Transcriber’s Note:

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Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.

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II

Field Marshal H.R.H. Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge K.G., G.C.B., G.C.H.,
Colonel Coldstream Guards 1805-1850.
FROM A PRINT IN THE POSSESSION OF THE REGIMENT.

A
HISTORY
OF THE
COLDSTREAM GUARDS,

From 1815 to 1895.

BY

L^T. Col. Ross-of-Bladensburg, C.B.

LATE

Coldstream Guards.

Illustrated by
Lieut. Nevile R. Wilkinson,
Coldstream Guards.

London,
A.D. Innes & C^o.
1896.

The following pages are a continuation of Colonel MacKinnon’s Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards, from the victory of Waterloo down to the year 1885. They have been compiled with great care and much labour, and the reader will, I trust, feel justified in adding, with accuracy and marked ability.

The first few chapters deal with events that took place in France, after Waterloo, including the military occupation of the North-Eastern frontier by the Allies, up to the year 1818.

The period onwards to the Crimean War, although containing but few accounts of interest concerning the career of the Regiment, is valuable as continuing, to a considerable extent, the history of events in Europe so far as that is consistent with the subject of the present volume.

There is reference, nevertheless, to the part taken by the Regiment in the suppression of the Canadian rebellion.

From the date, however, of 1854, the subject assumes a different character, and is of absorbing interest to every Officer and man associated with the Coldstream Guards.

The events connected with that campaign have been carefully selected from thoroughly authentic sources; they are recorded in no spirit of vainglory or self-sufficiency, but as a true and faithful tale of the share which the Regiment took in that eventful war,—illustrating, as it does, acts of gallantry, a noble and uncomplaining endurance of difficulties and hardships, and a strict performance of duty under very trying circumstances.

The accuracy of the record of the more recent Egyptian campaigns is of special value, from the fact of the author of this work having himself taken an active part in one of them.

The perusal of these records will be accompanied by the conviction which exists in the minds of all of us, that those who replace their gallant predecessors will, when their turn comes, deserve equally well of their country.

1896.

I beg to return sincere thanks to the many members of the Coldstream Guards, past and present, who have helped me to compile the volume I now venture to issue to the public; and to assure them that, but for their assistance, it would have been far less worthy of their acceptance than even it is at the present time. It is not possible for me, in the short space at my disposal, to mention all by name to whom I am indebted in this respect. But I should fail in my duty did I not, at least, express my gratitude to General Sir Frederick Stephenson, G.C.B., and to General Hon. Sir Percy Feilding, K.C.B., for the interest they have shown in my work, and for the trouble they have taken to enable me to carry it out.

Major Vesey Dawson was indefatigable in compiling all that concerns the Nulli Secundus Club. Captain Shute prepared an Appendix on the Coldstream Hospital. Mr. Sutton spared no pains in supplying information which the Regimental Orderly Room affords; and Mr. Studd arranged materials that required considerable labour. Major Goulburn, Grenadier Guards, moreover, lent me the interesting Crimean Diary of the late Colonel Tower; and Colonel Malleson kindly looked through the proofs, and made many valuable suggestions.

I also offer my acknowledgments to Messrs. Blackwood and Sons, and to Messrs. Seeley and Co., for their courteous permission to use the maps in Mr. Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea  and in Sir E. Hamley’s War in the Crimea .

Lastly, I must express the pleasure it gives me that my work is illustrated by so able and accomplished an artist as Mr. Wilkinson.

It only now remains for me to explain that as Colonel MacKinnon’s Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards  does not contain illustrations of uniforms worn by the Regiment during the many generations of its existence, we preferred to give representations, not of the familiar figures of this century, but of those that are less known. Thus, though the following pages only describe events from the year 1815 to 1885, the plates generally refer to a more remote period of the history of the Regiment.

October, 1896.

CORRIGENDA.

The central figure in Europe, during the first fifteen years of this century, was the Emperor Napoleon, the great military leader, who, having restored order in France—violently disturbed by the terror, anarchy, and confusion of the Revolution that broke out in 1789,—succeeded in ruling that country, and in imposing his arbitrary will upon its people. A master of the science of war, and gifted with the genius that makes a man supreme in the field of battle, he organized the military qualities of his subjects, who, under his guidance, invaded their neighbours, destroyed their institutions, and overran Europe from one end to the other. One opponent only remained unsubdued, and that was England; and so strong was her resistance to this modern Attila, that she succeeded not only in breaking his power, but in adding also to her own importance and influence in the world.

Napoleon, though a General of the first order,—whose campaigns will always commend themselves to the student of the art of war,—was less remarkable for his knowledge of that other science which makes a man a statesman. He lived by the sword, and he perished by the sword. He destroyed the prosperity of the people he subdued, but he could not cement a friendship with them. His object was war and only war, and he reaped its reward—military fame; but he did not use the absolute power he wielded, for the advantage of France, nor was he able to establish his name among the greatest and most enlightened rulers of mankind.

xxAfter a period of victory, he exhausted the resources of his country, and then there was formed against him a coalition of European Princes, who gradually closed their forces around him with ever tightening grasp, and pursued him to the heart of his Empire. At last, he was defeated and undone, and acknowledged his impotence to carry on any longer the mighty struggle in which he had been engaged (1814). Europe then restored the Bourbons as Kings of France, and determined that Napoleon should be expelled therefrom, and interned in the island of Elba,—an Emperor of a very narrow dominion, and a Monarch only in name. But scarcely had he been there a year, when he broke loose. Landing in France, he made the King (Louis XVIII.) fly from Paris; and, amid the acclamations of the people, he once more re-established himself upon the throne (March, 1815).

The Allied Sovereigns now combined to drive this disturber of the peace from France, and took immediate steps to invade that country again. In June, two of the Powers had their forces in Belgium,—the British and their immediate allies (the Dutch, Hanoverians, etc.), under the Duke of Wellington; and the Prussians, under Marshal Blücher. The rest were still east of the Rhine. Perceiving that his antagonists were not yet able to move forward together against him, the French Emperor resolved to strike the first blow, by advancing northwards and by attacking Wellington and Blücher. Accordingly, he left Paris on the 12th of June, and on the 16th he fought the battles of Ligny, where he defeated the Prussians and drove them off the field, and of Quatre-Bras, from which place the British, though they held their ground, eventually fell back slowly towards Waterloo. Giving orders to Marshal Grouchy, who was placed at the head of a considerable force, to pursue Blücher, and to prevent him from forming a junction with Wellington, Napoleon advanced, and attacked the British at Waterloo (June 18th). Here the most decisive battle of the present age took place. Stubbornly did the British troops maintain their position; while Blücher, rallying his forces, and leaving behind only a small xxicorps to contain Grouchy, marched with the remainder to the field of Waterloo. The French were now enveloped, and completely and irretrievably defeated.

There was a Guards Division at the battle of Waterloo, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir George Cooke, formed of two Brigades. The 1st Guards Brigade (Major-General P. Maitland) was composed of the 2nd and 3rd First (now Grenadier) Guards; and the 2nd Guards Brigade (Major-General Sir John Byng) of the 2nd Coldstream and the 2nd Third (now Scots) Guards. Sir George Cooke being severely wounded during the course of the day, the command of the Guards Division devolved upon Sir John Byng.

Flight of Napoleon from the field of Waterloo—Reaction in Paris—Napoleon’s abdication—Surrender to Captain Maitland—Provisional Government set up in France—Advance of the Allies from Waterloo—Operations of Marshal Grouchy—Allies hope to cut the enemy off from Paris—Blücher’s energy to secure that object—Unsuccessful efforts of the Provisional Government to obtain a suspension of hostilities—The Allies before Paris—The Prussians move round to the south of the city—Cooperation of Wellington—Capitulation of the capital, July 3rd—Advance of Austrians and Russians—“Waterloo men”—The “Wellington pension”—Rank of Lieutenant granted to Ensigns of the Brigade of Guards—The soldier’s small account-book introduced into the British army.

The battle of Waterloo broke the power of Napoleon for ever. So confident of victory had that great soldier been, that he did not even make any preparations for retreat, and hence, when he was defeated, a terrible rout ensued. The wreck of the French army, blocking the only road which was available, hurried from the scene of disaster in a confused mass of fugitives. The Prussians, who were comparatively fresh, took up the pursuit, and relentlessly they pressed it home, driving the enemy back, increasing his panic, and completing his misfortunes. Through the whole night of the 18th-19th of June, a fierce and active pursuit was maintained; 2while the British troops, exhausted by the labours and anxieties of the day, bivouacked as they stood, on the bloody but glorious field of victory.

Napoleon, stupefied by the unexpected result of the battle, forced his way through the surging mass of his now disorganized troops to Quatre-Bras, and as he went along, he had ever increasing evidence of the catastrophe that had overwhelmed him. He sent a message to Grouchy, announced his defeat, but gave the Marshal no orders. He then rode to Charleroi, and, almost unattended, pushed on to Philippeville, where he made his first effort to repair his broken fortunes. He ordered Marshal Soult to rally the débris of his forces at Laon; he despatched a letter to General Rapp, who was in command on the German frontier, and to General Lamarque, engaged in La Vendée, with orders to march to Paris; and he was sanguine enough to declare that he could reorganize a sufficient force to cover the capital, and to give time for the concentration of a much larger army, wherewith to renew the war and to save France from the invasion that threatened her.^[3] But he was far from being reassured. He could scarcely deny even to himself that the end of his career had at last come in earnest, and that the stupendous ascendency which he exercised over his countrymen had disappeared now and for ever. Once before had he been obliged to acknowledge himself vanquished, and the glamour of invincibility no longer surrounded his person. He had engaged in a desperate undertaking. The whole of Europe was arming against him, and was determined to put him down. His first bold venture to try and beat the Allies in detail had signally failed. The armies of Great Britain and of Prussia had hopelessly crushed the flower of his forces. He had henceforward to reckon with Austria and Russia, and with a formidable coalition flushed with victory. His countrymen never forgave a military leader who had suffered a disaster in the field. He knew that his prestige was weakened, that the influence which his name inspired was shaken, that his resources were at an end, and that his enemies were gathering about him from every quarter.

Tormented by these gloomy thoughts, he pursued his journey, and reached Philippeville; and there he snatched a few hours repose. But the fear of the Prussians haunted his followers, and 3he was hurried on, still in a state of indecision.^[4] The momentous question had now to be faced, and immediately decided. What was Napoleon to do? Should he remain in the field in command of his troops, rally the shattered remnants of the grand army, and cover Paris, or should he fly to the capital, assert his authority there, and trust to the magic of his name to retain his supremacy over France? His own desire was to stay among his men, and to abide the result at the head of an army, devoted to his person and to his interests. Had he done so, his fate would have been less humiliating than it eventually proved to be. But his failing health, and the shock he had experienced, paralysed the active energies of the man, and, dreading a revolution in the seat of government, he agreed, against his better judgment, to start at once for Paris. He reached his destination early on the 21st, exhausted and shaken both in body and mind.

Paris was struck dumb by this event. On the 18th, the guns of the Invalides thundered a salute in honour of the battle of Ligny, and on the two following days the details of the French victory over the Prussians were published in glowing colours; but towards the evening of the 20th, the news of trouble began to leak out, and on the morrow the Emperor arrived at the Elysée palace attended only by a few of his personal Staff. “Dans le premier moment on refusa à croire; ce fut ensuite une anxiété cruelle; puis une morne stupeur.”^[5] And now at length the fatal news was fully realized, and spread like wildfire through the excited people, and all knew for certain that the army of Napoleon had been annihilated, that his military genius had played him false, and that the catastrophe was at once complete and irretrievable.

Then the weakness of the Emperor’s power began to show itself, and the instability of the foundation upon which he had constructed his Imperial system became apparent. France, who drained her resources freely to serve her passion for glory, now spurned the defeated hero who had made her glorious. His rule, though it pandered to her vanity, did not rest upon the true affections of the people; and his want of success at the critical moment was an unpardonable offence, to be atoned only by 4abdication. Enemies created everywhere by his arbitrary will, by his reckless policy, and by the jealousy his brilliant genius inspired, now saw their opportunity to revenge themselves, and they arose to crush him. Alone in Paris, without an army, he was almost a prisoner in the hands of his foes, where he could not hope to recover from the disaster which had overwhelmed him, or employ his talents for the military protection of the country. The Chambers took the control of public affairs; and Napoleon, prostrated by recent events, and unable to resolve upon any definite course of action, acquiesced sullenly in allowing the reins of government to be snatched from his hands. He was forced to await the decision of a special Council of State that was summoned to settle the future of the Emperor and the policy to be pursued by the nation. Lafayette, who was named member of the Council, and was its leading spirit, insisted that the defence of the country should not be the only question discussed, but that negotiations for the restoration of peace should be also proceeded with; and he succeeded in carrying a resolution, to the effect that, as the Allies had signified their determination not to treat with Napoleon, the two Chambers should themselves nominate negotiators, who were, under their authority alone, to come to terms with the conquerors.^[6] It was a revolution; and it was nearly complete on the morning of the 22nd. In the divided councils of the Emperor, Lafayette gained a great advantage, and giving voice to the one thought that filled all minds in that moment of anguish, he resolved that Napoleon’s deposition should forthwith, and at all hazards, be carried into immediate execution.

A struggle—a one-sided struggle—took place between the Emperor and the Chambers. The former could only rely upon his previous military prestige and upon the halo of influence that still might be supposed to surround his name; but he did nothing to rouse himself out of the lethargy that oppressed his moral faculties. The latter, representing the reactionary and Republican parties, were tired of Napoleon and of his greatness. They regarded him as the sole obstacle to peace, and as a fallen leader who must be swept away in the interests of the country. So fickle were the French to the man they received as their ruler in defiance of Europe four months before, and who had been their unquestioned 5master for nearly fifteen years, and so intent were they to be rid of him, that they only granted him—and that with difficulty—but one short hour to make up his mind to vacate his throne; in default, he was to be discrowned by force. Napoleon was indignant, but he did not resist. “I have not returned from Elba,” he said, “to deluge Paris with blood;”^[7] and, fearing to provoke a civil war, he accepted the inevitable, and abdicated in favour of his son within thirty-six hours of his arrival in the capital.

And yet his overweening pride was still thirsting for power, and this act of renunciation was neither tendered nor accepted in good faith. Napoleon II., as he was called, was a child, and was in Austria, and the Emperor still clung to the delusive hope that he might be re-installed in the power he had lost, though he could only wield it in the name of his son. On the other hand, the Chambers, fearing to drive their antagonist to extremes, and dreading above all things a revival of his wonted energy, agreed to an equivocal recognition of Napoleon II. In this way they also satisfied the cravings of the army for Imperialism; but the assent was a mere fictitious one, which was intended to have no meaning and which had no result. The Empire was indeed doomed, its founder dishonoured, and his dynasty destroyed. It was a wretched end to a glorious career, not even redeemed by that fortitude and personal dignity which mark the fall of the truly great. This final downfall is without parallel in history, and the weakness of human nature and the vanity of man’s personal ambition stand out prominently, as the main features of the drama. The last scene was approaching, and may be described in a few words.

The moment Napoleon abdicated, he ceased to be a factor in the great events that followed. He was even an obstacle in the way of those who had usurped his place, and was treated with a contumely he had little deserved at the hands of flatterers, who, having basked in his smiles, had now constituted themselves the arbiters of his lot. Driven almost with indignity to the suburban retreat of La Malmaison, where his personality could not affect the Parisians, he still dreamt of power, but did nothing to grasp it. At last he was obliged to fly to the coast before the Allies, who were approaching the capital. Despairing of making good his escape, and feeling keenly the humiliation of his position, should capture await him in the land where for so long he had 6been the idol, he yielded himself a prisoner to Captain Maitland, who commanded H.M.S. Bellerophon—stationed near Rochfort to intercept the Imperial fugitive,—as to the representative of “the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous” of his enemies (July 15th). This is the last of Napoleon, and henceforward he lived and died a captive in the island of St. Helena, hated by his gaolers, forgotten by his country, and forsaken by his kindred.

The overthrow of her great military hero brought no satisfaction or relief to France. She needed a chief to direct, and a policy to shape her actions; but at the most critical moment, when the Allies were thundering at her gates, she deliberately deprived herself of the one, and had not thought of the other. Napoleon was rejected; but who was to take his place, and who was to safeguard her interests? The noisy demagogues had effectively stirred up a revolution, and had deposed the only soldier who could have stood between her and the victorious enemy. Their momentary success was complete; but they left nothing except chaos behind them, and their work was folly because it was destructive. It is true, they did conceive some hope that they could rear up a Republic or a Constitutional Monarchy upon the ruins of the Imperial system, and none for a moment believed that the unconditional restoration of the Royal Family was imminent. The “obstacle to peace” was removed; but the peace that France desired was denied her, and she was not to be allowed to have a voice in shaping her own destinies. The Allies were masters of the situation; and they were as intent upon taking 7ample securities against the people who had for so long scourged Europe, as against the man who had led them on to plunder Christendom. The man was gone, but the people remained; and in their eagerness to repudiate him, they forgot that they too had some account to render to the conquerors.^[9]

A Provisional Government was set up in Paris on the evening of the 22nd of June, composed of five persons, among whom was Fouché, Duc d'Otranto, late Minister of Police under Napoleon, and one of his bitterest enemies. He had the address to be named President, and in the anarchy produced by the panic which the crisis created, he alone preserved his faculties unimpaired. Seizing the supreme control of the State during the moment of interregnum, he became dictator, and the sole and irresponsible advocate of his country’s cause. A Republican by conviction, a regicide, and holding to the extravagant tenets which were enunciated in 1789, he was far more keenly alive to his own immediate interests than to his avowed principles; and perceiving clearly that his credit and reward could best be secured by obliging France to accept—even against her will—a Bourbon régime, he devoted his great talents and his incomparable powers of intrigue to bring about the unconditional restoration of King Louis. His treachery was deeply resented by the nation, but what could they do? Napoleon had been abandoned, and there was no one to replace him,—none to form a patriotic administration, none to give effect to the national aspirations of the people, none to cope with the difficulties that had arisen, none to secure those terms which a proud and vigorous race had a right to expect, even when overwhelmed by adversity. In the universal prostration which succeeded the battle of Waterloo, Fouché, “one of the most hateful among the hateful tribunes of the Terror,”^[10] reigned in France, an autocrat, hated by all, feared by all, and obeyed by all.^[11]

While these events were taking place in Paris, the victorious Allies were advancing towards that city, there to reap the fruits of their success, to restore the peace of Europe, and to impose their will upon the now distracted country that lay at their mercy. After the battle there was a meeting between the Duke of 8Wellington and Marshal Blücher, at which operations for the immediate future were decided. The former engaged to advance the following day, and returned for the night to his head-quarters at Waterloo; the latter agreed to pursue the enemy without delay, and to endeavour to cut off Grouchy. He then went to Genappe, and, on the 20th, his advanced troops were in French territory. Early on the 19th, the army commanded by Wellington left their bivouacs, the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards starting from the farm of Hougomont, which they had held—in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion of the Third Guards, and with the light companies of the First Guards (2nd and 3rd Battalions)—with such credit to themselves. They reached Nivelles that evening, where Major-General Sir John Byng wrote his despatch on the battle, and on the stubborn contest that centred round Hougomont.^[12]

On the 20th, the Guards Division reached Binche, and on that day the Duke of Wellington issued a General Order, which not only conveyed his thanks to the army under his command, for their conduct in the decisive action on the 18th, but which also warned the troops of the absolute necessity of treating the inhabitants of France as a friendly people.^[13] This admonition of the rules which prevail in war time among civilized nations, was not indeed needed by the seasoned troops of British origin, who had been trained in the humane usages invariably adopted by England, to respect the liberties and the property of the people over whose lands war has to be waged. It was rather addressed to the Anglo-allies (Dutch, Belgians, and Germans), to enforce the maxim that hostilities are not conducted against the population, and that ill treatment of peasants only exasperates the enemy, and does nothing to secure his final subjugation. It is to be remarked that this policy was not followed by the Prussians, with the result that the latter never gained the good will of the French, while the British, on the contrary, were looked upon by that proud and sensitive people with respect, and almost without distrust.

On the morning of the 22nd of June, Wellington was at Malplaquet, the scene of one of Marlborough’s greatest triumphs over the same enemy. Before leaving, he issued a proclamation in French to the people whose territories were then entered by the

9British troops, to the effect that the invaders had come to deliver them from the iron yoke that oppressed them; and that the population would be well treated by the army, provided they did not join the cause of the “Usurper” (Napoleon), who had been “pronounced to be the enemy of the human race, with whom neither peace nor truce could be made.”^[14] Neither in this effort to conciliate the population did Prince Blücher follow the example of his colleague; on the contrary he displayed resentment against the natives of a country whose military genius had, in the past, humbled in the dust the pride of his own nation. It was perhaps natural that he should assume this attitude when the provocation which the Prussians received is taken into account, but it was not calculated to reassure the French in their despair, nor to reconcile them to the restoration of the Royal Family.

In order to give a general view of the whole military situation, it will now be necessary to refer briefly to the incidents of the war that took place close to Waterloo, on the day of the battle, where Marshal Grouchy was struggling with Blücher’s rear-guard. On the 18th he was at Wavre, with 32,000 men, of whom 5000 were cavalry; and there he was held in check during the whole day by Thieleman’s Prussian Corps, only 15,000 strong. It was not until evening that he turned the right of the Prussians, when at length he opened a road for his troops, whereon to advance to the main body of the French army, known to be somewhere near Waterloo. As it was then too late to continue the action, Grouchy hoped next day to complete the victory he had achieved, ere he pushed forward to join his chief. On the morning of the 19th he received no tidings from the Emperor, and he believed that all was well; but Thieleman, though he was not informed of the full details of the disaster to which the French had been subjected, heard that a great battle had been fought, and that they were defeated; so he, too, determined to attack Grouchy in the morning. A battle consequently took place on the 19th, in which the Prussians, though they contested the ground inch by inch, were forced to fall back towards Louvain by the superiority of the masses they engaged. At the very moment of victory, Grouchy received the message which Napoleon had sent him from Quatre-Bras, announcing the total destruction of the French army, and thus revealing to him the full extent of the danger in which he was 10placed. Perceiving at once the necessity that his corps should be saved from the general wreck, he determined to retreat through Namur upon Givet, and began to move without delay. General Pirch I., having been detached from the main Prussian army on the evening of the 18th to intercept him, joined Thieleman, who also advanced as soon as he perceived that he was no longer being pursued by the corps which had defeated him. Both Prussian Generals endeavoured to arrest the enemy, but they failed to do so; and Grouchy, who marched with great rapidity and resolution, ably seconded by the valour of his subordinate Generals, reached Givet on the 21st, and entered French territory in safety. He was then ordered to join Marshal Soult, who was attempting to rally the broken fragments of the main army at Laon. This occurred on the fatal 22nd, the same day that Napoleon, coerced by the political leaders in Paris, closed his public career, and signed his abdication of the French throne in favour of his son.

Grouchy’s corps was the only one that, having taken part in the campaign in Belgium, remained intact. The main French army had been panic-stricken at Waterloo, and a large mass of those who survived the battle fled straight to Paris, or deserted their standards, and were nowhere to be found; many flung away their arms, and dispersed to their homes. The disruption of the great army was complete, and the defeat signal and decided beyond all former precedent. The co-operation of the greater bulk of Napoleon's forces in subsequent military events was impossible, and little resistance was to be apprehended from these men. But there was a remnant of true soldiers still available, who, seeking their Colours, concentrated some 20,000 strong near Philippeville. On the 22nd they were at Laon, and about that time the French could dispose of some 50,000 men for the defence of the northern frontier.frontier. The situation was a desperate one, and would have been fatal even to Napoleon himself in the full vigour of his military genius; but the position was all the more impossible, since the Saxons, the Austrians, and the Russians were by this time upon the eastern frontier of France, and were ready to advance in a concentrated and concentric march upon the capital.

On the 22nd of June, Wellington reached Le Cateau Cambresis. He had three divisions at Bavay, and four echeloned along the road to Le Cateau—the Guards Division being at Gommignie. Besides this, other troops were employed against Le Quesnoi 11and Valenciennes, which were occupied by men of the Garde Nationale. Blücher was at Catillon-sur-Sambre with his troops in the vicinity, including Thieleman, who had returned from the pursuit of Grouchy, but excluding Pirch I., who was ordered to remain in rear for the purpose of reducing the fortresses which defended the French frontier. The Prussians were also at that time blockading Landrecies and Maubeuge—also garrisoned by local levies, from whom little resistance was to be expected. The Anglo-Prussian Allies halted on the 23rd, for the purpose of collecting their stragglers, and of bringing up ammunition; and thereby a much-needed rest was afforded to men who, for more than eight days, had been constantly and actively occupied in the arduous labours of the war. During the halt the two Generals, Wellington and Blücher, met to decide how a united advance could best be made upon Paris. As a result of this conference, it was agreed that the Allies should not pursue the enemy directly, but, covered by the Oise, push along the right bank of that river, upon Compiègne and Creil, so as to turn his left, and if possible, cut him off from Paris,—the movement to be masked by the Prussian cavalry, whose presence, it was hoped, would induce the French to retard their retreat.^[15] Wellington, moreover, anxious that the moral effect of the battle of Waterloo should be fully reaped, and that Napoleon should have no time to recover from the disaster, hastened the arrival of King Louis into French territory, offering to secure Cambrai as his residence until Paris should be captured. Hearing, also, that that fortress was imperfectly guarded, he sent Sir Charles Colville forward with a detachment to seize it (June 23rd). The attack was successful, in so far that the town was taken with little loss; but the citadel held out until the 25th, when the Governor capitulated to the King. His Majesty by this time reached the British head-quarters, and he temporarily established his Court in Cambrai.

On the 24th the combined armies continued their advance. The British pushed on two brigades towards Cambrai, but otherwise only altered their position slightly, as they were waiting for their pontoon train. The Prussians, however, moved forward, taking Guise and St. Ouentin. During the day, intelligence was received of Napoleon’s abdication, but the news was at first 12discredited. Later, it became confirmed; but both Commanders determined that terms of peace could only be signed at Paris, and they rejected all overtures made to them by the Provisional Government to arrest their march upon the capital. On the 25th of June, the British head-quarters were at Joncourt, the Coldstream Guards being at Le Cateau.

Blücher, on the other hand, hearing that the French had not been deceived by the cavalry demonstration made in the direction of Laon, now came to the conclusion that they were hastening towards Paris; he therefore determined to secure the passages over the Oise, and he pushed on to these points with the utmost rapidity. A squadron entered Compiègne in the evening of the 26th, and early the following day a Prussian brigade supported it, just in time to prevent this place from falling into the hands of the enemy; for Grouchy, who had superseded Soult, ordered D'Erlon to occupy the bridge with the remnants of his Corps, about 4000 strong. D'Erlon, finding the Prussians in position, cannonaded it, and very soon afterwards retired, unpursued by the Prussians, who were too much exhausted to advance; so that it was mid-day before the advantage gained could be pressed home. These operations were connected with the movements of other Prussian columns, one of which also succeeded in capturing the bridge of Creil just before the French arrived there. Brushing the enemy away, the invaders continued to march to Senlis, where D'Erlon was met and driven off the straight line of his retreat. The bridge of St. Maxence was found partially destroyed, and the river had to be crossed in boats, but that of Verberie was taken. By the evening of the 27th, Blücher’s advanced troops were on the left of Grouchy, intercepting the road to Paris, and with every hope of being able to prevent him from reaching the capital before the Prussians.^[16] At dawn of the 28th, a small force under Pirch II. came into collision with the enemy near Villers-Cotterets, and, being greatly outnumbered at that point, they were in some danger of being overpowered. The French, however, were in no condition to fight; they had lost heart, and many were deserting their Colours. Being disorganized by their reverses, and by the fear that Blücher’s energy inspired, they now allowed Pirch to get away unhurt. The latter had succeeded by his manœuvre to delay them, so that during the day they were repeatedly attacked with considerable loss, and most 13of them were forced to turn to their left to cross the river Marne, and so reach Paris by a circuitous route. By the evening of the 28th, the Prussians had not only captured sixteen guns and four thousand prisoners, forced the French from their true line of retreat, and increased the terror and confusion which prevailed among them, but they also succeeded in following some few detachments of the enemy, who had been enabled to fly straight to Paris. In this manner their advanced posts were within five miles of the capital, near Le Bourget and Stains, where they carried panic and dismay into the heart of the city.^[17] Blücher established his head-quarters at Senlis.

