of the French fleet. Lafayette was the messenger, and made the round trip in a few hours. Count d’Estaing very properly held, that to put in peril the entire fleet of France, in support of land operations so far from home and upon a strange coast, was a practical disobedience of his orders, and unjust to his sovereign; but, while he would not return with his fleet, he informed Lafayette, that he “was willing to lead the French troops, in person, to Newport,” and place himself “under General Sullivan’s orders.” In a manly explanation of his course, and notwithstanding General Sullivan’s proclamation, of which he was advised, he used this language: “I was anxious to demonstrate that my countrymen could not be offended by a sudden expression of feeling; and that he who commanded them in America, was, and would be, at all times, one of the most devoted and zealous servants of the United States.”

By three o’clock of the twenty-ninth, the Americans occupied Quaker Hill and Turkey Hill. These localities are still remembered for the gallantry of their defenders during subsequent British assaults. At eleven o’clock, Lafayette returned from Boston, and before twelve—as reported by Sullivan—“the main army had crossed 245to the mainland with stores and baggage.” As at Brandywine, Barren Hill and Monmouth, Lafayette remained with the rear-guard, and brought away the last of the pickets in good order, “not a man nor an article of baggage having been left behind.”

On the morning of the thirtieth, one hundred and five sail of British vessels were in sight, bringing Clinton’s army to the rescue of the garrison. Howe returned immediately to New York, although Gray made an expedition from Newport which committed depredations at Bedford, Fairhaven, Martha’s Vineyard, and all places from which American privateers were fitted out for assaults upon British commerce. Admiral Howe afterwards sailed for Boston, but being unable to entice Count d’Estaing to so unequal a contest, returned again to New York. On the first of November, Admiral Byron appeared off Boston with a large naval force, but was driven to sea by a storm which so disabled his fleet that he was compelled to go to Newport and refit. On his voyage from England he had been compelled to stop at Halifax, and it has been well said of this officer, that he chiefly “fought the ocean, during the year 1778.”

Count d’Estaing sailed for the West Indies on the third of November. The first coöperation of the French navy in support of the United States had resulted in no victories, on land or sea; but it had precipitated the evacuation of Philadelphia, restricted the garrison of New York to operations within the reach of the British navy, and was a practical pledge of thorough sympathy with America in her struggle for complete independence of Great Britain, and of the emphatic determination of France to maintain, as well as acknowledge, that independence.

The Headquarters of the American Army remained at White Plains until the latter part of September. Upon reaching that post, immediately following the Battle of Monmouth, after two years of absence, the American Commander-in-Chief, profoundly appreciating the mutations of personal and campaign experience through which himself and army had kept company in the service of “God and Country,” thus expressed himself:

“The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith; and more than wicked that has not gratitude enough to recognize the obligation.”

Washington’s self-control of a strongly passionate natural temper, and his equanimity under most exasperating ordeals, first were due to maternal influence, and then to his faith in some guiding principle of the inner self which enabled him to devote his entire faculties to passing duty, unhampered by the many personal considerations which so grievously worried many of his subordinates.

Upon the failure of operations against Newport, Sullivan reoccupied Providence; Lafayette occupied Bristol, and afterwards withdrew to Warren, beyond the reach of the British shipping. Greene, still acting as Quartermaster-General, went to Boston, to superintend the purchase of supplies for the French fleet. It is to be noticed, in connection with the presence of the French fleet at 247Boston, that one of its officers, Chevalier de Saint Sauveur, was killed while attempting to quiet an affray between the French and some disorderly persons who visited a French bakery. On the next day, the Massachusetts General Assembly, ordered the erection of a monument to his memory.

Washington removed from White Plains to Fishkill, ever on the watch for the defences of the Hudson and the assurance of constant communication between New England and New York. On the tenth, he was at Petersburg. On the twenty-seventh, he announced the disposition of the army for the approaching winter.

The formal assignments of commands to posts and departments, at this time, indicate his judgment of their relative value and exposure: “Nine brigades are disposed on the west side of the Hudson River, exclusive of the garrison of West Point; one of which will be near Smith’s Clove, for the security of that pass, and as a reënforcement to West Point, in case of necessity. The Jersey brigade is ordered to spend the winter at Elizabethtown, to cover the lower parts of New Jersey. Seven brigades, consisting of the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania troops, will be at Middlebrook; six brigades will be left on the east side of the river and at West Point; three of which (of Massachusetts troops) will be stationed for the immediate defence of the Highlands,—one at West Point, in addition to the garrison already there, and the other two at Fishkill and Continental Village. The remaining three brigades, composed of the New Hampshire and Connecticut troops, and Hazen’s Regiment, will be posted in the vicinity of Danbury, for the protection of the country lying along the Sound; to cover our magazines lying on Connecticut river; and to aid the Highlands, on any serious movement of the enemy that way. The park of artillery will 248be at Pluckemin; the cavalry will be disposed of thus: Bland’s Regiment at Winchester, Va.”

The significance of this last assignment will be apparent, if it be remembered that the Hessian troops, captured at Saratoga, preferred to remain in America; so that, when Burgoyne’s army reached Cambridge for transportation to England, the foreign troops were sent to Virginia. Some threats had reached the ever-attentive ear of the American Commander-in-Chief, that an attempt would be made to release this command and employ it in the field, at the south. Of the other cavalry squadrons, Baylis’ was to occupy Frederick, or Hagerstown, Md.; Sheldon’s, to be at Durham, Conn.; and Lee’s Corps, (Col. Harry Lee), “will be with that part of the army which is in the Jerseys, acting on the advanced posts.”

General Putnam was assigned to command at Danbury, General McDougall, in the Highlands; and general headquarters were to be near Middlebrook.

No extensive field operations took place in the Northern States, after the Battle of Monmouth. Several restricted excursions were made, which kept the American Commander-in-Chief on the watch for the Highland posts; but these became less and less frequent as the year 1778 drew near its close. The British cabinet ordered five thousand of Clinton’s troops to the West Indies, and three thousand more to Florida.

On the twenty-seventh of September, General Gray surprised Colonel Baylor’s Light Horse at Tappan, on the Hudson, as completely as he had surprised Wayne at Paoli. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, confirmed their usual custom of warfare by forays which brought little plunder and less intrinsic credit. Cornwallis with five thousand men made an incursion into New Jersey, between the Hudson and the Hackensack; and Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, 249with three thousand men, operated in Westchester County, between the Bronx and the Hudson, but with small acquisition of provisions or other supplies.

On the eighth of October General Clinton, in writing to Lord Germaine, says: “With an army so much diminished, at New York, nothing important can be done, especially as it is weakened by sending seven hundred men to Halifax, and three hundred to Bermuda.” On the fifteenth of October, Captain Ferguson of the Seventieth British Foot, with three thousand regulars and the Third New Jersey Volunteers (royalists) made a descent upon Little Neck, N.J., where many privateers were equipped; surprised a detachment of Count Pulaski’s American Brigade, and inflicted a loss of fifty killed, but none wounded, including Lieutenant-Colonel the Baron de Bose, and Lieutenant de la Borderie. Ferguson says, in his official report: “It being a night attack, little quarter, of course, could be given; so that there were only five prisoners.” Count Pulaski vigorously pursued the party, inflicting some loss. This Ferguson was one of the partisan leaders who was merciless in slaughter, as too many of the auxiliary leaders of that period proved themselves to be when upon irresponsible marauding expeditions.

Meanwhile, Indian massacres in Wyoming Valley, during July, and that of Cherry Valley, on the eleventh of November, afterwards to be avenged, multiplied the embarrassments of the prosecution of the war, and kept the Commander-in-Chief constantly on the alert. The condition of Clinton, in New York, had indeed become critical. The position of the American army so restricted even his food-supplies, that he had to depend largely upon England; and on the second day of December he wrote again, and even more despondently, to the British Secretary of State: “I do not complain; but, my lord, do not 250let anything be expected of me, circumstanced as I am.” The British Cabinet had already indicated its purpose to abandon further extensive operations in the Northern States, and to utilize the few troops remaining in America, in regions where less organized resistance would be met, and where their fleets could control the chief points to be occupied. As early as November twenty-seventh, Commodore Hyde Parker had convoyed a fleet of transports to Savannah, with a total land force of thirty-five hundred men; and on the twenty-ninth of December, Savannah had been captured.

The year 1778 closed, with the Southern campaign opened; but the American Congress had no money; and the loose union of the States constantly evoked sectional jealousies. Any thoughtful reader of this narrative must have noticed with what discriminating judgment enlistments were accommodated to the conditions of each section, and that care was taken to dispose of troops where their local associations were most conducive to their enthusiastic effort. Washington thus forcibly exposed the condition of affairs, when he declared that “the States were too much engaged in their local concerns, when the great business of a nation, the momentous concerns of an empire, were at stake.”

Bancroft, the historian, thus fitly refers to Washington at this eventful crisis in American affairs: “He, who in the beginning of the Revolution used to call Virginia his country, from this time never ceased his efforts, by conversation and correspondence, to train the statesmen of America, especially of his beloved State, to the work of consolidation of the Union.”

At the close of 1778, General Washington visited Philadelphia; and thus solemnly and pungently addressed Colonel Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Burgesses. After urging Virginia to send the best and 251ablest of her men to Congress, he thus continues: “They must not slumber nor sleep at home, at such a time of pressing danger; content with the enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own State, while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into inevitable ruin.... If I were to draw a picture of the times and men, from what I have seen, heard, and in part know, I should, in one word say: that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance, seem to have laid fast hold of many of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration and almost of every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; ... while a great and accumulating debt, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequences is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations, if our affairs wore the most promising aspect.... An assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, will not only take men away from acting in this business, but even from thinking of it; while the great part of the officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the service; and the more virtuous few, rather than do this, are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want.”

There is a touch of the pathetic, and an almost despondent tone with which the closing paragraph of this utterance of the American Commander-in-Chief closes, when he adds: “Our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition, than they have been since the commencement of the war.”

There was no danger from any extended movement of British armies in force, and a consequent relaxation of effort pervaded the Colonies which had been most largely called upon for men to meet immediate invasion. This partial repose brought actual indolence and loss of enthusiasm 252in general operations beyond the districts immediately exposed to British attack. The winter garrison of Philadelphia, like that of Howe the previous year, languished in confinement, grew feeble in spirit, and weakened in discipline. Congress shared the enervating effect of the temporary suspension of active hostilities; and it was not until the ninth of March, 1779, that the definite establishment of the army, upon the fixed basis of eighty battalions, was formally authorized.

The inaction of Clinton at New York gave the American Commander-in-Chief an opportunity to turn his attention to the Indian atrocities perpetrated the previous year in central New York; and on the nineteenth of April he sent a force under Colonel Schenck, Lieutenant-Colonel Willett and Major Cochran, which destroyed the settlement of the Onondagas, on the lands still occupied by them, near the present city of Syracuse in that State. An expedition was again planned for Canada, but the wisdom of Washington induced Congress to abandon it. Confederate money dropped to the nominal value of three or four cents on the dollar; and Washington was constrained to offer his private estate for sale, to meet his personal necessities. Congress seemed incapable of realizing the impending desolation which must attend a forcible invasion of the southern States, and Washington was powerless to detach troops from the north, equal to any grave emergency in that section, so long as Clinton occupied New York in force. General Greene, comprehending the views of Washington and the immediate necessity for organizing an army for the threatened States, equal to the responsibility, asked permission to undertake that responsibility; but Congress refused to sanction such a detail, although approved by Washington. This refusal, and the consequent delay to anticipate British invasion at the South, protracted the war, and brought both disaster 253and loss which early action might have anticipated, or prevented. The utmost that could be secured from Congress was permission for the detail of a portion of the regular troops which had been recruited at the South, to return to that section for active service.

Lafayette, finding that active duty was not anticipated, sailed from Boston for France, January 11, 1779, upon the frigate Alliance, which the Continental Congress placed at his disposal.

General Lincoln, of the American army—who had reached Charleston on the last day of December, 1778—attempted to thwart the operations of the British General Sir Augustine Prevost; but without substantial, permanent results. The British, from Detroit, operated as far south as the valley of the Wabash River, in the Illinois country; but Thomas Jefferson, then Governor of Virginia, with troops raised in Virginia and North Carolina, strengthened the western frontier and placed it in a condition of defence, unaided by Congress.

The Middle States, however, had some experience of the desultory kind of warfare which characterized the greater part of the military operations of 1779. General Matthews sailed from New York late in April, with two thousand troops and five hundred marines, laid waste Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, destroyed over one hundred vessels, and returned to New York with seventeen prizes and three thousand hogsheads of tobacco, without serious loss to his command. As if keen to watch for the slightest opportunity of resuming active operations from New York, and constantly dreading the nearness and alertness of the American headquarters in New Jersey, Clinton, on the thirteenth of May, under convoy of the fleet of Sir George Collier, surprised the small garrisons at Verplanck’s and Stony Point, re-garrisoned them with British troops, and retired to Yonkers, 254leaving several small frigates and sloops-of-war to cover each post.

The American army was removed from Middlebrook to Smith’s Clove, on the ninth. On the twenty-third, Washington removed his headquarters to New Windsor, leaving General Putnam in command. General Heath was ordered to Boston, and General Wayne was stationed between the Clove and Fort Montgomery, near Dunderburg Mountain.

Such were the modified positions of the two armies of the north, at the close of June, 1779.

In Fennimore Cooper’s interesting romance, “The Spy,” he furnishes graphic delineations of the true character of those minor operations about New York which were parts of General Clinton’s military recreation, while he had too small a force to meet Washington’s compact army in actual battle. Night forays and short excursions, under the cover of small vessels-of-war and assured of safe retreat, were of frequent occurrence. Mounted bands, officially known as the Queen’s Rangers, had very large discretion in their movements and methods. They galloped to and fro, at will, sometimes securing plunder, and sometimes barely escaping with less than they started with. As a general rule, some “spy” was on the watch, and their ventures were simply mis-adventures. The American “cow-boys” were just as real characters, although less organized; and each party carried on a small war of its own, for the plunder realized. Clinton’s lucky capture of Stony Point encouraged him to undertake other enterprises which weakened the resources of the people, without enhanced prestige to the British troops. On the first of July, Tarleton went out for twenty-four hours, and on his return, made report. He had “surprised Sheldon’s cavalry, near Salem; captured Sheldon’s colors [accidentally left in a barn], burned the Presbyterian church, and received little loss.” 256He says: “I proposed terms to the militia, that if they would not fire from the houses, I would not burn them.” But the militia that gathered in his rear made the expedition unprofitable. In less than eight hours Washington learned of the excursion.

On the third day of July, General Tryon, under convoy of the fleet of Sir George Collier, which had escorted General Clinton to Stony Point, sailed with twenty-six hundred men for New Haven, Conn. On Sunday, July fourth, when the people were observing the Sabbath and looking forward with enthusiasm to the following morning and the observance of “Independence Day,” Tryon published the following letter to the people of Connecticut: “The ungenerous and wanton insurrections against the sovereignty of Great Britain into which this colony has been deluded by the artifices of designing men, for private purposes, might well justify in you every fear which conscious guilt could form respecting the intentions of the present movement. The existence of a single habitation on your defenceless coast, ought to be a constant reproof to your ingratitude.”

The landing of the various divisions at East Haven, Savin Rock, and other points; and the vigorous defence upon the New Haven Green, by Capt. James Hillhouse, in command of the students of Yale College, are matters of familiar history. Fairfield, Green Farms, Huntington, Long Island, Greenfield and Norwalk shared in this raid; but it only embittered the struggle, and on the thirteenth the expedition returned to New York. When Tryon’s expedition started, Washington was opposite Staten Island; being on a tour of personal inspection of all posts along the Hudson and the New Jersey approaches from the sea. On the seventh of July, when advised that Tryon had sailed, he sent an express to Governor Trumbull, and ordered General Glover, then at Providence, to 257coöperate with the militia in case the enemy should make any descent upon the Connecticut coast.

Meanwhile, and as the result of his tour of inspection, he planned a counter movement to these demonstrations of the New York garrison. During the six weeks’ occupation of Stony Point by the British Grenadiers of the Seventieth Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, heavy guns had been mounted; breastworks and batteries had been built in advance of the fort, and two rows of abatis crossed the slope leading to the water. Washington, perfectly familiar with the post and the additions to its defences, prepared a minute plan for its capture. General Wayne, it will be remembered, had been posted near Dunderburg Mountain, in the distribution of officers made on the twenty-third of the month. Wayne entered into the plan with avidity. The detail of troops made by Washington and the instructions given have interest, as every possible effort was made to avoid failure or premature disclosure of the design. Colonel Febiger’s Regiment, followed by Colonel Webb’s (Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs commanding) and a detachment from West Point under Major Hull, formed the right. Colonel Butler’s Regiment, and two companies of North Carolina troops under Major Murphy, formed the left. Colonel Lee’s Light Horse, three hundred strong, which had been manœuvered during the day so as not to lead vagrants or spies to suspect their destination, formed the covering party, and took a position on the opposite side of a swamp near the post. The troops left Sandy Beach at midnight and marched by single files, over mountains, through morasses, and deep defiles. At eight o’clock of the sixteenth, the command was within a mile and a half of the fort. Wayne made reconnoissance in person, and at half-past eleven at night the advance was ordered. In order to prevent any deserter from giving warning to the garrison, 258the purpose of the expedition was not announced until the order to attack could be given personally, by each officer, to his individual command.

The following order was at the same time communicated to the men: “If any soldier presume to take his musket from his shoulder; attempt to fire; or begin the battle till ordered by his proper officer, he shall be instantly put to death by the officer next him.” (This implied, of course, death by the sword.) The advance was to be “with fixed bayonets, and unloaded muskets.” Each officer and soldier had been ordered to place a white paper or cloth upon his cap, to distinguish him from an enemy; and the watchword, to be shouted aloud whenever one detachment reached its point of attack, as an encouragement to the others and a terror to the garrison, was, “The fort is ours!” Pioneer parties, carefully selected, wrenched away the abatis. The detachments moved instantly, as if impelled by some invisible, resistless force. The two assaulting columns met in the centre of the works almost at the same moment. Wayne fell, seriously but not mortally wounded, while passing the abatis. The entire American loss was fifteen killed, and eighty-three wounded. The British loss was one officer and nineteen men killed; six officers and sixty-eight men wounded; twenty-five officers and four hundred and forty-seven men taken prisoners; two officers and fifty-six men missing. The night was dark, and the difficulties of crossing the morass below the fort, at nearly full tide, and clambering up rugged cliffs thick with briars and underbrush, cannot be described. A modern visitor will find it difficult enough to make the same trip, by daylight. The stores, valued at $158,640, were divided by Washington’s order among the troops, in proportion to the pay of officers and men. The courteous treatment extended by him to the prisoners received very gracious 259recognition from the British authorities. The faithfulness, skill, and daring, and the good judgment with which Wayne comprehended and carried out, in almost literal detail, the plans of Washington, were greatly to his honor, and evoked most appreciative commendation from his superior officer.

General Clinton promptly organized a force, and proceeded up the river to recapture the post; but Washington, having dismantled it, decided that its further retention was not of sufficient value to spare a garrison for its permanent defence, and left it for occupation by the British at their leisure.

Another excursion from New York by Tarleton, into Westchester County, about the middle of August, was reciprocated under Washington’s orders, with decided éclat and success. On the nineteenth of August, Col. Henry Lee crossed the Hackensack; moved down the Hudson River, and at half-past two o’clock in the morning, at low tide, captured Paulus Hook, where Jersey City now stands, nearly opposite Clinton’s New York headquarters. Not a shot was fired by the storming party. Only the bayonet was used. The Americans lost twenty, and the British lost fifteen, besides one hundred and fifty taken prisoners.

For many months Washington had been watching for an opportunity of sufficient relief from British activity, to punish the Indians who perpetrated their outrages in the Wyoming Valley; and as early as the sixth of March, he tendered to General Gates the command of an expedition for that purpose. In this assignment he enclosed an order for him to assume General Sullivan’s command at Providence, in case he declined the expedition. General Gates, then at Boston, thus replied: “Last night, I had the honor of your Excellency’s letter. The man who undertakes the Indian service should enjoy youth and 260strength, which I do not possess. It therefore grieves me that your Excellency should offer me a command to which I am entirely unequal. In obedience to your command I have forwarded your letter to General Sullivan; and that he may not be one moment delayed, I have desired him to leave the command with General Greene until I arrive in Providence.”

General Sullivan marched from Eastern Pennsylvania, reaching Wyoming Valley on the thirty-first of July, and Tioga Point, N.Y., on the eighth of August, with a force of five thousand men. Gen. James Clinton joined him from the northern army. The brigades of Generals Poor, Hand, and Maxwell, Parr’s Rifle Corps, and Proctor’s Artillery, all familiar to the reader, formed the invading force. On the twenty-ninth day of August, the Battle of Chemung was fought, near the present city of Elmira, and the towns of the Six Nations were laid waste, including orchards, gardens, houses, clothing, and provisions, indiscriminately. There was nothing in this punishment of the Six Nations which commended the American cause to their favor; but they did not regard the details of these ravages as a part of Washington’s instructions. When the War for Independence closed, and their alliance with the United States became a fixed fact, Washington represented their ideal of the great soldier—“He had made the power of Britain to yield to his arms.” Governor Blackstone, Chief of the Senecas, Cornplanter, and Halftown, the famous trio who made the treaty with Washington, were ever known as “the friends of Washington.” A silver medal presented to Governor Blackstone, which bore the simple inscription “Second Presidency of George Washington,” was long esteemed as a most precious relic. Handsome Lake, known as the “Peace Prophet,”—brother of Tecumseh,—made as a tribute to Washington one of the most impressive utterances 261of his mission among the Six Nations. Even as late as the Eleventh United States Census, 1890, Washington’s name, alone of all the American Presidents, was not found among the children’s names of the Six Nations; so greatly was he held in reverence. They also engrafted into their religion the myth that “he occupies a mansion at the gate of Paradise, where he becomes visible to all who enter its portals and ascend to the Great Spirit, and both recognizes and returns the salute of all who enter.”

This devotion of his Indian admirers is hardly less valuable than the tributes of Frederick the Great and other European soldiers and statesmen to the qualities of Washington as a Soldier; and it permanently redeems the name of Washington from any responsibility for the excessive desolation with which the Six Nations were visited in the expedition of 1779.

On the twenty-fifth of August, while Sullivan was upon this Indian expedition, Admiral Arbuthnot arrived with reënforcements of three thousand men, and relieved Sir George Collier in naval command. On the twenty-first of September, Sir Andrew Hammond arrived with an additional force of fifteen hundred men, from Cork, Ireland. At this juncture, Count d’Estaing, having captured St. Vincent and Granada in the West Indies, suddenly made his appearance off the coast of Georgia. Spain had joined France in war against Great Britain; so that the whole line of British posts, from Halifax to St. Augustine, was exposed to such naval attacks as would divert the attention of Great Britain from the designs of her allied enemies against her West India possessions.

Washington, upon the arrival of these British reënforcements, strengthened West Point with additional works; but Clinton, even with his large naval force, did not venture an attack upon that post, as had been his intention when making requisition for more troops.

262On the twenty-fifth of October, 1779, General Clinton abandoned Newport, R.I.; then Verplanck Point; then Stony Point: and for the first time since Washington landed in New York, in 1776, the whole of New England and the entire stretch of the Hudson River, was unvexed by British steel or British keel.

If the mind weary of the recital of events which by night and by day burdened the soul and tasked the energies of the American Commander-in-Chief to their utmost strain, it cannot but be refreshed by evidence of his abiding confidence and patience in the cause of American Independence, as the theatre of war enlarged and gradually placed every colony under the weight of British pressure. The issue of two hundred millions of paper money had indeed been authorized, and a loan was invited abroad; but, as ever, men were wanted, and were not forthcoming. Even the States which had longest borne the brunt of battle, and had only just been relieved from its immediate dangers, seemed to weary under the reaction of that relief, as if the storm had passed by, never again to sweep over the same surface. It was also very natural as well as true, that the pledge of French intervention and the gleam of the oriflamme of France, did, in a measure, compose anxiety and lessen the sense of local responsibility for such a contribution of troops from every section as would make the nation as independent of France as of Great Britain.

There was a sense of weariness, a tendency to fitful strokes of local energy, without that overwhelming sense of need which first rallied all sections to a common cause. Congress also seemed, at times, almost to stagger under its load. But Washington, who sometimes grew weary 264and groaned in spirit, and sometimes panted with shortened breath while toiling upward to surmount some new obstruction, never, never staggered. For him, there were “stepping-stones in the deepest waters.” For him, though tides might ebb and flow, the earth itself forever kept its even course about the guiding sun; and for him, the sun of Liberty was the light of the soul. Every circling year but added blessings from its glow, and energy from its power. The intensity of his emotion when he penned those solemn truthful words to Harrison, showed but the impulse of a spiritual power which the times demanded, but would neither comprehend nor brook if from other sources than Washington’s majestic will and presence. From the summit of his faith, he clearly indicated with pen-point the driveling selfishness which postponed triumph and made the chariot-wheels drag so heavily through the advancing war.

The scenes were suddenly shifted to the southern stage of operations. New characters were to take the parts of some who had fulfilled their destiny; but many of both men and ships that participated in the siege of Boston itself, were still to act an honored part until the revolution should be complete. The cities of Charleston and Savannah were to be visited, as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia had been visited: not with a paternal yearning for their return to a cheerful “mother-home”; but in the spirit of a master dealing with overworked and fractious slaves. But the slaves had both burst and buried their shackles; and whether in city or country, on mountain or in valley, in forest or in swamp—wherever animal life could exist, there, and everywhere, the South, ever generous, ever proud, ever self-respecting, and ever loyal to completions of duty, were to besprinkle the altar of their country with life-blood, and consummate the War for American Independence upon her consecrated soil.

265The short-sighted critics of the North who had tried to play upon sectional prejudice, that some one of their self-sufficient number might till Washington’s saddle, began to wonder why he remained at his post in New Jersey; why he did not surrender the northern command to one of their number, and then go where his ancestral home was endangered and the companions of his youth were to struggle for very life itself. But the greatness of Washington the Soldier was never more apparent than now. Calmly he sustained himself at this point of vantage; stretching out his arm—in turn to soothe and warn, or to hurl defiance in the teeth of foes or stragglers, but ever to nerve the nation to duty.

There was no costly throne set up at Morristown, or Middlebrook. There was no luxury there. There were camp-cots, and camp-chairs, and usually, rations sufficient for the daily need; but the centre of the upheaving energies of American Liberty was there; and these energies were controlled and directed, with no loss in transmission, by the immediate presence of the Commander-in-Chief.

It will be remembered, at the very mention of Southern Colonies, or Southern States, how peculiar was their relation to the mother country, from the earliest British supremacy along the eastern Atlantic coast. The Romanist, the Churchman, the Presbyterian, and the Huguenot, in their respective search for larger liberty and missionary work, had shared equally in a sense of oppression, before their migration to America. They had much in common with the early settlers of the New England coast. The Hollanders of New Jersey and the Quakers of Pennsylvania, between the extremes, were not wholly absorbed in business ventures. But all alike had additional incentives to a more independent life, far removed from those social and artificial obligations which reigned supreme in the Old World. There were indeed 266adventurers for conquest, for wealth, and for political power, among them; and the aristocratic usages which accompanied the royal prerogative were fostered by the presence of slavery, so that they affected the vital functions of the new Republic for generations. But, with the exception of elements earlier noticed, the “ferment of American Liberty” was never more decided, pure, and constant in Massachusetts than in Virginia; nor more bold, desperate and defiant, among the Green Mountains of Vermont than among the pine woods and palmetto groves of North and South Carolina.

The closing months of the nineteenth century seem to have been reserved, in the providence of God, for the consummation of that lofty anticipation of Washington which Daniel Webster formulated in one sublime utterance, “The Union; now and forever; One and Inseparable.”

And now, in the spirit of this memory of the pioneers of American civilization, the narrative returns to the immediate burdens upon the mind of Washington; as, in the closing months of 1779, we face the mirror southward, and catch its reflections.

As the winter season of 1779–’80 drew on, and the ordinary hurricanes of the West India storm-belt indicated a very restricted use of the French navy in those waters, an effort was made to induce Count d’Estaing to support an American attack upon Savannah. He responded promptly; and besides sending five ships to Charleston to perfect details for the combined movement of both southern armies, anchored his principal squadron of twenty ships-of-the-line, two 50’s and eleven frigates, outside the bar of Tybee Island, on the eighth day of September. Six thousand French troops accompanied the fleet. Governor Rutledge of South Carolina so 267actively aided the enterprise, that a sufficient number of small craft were procured to land thirty-five hundred and twenty-four of these troops at Bieulien, on Ossahaw Inlet, about twelve miles from Savannah. The march was immediately begun. On the sixteenth, Count d’Estaing demanded surrender of the city. The Legislature of South Carolina adjourned. Militia replaced the regulars at Fort Moultrie, and within four days, on the eighth, quite a strong force marched for Savannah. General Lincoln left on the tenth. Meanwhile, the British General Prescott had so actively destroyed bridges and obstructed roads, that the Americans did not join the French troops until the sixteenth. Trenches were not begun until the twenty-fourth of September, and the difficulty of obtaining draught animals for hauling heavy siege-guns to their proper position, still longer delayed the movement. The enthusiasm of the American officers over the prospect of French coöperation led them to assure Count d’Estaing that his delay before Savannah would not exceed from ten to sixteen days; and upon this distinct assurance, he had thus promptly disembarked his land forces. The French West Indies had been left without naval support; and already an entire month had passed with every probability that a British fleet from New York would take advantage of the opportunity to recapture West India posts so recently captured by the French. Abandonment of the siege, or an assault, became an immediate necessity, especially as Count d’Estaing had undertaken the enterprise, urged by Lafayette, with no other authority than his general instructions as to America, and his deep interest in the struggle.

The assault was made on the ninth day of October. It was desperate, with alternate success and failure at different portions of the works; but ultimately, a repulse. The British casualties were few, four officers and thirty-six 268men killed; four officers and one hundred and fifteen men wounded and missing. The French loss was fifteen officers and one hundred and sixteen men killed; forty-three officers and four hundred and eleven men wounded. Count d’Estaing was twice wounded, and Count Pulaski, as well as Sergeant Jasper, so brave at Moultrie in 1776, were among the killed. Colonel Laurens, aid-de-camp to Washington, was conspicuous in the assault, as he proved himself at Newport, and afterwards at Yorktown.

The French withdrew their artillery, and sailed on the twenty-ninth. The Americans returned to Charleston. The result of the siege affected both northern armies. Washington abandoned an attack upon New York, for which he had assembled a large force of New York and Massachusetts militia. Learning that Clinton was preparing to go South, either to Georgia or South Carolina, he ordered the North Carolina troops to march to Charleston in November, and the Virginia regulars to follow in December. Clinton left New York on the twenty-sixth of December for Charleston with seven thousand five hundred men, leaving Lieutenant-General Knyphausen in command.

Washington again placed General Heath in command of the Highlands; sent the cavalry to Connecticut, and with the remainder of the army marched to Morristown, which for the second time became his winter headquarters.

The first act of General Washington upon reaching Morristown was to invoice his resources and balance his accounts. He “called the roll” of his army, made record of all supplies, and framed estimates for forthcoming necessities. It was a depressing exhibit. Excluding South Carolina and Georgia troops, which were assigned to their own home department, the entire Muster, including all independent organizations as well as drummers, fifers, teamsters, and all attachés of every kind, and upon the impossible assumption that every man on the original Roll was still living, and in the service, footed up only twenty-seven thousand and ninety-nine men.

The army was in huts. The snow was an even two feet in depth. All defiles were drifted full, and hard-packed, well-nigh impassable. But a few days more of the year remained. On the thirty-first, within a few days, two thousand and fifty enlistments would expire. In ninety days more, March the thirty-first, six thousand four hundred and ninety-six more would expire. By the last of April, when active operations might be anticipated, the total reduction by expiration of term of service would reach eight thousand one hundred and fifty; by the last of September, ten thousand seven hundred and nine; and, during the year, twelve thousand one hundred and fifty.

270The total force enlisted “for the war” was but fourteen thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight men; and from the numbers already given, were to be detailed the necessary number of artificers, armorers, wagoners, quartermasters’ employees, and all those subordinate detachments which reduce the fighting force of an army, as well as all casualties since their first muster. To this is to be added the fact, that the several States furnished their respective quotas at different times, and for different periods, so that there was a constant addition of raw levies. The army, in fact, had no opportunity to be thoroughly drilled and disciplined, in all its parts. Such was the condition of the Army of the United States, when the second campaign in the Southern States began.

Some reader may very naturally inquire why Washington did not attack the British garrison of New York, after Clinton’s departure for Charleston with so many troops. Critics at the time made complaint, and some writers have indorsed their criticisms through ignorance of the facts. An examination of the original Returns of Clinton, still found in the British archives, gives the following result. This estimate was taken at the time when Washington was preparing to make an attempt on New York. The British force of that post and its dependencies was twenty-six thousand seven hundred and fifty-six effectives. There were in Georgia three thousand nine hundred and thirty men; and in Florida, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven effectives. At Penobscot, Me., and at Halifax, subject to call, there was an additional force of three thousand four hundred and sixty, making an aggregated force of nearly thirty-eight thousand men.

When General Clinton sailed with his seven thousand five hundred men, the British force in the Southern Department 271became thirteen thousand two hundred and sixty-seven; but it left in New York an effective strength of twenty-one thousand and six men. And yet this garrison was not without apprehension of attack. The winter was one of unexampled severity. New York harbor froze until teams could cross upon the ice. The British army was almost in a starving condition. Country supplies of wood were cut off, until vessels at the wharves were chopped up for fuel. The American army was not wholly idle. Lord Stirling, with twenty-five hundred men, crossed to Staten Island on the ice, in spite of the extreme cold, to attack that British supply-post; but a sudden opening in the ice restored British communication with the city, and his expedition failed of valuable results. On the twenty-fifth of January, General Knyphausen sent a small detachment across the ice at Paulus Hook and captured a company at Newark; while Lieutenant-Colonel Buskirk crossed from Staten Island, and at Elizabethtown captured the picket and burned the Town House, as well as the church of the Rev. James Caldwell, Chaplain of Colonel Elias Dayton’s Regiment. On the second of February, Lieutenant-Colonel Norton rode in sleighs, to attack a small American post near White Plains; but, otherwise, the British as well as the American army had enough to do to prevent freezing to death.

During the extreme freeze of January, 1780, the suffering in the American camp is reported as “baffling description. The paths were marked by blood from the feet of barefooted soldiers.” Bancroft and Irving have left nothing to add here. General Greene, Quartermaster-General, reported on the eleventh of January: “Such weather I never did feel. For six or eight days there has been no living abroad. We drive over the tops of fences. We have been alternately out of meat and bread for eight or nine days past, and without either for three or 272four.” It was a time, also, when the royalist element gained some hope; and Clinton’s Official Return for December reports a force of four thousand and sixty-four Provincials then in British pay. The women of New Jersey came to the rescue of the suffering soldiers of Washington in a manner that exhausts all possible forms of recognition. Clothing and feeding the naked and hungry was their constant employment. Washington says of New Jersey, that “his requisitions were punctually complied with, and in many counties exceeded.”

During this entire period there was one supervision exercised by the American Commander-in-Chief which knew no interruption, whatever the inclemency of the weather. Every pass to his strongly intrenched camp, and every bold promontory, or distinct summit, that observed or commanded approach, was guarded, and watch-fires were instituted for signals of danger, or warning to the militia. The perpetuation of his strongholds in New Jersey saved the Republic.

During this well-nigh desperate condition of his army, and the increasing peril to the Southern Department, he made one more Report of his condition to Congress, and it belongs to this narrative as a signal exhibit of his wisdom and courage, as well as his discernment of the increasing lethargy of sections not in immediate danger from British aggression. It reads as follows: “Certain I am, unless Congress are vested with powers by the separate States competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume them as a matter of right, and they and the States act with more energy than they have done, our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge along in the old way. By ill-timing in the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarranted jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of 273Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and they differ in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill. While such a system as the present one, or rather, the want of one, prevails, we shall be ever unable to apply our strongest resources to any advantage.... I see one head gradually organizing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are considering themselves dependent upon their respective States.”

On the third of April, Washington again wrote in such plain terms of “the mutinous spirit, intense disgust, and absolute desperation of his small, famished, ragged, and depleted command,” that after hot debate, a committee of three was reluctantly sent to advise with him as to measures of relief.

That the reader may more fully appreciate the temper of some narrow-minded men of that period, and at so fearful a crisis, the following extract from a letter to the Count de Vergennes is cited. In referring to the simple question of appointing a committee to visit their Commander-in-Chief, this American writes: “It was said that the appointment of a committee would be putting too much power in a few hands, and especially in those of the Commander-in-Chief; that his influence already was too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of his army, joined to the kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States at his mercy; that it was not expedient to expose a man of the highest virtues to such temptations.”

General Schuyler, then in Congress, John Matthews and Nathaniel Peabody served on this committee, and as the result, Congress resolved to equalize the pay of the 274army, and make more systematic efforts to recruit and maintain it.