During this vigorous pursuit, the Anglo-allies were also advancing southwards. On the 26th, Sir John Byng assaulted the fortress of Peronne with the 1st Guards Brigade, who carried the outworks by storm with little loss, soon after which the town capitulated. The British head-quarters were at Vermand and the army in the vicinity, advanced cavalry patrols having penetrated as far as Roye. The Coldstream Guards halted at Coulaincourt. Next day the army crossed the river Somme at Willecourt; the Duke was at Nesle, and Roye was occupied. On the 28th, the British right was near St. Just, and Montdidier was occupied; the left was in rear of La Tulle, where the roads meet that run from Compiègne and Roye; the reserve reached the latter place, and the Guards Division was at Conchy, where the rest of the First Army-Corps was posted.

The rapid approach of the invaders upon Paris made it plain to the Provisional Government that they had no power to arrest the progress of the Allies for a single moment; and although the north side of the city was secured by a line of fortified works, sufficiently strong to resist a coup de main, yet the wreck of Napoleon’s army had not reached the capital, and time was imperatively required to bring them there and to organize some defence. An armistice was once more sought on the 27th, and again on the 28th, in the despairing hope that the Government might be allowed some breathing-time in which to consider their position, and make some show of resistance, in order to save France the humiliation which was clearly in store for her. But the allied Commanders were inexorable, and, refusing all such negotiations, they pursued their operations with the same activity 14as in the past. Wellington indeed frankly told the Commissioners who approached him on behalf of the Provisional Government, that he—

On the 29th, Blücher pressed on towards Paris, and reconnoitred the defences thrown round the northern side of the city. The remnants of the great army which had been shattered at Waterloo also entered the capital on that day, and the French mustered some 80,000 to 90,000 men there—troops from the provincial depôts and from the country having been called for the defence of the seat of government, and as many discharged veterans as could be collected having been assembled in a special corps some 17,000 strong. Besides this, there was plenty of artillery available, and about 30,000 of the Garde Nationale; but on the latter no great reliance could be placed. Marshal Davoût, Prince d'Eckmühl, was appointed Commander-in-chief. The British forces were still in rear, and occupied positions between Gournay and St. Maxence, the Guards Division being near St. Martin Longeau. At dawn, on the 30th of June, the advanced French post at Aubervilliers was attacked by the 4th Prussian Corps under Bülow, and the enemy was driven back, and pursued as far as the canal in rear of that village; but it became evident that to dislodge him from that line, a more serious effort would be necessary.

15The Duke of Wellington having proceeded to Blücher’s head-quarters during the night of the 29th-30th, a conference was held as to the future operations to be pursued. It was then agreed to move the Prussians to their right, to take advantage of the capture of the bridge of St. Germains which had already been effected, and to extend the investment of the capital round the west and south of the city, threatening to cut it off from those provinces that furnished it with supplies. The British army at the same time was to move into the posts which their allies had taken up north of the city, and to mask the defences which the enemy had erected there. During the night of the 29th-30th and the following day, these operations were carried out, the 4th Prussian Corps covering the movement until the British arrived. In the evening, the latter were about Louvres, twelve miles away from Paris; the Guards Division being at La Chapelle. The two Prussian Corps, under Thieleman and Ziethen, were close to St. Germain; while two regiments of Hussars, under Lieut.-Colonel von Sohr, having been thrown forward, bivouacked at Marley, on the road to Versailles. During the day, Bülow’s Corps had been engaged, as we have seen. On the 1st of July he began to move off, and in the afternoon he was relieved by the advanced British forces, who took his place; the Guards Division were at Le Bourget and the forest of Bondy, five miles from the capital.

On this day the enemy gained an advantage over the Prussians—the only one of the campaign, except the delusive victory at Ligny,—for the cavalry brigade under von Sohr, ordered to reconnoitre round the southern suburbs, proceeding too far away from its supports, was attacked, and, though the men defended themselves bravely, they were cut to pieces. This transient success, however, produced no effect upon the main result, and was but a passing incident in the drama now soon to close. Next day, the 2nd, Blücher continued his march round Paris; and his troops, under Ziethen, came into collision with the enemy near Sèvres, who was driven back to Issy, and, later in the evening, into the town. Thieleman pushed forward advanced troops to Chatillon; and the reserve, under Bülow, was near Versailles. The British remained in the positions on the north front of the capital, sending detachments across the Seine, which occupied the villages of Asnières, Courbevoie, and Suresnes, to keep up communications with the Prussians. On the 3rd, Vandamme made an attempt to 16drive Ziethen’s troops out of Issy, and a battle took place, which, lasting about four hours, ended disastrously for the French, who were repulsed, and forced to take refuge within the barriers of the city. This effort was the end of the operations, and no more fighting took place, for the Provisional Government, holding that the defence of Paris was not practicable against the victorious Allies, now agreed to treat for a capitulation.

A great change had by this time come over public feeling in Paris, and this was mainly the work of Fouché. France, left without a chief in the moment of her abasement, fell into the hands of Napoleon’s ex-Minister of Police. Once installed in power, he issued a proclamation to the people he was deliberately deluding (June 24th). It held out extravagant hopes that, under his guidance, France would at last be contented with an honourable peace. It was a dishonest proclamation, for it made impossible promises; and yet, in the national degradation which marked the crisis, the people had perforce to obey the man, who, while in secret correspondence with the Allies for the restoration of the King, told them—

Nor was it long before Fouché gained sufficient influence over Davoût to make it clear to him that the Empire had come to an end, and that the only solution possible out of the impasse in which France had become involved, was submission to the will of the conquerors and the restoration of the Bourbons. Once gained over, the Marshal did not hesitate to obey, and efforts to ensure the defence of the capital were undertaken with deliberate 17half-hearted vigour.^[20] The Parisians were rapidly becoming indifferent to their fate; they cared not who was to rule them, provided they were allowed to live in peace. The era of glory had afforded them some satisfaction, but it had its drawbacks, and late events had brought these to a crisis; therefore they were glad to welcome the strongest, and to have done with conquests. The Chambers, also, had exhausted all their energies in destroying the man whose military genius might have served the country at this terrible juncture. They succeeded admirably in their design; and now they devoted themselves to academical studies, and busied themselves in discussing a new constitution, quite oblivious of the fact that their labours must be fruitless. All sections of the nation were easily dealt with by Fouché; and even the army, devoted to their late incomparable leader, soon submitted to his will.

Besides the efforts already made to obtain a suspension of hostilities from the allied Commanders, Marshal Davoût approached them on the 30th of June, but again unsuccessfully. On the same day, he also joined in a protest addressed to the Chambers against the return of the Bourbons—a protest intended, perhaps, rather to satisfy the susceptibilities of the army than for any other purpose. The Chambers, in their reply, alluded to their proposed constitution; and stated that, while they were prepared to accept whatever dynasty the Allies might insist on fixing upon the throne, they were convinced that the accession of the new Monarch could only become an accomplished fact, when he had agreed to the conditions they meant to impose upon his prerogative. They “will never,” they said, “acknowledge as legitimate Chief of the State him who, on ascending the throne, shall refuse to acknowledge the rights of the nation, and to consecrate them by a solemn compact.”^[21]

But neither the Chambers nor the army were to determine the fate of the country; for Fouché, alone among Frenchmen, was possessed of power, and he only had any voice in shaping its policy in this crisis. Wellington, anxious above all things that Paris should submit without further bloodshed, consented, on the 2nd of July, to a suspension of hostilities, on the basis of the evacuation of the capital by the army. But he was not altogether master of the situation, for Marshal Blücher, to whom he was so greatly indebted for his victory over the enemy, had different ideas, and wished to humble the French in a manner that would have been 18impolitic as well as hostile to the best interests of a stable peace. It required, therefore, all the Duke’s tact to make him understand, that the best way to end the war, was to accept a capitulation, and to give up all ideas of incurring the responsibility of taking so large a city as Paris by force of arms. Blücher, fortunately, had some respect for the good sense of his colleague, and agreed to these views, and, on the 3rd, he consented to treat. Thereupon hostilities ceased abruptly, while Vandamme was being driven back, in the manner that has been already described, near Issy.^[22]

Commissioners met on the 3rd, at the Palace of Saint-Cloud, and speedily agreed to a Military Convention, which stipulated the following conditions:—

(1) The army to evacuate Paris within three days, and to take up a position in rear of the Loire, the movement to be complete within eight days; (2) St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly to be given up to the Allies on the 4th, Montmartre on the 5th, and, on the 6th, all barriers, giving access into the city, to be placed in the power of the Allies; (3) Order to be maintained in Paris by the Garde Nationale, and by the municipal Gens d’armerie; (4) The actual authorities to be respected “so long as they shall exist;” (5) Private and public property, except that which relates to war, to be respected, and all individuals to enjoy their rights and liberties, “without being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold, or may have held, or as to their conduct or political opinions;” (6) The capital to be furnished with supplies.^[23]

These stipulations, ratified by the British and Prussian Commanders, were carried out by the French with scrupulous fidelity. In spite of the violence of the troops, whose enthusiasm for the Imperial system had scarcely abated, the army, 70,000 men and 200 guns, marched towards the Loire on the 4th, under Marshal Davoût.^[24] The Chambers continued their sittings, still intent upon their proposed constitution. On the 7th, the Allies determined to enter Paris, heralding the re-instatement of Louis XVIII., the Bourbon king.

GRENADIER COMPANY 1670.         DRUM MAJOR 1670.         PIKEMAN 1669.
N. R. Wilkinson del.      A. D. Innes &C^o London       Mintern Bros Chromo.

19During this time the Germans, Austrians, and Russians were advancing to the capital, and, although the war was practically concluded by the Military Convention just signed, yet it languished for a few months longer in some of the provinces. The North-German Corps (26,000 men), formed of contingents brought together by the petty Princes, was occupied in the beginning of July, in reducing some of the French fortresses on the north-east frontier. The Austrian army, under Prince Schwartzenburg, including Saxons and South Germans, and amounting to more than 250,000 men, had its advanced troops between the Seine and the Marne, near La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, on the 10th of July. The Russians, under Marshal Barclay de Tolly (nearly 170,000 men), were at Paris and in its vicinity by the middle of July. A combined Austro-Sardinian army (60,000) was in the south-east of France, and completed, during that month, the subjugation of the districts in that quarter.^[25]

Besides the various expressions of thanks to the gallant army that destroyed the power of Napoleon at Waterloo, to which allusion has already been made, letters were published in General Orders, July 2nd, from the Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. the Duke of York, and from the Secretary of State for the Colonies and for War, Earl Bathurst, conveying the admiration felt at the conduct of the troops.^[26] On the 5th, the resolutions of thanks passed by the House of Lords and by the House of Commons were published in General Orders;^[27] and, on the 17th, those of the Common Council of the City of London (dated July 7th) were communicated to the troops in the same manner.

Towards the end of July it was determined, in recognition of the “conspicuous valour” displayed by the army “in the late glorious victory,” to grant: (1) increase to the pensions allowed to Officers for wounds, according as they might be promoted in the service; (2) to all Subalterns in the Infantry of the Line and in the Cavalry, and to all Ensigns of the Guards, at Waterloo, two years' service, so as to qualify them for extra pay after five, instead of seven, years' service; (3) to every Non-commissioned officer, private, etc., present at the battle, the distinction of being called a 20“Waterloo man,” and to every “Waterloo man” two years' service in reckoning his service for increase of pay or for pension, when discharged,—but this indulgence was not otherwise to affect the conditions of his original enlistment. These arrangements were notified on the 5th of August.^[28]

The Reverend John Norcross, Framlingham Rectory, Suffolk, having promised to settle an annuity of ten pounds—to be called the “Wellington Pension”—upon one of his “brave countrymen who fought in the late tremendous but glorious conflict,” to be selected by the Duke, the latter chose Lance-Sergeant Graham, Coldstream Guards, for that honour. The record shows that Sergeant Graham “assisted Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell in closing the gate” (at Hougomont) “which had been left open for the communication, and which the enemy was in the act of forcing; he shot the leading man. His brother, a corporal in the same company, was lying wounded in a barn on fire; Sergeant Graham removed him a short distance secure from the fire, and returned again to his duty. Three years and two months in the Regiment.” Another man, also recommended to the Duke, was Private John Lister, Third Guards, whose conduct was noted for particular bravery during the whole day.^[29]

On the 29th of July, H.R.H. the Prince Regent granted to all Ensigns of the three Regiments of Foot Guards then serving, and afterwards to be appointed, the rank of Lieutenant, as a mark of Royal approbation of the distinguished gallantry of the Brigade of Guards in the important battle which had just taken place. Thereby was completed the system of the “double rank” which had existed in the Household Infantry for many years. Captains of the First and Coldstream Guards had been given the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1687, and four years later, in 1691, Captains of the Scots Guards received the same privilege; while all Lieutenants of the three Regiments of Foot Guards were upon that occasion given commissions of Captains in the army.^[30]

During the halt which was made at Le Cateau on the 23rd 21of June, a return was ordered, giving the number of killed, wounded, and missing, casualties of the fighting that took place between the 16th and 18th inclusive.^[31]

Some changes took place in the army during the six months that followed the battle of Waterloo.

The Prince of Orange, having to return to Holland, on the 22nd of June, Major-General Sir John Byng assumed temporarily the command of the First Army-Corps until the 12th of July, when he reverted to his position of Commander of the Division of Guards until the 23rd; he was then replaced by Major-General Sir Kenneth Howard (late Coldstream Guards), and he re-assumed the command of the 2nd Guards Brigade, the 1st being still under Major-General Maitland. Owing to the absence of the Prince of Orange, the command of the First Army-Corps devolved upon Sir Kenneth Howard on the 22nd of August, when Sir J. Byng again reverted to the Guards Division, and remained at their head till further orders; thereupon Colonel Hepburn (Third Guards) became Brigadier of the 2nd Guards Brigade. On the 2nd of October, Sir J. Byng having obtained leave of absence to proceed to England, Major-General Maitland took command of the Division until his return.

22On the 20th of June, Captain Walton, Coldstream Guards, was temporarily appointed Brigade-Major of the 2nd Guards Brigade, vice Stothert, Third Guards, who was severely wounded, and who subsequently died. On the 6th of November, Captain Prince was appointed Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards vice Major C. Bentinck, who, upon the death of Captain Lascelles, was posted to the 1st Battalion as Senior Adjutant.^[32]

The following Officers, belonging to the 1st Battalion, were ordered, on the 22nd of June, to hold themselves in readiness for foreign service, viz. Colonel Sir. H. Bouverie, Captains Shirley and Girardot, and Ensigns Clifton and Salwey; next day Captain Sandilands received a similar order. With the exception of Sir H. Bouverie and Ensign Clifton, these Officers were posted to the 2nd Battalion on the 27th till further orders, and at the head of a detachment of two hundred men, they reached Paris on the 19th of July. Previous to this date, on the 1st, a redistribution of Subaltern Officers of the Battalion in France had been made, by which: Captain Anstruther was posted to the Grenadier company, Captain Sowerby and Ensign Short to the 1st, Ensign Hon. J. Forbes to the 2nd, Captain Cowell and Ensign Hon. W. Forbes to the 3rd, Ensign Gordon to the 4th, Ensign Douglas to the 5th, Captain Lord Hotham to the 6th, Ensign Buckley to the 7th, Ensign Hervey to the 8th, Captain Bowles and Ensigns Gooch and Buller to the Light-infantry companies.

It was about this time that the present soldier’s small account-book was introduced into the British army. By a letter from Lord Palmerston, the Secretary-at-War, to the Duke of Wellington, dated War Office, August 31, 1815, “in order to remedy the inconvenience and delay experienced in the adjustment of the claims of the soldiers,” it was determined that “a book should be kept by every Non-commissioned officer, trumpeter, drummer, fifer, and private man of His Majesty’s regular forces, calculated to show the actual state of his accounts.”^[33] This book was introduced by Horse Guards letter on the 6th of October following, and regulations were made to ensure that the accounts should be correctly 23made up to the 24th of each month, and to oblige the men to keep their small books in their own possession, and in good order.

The Coldstream Guards contained the following Officers, in November, 1815:—

Termination of the war—Difficulties of the situation—The Allies occupy Paris—Dissolution of the Provisional Government—Entry of Louis XVIII. into the capital—New French Government formed—Blücher and the Pont de Jena—Arrival of the Allied Sovereigns—Reviews in France—Paris in the hands of the Allies—Treatment of the French by the Prussians; by the British—The wreck of the French Imperial forces disbanded—Life in Paris—The Louvre stripped of its treasures of art—Prosecution of Imperialist leaders—Labedoyère, Ney, Lavalette—Peace of Paris, November 20th.

The long period of the wars of the French Revolution, which devastated the continent of Europe for more than twenty years, had now definitely come to an end, and another era was about to dawn upon the civilized world. France, who had provoked the struggle and prolonged the strife to satisfy the craving of a restless ambition, was at last crushed; and the military chief, whose genius had called into activity the warlike character of her inhabitants, was captured. The common enemy was no longer to be feared; but the balance of power in Europe had been rudely shaken, and new ideas had taken deep root in France into the political and social life of the people. A government had to be established in Paris, of a nature calculated to repress disorder, to calm the natural turbulence of the nation, and to give the Allies pledges for future good behaviour. In short, the French were to be invited to re-enter into the European comity of nations, and to conform to the re-settlement which was rendered necessary after the general disturbance that had taken place. But, in effecting this, the interests of the enemy could not be taken into account. Once before, France had been subdued, and, in 1814, the Allies had expelled Napoleon, and sought to restore a general peace without unduly oppressing the people who had been the aggressors. The attempt failed, for the Emperor returned to Paris, and thereby he 25re-kindled the torch of war, and revived the baneful policy which threatened his neighbours with destruction. France had participated in Napoleon’s act, and had received him once more as her ruler; and, being defeated, she had little to expect from the forbearance of the victors. She was thus treated as a conquered country, and was subjected to some of the indignities which her soldiery had, in their turn, inflicted for so long a time upon her present masters.

And yet the task of a French reconstruction was by no means an easy one. The vitality of the nation, homogeneous and patriotic, at once forbade the Allies from any attempt to dismember it, even if their mutual jealousies had allowed them to adopt such a proposal. The only feasible plan was to give the people a ruler who could and would control the explosive forces which existed among them, and put an end to the dangers that menaced Europe by reason of the warlike and unscrupulous character they had displayed in the past. But the Allies, in carrying out this policy, forgot that it was of the first consequence to the future wellbeing of the Monarchy, to place Louis in an independent position, and, instead of restoring him to his kingdom by force of hostile bayonets only, to attain to the same end, by fostering the movement towards Royalism, which France began to develop after the battle of Waterloo. The downfall of Napoleon and the rejection of his dynasty had left three solutions, and only three, for the future government of the country. A Republic might have been formed; a popular King might be set up in the person of an Orleanist prince, who would accept the tricolor flag; and, lastly, the legitimate rule of Louis could be established. The first two solutions were contrary to the spirit of the age, they gave no security for future tranquillity, and the Allies set their faces firmly against either of them. There remained the third, which was the avowed object of the conquerors, and it was obvious that it could best be reached by causing the people to recall their King of their own accord. This had been the proposition of Marshal Davoût and of others; and, while their views were possibly more in advance than could have been agreed to without modification, yet, had the matter been left in English hands, there is little doubt that the King’s restoration would have been effected, with the least shock possible to French susceptibilities, and the new order based on a firmer foundation than was given to it. But the British Government 26had others to consult, and the Allies, smarting under the injuries to which they had been subjected for more than twenty years, were not inclined to be too conciliatory.

Nor was this the only difficulty; for the French themselves, hopelessly divided into two hostile camps, were unable to come to any satisfactory agreement. On the one hand, there were the followers of the King, reactionary in feeling, who remembered with bitterness the cruelties they had experienced during revolutionary times, and who, now that they were supported by victorious armies, demanded the revival pure and simple of the ancien régime. On the other hand, there was Imperial and Revolutionary France—the nation itself,—who, having irrevocably adopted new canons of social and political existence, endeavoured to make terms with the party in power for the protection of the people. There was little sympathy between the two; but the latter had no leader, and had placed themselves unreservedly in the unworthy hands of Fouché, who, having gauged the situation, deserted those he was bound to support, and sought his own personal aggrandisement by joining the party that attached itself to the King.

The keen anxiety of Louis XVIII. to save France from the humiliations that were to be imposed upon her was undoubted; so also was his earnest desire to reign in accordance with the liberal spirit which the times required. He hoped to reconcile all sections of the population, and to prove himself their deliverer, not only from internal disorder, but also from foreign oppression. But though his good will and generosity were unquestioned, his prejudices remained, and were not to be eradicated even by misfortune, and his followers and intimate counsellors were not endowed with a similar noble spirit of forgetfulness for past ill-treatment. France, therefore, by the will of the Allies and with the full consent of the Royalist faction, was again to be unconditionally placed in the King’s hands, his prerogative was to be unfettered, and his power was to be absolute. Nor were his first proclamations, issued to his subjects and dated the 25th and 28th of June, calculated to give much satisfaction to a people who dreaded his rule. The King’s party, in short, had not the wisdom to perceive that a stable Restoration must be accompanied by a complete amnesty in favour of those, at least, who had no further power to resist—and resistance to the old French Monarchy had entirely ceased in the country. Hence, although 27Louis repudiated all intentions of restoring feudal rights, or of dispossessing those who had illegally acquired lands during the Revolution, yet he did not hesitate to threaten with punishment the men by whose assistance he imagined Napoleon had been able to install himself once again as Emperor.^[34]

28How little the arrangements made in 1815 secured the permanent tranquillity of France, is shown by the history of that country during the last eighty years; but to these events it is not our intention to revert, for our object is only to give as faithful a picture as possible of what did occur at this crisis, to describe the part which was taken in these events by the Regiment whose annals we are engaged in recording, and to explain the condition of affairs which presented itself to both Officers and men during this moment of victory and of anxiety.

The barriers of Paris were placed in the hands of the Allies in the afternoon of the 6th—in accordance with the terms of the Military Convention—amid persistent cries from the populace of: “No Bourbons!” “The Representative Government for ever!” intermingled with some in favour of the fallen Emperor. On the 7th, the Prussians under Blücher marched into the town in force, and took possession of the Luxembourg and of other places. The Duke of Wellington, with the tact which distinguished his conduct during this moment of triumph, contented himself with taking part in this demonstration by despatching one brigade only into the city, “with orders to camp in the Champs Elysées, and near to the Place Louis Quinze, where the Duke of Wellington will have his head-quarters to-day.”^[36] The main body of the British army were encamped in the Bois de Boulogne, to which place the Guards Division were also brought, without any display.display.

As soon as Paris was occupied by foreign troops, the Provisional Government dissolved itself, on the plea that the country had been deceived by the conquerors! The message of dissolution communicated to the Chambers, written by Fouché himself, asserted that up to the 6th it had been believed that “the Allied Sovereigns were not unanimous upon the choice of a prince who was to reign in France;” that it was only then declared that “all the Sovereigns had engaged to place Louis XVIII. upon the throne.” The message went on to say that, as foreign troops had just occupied the Tuileries, where the Government was sitting, “we can only breathe wishes for our country; and, our deliberations being no longer free, we think it our duty to separate.” Upon receiving this news, the Chamber of Peers immediately followed the example 29given, and also dissolved. The Deputies, however, determined to show a bolder front; and proclaiming that they were at their posts by the will of the people, and that bayonets only could disperse them, they continued their deliberations upon the proposed Constitution, which they determined to offer to the King for his acceptance, as if there was still a government in the country, and as if nothing had happened to disturb their equanimity. But the following day (July 8th), the farce came to an end, and they were excluded from their place of meeting by the bayonet; the gates were locked, a body of the Garde Nationale warned them off and made them retire, and thus they too were obliged to dissolve.^[37]

Paris was now ready to receive Louis, and his public entry took place on the 8th. The tricolor flag was everywhere replaced by the white standard of the Bourbons, and the people, who had vociferously welcomed Napoleon on his return from Elba, not four months before, now came in immense crowds to greet the King, and acclaimed his restoration with enthusiastic joy. The scene was gay, and the sight that presented itself to the inhabitants such as they loved to behold; but, beneath the surface of these outward appearances, the minds of those who had any power of reflection were filled with depression and sadness. “Even the Royalists were downcast: their patriotic feelings were deeply wounded by the defeat of France; they augured ill of the restoration of the King in the rear of the English bayonets.”^[38]

Next day, the new Government was formed, and announced to the public, at the head of which was Prince Talleyrand, who also became Minister for Foreign Affairs. It included, besides, men belonging to different parties, for Louis was anxious to get the confidence of all; and lastly, it contained the name of Fouché, who, having succeeded in shaping the anarchy, which followed the 30fatal 18th of June, to the benefit of the Royal cause, received, much against the King’s inclination, the portfolio of Minister of Police!

The difficulties of the situation were not lightened by the extraordinary conduct of Marshal Blücher at this juncture. That brave Commander could never forget the sufferings which the Imperial armies had caused in Prussia, nor the indignities imposed upon his country by the intolerance and the arrogance of Napoleon, when at the zenith of his power, in Berlin. He regarded the French nation as responsible for the outrages which had been inflicted, and, now that he was able to have his revenge, he determined to take it. He refused to hold any communications with the King, or with the new authorities who had been re-introduced into office by the co-operation of his own Government; and he desired Baron Müffling, appointed Military Governor of Paris, to levy a contribution of 100,000,000 francs on the town, as well as clothing sufficient for 110,000 men.^[40] But not content, he went still further, and insisted that one of the bridges over the Seine, known as the bridge of Jena, should be destroyed, because it bore the name of the battle which had been so disastrous to Prussia. Wellington, informed of this mad project, endeavoured to intervene; 31but so blinded was his impetuous and hot-headed colleague, that he declined to listen to any remonstrance, and began forthwith to undermine the arches. The Duke thereupon placed a guard of British soldiers on the threatened bridge, with orders to drive away by force any one who should attempt to damage it; and he intimated his determination to prevent this senseless destruction by arms if necessary.^[41] Blücher now at last was brought to reason, and gave way; and thus an act of vandalism was prevented which was not only a distinct infraction of the Convention of July 3rd, stipulating that all property was to be respected, but would also have cast a deep and lasting stain on the honour and good name of the Allies.

Shortly after this (July 11th), the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia arrived in Paris, when Guards of Honour were found by the Brigade of Guards.^[42]

About the same time, Lord Castlereagh and the other statesmen of the allied Powers reached the capital, to negotiate the terms of peace to which France was to be obliged to subscribe. The conclusions agreed to, and the incidents which took place during the occupation of Paris, will be noticed presently, but, meanwhile, we must make a short allusion to certain military displays made by the Allies during this period. On the 24th of July a celebrated review of the Anglo-allied army, which had just been reinforced by several regiments who had come to France from America—where peace had been concluded—took place near Paris, before the Emperor of Russia and the other Allied Sovereigns. There were as many as 60,000 British soldiers present, the whole of the troops being under the command of the Duke of Wellington.^[43] The demonstration was more of a pageant than anything else, and as correct a representation as possible was given of the battle of Salamanca. It is perhaps worth remarking that, in the General 32Orders issued, dated July 22nd, these words occur, “The Field Marshal begs that Officers may be dressed uniformly, and, if possible, according to the King’s orders;”^[44] while the following was also published in Battalion Orders of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards: “Officers are to appear in plain grey overalls, jackets hooked and buttoned regimentally, sashes to be tied on the left side.” On the 10th of September, a great review, which seems to have created a considerable impression at the time, also took place of all the Russian troops that were in France, near Chalons, where 160,000 men (including 28,000 cavalry) and 540 guns were brought together.^[45]

These displays, having as much for object an easy demonstration to the inhabitants that they were completely in the power of Europe, as an exhibition made for the purpose of satisfying the national vanity of the different armies concerned, were perhaps not necessary to prove to the French that their new Government rested only upon alien arms for support. Everywhere, except south of the Loire,—where the last remnants of Napoleon’s army had collected under Marshal Davoût,—was the country in the military occupation of foreigners; and in Paris especially, there were no regular troops to be seen, other than those of Great Britain, of Prussia, and of their allies. They guarded the King and the Royal palaces; they stood at the barriers of the town, and they performed all the military duties of the capital. They were to be seen at all the public buildings, at the various and numerous hôtels where the Allied Sovereigns and their Counsellors and principal Officers lodged, and even at the places of entertainment where the people flocked during the balmy weather of a French summer. Nor were these duties of a ceremonial 33character; for guard-houses were placed in nearly all the principal thoroughfares, the bridges were held by troops, there were chains of sentries everywhere, patrols were constantly on the move and on the alert, and guns were kept loaded and ready for any serious emergency.

Paris was placed under the command of Baron Müffling; his orders, dated July 23rd, for the preservation of order, were thus conceived:—

An English traveller who, having visited France in 1814, returned in 1815, thus describes some of his experiences:—

The military occupation of France, painful as it was to the inordinate pride of the people—especially after their armies had run riot in every capital of the Continent,—was rendered still more unbearable by the excesses which the Prussians indulged in. Following the example set by their gallant, but irrational, Commander, both Officers and men exercised their authority in a harsh and often in a brutal manner. Forgetful of what they owed to Louis XVIII., whose restoration absolved the French from past offences, and mindful only of the grievous tyranny which they had 35experienced, they made the unfortunate inhabitants feel the full measure of their revenge, by their arrogance and exactions.

It is pleasant to record that the Duke of Wellington adopted an entirely different system in his relations with the inhabitants; everything was paid for regularly, property was respected, and the people were unmolested. In short, the British army set an example of humanity, generosity, and forbearance, which not only did honour to their country and to their noble profession, but which also (notwithstanding national antipathies), gained them the respect and almost the affection of the French themselves.^[50]

In this connection, a quaint conversation between the English traveller (already quoted) and some Highlanders he came across in Peronne, may be noticed here. The latter, bivouacked, not billeted,—they said they seldom troubled the inhabitants for billets,—had only one thing to regret, viz. that they did not get the liberty “that ither sogers get—the Prussians and them,” for “there’s nae use in our 36being mealy-mou’d, if the ithers are to tak' what they like, the d—d Prussians ken better what they’re about,” and although, “ilka body praises us, but very few gie us ony thing.” In reply to the question, whether the Duke of Wellington took severe measures to enforce his principles regarding the lives and property of the inhabitants at the seat of war, they said: “Na, sir, no here, for the men ken him gailies now; but in Spain we aften had ugly jobs. He hung fifteen men in ae day there, after he had been ordering about it God knows how long. And d—n me if he didna ance gar the Provost-Marshal flog mare than a dizen of the wimen; for the wimen thought themselves safe, and so they were war’ than the men. They got sax and therty lashes a piece on the bare doup, and it was lang afore it was forgotten on ’em. Ane o’ ’em was Meg Donaldson, the best woman in our regiment, for whatever she might tak’ she didna keep it a’ to hersel’.”^[51]

The demeanour of the British troops was friendly to the French, and few brawls took place between them; this contrasted with what occurred to the Prussians, who had frequent and fierce encounters with the populace. The English soldiers were usually to be seen on the Boulevard du Temple, which at that time was an open space (but has since then been built over), and there they used to amuse themselves by watching jugglers, mountebanks, rope-dancers and other shows. A certain number of men of the armies of occupation were admitted free into the theatres; and we are told that a party of Guardsmen, headed by a sergeant, saw a piece admirably put on the stage, entitled Les Anglaises pour rire, in which Englishwomen were grotesquely caricatured. Not understanding the language, nor the acting, and being indignant at the insults they supposed were levelled against their countrywomen, the honest fellows stormed the stage, and drove off, not only the actors, but the police who attempted to arrest them. “It must be remembered that the only revenge which the Parisians were able to take upon their conquerors, was to ridicule them; and the English generally took it in good humour, and laughed at the extravagant drollery of the burlesque.” Notwithstanding these minor disputes, good feeling existed; and although numerous Prussians were assassinated in Paris and in the country, there was only one soldier of British nationality found dead in the streets of the capital, and, in his case, there were no signs of violence upon him.^[52]

SERGEANT. 1658.             DRUMMER. 1658.
N.R. Wilkinson del.       A.D. Innes & C^o London.          Mintern Bros. lith.

37That Wellington should be appealed to, to lighten the burden placed on the miserable people who groaned under the invader’s despotism, is natural enough; and there are petitions recorded on the part of the inhabitants of Le Cateau and Roye, asking that British troops might continue to garrison those towns, so that they might be placed under their protection.^[53] But it was not always that he could do anything for them. We find, for instance, M. de Breteuil, who, according to himself, was “one of the most faithful subjects of Louis XVIII.” and who had “given the King proofs of devotion,” complaining bitterly that not only was his house and property, situated at three leagues distant from St. Quentin, pillaged, but that the town itself was mulcted in a sum of 1,200,000 francs, of which he had to pay 20,000 (£800), because he had a single house there, “which brings in nothing, and is, on the contrary, full of soldiers.” To this complaint, Wellington could only reply, “I have no troops in St. Quentin, and never had any in that town. I think you ought to address yourself to Marshal Prince Blücher.”^[54]

Nor was the King unmindful of what he owed to the British army for their discipline; for, having invited the principal Officers to the Tuileries, and having formed them in a circle about him, he told them, in broken English, in the presence of the Emperor of Austria, “I congratulate you, gentlemen, upon the result of your valour and conduct; but I am most grateful to you for your generosity and humanity towards my poor misguided people; the father and the family will for ever hold it remembrance.”^[55]

In order to give employment to the men under his command, and to help the French peasants, at a time when labour was very scarce, the Duke of Wellington allowed British soldiers to reap the harvest. The owners of the harvest were to make their own bargains with the men direct, but application for labourers were to be made 38by the mayors of districts, and not by private individuals. Commanding Officers also were to know exactly where each soldier was employed; and the men were to return to their regiments every night, if possible, or at all events twice a week.^[56]

Towards the end of October, the Division of Guards, hitherto in the Bois de Boulogne, marched into Paris, and occupied on the 30th, the Casernes Rue Verte, Montblanc, and Rue Temple, the Palais Louis XV., and the Abbatoire de Roule. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards were thus lodged in barracks in the capital; and the general alarm post for the Division was the Palais Louis XV.^[57] At the same time, a general change of quarters took place among the whole of the British troops, and camps were abandoned for houses. Wellington issued on the 28th of October, strict orders for the protection of the inhabitants, to apply whenever men were to be billeted, or when they were marching through the country.^[58]

We left the wreck of Napoleon’s beaten army south of the Loire, where they were under the command of Marshal Davoût. There was nothing more for them now to hope, and their Commander soon persuaded them to conform to the circumstances of the hour, and, throwing aside their Eagles, to hoist the white flag of the Bourbons, and to adopt the white cockade. This they did, and shortly after, by Royal decree, dated the 23rd of July, they were disbanded. At the same time, a new army was forthwith to be formed, to consist of eighty Legions of infantry (103 officers and 1,687 men each), one to be raised in every Department, and to bear its name; forty-seven regiments of cavalry, and twelve regiments of artillery,—or a military force of some 200,000 regular troops. Disbanded 39Imperialists were allowed to engage after proper examination.^[59] The command was entrusted to Marshal Macdonald, who had remained firm in his allegiance to the King, during the whole of the Hundred Days of the second French Empire; and he replaced Davoût, who resigned.

Immediately hostilities came to an end by the Convention of the 3rd, a large number of English people went over to Paris, on business or pleasure, and settled in that gay capital, almost as if it had been their own. Coaches were soon brought over, and horse-racing introduced, contrasting very much in the disfavour of the native sport, which the King endeavoured to encourage, but which was then quite in its infancy. In short, the English made themselves thoroughly at home.

All eyes were turned to Paris at that time. Many Sovereigns were living there—the Monarchs of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Holland, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and France, and several independent Princes of Germany. They were accompanied by some of the most distinguished statesmen and diplomatists of the age; and military leaders were also present who enjoyed a European reputation for their achievements in the field. Events of transcendent importance were taking place in this capital; and the fate of a 40great and gallant nation, outlawed for a quarter of a century, and now reduced to submission, was being decided. Curiosity urged many to go to France, from all parts of Europe, at this historic juncture; the pleasures of society moved others, and duty took a still larger number there. “All the world’s in Paris,”^[61] was indeed true, and crowds flocked to that city; while the discordant elements to be found there, and the strange medley of Frenchmen, Englishmen, and foreigners of almost every nationality, brought together and kept together, at such a time and at such a place, presented at once a scene that was both unique and remarkable.

Paris was gay and dissolute, and the Palais Royal might be called the centre of dissipation.

The Palais Royal contained the principal, but by no means the only, gambling hell in Paris, and these constituted the “very fountains of immorality.” “There were tables for all classes; the workman might play with twenty sous, or the gentleman with ten thousand francs. The law did not prevent any class from indulging in a vice that assisted to fill the coffers of the municipality of Paris.”^[63]

In such a society it was only natural that constant disputes should arise between men who gave way to dissipation, and who, full of life and spirits and of national prejudices, had little to occupy them beyond the mere routine of military duty. Men’s minds were in a state of excitement, and all were engaged in defending interests which frequently conflicted with those of their temporary companions. These disputes could only be settled at that time by the sword or pistol. Numerous duels accordingly took place, sometimes between Royalists and Imperialists, and often between Frenchmen and the representatives of the invaders. 41It is stated that in almost every case the aggressors were the French; and while the English Officers had sometimes to defend themselves against the insolence of the natives, it appears that the Prussians, who used to congregate at the Café Foy in the Palais Royal, were the principal victims of Gallic fury, and were assailed more pertinaciously than the rest by half-pay French Officers, who went on purpose to pick quarrels with them.

France was the possessor of the most extensive collection of works of art ever before known; acquired, not by the genius of her people, but by the grasping policy of her Imperial master. Napoleon, having taken possession of every large city in continental Europe, during the plenitude of his power, had systematically seized all that was remarkable therein, and had transferred his plunder to Paris. The French were inordinately proud of this vast and unique collection, which served to flatter their vanity and to form a lasting monument of their extraordinary military successes. It had been untouched by the Allies in 1814, but in 1815 the disturbers of Europe were to be severely punished, and the stolen property was to be restored to its former owners. Attempts having failed to effect a restoration amicably, owing to the opposition of Talleyrand, forcible possession of the Louvre was taken on the 23rd of September, by a body of British troops, and with the assistance of Austrians and Prussians, the splendid galleries of that palace were stripped of those treasures of art, which belonged principally to Italy and to the Netherlands. Out of fifteen hundred celebrated pictures, it is said that only seventy-four were left in Paris. The restoration of the statuary was not less complete; and the well-known antique Corinthian bronze horses, taken from Venice, to form, in the Place Carrousel, the supporters of the great monument, designed—but not finished—to perpetuate Napoleon’s fame, were taken down and conveyed back to that city. Nothing 42affected the Parisians so much as this act of strict justice; for it showed them their own absolute weakness and humiliation, and it wounded their pride in the most sensitive point.^[65]

The policy of revenge and proscription against persons who aided and abetted Napoleon in the early part of 1815, which had been announced in the proclamations issued by Louis at Cambrai before he entered Paris (June 25th and 28th), was not to remain a dead letter; and we have now to mention some of the saddest incidents which took place at this crisis in French history, and which were witnessed by the British army. Fouché had become Minister of Police. He justified his acceptance of that post by declaring that he wished to save the men who were threatened with vengeance.^[66] Upon him it devolved to carry out this policy, and though he did so with outward reluctance, and told the King that there had been no conspiracy to dethrone him in favour of Napoleon—which appears to have been quite true, for all acted on the wild impulse of the moment,—yet still he was not ashamed to come forward in the odious light of an accuser against his former friends. On the 24th of July, two ordinances, countersigned by himself, were published, by which thirty-two Peers who had joined Napoleon’s Upper House, established since the 20th of March, were declared to have forfeited their rights to the French Peerage; twenty Officers and other Officials were at the same time ordered to be arrested, and brought to trial before a court-martial; and thirty-nine more were desired to quit Paris in three days, to places pointed out by the Minister of Police, and to remain there under his supervision, until the new Chambers should decide whether they were to be banished, or delivered over for trial to the tribunals.^[67]

43The first victim put upon his trial was General Labedoyère, who commanded the regiment at Grenoble that deserted its post and joined Napoleon in his famous march from Cannes to Paris. His defection had given the first signal to the universal revolt against the King’s authority that followed, and was one of the causes of the Emperor’s success; the partisans of the King were therefore more than ordinarily embittered against him. He admitted the facts of his treachery; he contented himself by defending his honour by declaring that, though he might have been misled by illusions, by recollections of his former master, and by a false idea of honour and of what was due to his country, he was no traitor or conspirator, and hoped that his death might atone his error. He was shot on the 19th of August.August.

Next day Marshal Ney, who had been previously apprehended in the Department of Lot, was examined at the Conciergerie; but his case was adjourned till later in the year. Meanwhile the King’s Government was overthrown, in September, and an ultra-Royalist Ministry established, with the avowed intention of showing no clemency to the proscribed. Ney’s trial accordingly took place early in November, and he was at first arraigned before a court-martial of four Marshals.^[68] But the latter decided that the prisoner, being a Peer, was entitled to be judged by his peers, and it devolved upon the Upper House to do so. His guilt was 44clearly established, and it was rendered all the more heinous by the protestations of loyalty with which he quitted Louis when he left Paris to arrest the progress of Napoleon, promising to bring the latter back in an iron cage. For some days he remained true to his duty, but, though a brave man, he was singularly impulsive, and was not endowed with much discretion or judgment. A frenzy of delirium had seized hold of the Royal troops, who were flocking to Napoleon’s standards, and Ney began to fear that he had not sufficient force to resist his former master; his moral courage began to fail. Dreading, above all things, a civil war, he resolved that no step of his should precipitate such a calamity; believing that the cause of the Bourbons was irretrievably lost, and, carried away by the violent excitement of the moment, he forgot his promises and the trust reposed in him, and wildly threw in his lot with the Emperor.^[69] Thereby he dealt a final blow to the fortunes of the King. For his defence, it was pleaded that the Military Convention of the 3rd, had guaranteed that no person in the capital should be disturbed or called to account, for his conduct or political opinions; but the Chamber refused to entertain the plea, and he was condemned to death by one hundred and thirty-nine votes against seventeen (December 6th). Strenuous efforts were made to obtain the prisoner’s release on account of the Convention, and applications were addressed to the Duke of Wellington, Lord Liverpool, and even to the Prince Regent on the subject. But these high authorities declined to do anything for him, on the ground that the Convention related only to the military occupation of Paris, and that, while the article in question prevented the Allies from adopting measures of severity towards persons in the capital, yet it did not, and could not, prevent the French Government from acting in this respect, as they might deem fit.^[70]

The execution took place in the gardens of the Luxembourg palace, at nine o’clock in the morning of December 7th, when Ney met his death with calmness and courage. It shed a deep gloom over Paris, and did little, as might have been expected, to serve the King. Had Louis shown clemency to the man who had deeply wronged him, and whose reputation had thereby 45become sullied, instead of proceeding to extremities by violating the Convention of July 3rd, his credit would have been raised. While the justice of such action becomes all the more clear, since it was stipulated that, in the case of difficulties arising, a favourable interpretation was to be given to the claims of the French army and of the city of Paris. Further, as foreign armies have no right to punish the inhabitants of a conquered State for political opinions or conduct, the Convention either bound Louis, on whose behalf the capital was taken, or else it had no value whatsoever.^[71]

The third and last victim selected for vengeance by the ultra-Royal party was General Lavalette, a relation by marriage of the Emperor, and Director of Posts, who was convicted of having misused his power in favour of Napoleon, when the latter reached Fontainebleau in March. Having been in civil employ, he was condemned to death by the guillotine; and the sentence, in spite of appeals to the mercy of the King, was to be carried out on December 21st. In this case, however, the Government were baulked of their prey, and the prisoner made good his escape by the courage and devotion of his wife, with the assistance of three Englishmen. His wife having exchanged dresses with him, Lavalette got out of prison; but he remained in hiding in Paris for more than twelve days, not being able to leave the closely guarded city until the 8th of January; when, by the co-operation of Mr. Bruce, and Captain Hutchinson, Grenadier Guards (afterwards Earl of Donoughmore), he drove to Compiègne in an open carriage, disguised as a British Officer, and accompanied by General Sir Robert Wilson. It was with difficulty that the latter piloted him out of France, but this was at last managed successfully. Sir Robert then returned to Paris on the 10th, and the police, having received information of the facts of the case, he, Captain Hutchinson, and Mr. Bruce were immediately arrested and confined, awaiting trial, till the 22nd of April, 1816, when they were condemned to be imprisoned for three months. That a distinguished Officer of high rank in the British army, and well known in Europe for his personal animosity against Napoleon, should have actively interfered to save the life of one of the latter’s best friends, was a sufficient reason to put a stop to further acts of the bloodshed, which cast so unnecessary a shadow over the first months of the restoration of King Louis.^[72]

46The negotiations which had been going on continually between the Allied Sovereigns and Louis XVIII., ever since they and their counsellors arrived in Paris, terminated at last by a treaty of peace, dated November 20th. There were matters of considerable difficulty to be discussed, before a general agreement could be arrived at between so many independent nations, whose interests were not all identical. The situation, moreover, was somewhat complex, and this is shown by Lord Liverpool who, writing to Mr. Canning, on the 4th of August, says:—

By the Treaty, the eastern frontier, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, was restricted generally, to the line that existed in 1790; and thus the French lost a strip of territory which, in 1814, had been ceded to them, including the fortresses of Landau, Sarre-Louis, Philippeville, and Marienburg. France had moreover to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, for the expenses of the war. Further, an army of not more than 150,000 men, formed of British, Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and German troops, in about equal proportions, and under a Commander-in-chief appointed by the Allied Sovereigns, was to occupy seventeen fortresses along the northern frontier, from Condé, Valenciennes, Bouchain, and Cambrai, to the tête de pont of Fort Louis on the Rhine. The occupation was to continue for three years certain, and might last for another two years. This mixed army was placed under the supreme command of the Duke of Wellington, and all the expenses incurred by it were to be defrayed by the French. It was understood that the primary object of these latter stipulations was to preserve Louis on the throne, and to give time for the consolidation of his government. Lastly, a sum of 835,000,000 francs was exacted by way of compensation to the Powers, for the spoliations and losses which they suffered during the Revolution, 47and to indemnify the minor States for their recent expenses. Thus, the French had to submit to the payment of more than sixty-one million sterling, as the result of their defeat; and this sum did not include the vast amounts which were otherwise taken from them, under the head of contributions for the armies that invaded their country, or that were to be maintained there, for the purpose of inducing them to conform to the new order which had just been established.^[74]

Organization of the Allied army of occupation, under the supreme command of the Duke of Wellington—Return of the remainder to their respective countries—Instructions of the Allied Courts to Wellington—Convention relating to the occupation, attached to the Treaty of Paris—Positions assigned to each contingent on the north-eastern frontier of France—March from Paris to Cambrai—Military precautions—Camps of instruction and field exercises—Reduction of the army of occupation—Difficulties with the French—Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle—Evacuation of France—The Guards Brigade leave Cambrai, after nearly three years' stay there, and embark at Calais—Valedictory Orders—The Coldstream sent to Chatham—Conclusion of military service in French territory.

In consequence of the Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, the capital was to be relieved of the unwelcome presence of the invader, and all the troops not required for the occupation of the north-eastern frontier were to evacuate France as soon as possible, and to be sent back to their respective homes. Of the Allied army of occupation, 150,000 strong, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia supplied a contingent of 30,000 men each; of the remainder 10,000 were Bavarians, while Denmark, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurtemburg furnished each a force of 5000 men.

By a General Order, dated the 30th of November, the future organization of the British contingent was notified. It was formed of 3 brigades of cavalry (3 regiments each), 3 divisions of infantry, and 60 guns; the cavalry under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Combermere, and the infantry under Lieut.-General Lord Hill. The First Division (Lieut.-General Sir L. Cole) was composed of 3 brigades (8 battalions); the Second Division (Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton) of 3 brigades (9 battalions); and the Third Division (Lieut.-General Sir C. Colville) of 3 brigades (8 battalions). The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, who were ordered to remain in 49France, formed the 1st Brigade of the First Division, under Major-General Sir P. Maitland.^[75] The Duke of Wellington, having in the same General Order provided for the return home of the rest of the army, took leave of the gallant troops now about to be dispersed, in these words:—

The despatch upon which the above arrangements were made was communicated to Wellington by H.R.H. the Duke of York by letter, dated the 9th of November, and is reproduced in an Appendix.^[77]

50The Prussian contingent was commanded by Lieut.-General von Ziethen, and consisted of 10 infantry regiments (thirty battalions), 1 battalion of Jägers, 9 regiments of cavalry (thirty-six squadrons), and 80 guns, formed into five brigades of infantry, and three of cavalry.

The Austrian corps, under General Baron von Frimont, contained 22½ battalions, 28½ squadrons, and 96 guns, divided into three divisions of two brigades each.

The Russians, under Lieut.-General Count Woronzow,—24 battalions, 6 regiments of cavalry (thirty-four squadrons), and 84 guns: two infantry divisions (of three brigades each), and the cavalry division (also of three brigades).

Prince Frederick of Hesse commanded the Danish contingent,—5 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 20 guns (two brigades). Major-General Sir J. Lyon (relieved afterwards by Count Alten), the Hanoverians,—6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 6 guns (two brigades). Lieut.-General Baron de Wöllwarth (replaced afterwards by General Count Scheler), the Wurtemburgers,—6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 6 guns. Major-General von Gablenz, the Saxons,—5 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 8 guns. And Lieut.-General de la Motte, the Bavarians,—3 regiments of infantry, and 2 of cavalry.^[78]

It had already been agreed by the four great Powers (Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia), on the 22nd of October, that the Allied armies—other than the corps required for the occupation—should 51evacuate French territory as soon as possible, and Wellington was commissioned to make the necessary arrangements for this purpose. Even before that date, the Russians, having a long way to march home before the winter set in, began to move eastwards; and Blücher intimated, as far back as the 8th of October, that, having been desired to withdraw towards Prussian territory, he was giving orders for the purpose of carrying out the intentions of his Government. The evacuation, however, by the British troops, did not begin till the middle of December, when, marching to Calais, they were shipped over to England with the least delay possible under the supervision of Major-General Sir D. Pack; but adverse winds retarded the operation, and it was only completed on the 4th of February, 1816.

When the Allied Sovereigns placed the supreme command of the army of occupation in the hands of Wellington, they gave him instructions to enable him to carry out the duty with which they entrusted him. On the 20th of November, they dealt with the political situation, by reminding him that the objects for which their troops were stationed in France were: (1) to secure the execution of the treaties concluded with that country, and (2) to protect Europe from French violence, and from internal revolutionary upheavals which were liable to take place among the people. They said their hopes of tranquillity were founded upon the system which they had established in the country, and they attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of a legitimate Sovereign, in the person of Louis XVIII. Until such times, therefore, as the forces of the King were organized, it was to be the duty of the Allied armies, in concert with the French Government, to protect the capital and the Royal family from popular effervescence; with this view the Commander-in-chief was empowered to delay his march from Paris until His Most Christian Majesty should notify to him that his presence in the capital was no longer necessary. The Allied Sovereigns, moreover, did not desire their troops to perform mere police duties, or to interfere in the internal administration of the country; but this did not exempt them from the obligation they were under, to maintain Louis on the throne of France, and “to support him against every revolutionary convulsion which might tend to upset by force the order just established, and to compromise the general tranquillity.” They did not disguise from themselves that it would be a delicate matter 52to judge when intervention might become necessary, but they announced their entire confidence in the British Commander-in-chief, to whose discretion they left the matter, should it ever arise. In order, however, to enable him to form a correct opinion upon it, they instructed him to take into consideration the views of the diplomatic Agents of the Powers residing in Paris. Finally, the latter were directed to send him, at least once a week, a united and common report, when he was absent from the capital; and they were also to transmit, in their corporate capacity, any communication which he might think it proper to address to the French Government.^[79]

The military situation had been considered at an earlier date (October 22nd), with the following conclusions: Full authority over the Allied army was given to the Commander-in-chief, who was enjoined to consult, as far as he could, the usages which prevailed in each contingent. The troops of each nationality were to be quartered as much as possible together, and on the lines of communications leading to their respective countries; they were to be under the immediate command of their own Generals, and everything relating to the discipline or to the interior economy of the various corps was to be dealt with by their own Officers. General Officers commanding contingents were formally placed under the supreme command of the Duke of Wellington; they were ordered to send their reports to him, and to obey him in all the dispositions which he might deem it his duty to make. Lastly, the French Government were invited to arrange with him, without delay, all matters affecting the occupation and the maintenance of the troops, as well as the “execution of particular conventions to regulate both these objects.”^[80]

Attached to the Treaty of the 20th of November there was a Convention, which was “as valid as if inserted word for word” in the Treaty, and, by Article No. 4,—

(1) The Allied troops were to occupy the Departments of Pas de Calais, Nord, Ardennes, Meuse, Moselle, Lower and Upper Rhine, their line of demarcation being the frontiers of these Departments respectively.

(2) A neutral zone was established between the above-mentioned strip of French territory in foreign occupation, and the remainder of the kingdom, in which neither the French nor the Allies were 53to maintain any military force, except for some special reason, and then only by mutual agreement. This zone was bounded on the south and west, by the river Somme to Ham, thence in nearly a straight line to Chalons-sur-Marne, whence it continued to a point between Joinville and Chaumont; from that place it took an easterly direction to Blamont, and then ran south to the Swiss frontier near St. Hypolite.