On the twelfth of February, Congress affirmed the sentence of a court-martial which sentenced Arnold, then commanding at Philadelphia, to a reprimand for giving passes to disaffected citizens and using public transportation for private use. The reprimand was mildly administered: but it made Arnold very angry. His life of ostentatious display, his extravagant habits, and his loose views of moral obligation, aroused public indignation; and the mere matter of the charges upon which he was sentenced would not have appeared so grave, except that he was universally suspected of using his official position for private emolument.

During all these struggles to keep his army together and prevent British operations out from New York, Washington was watchful of the operations then in progress at the South. General Clinton cleared the ice without difficulty, and left New York on the twenty-ninth of December, as already stated, expecting to reach his destination within ten days; but a storm dispersed his fleet, and one vessel foundered. Nearly all of his cavalry, and all of his artillery horses, perished. Although they reached Tybee Island, their first rendezvous, within the month, they did not leave for St. John Island, thirty miles below Charleston, until the tenth of February; and did not take up their position before Charleston, between the Ashley and Cooper rivers, until the twelfth of March. It appears from documentary data that the retention of Charleston, garrisoned by only two thousand two hundred regulars and a thousand militia, was largely induced by the inhabitants of the city. It is true that Commodore Whipple of the American navy regarded it as defensible; but Washington did not concur in that opinion. He held that the same force which would be required to hold the 275city, could do far greater and better service by remaining without the city, besides being more independent in securing supplies and coöperating with militia and other forces seeking their support. Besides this, the defences had been prepared to resist approach by sea, and not by land. An extract from Tarleton’s history of the campaigns of 1780–’81, is as follows, indicating the purpose of the movement itself: “The richness of the country, its vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from Washington, pointed out the advantages and facility of its conquest.”

The British forces broke ground on the first of April; on the nineteenth established their second, and on the sixth of May, their third, parallel. On the twelfth, the British took possession of the city. The schedule of prisoners prepared by Major André, of General Clinton’s staff, included all citizens, as prisoners of war. The Continental troops, including five hundred in hospital, did not exceed two thousand. General Clinton followed up this success by an absurd proclamation to the people, and wrote a more absurd letter to Lord Germaine, which is valuable to the reader, for the interest which attaches to its terms in connection with subsequent operations of Clinton, upon his return northward. It is as follows: “The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the king, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners, or in arms with us.” On the fifth of June, General Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command.

During the absence of Clinton from New York, and with the opening of spring, Washington’s position became more offensive to the garrison of New York. Amid all his gloom on account of the condition of his army, a bright episode gladdened his heart and nerved 276him for action. He had a visitor. The Marquis de Lafayette, who reached Boston on the 28th of April, by the frigate Hermione, entered Washington’s headquarters on the morning of May 10th. He announced, that the Count de Rochambeau was on the seas with the first division of an army, coming to support the American Republic. This French army was not directed to report to the American Congress, nor to take orders from that body. Washington opened the communication which Lafayette was intrusted to deliver, in advance of the arrival of Count de Rochambeau, and the following is a copy of the instructions to that officer: “The French troops are to obey Washington; to admit the precedence of American officers of equal rank; on all formal occasions to yield the right to the American army; and bear in mind that the whole purpose is, heartily and efficiently, to execute the will of the American Commander-in-Chief.”

On the fourteenth, after four days of confidential conference, Lafayette, bearing a letter from Washington, reported to the President of Congress for duty, preserving, for the time, the secret that the troops of France were already on their way to America.

But what a condition of affairs awaited the arrival of these gallant allies! The American army had already lost more in numbers than was anticipated by Washington in the official Report, already noticed. On the second of April, his entire force on both sides of the Hudson River consisted of only ten thousand four hundred, rank and file; and of these two thousand eight hundred had only two weeks to serve. Lord Rawdon had, indeed, taken from the New York garrison two thousand five hundred men as a reënforcement to General Clinton; but nearly twelve thousand remained behind. Although this increase of Clinton’s command afforded Washington small ground 277for hope of success in the Southern Department, he realized that it was impossible for him to abandon his present position. But he immediately despatched southward the Maryland and Delaware troops, which had fought in nearly every battle with the skill of veterans, and the First Artillery, all under the command of the Baron De Kalb.

While sparing these well disciplined troops, Washington’s position involved vastly increased responsibility. On the twenty-fifth day of May, two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they would “march home,” or at least secure subsistence at the point of the bayonet. Handbills were printed in New York and distributed, urging the soldiers to desert. “This mutiny,” says Washington, most impressively, “has given infinite concern.” There was no money except the Continental, and of this he says: “It is evidently impracticable, from the immense quantity it would require, to pay them as much as to make up the depreciation.” He further adds: “This is a decisive moment, one of the most. I will go further, and say, the most important America has ever seen. The Court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we, after, venture to confide that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what we want ability, or inclination, to assist them in.”

General Greene thus addressed the Colonel of the Morristown militia: “There are no more provisions than to serve one regiment, in the magazine. The late terrible storm, the depth of the snow, and the drifts in the roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which is in distant magazines. The roads must be kept open by the inhabitants, or the army cannot be subsisted. Unless the good people lend their assistance to forward 278supplies, the army must disband. The army is stripped naked of teams, as possible, to lessen the consumption of forage. Call to your aid the overseers of the highways, and every other order of men who can give despatch to this business. P.S.—Give no copies of this order, for fear it should get to the enemy.”

There was indeed reason for this considerate postscript. The mutinous spirit which had been evoked by sheer starvation, had been misinterpreted by the British officers in New York; and General Knyphausen must have been very proud of an opportunity to distinguish himself, in the absence of General Clinton, when he conceived of the poor American soldier as an unfortunate hireling waiting for a deliverer. He would become their Moses and conduct them back to the royal father’s embrace. He organized his missionary venture carefully. Accompanied by Generals Tryon, Matthews, and Sterling, he crossed from Staten Island to Elizabethtown Point. (See map.) He had a twofold plan in mind. He would demonstrate to the people of New Jersey that their half-frozen, hungry, and ragged countrymen with Washington, could not protect their homes from hostile incursions out from New York; and also supposed, in case he were very prompt and expeditious, that he might pounce, like a hawk, upon the coop of the arch-rebel himself. General Sterling led the advance, starting before daybreak. The column was hardly distinguishable, company from company, so heavy were the sea-mist and darkness. Suddenly, one shot, and then another, came from an invisible American outpost. General Sterling received the first, which ultimately proved fatal, and was removed to the rear. Knyphausen took his place at the front. The rising sun dispelled the fog, but disclosed the assembling of Colonel Elias Dayton’s Regiment, from various quarters. The anticipated surprise, and a corresponding 279welcome from the American soldiers, did not occur. The militia retired after a few scattering shots, and Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers dashed forward, followed by the British and Hessian Infantry. As by magic, the militia multiplied. Fences, thickets, orchards, and single trees were made available for as many single riflemen; and at every step of advance, one and then another of his majesty’s troops were picked off. During the march to Connecticut Farms, a distance of only seven miles, no friendly tokens of welcome appeared in sight. Puffs of smoke, and the rifle’s sharp crack, could hardly be located before similar warnings succeeded, and details to take care of the wounded soon began to thin out and sag the beautiful lines of the British front. Still, the column advanced toward Springfield, and directly on the line of travel which led immediately to Washington’s encampment.

At this point, Dayton’s Regiment, which had been so troublesome as skirmishers, hastened step, came into regimental order, and quickly crossed the Rahway bridge. But, to the surprise of the advancing enemy, the division of General Maxwell was in battle array, silently inviting battle. General Knyphausen halted to bring up artillery and his full force of five thousand men. He stopped also, to burn Connecticut Farms, because, “shots from its windows picked off his officers and guides.” Among the victims to his responsive fire, was the wife of Chaplain Chapman of Dayton’s Regiment. The news of her death spread, as a spark over pine or prairie regions. When within a half mile of Springfield, the Hessian general again halted for consultation as to his next order. Cannon sounds began to be heard from various directions, answering signal for signal. The ascending smoke of beacon-fires crowned every summit. The whole country seemed to have been upheaved as if by some volcanic 280force. Maxwell’s Brigade was just across the Rahway, and less than one-third the strength of the Hessian’s command. But General Knyphausen was too good a soldier not to peer through Maxwell’s thin line, and recognize, in solid formation, the entire army of Washington, waiting in silence to give him a hearty soldier’s reception. The day passed; and for once, both armies were at full halt. Knyphausen, for the time, was Commander-in-Chief of both, for it devolved upon him alone to order battle. He was filling the part of Pharaoh, and not that of Moses.

One monotonous sound echoed from a summit near Morristown. It was the “minute-gun,” which had been designated by the American Commander-in-Chief as a continuous signal whenever he wanted every man within hearing, who had a gun, to come at once to his demand. Night came on, and with it, rain; but still the minute-gun boomed on, with solemn cadence, and instead of smoking hill-tops, the blaze of quickened beacons illumined the dull sky as if New Jersey were all on fire. The night covered the Hessians from view, and when morning came they attempted to regain Staten Island; but the tide retired, leaving boats stranded and the mud so deep that even cavalry could not cross in safety. Having heard on the first of June that Clinton was en route for New York, Knyphausen simply strengthened the New York defences and awaited the arrival of his superior officer.

On the tenth, Washington wrote: “Their movements are mysterious, and the design of this movement not easily penetrated.” As a matter of fact, there were few operations of the war which bore so directly upon the safety of the American army and the American cause, as the operations before Springfield during June, 1779; and the conduct of both armies indicated an appreciation of their importance.

281On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consulting Washington, appointed General Gates to the command of the Southern Department. Gates had spent the winter at his home in Virginia, but eagerly accepted this command, although he had lacked the physical vigor to engage in the Indian campaign in New York. His most intimate friend and companion, both in arms and in antagonism to Washington, Charles Lee, sent him one more letter. It was a wiser letter than earlier correspondence had been, and decidedly prophetic. It closed with something like pathetic interest: “Take care that you do not exchange your Northern laurels for Southern willows.”

At this time, it did seem as if the bitter cup would never be withdrawn from the lips of the American Commander-in-Chief; for he had neither provisions for his army, nor the means of making welcome and comfortable his expected allies and guests from over the sea.

Sir Henry Clinton returned from Charleston to New York on the seventeenth day of June, 1780. He must have contrasted his report made to the British War Office, of the “conquest of South Carolina,” with that made by General Knyphausen to himself, of the recent experience of British operations in New Jersey. But Clinton was ever a man of action, prompt and energetic. He felt deeply the long protracted embarrassment of his position, while holding such a vast and responsible command without sufficient resources for pressing exigencies. He knew, and Washington, with a soldier’s instinct, knew that Clinton knew, that there was no safety for New York, and no possibility of effective operations out from New York, so long as a strong, faithful American army held the fastnesses of New Jersey, and a vigorous espionage of the Hudson River region was maintained. The sweep of Washington’s arm was largely shaping the future destiny of America from very humble headquarters; but no less firmly and decisively.

283Clinton did not remain idle, nor undecided, a single day. Troops were embarked upon transports immediately; and all suitable demonstrations were made as if an organized movement against West Point were designed. Washington placed his entire army in motion and advanced one division eleven miles, toward Pompton, on the twenty-second, en route for the Hudson, to be prepared for whatever might be the scheme of his adversary. His confidential agents in New York were always quick to report details of British movements. Washington invariably exacted “minute” details; and from these he interpreted the general plans of the enemy. In this instance, the embarking of field batteries instead of heavy guns, which could always be procured from ships, satisfied him that his own headquarters and the destruction of his army were Clinton’s real objectives.

He was prepared for Clinton’s choice of the alternate movements. Although one division had been advanced in the direction of the Hudson River, Generals Greene, Maxwell, and Stark, with Harry Lee’s cavalry, and a strong force of militia, had been left in position near Springfield. Few battles of the American Revolution have received less attention, as among the decisive battles of the war, than that of Springfield, N.J. And yet few were more strikingly illustrative of the strategic wisdom with which Washington had planned the successful prosecution of the war, as early as 1776.

On the morning of the twenty-third, at five o’clock, the British army, having crossed from Staten Island in two columns, began its advance. (See maps, “Battle of Springfield,” and, “Operations in New Jersey.”) Its force consisted of five thousand infantry, nearly all of their cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery. General Clinton, with the right wing, advanced along the Springfield road with vigor, but deliberately, as if this were his principal line of attack. Upon approaching the first bridge near the Matthews House, he was obliged to halt until his guns could gain a suitable position, since Colonel Angel’s Rhode Island regiment, with one gun, commanded the bridge over the Rahway, and occupied an orchard which gave good cover. At first, the British guns were 284aimed too high and did little execution. By fording the stream, which was not more than twelve yards wide, Angel’s position was turned, so that he was crowded back to the second bridge, over a branch of the Rahway, where Colonel Shreve resisted with equal obstinacy and bravery. By reference to the map it will be seen that General Greene, as well as Dickinson’s militia on a slight ridge in the rear of Shreve, was admirably posted for reserve support. Angel lost one-fourth of his men and was ordered to fall back, with Colonel Shreve, to the high ground occupied by Generals Maxwell and Stark, near a mill. Colonel Dayton’s Regiment was also distinguished for its gallant conduct. Washington Irving refers very pleasantly to the part taken in the action by Chaplain Caldwell, whose church had been burned on the twenty-fifth of January and whose wife had been killed on the sixth of June, as follows: “None showed more ardor in the fight than Caldwell the chaplain, who distributed Watts’s psalm and hymn books among the soldiers when they were in want of wadding, with the shout: ‘Put Watts into them, boys!’”

The other British column had for its special objective the seizure of the pass leading to Chatham and Morristown. Major Lee’s cavalry, and a picket under Captain Walker, had been posted at Little’s bridge, on the Vauxhall road, and Colonel Ogden’s Regiment covered them. General Greene found that he could not afford to hold so extensive a front, and concentrated his force at other positions eminently strong and capable of vigorous defence. The remainder of Maxwell’s and Stark’s brigades also took high ground, by the mill, with the militia force of Dickinson, on the flanks.

General Knyphausen led this column in person. But the Vauxhall bridge was as closely contested as had been that at Springfield. Greene shifted his position, in view 285of this second attack and its pronounced objective, to a range of hills in the rear of Byron’s tavern, where the roads were brought so near, that succor might be readily transferred from one to the other. The movement was admirable, scientific, and successful. Tn his report to Washington, he says: “I was thus enabled to reach Colonel Webb’s Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunton commanding, and Colonel Jackson’s Regiment, with one piece of artillery, which entirely checked the advance of the enemy upon the American left, and secured that pass.”

The Battle of Springfield had been fought with coolness and unfaltering bravery, and had been won. General Clinton burned Springfield, crossed to Staten Island at midnight, withdrew his bridge of boats, and reached his headquarters in safety. His loss, as reported by contemporary journalists, was placed at about one hundred and fifty men; but comparison of his Reports and Musters, before and after the expedition, make the killed, wounded, and missing twice that number. The American loss was one officer and twelve non-commissioned officers killed, five officers and fifty-six privates wounded, and nine missing; “Captain Davis and the militia not reporting.”

General Clinton’s report says: “I could not think of keeping the field in New Jersey; and wished to land the troops and give a camp of rest to an army of which many corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of fourteen months.”

For five years, New Jersey had been a constant theatre of active war. It was indeed the strategic centre of the war for American Independence. The bravery of her soldiery, whose homes were constantly menaced, was only surpassed by the heroism of her women. These, constantly exposed to every possible desolation that attended the marching and counter-marching of contending 286armies, never flagged, flinched, nor failed, until her delivery was at last complete.

On the night of June 24, 1780, the day after the Battle of Springfield, Washington, upon return to his headquarters, addressed another call to Governors of States for their full quota, under new assignments, and awaited with interest further tidings from the progress of the French allies, then on the sea. This Battle of Springfield had vindicated his confidence in the Continental troops; and, as in all armies, some regiments proved invariably reliable, under whatever conditions they fought.

On the tenth day of July, 1780, the first division of the French army sent by Louis XVI., in aid of American Independence, consisting of six thousand troops, landed at Newport, R.I. All were under the command of Lieutenant-General Rochambeau, accompanied by Major-General Chastellux, a relative of Lafayette, and escorted by seven heavy battleships, under command of Chevalier de Ternay.

Washington immediately submitted a project for the capture of New York; but on the thirteenth of July Admiral Graves readied that city with six ships-of-the-line, which gave to the British such superiority of ships and guns, that the plan was postponed to wait the arrival of the second French division, of equal numbers, which was supposed, at the time, to be already on its way from France. But Sir Henry Clinton was not inactive. The time to strike was before the French could unite with Washington and take their place in the American army. He planned a surprise, and advanced with eight thousand troops as far as Huntington, L.I., for a descent upon Newport; but Washington put his entire army in readiness to advance upon New York. Clinton, having learned that Rochambeau, advised by Washington, had gone into camp in a strong position, and with the rapidly assembling 287militia would be superior in force, recalled his troops. He converted the expedition into a naval blockade of Newport, if possible thereby to cut off the second division of the French army, upon its arrival within American waters.

The Count de Rochambeau, with a soldier’s exactness, soon caught the fire of Washington’s zeal, and well comprehended the situation of American affairs generally. So intense is his delineation of the condition of things as he observed them, that if penned by Washington himself, nothing could have been added. His letter to the Count de Vergennes, dated on July sixteenth, only six days after his landing in America, reads, in part, as follows: “Upon our arrival here, the country was in consternation; the paper money had fallen to sixty for one.... I spoke to the principal persons of the place, and told them, as I write to General Washington, that this was merely the advance guard of a greater force, and that the king was determined to support them with his whole power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last night, all the streets, houses, and steeples were illuminated, in the midst of fireworks and great rejoicing.... You see, Sir, how important it is to act with vigor.... Send us troops, ships, and money; but do not depend upon this people, nor upon their means. They have neither money nor credit. Their means of resistance are but momentary, and called forth when they are attacked in their homes. Then they assemble themselves for the moment of immediate danger, and defend themselves. Washington sometimes commands fifteen thousand, and sometimes three thousand men.”

The restriction of the French fleet to Narragansett Bay so immediately after its arrival, led Washington and Rochambeau to postpone operations against New York; and it is proper to notice the fact that no news was 288received of the second division of French troops until late in the fall, when it was reported as blockaded in the home port of Brest. A proclamation was made and published by Lafayette, with the sanction of Washington, announcing to the Canadians that the French would aid them to expel the British troops from their country. The object of this proclamation was chiefly to divert the attention of the garrison of New York from a proposed joint attack upon that city, which Washington kept always in view. The expedition was never seriously entertained; but General Clinton, on the thirty-first of August, as anticipated by Washington, forwarded a copy of the paper to Lord Germaine, while at the same time he placed before him, in confidence, a proposition of a different kind, from which he derived a strong expectation of British gain, through the acquisition, by purchase, of the principal Hudson River military post, West Point itself.

Washington had advised General Arnold that he would soon be tendered an active command. But that officer, pleading as excuse continued suffering from his wounds, expressed a preference for the command of a military post. After urgent solicitation of himself and his friends, he was authorized to designate the post of his choice. As the result, on the third of August, he was assigned to the command of “West Point and its dependencies, in which all are included, from Fishkill to King’s Ferry.” At the date of this assignment of Arnold to a post which was rightly regarded by Washington as most vital to ultimate American success, a clandestine correspondence had already passed between Generals Clinton and Arnold, through the medium of Major John André.

The attention of the reader is naturally retrospective, as the name of André reappears in connection with that of Arnold. He had been taken prisoner at St. John’s; was once on parole at Montreal, and familiar with Arnold’s 289habits and the outrageous abuse of his public trust with which, there, as afterwards at Philadelphia, he had been charged. André also knew of his gambling, his extravagance, his ambition, and his reckless daring, generally. His own personal antecedents during the grand ovation tendered to General Howe, upon that officer’s departure from Philadelphia, in which he had so conspicuously figured as escort to Miss Shippen, afterwards the wife of Arnold, acquire special interest. He was, and long had been, a confidential member of General Clinton’s staff. Neither Clinton nor André could conceive, for a moment, that Arnold and his wife, formerly Miss Shippen, would betray André’s confidence; or, if the proposition to betray West Point failed, that André would be allowed to suffer.

On the twenty-fifth of August, General Clinton wrote to Lord Germaine as follows: “At this new epoch of the war, when a foreign foe has already landed, and an addition to it is expected, I owe it to my country, and I must in justice say, to my own fame, to declare to your lordship that I become every day more sensible of the utter impossibility of prosecuting the war in this country without reënforcements.... We are, by some thousands, too weak to subdue the rebellion.” On the twenty-seventh of September, Lord Germaine wrote in reply: “Next to the destruction of Washington’s army, the gaining over of officers of influence and reputation among the troops would be the speediest way of subduing the rebellion and restoring the tranquillity of America. Your commission authorizes you to avail yourself of such opportunities, and there can be no doubt that the expense will be cheerfully submitted to.” The British archives, then secret, show that Lord Germaine was kept fully advised of the whole scheme. On the thirtieth of August, Arnold solicited an interview with some responsible 290party, in order definitely to settle upon the price of surrendering West Point to Great Britain. André was selected, as mutually agreeable to both Clinton and Arnold. On the eighteenth of September, Arnold wrote, advising that André be sent up to the sloop-of-war Vulture, then anchored in Haverstraw Bay, promising to send a person with a flag of truce and boat to meet him. Clinton received the note on the next day. Under the pretence of an expedition to Chesapeake Bay, freely made public, a body of picked troops embarked on frigates. André reached the Vulture on the twentieth. On the twenty-first he landed, met Arnold, accompanied him first to the Clove, and then to the house of Josiah Holt Smith. (See map, “Highlands of the Hudson.”) Smith’s antecedents were those of a royalist; but the secret was too valuable to be intrusted to such a man; and subsequent investigations failed to connect him with any knowledge of the conspiracy. The terms of purchase were, in so many words: “Pay, in gold, and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British Army.”

The terms were settled and the bargain was closed. Besides knowledge of the plans of the post and its approaches, André was advised of the signals to be exchanged; the disposition of the guards; and the points of surest attack which would be within the immediate control of disembarking grenadiers and sharp-shooters. The Vulture had dropped down the river with the tide too far to be promptly reached; so that André crossed the river, and having proper passports attempted to save time by returning to New York by land. While passing through Tarrytown, he was challenged, stopped, examined, and made prisoner. On the second of October, he was executed as a spy. America grieved over his fate, and no one with more of pity than did Washington. His soul still felt sore over the fate of 291Nathan Hale, and after a solitary hour of anguish in spirit, he suggested to General Clinton a method of escape for André. He offered to exchange him for Benedict Arnold. Clinton could not do this without loss of honor to himself and Great Britain. André had to die. Washington, with tender consideration and profound sympathy, gave to Mrs. Arnold a safe conduct and escort to her former home in Philadelphia, and shared the sentiment of all who knew her best, that the wife was not the confidante of her husband’s treason. Lafayette most tenderly announced his sympathy in her behalf.

General Greene was immediately assigned to command West Point and its dependencies. The garrison was also entirely changed. The works were skilfully modified and strengthened, so that any plans in the possession of Clinton would be useless; and Washington took post, in person, at Brakeness, near Passaic Falls, N.J.

It will be remembered that Baron De Kalb left Morristown on the sixteenth of the previous April with reënforcements for the Southern army. On the sixth of July, he reached Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N.C. On the twenty-fifth, Gates, who had been assigned to command of the Southern Department, joined him. “Away from Washington,” Baron De Kalb experienced deeply the sentiment of unreasonable, but perhaps natural jealousy of foreign officers which pervaded portions of the American army; and General Caswell, in defiance of positive orders to report to Baron De Kalb, marched directly to Camden and reported to General Gates. It had been De Kalb’s purpose, as an experienced soldier, to advance by Charlotte and Salisbury, where supplies could be readily obtained. “General Gates,” says Irving, “on the twenty-seventh, put what he called the ‘Grand Army’ on its march through a barren country which could offer no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe 292maize.” The Battle of Camden, or “Sanders’ Creek,” which followed, was a complete rout. Baron De Kalb fought with the utmost confidence and bravery, but fell upon the field, after having been eleven times wounded. Any support whatever, on the part of Gates, would have secured victory, or a well-balanced action. Gates overestimated his own force; refused to examine his Adjutant-General’s statement, or to consider the advice of his officers, who understood exactly the true condition of the crude material which he styled his “Grand Army,” and fled from the battlefield at full speed. He did not halt until reaching Charlotte, sixty miles away; and by the twentieth reached Hillsborough, one hundred and eighty miles distant, without gathering a sufficient force to form an escort. He said that he was “carried away from the field by a torrent of flying soldiers.” His self-conceit and presumption, like that of Lee, on account of having once served in the British army, and his utter want of every soldierly quality, except the negative sense of pride in having a personal command, were exposed to the American people without delay. He claimed to have made an attempt to rally his troops; but he had no influence whatever. During the Burgoyne campaign, he was never under fire; and Lee’s unheeded warning did indeed secure to his memory the wreath of “Southern willow, in place of that of laurel” which Congress had placed upon his brow, when the laurel had been earned by the brave and patriotic Schuyler. The troops of Delaware and Maryland alone would have saved the battle, if properly supported by Gates. The gallant Delaware Battalion which fought with De Kalb, was almost destroyed. The Maryland troops lost in killed, wounded and prisoners nearly four hundred, out of a total of fourteen hundred; but to their perpetual honor it is to be recorded, that of the number swept away in the final retreat of the whole army, 293seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates reported for duty by the twenty-ninth of the month.

On the eighth of October, the Battle of King’s Mountain was fought; and the names of Shelby, Campbell, McDowell, Sevier, and Williams are still associated with descendants from the brave participants in that battle. It partially offset the disaster at Camden, and was an inspiration to Washington in the adjustment of his plans for Greene’s movements. It compelled Cornwallis to delay his second invasion of North Carolina; and Tarleton, in writing, says of this people, that “the counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan were more hostile to England than any others in America.”

Gates endeavored to gather the remnant of his army; and, before his leaving to answer before a Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, about twenty-three hundred men assembled. On inspection, it was found that but eight hundred in the whole number were properly clothed and equipped.

The Southern campaign became one of petty operations mostly. Neither Cornwallis, Tarleton, Rawdon, nor Balfour made progress in subjugation of the people. Sumner, although wounded at Black’s Plantation on the twentieth of October, gained credit in several lesser expeditions. But universal British failures disappointed the expectations of the British Commander-in-Chief at New York. The loss of Charleston, in the opinion of Washington and the best military critics, was not without its compensations; and the collapse of Gates was an illustration of Washington’s knowledge of men and his foresight as a Soldier.

As a bird’s overlook of its wide field of vision cannot comprehend all objects within range, except in turn, so must the patient reader come back again to stand behind Washington and look over his shoulder as he points the glass of observation to the activities which he in turn surveys; to catch with him their import, and so far as possible strain the eye of faith with him, while with slowly sweeping supervision he comprehends all that the war for American Independence has intrusted to his care. Mountain and valley, ocean and river, marsh and morass, cave and ravine, are representatives of the various scenes of agitation and conflict. The entire land is in excited expectancy, and everywhere war is waged; but beyond and over all these contending conditions he discerns the even horizon of assured victory. And just now, immediately at hand, under his very feet, as well as wherever partisan warfare tears life out of sweet homes for the sprinkling of liberty’s altar, there is indescribable pain and anguish. His heart bleeds with theirs; for he is one with them, and they are one with him, in the willing consecration which generations yet unborn shall forever honor.

And as the year 1780 came to its close, he drew his sword-girth tighter, and seemed to stand many inches taller, as he embraced, in one reflected view, the suffering South and the half-asleep North. Between the two 295sections there was some restless impatience over such exacting contributions of fathers, brothers and sons, to regions so far from home; and just about his humble sleeping quarters, were suffering, faithful sharers of his every need.

Tidings of the failure of Gates, with its disaster and its sacrifices of brave legions, did not reach the Commander-in-Chief until September. But it was impossible for him to send troops in sufficient numbers to cope with the army of Cornwallis. The second French division, so long expected (and never realized), was reported to be blockaded at home, and of no possible immediate use to America. The British fleet still blockaded Newport. Lafayette did indeed elaborate a plan for an assault upon New York, Fort Washington, and Staten Island; but the plan was abandoned through lack of boats for such extended water-carriage. There were few periods of the war where more diverse and widely separated interests required both the comprehensive and the minute consideration of the American Commander-in-Chief.

A few illustrations represent the many. Forts Ann and George were captured, by a mixed force of Canadians, Indians, and British regulars, in October. Fort Edward was saved through the sagacity of Colonel Livingston, who, having a garrison of only seventy-nine men, averted attack by sending to the commanding officer of Fort George an exaggerated report of his own strength, with a promise to come to his aid. This was designed to be intercepted, and the British regulars had actually approached Saratoga, before their return to Lake Champlain. An excursion from Fort Niagara into the Mohawk Valley desolated the homes of the Oneidas, who were friendly to the United States. Some leaders in certain Vermont circles corresponded with British officials in Canada; and such was the uneasiness which prevailed along the northern and northwestern frontier, that three regiments 296had to be sent to Albany, to compose the unrest of that single region. On the seventh of November, Washington wrote: “The American army is experiencing almost daily want; while the British army derives ample supplies from a trade with New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which has by degrees become so common that it is hardly thought a crime.”

Early in September, a commercial treaty between Holland and the United States came under consideration, and Colonel Laurens was sent as commissioner to conduct the negotiations abroad; but he was taken prisoner and locked up in the Tower of London, to stand trial on the charge of high treason against the British crown. His papers were seized, and on the second day of December, Great Britain declared war against Holland.

The condition of Great Britain, at that time, was indeed one of supreme trial; and it is well for the people of America to honor the inherent forces of British liberty which vindicated, under such adverse ruling conditions, the very principles for which their brethren fought in America. It was the one solemn hour in British history when America, if fostered as a trusted and honored child, would have spared England long years of waste in blood and treasure. Not only were Spain and France combined to plunder or acquire her West India possessions; but Spain was pressing the siege of Gibraltar. Both Denmark and Sweden united with Catharine of Russia to adopt the famous system of “Armed Neutrality,” which declared that “free ships make free goods,” and that “neutrals might carry any goods or supplies wherever they pleased, with complete immunity from search or capture.” That was a deadly blow at British commerce. Even in the East Indies, her crown was one of thorns. Hyder Ali swept through the Province of Madras, and Warren Hastings was contending for very 297life, to save British rule in India from overthrow. France sent aid to Hyder Ali, as well as to America; and was thus, at this very period, unexpectedly limited in her anticipated contributions to the army of Washington.

Domestic excitements increased Britain’s burdens. Eighty thousand volunteers had been enrolled in Ireland in view of apprehended French invasion. A large number of her statesmen favored “peace at any price.” The wonderful capacity of Great Britain to withstand external force and to uncover the equally wonderful resources at her command, ought to have convinced her rulers that on the same basis, and by a legitimate inheritance, the American Colonies were unconquerable.

On the eleventh of November, General Sullivan, having resigned, took his seat in Congress. On the twentieth, Washington thus addressed him:

“Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that the army, or a State, that is the theatre of war, can rub through another campaign as the last. It would be as unreasonable to suppose that because a man had rolled a snow-ball till it had acquired the size of a horse, he might do it until it was the size of a house. Matters may be pushed to a certain point, beyond which we cannot move them. Ten months’ pay is now due the army. Every department of it is so much indebted that we have not credit for a single expense, and some of the States are harassed and oppressed to a degree beyond bearing.... To depend, under these circumstances, upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign bravery, will, I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.”

At a conference held with Count Rochambeau at Hartford, Conn., it had been proposed by General Sullivan, “that the French fleet seek Boston, and the French army join Washington”; but this was impracticable. The stay at Newport prevented the operations of the 298British blockading fleet elsewhere along the southern Atlantic coast; and thus far, restricted British movements generally. As early as October sixteenth, General Leslie left New York with three thousand troops; landed at Portsmouth, Va., and joined Cornwallis at Charleston late in December. A son of Rochambeau left Newport on the eighteenth of October, ran the gauntlet of the British fleet, in a gale, safely reached France, and urged “immediate additional aid of men, arms, and money.” The Chevalier de Ternay died at Newport, on the fifteenth of December, and was succeeded by Chevalier Destouches. Colonel Fleury, who will be remembered as distinguishing himself at Fort Mifflin and Stony Point, joined Rochambeau. These gallant French officers, like their sovereign, were so devoted to Washington, and entertained such absolute faith in his capacity as patriot and soldier, that the narrative of his career during the war would savor of ingratitude if their faithful service were not identified with his memory. At that time, there was a design under consideration, but never matured, for the association of Spain with France in active operations on the American coast.

Meanwhile, Washington proposed another plan for the reconstruction of the army, through the consolidation of battalions; thereby reducing their numbers, but fixing a permanent military establishment. It will appear from a letter written to Franklin on the twentieth of December, that he had reached a point, where, even under so many embarrassments, he felt that ultimate success was not far distant. The letter reads as follows: “The campaign has been thus inactive, after a flattering prospect at the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a decisive one, through failure of the unexpected naval superiority which was the pivot upon which everything turned. The movements of Lord Cornwallis during the 299last month or two have been retrograde. What turn the late reënforcements which have been sent him may give to his affairs, remains to be known. I have reënforced our Southern army principally with horse; but the length of the march is so much opposed to the measure that every corps is in a greater or less degree ruined. I am happy, however, in assuring you that a better disposition never prevailed in the Legislatures of the several States than at this time. The folly of temporary expedients is seen into and exploded; and vigorous efforts will be used to obtain a permanent army, and carry on the war systematically, if the obstinacy of Great Britain shall compel us to continue it. We want nothing but the aid of a loan, to enable us to put our finances into a tolerable train. The country does not want for resources; but we want the means of drawing them forth.”

The new organization was to consist of fifty regiments of foot, four of artillery, and other bodies of mounted men, including in all, thirty-six thousand men, fairly apportioned among the States. But not more than half that number were ever in the field at one time, and the full complement never was recruited. The prejudice against a regular army of any size was bitter; and Hildreth states the matter very truthfully when he says, that “Congress, led by Samuel Adams, was very jealous of military power, and of everything which tended to give a permanent character to the army.” Mr. Adams was sound in principle, for he not only realized that the Colonies had suffered through the employment of the British army to enforce oppressive and unconstitutional laws, but equally well knew that a larger army than the State needed for its protection against invasion and the preservation of the peace, was inimical to true liberty.

Money was still scarce. A specie tax of six millions was imposed, and the sixth annual campaign of the war 300drew near its close. John Trumbull, Jr., became Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, vice Robert H. Harrison who became Chief Justice of Maryland; and Colonel Hand became Adjutant-General, vice Scammon, resigned. Morgan was promoted, and with General Steuben and Harry Lee’s horse, was ordered to the Southern Department, accompanied by Kosciusko as engineer, vice Du Portail, captured at Charleston.

On the twenty-eighth of November, Washington designated the winter quarters for the army, establishing his own at New Windsor. The Pennsylvania Line were near Morristown; the Jersey line, at Pompton; the Maryland horse, at Lancaster, Penn.; Sheldon’s horse, at Colchester, Conn., and the New York regiments at Fort Schuyler, Saratoga, Albany, Schenectady, and other exposed Northern posts. This distribution of troops, from time to time indicated, enables the reader to understand how a wise disposition of the army, when active operations were practically suspended, equally enabled Washington to resume active service upon the shortest notice.

On the eighth of October, General Greene, who had been tendered the command of the Southern Department, vice Gates, submitted to Washington his plan of conducting the next campaign. He desired, substantially, “a flying army”; that is, “one lightly equipped, mobile as possible, and familiar with the country in which operations were to be conducted.” To secure to Greene prompt support in his new command, Washington addressed letters to Gov. Abner Nash, of North Carolina, Gov. Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, and Gov. Thomas S. Lee, of Maryland, soliciting their cordial coöperation in the work of the new Department-Commander. Greene began his journey on the twenty-ninth day of November, attended by Baron Steuben. He stopped at each capital to urge the necessity of 301immediate action, and secured the services of Generals Smallwood and Gist, of Maryland and Delaware, for recruiting service in those States. Upon reaching Virginia, he found that State to be thoroughly aroused for her own defence. General Leslie, whose departure from New York has been noticed, had fortified both Norfolk and Portsmouth, and this increase of the British forces had very justly alarmed the people. Washington had already sent Generals Muhlenburg and Weedon to Virginia to organize its militia, and they were endeavoring to confine the forces of Leslie within the range of his fortified positions. These officers had also served under General Greene, making their assignment eminently judicious. The matter of supplies, of all kinds, became a matter of the greatest concern, if operations were to be carried on effectively against Cornwallis at the South: while also maintaining full correspondence with the troops of the centre zone, and the North. The consolidation of regiments left many officers without commands; but the selection of a competent Quartermaster-General became an imperative necessity. Col. Edward Carrington was selected, and of him, Chief Justice Marshall says: “He was eminently qualified to undertake the task of combining and conducting the means of the Quartermaster-General’s department; obeyed the call to the office; and discharged it with unequalled zeal and fidelity.”

For the purposes of this narrative, it is only necessary to indicate the general conduct of operations southward, so far as they illustrate the wisdom of Washington in the selection of officers, and the instructions under which he made use of their services. He concurred with Greene in his general plan; and the initiative was undertaken with as frequent exchange of views, through express messengers or couriers, as was then practicable. Orders were issued for Colonel Carrington to explore the country 302of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers, and to make himself acquainted with the streams into which they discharged themselves. Kosciusko, Engineer-in-Chief of Greene, was charged with selecting proper places for defending or securing safe fording-places. A principal storehouse and laboratory was established at Prince Edward’s Court-House, and Baron Steuben was charged with maintaining the supply of powder from the manufactories, and of lead from the mines of Fincastle County. Such was the general preparation for the forthcoming campaign.

General Greene reached Charlotte on the second of December, and relieved Gates, who had been awaiting his arrival for the surrender of his command. After exchange of the proper courtesies, Gates returned to his farm. The wisdom of Washington’s choice in the assignment of General Greene may be seen by the citation of some of Greene’s letters written at that crisis.

To Jefferson he writes thus: “I find the troops in a most wretched condition, destitute of every necessity, either for their comfort or convenience, and they may be literally said to be naked. It will answer no good purpose to send men here in such a condition.... There must be either pride, or principle, to make a soldier. No man will think himself bound to fight the battles of a State that leaves him to perish for want of clothing, nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride while his situation renders him more an object of pity, than of envy. The life of a soldier, in the best estate, is liable to innumerable hardships: but when these are aggravated by the want of provisions and clothing, his condition becomes intolerable; nor can men long contend with such complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, and the hospital, must soon swallow up an army under such circumstances; and if it were possible for men to 303maintain such a wretched existence, they would have no spirit to face their enemies, and would invariably disgrace themselves and their commander. It is impossible to presume discipline, when troops are in want of everything: to attempt severity, will only thin the ranks by more heavy desertion.”

To Marion he wrote: “I am fully sensible that your service is hard, and your sufferings great; but how great the prize for which we contend! I like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently prevents surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, we must endeavor to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people in our favor, as much as possible. Spies are the eyes of an army, and without them, a general is always groping in the dark.”

In all these letters and the measures undertaken, Greene reflects the principles upon which his Commander-in-Chief carried on the war, and it was his highest pride so to act, as if under the direct gaze of Washington. On the twentieth of December, having been detained by rains at Charlotte, he abandoned his huts; and by the twelfth of January, 1781, was encamped on the banks of the Peedee River, awaiting the opening of the final campaign of the war for American Independence. Col. Christopher Greene, as well as Colonel Washington, Harry Lee, and Morgan, had already joined him, and Washington had thus furnished to the Southern army his ablest general and such choice details of officers and men as had been faithful, gallant, and successful throughout the war.

Nothing new or unfamiliar to the American student can be said as to the military operations of the British, French and American armies during the closing year of the war for American Independence; but they may be so grouped in their relations to Washington as a Soldier, that he may stand forth more distinctly as both nominal and real Commander-in-Chief. His original commission, it will be remembered, was accompanied by the declaration of Congress that “they would maintain and assist him, and adhere to him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American liberty.” After the Battle of Trenton, when Congress solemnly declared that “the very existence of Civil Liberty depended upon the right execution of military powers,” it invested him with dictatorial authority, being “confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George Washington.” And in 1778, after the flash of the Burgoyne campaign had spent itself, and the experiences of the American army at Valley Forge attested the necessity for a fighting army under a fighting soldier, Washington was again intrusted with the reorganization of the army, both regular and militia, in respect of all elements of enlistment, outfit, and supply.

From the date of his commission, through all his acts and correspondence, it has been evident, that he has been perfectly frank and consistent in his assignments of officers 305or troops, either to position or command; and his judgment of men and measures has had constant verification in realized experience.

It was very natural for European monarchs, including Louis XVI., to behold in the very preëminent and assertive force of Washington’s character much of the “one-man power” which was the basis of their own asserted prerogative; and there were astute and ambitious statesmen and soldiers of the Old World who hoped that a new empire, and a new personal dynasty, would yet arise in the western world, to be their associated ally against Great Britain herself. They did not measure the American Revolution by right standards; because they could not conceive, nor comprehend the American conception of, a “sovereign people.”

There was one foreign soldier in the American army, and of royal stock, who must have clung to Washington and his cause, with most ardent passion as well as obedient reverence. Nothing of sacrifice, exposure, or vile jealousy, whether in closet, camp, or field, amid winter’s keenest blasts or summer’s scorching fires, was beyond the life and soul experience of Thaddeus Kosciusko. His name, and that of Pulaski, so dear to Washington, and so true to him, should be ever dear to the American; and in the history of their country’s fall, there should ever be cherished a monumental recognition of ancient Poland and the Pole.

It was one of the most striking characteristics of Washington’s military life that he recognized and trusted so many of these heroic men whose lives had been nursed and developed in the cause of liberty and country. Such men as these beheld in Washington a superhuman regard for man, as man; and the youthful Lafayette almost worshipped, while he obeyed, until his entire soul was penetrated by the spirit and controlled by the example of his 306beloved Chief. Some of these, who survived until the opening of the year 1781, were able to realize that its successive months, however blessed in their ultimate fruition, were months in which Washington passed under heavier yokes and through tougher ordeals than were those of Valley Forge or Yorktown. For the first time during the Revolutionary struggle, the American citizens who did the fighting might well compare their situation under the guardianship of the American Congress, with that of Colonial obligation under the British Parliament and the British crown.

The fluctuations of numbers in the American army seemed very largely to depend upon its vicinity to endangered sections. Remoteness from the seaboard induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because British ships could not operate on land; and seaboard towns, which were constantly in peril, insisted upon retaining their able-bodied militia within easy reach, until armed vessels could be built and assigned for their protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human nature affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has already been noticed that Washington was profoundly grieved that country people courted the British markets of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty weight in the balance of “stay-at-home comfort,” against personal experience in some distant camp. Starvation and suffering could not fail to arouse resistance to their constraints. The condition of the army was one of protracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as follows: “Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer one-tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers,—the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.”

307Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that “it was not easy to persuade the military, that their brethren in civil life were unable to make greater exertions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could not be more equally borne.”

On New Year’s Day, January 1, 1781, the Pennsylvania line (Continentals) revolted, and Captain Billings was killed in the effort to suppress the outbreak. Thirteen hundred men, with six guns, started for Philadelphia. Wayne was powerless to control even his own command; and so advised Washington. The Commander-in-Chief was at first impelled to leave New Windsor and go in person to the camps; but knowing that he had troops who would obey him, whatever conditions might arise, he addressed himself to this state of affairs with a dignity, deliberation, and sympathy, so calm and yet so impressive, that he both retained the full prestige of his position, and secured full control of the disaffection. He allowed passion to subside; and then resolved to execute his own will, at all hazards. The details of his mental struggle, and the precautionary measures taken by him to master the situation, with eager and excited veterans at his back to enforce his will, would fill a volume. Recognizing the neglect of State authorities to furnish their own respective regiments with food, clothing, and money, he proudly, sublimely, and with a dignity beyond any heroic act of the battlefield, called upon the Governors of the Northern States to send their militia, at once, to take care of Clinton’s army in New York, if they wished to prevent the invasion and waste of their own peaceful homes. In other words, as plainly as he could do it, he made the “stay-at-homes” responsible for their own further immunity from battle scenes and battle waste.

This mutiny was indeed, a natural outbreak, inevitable, 308irresistible! It did not impair loyalty to country. The emergency overwhelmed every purely military obligation in that of self-preservation—of life itself. It did impair discipline, and did disregard authority, for the time; but in its manifestations had many of the elements of lawful revolution. The State first failed in duty to its defenders. For such a cause, the Revolution had its first outbreaks at Lexington and Concord. Washington was never so great in arms, as when with calm trust and steady nerve he faced this momentous issue. Besides his demand upon the States most exposed to British incursions, for men, he demanded money. Massachusetts and New Hampshire promptly gave twenty-four dollars extra, in specie, to each enlisted man. Colonel Laurens was appointed as special agent to France, to secure a loan. Eventually, he succeeded; but Count de Vergennes, when advised of his mission, wrote on the fifteenth of February: “Congress relies too much on France for subsidies to maintain their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant demands. The great expenses of the war render it impossible for France to meet these demands, if persisted in.” Franklin, then at Paris, wrote to his daughter, Mrs. Balche: “If you see Washington, assure him of my very great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old Generals here amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, and approve highly of his conduct.” Lafayette also wrote, urging full supplies of men and money; with most pointed assurances that the “American States would surely realize success, and be amply able to refund all advances which might be made by the king.”

Up to this time, the individuality of the States, in spite of Washington’s repeated appeals for entire unity of purpose and action on the part of all, had been jealously maintained. A partial relief was afforded, when, on the 309second of March, 1781, the Articles of Confederation finally went into effect, Maryland having yielded her assent on the previous day. Four years and four months had elapsed since their formal adoption and submission to the several States for acceptance.

All the insubordination of the American army before referred to, was well known at British headquarters in New York. That of the previous year had disappointed both Clinton and Knyphausen, who invaded New Jersey, it will be remembered, hoping to reap some benefits from its expression; but now that it assumed such unmistakable signs of armed revolt, they doubled their interest in its movements. General Clinton, mindful of his error on a former occasion, simply watched Washington. He received information of the general insubordination as early as Washington, and on the morning of the twenty-third, sent messengers to the American army with propositions looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. In writing to Lord Germaine, he says: “General Washington has not moved a man from his army [near West Point] as yet; and as it is probable that their demands are nearly the same with the Pennsylvania line, it is not thought likely that he will. I am, however, in a situation to avail myself of favorable events; but to stir before they offer, might mar all.”

At this period, the influence of the American Commissioners—Adams, Franklin and Jay, was proving very beneficial to the American cause with the Governments of Spain and Holland, as well as with France; and Colonel Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, after release from prison, pretty plainly assured the French Ministry that it “would be much wiser policy to advance money to America, than to risk such an accommodation with England as would compel America, so near her West India 310possessions, to make common cause with England against France.” Notwithstanding these negotiations, then in progress, the American army had become reduced to an effective force of barely five thousand men; and the French army could not be disposable for general service while their fleets were so closely confined to the harbor of Newport. The British fleet was wintering at Gardiner’s Bay, L.I., so as to watch all vessels that entered or departed from Long Island Sound, and maintained its blockade. Late in January a violent north-east storm made havoc with the British ships. The Culloden, line-of-battle ship (74 guns), was sunk. The Bedford was dismasted, and the America was driven to sea. Washington seized upon this incident to make a diversion southward and attempt, the capture of Arnold, who was in full commission as a brigadier-general of the British army.

Arnold had left New York with sixteen hundred men, on the nineteenth of the preceding December, for Virginia. His command consisted of the eighteenth British (Scotch) regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas, and the Queen’s Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe; the latter being a skilful officer, shrewd and cool, but noted, in the heat of battle, for characteristic ferocity in shortening fights, and thus reducing the number of wounded prisoners to be cared for. Clinton seems not to have fully relied upon the discretion of Arnold, since he reports, having “detailed two officers of tried ability and experience, and possessing the entire confidence of their commander.” As with so many naval expeditions of that period, a gale overtook Arnold on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of December, scattering his transports, so that without waiting for those still at sea, he landed with twelve hundred men and moved up the James River on the fourth of January. He landed at 311Westover, twenty-five miles below Richmond, and immediately marched upon the city. On the afternoon of the fifth, he entered Richmond. The militia, under Col. John Nichols, only two hundred in number, assembled upon Richmond Hill, but had to retire before Simcoe’s advance. A few men stationed on Shreve Hill, also retired. At Westham, seven miles above Richmond, a foundry, a laboratory, and some shops were destroyed, as well as the Auditor’s Records, which had been removed from Richmond for safety. Arnold sent a proposition to Governor Jefferson, offering to spare the city if no opposition were made to his vessels ascending the river to remove tobacco and other legitimate plunder of war. Upon rejection of this proposition, he burned so much of the city as time allowed, and returned to Westover, without loss. He carried off seven brass cannon, three hundred stands of arms found in the loft of the Capitol, and a few quartermasters’ stores, as his sole trophies of war. Upon information, however, that Baron Steuben was at Petersburg with some militia, Arnold hastened to Portsmouth to put its defences in better condition.

Before developing Washington’s plan for the capture of Benedict Arnold, it is advisable to glance at the military condition of the Southern Department in which Arnold was then serving in command of British troops. Lafayette had been intrusted with execution of the plan. He knew perfectly well that Arnold would not venture far from his fortified position at Portsmouth, and thus incur risk of capture and an inevitable death upon the gibbet.

The assignment of General Greene to the command of that department was designed by Washington, for the purpose of initiating a vigorous campaign against all posts occupied by British garrisons, and gradually to clear that country of the presence of British troops. He had great confidence in such men as Marion, Sumter, Hampton, and other partisan leaders, who were perpetually on the alert, by night and by day, for opportunities to repress royalist risings, and harass the enemy at every possible point of contact. It was very natural, then, to overestimate the British successes at Savannah and Charleston, and even to assume that the British army would be uniformly equal to active campaign service, and would not find it difficult to maintain supplies in the field. In view of the condition of roads, water-courses, swamps, and the limited agricultural improvements of 313those times, it is greatly to the credit of the British officers that so much was accomplished by them, in the face of the partisan operations above noticed.

Washington appreciated this condition fully; urged the Southern governors to renewed activity, and furnished General Greene with instructions respecting what he regarded as the final campaign of the war. The first element of success which he enjoined as a duty was “to avoid battle with fresh British troops, just out of garrison, and therefore in complete readiness for action.” The second injunction was, “so far as possible, to give a partisan or skirmish character to engagements where inferior numbers could keep their adversaries under constant and sleepless apprehension of attack.” The third was, “to utilize and control streams, swamps, and woods, where the bayonet and artillery could not be successfully employed by British troops.” The fourth principle of action was characteristic of Washington’s early experience, and was exemplified throughout the war—“never to halt, over night, without making artificial protection against surprise; and to surprise the enemy so far as practicable, whenever all conditions seem to render such surprise impossible.” Cæsar’s habitual intrenchments, upon a halt, were types of Washington’s methods; and the Crimean War made more impressive than ever the value of slight, temporary cover for troops in the field. The camp-kettle, the powder and lead, the pick and the spade, were Washington’s indispensable tools.

It was therefore with great confidence in the result that he intrusted this Southern campaign to the charge of Nathaniel Greene; and for the same reasons he sent him his best engineer, and his best corps of rifles and horse. General Greene, immediately upon taking command, removed all commissary supplies from the coast, to avoid liability of their seizure, and to maintain his food-supply. 314He ordered Quartermaster-General Carrington to collect all magazines upon the Roanoke, for ready access whenever he might need ammunition or commissary supplies. He wrote to Baron Steuben, to “hasten forward his recruits”; to the Governors of Virginia and North Carolina, to “fill up their quotas of regulars and call in all the militia that they could arm”; to Shelby, Campbell, and other participants in the Battle of King’s Mountain, fought on the eighth of October, 1780, “to come forward and assist in the overthrow of Cornwallis, and defeat his second attempt to invade North Carolina.” It is certain from his letters to Washington, that he expected to realize success. The battle of Cowpens immediately followed.

While awaiting response to his demands for troops, both militia and regulars, Greene promptly detached Morgan, with Colonels Washington and Howard, to learn the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and fritter away their strength by worrying tactics. Morgan came so near Tarleton as to know that he could have a fight, if he wanted a fight. This he resolved to have. Few military events on record show superior tact, daring, and success. He placed his command in the sharp bend of Broad River, then swollen by rains, and so deep and swift that neither boat, horse nor man could cross it; where, as he afterwards reported, “his men had to fight, or drown.” All that he asked of his advanced militia was, that they would give two volleys and scamper from his front, and re-form in his rear. He secreted Washington’s dragoons out of view, for their opportunity. Tarleton dashed madly after the scattering militia, and before he could rally his impetuous charge of horse and foot, was taken in the rear, utterly routed, and barely saved himself after a sabre-cut from Colonel Washington; leaving on the field, or as prisoners, seven hundred and eighty of his command, two cannon, fifty-five wagons, one hundred 315horses, and eight hundred muskets. Cornwallis was but twenty-five miles distant; but the exchange of sharp words afterwards, between himself and Tarleton, did not lessen the value and prestige of this timely American victory. Congress and various States united in recognition of Morgan’s gallant conduct. Broken down by rheumatism, he was compelled to leave active service. From Quebec, in 1775, to Cowpens, in 1780, he had been “weighed” in many battle-scales, and never “found wanting.”

On the twenty-fifth of January, while in camp on Hicks’ Creek, a fork of the Great Republic, Greene received the message of Morgan that he “had many prisoners in charge, but was pressed by Cornwallis.” It was most tantalizing, at such an hour, not to be able to improve this victory. The Southern army, including Morgan’s force, numbered, all told, including four hundred militia, only twenty-one hundred and three men, of whom the artillerists were but forty-seven, and the cavalry only one hundred and twenty. Greene wrote to Sumter, on the fifteenth of January, two days before the Battle of Cowpens: “More than half our numbers are in a manner naked, so much that we cannot put them on the least duty. Indeed, there is a great number that have not a rag of clothing on them, except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, about their waists.” But Greene put this force in the best possible order; and on the twenty-eighth, accompanied by a single guide, one aide-de-camp, and a sergeant’s party of twenty troopers, he started to join Morgan. On the night of the thirtieth, after a ride of one hundred and twenty-five miles, he was with him.

The crisis was immediate. Greene wrote to Varnum, then in Congress; to Gist, Smallwood, Rutledge, Washington, and others, appealing for five thousand infantry and from six to eight hundred horse. It seemed as if 316this very victory would only precipitate disaster. Washington thus replied: “I wish I had it in my power to congratulate you on the brilliant and important victory of General Morgan without the alloy which the distresses of the department you command, and apprehensions of posterior events, intermix.... I lament that you find it so difficult to avoid a general action; for our misfortunes can only be completed by the dispersion of your little army, which will be the most probable consequence of such an event.” This letter reflects the wise policy of Washington throughout the war; ever to reserve in hand a sufficient force to control the time and place for battle; while incessantly weakening that of his adversary and compelling him, finally, to flight “against odds.”

As the mind reverts to the contentions for high command which characterized the early years of the war; and as one officer after another disappears from the battle record, it would seem as if the officer who sat by the side of Morgan on the banks of the Catawba, on the thirtieth of January, 1781, must have felt as if a new generation had taken the place of the old comrades of 1776, and that he was simply waiting to pass away also.

But the hazard of delay was omnipotent to force instant action. Colonel Lee was ordered to hasten and join Greene. The report of the landing of British forces at Wilmington, just in the rear of the small army he had left at Hicks’ Creek, was a new source of anxious concern. The time of service of the Virginia militia was about to expire, and according to precedent, they would be prompt in their departure. With quick sagacity, Greene placed General Stephens in command, anticipating the exact term of their expiring enlistment, and sent them home, via Hillsborough, in charge of the prisoners of Tarleton’s command. He thus relieved Morgan of this encumbrance, and saved the detail of efficient troops for that escort duty.

317At this period, Cornwallis had abandoned Charleston as his base of supply, and was confident of a successful invasion of North Carolina. He certainly knew that Phillips, Arnold, and Simcoe could spare no troops from Virginia; and through the disaster which befell Tarleton, one of the best soldiers of that period, at Cowpens, he began to appreciate Clinton’s disappointing experiences about New York. He unburdened his thoughts to Clinton, in this melancholy vein: “Our hopes of success were principally founded upon positive assurances, given by apparently credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the approach of a British army in North Carolina, a great body of the inhabitants were ready to join it, and coöperate with it in restoring his Majesty’s Government. All inducements in my power were made use of without material effects.”

On the tenth of February, Greene had a force of only two thousand and thirty-six men; of which, but fourteen hundred and six were regular troops. A light corps of seven hundred men was organized under Colonels Williams, Carrington, Howard, Washington, and Lee, to operate in separate detachments so far as practicable, and thus keep the army of Cornwallis constantly under exposure to attack, and compelled to make many exhaustive marches. Kosciusko planned light earthworks, to cover fords as the army crossed and recrossed the same; and Greene was thus employing wise strategic methods for future action, when of his own choice he might confront Cornwallis in battle.

Many vicissitudes of thrilling interest attended these desultory operations; and when sudden floods, and as sudden abatement of swollen streams, had been successfully utilized by the patriotic leaders, just at the right moment, it is not strange that the American people, as 318well as Washington, saw in these deliverances the hand of favoring Providence.

At this juncture, Greene realized also, as well as did Cornwallis, that he could not expect any substantial aid from Virginia. He could hardly keep his immediate force in hand, while wear, waste, hunger and sickness began to impair their fighting energy as well as physical capacity. He determined to seek the first reasonable opportunity to join battle with Cornwallis; and the Battle of Guilford Court-House, on the fifteenth of March, realized Washington’s full anticipations of such protracted inaction.

The light troops of both armies had skirmished daily. Cornwallis issued a proclamation giving a limit within which the people must return to their allegiance to the Crown. On the sixth of March a skirmish occurred at Wetzell’s Mills, which brought nearly the entire army of Cornwallis into action. On the eighth, Colonel Carrington and Frederick Cornwallis, acting as commissioners for the two opposing armies, agreed upon terms for an exchange of prisoners. Cornwallis had been in the habit of paroling militia, wherever found, and carrying them on his list, as if captured in battle. In the adjustment made, Greene obtained a few officers who would have been otherwise idle during the campaign; but the arrangement had no other immediate value.

The position of the two armies is worthy of notice, because of its relations to succeeding events in Virginia. For several weeks Cornwallis had made special endeavor to control all upper fords. On the twenty-seventh of February he crossed the river Haw and fixed his camp on the Alamance, one of its tributaries. Greene adopted a line nearly parallel with that of his adversary, and advanced to the heights between Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek, having his divided headquarters near the 319Speedwell Iron Works and Boyd’s Mills, on two streams. Greene had gained the choice of position, entirely reversing the old relations of the armies. There were no British troops in his rear, or on his eastern flank, and none to endanger his communications with Virginia. He could give battle; retire as he advanced, or move into Virginia, by the same upper fords which Cornwallis had once so carefully occupied. At this time, the army of Cornwallis was also in great need of clothing, medicines, and all other essential supplies. The strain of so many unequal marches and skirmishes, through woods, thickets, and swamps, and across innumerable small streams, with no recompense in victories won, was very severe. He therefore pitched his camp between the Haw and Deep rivers, where the roads from Salisbury, Guilford and Hillsborough unite, and thus controlled the road to Wilmington, his only proximate base of supply.

Troops had already commenced reporting to General Greene, and he decided to offer battle. The command consisted of only fourteen hundred and ninety regular infantry, one hundred and sixty-one cavalry, and twenty-seven hundred and fifty-four militia. The army of Cornwallis, which on the first of January numbered three thousand two hundred and twenty-four men, had fallen off, by March 1st, nearly one-third; and there was reason for Greene’s hope that, in case his militia held firmly to positions assigned them, victory might be realized. He felt the enemy with Lee’s and Campbell’s cavalry; disposed his troops in admirable form; and failed at last, only through the weakness of his raw troops. For the purposes of this narrative, only the result need be stated. The American army retired to the iron-works on Troublesome Creek, a distance of twelve miles, to rally forces and prepare for future action. “It is certain,” says Colonel Lee, “that if Greene had known the condition of the British 320forces, he need not have retreated, and the American victory would have been complete.” Tarleton, who was wounded in the action, after stating that “the British army lost one-third of its number in killed and wounded, during the two hours of battle,” said that “this victory was the pledge of ultimate defeat.”

Greene, writing to Washington, said: “The enemy gained his cause, but is ruined by the success of it.” Fox, in the British House of Commons, said: “Another such victory would ruin the British army.” Pitt called it “the precursor of ruin to British supremacy at the South.” The casualties of the American army were, nominally, including missing, thirteen hundred and eleven; but so many of the missing immediately rallied, that the Virginia Brigade, after two days, reported as present for duty, seven hundred and fifty-two; and the Maryland Brigade mustered five hundred and fifty, showing a loss in action of only one hundred and eighty-eight men, instead of two hundred and sixty-one, reported on the seventeenth. Of one militia brigade, five hundred and fifty-two were missing. The British casualties were five hundred and forty-four, and of the general officers, only Cornwallis and Leslie escaped without wounds.

Cornwallis, after providing for the wounded as well as possible, and leaving under a flag of truce those who could not march, immediately crossed the deep river as if moving to Salisbury; then recrossed it, lower down, and entered Wilmington on the seventh of April, with only fourteen hundred and forty-five men. He wrote to Lord Rawdon, that “Greene would probably invade South Carolina”; but the messenger failed to get through to Charleston. Greene was delayed after the battle, to send back to his supply-train for ammunition, lead and bullet-moulds; but he followed so closely after, that he reached Ramsour’s Mills the twenty-eighth, the very day on which 321Cornwallis had bridged the river and pushed on to Wilmington.

The effect of this withdrawal of Cornwallis was of great value to the American cause, and cleared away obstructions to a broader range of operations for the army of the North. Subsequently, on the twenty-fifth of April Greene met Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, in an action sometimes called the Second Battle of Camden, as it was fought near that town, in which the American casualties were two hundred and seventy-one, and the British casualties were two hundred and fifty-eight. Greene, after the action, withdrew to Rugeley’s Mills, and Rawdon to Camden. Stedman says: “The victory at Hobkirk Hill, like that at Guilford Court-House, produced no consequences beneficial to the British army.” On the seventeenth of the subsequent September, Greene fought with Stewart, Rawdon’s successor, the Battle of Eutaw Springs, the final battle at the South. In this battle the American casualties were four hundred and eight, and the British casualties were six hundred and ninety-three. In dismissing these operations in the Southern Department, a single extract from Tarleton’s history of the war is of interest: “The troops engaged during the greater part of the time were totally destitute of bread, and the country afforded no vegetable as a substitute. Salt at length failed, and their only resources were water and the wild cattle which they found in the woods. In the last expedition, fifty men perished through mere fatigue.... We must not, however, confine the praise entirely to the British troops. The same justice requires that the Americans should not be deprived of their share of this fatal glory.... On the whole, the campaign terminated in their favor, General Greene having recovered the far greater part of Georgia, and the two Carolinas.”

This same Nathaniel Greene led the Kentish Guards to 322Boston on the morning after the Battle of Lexington, in 1775, and his early announcement of the principles upon which the war should be conducted to ensure final success, had been verified. He had vindicated the confidence of Washington in every line of duty, and in his Southern campaign cleared the way for the crowning triumph of the American Commander-in-Chief, at Yorktown.

The diversion of thought from Washington’s immediate surroundings will find its compensation in the development of his plan for the capture of Benedict Arnold. Its execution had been intrusted to General Lafayette, who was already assembling his command at Peekskill, on the Hudson.

The superiority of the British fleet before Newport having been reduced by the storm of January 22nd, Monsieur Destouches, successor to Admiral de Ternay, deceased, consented to send one ship-of-the-line and two frigates to prevent Arnold’s escape by sea. The Count de Rochambeau deemed it unnecessary and inexpedient to send troops, because the movement was to be so rapid in its execution. He assumed that the Continental forces in Virginia were adequate for operations under Lafayette. Letters from Washington, however, suggesting the detail of a considerable land force, did not reach him until after M. de Tully had sailed; or the entire French fleet, with a strong military contingent, would have joined the expedition. The three ships under the command of Monsieur de Tully sailed on the ninth of February; captured the British frigate Romulus in Linn Haven Bay, two privateers, and eight other prizes; but upon arrival at Elizabeth River, Virginia, finding that the depth of water would not allow the passage up the river of his larger ships, he returned to Newport.

324At this point, the beginning of the end of the war becomes apparent. Every fortuitous change in the details of immediately succeeding movements, and every modification of plans previously considered, seem to occur as if the American Commander-in-Chief adjusted characters and events with the accuracy of a master of chess who plays with a clear anticipation of the checkmate of Clinton and Cornwallis, his two antagonists. Each of the royal partners attempted, too late, the process of “castle-ing”; so that New York, first, and then Yorktown, became powerless to protect each other, or the dependent posts, garrisons, and commanders of each. And it is still more dramatic in the result than if Arnold had been captured; for the expedition of the French Marquis, which was at first regarded as only a temporary absence on his part from the immediate command of Washington, proved to be the vanguard of an advance which, through his extraordinary tact and skilful handling, finally inclosed Cornwallis, and made the opportunity for his capture.

Lafayette started from Peekskill immediately upon the departure of M. de Tully’s ships, taking with him twelve hundred light infantry, made up of New England and New Jersey troops. He reached Pompton, New Jersey, on the twenty-fifth day of February; Philadelphia, on the second day of March, and Head of Elk, on the next day. If the reader will imagine Lafayette as standing upon the high ground overlooking Chesapeake Bay on the evening of March 3, 1781, let him recall Maxwell’s visit to the same spot accompanied by Lafayette, on the third day of September, 1777, just before the Battle of Brandywine. On the former occasion, Lafayette slept in a log cabin where he had been watching the British landing. At daybreak, that cabin was within the British picket-lines. A suspicion that it was occupied 325by an officer of Lafayette’s rank was certainly beyond the conception of the Hessian Chasseurs who bivouacked close by. In a letter written by Lafayette, to his young wife, which was ever cherished by the late Senators Oscar and Edmond Lafayette, grandsons of the Marquis, he humorously contrasts his condition at the two dates. “The landing of Cornwallis, at this particular point” is noticed; then, “my first wound, in my first battle near Birmingham Meeting House”; and then, “my present independent command, and my hopeful expectation that the same British General will not much longer bar the way to American Independence.”

From this point, Lafayette sent his advance troops to Annapolis; but he first made a personal trip, in an open canoe, to Elizabethtown, to accelerate preparations for the capture of the traitor Arnold. He visited Baron Steuben at Yorktown, and learned that the Baron would undertake to raise five thousand militia for his support. He visited Muhlenburg at Suffolk; and then made a personal reconnoissance of Arnold’s defences at Portsmouth. The return of M. de Tully to Newport compelled him to return to Annapolis and there await instructions from Washington. Meanwhile, Washington, following up his own letters to Rochambeau, visited Newport, R.I., and accompanied Rochambeau to the French Admiral’s ship. Eleven hundred men had already embarked, awaiting the repair of a frigate before sailing. On the eighth, four frigates and eight battleships proceeded to sea. This was a profound surprise to the British fleet, still anchored in Gardiner’s Bay, as well as to Clinton, then in New York. The French fleet was actually under weigh before Admiral Arbuthnot suspected its design. He sailed promptly in pursuit, with an equal force, and wrote to General Clinton, to “warn Arnold of his danger.” On the sixteenth, the British and French 326squadrons fought a well-balanced battle, off the Chesapeake; but the presence of the British fleet having thwarted the chief object of its errand, Monsieur Destouches returned to Newport on the twenty-sixth, after an absence of only eighteen days. The inability of the French fleet to control the waters of the Chesapeake modified all plans.

Washington wrote to Lafayette on the fifth of April, as follows: “While we all lament the miscarriage of an enterprise [the capture of Arnold] which bid so fair of success, we must console ourselves in the thought of having done everything practicable to accomplish it. I am certain that the Chevalier Destouches exerted himself to the utmost to gain the Chesapeake. The point upon which the whole turned, the action with Admiral Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the Chevalier, and upon the marine of France. As matters have turned out, it is to be wished that you had not gone out of the Elk; but, I never judge of the proprieties of measures by after results.” This letter, so timely and wise, as well as so characteristic of its author, also instructed Lafayette to return to Philadelphia; but on the sixth, he was ordered to report to General Greene.

This order had hardly been issued when Washington learned that Clinton, acting upon Admiral Arbuthnot’s suggestion, had forwarded additional troops to the support of Arnold, under command of General Phillips. He at once countermanded Lafayette’s orders to report to General Greene, and assigned him to command in Virginia, reporting, however, both to General Greene and himself. Greene received a copy of this order March 18th, three days after the Battle of Guilford Court-House, and he dates his reply as follows: “Ten miles from Guilford Court-House. I am happy to hear the Marquis is coming to Virginia, though I am afraid from a hint in 327one of Baron Steuben’s letters that he will think himself injured in being superseded in command. Could the Marquis be with us at this moment, we should have a most glorious campaign. It would put Cornwallis and his whole army into our hands.”

Greene, at this time, knowing the condition of the army of Cornwallis at Wilmington, believed that by the advance of Lafayette from Virginia, and his own coöperation, just as he started in pursuit of Cornwallis, the capture of that officer’s entire command would be assured. But in other ways than had been anticipated, the assignment of Lafayette to command in Virginia did enforce the ultimate surrender of the British army of Virginia. Baron Steuben, with perfect confidence in the wisdom of Washington, gracefully accepted the order as final, and rendered to Lafayette prompt obedience and thoroughly hearty support.

The troops that accompanied Lafayette, however, did not like their transfer to a warmer climate. Desertions were frequent, and a mutinous spirit was exhibited. Lafayette hung the first deserter who was captured. A second was arrested and brought before him for disposal. He sent him adrift, with “permission to return to his home, or wherever he desired to go.” He then issued an order, reciting, that “he was setting out upon a dangerous and difficult expedition; and he hoped the soldiers would not abandon him; but that whoever wished to go away, might do so instantly.” “From that hour,” wrote Lafayette, “all desertions ceased, and not a man would leave.”

Washington himself, at this juncture of affairs, was peculiarly embarrassed. Congress had assured him that the new regular force of thirty-seven thousand men would be in the field by the first of January. Marshall, the historian, makes the following statement: “The regular force drawn from Pennsylvania, to Georgia inclusive, at 328no time during this interesting campaign amounted to three thousand effective men.” Of the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached under the Marquis de Lafayette, in the aid of Virginia. Including these in the estimate, the States, from New Jersey to New Hampshire, had furnished only five thousand effectives. The cavalry and artillery at no time exceeded one thousand. During May, the total force reached seven thousand, of whom rather more than four thousand might have been relied on for action; but even these had been brought into camp too late to acquire that discipline which is so essential to military service.

As early as February twentieth, when the Virginia campaign was in prospect, General Washington begged Schuyler to accept the head of the War Department, in these earnest words: “Our affairs are brought to an awful crisis. Nothing will recover them but the vigorous exertion of men of abilities who know our wants and the best means of supplying them. These qualifications, Sir, without a compliment, I think you possess. Why, then, the department being necessary, should you shrink from it? The greater the chaos, the greater will be your merit in bringing forth order.” General Schuyler replied on the twenty-fifth, and declared his intention never to hold office under Congress, unless accompanied by a restoration to military rank; and added that “such inconvenience would result to themselves [members of Congress] from such a restoration, as would necessarily give umbrage to many officers.”

Washington’s diary at this period affords a fair show of existing conditions, and reveals his anxiety better than another can depict it. On the first of May, his record is this: “Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scant pittance, scattered here and there, in different States. Instead of having our arsenals filled 329with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen are leaving them.... Instead of having the regiments completed under the new establishment, scarce any State has an eighth part of its quota in the field, and there is little prospect of getting more than half. In a word, instead of having everything in readiness to take the field, we have nothing.... And instead of having the prospect of a glorious, offensive campaign before us, we have a gloomy and bewildered prospect of a defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops, and money, from our generous allies, and these are at present too contingent to build upon.... Chimney-corner patriots abound; venality, corruption, prostitution of office for selfish ends, abuse of trust, perversion of funds from a national to a private use, and speculations upon the necessities of the times, pervade all interests.... In fact, every battle and every campaign is affected by these elements, and the diffusion of political responsibility still makes the United States only a loose partnership of scattered and loosely related partners.”

At this date, May first, the British troops in Virginia consisted of Arnold’s command of fifteen hundred and fifty-three men, and that of Phillips, of twenty-one hundred and sixty-three men. On the twentieth of May, including the forces of Cornwallis, the entire British force in Virginia did not exceed five thousand effective troops. Arnold, Phillips, and Simcoe made numerous excursions, destroying property, burning buildings, and leaving marks of desolation upon Williamsburg, Petersburg, Osborne, Hanover Court-House, Chesterfield Court-House, and elsewhere.

Lafayette’s command was almost ubiquitous, harassing the enemy at every point, so that they could hardly make an expedition without being compelled to abandon 330portions of the property plundered, and return to their fortified positions with the loss of some men and horses, every time. So soon as Lafayette learned that Cornwallis proposed to move northward from Wilmington to Virginia, and unite his command with those of Phillips and Arnold, he made an effort to reach Halifax Court-House, and cut him off; but the shorter route enabled Phillips to defeat Lafayette’s movement.

On the eighth of May, he wrote to Washington: “There is no fighting here, unless you have naval superiority; or, an army mounted on race-horses. Phillips’ plan against Richmond has been defeated. He was going to Portsmouth. Now, it appears that I have business with two armies, and this is rather too much. Each is more than double, superior to me. We have no boats, few militia, and no arms. I will try and do for the best. Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and reënforcements destined to General Greene’s army. I have forbidden every department to give me anything that may be thought useful to General Greene. When General Greene becomes equal to offensive operations, this quarter will be relieved. I have written to General Wayne [who had been ordered to report to Lafayette, with the Pennsylvania line, ordered south by Congress, on account of their mutiny] to hasten his march; but unless I am hard pressed, I shall request him to go southward.” Washington thus replied to this letter: “Your determination to avoid an engagement, with your present force, is certainly judicious. General Wayne has been pressed both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as much expedition as possible.”