(3) The French were to have power to garrison certain places within the territory to be occupied by the Allies; but the forces to be quartered there were not to exceed the number which was laid down, and only such war matériel and stores as properly belonged to these places were to be kept there, the remainder to be removed into the kingdom west of the neutral zone. Altogether 22,000 men were allowed to garrison these places, the largest number being in the following fortresses, viz. Calais, where the garrison was not to exceed 1000 men; St. Omer, 1500; Arras, 1000; Lille, 3000; Dunkerque, 1000; Douai and Fort Scarpe, 1000; Metz, 3000; Strasburg, 3000; Schelstadt, 1000; Neu Brisach and Fort Mortier, 1000; and Belfort, 1000 men.^[81]

The British contingent was ready to move to its allotted stations by the beginning of the year 1816; but a delay occurred in consequence of the representations made by the Duc de Richelieu, the French Minister of Foreign affairs, who believed that it would be dangerous to leave Paris unguarded until the discussions on the law of Amnesty, which was then being debated, had terminated.^[82] Wellington adds, “From what I have seen and heard likewise of the King’s Guard, I don’t conceive it is as yet a body in which much confidence could be placed, in case there should be any disturbance in this town.”^[83]

54These difficulties, however, were speedily overcome; and on the 24th of January, the Commander-in-chief of the army of occupation wrote to the Ambassador of Great Britain and to the Plenipotentiaries of the other Allied Powers, saying that he proposed forthwith to evacuate the capital. These Ministers having agreed, the troops began their march towards the fortresses on the north-eastern frontier of France, which they were to occupy, and, before the end of the month, Paris was left to the King and to the new system that had been established by the Treaty. No disturbances occurred, and Louis was enabled to maintain his authority without the intervention of a foreign force; but Wellington found that it would be expedient to remain a short time longer in the capital, believing that his presence there was “very useful to the Government and to the King, in a variety of ways, and gives confidence to that party which brought back the King.” As he was alone in the capital, and without British troops, Marshal Oudinot sent a detachment of French soldiers to mount guard over his quarters.^[84]

N^o. 1.

SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE
BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRANCE
FROM
1815 to 1818

A. D. Innes & C^o. London.

The positions occupied by the Allied contingents were as follows: The British corps had their head-quarters at Cambrai, and were quartered in the Departments of Pas de Calais and Nord, at Cassel, Hazebrouck, Lillers, St. Pol, Bapaume, Cambrai, Valenciennes, etc.; near them, in the Department Nord, the Danes were stationed at Bouchain, the Hanoverians at Condé, and the Saxons at Le Quesnoi. Occupying the eastern portion of the latter Department, as well as nearly the whole of the Ardennes, the Russians placed their head-quarters at Maubeuge, and were quartered in Landrecies, Avesnes, Charlemont, Givet, Réthel, etc. The Prussians were in the Departments of Meuse and Moselle, their head-quarters at Sédan, occupying Mezières, Montmédy, Longwy, Briey, Thionville, Commercy, Bar-le-Duc. The Baravians were close to them and to the Palatinate, at St. Avold, Sarreguemines (head-quarters), and Bische; the Wurtemburgers at Weissemburg and Lauterburg.^[85] The Austrian contingent took possession of the Departments of Upper and Lower Rhine, head-quarters at Colmar, and the principal 55garrisons were at Hagenau, Molsheim, Bischweiler, Mulhausen, and Altkirch.^[86]

The Coldstream Guards were the last troops to leave Paris. On the 26th of January all the public duties in the capital were found by the Battalion,^[87] and the 4th and 5th companies, under Lieutenant-Colonel MacKinnon, were ordered to relieve the 23rd Regiment at Montmartre. Next day, the Guards Brigade with Captain Sinclair’s brigade (field battery) of Artillery and the Sappers and Miners attached to the First Division, marched off from the barrière de Villette; the Grenadier Guards and the Sappers and Miners to Louvres, the Coldstream and the Artillery to Gonesse. The public duties were collected by Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins at the barrière des Martyrs, where they were joined by Lieut.-Colonel MacKinnon’s detachment, and the whole followed to Gonesse after the rest of the troops had left Paris. The march was continued to Cambrai in detachments, the Battalion being billeted at each halt in several villages,^[88] and the route taken was by Senlis and Peronne to Cambrai, which was reached by the head-quarters, together with the Grenadier and the 1st companies, on the 6th of February.

The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and the two companies of the Coldstream just mentioned, formed the garrison of Cambrai, while the remainder of the latter Battalion occupied the following villages:—2nd company, Villers Ploich; 3rd and 4th companies, under Lieut.-Colonel MacKinnon, Marcoing; 5th company, Banteau and Bantouzelle; 6th and 7th companies, Gouzecourt; 8th and the Light-infantry companies, Villers Glishain, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins, who had orders “to detach an Officer’s party to Honnecourt, if he deemed it desirable;” Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell was quartered at Gonnelieu, and took command of the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th companies.^[89]

56Though peace had been concluded, the foreign contingents were kept ready for active service, and the fortresses were held closely guarded, as if an enemy were in the field. Thus at Cambrai, the gates of the town were carefully locked under the superintendence of an Officer of the main guard, and were kept closed from sunset to dawn; no one was allowed to enter at such times, except under peculiar circumstances, (and then only when the main guard was turned out). Patrols were sent out constantly at uncertain hours; Non-commissioned officers and men were not permitted to leave their quarters after dark, without a pass; sentries were relieved hourly, both by day and by night; and even the Field-Officer of the day was not admitted into the Citadel by night, and the Officer of the guard there had to communicate with him from the ramparts.^[90]

The occupation of French territory lasted three years, until November, 1818, and during the whole of this time, the British troops were kept actively employed on their military duties. It was a period in which the efficiency of the army was maintained at a high standard. The Coldstream were continually exercised in route marching, in drill, in musketry,^[91] and, the Officers and selected Non-commissioned officers and men, in sword exercise. Every detail of interior economy was carefully attended to, under the company Officers, who were held responsible to the Commanding Officer for the arms and accoutrements, for the men’s regimental necessaries, for the cleanliness and good order of the barrack rooms, and for the regular closing of the accounts, which at the time was done on the 24th of each month.^[92] In the summer as many of the troops as 57could be spared from fortress duty were encamped wherever open spaces were available, the Guards Brigade upon the glacis of Cambrai, for the purpose of carrying out the Field exercises then practised by the army. The Duke of Wellington paid minute attention to the drill of the contingent, and issued repeated orders on the movements in which he desired the regiments to perfect themselves.^[93]

Reviews on a larger scale took place in the autumn of each year, in the neighbourhood of Denain. In October, 1816, the English, Danish, Saxon, and Hanoverian contingents were assembled, 36,000 men and 84 guns strong (of which nearly 26,000 men and 60 guns were furnished by the British army); a detailed programme of the operations to be performed was prepared, a feigned enemy was told off, and the whole concluded by a march past, according to the accustomed forms of the different corps present.^[94]

Their Royal Highnesses the Duke of Kent and the Duke of Cambridge were present on this occasion, and were received by Guards of Honour furnished by the Coldstream Guards. Similar manœuvres took place in the middle of October next year, near Bouchain, at which the King of Prussia and the Prince of Orange assisted, and again the same thing was repeated in September, 1818. Finally, another military display was given on the 23rd of October, 1818, just before France was evacuated by the Allies, near Villers-en-Couchies, in the presence of the Emperor of Russia and of the King of Prussia; 51,000 men and 168 guns were then brought together, of which 23,000 and 84 guns were Russians, 19,000 and 60 guns 58British, 3000 and 10 guns Danish, 3000 and 8 guns Saxons, and 3000 and 6 guns Hanoverians.^[95] The enemy was represented by a detachment of Cossacks and of Russian infantry and artillery, and by the British cavalry, three companies of Sappers and Miners, and three brigades of artillery; the latter under Lieut.-Colonel Sir G. Scovell, and the whole under the general direction of Major-General Narishkin.

The movements to be executed were all published beforehand, and the operations ended by a march past.^[96]

Soon after the British contingent reached its quarters in the Departments of Pas de Calais and Nord, a reduction was effected in its strength by three regiments of cavalry,^[97] by drafts of men entitled to their discharge or unfit for service, and by 400 men from the Guards Brigade (200 from each Battalion, so as to bring them to 1000 instead of 1200 men per Battalion). By this means, taking into account some 800 recruits who joined the contingent, the latter amounted to a little more than 29,000 Officers and men in the beginning of May, 1816.^[98]

There were found to be some 60 men unfit for service in the 2nd Coldstream Guards about this time, and the 200 were made up by selecting 15 of the most unserviceable men per company (or 150 from the Battalion). Captain Shirley, and Lieutenants FitzClarence and Douglas, proceeded to England in charge of this 59party (April 23rd), which, together with that belonging to the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, was placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel D. MacKinnon, Coldstream Guards.

In the course of the year, the Duc de Richelieu endeavoured to secure from the Allies a more solid and more general reduction of the army of occupation, in order to lessen the financial strain that burdened France, at a moment when she was oppressed by debt and afflicted by a bad harvest. He hoped thereby to render the King more popular. But he experienced considerable reluctance on the part of the British Government and of Wellington to agree to any such proposition, until the Chambers had proved by their acts that they were prepared to support the rule of Louis XVIII., and so “dissipate all reasonable apprehension as to the fulfilment of the late Treaty.”^[99] The Duke, indeed, was at first much opposed to it, and wrote strongly against it from Cambrai even as late as December, 1816, being of opinion that any real reduction of the Allied forces would tend to excite the French malcontents, and do harm to the Royal cause and to good government, and that “we ought to reduce only gradually and in proportion to our casualties.”^[100] A little later, however, being in Paris (January 9th), he modified his opinion on account of the successful negotiation of a French loan in London, which might “recall to the recollection of public men in France the obligations they owe to the Allied Sovereigns, and again reconcile them to measures which France herself, and not foreign Powers, rendered necessary.”^[101] Under these circumstances, he proposed a reduction of 30,000 men (or one-fifth from each contingent), to be made on the 1st of April, 1817, and to be announced “in the manner most likely to produce a favourable effect on the public mind,” as soon as the budget passed and the measures for ensuring the loan were definitely adopted.^[102] These proposals were accepted by the Allies, and were embodied in an official note, which was presented to the French Government on the 10th of February, 1817.^[103]

In pursuance of these arrangements, six battalions returned to England, proceeding there by Calais, to which were added detachments of 200 men from each of the Guards Battalions, or about 606000 men in all. The staffs, moreover, of the Third Division (Sir C. Colville) and of two brigades (Sir R. O'Callaghan and Sir J. Keane) were broken up.^[104]

In June, 1818, Sir P. Maitland having been sent to Upper Canada as Lieut.-Governor of that province, Major-General Sir J. Lambert was appointed to the Guards Brigade at Cambrai; but as he was on leave, Colonel Woodford, Coldstream Guards, remained in temporary command until August. In June, also, Major-General Sir R. O'Callaghan replaced Sir J. Lambert as Brigadier of the 7th Brigade, and Sir C. Colville assumed command of the Second Division, vice Sir H. Clinton.

The Band of the Grenadier Guards had been sent for a few months to Paris, during the autumn of 1815, and left London on the 1st of September, proceeding by Brighton to Dieppe. Next year, the Coldstream Band went to Cambrai, on the 10th of June, by Dover and Calais, and remained there till the following October.^[105]

The health of the troops in France, during the three and a half years succeeding Waterloo, seems to have been satisfactory. By a return, dated Paris, July 15, 1816, it appears that the number of sick amounted to 1060 men in the whole British contingent, of which only 43 belonged to the Coldstream, out of a total strength of 1104 Officers and men belonging to the Battalion at that time.^[106] The principal cause of illness arose from the prevalence of ophthalmia, which, beginning in Paris in the winter of 1815, continued to affect the men until they left the country in 1818. Numerous orders were issued to prevent the spread of this evil.

Two Officers belonging to the Regiment died in France during this period, viz. Lieutenant J. Buller, in Paris, in January, 1816, and Lieutenant A. Gordon, killed in a duel with a French Officer, at Cambrai, in April, 1818.

61There were not many incidents of any great importance to mark the occupation of French fortresses by European contingents. France, deprived of her incomparable military Chief, destitute of popular leaders, and exhausted by the wars that drained her resources during the past twenty-five years, settled gradually down, and accepted, though very reluctantly, the government which the Allied Powers had imposed upon her. The alien force did the work which had been contemplated; for, keeping the people under control, and repressing all revolutionary ebullitions, while Louis was consolidating his rule, the occupation did not come to an end until he had established his power in the country. Subsequent events have proved that the settlement thus effected by the will of Europe was not a permanent arrangement; France never consented to it, and we now know that it was overthrown within the brief space of fifteen years.^[107] But when the Allied forces finally returned to their homes, and left the conquered people to their own resources, the Bourbon régime seemed, at all events outwardly, to be restored, and the new authority to be unquestioned.

The British troops conformed in every respect to the laws of the country, and to the various and frequently vexatious police regulations that prevailed at the time.^[108] They conducted themselves peaceably in their various cantonments, and contrived to get on well with the 62population. So generally quiet was the state of affairs, that a liberal allowance of leave could be granted to the Officers of the contingent, soon after their arrival in the north of France.^[109] The same relations existed between the inhabitants and the troops of the other Powers.^[110] But, nevertheless, the occupation raised many controversies,—easily to be accounted for by the temper which the people were ready to display towards the invader, after a crushing military defeat. Irregularities committed by the troops, when they took place, were rectified without delay, and measures were adopted to prevent their recurrence; in this respect, at least, the French had nothing to complain of. On the other hand, there were repeated difficulties with the civil officials of the country, and with the turbulence that moved many of the inhabitants to be disorderly. The French Préfets and Maires too often refused to discharge their functions, the magistrates to convict on the clearest evidence, and the police to repress riots when the natives were found to be engaged in disputes with the foreign troops. Wellington continually protested strongly on this subject to the King’s Government, and assured the Ministers that, unless the local authorities did their duty, the troops would be provoked to retaliate and revenge the injuries they had too often to put up with.^[111] The irritation felt by a certain portion of the population against the foreign contingents, led to constant brawls, which became a source of danger when they occasioned the people to assemble tumultuously. The danger of frequent collisions was increased by the habit, then adopted by the British Officers, of using their fists for their personal protection, when drawn into scuffles with the natives in the streets. To stop this, the Duke insisted that all Officers should wear “their side-arms ... whenever they appeared out of their quarters or tents, except when hunting or shooting.”^[112]

63A grave incident occurred at Cambrai, where a riot took place in June, 1816; hearing which, Wellington wrote to Sir. P. Maitland, then in command of that fortress, as follows:—

The questions that arose out of the peculiar conditions in which the occupied districts were placed, caused difficulties, which differed in certain respects from those arising out of other military occupations. In 1871, for instance, after the peace of Versailles, Germany 64occupied some French provinces; and, in this case, the conquering armies had only to deal with the inhabitants—there were no hostile troops in their vicinity. But, in 1816, the Allies were placed in another position, and French soldiers were in their neighbourhood. Europe, moreover, had caused a revolution in France, and had to support the new government, until its power was established. The army of occupation, therefore, was not only exacting redress from the vanquished nation, according to treaty, but it was also in close alliance with the Government of the latter. Hence it was not unnatural that some delicate points should be raised, embarrassing to the French Ministers, who, while they posed as patriotic Frenchmen, had much to fear from the Imperialists and other malcontents that roamed over the country. A question arose in the Prussian districts, regarding the disbanded troops of Napoleon’s armies, which is perhaps best explained by quoting an extract from a letter addressed by the Commander-in-chief to General Ziethen, dated February 15, 1816:—

Owing to the arrangement sanctioned by the Convention of the 20th of November, 1815, attached to the Treaty of the same date, by which the French were allowed to maintain garrisons in certain specified places in the Departments under foreign occupation, further complications arose, which increased the tension between the King’s Government and the Allied forces. While manœuvres were going on in the summer of 1816, the Governor of St. Omer raised a note of alarm, on seeing British troops in the vicinity of the fortress; and the excitement became such, that Wellington was obliged to write to the Duc de Feltre (the War Minister), a letter of strong remonstrance, in which, having first defended himself against a ridiculous charge that he intended to seize a French fort, he declared that the occupation was a measure calculated to secure the peace of Europe and the consolidation of the Royal power, that the foreign contingents were the allies of the King, and that he would not suffer his soldiers to be disarmed when they had occasion to march through a French garrison.^[115]

66The passage of troops through fortified places had an unfortunate result at Cambrai; for, on the 10th of May, 1818, when a French detachment marched through the town from Paris to Douai, a riot ensued, in which three or four men of the Coldstream were injured. The British garrison behaved well in the emergency, and the following order was published by Colonel Woodford, then in command:—

N. R. Wilkinson del.    MUSQUETEER 1650.    Mintern Bros. Chromo.

The Allied forces were now soon to quit French territory. It had been stipulated by treaty that the occupation was to last five years, but it was also expressly stated that it might terminate in three, and all parties by this time wished to bring it to a conclusion as soon as possible. The French naturally pined for emancipation; and the words of the Duc de Richelieu, delivered in the Chambers, that “every heart throbbed at the thought of seeing on the soil of the country, no other banner but that of France,” found a responsive echo throughout the length and breadth of the land, and awoke a passionate longing for freedom in the minds of the people, which was very difficult to resist. 67Wellington, also, was disposed to assist them. The Government of the King had been showing increased hostility to the foreign contingents, who were becoming daily more hateful in the eyes of the French nation. He expressed himself clearly on this subject to Lord Bathurst, on the 8th of March, 1818:—

It was apparent to all that this condition of tension must come to an end; and, though there was no certainty that the King could maintain himself on the throne without foreign support, yet it was evident that the cure for the evils to be dreaded, was liable to become a greater misfortune to Europe, than the apprehension itself. The French, moreover, had made great efforts to discharge their financial obligations to the Allies; and in these efforts they were successful, aided by the Duke of Wellington, who, upon the proposal of the Emperor of Russia, was appointed president of the diplomatic and finance committee charged with the regulation of these liabilities.^[118] Added to this, the fortifications of the Netherlands frontier were by this time nearly completed, and as this was done to form a barrier against France, the moment had arrived when the country could be delivered from the burden that oppressed it, as well as from the cause which produced so much irritation.

In the autumn, therefore, of 1818, a Congress was convened at Aix-la-Chapelle, for the purpose of determining the question;^[119] and 68an agreement was made, on the 1st of October, by which the foreign forces were to leave the soil of France on or before the 30th of November. To this compact was added an invitation to His Most Christian Majesty to join the four Great European Powers, and to take part in their deliberations, present or future, for the maintenance of peace, and for the mutual guarantee of the rights of nations. The conference, however, did not end there; for a secret convention was also signed, by the four Powers only, stipulating that, in case France should resume her revolutionary ways, and again threaten the tranquillity of the civilized world, British, Prussian, Austrian, and Russian corps d’armées were to assemble forthwith at Brussels, Cologne, Stuttgart, and Mainz respectively, for the suppression of these disorders.^[120]

Wellington took early measures to effect the evacuation by the army of occupation, and hastened the operation with all possible despatch. General von Frimont reported (October 23rd) that the Austrian contingent would send the first column across the Rhine on the 1st of November, and that the whole corps would quit French territory on the 11th. The Prussians moved off early in the month, and were directed upon Cologne, Bonn, and Coblentz. The Russians marched in two columns immediately after the review, which had taken place near Villers-en-Couchies on the 23rd of October, the first through the Netherlands, the other following the Prussians to the Rhine at Mannheim. After this latter column, came the Saxons, who left Le Quesnoi on the 7th and 9th, and moved to Forbach. The Bavarians began to evacuate their cantonments on the 12th; while the Hanoverians and the Danes marched northwards, through the Netherlands, the former between the 4th and the 9th, and the latter between the 12th and the 19th. The British troops, who were placed under canvas during their march, were sent to Calais immediately after the review just mentioned, where they were embarked under the orders of Major-General Sir M. Power. The embarkation began on the 29th of October. As soon as the fortresses were permanently evacuated by the Allies, the French, who had been specially authorized to enter the occupied Departments for the purpose, marched into them without delay, and, hoisting the white flag, 69under a Royal salute, once more took possession of their own territory, amidst the universal enthusiasm and joy of the military and of the inhabitants. The British stores, which could not be conveyed to Calais, were shipped at Valenciennes, and were taken by water to Antwerp; a portion were sold to the King of the Netherlands.^[121]

The progress of the evacuation being sufficiently advanced, the Field-Marshal commanding the Allied forces, issued, on the 10th of November, a valedictory address, and on the same day similar orders were communicated to the British army. Later, on the 1st of December, a letter from H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief was published, conveying to the British contingent the thanks of the Prince Regent “for the discipline and good order which have been so successfully maintained, to the honour of the British arms, during the period it has been stationed in France.”^[122]

On the 6th of November, a letter was received from the Préfet of the Department of Nord, recording his gratitude and that of his subordinates, for the rigid discipline which prevailed in the army of occupation, “to which has been due the harmony which existed between the troops and the inhabitants.” He added that he felt a real satisfaction in testifying to the excellent conduct of the British corps, and to the zeal with which all the Officers carried out the views of the Duke, to alleviate as much as possible the burden of the occupation.^[123]

The Guards Brigade did not leave France with the rest of the British army, but remained at head-quarters at Cambrai, with the Chief of the Staff, Lieut.-General Sir G. Murray (the Duke being obliged to return to Aix-la-Chapelle after the review of the 23rd of October), until the morning of the 18th of November; when, evacuating the fortress, they moved, at eleven o’clock, to Cantin. The march of the Coldstream was made in six columns, four being composed of two companies; and was continued to Calais, the port of embarkation, avoiding as much as possible all large towns and centres of French patriotism. Marching by Lillers, 70Racquingham, and Louches, the Brigade reached Calais on the 23rd, and immediately embarked for Dover. On this date Sir J. Lambert published the following order of farewell to the Guards, who had completed their service in France:—

Arrived at Dover, the Coldstream marched to Chatham, where they arrived on the 28th of November, and remained quartered in that garrison till further orders.

Thus ended this stirring drama that began in March, 1815, and in which the Coldstream Guards participated to the fullest extent. During these eventful years, services were not only rendered to King and country, on the field of battle, at one of the most momentous crises of modern history; but duty was also zealously performed, in a less acknowledged sphere, when a war-like nation was induced, with much difficulty, to abate her military ardour, to renounce her menacing attitude, and to resume a pacific policy towards her neighbours. The years spent in France were useful to the British troops quartered there. It was a time when they had to be prepared for every emergency, when they had to cultivate amicable relations with a foreign people who resented deeply their presence among them, when their demeanour towards the inhabitants had to be both firm and conciliatory, and when their military efficiency and discipline could alone enable them to discharge the delicate duties with which they were entrusted.

This chapter must not conclude without recording that, at the end of the occupation, the Duke of Wellington was created a Field-Marshal in the armies of Austria, Russia, and Prussia; and that his services to Europe, which could not be further rewarded by 71his own Sovereign, were acknowledged in simple language, which expressed the difficulties of the situation, and the Royal approbation at the manner in which they had been overcome.

Distress in England after the war—Reductions in the Army and Navy—Stations of the Brigade—French Eagles captured, deposited in the Chapel Royal, Whitehall—Reforms in interior economy—Death of George III., and Accession of George IV.—Cato Street Conspiracy—Trial of Queen Caroline—Coronation of George IV.—Guards in Dublin—Distress in 1826—Death of the Duke of York—Changes in uniform—Death of George IV.; succeeded by William IV.—Political agitation at home, revolution abroad; the Reform Act—Coronation of William IV.—First appearance of cholera—Death of the King, and Accession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria—Changes and reforms introduced during the reign of William IV.

The defeat of Napoleon brought about a period of peace in Europe, which, lasting till 1853, almost entirely undisturbed by the clash of arms, is chiefly conspicuous in history for the internal changes, and for the popular and national ideas that were then developed, both in England and on the Continent. This period, containing necessarily, as far as the Coldstream is concerned, few of those stirring incidents which invest the annals of a regiment with public interest, marks the introduction to our present modern society, and exhibits a rapid growth in the British Empire, and a great improvement in the material lot of the people. But it opened inauspiciously, and was at its commencement tinged with gloom.

The principles of the French Revolution, generating dangerous and violent forces, and threatening Christendom with anarchy and destruction, were at length laid low, and, to outward appearances at least, they were finally crushed and eradicated. The victory rested with England, to whose indomitable energy, national power, and vast financial resources, the result of the gigantic contest had been due. And as men who have conquered in a desperate struggle, to rest and refreshment as the fruit of their labours, so did Great Britain indulge in the expectation that, the enemy being vanquished, she would at once be compensated for her innumerable sacrifices by the quiet and unalloyed enjoyment of the 73rewards of her valour. Nor was this an extravagant hope. Even during the war, while the people were oppressed by a crushing taxation, and when the country was in the very throes of an exhausting and terrible conflict, England, thanks to her commanding maritime supremacy, that alone endowed her with extraordinary strength, advanced steadily in riches and in population.^[126] It may, then, be readily conceived that, if such was the case in the hour of darkness, the nation had cause to look forward with confidence, to a rapidly accelerating progress in material prosperity, as soon as the millennium of a general peace should dawn upon the civilized world. But anticipations are frequently disappointed, and in this case they were not immediately realized. The cessation of hostilities, instead of heralding an era of plenty, was the signal of much misery and distress, which cast a dark shadow over the last few years of the reign of George III., and chastened the rejoicings that followed the successful termination of the greatest war of modern times.

Various causes are assigned for this unexpected suffering, into which we cannot enter. Suffice it to record the fact, and to note, that the widespread poverty that then prevailed, led to disorder, which, breaking out in many parts of the country, had to be quelled by the interference of military force. In London there were also disturbances or threats of riots, so that, from the end of 1816 until the autumn of 1817—and, indeed, upon many occasions afterwards—the Guards quartered in the Metropolis were constantly kept ready for the preservation of the public peace; the troops were often confined to barracks, the Officers recalled from leave, the public duties strengthened, and piquets temporarily sent to protect vulnerable points in the city. The rabble, urged by leaders, who endeavoured, as usual, to convert the distress to their own purposes, began to display a rising animosity towards the soldiery;^[127] and schemes were formed for the purpose of burning the barracks in London, and of attacking the Tower, the Bank, and other places of 74importance. No actual outbreak occurred until the 2nd of December, when a disturbance took place, known as the Spafield riots, in which the mob, having procured arms, marched into the City and retained possession of the Minories for some hours. After doing much damage, they were dislodged by the troops sent to put them down, and the district was patrolled till order was completely restored.^[128]

The abrupt cessation of hostilities occasioned reductions in the large naval and military establishments which had to be maintained for the vigorous prosecution of the war; and the promptitude with which they were effected, aggravated not a little the general distress that followed. The Government, defeated in their proposal to continue the property tax, and having thereupon voluntarily given up the war duty on malt, found themselves suddenly deprived of £17,000,000 of revenue, and had no option but to discharge forthwith, and in no sparing manner, a large portion of the forces of the Crown. Of the 100,000 men required for the Navy in 1815, only 33,000 were retained in 1816; the military establishment was also fixed during the Session, at 111,756 men, not counting the regiments serving in India, paid by the East India Company, nor the contingent quartered in France and provided for by that nation. To effect the necessary reductions in the land services, some 50,000 of the regular Army, the Militia 80,000 strong, and of course the foreign corps, nearly 21,000 men, were disbanded.^[129] Some of these changes did not take place until 1817, but they affected the Coldstream as early as the 24th of December, 1815, when the Regiment lost 400 men; on the 24th of March, 1817, simultaneously with the reduction effected in the army of occupation in France, another diminution of 200 men was made in the establishment; again, shortly after the 2nd Battalion 75returned from Cambrai (December, 1818), the services of four Lieutenants, sixteen Ensigns, two Assistant-Surgeons, and 200 men were further dispensed with; and lastly, on the 25th of August, 1821, four companies were abolished, twelve Officers were seconded, and 216 Non-commissioned officers and men were discharged.^[130] The sweeping nature of these reductions, rendered necessary by the termination of the war, is perhaps best appreciated by comparing the Regimental establishment as it stood in the spring of 1814, with that which was in force in the autumn of 1821:—

76In consequence of these changes, the King’s Guard and the Buckingham House Guard were reduced to ninety and thirty privates respectively, and the other public duties were lightened (January 1, 1822); very shortly afterwards (February 14th), the guards furnished by the Tower Battalion at the East and West India Docks were also abolished, and the Dock companies were thereby obliged to provide themselves with adequate protection.

During the war of 1815, and the subsequent occupation of Paris, there were only three Battalions of the Brigade in England, and they were all quartered in the West-end of London. In the winter of 1815-16, after the conclusion of the peace, two more Battalions returned home, when Windsor and the Tower were again occupied. On the 20th of August, 1816, a roster was published for the regular half-yearly change of quarters, viz. from the Tower, to Windsor, to Lower Westminster, to Portman Street barracks, to Knightsbridge barracks. This arrangement was slightly altered in December, 1818, when French territory was evacuated, and Finsbury and Chatham were added to the list.^[132] The quarters at these last two places were shortly afterwards vacated, or irregularly occupied, and Holborn and Brighton (or Portsmouth) substituted for them; in the end of 1821, a Battalion of Foot Guards proceeded to Dublin, and six months later the Brigade was stationed as follows:—Grenadier Guards, 1st Battalion, Dublin; 2nd Battalion, Tower; 3rd Battalion, Knightsbridge: Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion, King’s Mews barracks (now known as St. George’s barracks); 2nd Battalion, Portman Street: Third Guards, 1st Battalion, Lower Westminster; 2nd Battalion, Windsor.^[133]

As there was not, at this time, sufficient accommodation for a battalion at any of the London barracks, that portion of the men who could not be lodged there were billeted in the vicinity. At Windsor, also, the Foot Guards, though sometimes furnishing detachments at Hungerford, Reading, Kew, and Sandhurst, had not 77enough room in the barracks, and a portion of the men were similarly provided with quarters in the town. The system of billeting was gradually brought to an end, but it does not seem to have entirely disappeared, in London at least, until 1837, when barrack accommodation was provided for the whole Brigade. The discipline of the men in quarters was specially looked after, each company being told off into squads under proper superintendence; the men were frequently visited, and were efficiently controlled, and reports were made of any complaint either on the part of the soldiers, or on the part of the landlords.^[134] The following appears in the 1st Battalion Orders of the 25th of February, 1820:—

From May, 1816, until the summer of 1820, the West-end Battalions supplied a detachment of some 250 men, at Deptford and Woolwich, to protect the Government establishments maintained there. The detachment was relieved every fortnight at first, and afterwards once a month. Later, the Brigade supplied detachments of variable strength, for the same purpose, at irregular periods, to both, or to either of, these places, viz.: April, 1836-April, 1837; June, 1847-November, 1847; July, 1850; March, 1851; October 28, 1853-February 8, 1854.

On the 18th of January, 1816, the Eagles captured at Waterloo, were deposited with great solemnity in the Chapel Royal, Whitehall. An escort, consisting of Officers and men of the three Regiments, who had all been present at the battle (of which the Coldstream furnished 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 23 privates), marched past the public duties and the rest of the Brigade, assembled on the Horse Guards parade, lowering the Eagles as they approached the 78King’s Colour, and proceeded thence to Whitehall, accompanied by the band of the Coldstream. Divine Service was then read, during which, the trophies were brought in, and were lodged in the Chapel.

It is perhaps worthy of remark that, as early as 1817, Government granted to soldiers the privilege of sending their own letters by post, at the then very cheap rate of one penny.^[135]

The supply of Regimental necessaries had hitherto not been satisfactorily managed. The Commanding Officer accordingly established stores, from which all the articles required by the men could be procured, of good quality, at the cheapest rate, and at fixed and known prices; and he published an order, January 23, 1817, directing that, for the future, all the men’s necessaries should be got for them there, and at no other place.^[136] This order was enforced in the 2nd Battalion, then at Cambrai, on the 9th of February.^[137]

Increased attention was paid about this time to interior economy, and former orders on the subject, issued piecemeal, were summarized. The method of paying the men and of keeping their accounts, established by the Commanding Officer, was enforced by Regimental Orders of January 19, 1818, and July 28, 1820; the messing was more closely looked after; and the duties of the company Officers, and of the Officer of the day, were better defined. By a Regimental Order of June 20, 1822,^[138] Officers commanding companies were directed frequently to visit the barrack rooms, and to see the messes, also to inspect the men’s necessaries weekly, instead of monthly as heretofore; marching order parades every Sunday morning were then instituted for this purpose, and the custom was not abolished 79until the year 1843, when Saturday was finally substituted for Sunday, as the day upon which the inspection was to take place.

Colonel Sir Richard Jackson, K.C.B. (First Major of the Regiment), having left the Coldstream, Colonel Alexander Woodford, C.B., succeeded him in the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Sir Henry Bouverie, K.C.B., promoted Second Major, assumed the command of the 2nd Battalion (January 18, 1820).

George III., after a long and glorious reign of sixty years, died on the 29th of January, 1820, and was succeeded by the Prince of Wales, who, through the illness of the King, had been Prince Regent, or Monarch in fact, though not in name, ever since the end of 1810. The ten years during which George IV. occupied the Throne, did not differ generally from the five that succeeded Waterloo: they were marked by disturbances and political commotions, which, lasting until the reign of his successor, William IV., brought about important and radical changes in the constitution of the country. During this period, moreover, the power of steam was brought into practical use, and railways and steam-ships began to take the place of stage coaches and sailing vessels. England, in short, was passing through a phase of transition, when a new order was being established both in the political and social life of the people.

The first Battalions of the three Regiments of Foot Guards attended the obsequies of George III., which took place at Windsor, February 16th, and received from General Earl Cathcart, Gold Stick in Waiting, in chief command of the troops, through Colonel Askew, the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting, “the entire approbation of H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief of their appearance, attention, and regularity, on that most melancholy occasion, and his sincere thanks for the propriety of their conduct in performing the several services assigned to them.” Next day the 1st Battalion Coldstream proceeded for four months to Portsmouth, returning to Windsor in June.

The 2nd Battalion meanwhile remained at Portman Street, and rendered good service on the occasion of the apprehension of the Cato Street conspirators, on the 23rd of February. It was ascertained that the latter, not unlike a modern gang of anarchists, were plotting to murder the King’s ministers, and to overturn every form of government; that they were well armed, and were lying concealed in a loft over a stable in Cato Street, the only 80approach to which was by a ladder and through a trap-door. Some police, accompanied by a detachment of thirty men of the 2nd Battalion, under Lieutenant F. FitzClarence, stormed the loft, garrisoned by twenty-five desperate characters, and a fight ensued in the dark, under circumstances of great confusion. Several conspirators succeeded in making their escape, but nine were secured, and sufficient arms and ammunition for one hundred persons were seized; not, however, before one of the policemen was killed, and a sergeant of the 2nd Battalion, named Legge, wounded.^[139] A Regimental Order, dated February 25th, was issued, referring to this incident:—

The new reign began with an event that stirred the whole nation to the very depths, and wrought irreparable scandal through every grade of society—the trial of the unfortunate Caroline, Queen of George IV. Happily, the episode is now forgotten, and there is no necessity to revive it. But the trial of a Queen, publicly charged with degrading personal conduct, is unique in modern history, and it created naturally an extraordinary excitement among all classes at the time; and, as feeling upon the subject ran exceedingly high, and a spirit of disorder and disaffection was widespread, the Brigade had a part to play in it, which cannot entirely be passed over. The trial itself took the form of a Bill of Pains and Penalties, read a first time in the House of Lords, July 5th. On the second reading, evidence was heard, and the proceedings, beginning on the 17th of August, did not end until the 6th of November, when there was a majority of twenty-eight in favour of the measure. At the third reading (November 10th), the majority sank to nine votes, and thereupon Government abandoned the Bill. The populace had ever been the partisans of the unhappy Queen, and, when she arrived in England in June, she met with a reception which could only compare with that which greeted Charles II. on the restoration of the Monarchy in 1660. So, also, when the withdrawal of the Bill was announced, 81London was illuminated on three successive nights, and, the results of the inquiry being forgotten, a universal joy manifested itself through the whole country, which almost equalled the unbounded enthusiasm displayed after the fall of Napoleon.

During this trying time, the Battalions of the Brigade quartered in the Metropolis formed the main force for the repression of disorder, and arrangements of the most comprehensive nature were made to prevent an outbreak that was almost hourly expected. A detachment of 350 rank and file was furnished daily, from the 17th of August, for the protection of the House of Lords. For this purpose, 50 men were added to the Tylt, a guard of 50 men was stationed during the trial, in the Cotton Yard behind Westminster Palace, the piquet at Carlton Palace was permanently posted, and a force was held as a reserve in St. James’s Park. The guard at the British Museum was doubled, the Tower Battalion was prepared to supply 200 men at any moment, on the requisition of the Lord Mayor, while a Captain’s piquet of 100 rank and file was kept constantly ready at each of the three principal West-end barracks—the King’s Mews, Knightsbridge, and Portman Street. The usual half-yearly change of quarters took place on the 26th of August, when the 1st Battalion Coldstream proceeded from Windsor to the Tower, and the 2nd Battalion from Portman Street to Knightsbridge barracks, and to that part of Upper Westminster contiguous thereto. The military arrangements made for the trial were sometimes modified during its procedure, now being reduced and again increased. During October, a guard was placed in Westminster Hall, and the Bank piquet remained on duty for twenty-four hours. These precautions were finally discontinued on the 15th of November, and the ordinary leave granted to Officers; though we find, on the 28th, riots were again apprehended, and the 1st Battalion was directed to attend to the Lord Mayor’s requisition to the extent of 300 men.

The violence of popular excitement soon subsides, and, the inquiry over, the Queen’s partisans lost interest in her cause. The King, too, became more popular with the mob, and it was possible to fix a date for his Coronation. This great event was solemnized upon the 19th of July, 1821, with all the magnificent pomp and quaint ceremonial of past ages, and is more than usually interesting in that it was carefully conducted upon ancient models, and that it is the last pageant of its kind which is ever 82likely to be seen in England. The Royal procession, in gorgeous and mediæval array, moved from Westminster Hall to the Abbey by a covered platform, 1500 feet long, by 25 broad, fitted with a lower edging three feet wide on each side, and returned by the same route, after the religious ceremony was concluded. The whole of the Foot Guards (except the 1st Battalion Third Guards) were present (the 2nd Battalion Coldstream having been brought up from Windsor for the purpose), and were commanded by Colonel Hon. H. Brand, Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment. The two Grenadier companies of the Coldstream were stationed in the Abbey with the State Colours. The platform was lined throughout by 1500 men standing in single file on each side, on the lower portions just mentioned. They were divided into three divisions, each under a Field-Officer, with a part of the bands, drums, etc. Forty Officers and 1141 men were employed in furnishing strong piquets, extra guards, and Guards of Honour, in strengthening the public duties, and in patrolling the neighbourhood of Westminster. A portion of the streets was also lined, the Coldstream having its right at the west gate of the Abbey, and extending towards Westminster Hall. The troops got into position at one o’clock in the night preceding the ceremony; and a large force of cavalry, aided by Yeomanry, the Light Horse Volunteers, and the Honourable Artillery Company, were also present under Major-General Lord Edward Somerset, and furnished patrols throughout the Metropolis. These ample precautions were rendered necessary by the apprehension of a riot; for the Queen, whose application to be crowned had been refused, expressed a determination, nevertheless, to appear in person, and serious disturbances were expected to be the result. To such an extent did the panic spread, that, we are told, places to see the procession, which had been selling for ten guineas, were to be had, on the morning of the ceremony, for half a crown.^[140]

The following General Order was published on the day after the Coronation:—

Next day, on the appointment of Colonel Brand, C.B., to the rank of Major-General, Colonel Woodford, who had commanded the Coldstream Battalion at Waterloo, became Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment, and Colonel Macdonell, C.B., promoted Major, was posted to the command of the 2nd Battalion.

On the 3rd of September, the sum of £665 was distributed among the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Brigade who had taken part in the King’s Coronation, under the name of “Platform money.” The 6 Sergeants-Major received each 14s. 1½d.; 226 Sergeants, 7s. 1½d.; 225 Corporals, 4s. 8¾d.; and 3575 Drummers and Privates, 2s. 11¼d. A little more than £100 was allotted per Battalion, the Coldstream receiving £212 2s. 1½d.

It seems unnecessary to record the various and numerous reviews that have at all times taken place; it would be monotonous to do so, and little interest would thereby be afforded. For the most part, therefore, they will be omitted. It was usual upon these and other occasions, for the inspecting Officer to record publicly his opinion of the state of the troops reviewed; thus very many testimonials exist—speaking of the efficiency which has ever distinguished the Coldstream, and thanking the Officers and men for their zeal and exertions—written by order of the Sovereign, the Commander-in-Chief, the Colonel of the Regiment, the Lieut.-Colonel, Generals under whom a Battalion happened to be serving, and also giving messages from foreign Princes. These communications to the Regiment have also been generally omitted, as their number renders it difficult to reproduce them, and as their repetition would be tedious.

It has been already mentioned that a Battalion of the Foot Guards was sent to Dublin at the end of 1821. The step was rendered advisable by the increasing trouble which afflicted Ireland, where discontent prevailed, and where the recent currency laws had reduced the value of agricultural produce, on which alone the peasants had to depend. Each Battalion was kept there for a year, the change being made in the summer. It became the turn 84of the 1st Battalion Coldstream to proceed to Dublin in July, 1823, and on the 25th the troops were conveyed in canal boats from Paddington on the road to Liverpool, whence they were sent to their destination. The Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment thus published his opinion on the manner in which the start was effected from London:—

During their stay in Ireland, this Battalion gained the unqualified approbation and praise of the Lieut.-General, the Commander of the Forces, and of the Major-General commanding the District; and this will be best shown by giving two orders issued in Dublin. The first appeared in Regimental Orders of February 19, 1824:

The second was published as follows:—

The Duke of York recorded his appreciation of the conduct of the Battalion, by causing a letter, dated August 12th, to be addressed to Colonel Woodford, which was published in Regimental Orders of the 14th:—

Alterations in the Regimental Hospital in Vincent Square, established in 1814, were completed in September, 1823, and the building was re-occupied on the 9th; quarters were provided therein for a Medical Officer, under whose care the recruits of the Regiment (then at the Recruit House in London) were also placed.^[141] About the same time, 1824, another Medical Officer took up his residence in barracks, and was made specially responsible for the men, women, and children of the Battalion stationed there. After an inspection made by the Duke of Cambridge, the Colonel of the Regiment, an order was published, dated August 10, 1825, expressing to Dr. Whymper and the Medical Officers His Royal Highness' satisfaction and pleasure at the perfect state, regularity, comfort, and cleanliness of the Regimental Hospital.^[142]

A boat-race against time was got up in 1824, the conditions being, that “six Officers of the Guards belonging to aquatic 86clubs” should row in a six-oared wherry from Oxford to Westminster Bridge in sixteen consecutive hours, the crew to choose their own coxwain. The distance is 118 miles; there were no outriggers in those days, and many locks intervene and obstruct the course to be rowed over, which, however, on application to the Thames Commissioners, were kept in readiness to let the boat through without delay. An attempt had previously been made to perform the same feat in seventeen hours, by Lord Newry (the late Lord Kilmorey), with a crew selected by himself from among his own people, but it failed. The present match was looked forward to with considerable interest, and large sums of money were laid upon the event. Captain Short (Coldstream Guards) seems to have been captain of the boat, the other oars being Captains Gordon-Douglas (afterwards Lord Penrhyn), and H. S. Blane (Grenadier Guards), and Captains G. F. H. Hudson, G. D. Standen, and Hon. J. C. Westenra (Third Guards). The wherry left Oxford at 3 a.m. on the 14th of May, and, reaching Bolter’s Lock at 11.30, Windsor Bridge at 1 p.m., Teddington Lock at 5.30, Putney Bridge at 6, and Battersea Bridge at 6.30, arrived at Westminster Bridge, at 6.45, “amidst the acclamations of thousands of spectators,” with just a quarter of an hour to spare. “They were assisted out of the boat, carried on shore, and put to bed.” The average rate was about seven and a half miles an hour, counting stoppages for refreshment and those occasioned by going through the locks, and the feat was remarkable, considering the class of boat that existed at that time. We are told, moreover, that all the crew were in a state of great exhaustion at the conclusion of the race, and that one or two could not stand without support.^[143]

On the 16th of July, 1825, Major-General Woodford, promoted to that rank on May 27thMay 27th, retired from the command of the Regiment, and was succeeded by Colonel Macdonell, Sir H. Bouverie having also been appointed a General Officer in May. Thereupon Colonel Hamilton became Senior Major (commanding the 1st Battalion), and Colonel Raikes, Junior Major (2nd Battalion).^[144]

N. R. Wilkinson del       MUSKETEER 1669.      Mintern Bros. Chromo.

87In July, 1825, the Regiment contained the following Officers:—

Colonel.—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., G.C.B., etc.

Lieutenant-Colonel.—Colonel J. Macdonell, C.B.

Majors.—Colonels J. Hamilton; and W. H. Raikes.

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels F. Milman; T. Barrow; D. MacKinnon; and H. Dawkins; (Mounted).

Colonel Sir R. Arbuthnot, K.C.B.; Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. Gomm, K.C.B.; Colonel Waters, C.B.; Lieut.-Colonels T. Steele; J. Fremantle, C.B.; W. Walton; A. Wedderburn; C. Shawe; G. Bowles; C. Bentinck; G. FitzClarence; F. Russell.

Lieutenants.—Major J. S. Cowell; Captains J. Drummond; C. Girardot; T. Chaplin; H. Salwey; Hon. J. Forbes; A. Cuyler; W. Kortright; H. Armytage; H. Gooch; T. Powys; H. Bentinck (Adjutant); F. Shawe; F. Buller; J. Montagu; H. Vane; R. Bowen; C. Short; J. Hall; Hon. H. Dundas; W. Cornwall; Hon. W. Graves; H. Murray; B. Broadhead.

Ensigns.—Lieutenants C. Hay; G. Bentinck; W. Northey (Adjutant); J. D. Rawdon; Hon. T. Ashburnham; Hon. E. Erskine; W. J. Codrington; E. D. Wigram; St. J. Dent; Hon. H. Fane; Hon. J. Hope; W. Cotton; Hon. A. Upton; F. Paget; B. Manningham; E. B. Wilbraham; Lord M. W. Graham.

Quartermasters.—T. Dwelly and B. Selway.

Surgeon-Major.—J. Simpson. Battalion Surgeons.—W. Whymper, M.D., and T. Maynard. Assistant Surgeons.—G. Smith and F. Gilder.

Solicitor.—W. G. Carter, Esq.

The year 1826 was one of distress in England, which led to considerable disorder, especially in the manufacturing parts of Lancashire. The workmen, believing that the introduction of machinery, then beginning to be used, was the cause of their sufferings, committed many acts of outrage, and, during the last week of April, a large amount of property was destroyed by riotous mobs in that county. In order to strengthen the military force required to suppress these disturbances, the 2nd Battalion Coldstream and the 1st Battalion Third Guards proceeded to Manchester (by canal from Paddington) on the 1st and 2nd of May respectively. The 2nd Battalion were stationed there until the end of July, when they were sent to Dublin to relieve the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which, on reaching Liverpool, were ordered to remain in the Northern District.

On leaving this District, the following letter was addressed by the Lieut.-General Commanding (Sir J. Byng) to the Commanding 88Officer, 2nd Battalion Coldstream, dated July 23rd, and published in Regimental Orders, August 8th:—

Colonel Raikes having retired from the service, June 21, 1826, Colonel MacKinnon became Junior Major, commanding the 2nd Battalion.

It was not until towards the end of the year that the two Battalions of Guards quartered in Lancashire were brought back to London, and then a fresh duty awaited the Brigade. There was trouble between Spain and Portugal, and the Government determined to support the latter Power. The resolution to do so, was hastily formed or tardily published, and on the same day that it was announced in Parliament (December 11th), orders were issued for six companies of the 1st Grenadiers and of the 2nd Battalion Third Guards, made up to 84 rank and file each, to be held in readiness for foreign service; the Brigade so formed, to be commanded by Major-General Sir H. Bouverie (late of the Coldstream). The expedition, numbering 5000 men, under Sir H. Clinton, started immediately afterwards, and, before Christmas, the troops began to land at Lisbon. As no portion of the Coldstream took part in this service, it is unnecessary to make any further allusion to it in this volume, except to note that it lasted more than a year, and that the two Battalions did not return home until the spring of 1828.

The death of the Duke of York, January 5, 1827, brought to a close the career of an able military administrator who, for twenty-one years of his early life (1784-1805), had been Colonel of the 89Coldstream Guards. His unremitting devotion to the best interests of the service, during a period of thirty-two years (broken by a short interval only), in which he served as Commander-in-Chief (1795-1827), earned for him an enduring fame in the annals of the country. When he first was entrusted with this high office, the British army was still afflicted by that inefficiency which caused disaster in North America, and brought ruin and disgrace upon our arms; but, at the end of his life, greatly owing to his vigour and ability, this lamentable state of things was completely changed, and victory and glory once more shone upon our banners.

At the funeral, which took place at Windsor, the Brigade was represented by a force of about 1400 Officers and men, of whom the 1st Battalion Coldstream furnished 12 Officers and 269 Non-commissioned officers and men.

In the summer of this year, the 2nd Battalion returned from Ireland, and was quartered in Portman Street, the 1st Battalion being stationed in King’s Mews barracks (August 1st).

Next year, the 1st Battalion marched to Manchester (October 1st),^[146] and remained there for ten months, when they were sent to Dublin, by Liverpool (July, 1829), for a year’s service in Ireland, returning to London (Portman Street) in August, 1830. During this period, the Battalion continued to receive the highest commendation for the excellent discipline and good conduct that prevailed among all ranks, and the following extract from Major-General Dalbiac’s confidential report, dated May 6th, and sent by order of the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Hill) to the Lieut.-Colonel, for the information of the Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, will be read with interest:—

In this connection, a Battalion Order of February 11th, published in Dublin, may also be quoted:—

On May 16, 1829May 16, 1829, Colonel Hamilton having retired, Colonel MacKinnon became Senior Major (1st Battalion), and Colonel Sir W. Gomm was promoted Junior Major (2nd Battalion).

It should be noted here, that, about this time, a mistake began to creep in with respect to the title of the Regiment, which, being placed in the Army List between the First, or Grenadier, and the Third Regiment of Foot Guards, was occasionally described as the “Second Foot Guards.” In December, 1829, the Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel Macdonell) protested against this innovation; and, in reply, Sir H. Hardinge, then Secretary at War, had it stopped, and regretted that a clerical error should have accidentally been made.^[148]

Some changes had been made in the uniform of the Officers of 91the Brigade after 1815, especially in the beginning of the reign of George IV.; but a more complete and permanent change began to be adopted in the year 1830, and was not finally effected until 1834. It may be sufficient to state here, that blue trousers with gold lace, those of Oxford grey mixture with the red stripe (for winter wear), and the present gold and crimson sashes were then introduced. The gorget, the white pantaloons, or breeches and stockings (worn in the evening), and the cap-lines and tassels of Non-commissioned officers were discontinued; and the bearskin cap became the head-dress of the whole Regiment instead of the Grenadier company only, as was formerly the case. The Rose—one of the distinctive badges of the Coldstream, which has now, unfortunately, entirely disappeared from the uniform of Officers, though still happily to be seen on that belonging to Non-commissioned officers and men—was then retained on the epaulettes, and was not removed until a quarter of a century later. Further, a braided great-coat was allotted to Officers of the Brigade, of the same pattern for the three Regiments, to distinguish them from the Line. Lastly, Field-Officers of the Guards were ordered by the King (Brigade Order , March 2, 1831) to wear the same sword belt, as that of a General Officer. Uniform, at that time, seems to have been worn in out-quarters more frequently than is customary at present; and orders exist, which show that Officers stationed in Dublin, were not allowed to appear in plain clothes, unless going to some distance in the country, and remaining absent all night from their quarters. On the other hand, there was no special mess-dress; but uniform at mess was nevertheless the rule, and Officers did not dine in barracks in plain clothes.

The death of George IV. occurred on June 26, 1830, and William IV. ascended the Throne. The funeral of the late King took place at Windsor, and was attended by the 2nd Coldstream (the 1st Battalion was in Dublin). Upon this occasion an order was issued intimating that, “Colonel Macdonell has been honoured by His Majesty’s commands to communicate to the 2nd Battalion, in the strongest possible terms, his approbation of their conduct during the ceremonial of the Funeral of His late Majesty King George IV.,” adding that “the King has further directed Colonel Macdonell to say that it affords him the greatest pleasure thus to express his satisfaction, on the first opportunity he has had of seeing them since his accession to the Throne.” An order couched 92in similar terms was addressed to that part of the Brigade, employed in the ceremonial just mentioned, viz. 1st Grenadiers, quartered at Windsor, 100 men each from the 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers, the 2nd Coldstream, and the 1st Battalion Third Guards.

During the early years of his reign, William IV. frequently inspected the Foot Guards. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream was the first reviewed (July 19th), and on the same day, the King granted the Regiment the privilege of receiving His Majesty with the Coldstream March instead of the National Anthem. This was communicated by the following Regimental Order:—

On the same day, the King commanded that the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting, accompanied by the Adjutant in Waiting, and an Orderly Sergeant from each Regiment of Foot Guards, should attend His Majesty’s carriage on State occasions. The former practice was that the Field-Officer attended the Sovereign, and had a place in a Royal carriage assigned to him.

A few days later the members of the Nulli Secundus Club were honoured by an invitation to dine with His Majesty (July 31st). Upon this occasion, the King was pleased to express the attachment which he felt, especially, for the Coldstream Guards, and the sincere interest he took in the continued prosperity of the Nulli Secundus Club, and he intimated it to be his intention to receive the members at dinner every year.^[150]

93On the 22nd of July, Colonel Macdonell, having been promoted Major-General, was succeeded in the command of the Regiment by Colonel MacKinnon; thereupon Colonel Sir. W. Gomm became Senior Major (1st Battalion), and Colonel Milman, Junior Major (2nd Battalion).