On the eighteenth of May, pursuant to orders of General Greene, assigning him to sole command in Virginia, and instructing him to report only to Washington, Lafayette established his headquarters between the Pamunkey 331and Chickahominy rivers, equally covering Richmond and other important points in the State; and sent General Nelson with militia towards Petersburg. On the twenty-sixth of May, Cornwallis received reënforcements under General Leslie, and notified General Clinton of his own intention to “dislodge Lafayette from Richmond.” General Clinton’s letter of the twentieth had contained the following postscript: “Pray send Brigadier-General Arnold here, by the first opportunity, if you should not have particular occasion for his services.” Cornwallis replied: “I have consented to the request of General Arnold to go to New York; he conceived that your Excellency wished him to attend you, and his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of service.”

In view of the great effort on the part of Washington to arrest Arnold, it is well to consider some incidents that disclose Arnold’s true position in the British army. In none of his expeditions in Virginia did he face Continental troops. He attempted to open a correspondence with Lafayette, and threatened to send any prisoners he might capture, to the West Indies; but Lafayette never acknowledged a communication, simply forwarding them to Washington. Among papers of General Phillips which came to light upon his decease, was a letter from Clinton showing that Phillips’ assignment to duty, on the eleventh of April, was “for the security of Arnold and the troops under his command, and for no other purpose.” The reader, familiar with the Burgoyne campaign, will remember the brilliant and explosive burst of Arnold into the British lines, near Bemis Heights. General Phillips, then serving under Burgoyne, was one of the severest sufferers by that assault; and the relations of the two officers, in Virginia, were of the most constrained character. Upon the death of Phillips an attempt was made on the part of Arnold to 332conceal the knowledge of that fact; and some direct correspondence of Arnold with London officials had disturbed Clinton, so that he desired to have him under his immediate control. The departure of Arnold from Virginia resolved the Virginia campaign into a series of spirited marches, counter-marches, skirmishes and sharp encounters, which ultimately drove Cornwallis behind the intrenchments at Yorktown; and there he was securely inclosed, until all things could be prepared for the presence of the American Commander-in-Chief.

On the thirty-first of May, Washington wrote to Lafayette, and thus closed his letter: “Your conduct upon every occasion meets my approbation, but in none more than in your refusing to hold a correspondence with Arnold.”

On the twenty-first day of May, 1781, which proved to have been that of the arrival of Cornwallis at Yorktown, Washington held a conference with Count de Rochambeau and General Chastellux at Wethersfield, Conn., as to the details of the approaching summer campaign. As one result of this interview, Count de Rochambeau requested Count de Grasse, then in the West Indies, to coöperate for a while with Count de Barras, and close the port of New York. The French fleet could not be very well spared from the West India Station, for the reason that while coöperating with the Americans, and on a foreign coast, it had neither accessible docks nor other means of refitting and supply, in case of disaster. Pending the disposition of this matter, the immediate junction of the two armies was definitely settled.

The American army, with an effective force of a little less than forty-six hundred men, was ordered to Peekskill-on-the-Hudson. The Count de Rochambeau, with the Duke de Lauzun, marched from Newport and took post at Ridgebury, Conn., near Salem, on the road to Danbury, fifteen miles back from Long Island Sound.

Two British posts, just out of New York, one at Morrisania, where Delancey’s Rangers had a station, and from which constant incursions were made into Winchester 334county; and the other at the north end of Manhattan Island, not far from Fort Washington, were designated as the first objects of assault. Clinton had sent a considerable foraging force into New Jersey, and it was supposed likely that he might regard the posts named as not in danger of attack, or leave them lightly garrisoned. Sheldon’s Dragoons and a division under the Duke de Lauzun were to attempt the first of the expeditions, and General Lincoln was intrusted with the other. Washington advised Governor Clinton of his plan, so that he might concentrate the New York militia at the proper moment; and signal guns, as well as beacon-fires, had been arranged to give notice of success.

General Lincoln left Peekskill with eight hundred men, on the morning of the first of June, proceeded to Teller’s Point; there took boats, and with muffled oars rowed down Tappan Bay by night, hugging the eastern shore. On the morning of the second, he reached Dobb’s Ferry, without being discovered by the enemy. At three o’clock, on the morning of the second, Washington started, without baggage, and leaving all tents standing; passed through Tarrytown, reaching Valentine’s Hill, four miles above King’s Bridge, by sunrise of the third, where he gained a good position for the support of either expedition.

When General Lincoln crossed the Hudson, at Fort Lee, he at once noticed that the British expedition into New Jersey had returned and reoccupied the post near Fort Washington; and that a British man-of-war had anchored in the stream, near the shore just below that fort. A surprise of Fort Washington became impossible. He had, however, before leaving Peekskill, been supplied with alternate instructions, anticipating this very emergency. It had been Washington’s real purpose, now that the French army was immediately within his control, to draw Clinton, if possible, into a general engagement; 335and the entire French force awaited his signal for the movement. So soon as Lincoln discovered the British camp, he recrossed the Hudson and landed his troops just above Spuyten Duyvil Creek, near old Fort Independence; and then moved to high ground near King’s Bridge, so as to act in concert with the Duke de Lauzun and cut off any detachment which might attempt to cross the Harlem to support Delancey. Meanwhile the Duke de Lauzun had only reached East Chester, after a hot march over very rough country, and was several hours later than the hour designated for the assault. The troops of Lincoln were discovered by a large foraging force of fourteen hundred men which was sweeping over the country from right to left, in search of cattle and other supplies, and a sharp skirmish ensued. The Duke de Lauzun, hearing the firing, pressed forward with forced step to join in the action. Washington also moved rapidly to the front, and at his appearance the British fell back rapidly to New York. During the afternoon, after carefully reconnoitering the position, Washington also retired to Valentine’s Hill, and then to Dobb’s Ferry, as if entirely withdrawing his troops; but, on the sixth, he was joined by Rochambeau, and on the seventh, the American camp was fully established. Its right rested on the Hudson, covered by earthworks, and its left crossed Saw Mill River. (See Map, “Hudson River Highlands.”) The French army occupied the hills still farther eastward, as far as the river Bronx.

Washington at once made an effort to force General Clinton to fight for the possession of New York. Pickets were ostentatiously posted. Letters, designed to fall into Clinton’s hands, were written, and as early as the sixth, Clinton captured some of these “confidential” papers and enclosed them to Lord Cornwallis, saying: “I am threatened with a siege. Send me two thousand troops; the sooner they come, the better.”

336The agitation in New York is described by contemporary writers as “most intense and universal.” It was kept under all possible control; but the coast-guards were doubled, so that no stray boats might pass unchallenged, by night or day, and mounted couriers constantly passed and repassed, to furnish the speediest possible information at British headquarters of any hostile advance. The report published in slips, that “brick ovens were to be erected in New Jersey, opposite Staten Island, to supply bread rations, daily, for thirty thousand men,” was encouraged by Washington, and was accepted as true by the country near by, and generally at the north, New Jersey included.

When the camps were fully established, and guns were disposed for their best effect, Washington, accompanied by Count de Rochambeau and Generals de Boville and Du Portail, crossed to Jersey Heights, and with a small escort of one hundred and fifty Jersey troops, examined all the New York outposts, as far down as the ocean. Neither was this a mere sham—hollow in substance. The projected attack upon New York was a deliberate alternative; to compel Clinton to withhold reënforcements from the Southern army so that Cornwallis could be overpowered and captured; or, if he ventured to aid that officer, he must lose New York.

This reconnoissance in New Jersey was known to Sir Henry Clinton, and he might have been very thankful to General Washington for information that some of “his [Clinton’s] stores were inadequately guarded”; that “at some posts the small garrisons were doing no watchful guard duty”; and that there was “no serious difficulty whatever in seizing or destroying all the stores on Staten Island, without material loss or risk.”

A second reconnoissance of the entire British front, from King’s Bridge down the Hudson, and along Hell 337Gate channel, occurred on the evening of July 21st. This was no feeble “feeling of the enemy.” Five thousand choice troops took part in the investigation of the British position. General Chastellux commanded one division, and General Lincoln commanded the second. As early as the eighth of the month, Sir Henry Clinton wrote to Lord Cornwallis, as follows: “As your lordship is now so near, it will be unnecessary for you to send your despatches to the minister; you will therefore be so good as to send them to me in the future.”

It is a fact that Cornwallis was encouraged by the British War Office and the Ministry to write directly to those departments. He stood high in esteem; and, as will appear under his name in the Index, was subsequently honored, although captured at Yorktown. The letter of the eighth, thus referred to, was followed by letters on the eleventh, thirteenth, and nineteenth of June, with similar appeals for reënforcements; and these appeals were forwarded by special couriers or fast frigates. Then came the allied parade of the twenty-second. The troops reached King’s Bridge at daybreak. Lauzun’s lancers in their brilliant uniform, and Sheldon’s Light Corps, scoured the vicinity of Morrisania, and the dragoons went as far as Throgg’s Neck. The royalist refugees fled to islands, vessels, and the woods. This demonstration lasted during the twenty-second and twenty-third of June. Then Washington and Rochambeau, escorted by French dragoons, examined all advance posts, passing directly within range of fire from both vessels and picket posts. There was no pretence of secrecy in this inquisitive inquiry as to the British strength and British positions. It was a bold, deliberate challenge of the garrison to retire if they so desired, or to fight if they preferred battle. On the twenty-third, the troops resumed their places in the quiet camp.

338On the twenty-sixth, Clinton called upon Cornwallis for “three more regiments,” to be sent from Carolina, writing: “I shall probably want them, as well as the troops you may be able to send me from the Chesapeake, for such offensive and defensive operations as may offer in this quarter.” Cornwallis had previously offered to send two of the Hessian regiments, then in South Carolina, “as they could be spared in the hot summer months,” and Clinton begged him to “renew that offer.”

A brief glance at the Southern Department is necessary in order fully to measure the designs of the American Commander-in-Chief, which, on the surface, seemed to be local in their purpose. The army of Cornwallis, with reenforcements, numbered about seven thousand effective troops when he entered upon his active campaign against Lafayette. It will be remembered that Cornwallis had promised Clinton to drive Lafayette from Richmond. When Lafayette saw that by attempting to hold Richmond he would risk a general action, with the possible loss of Virginia and consequent ruin to Greene’s army at the South, he permitted that city to abide the fate of war, and marched northward to the upper Rappahannock; to effect an union with the forces of Wayne, approaching from the north. He decided to avoid further contest with Cornwallis, unless on terms of his own dictation.

The Assembly of Virginia, quickened to new energy, retired to Charlottesville May 24th. But they authorized the “issue of fifteen millions of bills,” and also the declaration of martial law within twenty miles of any army headquarters. That brought Richmond within the military control of Lafayette. The Burgoyne prisoners were also removed from Charlottesville, over the mountains, to Winchester. The details of the pursuit of Lafayette by Cornwallis, day by day, are full of thrilling interest, but beyond the province of this narrative.

339On the twenty-eighth of May, Lafayette wrote as follows to Washington: “The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice, I gave them a chance of fighting, taking good care not to engage them farther than I pleased, but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion. I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. His lordship had, exclusive of the reënforcements from Portsmouth, (said to be six hundred) four thousand men; eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or mounted infantry. Our force is about his; but only one thousand five hundred regulars, and fifty dragoons. One little action more particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place where he first began to retire to Williamsburg, is upwards of one hundred miles. The old arms at the Point of the Fork have been taken out of the water. The cannon was thrown into the river undamaged, when they marched back to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of consequence, but lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in the State. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground, in Virginia. I don’t know but what we shall, in our turn, become the pursuing enemy.”

On the very next day, after this letter was despatched to the American Commander-in-Chief, May twenty-ninth, Cornwallis did, in fact, abandon pursuit. Tarleton, who never lost opportunity to express his appreciation of the tact, skill, and “invariable wisdom of Lafayette’s movements,” states, that “an American patrol was captured; and among letters of Lafayette to Greene, Steuben, and others, was one to Governor Jefferson, urging him to rally militia during his absence, and using this prophetic expression: ‘The British success in Virginia resembles 340the French invasion of Hanover, and is likely to have similar consequences, if the governor and the country would exert themselves, at the present juncture.’”

When Cornwallis halted and moved back towards his base, Tarleton was detached with two hundred and fifty troopers, mounted on the picked stock of the best private stables, taken at will, and attempted to capture Governor Jefferson at Monticello. His report says: “I imagined that a march of seventy miles in twenty-four hours, with the caution used, might perhaps give the advantage of a surprise.” Tarleton charged through the Riviana River, captured seven members of the Legislature and Brigadier-General Scott, and destroyed one thousand arms and four hundred barrels of powder; but the Governor escaped, and the Assembly immediately convened at Staunton, beyond Tarleton’s reach. Then he started down the Riviana to join Simcoe in an attack upon Steuben’s depot of supplies at Elk Island. But Wayne joined Lafayette, and Lafayette proceeded southward. They soon started in pursuit of the retiring column of Cornwallis. The pursued had indeed become the pursuers. Tarleton thus writes: “The Marquis Lafayette, who had previously practised defensive measures with skill and security, being now reënforced by Wayne and about eight hundred continentals and some militia, followed the British as they proceeded down James River. This design, being judiciously arranged and executed with extreme caution, allowed opportunity for the junction of Baron Steuben; confined the small detachments of the King’s troops; and both saved the property and animated the drooping spirits of the Virginians.” On the thirteenth, Tarleton reported his own movements and the waste he had accomplished.

The scouts of Lafayette intercepted the letter, and he published it to the people before Cornwallis himself had 341knowledge of its contents. Cornwallis returned to his headquarters, to find despatches fifteen days old awaiting his attention. One contained this extraordinary information: “The Continentals under Lafayette cannot exceed one thousand; and the Pennsylvania Line, under Wayne, are so discontented, that their officers are afraid to trust them with ammunition. Postscript.—This may have, however, since altered.”

On the very day of the receipt of this despatch, Tarleton and Simcoe were actually compelled to cover the picket-lines of Cornwallis with their full force, to prevent Lafayette’s Continentals and the Pennsylvania Line from capturing the supply trains of his command. Cornwallis started for Portsmouth on the fourth. A sharp action at Williamsburg, in which Wayne made a brilliant bayonet charge, and in which Lafayette, having lost a horse, gallantly fought the battle on foot, resulted in a loss of one hundred and eighteen Americans and seventy-five British troops. From Portsmouth, Cornwallis took boats for Yorktown, on the first of August; and on the sixth, Tarleton says: “I threw my horses into deep water, near shore, and landed without loss,” joining Cornwallis on the tenth. Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, was occupied and fortified. Constant skirmishes occurred between Tarleton and Simcoe, of its garrison, and the detachments which Lafayette kept active in the vicinity.

On the eighth, Lafayette wrote to Washington as follows: “We shall act agreeably to circumstances; but avoid drawing ourselves into a false movement, which, if cavalry had command of the river, would give the enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no blunder can be hoped from him, to recover a bad step of ours. Should a fleet come in at this moment, our affairs would take a very happy turn.” On the 342thirteenth, Lafayette established his headquarters in the forks of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponey. On the twenty-third, he wrote, in part: “In the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come yourself to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with pretty good apparatus; but when a French fleet takes possession of the Bay, and we form a land force superior to his, that army must sooner or later be forced to surrender, as we may then get what reënforcements we please. I heartily thank you for having ordered me to Virginia. It is to your goodness that I am indebted for the most beautiful prospect which I may ever be able to behold.”

On the thirtieth, Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake with twenty-six sail-of-the-line, besides frigates and transports. On the third of September, Count de St. Simon landed with three thousand two hundred French troops, and was joined by Lafayette at Green Spring on the same day. On the fifth, the allies occupied Williamsburg, about fifteen miles from Yorktown. The Count de Grasse had a limited period for operations on the American coast, and united with the Count de St. Simon to urge an immediate attack upon Yorktown, before its defences could be completed, waiving seniority of rank, and agreeing to serve under Lafayette.

Lafayette thus wrote to Washington: “I am not so hasty as the Count de Grasse, and think that having so sure a game to play, it would be madness, by the risk of an attack, to give anything to chance. Unless matters are very different from what I think they are, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented with preventing the enemy’s forages, with militia; without committing our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis de St. Simon has been pleased to express to Colonel Gimât respecting his being under me, I shall do nothing without paying 343that deference which is due to age, talents, and experience; but would rather incline to the cautious line of conduct I have of late adopted. I hope you will find we have taken the best precautions to prevent his lordship’s escape. I hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the negroes; must be certain to lose one-third of his army, and run the greatest risk of losing the whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive from a brilliant defence.” On the eighth, Lafayette wrote: “If you knew how slowly things go on in this country! The governor does what he can; the wheels of government are so rusty, that no governor whatever will be able to set them free again. Time will prove that Governor Jefferson has been too severely charged. We will try, if not dangerous, on so large a scale, to form a good idea of the works; but unless I am greatly deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now, with our force. Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse and General Du Portail agree with me in opinion; but should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a position as we have, everybody thinks he cannot but repent of it; and should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle.”

The time had arrived for the presence of the American Commander-in-Chief.

Washington was in his tent, where only the quiet of a few hours at a time interposed their opportunity for other than field duty. At one of those intervals he was compelled to make assignments of the American army for associated operations with his French allies. He had just been advised that three thousand Hessian auxiliaries had reënforced the British garrison of New York. Appeals to the various State authorities had failed to realize appreciable additions to his fighting

It was an hour of opportunity for America. Failure to meet French support with a fair correspondence in military force, would compromise his country before the world. Amid such reflections, which were the basis of a fresh public appeal, he was rallied to action by the entrance of a special messenger from Newport, Rhode Island. The frigate Concorde had arrived from the West Indies, and the following despatch was placed in his hands: “Count de Grasse will leave San Domingo on the third of August, direct for Chesapeake Bay.”

With imperturbable calmness, Washington folded the despatch, and then consulted with the Count de Rochambeau alone, as to the best disposition to be made of the squadron of Admiral de Barras, still at Newport. That officer, although the senior of the Count de 345Grasse, promptly expressed his readiness to waive precedence and serve as best advised by the American Commander-in-Chief. He had indeed but seven ships-of-the-line disposable and ready for sea; but this force was deemed a sufficient convoy for the transports which were to carry heavy artillery and ammunition, for siege purposes before Yorktown. This courtesy of the French admiral had its important sequel, in changing what would have been a superior British naval force in those waters to a determining superiority on the part of France, at the most critical moment of that final campaign in behalf of American Independence. Every officer of Washington’s staff received instant instructions. They were only advised, very reservedly, that supplies of heavy artillery would be forwarded to General Lafayette, for his use; but it began to be realized that with French troops sufficient to complete the environment of Yorktown, and a French fleet competent to destroy the coast defences, the capitulation of Cornwallis could be enforced.

Letters were immediately sent by trusty messengers to every Northern governor, to hasten forward their Continental quotas yet in arrears, and to rally their militia in force, for the “capture of New York.” Confidential agents were also despatched to General Lafayette and the Count de Grasse, with the joint instructions of Washington and Rochambeau, sufficiently embodying an intimation of plans held in reserve; but explicitly warning them not to permit Cornwallis to escape, nor to receive reënforcements by sea from New York. Other letters were written to the authorities of New Jersey and Philadelphia, quite minutely defining a plan for the seizure of Staten Island, under cover of a French naval force; while the principal allied armies were expected to force the upper defences of New York by irresistible assault. Some of these despatches, carefully duplicated, with enclosed plans, as once 346before, were put into the hands of other messengers, designedly for interception by Clinton. Heavy batteaux on wheels, hauled by oxen, made ostentatious movement, together with wagon-loads of supplies, to the seashore opposite Staten Island. General Heath was placed in command of a large camp near Springfield, New Jersey, for assembling and drilling a large force of militia. Other small camps of Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia, easily distinguishable by the spies of General Clinton, dotted the country. The militia of Connecticut and New York also hastened to participate in the long-hoped-for emancipation of New York from British control.

As late as the nineteenth, in order to give General Clinton fair notice that he might expect no unnecessary or protracted delay in the attack already ripe for execution, all roads leading to King’s Bridge were cleared of obstructions. Fallen trees and scattered branches were removed so as to expedite a swift assault upon the British advanced outposts. All these were heaped up and burned at night, as a reminder of the impending crisis. Everything worked admirably as planned, and still, as on the fourth of March, 1776, before Boston, the American Commander-in-Chief kept to himself his secret purpose.

Afterwards, he thus explained his action: “That much trouble was taken, and finesse used, to misguide and bewilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the real object, by fictitious communications as well as by making a deceptive provision of ovens, forage, and boats, in his neighborhood, is certain. Nor, was less pains taken to deceive our own army; for, I had always conceived, when the imposition does not completely take place at home, it would never sufficiently succeed abroad.”

During the nineteenth, while the obstructions were being thus removed from the roads leading into New 347York, Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb’s Ferry and demonstrated for an advance upon Staten Island, from the Jersey shore, immediately opposite. On the twenty-first, a detachment selected by Washington himself crossed the Hudson at King’s Ferry, near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the armies were united on the twenty-fifth. During this brief delay, Rochambeau accompanied Washington to a final inspection of West Point; and the headquarters of the American army at New Windsor, between that post and Newburg, were formally abandoned.

The combined armies of America and France no longer threatened New York; but they had not been missed by Clinton. The American forces moved rapidly toward Springfield, on the Rahway, as if to strike Staten Island. The great baggage-train and the same batteaux demonstrated toward Staten Island. But the French army marched for Whippany, in the direction of Trenton. Washington and his suite reached Philadelphia about noon, August thirtieth. Still they had not been missed by Clinton.

But now, for the first time, the American army realized that it was destined southward, and that a triumphant entry into New York City was not to be the crowning reward for service so faithfully done. Dissatisfaction was openly and bluntly expressed. Even officers, long in arrears of pay, equally with the rank and file, bitterly complained. Rochambeau, quickly alive to the situation, promptly advanced twenty thousand dollars in gold for the men, upon the simple pledge of Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, that it should be refunded by the first of October.

Suddenly, Colonel Laurens, just from France, having landed at Boston on the twenty-fifth, only five days before, appeared at Washington’s quarters’ with report of 348the result of his mission to the French king. His ship brought clothing, ammunition, and half a million of dollars, as the first instalment of six million of livres ($1,111,111) generously furnished by Louis XVI., with the pledge of additional sums to follow. This welcome visitor further announced to the calmly attentive American Commander-in-Chief this message: “Dr. Franklin advised me that he had secured a loan of four million of livres ($740,740) to cover American drafts made before I could arrive in America; and Count de Vergennes agreed to guarantee a loan in Holland, for ten million livres ($1,851,851).”

If the heavens had opened and reverberating thunder had distinctly articulated: “American Independence is achieved!” the assurance of a Divine interposition would hardly have appeared more emphatic to the waiting faith of Washington, or have more thrillingly encouraged the weary but obedient soldiers of his command.

And still this American army, thus refreshed in spirit and joyous in the hope of speedy and final victory, had not been missed from New York by General, Sir Henry Clinton. Another fast-sailing frigate was speeding through the Narrows, past Sandy Hook, southward, once more to appeal to Lord Cornwallis to come to the rescue of imperiled, beleaguered New York.

On the second day of September, the American army made its third formal entry into Philadelphia, amid glad acclaims of welcome, and sharing with the people in the spirit of one great jubilee. At that very hour, another courier vessel, in chase of the former, left New York with a message for Cornwallis, which failed to reach him until the fifteenth. It was in cipher, and read as follows:

Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward, with an appearance of haste; and gives out that he expects the coöperation 349of a considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may be assured that if this should be the case, I shall endeavor to reënforce your command by all means within the compass of my power; or, make every possible diversion in your favor.

P.S.—Washington, it is said, was at Trenton, this day, and means to go in vessels to Christiana Creek, and from thence by Head of Elk, down Chesapeake Bay also.... Washington has about four thousand French, and two thousand Continentals, with him.

On the following day, the French army, having taken a day for cleaning arms, uniforms, and accoutrements, made a dress parade through the American capital. Every gorgeous trapping of their brilliant, sentimental outfit was proudly displayed before the wondering and delighted populace. Contemporary writers could not sufficiently describe the “magnificence of the parade, and the convulsions of joy that animated the entire population.” And yet, one eminent French officer, in describing the march of the American army on the previous day, said: “The plainly dressed American army lost no credit in the steadiness of their march and their fitness for battle.”

On the same day, Washington received despatches from Lafayette. One, dated August 21st, reported that “the British troops were fortifying Gloucester, across the river from Yorktown.” Others were as follows: “A small garrison remains at Portsmouth”; “I have written to the Governor, to collect six hundred militia upon Blackwater”; “I have written to General Gregory, near Portsmouth, that I am advised that the enemy intend to push a detachment into Carolina; to General Wayne, to move to the southward and to have a column ready to cross the James at Westover; and that my own army will soon assemble again upon the waters of the Chickahominy.” Reference has already been made to Washington’s receipt of Lafayette’s letter of August 8th, announcing the occupation of Yorktown by Cornwallis.

Washington made no delay, but on the fifth of September 350started for the “Head of the Elk.” He had but just passed Chester, when he met a courier from Lafayette, with announcement of the arrival of the Count de Grasse. Riding back to Chester, Washington advised Rochambeau of the welcome tidings, and then pushed forward, arriving at the Head of Elk the next morning.

The previous day had been one of peculiar excitement in the city of Philadelphia. A formal review and rigid inspection of the entire French army took place, and the President of the American Congress received the honors of the occasion. During the evening, the French officers gave a grand banquet in honor of Chevalier Lauzun. The despatch to Washington was read amid cheers. A half hour later, a second despatch, announcing “the landing of Count de Simon and his junction with Lafayette,” was read; and read a second time, “all standing” in its honor.

On this memorable date, September 6th, other events of interest are to be noticed. It was Lafayette’s twenty-fourth birthday. In a letter to his wife, still preserved by the family, he poured forth from an overflowing soul, his “love for his great Captain”; “for the American cause”; appreciation of his “enviable lot, as victory is drawing nigh,” and his “longing to tell her, face to face, of thrilling adventures, which had never been interrupted by night or day.”

September 6th, also, Clinton wrote to Cornwallis:

As I find by your letters, that Count de Grasse has got into the Chesapeake, and I have no doubt that Washington is moving with at least six thousand French and rebel troops against you, I think the best way to relieve you, is, to join you, as soon as possible, with all the force that can be spared from here, which is about four thousand men. They are already embarked, and will proceed, the instant I receive information from the admiral that we may venture; or that from other intelligence, the commodore and I should judge sufficient to move upon. By accounts from Europe we have every reason to expect Admiral Digby hourly upon the coast.

351On this same sixth of September, Clinton disclosed his last move to check Washington’s advance, and take Cornwallis out of check. Arnold, who had been so summarily withdrawn from the South, landed at New London, Connecticut, wantonly destroying houses, stores, a church, the Court-House, ships, and whatever he could damage without personal danger to himself; and made forever memorable the cruel massacre of Colonel Ledyard and the garrison of Fort Griswold after their honorable surrender. He no less permanently made memorable their extraordinary defence, in which the British assailing column lost one hundred and sixty-three officers and men, a number exceeding that of the entire American resisting force. It was soon over; and Arnold did not dare delay, and risk his fate with the yeomanry of his native New England. The secret of Clinton’s cipher despatch to Cornwallis on the second of August, respecting the use of Arnold, was thus revealed. But the attention of the American Commander-in-Chief was not diverted from his own supreme purpose, whatever Clinton might undertake in his absence.

The allied French and American armies remained at Head of Elk for transportation; but during that interval, Rochambeau accompanied Washington to Baltimore, where illuminations and civil honors attested the welcome of these distinguished guests. On the ninth, for the first time in six years, the American Commander-in-Chief visited his Mount Vernon home. On the tenth, his own staff, together with the Count de Rochambeau and staff, were his guests. On the eleventh, General Chastellux and aides-de-camp joined the party. On the twelfth, the visit came to its close. On the fourteenth of September, Washington reached the headquarters of General, the Marquis de Lafayette, commanding the Department, at Williamsburg, Virginia.

The story of the siege of Yorktown and the surrender of Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General in command, has been so fully detailed by many writers that only a few features of the general conduct of that campaign, and some special incidents not so frequently noticed, are within the province of this narrative.

While the control of Chesapeake Bay and of Virginia was essential to British success, Sir Henry Clinton deliberately proposed to couple with that general design another invasion of Pennsylvania, but from the south. When Cornwallis moved northward from his useless position at Wilmington, he was advised by General Clinton to make a movement upon Philadelphia. General Clinton must have very feebly remembered the circumstances of his hasty departure from that city in 1778, or have overlooked Washington’s strategic control of that entire region. The movement of Lafayette southward, and the energy with which that officer rallied Virginians to his support, were not appreciated by either of the British Generals in time to be of benefit to either.

Clinton and Cornwallis alike failed to comprehend that when the American Commander-in-Chief parted with Lafayette, and afterwards gave him so large a command, he must have had in view some special service which that 353officer could perform with credit as a significant factor in the entire campaign. Cornwallis knew, however, that unless he could destroy Lafayette’s army, the British cause in Virginia would certainly be lost. But the same profound strategy which had inclosed Clinton at New York, isolated Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Washington was well aware, that neither Louis XVI. nor Rochambeau wholly favored an attack upon New York. Their objections were substantial. Such a movement involved the presence of enormous naval forces, which once within the harbor, might be easily captured or destroyed, whenever Great Britain could seriously concentrate ships for that purpose. Neither could a French fleet secure supplies of any kind, so long as Clinton controlled the city. It was the natural naval depot of Great Britain for the American coast, and convenient for her West India dependencies. France, ever willing to aid America, must, however, always have her naval base in the West Indies, which wholly depended upon her naval supremacy for immunity from British aggression. Notwithstanding these considerations, the harmony of the French and American alliance was never interrupted, and mutual confidence was invariably enjoyed.

It is never to be overlooked that Washington cared more for his position in New Jersey than for the possession of New York. Its occupation without a controlling fleet, would be as fatal as the presence of a fleet without control of the city.

On the day after his arrival at Lafayette’s headquarters, he requested the Count de Grasse to hasten the transportation of the American troops from Baltimore; and yet, added a postscript that “Lafayette already anticipated” his request. On the seventeenth, he embarked with Count Rochambeau, General Knox and General 354 Du Portail upon the frigate Queen Charlotte; and on the eighteenth, visited the Count de Grasse upon his flag-ship, the Ville de Paris. The distinguished visitors were received with appropriate honors, and at once took under consideration the plan for the most speedy prosecution of the siege.

During that interview, Washington was advised of an immediately preceding event which must interest the modern reader, at a time when all maritime nations are interested in naval development and ships of great power. Just before his visit, there had been concentrated, about the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, one of the heaviest armaments known to maritime warfare. Fifty-two ships-of-the-line—each with three, or even four gun-decks, and ranging from sixty-four to one hundred and twenty guns, besides frigates—constituted that imposing battle array. It has already been noticed that Admiral Barras sailed from Newport in convoy of transports which carried heavy guns for siege use before Yorktown. When Lafayette first moved southward, Washington supplied his detachment with twelve heavy guns, including two eight-inch mortars, one twenty-four and two eighteen-pounder guns, for use in arming small vessels, or assailing Arnold’s defences. These were difficult of transportation, but no less indispensable as a contingent part of his outfit. The wisdom of these provisions had a twofold fruition. A British fleet had been detached from the West India station for the purpose of supplementing the New York and Newport squadrons. Admiral Hood, in command, crossed the mouth of Chesapeake Bay just before the arrival of the Count de Grasse; looked into Delaware Bay, and reported to Admiral Graves at Sandy Hook on the twenty-fourth day of August. That officer had but five ships-of-the-line ready for sea. Upon receiving advices from Gardiner’s Bay that Admiral de Barras had actually sailed southward from Newport, he incurred no delay, but on the thirty-first of August sailed, with nineteen ships, in pursuit of the French. On the fifth of September, he passed within the Delaware Capes without having encountered Admiral Barras at sea, and without the slightest intimation that he was soon to be in the presence of a superior naval adversary. The Count de Grasse, when notified of the appearance of so many large ships, supposed at first that the fleet of Admiral Barras, already due, was at hand. Seventeen hundred of his seamen were on the James River, planting heavy batteries; but so soon as the British flag revealed the hostile character of the ships, he moved his first division at once, seaward and southward, ordering the second division to follow immediately. By this prompt and judicious manœuvre he not only left the northern channel open for the admission of De Barras from the north, but secured the weather-gauge of the British fleet; and this he maintained with equal skill and intrepidity. These great fleets manœuvered for five days without a general action, but with several sharp encounters in which several vessels suffered severely. The French casualties were two hundred and twenty, and the British three hundred and thirty-six.

355During this exchange of hostilities, Admiral Barras safely entered the bay with seven ships-of-the-line and fourteen large transports, bringing heavy guns for the siege. (See map.) The Count de Grasse slowly retired, followed by Admiral Graves; but when the latter realized that Admiral de Barras had indeed arrived, and that his own fleet was now greatly inferior in force to that of his adversary, he returned promptly to New York. The Count de Grasse at the same time knew that Admiral Digby had arrived at New York from the West Indies with three line-of-battle ships (reported as six). All these particulars 356of the previous week’s operations were communicated to General Washington and his party, on the Ville de Paris. These officers at once started for their respective camps. Owing to severe and contrary winds, Washington did not reach Williamsburg until the twenty-second. All at once, a very grave question, and one which threatened to defeat his carefully matured plans, confronted the American Commander-in-Chief. The Count de Grasse outlined his purpose as follows: “To detach two ships for the mouth of James River; to leave four frigates and several corvettes, in the James; then, to sail for New York, and either intercept or fight the British fleet, before it could receive further reënforcements from England or the West Indies; then, to return and act in concert, each on his own side.”

Against this departure from the concerted plans of Washington and Rochambeau, Lafayette protested in vigorous terms. His influence at that time with the French Court was paramount as to American affairs, and Queen Marie Antoinette was even a greater enthusiast in behalf of American liberty than Louis XVI. The instructions of the King to Rochambeau, already cited, which made Rochambeau subordinate to Washington in the use of French auxiliary forces, were produced; and the Count de Grasse gracefully withdrew his suggestion and accepted the judgment of the generals in command of the land forces, as his rule of action respecting his fleet.

On the twenty-fifth, the remaining troops en route from the north reached Williamsburg, making a total of twelve thousand regular troops, besides more than four thousand militia. On the twenty-eighth, the entire army advanced and took position within two miles of the British works. On the twenty-ninth, after a thorough reconnoissance, the movement began for the complete investment of Yorktown, and all its approaches. From the opening of the first parallel of approach until October seventeenth, the activity of the allied forces, the spirited and generous emulation of Frenchmen and Americans in repulsing sorties, in storming redoubts, in bombardment, or silencing the enemy’s guns, was incessant by night and day.

357A careful inspection of the map will disclose the relations of the allied forces, and the completeness of the investment. Washington opened the fire in person. The rivalry of the American and French troops became intense. Generals Lincoln, Wayne, Knox, Du Portail, Steuben, Nelson, Weedon, Clinton, St. Clair, Lawson, and Muhlenburg, with Colonels Hamilton, Stevens, Lamb, Carrington, Scammel, and Laurens, were among the American leaders. Generals de Boville, de Vioménil, Chastellux, de Choisy, de Lauzun, de St. Simon, and Colonels de Dumas, de Deux Pont, and Gimât, were as active, on the part of the French.

The line of redoubts and batteries marked F (French) had been completed, and it was deemed necessary to storm two British redoubts and take them into the parallel. Famous soldiers and corps took part in simultaneous assault, upon rocket signals, at night. Lafayette, with Gimât, Hamilton, Laurens, and Barber, was assigned to the redoubt nearest the river. The Baron de Vioménil with the Count Deux Pont, supported by the grenadiers of Gatinais, attacked the other. This regiment had been formed out of that of Auvergne, once commanded by Rochambeau, and long known as the Regiment d’Auvergne, sans tache. When drawn up in line, Rochambeau promised that if they did well, he would ask the King to restore their old name; and this was afterwards done by Louis XVI.

Before the signal of attack was given, some light words passed between the Baron de Vioménil and Lafayette as to 358the superiority of the French Grenadiers for these attacks. Lafayette’s column succeeded first, and he promptly despatched Major Barber to the Baron, with a tender of assistance. Hamilton and Laurens were conspicuous for gallantry, moving over the abatis with unloaded muskets; and the French officers were equally complimented for daring and disregard of British resistance.

Clinton, at his New York headquarters, was in the fullest possible possession of the record of events then occurring in and about Yorktown. Space cannot be given, even to a glance over his shoulder, as he reads, day by day, repeated messages and short postscripts from Cornwallis indicating the grave peril of his position, and the conviction that protracted resistance is not to be looked for. An attempt by Cornwallis, to cross the river and gain New York by land, was a failure. On the sixteenth, when he ordered these detachments to return, he closed his correspondence with Clinton in this sad and desperate paragraph: “Our works are going to ruin. The boats are now being returned. We cannot fire a single gun. Only one eight-inch, and a little more than a hundred cohorn shells remain. I therefore propose to capitulate.”