The period 1829-1832, will ever be memorable in English history as one of great trouble, anxiety, and difficulty. There was considerable distress among the working classes, especially in 1829,—due, according to some writers, to the currency laws which then came into operation.^[151] But besides this, and far more important, a wave of agitation swept over the face of the country with a terrific force, unknown since the great Rebellion. Violent riots and great disorder were of frequent occurrence; and civil war, though happily it never broke out, was imminent, and was believed by some to be inevitable. During this period, Catholic Emancipation was carried and Reform was passed; the landmarks of the then existing British Constitution were obliterated, and the political principles, which were held by many to be the basis of national prosperity, were uprooted. The death of George IV. at this critical juncture, contributed in no small degree to fan the flames of discontent, and to produce the uncompromising changes in the government of the country, which were effected in 1832. But events abroad also served to shape the destinies of England; for, added to the trouble at home, Europe, too, was convulsed by mighty disturbances, which shook to their foundations some of the principal Continental nations, and influenced the course of agitation in this country. Belgium, at that time subject to the Crown of Holland, rebelled, declared her independence, and succeeded in establishing herself as a separate Monarchy under the rule of a Prince of Saxe-Coburg, who assumed the title of King Leopold I.^[152] In France the spirit of revolution, vainly smothered in 1815, and ignorantly dealt with by the Bourbons, again reared its head, and Charles X. was hurled from his throne. The ancient Monarchy of France was finally and for ever extinguished, and a Citizen-King, surrounded by Republican institutions, was invited 94to reign by the favour of the Garde Nationale—the armed representatives of the populace. The insurrection, that succeeded in vesting Louis-Philippe with a semblance of Royal power, and that effectually tore to shreds the constitution fixed by the Allies in 1815, began in Paris on the 26th of July, 1830, just two days after the dissolution of Parliament in London. The general election took place about a month later; and in the excited state of men’s minds, when widespread sympathy was felt and expressed for the aspirations of the Orleanist faction in France, the result could not but reflect the movement that was carried on there, and give impetus to an agitation which had already acquired considerable strength.

Parliament opened on the 26th of October, and three weeks later, on the fall of the administration of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Grey was called to office. The winter passed gloomily, and a wild spirit of revolt was abroad. The southern counties around London were “in a state of open insurrection;” the agitators, frequently referring to events in Belgium and France, inflamed the passions of the people; outrages and excesses were committed, and so great was the consternation created by the fear of disorder, that the King’s visit to the city (November 9th) had to be given up. It is unnecessary to describe the various vicissitudes which attended the great struggle for Reform. Suffice it to say that the country continued to be the prey to an increasing agitation, unparalleled in modern British history, and that the Bill was finally passed into law by a large majority, June 7, 1832, because those that opposed it were intimidated into silence, believing that further resistance would end by plunging the nation into the abyss of civil war.

The army, taking no part in the effervescence that seethed around, was occupied in the uncongenial duty of preserving the public peace, wherever it was disturbed. In London, a system of Metropolitan Police had just been organized (1829), to replace the watchmen, who up to that time were responsible for good order and for the prevention of crime. The new force had only come into existence, nor was it sufficiently strong to cope with the serious emergency that had arisen. The Brigade, therefore, was frequently held in readiness to aid the civil power, and in November, 1830, all Officers were recalled from leave, while Non-commissioned officers and men on furlough were ordered to 95rejoin their corps without delay. A detachment of two Subalterns and fifty-seven men were stationed at North Hyde, furnished by each Battalion in turn, the reliefs being made fortnightly, until March 1, 1831, when it was found by the 1st Battalion Coldstream, who proceeded to Windsor on that date.^[153]

The Coronation of the King and Queen took place in Westminster Abbey, September 8, 1831, the day after the Reform Bill had passed the committee stage in the Commons. The ceremony was sufficiently magnificent, but was shorn of much of its ancient splendour, and, in accordance with the economy of the age, His Majesty was prevented from giving the usual Coronation Banquet in Westminster Hall.^[154] The Brigade lined the streets in the vicinity, the 1st and 2nd Battalions Grenadiers and the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards^[155] occupying the west side, the 1st and the 2nd Battalions Coldstream—a portion of which had been brought from Windsor—and the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the east side, the left of the Coldstream being posted near the Abbey. Piquets were also held in readiness in case of disorder, which happily did not occur. The troops, in review order, wearing white trousers, and Officers in gold sashes, were in position at 7 a.m. The largesse of “Platform money” was not distributed upon this occasion, but an allowance of one shilling, to each Non-commissioned officer and private under arms, was made for refreshments, half of which was spent, the remainder being given to the men in the evening.^[156]

The pleasures of political agitation were somewhat marred, and the intensity of the strife was perhaps blunted, by the first appearance in England of the plague of cholera, which occurred 96towards the end of 1831. This terrible disease, having broken out in Bengal in 1817, spread to Persia in 1823, where it remained in a more or less dormant state, until 1830, when it revived, and extended rapidly through Russia, into Austria, and North Germany. In spite of severe quarantine regulations, cases of this fatal illness were reported in Sunderland on October 26, 1831; and before the end of the year many persons were attacked, and succumbed to its violence, in the north of England and in Scotland.

In February, it appeared in the port of London, and from thence it spread through every part of the kingdom, and continued its ravages into Ireland. The panic created by this unknown epidemic was great. Medical men were naturally at a loss to understand, much more at a loss to treat effectively, the new disorder; but, though severe, it was everywhere less fatal than preconceived notions had anticipated, and, when it gradually disappeared in the autumn, surprise seems to have been general that so much apprehension had been entertained.^[157]

The results of cholera were not, however, unimportant, for the visitation served to introduce more sanitary and cleanly habits among the people, and to put an end to the billeting system and to overcrowding in military barracks. Every precaution was naturally taken to preserve the health of the troops, and to guard them against infection. The 2nd Battalion, being at the Tower, in a dangerous quarter, stringent orders were issued to secure this object. Frequent medical inspections took place, certain districts were placed out of bounds, drunken men were isolated until visited by the Surgeon, the water supply was not neglected, and the men were “earnestly desired to report themselves directly they felt unwell, as it is found when remedies are applied in time fatal results seldom ensue.” The order (dated March 21, 1832) added that—

In February, moreover, Warley was converted into a Depôt for 97all Brigade recruits, who were taken from the Recruit House in London; and the Royal Waggon Train, being removed from Croydon, the barracks there, were placed at the disposal of the Foot Guards for the occupation of those convalescents or weakly men, who were unable to perform the usual military duties in town. During the same month, married soldiers and others were sent to Croydon, Chatham, and Brighton—at which latter place there was then accommodation for 336 men. In March, also, certain houses in Hanley Road, Hornsey, were hired for a year, fit to receive five Officers and 463 men. New barracks were constructed, or the old ones improved, and, in November, 1833, the King’s Mews were changed into St. George’s barracks,^[158] and the Recruit House into the present old wing of Wellington barracks, called at that time, for a few months only, Westminster barracks. On March 1, 1834, the Brigade occupied the following quarters: Grenadier Guards—1st Battalion, Tower; 2nd Battalion, Portman Street; 3rd Battalion, Wellington (Westminster) barracks: Coldstream Guards—1st Battalion, Windsor; 2nd Battalion, Knightsbridge, Kensington, and the Magazine barracks: Scots Fusilier Guards—1st Battalion, St. George’s barracks; 2nd Battalion, Dublin.

It may be stated here, that a company was also stationed in Buckingham House, usually found by the Battalion occupying Knightsbridge, and that the latter barracks were given up in May, 1836, and St. John’s Wood substituted for them. The Brigade continued to occupy these West-end quarters until the Crimean war broke out—that is, Portman Street, St. George’s, and Wellington barracks accommodated one Battalion each, while the fourth Battalion was divided into detachments, the head-quarters and three or four companies being in St. John’s Wood, the remainder in Kensington, the Magazine, Buckingham Palace, and St. George’s or Wellington barracks.

In July, 1832, the 2nd Battalion proceeded to Dublin by Bristol, returning to London in the following summer. Ireland was then passing through one of the phases of popular discontent and resistance to law so common in her history, and which have for so long troubled the government of that island. The anti-tithe agitation was then in full swing, and was accompanied by 98incidents very similar to those that occurred during the recent anti-rent struggle, with which we are familiar. As a means of pacifying the disturbed districts, troops were quartered in them, just as was done in 1880. The 2nd Battalion furnished three companies for this duty during the latter end of October, when it appears that this force, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J. Forbes, was stationed at Leighlin Bridge, in Carlow, and was quartered there for a fortnight. The Battalion gained the approbation of the military authorities in Dublin, shown by two orders (dated May 23 and August 12, 1833), testifying to the high opinion entertained by them of the “exemplary conduct,” and of the discipline of the corps whilst serving in Ireland.

The next two years passed without much incident until 1836, when the Regiment was put into mourning by the unexpected death of the Lieut.-Colonel (Colonel MacKinnon), who, having served in the Coldstream throughout the whole of his military career, from the early age of fourteen to the day of his death, in every rank from Ensign to Lieut.-Colonel, through the Peninsular war and at Waterloo, where he was wounded, may be considered as an Officer peculiarly belonging to the Regiment.^[159] In spite of illness, he remained at his post until the middle of June, when he obtained a year’s leave; but he was unable to avail himself of it, for a few days later, on the 22nd, he died, only forty-six years of age, respected alike by the Officers and the men. The public exercises of the Regiment were immediately suspended till after the interment of the Commanding Officer, and, on the 8th of July, the following order was promulgated by Colonel Sir W. Gomm, who succeeded him, on the occasion of an inspection of the two Battalions by Lord Hill, the Commander-in-Chief:—

Sir W. Gomm did not long retain the command of the Regiment; but, as will be seen, he returned to the Coldstream a quarter of a century after he had left it, when he was appointed Colonel of the Regiment. Becoming Major-General, the Lieut.-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Milman, and Colonels Fremantle and Walton succeeded as Senior and Junior Majors respectively (January 10, 1837).

The Coldstream now stood—

Colonel.—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., etc.

Lieut.-Colonel.—Colonel F. Milman.

Majors.—Colonels J. Fremantle, C.B.; and W. Walton.

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels A. Wedderburn; C. Shawe; G. Bowles; and C. Bentinck; (Mounted).

Lieut.-Colonels T. Chaplin; H. Armytage; H. Bentinck; C. Short; W. Cornwall; B. Broadhead; C. Hay; H. Gooch; J. Rawdon; Hon. T. Ashburnham; W. Codrington; E. Wigram.

Lieutenants.—Captains W. Stewart; Hon. J. Hope (Adjutant); G. Knox; Hon. A. Upton; F. Paget; Hon. E. Wilbraham; Lord M. W. Graham; J. Pringle; J. Clitherow; Gordon Drummond; Lord F. Paulet; C. Horton (Adjutant); J. Forbes; R. Vansittart; C. Windham; C. Wilbraham; W. Tollemache; J. Elrington; H. Daniell; Hon. R. Boyle; F. Halkett; H. Dent.

Ensigns.—Lieutenants C. Dundas; R. Hulse; D. Chisholm; S. Conroy; Hon. F. Villiers; H. Brand; G. Herbert; Viscount Alexander; Hon. R. Lambart; G. Johnson; W. S. Newton; Hon. C. Grimston; G. Mundy; P. Bathurst; E. Milman; Hon. L. Hope; Spencer Perceval.

Quartermasters.—T. Dwelly; and W. Morse.

Surgeon-Major.—G. Chenevix. Battalion Surgeon.—W. Hunter, M.D. Assistant-Surgeons.—F. Gilder; and J. Wedderburn.

Solicitor.—W. G. Carter, Esq.

The reign of William IV. was now drawing to a close, and a few months only elapsed, when, by the death of the Sovereign, 100June 20, 1837, our present Gracious Queen, then just eighteen years old, ascended the Throne. The funeral obsequies took place as usual at Windsor, and were fixed for the 8th of July. The 1st Grenadiers were stationed there at the time; and the 1st Coldstream had gone to Dublin in 1836, whence they did not return until August, 1837. About one hundred men from each of the other Battalions of the former Regiment, as well as four companies from each Battalion of the Scots Fusiliers, and the whole of the 2nd Coldstream Guards proceeded to Windsor to take part in the ceremony.

Before closing this chapter, it may be well briefly to record one or two points which affected the Regiment during the reign that has just come to a conclusion. Towards the end of 1829, gratuities, in addition to the pension, were granted, on discharge, to specially selected Non-commissioned officers and men, who, by their length of service and meritorious conduct, were recommended for reward; and on the 30th of July of the following year, the silver medal for “Long service and good conduct” was instituted, and presented to them. Later, in 1836, good conduct badges—or “marks of distinction,” as they were then called—were introduced, and worn on their uniform, by men whose character deserved recognition. Each “mark” added a penny a day to the recipient’s pay; and, if in uninterrupted possession of it for five years immediately preceding discharge, the same amount was added to the pension.^[161] During this reign, moreover, a Commission inquired 101into military discipline, more especially into the system of flogging, then in force in the army. The final report, dated March 15, 1836, was in favour of retaining corporal punishment, but recommended that “no pains may be spared to endeavour to make its infliction less frequent.”^[162] Regimental numbers, identifying soldiers, appear to have been introduced into the army about this time; they were at first applied only to the men’s records, but gradually they were more generally adopted (Regimental Order , January 2, 1836).

In the summer of 1836 it was ordered that the Battalions of the Foot Guards, and not the light companies only, should be practised in light infantry movements in extended order (Brigade Order , July 11, 1836).

We have seen that the Brigade Depôt was transferred from London to Warley early in 1832. It appears, that the recruits of the Coldstream and of the Scots Fusiliers were ordered to Croydon in June, 1833, and the rest followed to the same place next year. A Subaltern Officer was placed in command of the station; but in January, 1837, a Regimental Lieutenant (bearing rank of Captain) was ordered to perform this duty, and he remained there for a fortnight at a time. An Assistant Surgeon, relieved every two months, was also quartered at the Depôt.

The control exercised by the Lieutenant-Colonel over the two Battalions of the Regiment was made somewhat more direct by the introduction of weekly reports, which were furnished to him by Officers commanding Battalions, and which stated what drills, exercises, etc., were performed, and whether there had been ball practice or marching (Regimental Order , April 12, 1833). A scale of punishment was instituted, to equalize, as far as possible, awards made for minor offences (1st Battalion Order, May 24, 1831). On July 14, 1832, a Regimental Order was issued, which gives some idea of the system then pursued in the Regiment, as regards the discipline of the men:—

Lastly, it may be stated that His Majesty’s Commands for the part to be taken by the Brigade, at investitures of the Order of the Bath, were published in 1835 (Brigade Order , August 19th), and were to be considered as a Standing Order for the future, when the ceremony should take place in St. George’s Hall, Windsor Castle. The Sergeant-Major and fifteen Sergeants from the Windsor Battalion, and the Sergeants-Major and forty-two Sergeants of the West-end Battalions, were stationed in the Hall; the former at each of the doors right and left of the Throne, the latter forming a line from the Throne to the entrance; the whole under the Adjutant of the Windsor Battalion, whose place was near the King. At the subsequent banquet in the Waterloo Chamber, the Colours of the Battalion were crossed over the south fireplace, six Sergeants of the same corps stood at the doors, and the remainder formed a line from St. George’s to the Banqueting Hall, as the procession passed to and from the Waterloo Chamber; the Band was placed in the latter room, the Drums at the top of the grand staircase. Additional sentries were mounted, eight in the Quadrangle, and one on Queen Elizabeth’s Gate.

N. R. Wilkinson del      OFFICER TEMP. JAMES II.      Mintern Bros. lith.
A. D. Innes & C^o. London

Beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria—Troops during Parliamentary elections—Coronation of the Queen—Fire at the Tower of London, 1841—Rebellion in Canada—Two Guards Battalions sent there, 1838, of which one the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards—Return home, 1842—Visit of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I. to England—European revolution—Bi-centenary celebration of the formation of the Coldstream Guards, 1850—Death of the Colonel of the Regiment, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge; succeeded by General the Earl of Strafford—Exhibition in London—Death of the Duke of Wellington—Changes and reforms up to 1854—Camp at Chobham.

The young Queen had only reigned a few months, when it became necessary to send a military expedition to Canada, where for some time trouble had been brewing, and where reinforcements were required to maintain the authority of the Crown, and to settle the difficulties that had arisen. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream formed part of this expedition, and left London March 28, 1838; but before we refer to the events which occurred in that colony, we propose to deal shortly with those that took place at home, until the year 1842, when the Battalion returned to England.

During the General Election that followed immediately after Her Majesty’s Accession, the troops quartered at Portman Street and in St. John’s Wood, were ordered to march away from the borough of Marylebone. The 2nd Coldstream being at the former station, proceeded, in consequence, to “Hammersmith and adjacents,” July 22nd, until the 28th. The system of removing soldiers from the place of an election seems never to have been adopted in Westminster, nor does it appear to have been a usual practice elsewhere in the Metropolis, except in the City, where the Bank piquet was often suspended for two or three days; as a general rule the troops were confined to barracks. On one other occasion, however (June 28, 1841), the 1st Battalion Coldstream vacated Portman Street, and 104marched to Fulham, Parson’s Green, and Walham Green, while an election was taking place in Marylebone; and from thence, on the 3rd of July, proceeded to Hounslow and Twickenham during an election in the county of Middlesex; the Battalion returned to London on the 9th. Upon the same occasion, the recruits at Croydon were marched to London, July 5th, to their respective Regiments, until after the termination of the East Surrey election, July 12th; during the interval, the Assistant Surgeon, the Hospital establishment, and a corporal and an old soldier from each Regiment, only remained in barracks.

On the retirement of Colonel Milman to half-pay, August 8, 1837, Colonel Fremantle succeeded as Lieutenant-Colonel, and Lieut.-Colonel Shawe was promoted Major. Colonel Walton took command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Shawe of the 2nd.

The expedition to Canada put an end to the Dublin quarter, which was not again renewed for nearly twenty years; and the 1st Battalion Scots Fusiliers, who had proceeded there in the summer of 1837, returned to London in the following March. Moreover, during the absence of two Battalions of the Brigade in North America, the Tower was not occupied by Guards in 1838, and duty was done in Windsor, 1839-1842, by a regiment of the Line.

On May 6, 1838, the Royal Military Chapel in Wellington Barracks was opened for the first time; and a year later (July, 1839), the three Regiments took it in turn to send their Bands there to attend Divine Service.

The Queen’s Coronation, June 28, 1838, was conducted on the abridged model of that of William IV.; but in some respects it was more magnificent and stately than the latter, and it included a public procession to and from Westminster Abbey, which had been absent in former ceremonies of the kind, since the reign of Charles II. As the personality of Her Majesty, moreover, roused enthusiasm among all classes to a far greater degree than had been the case with many of her predecessors, the people, drawn in dense crowds to the splendour of the spectacle, were not slow to display the feelings of genuine loyalty and affection, with which they were filled towards their youthful Sovereign; and the effect produced on the public mind, was even greater than if, under ordinary circumstances, the older forms of mediæval pageantry had been adopted. The streets were lined by troops from Buckingham Palace to the Abbey, the infantry in single rank on either side of the road; the Brigade 105occupied the distance from Westminster to Marlborough House, and the five Battalions were present. The 1st Coldstream, having been brought up from Windsor, were in Pall Mall, the Scots Fusiliers thence to the Horse Guards, and the Grenadiers took up the remaining ground. On the other side of the Coldstream, in St. James’s Street, Piccadilly, and Constitution Hill, there were Marines, Rifles, and the 20th Regiment (then at the Tower). In the Abbey a line was kept by a detachment of the Queen’s company, Grenadier Guards, the Ensign of which carried the Royal Standard, and men of the Grenadier companies of the 1st Coldstream and of the 1st and 2nd Scots Fusiliers, under Subaltern Officers of their own corps.^[163]

Her Majesty held her first review in Hyde Park on the 9th of July following, at which the Coldstream was not present, being at Windsor, but a detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Gooch went up to London and found the public duties upon that occasion. It may be interesting to note that each man of the force inspected, was supplied “with thirty rounds blank cartridge, a good flint, and a spare one in his pouch.”

Colonel Fremantle having retired December 31, 1839, Colonel Walton became Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel Bowles was promoted Major (2nd Battalion), Colonel Shawe assuming command of the 1st Battalion. In the Regimental Order of farewell, Colonel Fremantle, after referring to his services of nearly thirty-five years in the Regiment, dwells on “his proud satisfaction of participating in those fields of honour in which the Coldstream acquired its noble perfection,” and continues:—

Among the miscellaneous duties performed by the Brigade in London, was that relating to the extinguishing of metropolitan fires,—one even now discharged, but which was of more importance in days when the Fire Brigade was imperfectly organized. In October, 1834, when the Houses of Parliament were destroyed, the exertions of the troops to arrest the flames were warmly recognized by the Home Secretary; and again, in January, 1836, the thanks of Lord Palmerston were published, with the intimation that, but for the timely assistance of the Brigade, the Foreign Office would have been burnt down. On the night of October 30, 1841, a conflagration took place in the Tower, which, having spread with alarming rapidity, completely gutted the Armoury, and destroyed many of the trophies of former wars which had been deposited there. Owing to the exertions of the Battalion quartered in the Tower (1st Scots Fusiliers), and other portions of the Brigade, that hurried to the disaster, the Regalia was saved, and many interesting parts of that historic fortress and prison were preserved.^[164] On the 5th of November the following Regimental Order was issued:—

Officers who have so often seen the piece of plate, representing the Sphinx, on the table of St. James’s Palace, may be interested in knowing, that it was received at a general meeting of the Guards Club, on May 5, 1842. The Duke of Bedford, executor of General 107Earl of Ludlow, Scots Fusilier Guards, gave it, in accordance with the latter’s will, by which he left “the Egyptian vase, presented to him by the Brigade of Guards in the camp before Alexandria, to the Guards Club, with his grateful thanks.”

It is now time to revert to the more serious affairs, which engaged the attention of the 2nd Battalion in North America. Canada at that period was divided into two distinct colonies—the Lower province, inhabited almost entirely by old French settlers, and the Upper province, peopled by immigrants of British nationality. In the former, a simmering of discontent had prevailed for some years; the colonists resented the system by which, under a semblance of constitutional government, their popular representatives were excluded from all control and authority over their own affairs. In the month of November, 1837, things came to a head, and a rebellion broke out, led by one Papineau. Encouraged to violence by this evil example, assisted by free-booters from the United States, and having some grievances of their own to complain of, another insurrection occurred almost simultaneously in Upper Canada. In both cases, the disorder was instantly put down by Sir J. Colborne (afterwards Lord Seaton), with a military force in Lower Canada, and by the local militia in the other province. But the news reaching home, that an actual outbreak had taken place, created the utmost sensation in England. It was immediately determined to strengthen the troops in the colony, and to send out Lord Durham as Governor-General and High Commissioner, with large powers to deal with the difficulty.

On the 23rd of January, the 2nd Grenadiers and the 2nd Coldstream were ordered to be held in readiness for embarkation for Quebec, each to be made up to 800 rank and file; and the Brigade, so formed, was placed under the command of Major-General Sir J. Macdonell, K.C.B. (late of the Coldstream). Captain Arthur Torrens, Grenadier Guards, was appointed Major of Brigade; and Captain J. Elrington, Coldstream Guards, Aide-de-camp to the Major-General. On the 22nd of March this body of men was inspected by Lord Hill, when a congratulatory order was issued upon their appearance, expressing the Commander-in-Chief’s conviction that they “would do honour to the high reputation of the Brigade of Guards,” and concluding with his “best wishes for their welfare while employed abroad in the service of the country.” After the Officers had attended a Levée “to take leave,” and had 108been entertained at dinner by the Colonel, the Duke of Cambridge, the 2nd Coldstream left London for Winchester, in four divisions, on the 28th and 29th.

1st Division, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. T. Ashburnham, Commanding (Nos. 1 and 2 Companies); Captains W. Tollemache, Hon. R. Boyle; Lieutenants Hon. L. Hope, G. Mundy.

2nd Division, Colonel G. Bowles, Commanding (Nos. 3 and 4 Companies); Captains R. Vansittart, C. Wilbraham; Lieutenants M. Tierney, Hon. A. Graves.

3rd Division, Lieut.-Colonel W. Stewart-Balfour, Commanding (Nos. 5 and 6 Companies); Captains C. Windham, R. Hulse; Lieutenants W. Clayton, Lord Alexander.

4th Division, Lieut.-Colonel E. Wigram, Commanding (Nos. 7 and 8 Companies); Lieutenants S. Perceval, E. Milman, P. Bathurst.

Head-quarters, Colonel C. Shawe, Commanding the Battalion; Lieutenant D. M. Chisholm, Adjutant; Quartermaster T. Lee; and Surgeon F. Gilder, and Assistant-Surgeons E. Greatrex and W. Robinson.

The following Officers belonging to the Battalion were allowed to find their own way out to Canada: Lieut.-Colonels W. Codrington, Hon. J. Hope, and T. Chaplin; Captains H. Daniell, F. Halkett, and H. Dent. Lieutenant Hon. F. Villiers was appointed Aide-de-camp to Lord Durham. The Battalion embarked at Portsmouth on the 17th of April, in H.M.S. Edinburgh and Athol, and landed at Quebec on the 11th of May, a few days before the arrival of the new Governor-General, who reached the Colony towards the end of the month, and was received in state by the newly arrived Guards Brigade.

The situation in Lower Canada was one of outward tranquillity, the rebellion had been crushed, and order was restored; but serious complications still remained to be adjusted. Numerous prisoners were in custody awaiting trial, for their treason; and as it would have been impossible to obtain a conviction by a local jury, Sir J. Colborne, the temporary Governor, confined most of them in prison, 161 in number, until the decision of the High Commissioner could be given. On the 28th of June, Lord Durham issued an Ordinance, by which he granted a complete amnesty to all, with the exception of eight of the principal ringleaders; these men he transported to Bermuda. He also declared that if these men, or if Papineau and other fifteen chiefs of the insurrection—who had absconded and had fled for safety into the United States, 109directly they were in danger of capture—were again found at large without permission, they would suffer death as traitors. The Ordinance, though humane and calculated to bring about peace without further bloodshed, was adjudged to be illegal or unconstitutional. There was no power to transport offenders nor to threaten, with the extreme rigour of the law, those who had not been tried. It would have been necessary to pass an Act of Parliament to make it valid, and the state of parties at home rendered any such course impossible. Government was weak, a strong Opposition was ready to oust the Ministers from office, and Lord Durham had many personal enemies. Lord Melbourne, the Prime Minister, disavowed the Ordinance, and threw over the High Commissioner, and thereupon the latter resigned his post, and left Canada, November 1st.^[165] But before quitting North America, he committed an act for which he has been gravely censured; for, he announced to the rebels (October 9th), that the general amnesty he granted had been ratified by Her Majesty’s Proclamation, and that the exceptions to the amnesty had been disallowed, and he told them that there was no further impediment to prevent them from returning to the colony.^[166] The exiles were not slow to avail themselves of this welcome intelligence, and in the month of October they came back, freed from the consequences of their former guilt, and determined to light afresh the torch of civil war.^[167]

During the first six months, the troops had little to do beyond their ordinary duties,^[168] and in the summer leave was freely given to many of the Officers to see the country, on the understanding, 110however, that none were to enter the United States. But, in spite of the appearance of outward tranquillity, there was a spirit of disaffection abroad, the authorities were resisted, the jury system had broken down, and the population of one nationality were bitterly divided from that of another. The execution of the law was difficult, as a Battalion Order of the 11th of July may perhaps exemplify—publishing the good conduct of several privates of the Coldstream for assisting the Superintendent of Police in the execution of his duty; “but for them, two prisoners would have escaped, and he would have received a severe beating from the crowd.”

Feeling ran high among the loyal inhabitants, at the weakness and timidity of the Home Government, and at the ungenerous treatment their Commissioner had received at their hands. Addresses poured in upon him from all quarters, expressing sorrow at his departure. A farewell dinner was also given to him by the Officers of the Guards Brigade, at which Sir J. Macdonell spoke of him and his policy in eulogistic terms—an incident which raised some comment, as it was supposed by some to be an interference by a military Officer in a political question; though undoubtedly it testified to the sentiments that prevailed among the well-disposed. It was universally felt in the province, that the welfare of the colony had been sacrificed to the evils of party exigencies.

Already, before the departure of Lord Durham, a rising had been prepared, under the leadership of the returned exiles, and it broke out on the 3rd of November, 1838, in the neighbourhood of Beauharnois, a place on the right bank of the St. Lawrence river, not very far distant from Montreal.

Troops were at once despatched to quell the disturbance. The Grenadiers joined the expedition, and did not return to Quebec till the end of April, 1840; but the Coldstream Battalion being ordered to remain in that town to secure its tranquillity during the crisis, did not form part of the column sent forward to disperse the rebels.^[169] The outbreak was sudden, and caused considerable alarm while it lasted; but the operations were of short duration, nor were they of much importance from a military point of view. Volunteer 111forces also lent their aid to put down the rebellion, and on the 17th of November they were cordially thanked by the Commander of the Forces (Sir J. Colborne, who, since Lord Durham’s departure, was also Governor), “for defeating the traitors and invaders” by “their heroic perseverance and devotion to the service of their country, which they have displayed from the first moment of this second revolt.” The disaffected made little or no resistance, and, unable to maintain themselves in the field, they soon dispersed or surrendered. The insurrection thus came to an end almost immediately, and many of the prisoners were taken to Montreal, where a Court-Martial sat continuously for six months to try them. The Coldstream, still at Quebec, did not furnish Officers for these trials.

After the suppression of the insurrection, there was still cause for the presence of troops in the colony. First, to protect the loyal portion of the population from the evil influence of agitators, who continued to lurk in the country; and secondly, to maintain order, while reforms were being introduced, calculated to put an end to discontent for the future. Volunteer corps were raised, and Officers appointed to command and organize them. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. James Hope (Coldstream Guards) was placed in command of the “Queen’s Volunteers,” and reported, Dec. 10, 1839, that this corps was then composed of 2 staff-sergeants, 24 sergeants, 6 drummers, and 432 rank and file, of whom 381 were taking their share of garrison duty.^[170] Captain Halkett (Coldstream Guards), appointed Assistant Military Secretary in Upper Canada, also superintended the formation of another corps.^[171] About the same time, the Royal 112Canadian Regiment was raised, and some Non-commissioned officers and men from the Guards were allowed to volunteer for service therein. As it appears to have offered special advantages to married men, the latter readily endeavoured to be allowed to obtain a transfer to its ranks.

Although Lord Durham’s action in Canada was repudiated by the Government in England, the efforts he made to reconcile the people to British rule were in the end very successful. Before he left North America, he made a masterly and comprehensive report upon the position of affairs in the colony, and he recommended remedies to redress the grievances, which he perceived kept the people in a state of ferment. “As Mr. Mill has said, these recommendations laid the foundation of political success and social prosperity, not only of Canada, but of all the other important colonies.... In brief, Lord Durham proposed to make the Canadas self-governing as regards their internal affairs, and the germ of a federal union.”^[172] His report was accepted, and it became the basis of the policy which Government now adopted. Mr. Paulet Thompson, created shortly afterwards Lord Sydenham, was sent to North America at the end of 1839, in the capacity of Governor-General of the two Canadas, to carry out the recommendations which he proposed. At the same time, Sir J. Colborne returned to England, being relieved as Commander of the Forces by Lieut.-General Sir Richard Jackson (late of the Coldstream Guards). Early in 1841, the legislative union of the two provinces was carried into execution, and from this act the new system of colonial life, as now understood in the British Empire, may be said to date.

The Coldstream continued all this time to remain at Quebec, nor were they moved therefrom until they left North America in 1842. During these years small drafts were annually sent out to keep up the Battalion to its proper strength, and upon almost every occasion they were inspected previous to departure by the 113Colonel of the Regiment, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge. Arrangements for winter clothing were made by the Commanding Officer, who authorized a coat and cap to be worn by the Officers, in cold weather, the former to replace the ordinary red coatee, then used instead of the present tunic. An allowance was made by the Treasury, calculated at £1 10s. for every effective soldier serving in Canada for the first winter, and at 5s. for subsequent winters. This money formed a fund, from which a supply of winter clothing was provided for Non-commissioned officers and men. These articles were to be considered public property, and could, if necessary, be transferred from one man to another.

In the winter, parties were sent out into the woods when snow lay deep on the ground, to be practised in “camping, etc.,” or rather, in constructing log huts. The public duties in Quebec appear to have averaged two Subalterns (on guard at the Castle and at the citadel), 10 sergeants, 15 corporals, 2 drummers, and from 110 to 180 men,—besides ten to fourteen men of the Royal Artillery. It may here be mentioned that the stuffed goose’s head, adorned with a gorget (to be seen in the Regimental Orderly Room), records an incident which took place at this time. The goose, having attached itself to the Battalion, became the constant companion of one of the sentries in the citadel, and a humble, though faithful friend and follower of the Regiment. While it lived it wore the gorget that now is to be found round its neck; and a picture, also in the Orderly Room, testifies to its never varying attendance on the beat of the sentry it had chosen to follow.

On March 27, 1841, Officers were posted to companies as under:—

114Sir James Macdonell left Canada (June, 1842), having been promoted Lieut.-General some time before; thereupon, Colonel Bowles, commanding the 2nd Coldstream, assumed the command, as Guards Brigadier, of the two Battalions, until they left for England. Also on the promotion of Captain Torrens (September, 1840), Captain Lord Frederick Paulet, Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, was appointed to succeed him as Major of the Brigade in Canada, when Captain Forbes became Acting Adjutant.

The reforms introduced by Lord Sydenham produced a speedy and salutary effect in Canada, and the recollection of the period of rebellion soon passed away. Tranquillity, order, and stable government were restored by the new policy, and the improvement effected, appeared to be of a permanent character. The Guards might have gone back to England in 1841, for, as far as affairs in the colony were concerned, their presence was no longer required. But we had still a question with Washington, and, as the two Battalions happened to be in North America, it was naturally deemed advisable to keep them there until this matter should be adjusted. Previous treaties had not properly defined the north-eastern frontier of the United States, nor traced a clear line of demarcation between the State of Maine and the British possessions which lay to the north of it. Both Governments desired to come to an amicable conclusion on the subject, and, early in 1842, Lord Ashburton was sent out to settle it. A Treaty was agreed to and approved at Washington on the 9th of August. Our American cousins were not displeased with the result, for it gave them advantages, which perhaps, in strict right, they had little reason to expect. But in a sense, it was also satisfactory to the British Government, as at least it put an end to a dispute, or to a cause of future trouble, of long standing. The arrangement was therefore ratified without demur, and we were content to abide by it.^[173]

The Brigade had now been for more than four years in North America, and the time had been passed pleasantly and profitably by all ranks. Seldom have the Guards had an opportunity of observing for themselves the life of a thriving British colony, and the development of our national energy across the ocean. The experience was a useful and a novel one, and was very different to that which they are wont to feel, when sent to a foreign country 115to maintain the interests of the Empire in times of war, or of disturbance. In Canada, at least, we were among our own people, among settlers loyal to the British Crown, who form a part of our own commonwealth. Difficulties did exist among them, but these were capable of easy adjustment by the light which the British Constitution will always afford in such cases; and guided by this light, it was not long before statesmen found a remedy for the evils that were complained of. If the troops were necessary to put down the disorder of the few, and to guard the introduction of reforms from the impatience of popular agitation, so is it also true, that the intelligence of the whole colony ranged itself on the side of the authorities and of the soldiers, who saved the Canadian communities from the tyranny, and the rapacity of revolutionary leaders.

Thus did a cordial feeling of respect and of mutual good will spring up between the Guards and the colonists; and the former, adhering closely to their Regimental traditions, that have formed their character, and guided them in every position in which they have been placed, maintained their discipline unimpaired in the midst of surrounding temptations.^[174] Some of our men acquired a taste for colonial life, and wished to settle in the country. For this purpose, it was necessary to obtain their discharge in Canada, and an application was accordingly made to that effect. The order for the return of the Brigade to Europe, was dated August 18, 1842, and, two days later, Sir H. Hardinge, the Secretary at War, agreed that a certain number of men might be allowed to receive their discharge with a modified pension. He specially desired that it should be known “that this extensive indulgence had been assented to, in consequence of the very exemplary manner in which the Guards have conducted themselves, during the time they have performed Colonial service in North America.”

The movement towards home took place in the autumn of 1842, the bulk of the Grenadier Guards leaving a few days before the Coldstream. Six companies of the latter, having embarked at Quebec on the 5th of October, on board H.M.S. Calcutta, sailed 116therefrom on the 6th, and reached Spithead on October 31st, whence they proceeded by train in two detachments to Winchester. After an inspection by Major-General Sir H. Pakenham, on the 1st of November, the Officer Commanding, in communicating the Major-General’s “high approbation of the steadiness and appearance” of the men, expressed his own “sense of their soldier-like conduct during the late voyage and up to the present moment, which he will take the earliest opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Officer Commanding the Regiment.” The remaining two companies followed from Canada, together with two companies of the Grenadiers, in H.M.S. Pique, and left on the 19th of October, arriving at Spithead on the 12th of November. The Battalion, reunited at Winchester, remained there until the 22nd of November, when they were sent to London (St. George’s barracks).^[175] On the 30th of November, the Lieutenant-Colonel issued the following Regimental Order:—

On the return of the Brigade from Canada, Windsor was again occupied by the Foot Guards, and Winchester remained an out-quarter until June 24, 1847, when Chichester was substituted for it. A Battalion was stationed at this latter place up to 1854.

Colonel Bowles, who had joined the Regiment in December, 1804, having retired upon half-pay, after nearly thirty-nine years service, on May 30, 1843, Colonel C. Bentinck was promoted Major, and commanded the 2nd Battalion.

As far back as January, 1832, a sergeant and corporal from each of the three Regiments were sent to the Fencing Rooms of Mr. Angelo (at that time in Old Bond Street), to learn a system of bayonet exercise which he had invented, and were inspected the following month by Lord Hill. The latter appears not to have considered the results satisfactory, and nothing more was done in the matter.^[176] But later, in February, 1843, Mr. Angelo’s services were again requisitioned, and several Non-commissioned officers were sent to his School of Arms, in St. James’s Street, to be instructed in the sword exercise, and with a view to their drilling the men of their Battalions in the use of the bayonet. Mr. Angelo, moreover, held periodical inspections of the Officers and men of every Battalion of the Brigade. He commenced this duty in December, 1843, and continued to perform it until the spring of 1852. The bayonet exercise thus begun in the Brigade, was not extended generally to the rest of the army, until after the Crimean war.

A review took place at Windsor on June 5, 1844, before the Emperor of Russia, attended by the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, then stationed there, and by the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Coldstream, who proceeded from London for the purpose. Lord Saltoun commanded the Brigade; the whole, including infantry of the Line, cavalry, and artillery, being under Lord Combermere. It is perhaps of interest to remark that His Majesty the Tsar, who within ten short years, was engaged in a serious war with this country, conveyed his approbation and thanks to the troops, and desired that they should be spoken of as “his comrades in arms.” Three years later, another review on a large scale, but of infantry 118only, was held in Hyde Park, June 17, 1847, before H.I.H. the Grand-Duke Constantine of Russia, and was attended by the Duke of Wellington. Five Battalions of the Brigade were present (1st and 2nd Grenadiers, 1st and 2nd Coldstream, and the 2nd Scots Fusiliers), divided into two brigades—the Coldstream in one, under Colonel C. Bentinck,—and a brigade of the Line. The whole under the command of H.R.H. Prince George of Cambridge, who expressed the pleasure it afforded him to command a body of the Brigade of Guards for the first time.

On the retirement of Colonel Walton (May 8, 1846), Colonel Shawe became Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel Chaplin was promoted Major (2nd Battalion). A few months later (November 9thNovember 9th), Colonel Shawe being appointed Major-General, Colonel C. Bentinck succeeded to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of the Regiment, and his brother, Colonel H. Bentinck, became Junior Major. Thereupon Colonel Chaplin commanded the 1st, and Colonel H. Bentinck the 2nd Battalion. It will be remembered that Colonel C. Bentinck had served as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General at Waterloo; and that Colonel Walton, then Acting Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, had been appointed Brigade-Major of the 2nd Guards Brigade, June 20, 1815, until the corps was dissolved, after the treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815. Again, in 1848 (April 25), there was another change in the command of the Regiment, when, on the retirement of Colonel C. Bentinck, Colonel Chaplin was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, and Colonel Hay became Major. According to the rule then prevailing, the latter commanded the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel H. Bentinck was transferred to the 1st Battalion.

In May, 1848, the Regiment stood as follows:—

Colonel.—Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., etc.

Lieutenant-Colonel.—Colonel T. Chaplin.

Majors.—Colonels H. Bentinck; C. Hay.

Captains.—Colonels W. Cornwall; W. Codrington: Lieut.-Colonels Hon. A. Upton; F. Paget; (Mounted).

Lieut.-Colonels Hon. G. Upton; J. Clitherow; Gordon Drummond; Lord F. Paulet; J. Forbes; R. Vansittart; C. Windham; H. Daniell; Hon. R. Boyle; W. S. Newton; E. Milman; G. A. Vernon.

Lieutenants.—Captains G. Johnson; Spencer Perceval; M. Tierney; Hon. V. Dawson; H. Cumming; T. Steele; W. M. Wood; W. Eccles; C. White; W. Baring; C. Cocks; P. Somerset (Adjutant); J. Cowell; 119J. Halkett (Adjutant); Sir J. Harington, Bart.; D. Carleton; Lord A. C. FitzRoy; C. Burdett; F. Newdigate; L. MacKinnon; Sir G. Walker, Bart.; G. Warrender; W. Dawkins.

Ensigns.—Lieutenants H. Jolliffe; Lord Dunkellin; F. Burton; Hon. P. Feilding; E. Dering; W. Reeve; Hon. G. Eliot; C. Baring; H. Bouverie; H. Armytage; Hon. H. Byng; C. Morgan; A. Thellusson; T. Rolt; R. Sulivan; H. Cust; D. Williamson.

Quartermasters.—W. Morse; T. Lee.

Surgeon-Major.—E. Greatrex. Battalion Surgeon.—W. Robinson. Assistant-Surgeons.—J. Munro; J. Skelton.

Solicitor.—W. G. Carter, Esq.

The fever of revolution again attacked the continent of Europe, and the year 1848 was one of confusion and disturbance. Insurrections of a violent character were the order of the day, and convulsed every country. France more especially was affected, where Louis-Philippe, the Citizen-King, was swept away, and a Republic erected. England alone was preserved free from rebellion, in spite of the efforts of a body of malcontents, called Chartists, who sought to involve the country in serious trouble. For some time this body had been at work to undermine the British Constitution by every means in their power. They selected the 10th of April upon which to give a great display of their strength and numbers, and so to “overawe Government into a concession of their demands, as the only means of averting a violent revolution.”^[177] But these efforts entirely failed; for the people, firm in their love of order, had no sympathy with agitators, whose sole desire was to disturb the public peace. Preparations on an extensive scale, were made by the Duke of Wellington to resist any unlawful attempts that might be made to coerce the constituted authorities. But the troops, as far as possible, were kept out of sight, as a reserve, to come to the aid of the numerous special constables, who, drawn from every class of society, eagerly enrolled themselves for the occasion. Early in March, when the trouble was brewing, the Guards were confined to barracks, and piquets were held in readiness to assist the civil power; these arrangements continued intermittently during the month. On the 10th of April, however, more elaborate precautions were taken: the 1st Coldstream, then at the Tower, having left detachments in the Mint and Bank, were stationed for the day in Blackfriars; the 1202nd Grenadiers, brought up from Chichester, occupied Somerset House; the West-end Battalions being placed at Wellington barracks, at Buckingham Palace, in the Magazine (Hyde Park), in the Royal Mews (Pimlico), and at St. George’s and Portman Street barracks.^[178] The day passed without riot or disturbance; after which, the effervescence gradually cooled down, and the normal state of public tranquillity soon prevailed again.

The year 1850 was the two hundredth anniversary of the formation of the Regiment, and it was celebrated, with due solemnity and much enthusiasm, on the 22nd of May. The 1st Battalion was quartered in Portman Street, the 2nd in St. George’s barracks. In the forenoon, the Regiment paraded in Hyde Park, and the men of the two Battalions were formed into one corps of eight companies, those belonging to a company of one Battalion being mixed up with those of the corresponding company of the other. In this order the Regiment, 1400 strong, were marched to Portman Street, under Colonel H. Bentinck. A substantial dinner was then provided for Non-commissioned officers and men in the barrack yard, which had been completely covered with canvas, and suitably decorated with emblems, flags, and banners; and conspicuous among them were the tattered Waterloo Colours wreathed in laurel, presented to the Regiment the day before, by Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Woodford, who had commanded the 2nd Battalion at that battle. Sergeant-Major Hurle presided, and the Colonel and all the Officers were present, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge occupying a seat among the privates. After some time spent together, during which the warm relations existing between the various ranks of the Regiment were manifested, the Officers left at four in the afternoon, and dancing and other amusements terminated the day. In the evening, the bicentenary festival was also celebrated by a dinner held in the Banqueting Hall, St. James’s Palace, and attended by all the Officers past and present, together with a few guests, among whom was the Duke of Wellington, Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, and then Commander-in-Chief. Altogether 140 persons sat down to table; Colonel Chaplin presided. In the course of the entertainment, many toasts were proposed and honoured, among them “the Marquis of Huntly, the oldest Coldstreamer present,” who, as Lord Strathavon, had left the Regiment in 1792, and was now nearly 121ninety years of age. The Duke of Wellington also made a speech, from which, on account of his great military position and authority, it may be interesting to give the following extract:—

The recollections of the bicentenary celebration were still vividly in the minds of the Coldstream, when the Regiment was plunged into mourning by the death of their veteran Colonel (July 8, 1850), who, appointed in September, 1805, was the oldest soldier in the corps, and “the Father of the Coldstreamers,” as he himself delighted to be called. H.R.H. Prince Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Cambridge, was born in 1774, and was the seventh and youngest surviving son of George III. He saw active service in Flanders,—where he was twice wounded—in 1793, under his brother the Duke of York and Marshal Freytag, and again in the two subsequent years. Later, he was given appointments in Hanover, and was Governor there until the death of William IV., when the Duke of Cumberland became Sovereign of that State, and when the kingdom was finally separated from the Crown of England.

The funeral took place at Kew on the 16th, and it was attended by both Battalions, each of which furnished a Guard of Honour, the 2nd Battalion at Cambridge House, Piccadilly, and the 1st Battalion at Kew. On the 25th the following Regimental Order was issued:—

Shortly afterwards (August 15th), the Colonelcy of the Regiment was bestowed by Her Majesty upon General the Earl of Strafford, G.C.B. (late of the Third Guards), and better known in the Coldstream as Sir John Byng, the gallant commander of the 2nd Guards Brigade during the campaign of 1815, and (when Sir G. Cooke was wounded) of the Guards Division at Waterloo.

London, in the summer of 1851, was the scene of the first great Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations—a scheme to promote the peaceable development of commerce, which was conceived, initiated, and organized by the enlightened energy of the late Prince Consort. This splendid display of the arts and sciences created extraordinary interest among all classes, both at home and abroad. The Brigade took its part in this undertaking by guarding the building, and by furnishing a piquet of one Officer and 50 men in case of emergency. The latter were quartered in the disused Knightsbridge barracks, and the usual autumn change of quarters was put off until the end of October.

On the 22nd of August, Colonel H. Bentinck was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel on the retirement of Colonel Chaplin, when Colonel Hon. A. Upton became Junior Major (2nd Battalion).

The year 1852 (September 14th) saw the death of the now aged Duke of Wellington—the great Commander who broke the power of Napoleon, and who, above all other Generals, raised the military prestige of England to that high standard of fame and glory, that made the British nation invincible in the field, and enabled her to stand single-handed against the conqueror of Europe. It is quite impossible in a work of this kind, to attempt to recapitulate a tithe even of the services which this great man rendered to his country. They stand recorded in history, and in the annals of the Coldstream they are partially described in the events which occurred up to 1818, when his active military career, as a General in the field, came to an end. Suffice it here to reproduce the touching General Order which Her Majesty caused to be published to the Army as soon as she learnt that her faithful soldier and servant had breathed his last:—

The remains of the illustrious dead having been removed from Walmer to London (November 10th), the lying-in-state lasted some days in Chelsea Hospital, when Guards of Honour were furnished daily by the Battalion finding the public duties; and thousands flocked to the scene to pay a last tribute to the memory of the greatest Englishman of the century. The funeral was fixed for the 18th, and the ceremony was on as imposing and magnificent a scale as a grateful country could devise upon so solemn an occasion of universal mourning and public sorrow. The procession started from the Horse Guards Parade, under an escort of six battalions, eight squadrons, and nineteen guns, together with representatives of every available regiment of the British Army,^[180] the whole under the command of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.

The infantry consisted of two brigades, one of which, under Major-General Shawe (late of the Coldstream), was composed of 124the 1st Battalions of the Grenadiers, Coldstream, and Scots Fusilier Guards. The 2nd Coldstream, then at the Tower, was posted near St. Paul’s, where the interment took place, while the flank companies of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers, the late Duke’s Regiment, took up a position within the iron railings there.^[181]

Eighteen months had barely elapsed, after the disappearance of the chief actor in the glories of the great wars that disturbed the beginning of the century, when the long European peace came to an end, and again there was a call to arms, and the nation was involved in the harassing anxieties of a sanguinary struggle in the East with Russia. The Crimean war opens up a new era in the military history of the country, and as the Coldstream participated largely in it, it will be described in the subsequent chapters. Meanwhile, it may be convenient to mention, as briefly as possible, some few of the changes and reforms that affected the army at large, and the Regiment in particular, during the period (1837-54), with which we are now more immediately concerned.

It may be stated that, during the reign of William IV., there was only a sergeant’s guard at Buckingham Palace; but in July, 1837, when Her Majesty took up her residence there, it was increased to one Subaltern and forty-four Non-commissioned officers and men. Again, before the Queen’s Accession, guard-mounting, attended by the flank companies of the Brigade, seems often to have been held more than once during the year; but since that time, it took place more regularly as a Birthday ceremonial. Moreover, prior to 1841, the public duties mounted, as a rule, all the year round from the Horse Guards Parade; from that date, however, they appear to have paraded there during the summer months only (May 1st-October 1st), when white trousers were worn by the troops. The practice of mounting the public duties from the battalion parades during the whole year, except for about a month, as at present, began about 1849.

As early as 1829, efforts were made to increase the comfort of the men on guard, by providing them with means to cook, or at least to warm, their dinners, which, prior to that date, had been served up to them in a very unsatisfactory manner. Later, other improvements were introduced into barracks. Suitable washing 125and cooking arrangements began to be organized (1838 and 1843), and fuel and light were authorized for a room to serve as a “library” for the use of men (1839). These changes, however, were not finally complete until 1849, in which year also, the new barracks at the Tower (Waterloo barracks) were finished and ready for occupation. It may be interesting to note that, in 1850, by an order from the Horse Guards, all bagatelle tables in barracks were forbidden; and this was interpreted to entail the removal of a billiard table which had been set up at Chichester, as the Field-Officer in Brigade Waiting considered it “in the same light as the bagatelle boards which have been so recently done away with by the Commander-in-Chief” (Brigade Order , July 24, 1850).

Regimental Savings Banks were established in the end of 1843, and were brought into operation in the Coldstream by a Regimental Order, dated January 22, 1844.

Considerable attention was paid to the well-being of the Recruit Depôt at Croydon, and it is satisfactory to record a Regimental Order of the 20th of June, 1843, showing that the system then adopted, met the requirements which it was intended to supply.

In 1849 new school arrangements were introduced there, and a routine of duty, both for the winter and summer, was fixed to enable the recruits to attend the classes regularly.

On the 19th of December, 1845, a medal for “Meritorious Service” was introduced into the army, to be presented, in addition to an annuity not exceeding £20, to sergeants recommended for distinguished service, and to be held while doing duty or together with pension. A yearly sum of £2000 was set apart for this purpose.^[182]

126It may be remarked that in April, 1850, a modification was made in the manner of keeping the men’s accounts, and Officers were held responsible, as heretofore, to inspect and sign the pay and soldiers' settling books, as well as to see that any balances deposited in the Savings Bank were duly entered. A certificate to this effect was signed once a month.

Events contributed to cause the country generally, to bestow some greater attention on military matters than had been the case for many a long year. The fear that we might become involved in a serious dispute with the French, owing to affairs in Syria in 1841; the increasing hostility displayed by that people; and the revolution that disturbed Europe in 1848-49, induced us to make some augmentations to the regular forces, to reform the system of army service, and to reconstitute the militia.^[183] But the value of these changes would not have been complete unless other means had also been taken to improve the state of the army. It is known, and recognised with gratitude, that H.R.H. the Prince Consort devoted his great talents, with the earnestness that marked his character so strongly, to the well-being of the army, and laboured indefatigably to secure reforms and to increase efficiency.^[184] Lord Hardinge, the new Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Duke of Wellington, also took immense interest in the subject, with the result that the soldier’s firearm was improved, and that some system of practical training was at last provided for both Officers and men.

REGULATION MUSKET 1830.

ENFIELD. 1853-1865.

SNIDER. 1865-1871.

MARTINI HENRY. 1871.

LEE METFORD. 1890.

N.R. Wilkinson del.     A.D. Innes & C^o. London    Mintern Bros. lith.

The armament of the Brigade underwent a change during the first sixteen years of Her Majesty’s reign. As far back as 1836, the Quartermasters of the 1st Coldstream and of the 3rd Grenadiers received “percussion muskets intended for trial;” but the old flintlock was still retained, until about the year 1843, when percussion caps were introduced, and the “pickers and brushes,” worn by the 127corporals and privates, were discontinued in the Regiment. The Minié musket-rifle was produced in 1851, and Brigade Orders, dated February 26th, and April 1, 1852, directed the seven Battalions of the Foot Guards to send two intelligent Non-commissioned officers to Woolwich, for the purpose of being instructed in its use. Early the following year, a few of these firearms were served out, when each Battalion of the Regiment received 200. A general distribution of the new musket-rifle, however, was not by any means complete when hostilities broke out in 1854, nor had the authorities apparently quite made up their minds upon its value; but, fortunately, sufficient progress had been made in its construction, and the Guards and the greater portion of the British Army, that took the field, were all armed with it before they met the Russians. It may therefore be stated at once, that the weapon which we had in the Crimea, was much superior to that used by the majority of the enemy’s troops. Another pattern was adopted in 1853, but it was not issued till later.

Prior to the introduction of the Minié rifle, musketry was imperfectly and irregularly practised. Battalions in out-quarters (Chichester and Dublin) contrived to do so, but in London it was not attempted. Officers took much interest in teaching the men the use of their firelock, and encouraged them to shoot by offering prizes for which they competed. The ranges were, of course, short—100 yards,—the results inferior, and only five or ten rounds per man were fired. The target, some 6 feet by 2 feet broad, was often embellished with a figure of a French Grenadier, to give the men zest in their efforts to hit it. In 1853, a range was procured near Kilburn, and on the 25th of August, the four Battalions in London were ordered to commence ball practice there as soon as possible. The year following, it was but natural that “incessant” musketry should be ordered, and in March a party was sent to the school of Hythe, which appears to have been opened about that time. In May, a return was called for on the musketry as practised at Kilburn, and Captain Le Couteur (Coldstream Guards), “having made himself acquainted with the method of instruction as carried on at Hythe,” was ordered to superintend all target practice of the 2nd Battalion which was then at home. It may be added, that drafts going out to the Crimea, were also ordered to practise musketry during the voyage out, and ammunition was provided for that special purpose. The 128present system of musketry now adopted in the army, appears to have grown out of these beginnings.