The seventeenth day of October, 1781, dawned, and at 10 o’clock A.M. two concurrent events occurred,—one at New York, and its contrary, in Virginia. Sir Henry Clinton, accompanied by a command of seven thousand choice troops, under convoy of the magnificent squadron of twenty-five battleships, two fifty-gun ships, and eight frigates, sailed past Staten Island, for the rescue of the worn-out garrison of Yorktown. He had previously sailed past Sandy Hook, and the reader will appreciate the involuntary contrast with a similar departure southward, in the year 1776.

At the same hour, ten o’clock, A.M., a flag of truce 359bore to the headquarters of the American Commander-in-Chief, the following note:

Sir: I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, and that two officers be appointed by each side, to meet at Moore’s house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.

The following reply partakes of the dignity, wisdom, and appreciation of existing conditions which have characterized all letters of Washington previously cited. It reads as follows:

My Lord: I have the honor to receive your Lordship’s letter of this date.

An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood will readily incline me to such terms for the surrender of your posts of York and Gloucester as are admissible.

I wish, previously to the meeting of the Commissioners, that your lordship’s proposals, in writing, may be sent to the American lines; for which purpose, a suspension of hostilities during two hours from the delivery of this letter will be granted.

At half-past four in the afternoon, the proposals of Cornwallis were received; but they were so general in their nature, that the Viscount de Noailles and Colonel Laurens, on the part of the allied armies, and Colonel Dundas and Major Ross, of the British army, were charged with preparing other terms of capitulation, for official signature. These were completed on the eighteenth. On the nineteenth they were signed at Yorktown, by Cornwallis and Thomas Symonds of the Royal Navy, who led the attack upon Fort Sullivan (Moultrie) in 1776; and, “In the 360trenches, before Yorktown, in Virginia,” by George Washington and Le Compte de Rochambeau, and by Le Compte de Barras for himself and Le Compte de Grasse.

At twelve o’clock, noon, the two redoubts on the left flank of Yorktown were delivered, one to American infantry, and the other to French Grenadiers. At one o’clock, two works on the Gloucester side of the river were respectively delivered to French and American troops. At two o’clock, P.M., the garrison of York marched to the appointed place of surrender in front of the post, with shouldered arms, colors cased, and drums beating a British march; grounded their arms, and returned to their encampments to await a temporary location in the States of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. At three o’clock, P.M., the Gloucester garrison also marched forth—the cavalry with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, and the infantry as prescribed for the garrison of York.

The terms of surrender were the same as those observed when General Lincoln surrendered Charleston to Cornwallis, in 1780; and when General O’Hara, on account of the illness of General Cornwallis, tendered the sword of that officer to General Washington, as the pledge of surrender, he was graciously referred to General Lincoln as its recipient, and that officer as graciously returned it. The land forces became prisoners to the United States, and the marine forces to the naval army of France. (See Appendix F.)

On the twentieth, Washington issued an order of congratulation to the allied army, in the following words:

“Divine service is to be performed to-morrow in the several brigades and divisions. The Commander-in-Chief earnestly recommends that the troops not on duty should universally attend, with that seriousness of deportment and gratitude of heart which the recognition of such 361reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence demand of us.”

The American army which paraded on that Thanksgiving Day was not the same army that began the war. The one central figure, Washington, the Commander-in-Chief, is present. Some, crowned with well-deserved honors, are serving in the Halls of Congress. Some, worn out in service, have retired from active duty. All who had inordinate ambition, and cared more for self than country, have dropped from the Army Roster.

After the surrender of Cornwallis, American and French officers vied in extending courtesies to the British officers, as Lafayette describes their visits, “with every sort of politeness, especially toward Lord Cornwallis, one of the men of the highest character in England, who was considered to be their foremost general.” In a parting interview, Cornwallis replied to Lafayette: “I am aware of your humanity toward prisoners of war, and I commend to you my unfortunate army.” Lafayette, calling attention to the earlier surrender of Burgoyne’s army, answered: “Your lordship knows that the Americans have always been humane towards captured armies.” In recalling the incident in his “Mémoires Historiques,” Lafayette says: “In truth, the English army was treated with every possible consideration.”

Washington designated Lafayette as commander of an expedition to Wilmington and Charleston, with the brigades of Wayne and Gist. In his journal he says: “It was to be entrusted to the Marq’s de la Fayette, in case he could engage the Admiral to convey it & secure the debarkation. I left him on board the Ville de Paris, to try the force of his influence to obtain these.” Although fixed for November 1st, it was dropped, and the French feet sailed for the West Indies.

Lafayette obtained leave of absence, and sailed from 362Boston on the frigate Alliance, December 23rd, having affectionately parted with Washington; and after a passage of twenty-three days, landed at L’Orient, where he was cordially welcomed home by his family and the entire French people.

Washington’s faithful friend, Rochambeau, remained with him, under his command, when the troops of the Marquis de St. Simon and the fleet of the Count de Grasse sailed for the West Indies. Rochambeau wintered at Williamsburg; in the summer of 1782, returned through Philadelphia, to the Hudson; thence to New England in the autumn, and sailed for the West Indies during December, 1782. The American Congress did not fail to appreciate the services of this distinguished French officer. A “stand of colors” (ever since appreciated by his family), and a piece of ordnance, were gifts; and it was decreed that a marble monument should be erected at Yorktown, “to commemorate the alliance between France and the United States, and the victory achieved by their associated arms.”

Even before the departure of Rochambeau from America, the crowning event of the fraternal alliance between France and the United States had been realized, and Independence was no longer a matter of doubt. On the seventh day of May, 1782, Sir Henry Clinton was relieved of all further responsibility in command of New York, by Sir Guy Carleton; who assumed command, and immediately announced to the American Commander-in-Chief that he had been appointed as a Commissioner to consider the terms of a permanent peace between Great Britain and the United States of America. If the reader will recall the antecedents of this officer and the spirit with which he paroled the American troops, after the disastrous assault upon Quebec in the winter of 1775, he will appreciate the fitness of his taking part in the final negotiations for fraternity and peace.

363The negotiations between these officers brought into striking relief certain qualities of Washington as a soldier which have had too slight recognition. The terms “tory” and “royalist” have been used in this narrative as they were specially in vogue at the different times and places where they occur. It has been too often assumed by youth who study Revolutionary history, that Hessian soldiers were always brutal, that Tarleton and Simcoe, and especially the Queen’s Rangers, were irresponsible marauders, and that the tories generally were cruel, and deserving no quarter.

As a fact, the Revolutionary War had, at its start, many of those painful antagonisms among neighborhoods and families which always attach to civil conflicts under the best possible conditions. Among the thousands who adhered to the British cause, and especially among the royalist “Provincial Corps,” there were eminent divines, physicians, lawyers, and scholars. All they had in the world was involved in the struggle. Many of these sympathized with the best British statesmen, and longed for some adjustment of differences which would not require abandonment of their homes in America. By a grave oversight on the part of Great Britain, no adequate provision was made by her ministry for this class of Americans who had fought to the last for the Crown. The action of Washington in coöperation with Sir Guy Carleton, respecting these men, disbanded as soldiers, but cast upon the world with no provision for their relief, was so marked by generosity, active aid, and wise relief, that until this day their descendants in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick pay glad tribute to his memory. Through the joint efforts of these two officers, five thousand were sent to St. John, New Brunswick. The seventeenth day of May, 1783, when the first large detachment of the Queen’s Rangers landed, is honored as the Natal Day of that Province. Simcoe, 364their old commander, became the first Governor of Upper Canada. In 1792, he organized a miniature Parliament of two Houses. He founded the City of Toronto; and in 1796, governed the Island of San Domingo.

Professor Roberts, in his “History of Canada,” already cited, represents the migration of thirty thousand Americans to that country immediately after the Revolutionary War, as “no less far-reaching and significant in its results than the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth.”

There have been those who regarded as the most noble and unselfish act of Washington’s public career, his patriotic protest against the demands of his unpaid, starving, and self-sacrificing comrades, that he accept royal dignity or else become the Oliver Cromwell of his generation. But the consideration, firmness, and justice with which he dismissed these mustered-out, disbanded royalists, and, in spite of abuse and outcry, assisted them to independence in a land of their own choice, adds another laurel to his chaplet as the magnanimous, no less than the great, soldier. The subsequent triumphal entry of Washington into the City of New York, on the twenty-fifth day of November, 1783, was the crowning military incident of the war.

The numerous Centennial observances in honor of events of the Revolution, since the second century of American Independence began, have helped to bring to light many family and other historical data which otherwise would have been lost; and all of these relating to the American Commander-in-Chief have only confirmed the world’s estimate of Washington the Soldier.

Words, at best, are feeble exponents of principles which actions so much better reveal; and battles on paper, however minutely described, can never expose the brain processes through which military orders are matured; nor can the pen portray the experiences of the “rank and file” of a suffering army, during such an ordeal of war as 365that in which George Washington was both the centra executive force and the sympathetic guardian of the rights of all, of whatever grade of service or duty. Stupidity, jealousy, self-sufficiency, personal ambition, and treason, could not survive their impact upon Washington. His mastery of every antagonistic force, whether professedly military or distinctly political, was due to that unsought but real supremacy which incarnated unselfish patriotism, and made American Independence the sole objective of a righteous judgment and an irresistible will.

On the eighth anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, April 19, 1783, the American Commander-in-Chief proclaimed a formal “Cessation of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain,” as the result of negotiations concluded with Sir Guy Carleton on the previous day.

This Proclamation, like the Letter of Louis XVI., received at Valley Forge on the seventh day of May, 1778, was ordered to be read at the head of every regiment and corps of the army; after which, as the order reads:

“The chaplains with the several brigades will render thanks to Almighty God for all His mercies; particularly, for overruling the wrath of man to His own glory, and causing the rage of War to cease among the nations.

“On such a happy day, which is the harbinger of peace—a day which completes the eighth year of the war, it would be ingratitude not to rejoice; it would be insensibility not to participate in the general felicity.

“Happy, happy, thrice happy, shall they be pronounced, hereafter, who have contributed anything, who have performed the meanest office, in erecting this stupendous fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis of independency; who have assisted in protecting the rights of human nature, and in establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.”

The blending of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries comes at a moment of such marked transition in all that directs human activity and relationship, that the promise of Washington’s benediction, with which he proclaimed peace, seems about to be verified with a fuller, grander, and more universal scope of responsibility and example than even his sublime faith encompassed.

“A stupendous fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis of independency,” has already been established. The present generation and its actors in every department of public duty—including Washington’s successor in the Presidential Chair; the American Congress in both Houses; Governors of all the States; and responsible agencies in all sections—have seemed to unify their efforts to maintain the empire thus established. Those now living are the heirs to be made “happy, happy, thrice happy,” through the legacy of his life; if they do their part in “protecting the rights of human nature, and in establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.”

Nothing in the career of Washington the Soldier was more sovereign in its sway over citizens under arms, than his constant appeal to a Divine Providence as the truest ally of the soul, in hours of grave responsibility and peril. This narrative would lose much of its value to 367America and to mankind, if the passages reflecting Washington’s religious faith were to be lightly passed over; and if he were to be measured only as a distinguished representative of the military profession.

He has, indeed, been tested by the sternest maxims of the military art. He has been found responsive to their most exacting demands. But all such tests are largely those of mere intellectual power—not disclosing excellence in moral and social relations, except as these illustrate “Statesmanship in War,” and complement other qualifications of the Ideal Soldier. But Washington was more than a soldier. It is no ill-conceived paradox to assert that the ideal soldier, the greatest soldier, is not the man who most literally represents knowledge of the military art. It is asserted in the Word of Life, that “he that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city.” It is not to be forgotten that the only proper function of War is, to eliminate disturbants of the public peace. To give life for country is to partake of the Divine prerogative of giving life for humanity.

And the soldiers who fought under Washington were not mere men, of certain ages, to be handled well in battle, as parts of a machine. They were not hirelings, discounting the chances of life and death for money. Peace and its domesticities represented the goal of their pursuit; and self-sacrifice, even of life, to secure that peace, was their conscious service to family, to country, and to God. The people, as a people, had no unholy frenzy for war as a source of purely military glory. Only barbarous nations, or the devotees of some great conqueror or fanatical religionist, can thus pervert the patriotic sentiment to the instincts of the beast.

Washington’s army was strong, because strong at home. Country, was the aggregate of homes many. Never did the term patriotism have a more radiant reflection 368of its intrinsic glory; and Washington, as “Pater Patriæ,” was so paternal in his trust, that his army was filial as well as loyal, in the highest quality of duty to their great Captain. His faith in his country’s future was based upon the intelligence of the people; and his army was both intelligent and religious, because respect for law and religion was the basis of the first settlement of the American Colonies as well as the foundation upon which they established all domestic and political concerns.

In 1780, Thomas Pownall, once royal Governor of Massachusetts, pronounced “American Independence as fixed as fate”; adding: “North America has become a new Primary planet, which, while it takes its own course, in its own orbit, must shift the common centre of gravity.” He added this significant inquiry: “Will that most enterprising spirit be stopped at Cape Horn; or, not pass beyond the Cape of Good Hope? Before long, they will be found trading in the South Sea, in the Spice Islands, and in China. Commerce will open the door to emigration. By constant intercommunication, America will every day approach nearer and nearer to Europe.”

But this “independency of freedom and empire,” predicted by Washington, is not independency of moral obligation, or relation. It carries with its exercise an independent control of both moral and physical activities with which to insist that its inalienable rights shall be universally respected.

The associated prediction of Washington has also been realized—in “the establishment of an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.” America must therefore bear the responsibility of protecting her wards everywhere, and penetrate the earth with the conviction that wrong done to one, is wrong done to all. Oceans are but lakes. Distances are but steps. Neither light nor sound outspeed the cry of suffering humanity; 369and neither light nor sound must be allowed to outrun the speed of wise relief. Beneficiaries of this Empire-Asylum, between the great seas, have become elements of our wealth and power. They have ceased to be foreign elements in crystalized society; and blend, as integral forces in the body politic, just as the elements of air and water invisibly combine. Countless messages—of happiness, prosperity, and peace—cross the great seas by every steamship, to cheer their former countrymen with the hope of like liberties, in times not far distant, which they also shall enjoy. The prayers of a Christian people for all mankind, which Heaven doth “gather in vials, as sweet odors,” are not lost between earth and sky; but other peoples, inhaling wafted fragrance, dream of the Land of Washington.

Whatever may be the jealousies or dislikes of personal or dynastic rule abroad, no truly enlightened nation can long remain insensible to that exhibition of moral and industrial power under which America is fully equipped for the support of her honor and her flag. Her indwelling peace matures and conserves financial independence; and infinitely multiplies capacity and resources with which to meet every just obligation to all mankind. Her peace, while enriching herself, blesses all nations. Her products of the shop and farm have become indispensable to the good of all. This new “centre of gravity,” has become, as Egypt once chanced to be, the famine magazine, the granary of relief, to the famishing millions of every land. The ability of America to spring from the repose of peaceful industry and protect her rights and the rights of humanity wherever assailed, has compelled the world’s consideration and respect.

The terra incognita of olden times has become the busy field of competitive industry. The vast empires of China and Japan have caught from the American Republic 370their own best stimulus, and a timely suggestion to resist aggressive strangers. From America, they fear no unjust demands, no plunder of territory, no violation of sound principles of international law. China, indeed, only feebly responds to the quickening impulse; while Japan recognizes and accepts her opportunity to become an independent, self-respecting power—a truly modern State!

At the famous Berlin Conference, Count Schouvaloff of Russia, recently retired from public life, proposed a formal Resolution, that no modern arms or ships be sold to the empires of the East; declaring that “if those nations, India, China and Japan, were thus armed, and once began to contrast their millions of subjects and associated poverty, with the smaller populations, but vast treasure-houses of Europe, the cities of Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, would be in more danger, through some tidal-wave of desolation and plunder from the East, than from all the standing armies of Europe.” And now that the earth is but a sensitive “whisper-gallery,” and every hammer’s stroke and every anvil’s ring reverberate in every machine-shop where despoilers of the East fabricate implements for its dismemberment and ruin, those same Eastern nations in part accept, and Japan quotes, the wise maxim of Washington: “In peace, prepare for war.”

Washington’s career as a soldier is replete with counsel which finds its crowning opportunity in the present attitude of America before the world. So long as we deal honorably with all mankind, the buzzing electric energies of peace are our best assurance of success in a righteous war. Only wanton neglect of prudent and adequate preparations for the protection of our commerce, and of our citizens wherever they chance to sojourn for legitimate business or pleasure, can engender mistrust of our 371courage, and invite the very aggressions otherwise beyond the possibility of occurrence.

But Washington, skilled in the European complications of his times, never imagined that the same European nations, or any of them, would select the extreme East as the arena from which to replenish wasted home resources by force; and then convert the continent of Europe into one vast magazine of dynamite, until all chief agencies which belong to domestic prosperity and happiness should be drawn into the wild whirl of Colonial adventure, for plunder. And as the reader recalls Washington’s earnest appeals for unity of spirit in all national affairs, and is reminded of his Farewell Address to the American People, wherein he deprecated all political combinations abroad which might qualify or compromise our absolute independence as a Free Republic, he will be more profoundly impressed with the great fact, that in the present attitude of these United States before the world, the sublime anticipations of the “Father of his Country” are maturing to a resplendent and complete fulfilment. The only natural alliance, in the event of monarchical combinations to stay the advancing triumph of true liberty, would be a concerted action of the United States and the mother country, through the inheritance of like bequests under Magna Charta. The pregnant future may yet give birth to that fruition.

There is an awful grandeur, more densely charged with ills than the fiercest spasms of Nature’s fury, in the visible armaments which are costing peoples, not thrones, annually, more than enough to feed and clothe every suffering member of the human race. The alleged object is, “to preserve the peace,” as if every nation naturally antagonized all others. The peace of the silent grave, which would turn one’s neighbor’s soil into a vast cemetery, seems to supplant that peace “which passeth understanding,” 372when every heart and mind shall enter a condition of happy repose and prosperous industry. The inquiry propounded nearly nineteen hundred years ago—“From whence come wars and fightings among you?” can be in like manner answered, with solemn emphasis, to-day. No uninspired pen can match the imagery of prophetic vision which predicted the outcome of such conditions as now threaten mankind—“Woe to him that calleth Peace, Peace, when there is no peace!” But greater woe shall befall those that “call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.” As with the man who wrongeth his neighbor, and taketh that which is not his, to his own profit; so shall it be with nations. Only those nations which love righteousness and do justice shall rise above the wreck of all oppressors, and take part in the enjoyment of that destined era of righteousness and peace, when nations shall not “learn war any more.” That nation alone will be truly great, whose supreme purpose through every armament and armed expression shall be in behalf of humanity, and to punish or repress the destroyers of peace.

But present conditions had their marvellous premonition in 1892—when “a Congress of Nations,” and “a Parliament of Religions,” convened during the World’s Columbian Exposition, at Chicago, in the State of Illinois. For the purpose of that Exposition, a miniature city, of more than Roman or Grecian classical beauty and adornment, sprang up as by the power of magic, wherein all the nations of earth blended their contributions, in lines of utility and art. Their representatives, their contributors, and their wise men, beheld “the triumphs of peace,” uncontrolled by the prestige of artificial rank, or by the persuasion of bayonet, cimeter, or dagger. They journeyed to and fro in safety; were treated as 373brethren; as children of one supreme creative Father; and took thence some valuable lessons for thoughtful improvement. No social banquet at their far-distant homes, nor regal display at their national capitals, could have surpassed the cordial welcome or the deep significance of that purely Republican entertainment. The temporary shelter for their pleasure and comfort, costing millions, besides their own generous outlay, had its day and its uses; and then was set aside, as one gives away the morning daily paper, after its quick perusal. Then mighty warehouses, business blocks, and all the permanent features of a vast inland city, one thousand miles distant from the nearest ocean-port, rose instead of the temporary palaces of entertainment; while the markets of the world had received a new impulse, never to be lost.

And such is the Land of Washington! His retirement from command of the “Continental Army of America,” in the spirit of Joshua, the Hebrew Captain, when the people thought no honor too rich for his reward, magnified his office and immortalized his example. Since his career as a soldier demands no elucidation of his office as legislator, statesman, or as the first President of these United States, there remains little to be added; except to commend to American youth, and to all patriotic youth, wherever these pages may invite perusal, the exemplar career of one whose unselfish patriotism, moral rectitude, and exalted qualities as an Ideal Soldier can never lose charm nor value.

Washington based his hopes of success upon the intelligence of the American people. For their proper training in arms, and the contingency of a summons to defend their dearly bought liberties, he designed the Military Academy at West Point on the Hudson. For a uniform system of education in all that develops social 374culture and good citizenship, he proposed, with gift of a proper site, a National University at the National Capital. Since his immediate mission on earth closed, the American Republic, which, under God, he established, has donated through religious, educational, and benevolent channels, more than three hundred millions of treasure; and found full compensation, in the civilization and enlightenment thereby imparted to less favored peoples throughout the world. The American Census of 1890, disclosed the fact, that American eleemosynary gifts annually exceeded the cost of the largest standing army of the world.

To-day, America is able, single-handed, to defend her honor and her flag, whoever may deride her peaceful habits and her homely virtues. The words of Washington, used upon his return to White Plains in 1778, as emphatically appeal to the American people to-day, as when they were first uttered.

A Nation of nearly eighty millions stands ready to vindicate the loftiest aspirations and redeem the confidence of Washington. So surely as the Almighty Father is a covenant-keeping God, whatever may be the scenes of conflict forwarding His purpose, He will emancipate man from error’s chain and the oppressor’s lash; and this Republic must be ever prepared to maintain, from generation to generation, one sentiment of the great Soldier—

“The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that he must be worse than an infidel, that lacks faith; and more than wicked, that has not gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligation.”

The American Army, after 1776, never equalled thirty-eight thousand Regulars, at any one time. Small, temporary, and unorganized detachments of minute men were often employed to meet sudden forays; but the aggregate of those who afterwards claimed Revolutionary service was far beyond the actual numbers subject to Washington’s orders, or under control by Congress.

In stating these aggregates as credited to their respective States, under their designated quota, it is to be taken into account, that each enlistment received a special credit, and generally, by years or term of service. Hence, many who served from April 19, 1775, until the nineteenth of April, 1783, counted as eight, in the aggregate.

In the American Civil War of 1861–’65, the same rule followed. Nine Ohio regiments, for example, and those militia, marched to West Virginia for three months, reënlisted for three years, and then reënlisted for the war. Several “One Hundred Day” regiments, including the Sixtieth Massachusetts, and many in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, became credits to their respective States. The same men were sometimes counted three times—that is, for each reënlistment.

The contributions of the States, during the Revolutionary War, on this basis, were as follows:

The original organization of the American Navy is noticed on pages 59–60 of the text.

On the thirteenth of December, 1775, several frigates, were authorized, the annexed figures indicating their rate, by guns:

Note.—John Paul, who took the name of John Paul Jones through gratitude to a citizen of North Carolina who assisted him in securing a naval commission (noticed on page 60 of the text), distinguished himself upon the British coast, and in his capture of the British ship Serapis, Sept. 23, 1779. His own ship, the Bon Homme Richard, was fitted out in France, by the aid of Benjamin Franklin, to war against British commerce. Franklin, in the issue of his “Almanack,” with shrewd business and moral maxims at the bottoms of the pages, used the nom-de-plume, “Poor Richard.” It was graceful in John Paul to name the ship Richard, in Franklin’s honor, with a complimentary prefix.

Of the later navy, that of 1812, the Brandywine (44), named after the battle of that name, was placed at the service of Lafayette when he visited America in 1825. (See note at end of Chapter XVIII., concerning Lafayette as first appearing in that battle.)

The analogies between the Revolutionary War and later American wars are noticed in the Preface. Some special points should be noted for further comparisons.

The field casualties, including killed and wounded, in twenty-six of the principal engagements of the Revolution, do not greatly exceed 9,000; but other causes kept the army upon a very unsatisfactory basis in respect of numbers as well as efficiency.

Operations in Canada, early in the war, irrespective of the expeditions of Montgomery and Arnold, cost, through a visitation of small-pox, 5,000 lives in sixty days. (Page 88.)

At the April muster of the army in 1776, only 8,303, out of a total of 10,235, were fit for duty. (Page 87.)

At the August muster, 1776, 3,678 were reported as sick, either present or on furlough, out of a total of 17,225. (Pages 101, 102.)

At the September muster, 1776, less than 20,000 were reported as fit for duty (page 114), out of a total of 27,000 (page 103).

At the Battle of Trenton, Christmas night, 1776, more than 1,000 out of a force of 2,400 were disabled by frost during the brief march and engagement which gave such fresh vigor to the cause of American Independence. (Page 142.)

At the October muster of the same year, out of a total of 25,735, the large number of 8,075 was reported as sick, or on furlough. (Page 122.)

The camps at Morristown, Valley Forge, and at the South, were scenes of great suffering, distress, and waste. The suffering was greater in crowded and stationary camps than when 381on the march. Special diseases like measles, then as ever since, prostrated great numbers who suddenly changed house for canvas shelter. In 1862, at one of the healthiest cantonments at the North, near Indianapolis, fully 1,400 were disabled for duty within four weeks after reporting for muster. A similar experience marked Camps Chase, Dennison, and Jackson, Ohio, and Camp Douglas, Illinois.

That “three months” service in 1861 was exceptionally effective under existing conditions, and similar service in the war with Spain, in 1898, reads more like some fabulous tale than the faithful record of continuous victories by an improvised army, with a minimum sacrifice of life. (See Military Notes in Preface.)

In the Revolutionary War, gardens and orchards, near camps, seriously endangered both discipline and health. Home luxuries from visiting friends became so injurious in their effects that Washington was compelled to deal sternly with this mistaken kindness. Besides all this, quartermasters and commissaries, ignorant of their duties, speculated upon public stores; and even surgeons embezzled supplies until some regiments had no medicines for immediate emergencies. (Page 123.)

Derelictions from duty were not peculiar to Revolutionary times. Early in 1861, when haste was so urgent, and the North was not prepared to clothe promptly even seventy-five thousand men, the First and Second Ohio reached Harrisburg, en route for Washington, only to find that the uniforms contracted for and delivered were worthless. The Fifteenth Ohio, after a rain, found themselves at Grafton, W. Va., just after the battle of Philippi, with soleless shoes, glue having been used in their manufacture instead of pegs or thread. The Adjutant-General of that State, then inspecting Ohio troops, peremptorily forbade their moving until an entire refit could be supplied, and William Dennison, then Governor, sustained his action.

The Continental Congress, during the war with Great Britain, tried to act as Commander-in-Chief, until in conscious impotence it surrendered military trusts to Washington, with 382the impressive Resolution, that “the very existence of civil liberty depends upon the right exercise of military powers,” and that “the vigorous, decisive conduct of these” is “impossible in distant, numerous and deliberative bodies.” (Page 148.)

The Revolutionary War, therefore, illustrated every form of distemper which belongs to war in a republic, when its citizens are suddenly called to face camp and battle conditions without adequate training and preparation in advance. Jealousy of a standing army, greed for office and place, and incessant, selfish, or self-asserting antagonisms, were the chief burdens that grieved the soul and embarrassed the movements of Washington, the American Commander-in-Chief.

The British Official Records show that the entire British force in America, including troops in Canada, Florida and the Bahama Islands, hardly exceeded, at any one time—and then not until 1780—42,000 men. Some of the regiments appear upon the maps as participants in battles from the attack upon Breed’s Hill until the final surrender of Cornwallis. The colonels of these regiments, under British regulations, held command as general officers; but the regiments retained their personal relation to the commanding officer, although the lieutenant-colonel commanded the battalions in the field, one recruiting battalion always remaining at the home depot.

The following Tables have peculiar value, being compiled direct from original sources:

1. British regiments assigned to America, 1776.

The above were stationed in Boston, with five companies of the Royal Artillery.

On their passage from Ireland to Boston:

Then, in Canada:

384Ready to sail for America, from Cork:

Ordered for Boston:

Ordered for Quebec:

Also, 29th Foot upon opening of navigation.

Cunningham’s Regiment, the 14th Foot, was in part in Virginia; the residue, with a Company of the Royal Artillery, was at St. Augustine, Florida.

2. British Army at the Battle of Long Island.

ADVANCE CORPS.

Four Battalions of Light Infantry and the Light Dragoons.

RESERVE CORPS.

Four Battalions of Grenadiers, 33d and 42d Regiments.

BRITISH COLUMN.

Colonel Donop’s command consisted of the Hessian Grenadiers and the Chausseurs.

General De Heister’s command consisted of two Hessian brigades.

TOTAL OF COMBINED ARMIES, INCLUDING FORCE ON STATEN ISLAND.

General Clinton in his report gives Howe’s “effectives fit for duty” as 26,980—officers not included; but, including all officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, as 31,625 men.

3. British effective force in America, June 3, 1777.

385On this date, 2,631 men had been sent to Rhode Island, and the total force of foreign troops which had arrived—including those of Hesse, Anspach, and Waldeck—amounted to 14,777.

4. British effective force in America, March 26, 1778.

5. Aug. 15, 1778.

In New York and vicinity, 19,586; in Long Island, 8,117; in Rhode Island, 5,189; Lord Howe’s fleet, 512; making an aggregate of 33,404.

A later return of November 1, on account of troops sent to Halifax and to the West Indies, reduced the aggregate to 22,494 for duty.

6. May 1, 1779.

7. December 1, 1779.

Aggregate, including East Florida, Providence Island and Bermuda, 38,002.

9. December 1, 1780.

10. May 1, 1781.

11. Sept. 1, 1781.

Note.—Stedman has the following estimate:

To remain in Canada, part of 8th regiment, 460 men; part of 34th, 348 men; parts of 29th and 31st regiments, 896 men; eleven additional companies expected from Great Britain, 616 men; brigade detachments, 300 men; detachments from German troops, 650 men, and Royal Highland emigrants, 500 men; making a total of 3,770 men.

The army of invasion (see page 171) numbered as follows:

To this force were to be associated “as many Canadians and Indians as might be thought necessary for the service.”

This force, when fully concentrated on Virginia, Aug. 1, 1781, consisted of the following troops: British, 5,541; German, 2,148; Provincials, 1,137; on detachments, 607; making a total of 9,433 men.

The general Return of officers and privates surrendered at Yorktown, as taken from the original Muster Rolls, is stated by the Commissary of prisoners to have been as follows—General and staff, 79; Artillery, 23; Guards, 527; Light Infantry, 671; 17th Reg’t, 245; 23d Reg’t, 233; 33d Reg’t, 260; 43d Reg’t, 359; 71st Reg’t, 300; 76th Reg’t, 715; 80th Reg’t, 689; two battalions of Anspach, 1,077 (these two battalions alone had Colonels present), Prince Hereditary, 484; Regiment of De Bose, 349; Yagers, 74; British Legion, 241; Queen’s Rangers, 320; North Carolina Vols., 142; Pioneers, 44; Engineers, 23. Total, including commissary department, and 80 followers of the army, 7,247 men. Total of officers and men, 7,073. Seamen and from shipping, about 900 officers and men. Other authorities increase this number to over 8,000. It is evident that the Return of August 15, cited on page 385, overestimates the really effective force.

Seventy-five brass cannon, 69 iron guns, 18 German and 6 British regimental standards, were among trophies captured.

The military chest contained £2,113, 6s, sterling. The Guadaloupe 28, the old Fowey, the Bonetta (sloop) 24, and Vulcan (fire-ship), thirty transports, fifteen galleys, and many smaller vessels, with nearly 900 officers and seamen, were surrendered to the French.

The Court met July 1, 1778, at the house of Mr. Voorhees, New Brunswick, N.J.

The charges were as follows:

First—For disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on the twenty-eighth of June, agreeably to repeated instructions.

Second—For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.

Third—For disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, in two letters dated the first of July and the twenty-eighth of June.

GENERAL LEE PLEAD “NOT GUILTY.”

On the twelfth of August, the Court found him to be guilty under all the charges, and sentenced him to be “suspended from any command in the Armies of the United States of America, for the term of twelve months.”

Forty-two witnesses were examined. (See page 235 of text, for their unanimity in vindication of Washington from use of any language not proper, in his rebuke of Lee at the time of his retreat.)

390The following are the letters that concluded with Lee’s demand for a court-martial:

FIRST LETTER.

Sir: From the knowledge I have of your Excellency’s character, I must conclude that nothing but misinformation of some very stupid, or misrepresentation of some very wicked, person, could have occasioned your having made use of so very singular expressions as you did on my coming up to the ground where you had taken post; they implied that I was guilty either of disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or want of courage; your Excellency will therefore infinitely oblige me by letting me know on which of these three articles you ground your charge, that I may prepare for my justification, which, I have the happiness to be confident, I can do to the army, to the Congress, to America, and to the world in general. Your Excellency must give me leave to observe that neither yourself nor those about your person could, from your situation, be in the least judges of the merits or demerits of our manœuvres; and, to speak with a becoming pride, I can assert, that to these manœuvres, the success of the day was entirely owing. I can boldly say, that had we remained on the first ground, or had we advanced, or had the retreat been conducted in a manner different from what it was, this whole army and the interests of America would have risked being sacrificed. I ever had, and hope ever shall have, the greatest respect and veneration for General Washington; I think him endowed with many great and good qualities; but in this instance, I must pronounce that he has been guilty of an act of cruel injustice towards a man who certainly has some pretentions to the regard of every servant of this country; and, I think, Sir, I have a right to demand reparation for the injury committed, and, unless I can obtain it, I must, in justice to myself, when this campaign is closed (which I believe will close the war), retire from a service at the head of which is placed a man capable of offering such injuries; but, at the same time, in justice to you, I must repeat, that I from my soul believe, that it was not a motion of your own breast, but instigated by some of those dirty earwigs who will forever insinuate themselves near persons in high office; for I really am convinced, that when General Washington acts for himself no man in his army will have reason to complain of injustice or indecorum.

Sir: I beg your Excellency’s pardon for the inaccuracy in mis-dating my letter. You cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the opportunity of showing to America the sufficiency of her respective servants. I trust that the temporary power of office, and the tinsel dignity attending it, will not be able, by all the mists they can raise, to obfuscate the bright rays of truth; in the meantime, your Excellency can have no objection to my retiring from the army.

WASHINGTON’S LETTER IN REPLY.

Sir: I received your letter (dated through mistake, the 1st of July), expressed, as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not conscious of having made use of any very singular expressions at the time of my meeting you, as you intimate. What I recollect to have said was dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion. As soon as circumstances will permit, you shall have an opportunity either of justifying yourself to the army, to Congress, to America, and to the world in general, or of convincing them that you were guilty of a breach of orders, and of misbehavior before the enemy on the 28th inst., in not attacking them as you had been directed, and in making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.

After the reading of the foregoing letters by the Judge-Advocate, General Lee requested the following letter to be also read:

Sir: Since I had the honor of addressing my letter by Colonel Fitzgerald to your Excellency, I have reflected on both your situation and mine, and beg leave to observe, that it will be for our mutual convenience that a Court of Inquiry should be immediately ordered: but I could wish it might be a court-martial, for if the affair is drawn into length, it may be difficult to collect the necessary evidences, and perhaps might bring on a paper war betwixt the adherents to both parties, 392which may occasion some disagreeable feuds on the continent, for all are not my friends, nor all your admirers. I must entreat, therefore, for your love of justice, that you will immediately exhibit your charge, and that on the first halt, I may be brought to a trial; and am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

The date of the assembling of the court-martial shows that Washington acted promptly.

Abatis.—Felled trees, with sharpened branches, pointing outward toward an approaching enemy.

Bastion.—A work of two faces and two flanks, with salient angles.

Batteau.—An old-style flatboat of large capacity, in form of the modern scow.

Billet.—An old term for a brief letter; or, an assignment of troops to certain quarters.

Boom.—A chain cable or line of spars bound together to prevent the passage of vessels at a harbor entrance, or across a river.

Cabal.—A plot, or secret intrigue.

Cantonment.—A lodgment for troops.

Cheveau-de-Frise.—A cylinder, of iron when practicable, with sharp, projecting spears on all sides; to oppose an invading force, or to close a gap in the defences.

Command.—A body of troops, or a separate command.

Corduroy.—(“Cord of the King.”) An extemporized road, a uniting cord, by a series of parallel logs across a swamp or soft ground.

Countersign.—A confidential word of recognition, changed daily or more frequently, emanating from the officer in chief command.

Curtain.—A wall connecting two bastions.

Detachment.—A fraction of a command, or troops assigned to some special duty.

Detail.—An assignment for special duty.

Engineering.—See Preface.

Fascines.—Bundles or faggots of brushwood, or small poles, tied together, for defence or for crossing swamps.

Fusee.—A small musket of early times.

Gabions.—Cylindrical wicker baskets open at both ends, filled for defensive purposes, making a temporary parapet.

Galleys.—Small vessels of light draft.

Grand Tactics.—See Preface.

Hurdles.—Pickets about three feet high, united by twigs, to give a solid footing for a battery, or for crossing soft ground and swamps.

Itinerary.—Record of daily marches; including notes of country traversed, streams crossed, and whatever may be valuable for record or subsequent guidance.

394Line-of-battle ship.—A full-rigged ship, with two or more gun-decks.

Log-book.—The itinerary of a ship.

Logistics.—See Preface.

Magazine.—A depot of powder or of other supplies.

Muster.—A detailed record of troops, periodical or otherwise, for exact information of the force under command.

Orderly Book.—A record of current orders, whether of commissioned or non-commissioned officers.

Parapet.—A work, breast-high or more, for defence.

Patrol.—A small scouting-party beyond the usual line of sentries; or a detail of search as to the movements of the enemy.

Picket.—An outside sentry, to guard against surprise.

Quota.—A fixed apportionment upon the basis of numbers.

Reconnoissance.—A personal examination of country within the range of military movements.

Redoubt.—An inclosed defence.

Rendezvous.—A designated place for assembling troops or supplies.

Roster.—A list of officers, or of officers and men; on any duty, or subject to duty.

Salient.—An angle projecting outward, toward hostile approach.

Strategy.—See Preface.

Surveillance.—On the constant watch, with critical observation of existing or contingent conditions.

Taking Post.—Occupying a designated position, whether under orders, or in the contingencies of a march or an advance.

Zone.—A belt or stretch of country, indicating the sphere of action of the various parts of an army, which secures concert of action in combined movements.

Note.—The contemporaries of Washington named in this index are in general only persons so associated with or opposed to the cause he stood for as to influence his military action.

Events are treated and indexed in chronological order, so that the index becomes thereby a miniature biography of the characters taking part in the events narrated. It may often prove interesting to note the age of a prominent actor in these events at the time, by calculating it from the year of his birth when given below.

Abbreviations.—For various nationalities: Am. (American); Br. (British); Fr. (French); H. (Hessian). In the biographical notices, b. for birth and d. for death are used; and occasionally, k. for killed, w. for wounded, and like familiar abbreviations may be found. The subsequent career of many is indicated thus—Cornwallis, sub. gov.-gen. India.

• Acts of Parliament to be resisted, 17
• Adams, John—statesman; sub. pres, twice; b. 1735, d. 1826.
  • in first Continental Congress, 16
  • on special naval committee, 60
  • commissioner in the interests of peace, 116
  • his influence abroad, 309
• Adams, Samuel—orator; b. 1722, d. 1803.
  • exempted from the proffered pardon, 32
  • his opinion of a regular army, 299
• Agnew, James— Br. maj.-general;
  • k. at Germantown, 196
• Alamance, N.C., battle of, May 16, 1771, 84
• Albany Convention of July 4, 1754, 12
• Allen, Ethan—col.; b. 1637, d. 1789.
  • captures Ticonderoga, May 10, 1775, 30
  • tries to capture Montreal, without orders, 62
  • captured and sent to England, 62
  • insubordination commented upon by Washington, 62
• Alliance frigate, twice takes Lafayette to France, 253, 362
• American army,
  • wholly composed of militia, 21
  • call for 30,000 under arms, 22
  • officially recognized, 32
  • its strange experience, March 2, 1776, 75
  • occupies Boston, March 17, 1776, 80
  • begins its first campaign, 83
  • April muster, 1776, 87
  • August muster, 1776, 101
  • September muster, 114
  • 85 regiments authorized, 116
  • its condition, Sept. 10, 1776, 119
  • October muster, 122
  • its lack of discipline, 123
  • Lee’s grand division, 135
  • special muster ordered by Washington, Nov. 23, 1776, 136
  • its condition, Dec. 30, 1776, 147
  • parades in Philadelphia, 183
  • August muster, 1777, 184
  • condition at Valley Forge, Dec., 1777, 205–6
  • at Newport, 1778, 242
  • assignments of divisions, 1778, 247
  • fixed at 80 battalions, 252
  • at Philadelphia, weakened in discipline, 252
  • its condition, Dec., 1779, 269
  • its condition, Nov. 7, 1780, 296
  • reorganization proposed, 298
  • new basis, of 36,000 men, 299
  • 398divisions again assigned, 300
  • its condition, 1781, 306
  • mutinous elements noticed, 307
  • at the South, 315–317
  • at Peekskill, 1781, 333
  • before Yorktown, 1781, 356
  • by States (Appendix A), 377
• American Civil War referred to, for comparison (Preface), vii
  • policy defined, 91
  • commissioners appointed in the interests of peace, 115
  • cow-boys near New York, 255
  • speculators feed the British, 306
• Americo-Spanish War of 1898 illustrating the principle of “Strategy and Statesmanship in War” (Preface), x, xii
• André, John—Br. major, sub. asst. adjt.-gen.; b. 1751, d. 1780.
  • taken prisoner, at St. John’s, 62
  • arranges fête in honor of Howe, 215
  • at capture of Charleston, 275
  • his antecedents noticed, 289
  • former relations to Miss Shippen, 289
  • executed as a spy, 290
  • his fate regretted, 290
  • exchange for Arnold morally impracticable, 291
• Angel,—col. at Fort Mercer, R.I., 201
  • at Battle of Springfield, 283–4
• Arbuthnot, Mariot—Br. admiral; b. 1711, d. 1794.
  • arrives at New York, 261
  • relieves Sir George Collier, 261
  • fights a French fleet, 326
• Armies of modern times, 370–1
  • of the Revolution as given by the British authority, Stedman (Appendix D), 386
• Arms from France, 164
• Armstrong, John—brig.-gen.; b. 1758, d. 1843.
  • at Brandywine, 186
  • on the Schuylkill, 192
• Arnold, Benedict—sub. maj.-gen.; b. 1740, d. 1801.
  • takes a company to Boston, 30
  • hastens to Lake Champlain, 30
  • anticipated by Allen, 30
  • organizes a naval force, 30
  • loved by Washington, 45
  • returns in angry mood, 51
  • proposes conquest of Canada, 51
  • his expedition for Quebec, 55
  • his disastrous march, 64
  • wounded in a bold assault, 66
  • his captains refuse longer service, 66
  • the siege of Quebec fails, 66
  • at Providence, 163
  • unjustly treated by Congress, 165
  • gallantry at Ridgefield, 166
  • in command at Philadelphia, 167
  • gallantry in Burgoyne campaign, 176
  • finally promoted, 176
  • court-martialed, 274
  • is married to Miss Shippen, 289
  • suffers from old wound, 222, 288
  • in command at West Point, 288
  • corresponds with Clinton, 288
  • invites André to visit him, 290
  • dictates price of his treason, 290
  • antecedents in Philadelphia, 289
  • his treason anticipated by Lord Germaine, 289
  • his exchange for André impossible without dishonor, 291
  • leaves N.Y. with troops, 310
  • overtaken by a storm, 310
  • his discretion doubted by Clinton, 310
  • plunders Richmond, Va., 311
  • cannot intimidate Jefferson, 311
  • returns to fortify Portsmouth, 311
  • writes to Lafayette, 331
  • treated with silent contempt, 331
  • tries threats to no purpose, 331
  • relations with Gen. Phillips, 331
  • ordered back to New York, 331
  • lays waste New London, 351
  • his recall explained, 351
• Arnold, Mrs. (formerly Miss Shippen)—ignorant of Arnold’s treason, 289
  • honored by Washington, 291
  • sympathy of Lafayette, 291
• Articles of Confederation finally adopted, 309
• “Art of War” (Preface), x–xii
• Ashe, John—brig.-gen.; b. 1721, d. 1781; declares while speaker of the North Carolina Assembly, concerning the Stamp Act, “We will resist its execution to the death,” 13
• 399Atlee, Samuel J.—col.; b. 1738, d. 1786.
  • joins the army at Brooklyn, 105
  • commands Pennsylvania Rifles, 105
  • makes a gallant fight, 107
  • prisoner with Stirling, 107
• Augusta 74, Br.; blown up in the Delaware, 202
• Aux Trembles reached by Benedict Arnold, 65
  • reached by Montgomery, 65
  • reached by Carleton, 66
• Baltimore pays honor to Rochambeau and Washington, 351
• Bancroft, George—diplomat and historian; b. 1800, d. 1891.
  • as to the invasion of Canada, 54
  • his estimate of Washington, 250
• Barras, Paul François Jean, Count DE—Fr. admiral; b. 1755, d. 1829.
  • sails from Newport, 354
  • enters the Chesapeake, 355
  • signs capitulation of Yorktown, 360
  • also signs for Count de Grasse, 360
• Bennington unwisely attacked by Burgoyne; anticipated by Washington, 176
• Berlin conference noticed, 370
• Biddle, Nicholas—appointed naval captain, 60
• Billingsport raided by Cornwallis, 203
• Bird—Br. lieut.-col.; k. at Germantown, 196
• Blackstone—chief of the Senecas; friend of Washington, 260
• Bordentown occupied by Donop (H.), 139
  • occupied by Cadwallader, 156
  • visited by British troops, 213
• Boston, massacre of March 5, 1770, 15
  • Tea Party entertainment, Dec. 16, 1773, 15
  • Port Bill, 1774, 15
  • surrounded by 20,000 minute men, 30
  • deliverance from British control a fixed purpose, 30
  • not a proper British base, 33
  • bombarded three nights, 74, 77
  • evacuated, 80
  • visited by D’Estaing, 243
  • visited by Greene, 246
  • visited by Lafayette, 244
  • visited by Rochambeau, 361
• Botta, Carlo Giuseppe Guglielmo—Ital. historian; b. 1768, d. 1837.
  • as to Battle of Long Island, 113
  • as to Battle of Trenton, 149
  • reviews New Jersey campaign, 159
• Boville, De—Fr. maj.-gen.; reconnoitres with Washington, 336
• Bowdoin, James—pres. Mass. Council; b. 1727, d. 1790;
  • addressed by Charles Lee, 139
• Braddock’s operations noticed, 7
• Bradley, Joseph P.—Justice U.S. Supreme Court; b. 1813, d. 1892;
  • corrects a tradition as to Lafayette’s alleged reminiscence of Washington’s profanity, 235
• Brandywine, Battle of, 185
• British army, at various dates (Appendix D), 383
  • troops quartered by British Parliament in Boston, 1768, 14
  • estimates for troops, by British ministry, 96
  • foreign auxiliaries opposed by British statesmen, 96
  • four military operations proposed, 97
  • its movements after Battle of Long Island, 116
  • advances to Horn’s hook (see map), 120
  • lands at Throgg’s Neck (see map), 125
  • advances beyond New Rochelle, 126
  • awaiting reënforcements, 127
  • in New Jersey, 139
  • invades the Illinois country, 253
  • opposed by Gov. Jefferson, 253
  • fed by Am. speculators, 296
• British military policy defined, 95
• British Parliament urges king to arrest Americans, 1769, 14
  • rejects “Conciliatory Bill,” 1775, 18
  • restricts New England trade, 18
  • favors certain colonies, 18
• 400Brookline, Mass., furnished fascine rods, 78
• Brooklyn, N.Y., occupied by Lee, 85
  • fortified by Greene, 102
  • evacuated by Washington, 112
• Bull Run, 1861, illustrates Brandywine (Preface), x
• Bunker Hill or Breed’s Hill, significance of the battle, 34
• Burgoyne, Sir John—lieut-gen.; b. 1730, d. 1792.
  • arrives at Boston, 33
  • describes rebels as peasants, 34
  • calls battle on Breed’s Hill “a great catastrophe,” 40
  • reaches Canada from Ireland, 89, 171
  • issues an unwise proclamation, 172
  • responded to by Washington, 172
  • has no sympathy with “hire of Indians”, 172
  • sharp letter from Gates, 173
  • his noble response, 173
  • captures Ticonderoga, 175
  • his diversion to Bennington an error, 175–6
  • surrenders his army, 176
  • organization of his army (Appendix E), 387
• Burke, Edmund—Br. statesman; b. 1730, d. 1797.
• Burr, Aaron—col.; sub. vice-pres.; b. 1750, d. 1830.
  • accompanies Arnold to Quebec, 55
• Butler, Thomas—col.; at storming of Stony Point, 257
• Byron, John—Br. admiral; b. 1723, d. 1786.
  • relieves admiral, Lord Howe, 239
  • fleet scattered by a storm, 239
  • arrives off Boston, 245
• Cadwallader, John—brig.-gen.; b. 1743, d. 1786.
  • guarding the Delaware, 141
  • fails to cross river, 142
  • crosses Delaware at Bristol, 146
  • arrives at Trenton, 151
  • at Princeton, 156
  • at Bordentown, 156
• Cæsar, Julius—Roman general; b. 100 B.C., d. 44 B.C.
  • his campaigns cited in comparison (Preface), viii
  • his methods imitated by Washington, 313
• Caldwell, James—his church burned by the British, 271
  • his wife shot by the British, 279
  • furnishes hymn books for gun-wadding at Springfield, 284
• Campbell, William—Am. col.; b. 1745, d. 1781;
  • at Battle of King’s Mountain, 293
• Canada lost to France, 1763, 10
  • as a British base, 30
  • invasion urged by Congress, 50
  • Arnold its active spirit, 51
  • Congress again moves, 52–3
  • difference in religious faith, 52
  • two expeditions planned, 55
  • did not support Burgoyne, 55
  • failure of the expeditions, 66
  • visited by commissioners, 88
  • visited by small-pox, 88
  • costs five thousand American lives in sixty days, 88
  • British reënforcements come, 89
  • abandoned by the American army, 89
  • the excuse of Congress, 89
• Canadian Acts of Parliament, 50
  • expeditions of Schuyler and Montgomery, 52, 55
  • expedition again suggested, but opposed by Washington, 252
• Carleton, Sir Guy—gov., of Canada, sub. gov. New York; b. 1724, d. 1808.
  • Arnold’s report of his small force in Canada, 51
  • flees from Montreal in disguise to Quebec, 64
  • pays military honors to his old comrade, Montgomery, 66
  • his magnanimous parole of American prisoners of war, 66
  • being largely reënforced in June, 1776, takes the offensive, 89
  • succeeds Clinton in N.Y., 362
  • coöperates with Washington, 363
  • surrenders New York, 363
• Carrington, Edward—col., sub. quartermaster-gen. (South); b. 1749, d. 1810.
  • indorsed by Chief Justice Marshall, 301
  • explores the Southern rivers, 302
  • 401commissioner to exchange prisoners, 318
• Carroll, Charles—last survivor of the signers of the Declaration of Independence; b. 1737, d. 1832;
  • commissioner to Canada, 88
• Carroll, Rev. John—sub. Archbishop of Maryland; visits Canada and reports a terrible condition of affairs, 88
• Catharine II. of Russia—b. 1729, d. 1796;
  • is hostile to British commerce, but favors American interests, 296
• Charleston, S.C., captured by Clinton, 275
• Charlestown Heights, neglected by British, 34
  • occupied by Americans, 34
  • occupied by British, 35
  • abandoned, 61
• Charlottesville, Va., a Hessian prison-camp, visited by Tarleton, 340
• Chase, Samuel—Md.; b. 1741, d. 1811;
  • appointed commissioner to Canada, 88
• Chastellux, François Jean, Marquis DE—maj.-general; b. 1734, d. 1789.
  • accompanies Rochambeau to America, 286
  • a relative of Lafayette, 286
  • marches from Newport to Ridgebury, Conn., 333
  • in conference at Wethersfield, 333
  • commands a division, 337
• Chatham, Lord (William Pitt)—orator and statesman; b. 1756, d. 1835.
  • Pittsburgh named in his honor, 10
  • describes the First Continental Congress, 17
  • his conciliatory bill defeated, 18
  • as to making slaves of American Englishmen, 20
  • as to Battle of Guilford, 320
• Chatterton Hill, battle near White Plains, 129
• Chemung, Battle of, noticed, 260
• Chesapeake Bay memorable in naval warfare, 354
• “Chimney-corner patriots” disgust Washington, 328
• China stimulated by American example, 370
• Civil liberty requires right execution of military power, 304
• Clinton, James—brig.-general; b. 1736, d. 1812.
  • gallantry at Fort Clinton, 179
  • in Indian expedition, 260
• Clinton, George—gov., brig.-gen.; sub. vice-pres.; b. 1736, d. 1812.
  • commands in the Highlands, 166
  • his services noted, 178, 190
• Clinton, Sir Henry—lieut.-gen.; b. 1758, d. 1795.
  • arrives in America, 33
  • urges attack upon Cambridge, 35
  • overruled by Howe, 35
  • expects an independent command, 70
  • anticipated by Washington, 70
  • visits Tryon in New York, 85
  • ordered to destroy Southern cities, 85
  • in attack upon Fort Sullivan, S.C., 85
  • returns to New York, 89
  • in battle of Long Island, 107
  • expects large success, 110
  • at Newport, R.I., 150
  • in expedition up the Hudson, 178
  • outgenerals Putnam, 178
  • captures Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 179
  • did not intend to join Burgoyne, 180
  • returns to New York, 182
  • relieves Howe in command, 215
  • gives a fête to Howe, 215
  • attempts capture of Lafayette, 216
  • fails to capture Lafayette, 217
  • his policy outlined, 221
  • evacuates Philadelphia, 222
  • moves toward Monmouth, 223–4
  • followed by Lafayette, 225
  • prepares for battle, 229
  • abandons position at night, 234
  • regains New York, 234
  • escapes the French fleet, 238
  • tries to reënforce Newport, 245
  • reports to Lord Germaine, 249
  • inactive at New York, 252
  • captures Stony Point, 253
  • reoccupies Stony Point, when Washington abandoned it, 259
  • declines to attack West Point, 261
  • 402abandons Newport and New England, 262
  • sails for Charleston, 268
  • reports his force, 270
  • reports as to Provincials, 272
  • expedition suffers from storm, 274
  • captures Charleston, 275
  • issues absurd proclamation, 275
  • reënforced by Rawdon, 276
  • returns to New York, 282
  • plans a new expedition, 283
  • invades New Jersey, 283
  • Battle of Springfield, 283–4
  • burns Springfield, 285
  • “needs rest for his army”, 285
  • plans descent upon Newport, 286
  • writes Lord Germaine as to West Point, 288
  • corresponds with Arnold, 289
  • again writes Lord Germaine, 289
  • closes bargain with Arnold, 290
  • cannot exchange Arnold for André, 291
  • watches the American mutiny, 309
  • advises with Lord Germaine, 309
  • sends Arnold to Virginia, 310
  • doubts Arnold’s discretion, 310
  • sends good officers with him, 310
  • equally powerless with Cornwallis, 324
  • learns of effort to capture Arnold, 325
  • sends Phillips to support Arnold, 326
  • orders Arnold to New York, 331
  • disturbed by Arnold’s correspondence with London officials, 332
  • receives Washington’s decoy letters, 335
  • “in a state of siege”, 335
  • other decoy letters reach him, 336
  • orders Cornwallis to report to him, 337
  • calls for reënforcements, 338
  • intercepts other decoy letters with plans enclosed, 346
  • outgeneraled by Washington, 347–8
  • writes Cornwallis—promising help, 350
  • advises Cornwallis to strike Philadelphia, 352
  • does not understand Washington, 352
  • hears from Cornwallis, 358
  • sails for Yorktown too late, 358
  • contemporaneous surrender of Cornwallis, 359–60
  • is relieved of command in New York, 361
  • succeeded by Sir Guy Carleton, 361
• Collier, Sir George—Br. commodore.
  • convoys Clinton and his troops up the Hudson, 253
  • his fleet visits New Haven, 256
  • relieved by Admiral Arbuthnot, 261
• Colonial Congress at New York, 1765, 11
  • nine Colonies represented; others ratify action, 11
  • names of Colonies that were not represented, 11
  • the Declaration of Rights, 11
  • denounces Stamp Act, Oct. 7, 1755, 13
• Colonial expeditions, 1755, 10
  • additional, 1758, 10
• Colonial governments and their forms described, 16
• Columbian Exposition, 1892, noticed, 372–3
• Commissioners sent to Canada, 88
  • General and Admiral Howe meet American commissioners in New York, 98
  • arrange terms between Cornwallis and Washington, 359
• Committee of Congress visits Boston, 60
• Committee of Correspondence, 1773, and their purpose, 15
• Connecticut Farms, N.J., burned by General Knyphausen, 279
• Connecticut sends 2,000 men to Boston, April 26, 1775, 23
  • assigns Putnam, Wooster, and Spencer to command, 23
  • sends volunteers to New York with Lee, 71
  • her militia greatly reduced, 116
  • responds to Washington’s appeal, 116
  • twice invaded by Tryon, 166, 256
  • invaded by Arnold, 351
• Continental Army organized, 32
• 403Continental Congress adopts militia about Boston as the American Continental Army, 32
  • forms Light Infantry corps, 32
  • appoints Washington Commander-in-Chief, 32
  • accompanies commission with pledge of support, 32
  • sends committee to Washington at Cambridge, 52
  • disclaims purpose to operate against Canada, 54
  • but initiated and pressed every expedition, 54
  • sends a second committee to Cambridge, 60
  • authorizes a navy, 60
  • urges attack upon Boston, 61
  • sends committee to N.Y., 85
  • orders additional troops to Canada, 88
  • proposes to hire Indian allies, 88
  • appoints commissioners to Canada, 88
  • authorizes abandonment of New York, 117
  • confers large powers upon Washington, 140
  • imparts dictatorial powers, 148
  • makes promotions without consulting Washington, 165
  • adjourns to Lancaster and to York, 194
  • honors the defenders of Fort Mifflin, 202
  • places enemies of Washington in responsible commands, 205
  • sends a committee to Valley Forge, 212
• Continental money worth 3 cents on the dollar, 252
• Conway, Thomas—Irish adventurer; brig.-gen. at Battle of Germantown, 195
  • promoted major-general and inspector-general, 205
  • resigns his commission, 207
  • responsible for the “Conway cabal”, 212
  • departs for France, 212
• Cornwallis, Charles, Lord—sub. lieut.-gen. India; b. 1738, d. 1805.
  • sails for America, 97
  • lands at Wilmington, N.C., 97
  • accompanies Clinton to Charleston, S.C., 97
  • returns to New York, 99
  • in Battle of Long Island, 107
  • enforces the surrender of Sullivan and Stirling, 108
  • assaults Fort Washington, 132
  • invades New Jersey, 136
  • halts at Brunswick, 137
  • on eve of departure for England, 150
  • ordered back to New Jersey, 150
  • advances upon Trenton, 152
  • threatens Washington’s position, 154
  • strengthens his own position, 154
  • outgeneraled by Washington, 156
  • retires to Brunswick, 156
  • again on the aggressive, 167
  • attempts to gain Washington’s defences, 169
  • retires to Staten Island, 169
  • in skirmish upon invasion of Pennsylvania, 185
  • moves up the Brandywine, 188
  • leads the advance of Howe’s army, 188
  • surprises Sullivan’s division, 187–9
  • moves to Chester, 192
  • enters Philadelphia, 194
  • lands in New Jersey, 203
  • compels Americans to destroy their galleys, 203
  • threatens Washington at Chestnut Hill, 204
  • skirmishes with Morgan, 204
  • makes incursion into New Jersey, 248
  • in command at the South, 275
  • suspends invasion of North Carolina, 293
  • fails to subjugate the people, 293
  • sore over Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens, 315
  • presses closely upon Greene, 315
  • informs Clinton of his condition, 317
  • abandons Charleston, 317
  • expects no aid from Virginia, 318
  • his proclamation to rebels, 318
  • arranges for exchange of prisoners, 318
  • parols militia as prisoners, 318
  • seeks to control upper fords, 318
  • is outgeneraled by Greene, 319
  • 404in need of all supplies, 319
  • at Guilford Court-House, 319
  • cannot improve success, 320
  • practically a defeat, so judged by contemporaries, 320
  • retires to Wilmington, leaving his wounded, closely pursued by Greene, 321
  • his position, and that of Clinton, noticed, 324
  • reminiscence of earlier campaign, 325
  • his effective force reduced, 329
  • arrives at Yorktown from Wilmington, 333
  • sustained by British ministry, 337
  • Clinton wants his troops, 338
  • promises to expel Lafayette from Virginia, 338
  • in pursuit of Lafayette, 38–9
  • his course described by Lafayette, 339
  • abandons the pursuit, 339
  • is followed by Lafayette, 340
  • returns to headquarters, 341
  • finds old despatches from Clinton, 341
  • takes boats for Yorktown, 341
  • his movements reported to Washington, 342
  • is warned by Clinton of danger, 350
  • relations to Clinton noticed, 352–3
  • must destroy Lafayette’s army to hold Virginia, 353
  • attempts escape by Gloucester, 358
  • the movement abandoned, 358
  • graphic report to Clinton, 358
  • terms of surrender fixed, 359
  • surrender completed, 360
  • courtesies between officers of the three armies, 361
  • his interview with Lafayette, 361
• Cornwallis, Frederick—acts as Br. commissioner to exchange prisoners, 318
• Coudray, Monsieur DE—ordered to complete defensive works along the Delaware, 192
• Court-martial of Arnold, 274
• Court-martial of Lee (Appendix G), 389
• Cowpens, Battle of, 312
• Coxe, Daniel—urges union of Colonies, 1722, 12
• Crimean War noticed, 313
• Cromwell, Oliver—Lord Protector of England; b. 1599, d. 1659.
  • cited by Washington’s officers as a precedent for assuming permanent command, 364
• Crown Point, expedition against, 1755, 10
  • visited by Allen and Arnold, 30
  • captured by Seth Warner, 51
• Custis, Mrs. Martha—b. 1732, d. 1802.
  • her marriage to Washington, 8
• Danbury, Conn., invaded (with Ridgefield) by Tryon, 166
• Dartmouth, George, Lord—Br. statesman; b. 1748, d. 1791.
  • comments upon Lexington and Concord, 20
  • opposed military occupation of Boston, 33
  • advised Howe to attack Southern cities, 69
  • regarded New York as the true British base, 69
• Dayton, Elias—col.; b. 1735, d. 1807.
  • his regiment in battle, 278–9
• Deane, Silas—b. 1737, d. 1834.
  • on naval committee, 60
  • commissioner to France, 209
  • returns to Philadelphia, 238
• Deborre, Prudhomme—brig.-gen.; disgraced at Brandywine, 189
• Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, 91
• D’Estaing, Charles Hector, Count—Fr. lieut.-general; b. 1729, d. 1794.
  • reaches the Delaware with French fleet, 238
  • sails at once for New York, 239
  • unable to cross the bar, 240
  • arrives at Newport, R.I., 240
  • consults Sullivan as to attack, 242
  • not affronted by Sullivan’s landing first, 243
  • is confronted by British fleet, 243
  • both fleets dispersed, 243
  • returns to Newport, 243
  • 405sails for Boston to refit; notices Sullivan’s protest, 243
  • his manly course vindicated, 244
  • sails for the West Indies, 245
  • off the coast of Georgia, 261
  • his siege of Savannah, urged by Lafayette, 267
  • twice wounded, 268
• De Fleury, Louis—Fr. lieuten’t, sub. col.
  • at defence of Fort Mercer, 202
  • planned Fort Mifflin, 202
  • wounded in its defence, 203
• De Grasse, François Joseph Paul—Fr.; b. 1723, d. 1788.
  • arrives in the Chesapeake, 342
  • limited in period of operations, 342
  • urges assault upon Yorktown, 342
  • yields to Lafayette’s judgment, 343
  • is visited by Washington, 354
  • has naval fight with Admiral Graves (see map), 355
  • suggests a plan of action, 356
  • opposed by Lafayette, 356
  • sails for the West Indies, 361
  • his trophies at Yorktown (Appendix F), 388
• De Heister—H. lieut.-gen.; lands at Gravesend, Aug. 25, 1776, 106
  • captures Sullivan and Stirling, and parts of their commands, 108
  • advances to support Howe, 126
• De Kalb, John, Baron—maj.-gen.; b. 1732, d. 1780.
  • comes to America with Lafayette. Note to Chap. XVIII, 191
  • reports as to the army, 205
  • appointed inspector-general, 207
  • commands Maryland and Delaware troops, 277
  • Southern campaign, 291
  • k. in Battle of Camden, 292
• Delaware troops always efficient, 277
  • gallantry at Camden, 292
• Denmark and Sweden hostile to England, 296
• Destouches, Chevalier—succeeds De Ternay, deceased, 298
  • supports Washington, 323
  • indorsed by Washington, 326
• De Ternay, Chevalier—convoys Rochambeau’s army from France, 286
  • blockaded by British at Newport, 298
  • dies at Newport, 298
  • is succeeded by Destouches, 298
• Dickenson, John—in first Continental Congress, 17
• Dinwiddie, Robert—gov. of Virginia; b. 1690, d. 1770; sent Washington as commissioner to French frontier, 6
• Donop—H. col.;
  • in the storming of Chatterton Hill, 129
  • abandons Bordentown, 146
  • k. in storming Fort Mercer, 201
  • is buried by the Americans, 202
• Dorchester Heights occupied by the Americans, 76–80
• Drayton, William H.—b. 1742, d. 1779; chief justice, South Carolina, 1776, 86
• Dumas, Mathieu, Count DE—Fr. col.; sub. marshal-de-camp and historian; b. 1753, d. 1837;
  • gallantry at Yorktown, 357
    • Note.—He was wounded in storming redoubt.
• Dundas, Francis—Br. lieut.-col.; b. 1750, d. 1824; goes to Virginia with Arnold, 310
• Dunmore, John Murray, Lord—Br. gov. Virginia; b. 1732, d. 1818.
  • seizes colonial powder, 28
  • opposed by Patrick Henry, 28
  • takes refuge on board the man-of-war Fowey, 28
  • bombards Norfolk, New Year’s day, 1776, 68
  • is visited by Gen. Clinton, 85
• Du Portail, Lebegue—Fr. brig.-gen.; d. 1802.
  • captured at Charleston, 300
  • succeeded as engineer by Kosciusko, 300
  • reconnoitres with Washington, 336
  • visits the Count de Grasse with Washington, 353
• Effingham, Lord—Br.; resigns when ordered to America, 21
• 406Elizabethtown, N.J., visited by Knyphausen, 227
• Engineering defined, with note (Preface), xi
• Erskine, Sir William—Br. brig.-gen.; captured by Am. privateer at sea, 98, 99
  • warns Cornwallis at Trenton, 155
  • attempts to capture Lafayette, 216
• Eutaw Springs—the last battle at the South, 321
• Evacuation of Boston (Br.), 80
  • Brooklyn (Am.), 113
  • New York (Am.), 127
  • Philadelphia (Br.), 222
  • Charleston (Am.), 267
  • Yorktown (Br.), 361
  • New York (Br.), 363
• Ewing, James—brig.-general; failed to cross at Trenton, 1776, on Christmas night, 162
• Fairfax, Bryan, Lord—b. 1730, d. 1802; friend of Washington, 5
• Fairfield, Conn., raided by Governor Tryon, 255
• Febiger, Christian—colonel at Stony Point, 257
• First Continental Congress, at Philadelphia, Sept. 5, 1774, 16
  • its officers and members noticed, 16
  • Washington a member, 17
  • honored by Lord Chatham, 17
  • supports Massachusetts, 17
• Fleury, Louis de. See De Fleury.
• Forman—brig.-gen.,
  • at Battle of Germantown, 195
• Forrest’s battery (Am.) at Trenton, 145
• Forts Clinton and Montgomery captured (see map), 179
• Fort Du Quesne, became Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh), 10
• Fort Mercer and its gallant defence, 201
• Fort Mifflin, planned by De Fleury (Fr.), 202
• France retains certain American possessions by Treaty of Paris, 1763, 11
  • makes a formal alliance with America, 213
  • sends an ambassador to America, 238
  • sends a fleet to America, 238
  • sends a second fleet to America, 261
  • sends an army to America, 286
  • sends a third fleet and troops to America, 342
  • sends money to America, 348
  • shares in the trophies of Yorktown, 388
• Franco-Prussian war cited in comparison (Preface), vii
• Franklin, Benjamin—philosopher, diplomat, and statesman; b. 1716, d. 1790.
  • urges a union of the Colonies, 1754, 12
  • the convention of July 4, 1754, the result, 12
  • reasons for its failure, 12
  • on passage of Stamp Act, writing to Charles Thompson, 13
  • Thompson’s reply quoted, 13
  • describes the servile attitude of the English people, 18
  • chairman Penn. Committee of Safety, 28
  • his opinion of fight at Breed’s Hill, 34
  • commissioner to Canada, 88
  • commissioner to meet Gen. and Admiral Howe, 116
  • secures French support, 209
  • writes as to Washington’s standing abroad, 308
  • influence with Holland and Spain noticed, 309
  • secures a loan from Holland, 348
• Frederick II.—third king of Prussia (called “the Great”); son of Frederick William I.; b. 1712, d. 1786; like Washington in reticence, 44
• French army at Newport, R.I., 286
  • marches through Connecticut, 335
  • joins Washington, 335
  • threatens New York, 336
  • supports Lafayette, 342
  • parades in Philadelphia, 349
  • reviewed by the president of Congress, 349
  • in siege of Yorktown, 357
  • competes with Americans, in action, 358
• 407French fleet off the Delaware, with French Ambassador, 238
  • unable to enter New York, 240
  • sails for Newport, R.I., 240
  • engages fleet of Howe, 243
  • repairs at Boston, 243
  • at Savannah, Ga., 261
  • blockaded at Newport, 295
  • off the Chesapeake, 350
  • engages with British fleet, 354
  • leaves America, 361
• Frigate Le Sensible (Fr.) brings French treaty to America, 213
  • La Chinier (Fr.) brings French minister to America, 238
• Frigates built during the war, and their fate (Appendix B), 378
• Gage, Thomas—Br. lieut.-gen.; b. 1721, d. 1787.
  • appointed gov. Massachusetts and Commander-in-Chief, 16
  • his fatal movement upon Concord, 20
  • succeeded by Howe, 58
• Gates, Horatio—maj.-general, sub. adj.-general; b. 1728, d. 1806.
  • his antecedents, 36
  • succeeds Sullivan in Canada, 88
  • the confidant of Charles Lee, 127
  • confidential letter from Lee, 127
  • another letter from Lee, 138
  • reports for duty, 139
  • absent without leave, 141
  • dodges Battle of Trenton, 142
  • insolent letter to Burgoyne, 173
  • its lofty rebuke, 173
  • relieves Schuyler, and himself relieved, 173
  • declines command of Ticonderoga, 173
  • insulting letter to Washington, 173–4
  • Washington’s reply, 174
  • appeals to congressmen, 174
  • on leave of absence, 174
  • supersedes Schuyler, 176
  • captures Burgoyne’s army, 176
  • congratulated by Washington, 179
  • reports direct to Congress, 179
  • president of Board of War, 205
  • still corresponds with Lee, 205
  • commands at Peekskill, 212
  • on Council of War, 217
  • letters to Lee known to Washington, 220
  • declines to fight Indians, 259
  • “unequal to the command,” 260
  • spends winter in Virginia, 281
  • Congress gives him the Southern Department, 281
  • sarcastic letter from Charles Lee, 281
  • in command at the South, 291
  • criticised by Irving, 291
  • routed at Camden, 292
  • his disgraceful flight, 292
  • his abject apology, 292
  • could have saved the battle, 292
  • attempts to gather his army, 293
  • the tidings reaches Washington, 295
  • is succeeded by Greene, 300
  • turns command over to Greene, 302
  • retires to his farm, 302
• George III.—King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith; b. 1738, d. 1820.
  • does not understand Englishmen in America, 20
  • hears of Burgoyne’s surrender, 208
  • unwisely adjourns Parliament, 208
• Gerard (De Rayvenal), Monsieur Conrad A.; d. 1790.
  • pledges to Franklin and Deane French support, 209
  • first Fr. ambassador to America, 238
• Germaine, George (Viscount Sackville), Lord—Br. Prime Minister; b. 1716, d. 1785.
  • correspondence with Howe, 98
  • with Clinton, 249, 289
• Germantown, Battle of, Chapter XIX., 192–7
• Gimât—Fr. col. on Washington’s staff.
  • at Monmouth, 233
  • witness on Lee’s trial, 233
  • at siege of Yorktown, 357
• Gist, Mordecai—brig.-gen., sub. gov. Del.; b. 1743, d. 1792.
  • skirmishes with Cornwallis, 204
  • recruits for Greene’s army, 301
• Glover, John—col.; sub. brig.-gen.; b. 1732, d. 1797.
  • 408at Battle of Long Island, 108
  • covers the retreat, 111
  • resists British landing at Throgg’s Neck, 125
  • at Battle of Trenton, 142
• Gordon, Rev. William, as to Battle of Monmouth, 234
• Grand tactics defined, with note (Preface), x
• Grant, James—Br. maj.-gen.; b. 1720, d. 1806.
  • at Battle of Long Island, 107
  • watches Washington from Brunswick, N.J., 143
  • compliments Washington’s sagacity, 143
  • put Hessians off their guard, 143
• Grant, Ulysses Simpson—Gen. U.S.A., sub. pres. twice; b. 1822, d. 1885.
  • his example cited, 66
• Graves, Thomas, Baron—Br. admiral; b. about 1725, d. 1802.
  • ordered to burn coast towns, 59
  • counter-action of Washington, 59
  • attempts to capture Lafayette, 216
  • sails for the Chesapeake, 355
  • misses Count de Barras, 355
  • engages a superior French fleet, 355
  • returns to New York, 355
• Gray—Br. maj.-gen.
  • surprises Wayne at Paoli, 193
  • in attack upon Washington at Chestnut Hill, 204
  • attempts to capture Lafayette, 216
  • surprises Light Horse, at Tappan, 248
• Great Britain sublimely faces world-wide antagonisms, 296
  • unjust to her Provincial troops, 362
  • Washington aids Carleton in their behalf, 363
• Greene, Ashbel—chaplain at Monmouth; sub. pres. Princeton College, N.J.; b. 1762, d. 1848;
  • as to Washington’s interview with Lee at Monmouth, 236
  • See also Washington’s letter as to the language used by him, 391
• Greene, Christopher—colonel; b. 1737, d. 1781.
  • in Arnold’s expedition to Canada, 55, 200
  • commands Fort Mercer, 200
• Greene, Nathaniel—maj.-gen.; b. 1740, d. 1786.
  • commands Rhode Island troops, 24
  • a Quaker youth and blacksmith’s apprentice, 25
  • studied by forge-light, after work hours, 25
  • announces principles essential to success, 25
  • thorough work as member of the Kentish Guards, 26
  • antecedents and studies, 26
  • likened to Grant and Lee, 26
  • outline of his career anticipated, 39
  • his brigade noticed, 69
  • in charge of Brooklyn Heights, 87
  • completes the defences, 102
  • prostrated by fever, 104
  • succeeded by Putnam, 104
  • advises retreat, 115
  • describes Washington at Kipp’s Bay, 119
  • assumes command in New Jersey, 122
  • describes corrupt practices of surgeons, 123
  • joins for duty, 127
  • prepares for campaign in New Jersey, 130
  • regards Fort Washington as defensible, 132
  • at Battle of Trenton, 142
  • commands advance posts before Trenton, 151
  • leads the advance, Jan. 2, 1777, 155
  • visits Congress, 166
  • advances to meet Howe, 168
  • his plan vindicated, 169
  • selects position on the Brandywine, 185
  • commands the reserve, 186
  • with Washington, covers the retreat, 189
  • at Battle of Germantown, 195
  • enters New Jersey, 203
  • assigns Lafayette to duty, 203
  • at Council of War, 217
  • at Monmouth, 230, 233
  • 409at Boston, as quartermaster-general, 246
  • describes the winter, 1780, 271
  • in Battle of Springfield, 283
  • manœuvres for position, 284
  • scientific movements noticed, 285
  • succeeds Arnold at West Point, 291
  • submits plan for Southern campaign, 300
  • succeeds Gates and goes South, 300
  • relieves Gates, 302
  • his reports and letters, 302
  • graphic letter to Marion, 303
  • “spies are the eyes of an army”, 303
  • acts as if under the eyes of Washington, 303
  • initiates his campaign, 313
  • his army without clothing, 315
  • uses blankets, “Indian style”, 315
  • rides 125 miles to see Morgan, 315
  • joined by Harry Lee, 316
  • provides for Morgan’s prisoners, 316
  • his wise strategic methods, 317
  • expects no aid from Virginia, 318
  • decides to fight Cornwallis, 318
  • battle of Guilford Court-House, 319
  • drives Cornwallis into Wilmington, 320
  • his report to Washington, 320
  • fights Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, 321
  • the casualties stated, 321
  • fights Stewart, at Eutaw Springs, “the final battle at the South”, 321
  • redeems Georgia and the Carolinas, 322
  • welcomes Lafayette to the South, 326
  • regards capture of Cornwallis as settled, 327
  • his army reënforced by Lafayette’s self-denial, 330
• Greenfield, Conn., raided by Tryon, 256
• Green Mountain Boys, Vt., regularly organized, 51
  • resist Carleton’s advance from Canada, 62
  • decline to reënlist after capture of Montreal, 63
• Grenville, George—Br. Prime Minister; b. 1712, d. 1770;
  • ordains a revenue system, 1764, 12
• Gridley, Richard—col.; b. 1711, d. 1796.
  • Engineer-in-Chief at Bunker Hill, 23
  • resigns, and succeeded by Knox, 61
• Griffiths—Am. col.; skirmishes with Donop (H.), 146
• Hale, Edward Everett—clergyman, journalist, and author; b. Boston, Mass., 1822.
  • his tribute to Nathan Hale, 120, 121
• Hale, Nathan—Am. captain; b. 1755; d. 1776.
  • confidential messenger of Washington, 120
  • executed as a spy, Sept. 22, 1776, 121
  • his memorable last words, 121
  • his career sketched by the Rev. E. E. Hale, 120–121
  • place of his execution identified by Lossing, 131
• Hamilton, Alexander—col., sub. eminent financier; b. 1757, d. 1804.
  • occupies Chatterton Hill, with two guns, 128
  • is sent to Gates for troops, 204
  • with Lafayette at Monmouth, 226
  • reports New York Harbor too shallow for French fleet, 240
  • gallantry at Yorktown, 357
• Hammond, Sir Andrew—Br. commodore;
  • arrives with troops, 261
• Hampton, Wade—col.; b. 1754, d. 1835;
  • honored by Washington, 312
• Hancock, John—statesman and maj.-gen.; b. 1737, d. 1793.
  • pres. Mass. Provincial Congress, 17
  • advises Washington of Howe’s movements, 183
  • at siege of Newport opposes departure of D’Estaing, 243
• 410Hand, Edward—col.; b. in Ireland, 1744, d. 1802.
  • in skirmish on Long Island, 104
  • falls back to Prospect Hill, 105
  • delays British landing at Throgg’s Neck, 125
  • skirmishes with the Hessian Yagers, 126
  • in front of Trenton, 1776–7, 151
  • in Sullivan’s expedition, 260
  • becomes adjt.-gen., vice Scammon, resigned, 300
• Hannibal—Carthaginian prince and general; b. 229 B.C., d. 183 B.C. (Preface), v
• Harrison, Benjamin—signer of Declaration of Independence; b. 1740, d. 1791;
  • visits Boston on naval affairs, 60
• Harrison, Robert H.—col.
  • secretary to Washington, 300
  • becomes C.J. of Maryland, 300
• Harrison, Thomas—speaker of Virginia House of Burgesses;
  • addressed by Washington, 250
• Haslet—col. Delaware reg’t; b. in Ireland, d. 1777.
  • joins army at Brooklyn, 105
  • makes a gallant fight, 107
  • attacks the Queen’s Rangers successfully, 126
  • k. at Battle of Princeton, 154
• Hazelwood, John—Am. naval officer; b. 1726, d. 1800;
  • gallantry on the Delaware, 202
• Hazen, Moses—col., sub. brig.-gen.; b. 1733, d. 1802;
  • threatens Staten Island, 347
• Heath, William—maj.-general; b. 1735, d. 1814.
  • appointed brig.-gen, 36
  • his antecedents, 36
  • subsequent career outlined, 39
  • describes occupation of Dorchester as “never so much done in so short a space”, 77
  • ordered to New York, 82
  • efficient at New York, 104
  • aids in the retreat, 110
  • makes a night march, 128
  • commands in the Highlands, 131
  • at Fishkill, 135
  • advised of Washington’s plans, 141
  • ordered to take the offensive, 147
  • special assignment to duty, 156
  • reprimanded for mismanagement, 157–8
  • ordered to Boston, 254
  • again in the Highlands, 268
  • commands camp in New Jersey, 346
• Hebrew military and civil antecedents (Preface), viii, ix
• Henry, Patrick—orator and statesman; b. 1736, d. 1799.
  • charged with treason, 13
  • denounces British Stamp Act, 13
  • in first Continental Congress, 17
• Hessian prisoners taken at Saratoga remain in America, 248
  • quartered in Virginia, 248
• Hessian soldiers misunderstood, 363
• Hildreth, Richard—historian; b. 1807, d. 1865.
  • criticises Samuel Adams, 299
  • Mr. Adams’ position sound in principle, 299
• Hillhouse, James—captain, sub. eminent lawyer and senator; b. 1754, d. 1832.
  • resists Tryon’s invasion of New Haven, 256
• Hobkirk Hill noticed, 321
• Hood, Sir Samuel—Br. admiral; b. 1724, d. 1816.
  • arrives in America, 354
  • looks into Delaware Bay, 354
  • proceeds to New York, 354
  • reports to Admiral Graves, 354
• Hornblower, Joseph C.—Chief Justice of New Jersey; b. 1777, d. 1864;
  • misreported as to Washington’s language at Monmouth, 235
• Howe, Lord Richard—admiral; b. 1725, d. 1799.
  • reaches N.Y. July 12, 1776, 98
  • joint commissioner with General Howe, 98
  • refuses to recognize Washington’s military title, 96
  • does so in order to secure Erskine’s exchange, 99
  • returns to New York, 245
  • sails for Boston, 245
• Howe, Sir William—lieut.-gen.; b. 1730, d. 1814.
  • declares martial law, 32
  • offers pardon to all but Samuel Adams and John Hancock, 32
  • 411established in America, 33
  • overrules Clinton’s advice to attack Cambridge, 35
  • his martinet discipline, 48
  • ordered to succeed Gage, 58
  • issues an unwise proclamation, 58
  • Washington’s counter-proclamation, 58
  • orders coast towns to be devastated, 59
  • instructed by Lord Dartmouth, 69
  • “New York is the proper British base”, 70
  • overruled by Gage, 70
  • Dorchester Heights seized, 77
  • his report to Lord Dartmouth, 77
  • fails to recapture the Heights, 80
  • evacuates Boston, 80
  • embarks for Halifax, 80
  • sails from Halifax for New York, 97
  • lands troops on Staten Island, 98
  • confers with Governor Tryon, 98
  • writes Lord Germaine as to plans, 98
  • addresses George Washington, Esq., 98
  • changes the address to secure a military exchange, 99
  • “dispensing pardon to repentant sinners,” as Washington styles Howe’s mission, 99
  • brilliant landing of his army, 106
  • the battle outlined, 107–9
  • negotiations with American commissioners, 108
  • advance of his army, 117
  • makes enormous requisitions for troops, 118
  • movements anticipated by Washington, 120
  • writes Lord Germaine as to a long campaign, 124
  • will not attack Harlem Heights, 125
  • lands at Throgg’s Neck, 126
  • orders storming of Chatterton Hill, 126
  • awaits reënforcements, 126
  • outgeneraled by Washington, 129
  • crosses to the Hudson, 129
  • anticipated by Washington, 130
  • tries to deter American enlistments, 130
  • guarantees “liberties and properties”, 130
  • captures Fort Washington, 132
  • knew of Adjutant Dumont’s treason, 133
  • excuse for not following Washington, 133
  • specific instructions given, 133
  • sends Cornwallis into New Jersey, 137
  • “weather too severe for field service”, 137
  • returns to New York, 139
  • winter quarters specified, 139
  • surprised by news from Trenton, 150
  • calls for 20,000 more troops, 150
  • hurries Cornwallis to New Jersey, 150
  • withdraws troops from Newport, 163
  • plans anticipated by Washington, 165
  • marches again into New Jersey, with 17,000 men, 167
  • details of the campaign, 168–170
  • will invade Pennsylvania, 177
  • writes a decoy letter, which Washington detects, 177
  • no doubts of Burgoyne’s success, 181
  • sails for the Chesapeake, 182–183
  • skirmishes with American advance, 185
  • masterly strategy in the Battle of Brandywine, 187–190
  • cares for the wounded of both armies, 192
  • his rear threatened by Washington, 194
  • his headquarters at Germantown, 195
  • repels Washington’s attack, but does not attack in turn, 195
  • after battle returns to Philadelphia, 196
  • threatens American army at Chestnut Hill, 204
  • explains the failure of his movement, 204
  • succeeded in command by Clinton, 215
  • his army in detail (Appendix D–2), 384
• 412Huntington, L.I., raided by Tryon’s expedition, 256
• Hyde Park, Mass., where fascine rods were made available, 78
• Independence, National, proclaimed at Philadelphia, July 4, 1776, 91
• Independence proclaimed at Charlotte, N. C., May 20, 1774, 29
• Indian atrocities during the Revolution, 249
  • summarily avenged, 252, 260
• Indian auxiliaries advocated by Great Britain, 172
  • advocated by Congress, 88
  • denounced by Burgoyne, 172–3
  • ridiculed by Schuyler, 88
• Irving, Washington—diplomat, historian, scholar; b. 1783, d. 1859.
  • his personal aid acknowledged by the author (Preface), xiv
  • his sketch of Washington’s youth, 1
  • his tribute to Mary Washington, 5
• Japan honors the example and teachings of Washington, 370
• Jay, John—statesman and jurist; b. 1745, d. 1829.
  • in first Continental Congress, 17
  • suggests to burn New York, 108
  • commissioner to France, 309
  • his services recognized, 309
• Jefferson, Thomas—patriot and statesman, governor Va., sub. pres. twice; b. 1743, d. July 4, 1826.
  • sees basis for a constitution in government of Iroquois Indian Confederacy, 12
  • protects the western frontier, 253
  • advised by Washington, 300
  • defies Arnold’s threats, 311
  • narrowly escapes capture by Tarleton, 340
  • is vindicated by Lafayette, 343
• Jomini, Henri, Baron DE—gen.; chief of staff to Napoleon; aide-de-camp Emperor of Russia; military writer; b. 1799, d. 1869.
  • gives grounds of Napoleon’s success (Preface), xiii
  • as applied to Washington, 44
  • as to retreats, 73
• Jones, John Paul—lieut., captain in the navy, sub. admiral in the Russian navy; b. 1747, d. 1792.
  • appointed in the navy, 59
  • history of his name, 379
  • his naval success, 379
• Joshua—the Hebrew captain, an antetype of Washington upon completion of his mission, 373
• Jubilee, Am., at Valley Forge, 213
  • French alliance honored, 213
  • Br. at Philadelphia, 215
  • General Howe honored, 215
  • noted participants, 215
• Kent, James—chief justice, jurist, and author, N. Y.; b. 1763, d. 1847;
  • his opinion of General Schuyler, 37
• Kentish Guards, R.I., identified with Greene, 26
  • their prompt start for Boston, 27
  • their subsequent promotions in the service, 26
• Keppel, Augustus—Br. admiral; b. 1725, d. 1786; gives an opinion of the war, 21
• King’s Mountain, Battle of, mentioned, 293
• Kingston, N. Y., burned by Gen. Vaughn, 179
• Knowlton, Thomas—capt., sub. col.; b. 1740, d. 1776.
  • at Bunker Hill, 122
  • k. at Harlem Heights, 122
• Knox, Henry—chief of artillery, sub. maj.-gen.; sub. Sec. of War; b. 1750, d. 1806.
  • succeeds Gridley, resigned, 61
  • efficient in ordnance department, 71
  • mounts Ticonderoga cannon at Cambridge, 71
  • reports his artillery force, 102
  • efficient at Trenton with Forrest’s battery, 145
  • recruits artillery in Mass., 163
  • establishes gun-factory at Springfield, 163
  • visits Count de Grasse, with Washington, 353
• Knyphausen, Wilhelm, Baron VON—H. lieut.-general; b. 1730, d. 1789.
  • arrives in America and joins Howe, 126
  • 413in attack upon Fort Washington, 132
  • at Brandywine, 186–7
  • conducts Clinton’s baggage-train from Philadelphia, 224
  • pushes for Monmouth, 224
  • reaches New York, 229
  • invades New Jersey, 271
  • in Battle of Springfield, 279
  • acts the part of Pharaoh, instead of that of Moses, 280
• Kosciusko, Thaddeus—Polish maj.-general; b. 1750, d. 1817.
  • perfects fortifications at West Point, 212
  • appointed chief engineer, vice Du Portail, captured, 300
  • ordered to the South, 302
  • his efficiency, 302
  • his antecedents, 305
  • locates earthworks, 317
• Lafayette, or La Fayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Rock-Gilbert Dumotier, Marquis DE—maj.-general; b. 1757, d. 1835.
  • arrives in America, 191
  • reaches Philadelphia, 191
  • joins Washington, in council, 191
  • his first scout, 185
  • commands a division, 203
  • visits Albany as to Canadian movement, 211
  • rejoins Washington, 212
  • concurs with his chief, 213
  • skilful at Barren Hill, 215
  • amusing incident of the battle, 216
  • outmanœuvres Clinton, 216
  • attends a Council of War, 217
  • pursues Clinton, 225
  • reports progress, 226
  • his relations to Lee, 228
  • skirmishes with Queen’s Rangers, 229
  • protests against retreat, 229
  • commands second line at Monmouth, 231
  • conduct during the battle, 235
  • alleged statement as to Washington at Monmouth disproved, 235
  • a letter to his wife, 236
  • on duty at Newport, 241
  • corresponds with D’Estaing, 244
  • makes quick trip to Boston, 244
  • covers retreat to Newport, 245
  • occupies Bristol, 245
  • sails for France, 253
  • returns to America, 276
  • joins Washington, 276
  • reports to Congress, 276
  • his proclamation as to Canada, 288
  • his sympathy with Mrs. Arnold, 291
  • his estimate of Washington, 305
  • extols the American army, 306
  • intrusted with arrest of Arnold, 312, 323
  • starts on his expedition, 324
  • an interesting reminiscence, 325
  • letters to his wife, 325
  • wounded at Brandywine, 325
  • his active movements, 325
  • orders from Washington, 326
  • has confidence of Greene, 327
  • how he treated deserters, 327
  • harasses the enemy, 329
  • his letter to Washington, 330
  • headquarters established, 331
  • ignores Arnold’s letters, 331
  • complimented by Washington, 332
  • marches to meet Wayne, 338
  • reports his movements, 339
  • takes the offensive, 339
  • joined by Wayne and unites with Steuben, 340
  • intercepts Tarleton’s correspondence, 340
  • in sharp action at Williamsburg, 341
  • gallantry noticed, 341
  • writes Washington in full, 342
  • reports landing of French troops, 342
  • declines grave risks, 342
  • outgenerals Cornwallis, 343
  • ready for Washington’s arrival, 343
  • has Cornwallis inclosed, 343
  • complains of “rusty wheels”, 343
  • vindicates Gov. Jefferson, 343
  • confident of victory, 343
  • receives special orders from Washington not to let Cornwallis escape, 345
  • 414sends despatches to Washington, 349
  • his twenty-fourth birthday, and incidents, 350
  • writes to his wife as to his “thrilling adventures” and “enviable lot”, 350
  • welcomes Washington at his headquarters, 351
  • hastens Washington’s army from Baltimore, 353
  • relations to the French court, 356
  • overrules plans of De Grasse, 356
  • storms a redoubt, 357
  • pleasantry with Baron Vioménil, 358
  • relations to Cornwallis, 361
  • their mutual appreciation, 362
  • expedition to Charleston abandoned, 362
  • sails from Boston for France, 362
  • bids farewell to Washington, 362
• Laurens, Henry—statesman; b. 1724; d. 1792.
  • vice-president of South Carolina, 86
  • reports New York Harbor too shallow for French fleet, 240
  • in the siege of Savannah, 268
  • sent commissioner to Holland, 296
  • taken prisoner in London, 296
  • in London Tower for high treason, 296
  • sent on special mission to France, 296
  • arrives in Paris, 309
  • speaks plain words at Paris, 309
  • returns to America with funds and pledges of French support, 348
• Lauzun, Armand Louis de Goutant, Duke DE—b. 1747, d. 1793.
  • with Rochambeau, 333
  • threatens Morrisania, 334
  • in concert with General Lincoln, 335
  • his lancers in action, 337
  • tendered a banquet at Philadelphia, 350
  • despatches from Lafayette read, 350
  • at Yorktown, 357
• Ledyard, William—col.; b. 1750, d. 1781;
  • massacred at Fort Griswold, 351
• Lee, Charles—retired Br. officer, maj.-general; b. 1731, d. 1782.
  • first noticed, 36
  • his characteristics, 37
  • how regarded by Washington, 45
  • distrusts American troops, 56
  • opposes Washington’s plans, 56
  • is sent to Connecticut, 70
  • advises occupation of New York, 70
  • writes about “crushing serpents”, 70
  • ordered to New York, 71
  • fortifies Brooklyn Heights, 85
  • arrogates authority, and is reprimanded, 85
  • ordered to South Carolina, 85
  • his conduct at Charleston, 86
  • returns north for duty, 127
  • abuses Congress, 127
  • curious letter to Gates, 127
  • finally joins Washington, 128
  • in charge of reserve camp, 131
  • his grand division noticed, 135
  • withholds troops required by Washington, 135
  • finally enters New Jersey, 137
  • is taken prisoner, 137
  • writes Gates, insulting Washington, 138
  • writes Heath, insulting Washington, 138
  • writes James Bowdoin as to Washington, 139
  • mistakes the man addressed, 139
  • his capture noticed by Washington, 139
  • effect of his independent action, 141
  • his risks as prisoner of war, 164
  • Washington’s firmness in the matter, 164
  • unsoldierly conduct, 174
  • placed on parole, 217
  • reports for duty, 217
  • compared with Arnold, 218
  • letters to Congress, 218
  • letters to Washington, 218
  • Washington’s stinging reply, 218
  • conferences with Howe brought to light in 1872, 219
  • 415joins army at Valley Forge, 220
  • opposes Washington’s plans, 225
  • his theory noticed, 225
  • relations to Lafayette, 227
  • declines a special command, 227
  • his contemptuous reference to Washington’s plans, 227
  • begs for it, afterwards, 227
  • writes Lafayette, in great distress, 228
  • pretends to be satisfied, 228
  • commands the advance troops, 228
  • orders retreat against Lafayette’s protest, 229
  • never handled a command before, 230
  • never under fire during the war, 230
  • is rebuked by Washington, 232
  • the incident described, 232
  • his conduct during the day,, 233
  • his trial, suspension, and death, 234
  • vindication of Washington from traditions as to language upon meeting Lee, 235
  • Notes of Lee’s Court-martial (Appendix G), 389–392
• Lee, Henry—colonel, sub. brig.-gen.; b. 1756, d. 1818.
  • at storming of Stony Point, 257
  • captures Paulus Hook, 259
  • joins General Greene, 303
  • opinion as to Battle of Guilford, 319
• Lee, Richard Henry—statesman; b. 1732, d. 1794.
  • in first Continental Congress,, 17
  • in March, 1775, urges Virginia to arm, 26
• Lee, Robert Edward—eminent confederate general, 1861–5; b. 1810, d. 1870;
  • shared peculiarities of Washington and Grant, 44
• Lee, Thomas S.—gov. Md.; addressed by Washington, 300
• Leslie, Alexander—Br. maj.-general; b. 1740, d. 1794.
  • commands the assault at Chatterton Hill, 129
  • joins Cornwallis, 298
  • fortifies Norfolk, 301
  • at battle of Guilford, 320
  • in the Virginia campaign, 331
• Lincoln, Benjamin—maj.-gen.; b. 1733, d. 1810.
  • joins the army with Mass. troops, 122
  • reaches Peekskill, with four thousand New England militia, 157
  • threatens Fort Independence, 157
  • at Charleston, S.C., 253
  • has a fresh command, 334–5
  • commands a division, 337
  • receives sword of Cornwallis at Yorktown, 360
• Livingston, Henry B.—col.; b. 1757, d. 1823;
  • saves Fort Edward, 295
• Livingston, Philip—signer of Declaration of Independence; b. 1716, d. 1778;
  • in first Continental Congress, 17
• Logistics defined, with note (Preface), x, xi
• Lossing, Benson J.—historian, b. 1813, d. 1891;
  • gratefully noticed by the author (Preface), xiv
• Louis XVI.—king of France; b. 1754, d. 1793.
  • officially supports America, 213
  • his purpose anti-British, 302
  • opposed occupation of New York, 352–3
• Lynch, Thomas—patriot; b. 1720, d. 1776.
  • in first Continental Congress, 17
  • at Cambridge, 60
• Magaw—col.;
  • at Fort Washington, 130–2
  • betrayed by his adjutant, 133
  • casualties of the assault, 133
• Manly, John—Am. captain;
  • makes valuable captures at sea, 60
• Marie Antoinette—queen of France; b. 1755, d. 1793;
  • friend of Lafayette and of America, 356
• Marion, Francis—brig.-general; b. 1732, d. 1795.
  • addressed by Greene, 303
  • esteemed by Washington, 312
• Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of—gen., sub. field marshal; b. 1650, d. 1722;
  • cited in comparison (Preface), viii
• 416Marshall, John—chief justice U.S., jurist and historian; b. 1755, d. 1836.
  • as to Asst. Quartermaster-General Carrington, 301
  • as to American mutiny, 307
  • as to troops sent South, 327
• Maryland troops always efficient, 277
  • gallantry at Camden, 202
  • at Rattle of Guilford, 320
• Massachusetts leads resistance to Stamp Ac, 13
  • resolves its Assembly into a Provincial Congress, 17
  • elects John Hancock as its first president, 17
  • organizes a force of “Minute Men”, 17
  • organizes a Committee of Safety, 17
  • summons 30,000 men to instant duty, 22
  • drafts one-fifth of her able-bodied men, 116
  • orders a monument to Chevalier de Saint Sauveur, 247
  • liberal to troops during a mutiny, 308
• Matthews—Br. maj.-gen. in attack upon Fort Washington, 132
  • lays waste Portsmouth and Norfolk, 253
  • in Battle of Springfield, 278
• Matthews, John—jurist; b. 1774, d. 1802;
  • on special War Committee. 73
• Maxwell, William—brig.-gen.; b. in Ireland, d. 1798.
  • in command at Morristown, 141
  • on special duty, 147
  • stationed at Elizabethtown, 164
  • moves against Howe, 168
  • at Red Clay Creek, 185
  • accompanied by Lafayette, 185
  • gallantry at Chadd’s Ford, 186
  • active in New Jersey, 222
  • obstructs Clinton’s retreat, 224
  • in Battle of Springfield, 279
  • associated with Lafayette, 324
• McClellan, George Brinton—maj.-gen. U.S.A.; b. 1826, d. 1885;
  • his qualities cited in comparison, 162
• McCrea, Jane—her murder not chargeable to Burgoyne, 173
• McDougall, Alexander—brig.-gen.; b. 1750, d. 1786.
  • occupies Chatterton Hill, 128
  • fights the battle known as “White Plains”, 129
  • on special duty at Morristown, 147
  • succeeds Heath at Peekskill, 166
  • in Battle of Germantown, 195
  • established at Peekskill, 206
  • accompanies Kosciusko to West Point, 212
  • again in the Highlands, 248
• McDowell, Charles—colonel; b. 1743, d. 1815;
  • at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293
• Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, 29
  • County, North Carolina, eminently patriotic, 293
• Meigs—Am. col.;
  • attacks Sag Harbor, 167
  • at storming of Stony Point, 257
• Mercer, Hugh—brig.-general; b. 1721, k. at Battle of Princeton, 1777 154
• Mifflin, Thomas—brig.-general; b. 1744, d. 1800.
  • efficient before Boston, 72
  • provides barracks in New York, 83
  • in battle of Long Island, 106
  • skilful in the retreat, acting under confidential orders, of Washington, 110
  • absence from Valley Forge disastrous, 206
  • rejoins camp, 217
  • criticised by Washington in letter to Gouverneur Morris, 217
• Milton, Mass., where Rufus Putnam found fascine rods, 78
• Minnigerode—H. col.; k. in attack upon Fort Mercer, 201
• Monckton, Henry—Br. lieut.-col.; b. 1740, k. 1778, at Monmouth, 233
• Monmouth, Battle of, described (see map), 229–237
• Monroe, James—lieutenant, sub. pres.; b. 1758, d. 1831.
  • at battle of Trenton, 142
  • helps capture two guns, 145
  • wounded in battle, 145
• 417Montgomery, Richard—Am. brig.-gen.; b. 1737, k. before Quebec, 1775.
  • his military antecedents, 36
  • subsequent career outlined, 38
  • a comrade of Carleton when Wolfe fell, 38
  • in despair at condition of the troops, 38
  • starts for Canada, 55
  • reaches Ticonderoga, 61
  • receives imperative orders from Washington, 61
  • sympathetically sustained by Washington, 63
  • his Orderly Book, 63
  • occupies Montreal, 63
  • tries a forlorn-hope assault upon Quebec, 63
  • goes to Arnold’s relief, 65
  • is killed in battle, 65
  • buried with honors of war, 66
• Montreal captured by British, 1760, 10
  • captured by Montgomery, 1775, 63
• Moore, George H.—sec. N.Y. His. Soc.;
  • brings to light Charles Lee’s papers, 219
• Morgan, Daniel—brig.-general; b. 1737, d. 1802.
  • captured at Quebec, 65
  • attacks Hessians in New Jersey, 169
  • skirmishes with Cornwallis, 204
  • supports Maxwell in N.J., 225
  • serves under Lafayette, 225
  • reports to Gen. Greene, 303
  • fights Battle of Cowpens, 314
  • is visited by Greene, 315
  • retires from the army, 315
• Morris, Gouverneur—statesman; b. 1752, d. 1816;
  • his letter from Washington, 1778, 217
• Morris, Robert—financier and statesman; b. 1734, d. 1806;
  • friend of Washington, 164
• Morristown headquarters described, 265
• Moses—Hebrew deliverer of his people; model legislator; founder of modern civil codes; b. about 1570 B.C., d. about 1450 B.C.
  • the Hebrew Commonwealth and its military system noticed (Preface), viii
  • his decimal army organization (Preface), viii
  • his sanitary and police regulations (Preface), viii
  • patriotic instruction of Hebrew youth imperative by his laws (Preface), viii
  • his general order, “Forward,” when he led his people to national independence, quoted, as Washington marched through Philadelphia for Brandywine, 184
• Muhlenburg, Peter—maj.-gen.; b. 1746, d. 1807.
  • at Battle of Brandywine (see map), 186
  • active in Virginia, 301
• Murphy—maj.;
  • leads N.C. troops at Stony Point, 257
• Murray, Lindley—grammarian; b. 1745, d. 1826;
  • friend of Greene, 25
• Mutiny of Connecticut troops, 277
  • of Pennsylvania troops, 306–7
  • a natural outbreak, 308
• Napoleon I.—Bonaparte (Buonaparte), Emperor of France; b. 1769, d. 1821.
  • his military maxims noticed (Preface), viii
  • his Italian campaign compared with the First New Jersey campaign in the Am. Revolution (Preface), xiii
  • the basis of his success given by Jomini (Preface), xiii
• Nash, Abner—gov. N.C.; b. 1716, d. 1786;
  • addressed by Washington, 300
• Nash, Francis—brig.-general; b. 1720, k. at Battle of Germantown, 1777, 195–6
• New England discriminated against by Great Britain, 18
  • experience in earlier wars, 21
  • her governors in conference with committee of Congress, 60
  • finally relieved from British hostilities, 262
• New Hampshire liberality during the American mutiny, 308
• New Haven, Conn., invaded by Tryon, 256
• 418New Jersey seizes the Provincial treasury and raises troops, 28
  • the chief battleground, 161
  • more than meets her quota, 272
  • her noble women, 272, 285
  • a continuous battlefield and the strategic center, 285
• Newport, R.I.; Howe’s strategic objective, 1776, 118
  • occupied by the British, 150
  • besieged by Franco-American forces, 241
  • abandoned by the British, 262
  • occupied by Rochambeau, 286
• New York city as a British base, 94
• New York Committee of Public Safety aroused, 27
  • its assembly becomes a Provincial Congress, 27
• Nook’s Hill fortified, March 10, 1775, 60
  • evacuation of city a necessity, 60
• Norfolk, Va., laid waste by Matthews, 253
• North Carolina “will resist Stamp Act to the death”, 13
  • defies its Provincial governor, 28
  • adopts the cause of Boston, 28
  • a convention meets at Charlotte, May 20, 1775, 29
  • the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, 29
  • sends Gen. Moore with two battalions to New York, 115
  • two companies in storming of Stony Point, 257
• North, Frederick, Lord—Earl of Guilford; b. 1733, d. 1792.
  • British Prime Minister, 1769, 15
  • abolishes all duties except on tea, 15
  • the consequences noted, 15
• Norwalk, Conn., raided by Tryon, 256
• Ogden—Am. col.;
  • as to panic at Monmouth, 231
• O’Hara, Charles—Br. maj.-gen.; b. 1756, d. 1791.
  • makes the surrender of army of Cornwallis, 360
• Onondaga Indians near Syracuse, N.Y., punished, 252
• “On to Philadelphia,” like the “On to Richmond” of 1861, ill-judged, 198
• Panic at Brooklyn controlled by Washington, 112
  • at Kipp’s Bay, noticed, 119, 237
  • at Toulon, compared, 120
  • at Princeton, controlled by Washington, 154
  • at Monmouth, turned by Washington into victory, 231
  • at Camden, 292
• Paoli, birthplace of Wayne, visited by British, 193
• Paris, Treaty of, 1763, and its terms, 11
• Parker, Sir Peter—Br. admiral; b. 1716, d. 1811.
  • sails from Ireland, 97
  • repulsed by Moultrie, 97
  • joins Howe in New York, 99
• Parliament of Nations, 1892, noticed, 372
• Parsons, Samuel H.—brig.-gen.; b. 1737, d. 1789.
  • his brigade at Kipp’s Bay, 119
  • were trusted by Washington, 119
  • redeemed their good name, 119
  • a parallel case cited under Napoleon, 120
  • before Fort Independence, 157
  • on duty in Connecticut, 163
  • joins Washington, 168
  • in the Highlands, 179
• Peabody, Nathaniel—statesman; b. 1741, d. 1823;
  • on special War Commission, 273
• Penn, William—b. 1644, d. 1718;
  • urged a Colonial Union, 1697, 12
• Pennington, William—gov. N.J., and speaker U.S. House; b. 1717, d. 1791;
  • as to Washington’s language at Monmouth, on meeting Lee, 236
• Pennsylvania appropriates money for troops, 28
  • her Assembly corresponds with Washington, 207
• Penobscot, Me., a British post 270
• Percy, Hugh, Earl—Br. lieut.-gen., Duke of Northumberland; b. 1742, d. 1817.
  • his soldierly qualities noticed, 35
  • fails to recapture Dorchester Heights, 80
  • at Battle of Long Island (see map), 105
  • joins Howe before White Plains, 128
  • 419in the attack upon Fort Washington, 132
• Philadelphia takes action, April 24, 1775, 28
  • her citizens overawe the opposing element, 28
  • visited by Washington’s army, 183, 192
  • mighty ovation to the soldiers, 184
  • supplies the suffering army, 194
  • is occupied by Howe, 196
  • its winter experiences, 1778, 210
  • the Howe carnival and its magnificence, 215
  • evacuated by Clinton, 221–222
  • occupied by Arnold, 222
  • visited by Washington and Rochambeau, 348–9
• Phillips, William—Br. maj.-gen.; b. 1731, d. 1781.
  • sent to Virginia, 326
  • destroys much property, 329
  • his relations to Arnold, 331
  • his death and its effects, 331
• Pigot, Sir Robert—maj.-gen.; b. 1720, d. 1796;
  • at Newport, R.I., 241
• Pomeroy, Seth—brig.-general; b. 1706, d. 1777.
  • his military antecedents, 24
  • appointed brig.-gen., 36
  • declines further service, 38
• Portsmouth, Va., laid waste by Matthews, 253
• Pownall, Thomas E.—Br. gov. Mass.; b. 1722, d. 1805;
  • his prediction, 368
• Prescott, Richard—Br. maj.-general; b. 1725, d. 1788;
  • taken prisoner, and exchanged for Lee, 217
  • at Savannah, 267
• Prescott, William—colonel; b. 1726, d. 1795.
  • conducts the Bunker Hill (Breed’s Hill) fight, 34
  • Governor’s Island, N.Y., 102
  • safely removes all stores, 112
  • repels Howe’s advance at Throgg’s Neck, 125
• Prevost, Sir Augustine—Br. maj.-gen.; b. 1725, d. 1786;
  • outgenerals Lincoln but without substantial results on either hand, 253
• Proctor, Thomas—Am. capt. of artillery; b. in Ireland, 1739, d. 1806.
  • with battery at Chadd’s Ford Brandywine, 186
  • in Indian expedition, 260
• Pulaski, Casimir, Count—Polish maj.-gen.; b. 1747, k. 1779, in siege of Savannah, 268
  • dear to Washington, 305
• Putnam, Israel—maj.-general; b. 1718, d. 1790.
  • his military antecedents, 23
  • conspicuous at Bunker Hill, 38
  • subsequent career outlined, 38
  • commands at New York, 87
  • succeeds Sullivan at Brooklyn, 104
  • instructed by Washington, 104–5
  • succeeded by Washington in person, 107
  • fortifies Hudson River shore, 115
  • favors retreat from New York, 115
  • his laconic utterance, 115
  • commands New York city, 115
  • a division at White Plains, 129
  • at Philadelphia, 153
  • located at Peekskill, 178
  • grants unwise furloughs, 178
  • outgeneraled by Clinton, 179
  • regains position, 180
  • on the Long Island shore, 206
  • returns to Peekskill, 206
  • at Danbury, Conn., 248
  • in command on the Hudson, 254
• Putnam, Rufus—col.; b. 1738, d. 1824;
  • his efficiency as civil engineer at Boston, 75
• Quebec, captured in 1759, 10
  • assaulted by Montgomery and Arnold, 1776, 66
  • magnanimity of General Carleton at death of Montgomery, 66
• Queen’s Rangers (Provincial), noticed, 204, 255, 279
  • Washington’s magnanimity toward them, reciprocating Carleton’s action at Quebec, 363
• Rahl (Rall), John Gottlieb—H. col.; b. 1720, d. 1776.
  • storms Chatterton Hill, 129
  • commands at Trenton, 139
  • k. in battle, 146
• 420Rawdon, Francis, Lord—Marquis of Hastings, earl, sub. gov.-gen. India; b. 1754, d. 1825.
  • gallantry at Bunker Hill, 35
  • reënforces Clinton at the South, 276
  • in battle of Hobkirk Hill, 321
• Reed, Joseph—adjt.-general, sub. gov. Penn.; b. 1741, d. 1785.
  • in Washington’s confidence before Boston, 71
  • describes the army at Harlem Heights, 123
  • in the secret of Washington’s attack upon Trenton, 141
• Religious distinctions among the colonies harmonized, 266
• Rhode Island sends 1,500 men to Boston, April 25, 1775, 22
  • her troops under Nathaniel Greene, 25
  • seizes British stores, 27
  • calls for protection of her ports, 87
  • two regiments in Continental pay, 87
  • sends additional troops to New York, 115
• Richmond, Charles Lennox, Duke—Br. Sec. of State; b. 1735, d. 1806.
  • denounces hire of Hessian troops, 96
  • his prediction verified, 209
• Ridgefield, Conn., invaded by Tryon, 166
• Riedesel, Friedrich Adolph, Baron—H. maj.-general; b. 1730, d. 1800.
  • reaches Canada with troops, 89
  • in Burgoyne’s command, 387
• Roberts, Charles G. D.—prof. King’s College, N.S.;
  • his history of Canada cited 63
• Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur de—Fr. marshal; b. 1725, d. 1807.
  • arrives in America, 286
  • appreciates Washington, 287
  • writes as to American conditions, 287
  • confers with Washington at Hartford, 297
  • sends his son to France, 298
  • again in conference at Wethersfield, 333
  • asks coöperation of Count de Grasse, 333
  • at West Point with Washington, 347
  • moves southward, 347
  • advances $20,000 in gold to American army, 347
  • parades in Philadelphia, 349
  • receives despatches from Washington, 350
  • entertained at Baltimore, 351
  • guest of Washington at Mt. Vernon, 351
  • opposed occupation of New York, 353
  • visits Count de Grasse with Washington, 353
  • signs articles of Cornwallis’ surrender, 360
  • honored by Congress, 361
  • remains with Washington, 361
  • visits New England, 361
  • sails for the West Indies, 361
• Rowan county, N.C., eminently patriotic, 293
• Rutledge, Edward—statesman, signer of Declaration of Independence; b. 1749, d. 1800;
  • commissioner with Adams and Franklin to meet Gen. and Admiral Howe, 1776, 118
• Rutledge, John—sub. gov. and chief justice, S.C.; b. 1739, d. 1800.
  • pres. Republic of South Carolina, 86
  • controls the conduct of Charles Lee, 86
  • his characteristics, 86
  • aids in siege of Savannah, 267
• Saint (St.) Clair, Arthur—maj.-gen; b. 1734, d. 1818.
  • at Battle of Princeton, 154
  • writes a boastful letter, 175
  • abandons Ticonderoga, 175
• Saint (St.) John, N.B., founded by British Provincials, 363
  • May 17th its natal day, 363
  • honors Washington, 363
• Saint (St.) John’s, captured Nov. 3, 1775, 62
  • André among the prisoners, 62
• Saint (St.) Ledger, Barry—Br. col.; b. 1737, d. 1789;
  • invades the Mohawk valley, 171
• 421Saint (St.) Luc, La Corne de—b. 1712, d. 1784.
  • as to hiring Indians, 173
  • is rebuked by Burgoyne, 173
• Saint (St.) Memin, Charles Balthazar Julien Favre de—Fr. artist; b. 1770, d. 1852;
  • his profile of Washington, by a crayon process of his own, the last portrait of Washington taken, frontispiece
• Saint (St.) Sauveur, Chevalier DE—Fr.; k. at Boston, 247
  • a monument to his memory ordered, 247
• Saint (St.) Simon, Claude Henri, Count DE—Fr.; b. 1760, d. 1825.
  • arrives with De Grasse, 342
  • lands 3,000 French troops, 342
  • reports to Lafayette for duty, 342
  • waves seniority of rank, 343
  • urges immediate assault, 343
  • yields to Lafayette’s judgment, 343
  • sails for the West Indies, 362
• Salem, Mass., declines benefits of Boston Fort Bill, 16
• Savannah, Ga., responds to call from Lexington, 29
  • intercepts royal letters to governors, 30
  • Committee of Safety, acts promptly, 30
  • besieged without success, 267–8
• Schovalhoff, Count—Russian statesman; his prediction at the Berlin Conference verified in 1898, 370
• Schuyler, Philip—maj.-general; sub. U.S. senator; b. 1733, d. 1804.
  • appointed maj.-gen., 36
  • his antecedents, 36
  • his career outlined, 37
  • honored by Kent and Webster, 37–8
  • ordered to Canada, 55
  • among the Six Nations, 61
  • urged forward by Washington and joins Montgomery, 61
  • advised as to Allen’s misadventure, 62
  • suspends resignation at Washington’s request, 63
  • his Orderly Book, 63
  • again advised by Washington,, 64
  • is to expect a bloody summer, 87
  • ridicules hiring Indians, 88
  • to resist Carleton’s advance, 163
  • is relieved by Gates, 173
  • is promptly restored, 173
  • offers Gates a command, 173
  • it is sneeringly declined, 173
  • his energetic action, 174
  • is absent, sick, without fault, 175
  • has a prophetic letter from Washington, 175
  • organizes a large army, 176
  • is superseded by Gates, 176
  • returns to Congress, 273
  • on committee to visit Washington, 273
  • is urged to be Secretary of War, 328
  • gives reasons for declining, 328
• Second Continental Congress, May 10, 1775, 31
  • provides money and munitions, 31
  • delegates from Georgia make action unanimous, 31
  • rules and articles of war adopted, 31
  • denounces acts of Parliament as “unconstitutional, oppressive, and cruel”, 31
• Second New Jersey campaign, and its results, 167
• Sevier, John—Am. col.; b. 1745, d. 1815;
  • at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293
• Sharpe, Granville—Br. philanthropist; b. 1734, d. 1813;
  • resigns rather than aid the war, 21
• Shelby, Isaac—col., sub. gov. Kentucky; b. 1750, d. 1826.
  • at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293
  • summoned to Virginia, 1780, 314
• Sheldon, Elisha—col.; attacked by Tarleton, 255
  • on expedition with Lauzun, 334
  • supports Washington, 334–5–6
  • has a spirited scout, 337
• Sheridan, Philip Henry—general U.S.A.; b. 1831, d. 1888;
  • his example cited, 162
• Sherman, William Tecumseh—general; b. 1820, d. 1891;
  • his march to the sea cited by way of comparison, 162
• 422Shippen, Miss, belle of the Philadelphia fêtes, 216
  • becomes the wife of Arnold, 289
  • had no knowledge of Arnold’s treason, 291
  • highly esteemed by Washington and Lafayette, 291
• Shuldham—Br. admiral;
  • relieves Graves at Boston, 68
  • comments on seizure of Dorchester Heights, 77
• Siege of Quebec closed, 66
  • Boston, 80
  • Newport, 245
  • Savannah, 268
  • Yorktown, 268
  • Charleston, 275
  • New York, 347
• Signal-fires in New Jersey, 280
• Simcoe, J. Graves—Br. lieut.-col., Queen’s Rangers; sub. gov. Canada; b. 1752, d. 1806.
  • active in forays, 248
  • in the Battle of Springfield, 279
  • in Virginia with Arnold, 310
  • raids Virginia, 320
  • popular misconceptions of his character, 363
• “Six Nations” (Iroquois) a model for Jefferson’s constitution, 12
  • as a confederacy, 13
  • invaded by Sullivan, 260
  • devastated by Sullivan, 260
  • their estimate of Washington, 260–1
• Smallwood, William—brig.-gen.; sub. governor Md.; b. 1732, d. 1792.
  • with Maryland troops at Long Island, 105
  • makes a gallant fight, 107
  • deplores ignorance of officers, 123
  • in Pennsylvania, later, 193
  • in battle of Germantown, 195
  • on duty near Philadelphia, 206
  • as governor, recruits for Greene’s army, 301
• Smith, Samuel—lieut.-colonel; b. 1752, d. 1839;
  • with Maryland troops at Fort Mifflin, 200
• Sons of Liberty organized, 14
• South Carolina denounces the Stamp Act, 13
  • seizes the colonial magazine, April 21, 1775, 29
  • first news from Lexington, 29
  • intercepts royal packages, 29
  • declares a Republic, with officers, congress, army, navy, and all the accessories of an independent state, 86
• Spain joins France against Great Britain, 1761, 11
• Spencer, Joseph N.—brig.-gen.; b. 1714, d. 1789.
  • his military antecedents, 36
  • his subsequent career, 39
  • attempts capture of Newport by Washington’s order, 163
• “Spies,” says Greene, “are the eyes of an army”, 303
• Springfield, Mass., selected by Knox for a gun-factory, 163
• Springfield, N.J., Battle of, 278–9
  • its lesson emphasized, 283
  • its casualties noticed, 285
  • tested the Continental troops, 286
• Stamp Act of 1755 noticed, 13
  • repealed in 1766, 14
• Stark, John—maj.-gen.; b. 1728, d. 1822.
  • in the Battle of Bunker Hill, 32
  • at the Battle of Trenton, 142
  • at the Battle of Springfield, 283
• Statesmanship in war defined, with note (Preface), xii
  • as stated by Jesus (Preface), xii
• Stedman, Charles—Br. staff officer and historian; b. 1745, d. 1812.
  • as to Burgoyne campaign and Clinton, 180
  • as to loose Br. discipline, 210
  • as to Battles of Guilford and Hobkirk Hill, 321
  • as to Br. and Am. forces in 1776 and 1777 (Appendix D), 386
• Stephen, Adam—Am. maj.-gen.; b. 1730, d. 1791.
  • service at Brandywine, 189
  • at Battle of Germantown, 195
  • dismissed for drunkenness, 196
• Stephens, Edward—brig.-general; b. 1745, d. 1820;
  • conducted prisoners, taken at Cowpens, northward, 316
• Sterling—Br. col., sub. maj.-general. [Should not be confused with Lord Stirling, in the Am. service, see below.]
  • along the Delaware, 194
  • k. in Battle of Springfield, 278
• 423Steuben, Frederick William Augustus, Baron—maj.-gen.; b. 1730, d. 1794.
  • instructor at Valley Forge, 210
  • promoted maj.-gen, 212
  • acts in harmony with Washington and Lafayette, 213
  • at Battle of Monmouth, 233
  • ordered to the South, 300
  • in charge of powder and lead supplies, 302
  • in concert with Lafayette, 327
  • his depot at Elk Island attacked, 340
  • joins Lafayette’s division, 340
  • in the siege of Yorktown, 357
• Stewart—Br. col.;
  • succeeds Rawdon at the South, 321
  • fights Green at Eutaw Springs, 321
• Stiles, Ezra—pres. Yale College; b. 1727, d. 1795;
  • friend of Greene’s youth, 25
• Stirling, William Alexander, Lord [his claim to Br. title and estates had been in dispute]—Am. col., sub. maj.-gen.; b. 1726, d. 1783.
  • in Battle of Long Island, 105
  • his brigade of picked regiments, 105
  • fights both Grant and Cornwallis, 107
  • taken prisoner by superior numbers, 108
  • is exchanged and returns to duty, 122
  • reaches White Plains, 128
  • established at Princeton, 136
  • in Battle of Princeton, 154
  • engages Cornwallis, 169
  • in Battle of Brandywine, 186
  • his good conduct, 189
  • in Battle of Germantown, 195
  • at a Council of War, 217
  • in Battle of Monmouth, 233
  • threatens Staten Island, 271
  • president at Charles Lee’s court-martial (Appendix G), 389
• Stony Point stormed by Wayne, 257–8
  • abandoned by Washington, 259
• Strategy defined, with note (Preface), x
• Sullivan, John—maj.-general; b. 1740, d. 1795.
  • personal notice, 36
  • his career outlined, 39
  • sent to Canada, 87
  • succeeded by Gates, 88
  • ambitious letter to Washington, 89
  • Washington’s discreet reply, 89
  • his attitude defined, 89
  • succeeds Greene on Long Island, 104
  • succeeded by Putnam, 104
  • a peculiar letter, 104
  • his specious report, 107
  • taken prisoner, 108
  • on exchange, takes Lee’s division, 139
  • accompanies Washington to Trenton, 142
  • incident of the march, 144
  • enters the lower town, 145
  • frets about appointments, 166
  • Washington’s rejoinder, 166
  • again in New Jersey, 167
  • fails in the attack upon Staten Island, 184
  • joins Washington in time for Brandywine, 184–5
  • his position at Brandywine (as per map), 186
  • ordered to attack Cornwallis, 187
  • flanked by Cornwallis, 187
  • ordered to change position, 187
  • movement beyond his capacity, 188
  • difficult under best conditions, 188
  • loses control of his division, 188
  • personal valor undoubted, 189
  • treated justly by Washington, 190
  • surprised by Howe, 191
  • in Battle of Germantown, 195
  • his gallantry noticed, 196
  • urges attack upon Philadelphia, 207
  • attempts siege of Newport, 241
  • relations to the Count d’Estaing, 242–3
  • issues an intemperate order, 243
  • prudently modifies the same, 243
  • advised by Washington to retreat, 244
  • manly course of D’Estaing, 244
  • retires to Providence, 245
  • devastates the Six Nation region with unsparing desolation, 260
  • 424comments upon that invasion, 260–261
  • resigns and enters Congress, 297
  • laconic appeal to him by Washington, 297
• Sumter, Thomas—col.; b. 1734, d. 1832;
  • honored by Washington, 312
• Symonds, Thomas—Br. royal navy.
  • led attack upon Fort Sullivan (Moultrie) in 1776, 359
  • signs terms of capitulation of Yorktown, 359
• Tarleton, Banestre—Br. lieut.-col.; b. 1754, d. 1833.
  • attacks Sheldon’s cavalry quarters, 255
  • raids Westchester County, N.Y., 259
  • Washington’s counter-stroke, 259
  • makes no progress at the South, 293
  • pursues Morgan, 314
  • completely routed at Cowpens, 314
  • acknowledges the American success, 321
  • makes a raid upon Charlotte, 340
  • fails to capture Jefferson, 340
  • compliments Lafayette, 340
  • covers the retreat of Cornwallis, 341
  • joins him at Yorktown, 341
  • skirmishes with Lafayette, 341
• Ternay. (See De Ternay.)
• Thanksgiving Proclamations of Washington—
  • at Valley Forge, 214
  • at White Plains, 246
  • at Yorktown, 360
  • at New York, 365
• Thayer—Am. maj.;
  • in defence of Fort Mifflin, 203
• Thomas, George Henry—maj.-gen. U.S.A.; b. 1815, d. 1870;
  • his example cited, 26
• Thomas, John—major-general (Mass.), Continental brig.-gen.; b. 1725, d. 1776.
  • military antecedents, 23, 36
  • subsequent career noticed, 39
  • efficient in the siege of Boston, 78
  • sent to Canada, 84, 86
  • a victim to small-pox in camp, 88
• Thompson, Charles—Secretary of first Continental Congress, and his correspondence with Franklin noticed, 13, 16
• Ticonderoga taken by Ethan Allen, 30
  • retaken by Burgoyne, 182
• Towers, Robert, of Philadelphia, to receive and pay for arms, 141
• Trumbull, Jonathan—gov. Conn.; statesman; the original Brother Jonathan; b. 1710, d. 1788.
  • anxious about sea-coast exposure, 56
  • his correspondence with Washington, 56
  • always Washington’s fast friend, 56
  • furnishes troops for New York city, 83
  • sends nine more regiments to Washington, 102
• Trumbull, Jonathan Jr.,—col., statesman; b. 1740, d. 1804.
  • commissary at Long Island, 110
  • becomes secretary to Washington, 300
• Tryon, William—gov. N.C.; b. 1725, d. 1788.
  • his relation to the British Stamp Act, 13
  • his career in North Carolina, New York, and Connecticut, 84
  • holds a conference with Gen. Howe, 98
  • invades Connecticut, 166
  • fights Worcester and Arnold at Ridgefield, 166
  • again invades Conn., 256
  • resisted by Yale College students at New Haven, 256
  • in the Battle of Springfield, 278
• Tully, Monsieur DE—sails for the Chesapeake, 323
  • is obliged to return, 323
  • his reasons satisfactory to Washington, 326
• Union of the Colonies advocated in 1697, 1722, 1754 by Penn, Coxe, and Franklin, 12
• 425United States of America, a “stupendous fabric of freedom and empire,” as predicted by Washington, and the fulfilment, 365, 366, 368
  • “asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations,” as predicted by Washington, and comments, 365, 368
  • respect for law and religion the basis of Washington’s character, and of the confidence he inspired in the American people, 367–8
  • shares with Great Britain bequests under Magna Charta, 371
  • harmony in that fruition, the possible future, 371
  • three hundred millions of treasure, her free-will offering to man, 374
  • her alms, recorded in the census of 1890, the gauge of her maturing sympathy with humanity, 374
• Valley Forge established as headquarters, 206
  • special Council of War noticed, respecting “On to Philadelphia!”, 212
  • French alliance announced in camp, 213
  • a grand parade ordered, 214
  • a Thanksgiving proclamation made, 214
  • special Council of War, April 20, 1777, 217
  • its ordeal made soldiers, 231
• Varnum, James Mitchell—brig.-gen.; b. 1749, d. 1789.
  • his brigade reports for duty, 203
  • in Battle of Monmouth, 233
  • enters Congress, 315
• Vaughan, Sir John—Br. maj.-gen.; b. 1738, d. 1795;
  • burns Kingston, N.Y., 179
• Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Count DE—Fr. minister of foreign affairs; b. 1717, d. 1787.
  • comments on the Battle of Germantown, 197
  • proclaims the French alliance and the active support of American Independence, 209
  • is advised by Rochambeau of American conditions, 287
  • regards the American Congress as too exacting, 308
  • guarantees a loan from Holland, 348
• “Victory or Death” the countersign and alternative proclaimed by Washington, 149
• Vioménil, Baron Antoine Charles de Houx—Fr. gen.; b. 1728, d. 1792.
  • storms a redoubt at Yorktown, 357
  • pleasantry of Lafayette noticed, 358
• Virginia aroused by the Stamp Act, 13
  • responds to Patrick Henry’s appeal, 14
  • includes Washington in her delegation to First Continental Congress, 17
  • catches the news from Lexington, 28
  • excited conflict with Lord Dunmore, 28
  • called upon for more troops, 115
  • her troops at Middlebrook, 247
  • receives Greene and other officers gladly, 301
  • invaded by Arnold, 310, 311
  • Lafayette in command, 326, 330
  • Cornwallis arrives, 331
  • adjournment of Assembly to Charlotte, 338
  • liberal in its enactments, 338
  • Lafayette’s gallantry at Williamsburg, 341
  • Jefferson sustained by Lafayette, 343
  • arrival of Washington, 351
• Ward, Artemas—maj.-general; b. 1727, d. 1800.
  • his antecedents, 23
  • appointed senior maj.-gen., 35
  • his brief career noticed, 37
  • occupies Boston, March 17, 1776, 80
• Warner, Seth—colonel; b. 1744, d. 1785.
  • a volunteer at Bunker Hill as well as at Ticonderoga, 35
  • 426accompanies Allen to Ticonderoga, 35
  • his subsequent career, 35
• Washington, Augustine—father of the Soldier; b. 1694, d., in his son’s eleventh year, 1743, 4
• Washington, George—gen., sub. pres. twice; b. 1732, d. 1799.
  • his boyhood, tastes, and training as described by Irving, 1
  • physical appearance as described by Mercer, 2
  • physical accomplishments, 3
  • personal characteristics, 4
  • choice of a profession, 4
  • parentage, and mother’s influence, 4
  • first victory won, 4
  • surveyor, inspector, adjutant-general, 5
  • commissioner to the French, 6
  • frontier service, 6
  • with Braddock, 7
  • military studies and maxims, 8
  • marriage, and in House of Burgesses, 8
  • anticipates revolution, 14
  • in the First Continental Congress, 17
  • predicts a bloody future, 18
  • appointed Commander-in-Chief, 32
  • his associates in command, 35
  • starts for Cambridge, 40
  • assumes command, 41
  • his army noticed, 41
  • withholds some commissions, 44
  • his reticence compared with that of other generals, 44
  • his trust in Providence, 44
  • method of assignments, 44
  • his estimate of Arnold, 45
  • rebukes profanity, 46
  • enjoins observance of the Sabbath, 47
  • institutes courts-martial for “swearing, gambling,” etc., 47
  • skilled in logistics, 48
  • regard for private soldiers, 49
  • deserters rebuked, 49
  • games of chance prohibited, 49
  • invasion of Canada forced by Congress, 50
  • visited by Committee of Congress, 52
  • risks of Canadian invasion, 53
  • denounces religious bigotry, 53
  • after Boston, then New York, 54
  • expeditions to Canada urged by Congress, 55
  • attitude of Gen. Charles Lee, 56
  • ignores sea-coast raids, 56
  • writes Gov. Trumbull, 57
  • would burn Boston, 57
  • policy as to holding cities, 57
  • straggling rebuked, 58
  • appeals to Congress, 58
  • privateering regulated, 59
  • visited by Congressmen and secures a navy, 60
  • laconic letter to Congress, 61
  • writes Schuyler as to Northern expeditions, 63
  • writes Congress as to same, 63
  • begs Schuyler not to resign—for sake of “God and Country”, 63
  • writes Schuyler as to British action, 64
  • plans operations against New York, 69
  • sends Lee to New York, 70
  • would cross to Boston on the ice, but opposed by Council, 71
  • laconic letter to Joseph Reed, 72
  • preparations for assault, 72
  • his inflexibility of purpose, 72
  • preparations for future service, 72–3
  • experimental bombardment, 74
  • enforced silence in camp, 75
  • his confidential staff, 75
  • secret plan near execution, 76
  • second bombardment, 76
  • third bombardment and occupation of Dorchester Heights, 77
  • British criticism, 77
  • contingency of failure anticipated, 79
  • a general bombardment, 80
  • Nook’s hill fortified, 80
  • Boston evacuated, 80
  • his mission to Boston completed, 81
  • reorganization of the army, 82
  • movement to New York begun, 82
  • advises Congress and Governor Trumbull of his plans, 83
  • disciplines delinquent officers, 83
  • establishes a regular Pay System, 83
  • 427visits Connecticut to hasten troops forward, 84
  • reaches New York, 84
  • rebukes Lee and sends him South, 85
  • forced by Congress to send more troops to Canada, 86
  • details more troops to Canada under order of Congress, 86
  • compels citizens to choose between Britain and America, 86
  • deprecates detachment of troops to Canada, 87
  • predicts danger to both the armies, 87
  • warns soldiers not to right their own wrongs, 87
  • learns of British contracts for Hessians, 87
  • notes change in Canadian sentiment, 87
  • writes Schuyler predicting a bloody summer, 87
  • describes Sullivan’s characteristics, 89
  • apology of Congress for Canadian disaster, 90
  • strategic conditions at New York, 91
  • Declaration of Independence and its effect, 91
  • British plans noticed, 93
  • correspondence with Howe, 98
  • describes British commissioners, as dispensing pardon to repenting sinners, 99
  • spreads Howe’s proclamation broadcast, 99
  • denounces gossip-mongers, 100
  • informs Gov. Trumbull that to trust Providence without effort is to tempt Providence, 102
  • issues stringent orders as to discipline, 103
  • reënforces garrison at Brooklyn, 104
  • details Sullivan, vice Greene, sick, 104
  • a remarkable letter from Sullivan, 104
  • Putnam supersedes Sullivan, 104
  • issues orders to Putnam as to wasteful firing, 105
  • skulkers must be shot down on the spot, 105
  • an “army” not a “mob”, 105
  • will make battle costly to enemy, 108
  • omnipresent in tent or trench, 108
  • plans to withdraw to New York, 109
  • consummate ruse to prevent demoralization of troops, 110
  • withdrawal consummated, 112
  • its incidents and success, 112
  • comment of historian Botta, 113
  • labors without sleep for forty-eight hours while assembling the untrained army, 114
  • laconic notice of bad habits in officers and men, 114
  • describes the militia as “dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return home”, 114
  • notices periodical homesickness, 115
  • its contagious virulence before battle, 115
  • again demands a sufficient regular army, 115
  • denounces robbing orchards and gardens, 115
  • orders three daily roll-calls, to stop straggling, 115
  • writes Congress as to vacating the city, 115
  • advises Gov. Trumbull to deal with deserters, 116
  • generous response of Mass. and Conn, 116
  • describes the situation, 117
  • initiates retirement from the city, 119
  • denounces a panic at Kipp’s Bay, 119
  • his personal exposure to rally fugitives, 119
  • a mournful letter to Congress, 120
  • Edward Everett Hale’s account of the execution of Nathan Hale as a spy serving under Washington’s orders, 120
  • embezzlement by regimental surgeons, 123
  • offers reward for Hessian troopers and their horses, 126
  • his skirmishers successful, 126
  • outgenerals Howe and gains White Plains, 127
  • is joined by Greene and Lee 127
  • 428letter of Lee to Gates, censuring Washington, 127
  • operations at White Plains, 128
  • battle of Chatterton hill, 129
  • British preparations for attack, 129
  • retires to North Castle Heights, 129
  • advises Congress of Howe’s plans, 129
  • advises with Greene as to Fort Washington, 131
  • crosses into New Jersey, 131
  • orders Lee to follow, 131
  • so advises Gov. Trumbull, 131
  • writes forcibly to Congress, 131
  • judicious order in logistics, 131
  • boys or old men enlisted at officers’ risk, 131
  • warns Congress of certain invasion of New Jersey by Howe, 132
  • abandons Fort Lee, 133
  • enters upon his first New Jersey campaign, 133
  • a misnomer to call it simply a “masterly retreat”, 135
  • musters his army, 136
  • skirmishes with Cornwallis, 136
  • controls the Delaware river, 136
  • plans Dec. 5, to take the offensive, 137
  • notes the capture of Lee, 139
  • Sullivan takes Lee’s division, 139
  • other letters of Lee, 138–9
  • his powers enlarged by Congress, 140
  • places Philadelphia under military rule, 140
  • takes the aggressive, 143
  • battle of Trenton, with map, 144
  • “will drive the enemy from New Jersey”, 147
  • is clothed with dictatorial authority, 148
  • his response to Congress, 148
  • his motto, “Victory or death,” retained, 149
  • reoccupies Trenton, 152
  • awaits arrival of Cornwallis, 152
  • fights battle of Princeton (see map), 152
  • instructs officers having independent commands, 157
  • headquarters established at Morristown, 157
  • exercises with energy his enlarged powers, 157
  • his capacity for reprimand, 157
  • sternly rebukes Heath, 158
  • issues counter-proclamation to one by Howe, 158
  • review of his career by Botta, 160
  • base of operations established (see map), 161
  • appreciates Howe’s plans, 164
  • the second New Jersey campaign, 167
  • outgenerals Cornwallis, 169
  • learns of Burgoyne’s invasion, 171
  • replies to his proclamation, 172
  • tart correspondence with Gates, 174
  • prophetic letter to Schuyler, 175
  • detects Howe’s modified plan, 177
  • reaches Philadelphia, 183
  • triumphant march through the city, 184
  • takes position on the Brandywine, 185
  • battle of Brandywine, 187
  • its lesson, 191
  • reaches Philadelphia, 192
  • resumes the offensive, 194
  • attacks Germantown, 195
  • lesson from that battle, 197
  • operations along the Delaware, 200
  • sends Lafayette into New Jersey, 203
  • hostile attitude of Gates, 204
  • experience at Valley Forge, 206
  • pleads with Congress, 206
  • clock-work and army discipline similar, 206
  • sharply rebukes the Pennsylvania Assembly, 207
  • the Conway cabal, 207
  • French alliance proclaimed, 213
  • gives Lafayette an independent command, 215
  • a sharp letter to Lee, 217
  • follows Clinton, 224
  • increases Lafayette’s command, 225
  • advises Lafayette as to Lee, 228
  • advances to his support, 230
  • rallies the retreating army, 231
  • rebukes Lee on the field and takes command, 232
  • 429fights the battle of Monmouth, 233
  • European comments noticed, 234
  • Clinton escapes him to New York, 234
  • trial and sentence of Lee, 234
  • end of Lee’s career, 234
  • tradition as to profanity at Monmouth disproved, 235–7
  • at White Plains again, 237
  • watches D’Estaing, 240
  • “George Washington, Esqr.,” and Howe, 241
  • writes Sullivan at Newport, 242
  • warns him against Clinton, 244
  • suggests a timely retreat, 244
  • officially recognizes the hand of Providence, 246
  • removes to Fishkill, 247
  • assigns army divisions, 247–8
  • opinion of Bancroft cited, 250
  • visits Philadelphia, 250
  • writes Speaker Harrison as to corruption of the times, 250–1
  • social excesses of congressmen deplored, 251
  • opposes another expedition to Canada, 252
  • sacrifices his private fortune, 252
  • at New Windsor, 254
  • watches hostile demonstrations, 256
  • plans attack upon Stony Point, 257
  • its success as planned, 258
  • capture of Paulus Hook, 259
  • sends Sullivan to punish Indians, 259
  • honored by the Six Nations, 260–1
  • strengthens West Point, 261
  • his sublime faith, 264
  • his trials at Morristown, 265
  • postpones attack upon New York, 265
  • reorganization of the army imperatively necessary, 269
  • praises New Jersey promptness, 272
  • again appeals to Congress, 272–3
  • watches Clinton closely, 274
  • visited by Lafayette, just returned from France, 276
  • gives him a letter to President of Congress, 276
  • sends Southern troops southward, 277
  • the mutiny of troops gives him “infinite concern”, 277
  • outgenerals Knyphausen, 280
  • describes British movements, 280
  • new trials at hand, 281
  • outgenerals Clinton, 282
  • Battle of Springfield, 286
  • adroit appeal to governors at the North, 286
  • again threatens New York, 286
  • appreciated by Rochambeau, 287
  • assigns Arnold to West Point, 288
  • Arnold’s treason and the execution of André, 290
  • vindicates Mrs. Arnold, 291
  • takes post at Brakeness, 291
  • assigns Greene to West Point, 291
  • his outlook over the field, 294
  • his sympathy with the rank and file, 295
  • writes about American speculators in food, 296
  • appeals to Sullivan, then in Congress, 297
  • compares rolling small and large snowballs, 297
  • confers with Rochambeau, 297
  • writes Franklin of approaching victory, 298
  • reënforces Southern army, 299
  • temporary expedients denounced, 299
  • designates winter quarters, 300
  • addresses Southern governors, 301
  • places Greene in Gates’ place, 301
  • sends his best officers south, 303
  • his powers again enlarged, 304
  • as judged abroad, 305
  • “stay-at-homes” derided, 305
  • his “superhuman regard for man, as man”, 305
  • his relations to foreign officers, 305
  • treatment of Pennsylvania mutiny, 307
  • is judged by French generals, says Franklin, 308
  • individuality of the States, noticed, 308
  • keeps away from scene of mutiny, 309
  • elements of success in sight, and all plans matured, 313
  • 430his specific instructions to Greene, 313
  • his use of “pick and spade,” 313
  • writes Greene as to Cowpens, 316
  • is advised of Greene’s movements, 320
  • plans for capture of Arnold, 323
  • the war approaches its crisis, 324
  • writes Lafayette as to French support, 326
  • modifies Lafayette’s orders, 326
  • “never judges the past by after events”, 326
  • urges Schuyler to be Secretary of War, 328
  • startling extracts from his diary, 328
  • “chimney-corner patriots” denounced, 328
  • “venality, corruption and abuse of trust universal”, 329
  • indorses Lafayette’s strategy, 330
  • approves his action respecting Arnold, 332
  • confers again with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, 333
  • advances toward New York, 334
  • joined by French army, 335
  • sends out decoy letters and plans, 335
  • builds brick ovens in New Jersey, 336
  • reconnoitres Clinton’s outposts, 336–7
  • challenges Clinton to battle, 337
  • hears good news from Lafayette, 339
  • second report from Lafayette, 341
  • Lafayette ready for his arrival, 343
  • good news from Count de Grasse, 344
  • urges Northern governors to action, 345
  • swift messengers sent everywhere, 345
  • his finesse outwits Clinton, 346
  • visits West Point with Rochambeau, 347
  • abandons fixed headquarters, 347
  • allied armies in motion not missed by Clinton, 347
  • grand tidings from France, 348
  • enters Philadelphia, not yet missed by Clinton, 348
  • despatches from Lafayette received, 349
  • starts for Chesapeake Bay, 349
  • meets courier from Lafayette, 350
  • another courier arrives, 350
  • welcomed with Rochambeau at Baltimore, 351
  • visits Mt. Vernon with French officers as guests, 351
  • arrives at Lafayette’s headquarters, 351
  • his strategy noticed, 352–3
  • studies the position with care, 354
  • visits Count de Grasse, 356
  • fires the first gun before Yorktown, 357
  • siege pushed with vigor, 357
  • terms of surrender settled, 359
  • surrender consummated, 360
  • issues proclamation for Public Thanksgiving, 360
  • a grand parade of the entire army, 360
  • assigns Lafayette to a Southern expedition, 361
  • the expedition abandoned, 361
  • parts with Lafayette who returns to France, 361
  • retains Rochambeau in America until 1782, 361
  • his magnanimous treatment of the Queen’s Rangers, 362
  • still honored in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 362–3
  • triumphant entry into New York, 363
  • formally closes the war, 364
  • another Thanksgiving proclamation, 364
  • predicts a grand future for America, 365
  • his trust in Divine Providence emphasized, 366
  • tested by military art, 367
  • grounds of his faith in American destiny, 371
  • lessons from his career, 373
  • founds West Point Military Academy, 373
  • donates sites for National University, 374
  • his closing appeal to the American conscience, 374
• 431Washington, Lawrence—brother of the Soldier; b. 1718, d. 1752.
  • educated in England, 1
  • in the British army, 1
  • his example and influence, 1, 4
• Washington, Martha—wife of the Soldier; b. 1732, d. 1802;
  • her marriage (see also Custis), 8
• Washington, Mary—mother of the Soldier; b. 1706, d. 1789.
  • her will-power, 4
  • her moral training, 5
  • their permanent effect in her son’s character, 5
• Washington, William—colonel; b. 1752, d. 1810.
  • at Battle of Trenton, 142
  • captures two guns at Trenton, 145
  • wounded in the attempt, 145
  • at Cowpens, 314
• Washington’s “Invincibles”, 105
• Wayne, Anthony—maj.-gen.; b. Paoli, Pennsylvania, 1745, d. 1796.
  • attacks Hessian rear-guard in N.J., 169
  • at Battle of Brandywine, 186, 189
  • surprised at Paoli, 193
  • at Battle of Germantown, 195
  • with Lafayette at Monmouth, 226
  • powerless at time of mutiny, 307
  • joins Lafayette in Virginia, 341
  • makes a brilliant charge at Williamsburg, 341
• Webster, Daniel—statesman and orator; b. 1782, d. 1852.
  • his opinion of General Schuyler, 37
  • his sublime ideal, “Union,” in prospect, 266
• Wellington, Arthur Wellesley—Br. gen., sub. field marshal; b. 1769, d. 1852;
  • cited for comparison (Preface), viii
• Wesley, John—eminent divine; b. 1703, d. 1791;
  • had visited America, 21
• Whipple, Abraham—Am. naval officer; b. 1731, d. 1819;
  • cited as to Charleston, 274
• Wilkinson, James—maj.-gen.; b. 1757, d. 1825.
  • with Lee at his capture, 138
  • at Battle of Trenton, 142
  • his interview with Washington, 142
• Willett, Marinus—col.; b. 1744, d. 1826;
  • operates against the Onondagas near Syracuse, 252
• Williams, James—Am. col.;
  • at King’s Mountain, and descendants honored, 293
• Wilmington, N.C., visited by Sir Peter Parker, Cornwallis and Clinton, May 3, 1776, 97
• Winthrop, Robert Charles—scholar, historian, statesman; b. 1809, d. 1894;
  • gratefully remembered by the author (Preface), xiv
    • Note.—Mr. Winthrop delivered the oration at laying the corner-stone of the national Washington monument, at Washington, D.C., and also at its dedication.
• Woman’s heroism in the Revolution, 285
• Wooster, Daniel—maj.-gen.; b. 1711, d. 1777.
  • his military antecedents, 23
  • his subsequent career outlined, 38
  • in movement against Fort Independence, 157
  • at home with the Connecticut militia, 165
  • resigns his commission, 165
  • is mortally wounded, 166
• Wright, Sir James—royal governor of Georgia; b. 1714, d. 1785, noticed, 29, 30
• Wyoming Valley invaded by Indians, 249
  • summarily avenged, 252, 260
• Yale College students resist Tryon’s invasion of New Haven, 256