In 1852, several detachments, consisting of one Officer and 20 to 25 men of the 1st Battalion, were sent to Chatham for the purpose of being instructed in siege operations, and in the construction of field-works.

The next year was one of considerable military activity, brought about by the efforts of the Prince Consort, and by the fact that other nations, more especially Prussia, were devoting much attention to the training of their troops. A camp of instruction was formed at Chobham, under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Seaton, which lasted for two months, commencing from the middle of June. The Foot Guards proceeded there for their training in two Brigades, each remaining for a month,—the first consisting of the 1st and 3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusiliers, under Colonel H. Bentinck; the second, of the 2nd Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 2nd Scots Fusiliers, under Colonel Godfrey Thornton (Grenadier Guards). Captain Frederick Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed Major of Brigade of both Brigades.

The instruction was of a practical character, and the troops acquired a knowledge of their duties in the field, which could in no other way be imparted to them. Some 16,000 were altogether present. Being the first peace manœuvres held in England (we should perhaps, in the present day, call them only summer drills), the camp at Chobham evoked much interest among all classes; and as the Queen, accompanied by the Prince Consort, frequently inspected the troops or was present when military exercises were performed, it became a centre of attraction to thousands of spectators, who flocked to see those unwonted displays of mimic warfare.

Thus ended the year 1853, the forerunner of the great war with Russia, which was so soon to try the value of the British army under the cruel test of hardships, difficulties, and privations. The army at that time had passed through a long period of peace; it had little theoretical knowledge of its profession, and was imperfectly served by those departments that are indispensable to its efficiency in the field. But it was a thoroughly disciplined army, one that knew its duty, that respected and obeyed authority, and that bore unflinchingly and without murmur, all the sufferings 129which it was called upon to endure. This was the army with which England again engaged in a serious European war. Nor was the country disappointed with the work that was performed. For, in spite of many shortcomings in administration and organization, and notwithstanding innumerable trials and difficulties, the troops maintained unsullied the honour of their Sovereign, by the conspicuous display of those pre-eminent and fundamental military virtues,—discipline and fortitude.

Position of Russia in Europe—State of the Continent in 1853—British alliance with France—The Tsar’s quarrel with Turkey—Commencement of hostilities on the Danube—The affair of Sinope—How it drew England and France into the war—Three Battalions of the Brigade of Guards ordered on foreign service—Concentration of the Allies in the Mediterranean—Guards Brigade at Malta—Thence to Scutari—Want of transport—The Allies moved to Varna—Good feeling between the British and French troops—Course of the war on the Danube—Siege of Silistria—Retreat of the Russians into Bessarabia—Intervention of Austria—The Allies in Bulgaria—Sickness among the troops—Return to Varna—Preparations for the invasion of the Crimea—The organization and strength of the Allies.

The Empire of Russia—except for the great expansion in Central Asia which has taken place during the last forty years, and which has now brought its frontiers close to India—was scarcely less vast and formidable in 1853 than it is at present. Stretching from Germany on the west, to the Pacific Ocean on the east, bordering the Black Sea, and pressing on Turkey, Persia, and China, it occupies an immense and continuous territory, both in Europe and in Asia, and exercises many and important influences over the civilization of the world. Inhabited generally, by a docile agricultural population who live in the plains, and whose liberties and property are at the mercy of a strong executive power, it is ruled by an Autocrat both in name and in reality, and is governed by a trained army of ubiquitous administrators and officials, who enforce his decrees, and coerce the whole people to spend their existence in the service of the Tsar. The organization of Russia, less adapted, perhaps, to secure the welfare of her subjects than to accomplish the will of her rulers, is skilfully constructed; and the sagacity she displays in the conduct of her affairs, is as conspicuous in the manner she brings fresh conquests within her grasp, as in that by which she controls and assimilates the 131numerous and heterogeneous nationalities, that are to be found within her borders. But here her advantages end. Russia has no seaboard, and her foreign commerce, incommensurate to her size and importance, is not sufficient to enable her to develop her vast resources, or to consolidate the stupendous forces with which her disciplined intelligence, large possessions, and teeming population should endow her. A glance at the map reveals the disability under which she labours. Fettered in the north by an ice-bound ocean, she has but two outlets through which to reveal her strength, and these are blocked by the narrow channels of the Sound and the Bosphorus.

That Russia is ambitious and greedy of power, few will deny; but her encroachments are not altogether due to the mere love of extending her territories. Her existence, as a nation of the first rank, is menaced by her maritime weakness, and until she frees herself from the shackles that cripple her commercial activity on the sea, she is the ready and easy victim of the Power that holds, and has strength to use, the keys of her house. But, added to this, her statesmen have long perceived that, as soon as they shall have gained the Bosphorus, they will win a commanding supremacy over the destinies of the world. While, therefore, they are impelled to a system of aggrandisement, in order to force their way to the sea and to preserve the life of their Imperial structure, they by no means despise the glorious goal of wide dominion, to which the success of this policy must infallibly conduct them. This, then, is, and has been for many generations, ever since their genius conceived the design, the reason which has urged them relentlessly to enlarge their possessions in Poland, Persia, and in Central Asia, and to exhibit undying hostility towards the Turkish Empire.

The Western Powers have not failed to recognise the danger to which they are exposed by this active and aggressive policy, and Great Britain, having vital interests of her own in the far East, has never been able to view with unconcern the absorption of Turkey by her Northern rival. Hence, it has come about that, when the Sultan has been threatened, many nations of the West have endeavoured to go to his assistance, and to ward off the disaster that seemed to be imminent. But their efforts have been badly directed; for, divided among themselves, pursuing divergent interests, interfering without wisdom, or led away by false conceptions of the real situation, they too often manacled the defensive 132power of Turkey, and gave victory to the Russians, when the latter had not won it by their own strength. In this way Russia advanced and prospered,—by the ascendency that organized intelligence will ever command over a policy of mere sentimental or unreflective expediency,—until 1853, when another crisis was impending in the East, which produced a great European war, and terminated the long peace that had existed since 1815.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the origin of the war. It arose from a trivial incident—the possession of the keys of the Holy Places in Palestine. The Emperor Nicholas I. reigned at St. Petersburg at that time, and he claimed these emblems of superiority as head of the Greek Church; so also did the French, in virtue of an old Treaty made in the sixteenth century, which, they affirmed, constituted them protectors of the Latin Church in the East. The Sultan adjusted the petty cause of dispute, and thereupon the Tsar made fresh demands, which the Porte resisted. These will be adverted to presently, but a word will be necessary here to describe briefly the position of affairs, that existed on the continent of Europe.

France did not long maintain the Republic set up by the Revolution of 1848. Louis Napoleon, nephew and political heir of the first great Napoleon—in spite of the old decree banishing the family of the late Emperor,—was elected President for four years by a large majority (December 20th). Strengthening his position with the army, by appeals to past glory, and with the people generally, by the maintenance of order in troublous times, he resolved to revive the Empire, and succeeded in December, 1851, in constituting himself President for ten years, with largely increased powers, and with the title of Prince. Twelve months later (December 2, 1852), he was proclaimed Emperor under the name of Napoleon III., and was so acknowledged by Europe. The new Sovereign was not blind to the advantages which a friendship with England would confer upon him; he was even anxious to conciliate a people he had known and respected in the days of his exile. The defect in his title, moreover, was best obliterated by the adoption of a policy of adventure. The appearance of the Eastern cloud furnished him with an opportunity he was glad to seize; and, as it became darker, so did he, the more readily, co-operate with the British Cabinet, in their attempt to disperse it. When it was determined that peace could no longer be maintained, 133an alliance was cemented between the two countries, and England and France, so often in the past unhappily opposed in war, were at length found side by side in the strife, combating the same foe and loyally supporting each other in the field of battle—rivals only in the honour and glory to be derived therefrom. And yet this union was not without serious drawbacks. Seldom can a confederacy of independent States be satisfactory; for each has different interests to serve, and conflicting opinions too frequently weaken the efforts of those who have banded themselves together to accomplish an object avowedly dear to all. In 1854 the alliance was definitely established; it became l’entente cordiale, as it was felicitously termed, and, when the war was in progress, harmony and mutual respect and confidence reigned between the armies engaged. But, as a price, to please Napoleon, England gave up some of her most cherished customs of naval warfare—a sacrifice which the armed forces of Europe had in vain sought to wring from her,—and hostilities assumed a direction which, as will be seen, did the least damage to the enemy, and effected injury to the cause which the British nation had most at heart.

The popular explosion in France in 1848, affected not only that country, but produced widespread results, and its consequences were felt, like the Revolution of 1830, all over the continent of Europe. In Austria the crisis had been peculiarly acute, and the Hungarians and Italians rose in rebellion against the authority of their Sovereign. The latter was able to re-assert his power in Lombardy by his own resources; but in Hungary the resistance was so strong that, when the Tsar offered the assistance of his troops, the proposal was accepted, and Russian bayonets reduced the Magyars to obedience, and placed them once more under the Austrian Emperor (1849). In Prussia and in the petty States of Germany less difficulties had been experienced; but the temper of the people had been aroused, and they clamoured for reform and a greater control over their own affairs. The German Princes were alarmed; they distrusted their subjects, and relied for counsel and aid upon Russia—the only Power whose government, like theirs, was despotic, but who, unlike them, had no fear of a popular ebullition. In truth, the credit of the Tsar was in the ascendent in Central Europe: he ostensibly saved Austria from disaster, if not from dissolution; he intervened in the 134question of the Danish Duchies,^[185] which then agitated the whole of Germany; and he mediated successfully between Austria and Prussia, when they became rivals and jealous of each other, on account of the efforts of the latter to restore in her own favour the Imperial Constitution of Germany, which had come to an end in 1806. In short, the Emperor Nicholas controlled the German nations; he arbitrated in their differences; and could involve them in serious trouble should they see fit to dispute his pleasure.

When Russia, therefore, not content with the settlement effected with respect to the Holy Places, determined still to provoke a quarrel with Turkey, the Western Powers were not united upon the problem that invited their attention. England and France alone resolved to resist her pretensions, while the others—Austria, Prussia, and the minor States of Germany—practically ranged themselves on her side. The demands made upon the Porte are of little importance; any pretext is good, where an object is to be gained. The Sultan was required to accept the protection of Russia over his Christian subjects, and he refused to submit (May 23, 1853). In this determination England agreed; indeed, it is clear that it would have been impossible for him to deliver over a very considerable section of his people into the hands of his hereditary enemy. Thereupon a Russian force, under Prince Michael Gortchakoff, crossed the Pruth (July 2nd), occupied the Principalities (now the kingdom of Roumania), and established itself upon the Danube. The Turks immediately made great efforts to meet the emergency, by collecting troops and despatching them both into Asia Minor, and into Bulgaria. But no declaration of war took place, for the Western Powers persuaded the aggrieved party to have patience, while they sent representatives to Vienna to try to avert hostilities by the arts of diplomacy.

These endeavours failed entirely, not to say ridiculously. An Instrument was drafted, called the Vienna Note, to which both the Tsar and the Sultan were to consent, as a basis for a future arrangement. The former did so readily, but the latter peremptorily refused his adhesion to it. That he was right, is shown by the fact that the Note was so loosely drawn, as to be capable of an interpretation, whereby the full demands of Russia would have been agreed to by Turkey; and in the negotiations which followed, it became apparent 135that this was the only interpretation which the Emperor Nicholas had adopted! So the intervention projected at this centre of Russian intrigue, came to an end with the full concurrence of the British and French Governments, who were obliged to recognize that they had been duped. In October, the Porte formally called upon General Gortchakoff to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, and ordered Omar Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-chief in Bulgaria, “to commence hostilities if, after fifteen days from the arrival of his despatch at the Russian head-quarters, an answer in the negative should be returned.” After the stated interval, towards the end of the month, the war commenced, not only on the Danube, but also on the Armenian frontier in Asia.

Interesting as is the campaign that now began, to the student of military history, it will be impossible to describe it at any length in these pages. It must suffice to say that, at the end of the year, the results in Asia were unimportant. There were victories on both sides, but no great progress was achieved by either of the combatants. It was different in Europe, for there, thanks to the skill and energy of Omar Pasha, and to the gallantry of his troops, the Turks gained many and considerable advantages. Crossing the Danube at Turtukai, they secured a position on the northern bank of the river at Oltenitza, in the face of superior forces, and repulsed every attempt to dislodge them. Again, having established themselves firmly at Kalafat, opposite Widin, they attacked and dealt a crushing defeat (early in January, 1854) on a strong corps, which had entrenched itself in their vicinity near Citate. The Ottoman troops were everywhere victorious in this theatre of operations; the Russians, on the other hand, were beaten and disorganized, their morale shaken, and their losses, on their own admission, amounted to 35,000 men.

While these successes were being won, an incident occurred which caused the war to spread, and drew England and France into its meshes. A small Turkish squadron of a few frigates and smaller vessels lay at anchor at Sinope; whereupon, a far more powerful Russian fleet, consisting of heavily armed and large ships, approached under cover of a fog, surprised them, and completely destroyed them (November 30th). The attack was conducted under circumstances of considerable barbarity; no quarter was given, the ships were sunk, the wounded and the helpless were not spared, and 4000 men were slaughtered or drowned. When the 136news of this action reached Europe, indignation, already aroused by previous events, could not be restrained in England, and so strong was the feeling evoked in the country, that war could no longer be avoided. At first sight it may appear strange, that the story of useless butchery, perpetrated in war time, should produce so violent a resentment; but when events are reviewed, the reasons for it will be perceived. It is necessary to glance at these events, in order to understand some features connected with subsequent operations.

The guiding line of thought that influenced the statesmen of the two Powers, interested in curbing the aggression of St. Petersburg, was the conviction that Russia was at that time overwhelmingly powerful, and that the Ottoman Empire was in the last gasp of impotence and decrepitude. The Emperor Nicholas had for long fostered this idea, and had carefully instilled it into our Government. With this object, he made a journey to this country as early as 1844, and he pressed it upon our Ambassador at his Court, in secret communications held in the spring of 1853, before the actual crisis had taken place. We were then told that Turkey was “a sick man—a very sick man” who might at any moment “die upon our hands,” and that it was therefore advisable to divide his inheritance; and our cupidity was tempted by the offer of Egypt, and even of the island of Crete, if we would take these bribes, and give Russia a free hand. We believed these assertions of omnipotence on the one hand, and of prostration on the other, though needless to say we had no desire to share in the spoils. Our minds instantly recurred to the campaigns of 1828-29, when the Russians crossed the Balkans, and forced a disastrous treaty upon the Sultan at Adrianople. We dwelt upon these results, showing only Russian victories and Turkish defeat, and we drew our conclusions therefrom. But we forgot a few historical facts connected with that war.

We forgot that the Russians could only undertake a successful invasion of Turkey, when they had the command of the Black Sea, and that we ourselves had secured this for them, in 1828, by annihilating the Turkish fleet the year before (August, 1827), at the unfortunate victory of Navarino. We forgot, also, that the Balkans do not form the last line of defence, but that the difficulties of an invader increase materially as he approaches the Sea of Marmora. In 1829, the Russian army had achieved a great deal, but it had not attained to victory. It was exhausted, and unable to 137maintain itself at the end of a long line of communications; while Turkey, on the other hand, was gathering her forces together. We surely, then, failed to recollect, that we seized the opportunity at that very critical moment to force the Sultan to make a shameful peace; thereby saving the aggressor from disaster, and securing to him advantages which otherwise he could never have hoped to gain.

As a consequence of the exaggerated dread inspired by the great Northern Power, the Turks were not allowed to act in their own defence in 1853; they were obstructed by severe diplomatic pressure, and harassed by vexatious interference. At last, after the fiasco at Vienna, they could no longer be restrained by their timid friends, and, in spite of them, they at length declared war, in the autumn of 1853. Now, when the Emperor Nicholas ordered an advance into the Ottoman Empire (viz. the Danubian Principalities), in July, and when the Porte, dissuaded from using force to repel the invasion, was obliged to allow her enemy quietly to consolidate himself therein, Russia, to appease Europe, made an announcement that she intended only to seize a material guarantee, and would engage in no further offensive operations. She would only meet any assault directed against her. England and France had sent their ships to a port near the Dardanelles (September 11th), and, as soon as the Sultan commenced hostilities, they ordered them up to Constantinople, to protect Turkey from Russian aggression (October 22nd). Conscious of the dangers surrounding the small Turkish squadron in the Black Sea, very urgent requests were made, that the friendly fleets should pass through the Bosphorus, to prevent its falling into the power of the enemy. But these applications were all peremptorily refused.^[186] To make the matter very much worse, and, indeed, to render the whole course of action unintelligible, the Turkish fleet itself, by the strong representations of the Sultan’s Western advisers, was also kept back idly in the Bosphorus, and was prevented from sailing to the support of the exposed squadron!^[187] 138Hence the disaster at Sinope became inevitable. When this state of affairs was realized in England,—when it was seen that our diplomatic skill was again at fault, that the assurances of Russia were not to be relied upon, and that our naval demonstrations were held in contempt,—then the natural consequences followed, and the British people, their Government notwithstanding, determined that the disturber of the peace of Europe should be punished.

Early in 1854, the English, French, and Turkish fleets entered the Black Sea; but the Russian flag had everywhere disappeared. The victorious Admiral at Sinope,—never dreaming that our extreme caution and fear of giving offence to his Imperial Master would prevent us from taking some action, or from giving the Sultan leave to pursue and capture him,—had betaken himself back to Sevastopol with the utmost speed; he only waited to make the necessary repairs to secure a safe passage, for “the Russian squadron had suffered considerably.” Nor was the Emperor Nicholas cast down by recent events, except for the fact that Omar Pasha was steadily destroying his military prestige on the Danube, and was revealing to the world the real weakness of his supposed power in the field. He ordered his Ambassadors in London and Paris to demand their passports, and they left those capitals on the 6th of February. Meanwhile the tedious and fruitless negotiations continued at Vienna, and Russia, far from showing any conciliatory disposition, increased her demands. But these conferences came to nothing, and on the 13th the British Ambassador was invited to quit St. Petersburg.^[188] An Ultimatum followed, calling upon the Tsar to evacuate the Principalities, and the formal declaration of war was issued on the 28th of March.

Before this date, preparations for the coming strife had already been made. Treaties of alliance were concluded with France and Turkey, and the expeditionary force was sent to Malta. On the 10th of February a Brigade Order was issued, whereby a Brigade of Foot Guards, consisting of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalions Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards, were to be held in readiness to proceed on foreign service by the 18th, each Battalion to be completed to 40 sergeants, besides the usual Staff-sergeants, and 850 rank and file. The 1st Coldstream, then quartered at St. George’s barracks, were sent on the 14th of 139February to Chichester, where the 2nd Battalion were stationed,^[189] there to be made up to field strength, and to transfer weakly or unfit men to the latter. This was the first movement of the troops in London, and the people, eager for war to commence, and ever ready to welcome their brave defenders, hailed the appearance of the men with unbounded enthusiasm. A contemporary writer thus describes the scene:—

The Battalion, having been inspected at Chichester on the 17th, proceeded to Southampton, and, amid the hearty cheers of a dense crowd, embarked on board the steamship Orinoco (22nd) for Malta. Arriving there after a prosperous voyage, on the 4th of March, they were stationed at Fort Manoel (4 companies), Fort Tigne (1 company), and in the Lazarette (3 companies). The strength was 35 Officers, 919 men, and 32 women, the average age and service of the men being twenty-nine and seven years respectively.^[191] The following Officers embarked:—

The three Guards Battalions reached Malta about the same time, and were commanded by Colonel Bentinck (Coldstream Guards), who was appointed Brigadier-General, February 21st. There they remained for about seven weeks, awaiting events; while other troops, all infantry, poured into the island, without General Officers, Staffs, or Departments, wherewith to form an army. At first it seemed somewhat doubtful whether they would go further. Our Government at home still dreamt of peace, and could not make up their minds that war was upon them; they even seemed to have thought that, though a naval demonstration had signally failed at Constantinople, a military display in the Mediterranean might frighten the Russians! The interval, however, was not misspent; it was utilized in preparing the men for active service, principally in the exercise of musketry, which was practised without interruption. With reference to this important subject, the following, written by a Coldstream Officer (Colonel Wilson), who was present with the Battalion, will be of interest:—

Towards the end of March our French allies, already formed into fighting units, began to appear in Malta on their way to Gallipoli, when they fraternized freely and cordially with their British friends. A few days later, Lieut.-General Sir George Brown reached the island, and started for the same destination, where he was joined by five battalions of infantry. Shortly afterwards, Scutari, opposite Constantinople on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, was occupied by our troops, and the British forces in the East began to collect there. The Guards Brigade left Malta on the 21st of April, in three ships, seven companies of the Coldstream embarking on H.M.S. Vulcan, the eighth accompanying the Grenadier Guards on board the Golden Fleece; and, landing at Scutari on the 29th, they encamped there. Next day a General Order was issued, which announced to the troops the arrival and appointment of General Lord Raglan, G.C.B., to the command of the army in Turkey,^[194] whose composition into divisions and brigades, “to replace the provisional arrangement hitherto made by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown,” was also notified. The organization and strength of the Allies will be given later, when they were more complete, but it may be stated here, that Captain F. Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards) was appointed Brigade-Major of the Guards Brigade, and that the following Officers belonging to the Coldstream were placed upon the Staff: Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Steele, Military Secretary, and Lieut.-Colonel P. Somerset, Aide-de-camp to Lord Raglan; Captain Hon. A. Hardinge, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division; Captain Hon. H. Byng, Aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Bentinck; and Lieutenant Lord Bingham, extra Aide-de-camp to Major-General Earl of Lucan.^[195]

The six weeks spent at Scutari passed pleasantly enough. The scenes around them were new to the rank and file, and many, in the Household Brigade certainly, had never dreamt of the East and its marvels. There was much to excite the interest of the men, and little to mar their enjoyment. British sports and pastimes were freely indulged in; the food was good; stores of groceries and other material comforts were provided; no hardships were endured; the heat was not too oppressive; the military authorities even relaxed some of their old-fashioned and most cherished regulations, and the dog collar, called the stock, which then throttled our soldiers, was happily discarded. Cavalry and artillery began, moreover, to arrive in camp, and we seemed at length to be consolidating into a field army. The troops were turned out on the Queen’s birthday, and again on the 31st of May, for the inspection of the Sultan; and, as usual, they presented a splendid appearance, both in physique and discipline; moreover, they also began to look like an organized force. Still there was no transport, and the medical service left much to be desired. With no efficiency in these departments, how was war to be conducted? And as the deficiency was absolute, did our Government really mean that we should take the field? At last a makeshift was proposed, which is best described in Colonel Wilson’s words:—

After this, orders were issued to all Officers to provide themselves with bât-horses.^[198] Twenty-one were allotted to each battalion, of which two belonged to every company for the transport of tents (General Order , June 1, 1854). Baggage parades frequently took place, to instruct the men how to pack the loads, and to accustom the animals to carry them.

During the stay at Scutari, the question arose as to what further should be done, and, to resolve it, the British and French Commanders-in-chief proceeded to visit Omar Pasha in Bulgaria. The latter naturally desired to have the Allies at his back, and he urged that they should occupy Varna. This was agreed to, and the armies of England and France were at last to be transferred to the seat of war. On the 29th of May, Sir G. Brown’s division began to move, and a fortnight later (June 13th), the Guards and Highland Brigades, forming the First Division, steamed up the Bosphorus for their new destination. The Coldstream were conveyed there in the steam-transport Andes. The 144men started in light order; a reduced kit was carried in the knapsacks, the great coats, smock frocks, and blankets rolled on the top, but the rest of the clothing and necessaries were packed in the squad bags and left behind.^[199]

It may strike the modern reader as strange, that a proportion of women were allowed to accompany their husbands belonging to the force destined for the East. In Scutari they were lodged in huts in the camp, and though inadequately provided for, badly housed, and subject to inconveniences which could not be permitted in the present day, their existence still was tolerable. But seeing how incomplete were the transport arrangements, our astonishment must be extreme, when we learn that the British army, about to take the field in a quarter where no depôt or base of operations existed, was to be accompanied by these women, whose presence under such circumstances, could not fail to be a misery to themselves, as well as a serious burden to our defective military organization. Yet this was done, and we find two tents per battalion, making a total of ninety-six, allotted for their accommodation. In the subsequent operations these unfortunate women, as might have been easily anticipated, suffered considerably. They remained in camp until the embarkation for the Crimea took place. A few were even allowed to sail with the army to that coast, and during the passage the wife of a sergeant of the Coldstream gave birth to a daughter, who was appropriately christened “Euxina.” Fortunately they did not all land.^[200] They were sent back to Scutari, where the main depôt and primary base of operations of the army in the East was formed, of which a Brevet Major of the 30th Regiment was appointed Commandant.^[201]

Arriving at Varna (June 14th), the 1st Coldstream landed late 145in the evening, and had to pitch their camp in the dark. The site was unfortunately selected, both for the Brigade and for the rest of the British army, being situated on a slimy flat, close to a large lake of stagnant water, three-quarters of a mile from the town. Before a week elapsed, the intense heat, bad water, indifferent and insufficient food, and the monotony of inaction began to tell upon the men; they were afflicted with diarrhœa and other ailments, so that the health of the troops, hitherto entirely satisfactory, rapidly deteriorated. The French, on the other hand, had taken greater care of themselves; they occupied higher ground, and they suffered less. During the stay there—about a fortnight, for, on the 1st of July, an advance was made to Aladyn, some ten miles in the interior—the masses of the allied soldiery met each other for the first time, and the warmest good-fellowship existed between them. The French Chiefs, Marshal St. Arnaud and General Canrobert, often rode through our camps, and the men invariably turned out and cheered them with the utmost heartiness and good will—a welcome which was always much appreciated. In spite of the sickness that oppressed our troops, the Officers amused themselves, as they are always sure to do, in various ways, not least of which was a hunt, extemporized (but without hounds), after the wild mongrel dogs that were driven out of the town, and infested the district. In the month of June, the armies continued their concentration in Bulgaria; and by the 21st the bulk had arrived there, when, in addition to the detachments of Turkish and Egyptian troops that were stationed in the neighbourhood, they mustered some 60,000 men.^[202]

Meanwhile the forces under Omar Pasha were seriously engaged with the enemy, and a few words will be necessary to explain briefly the military events that took place. After the victory at Citate, there was a pause in the operations till the middle of February, owing to the severity of the winter and to the temporary illness of the Turkish Commander. The Russians made strenuous efforts to repair their failures and their losses sustained in 1853, and they poured large reinforcements into the Principalities. In March, the Ottoman troops gained several successes. On the 4th, they crossed to the northern bank of the Danube and made a raid on Kalarashi; they repulsed an attack at Kalafat on the 11th, and on the 15th they prevented a 146passage at Turtukai, while a like attempt upon Rustchuk was also defeated. But the enemy, under General Luders, succeeded about the same time in crossing the river lower down, near its mouth, at Galatz, and invaded the Dobrudsha—an unhealthy district, full of swamps, and badly suited to military operations. Overjoyed with this advantage, Gortchakoff now reinforced Luders. After a series of well-contested engagements, at the price of great losses, the principal fortresses of the province, as far as Trajan’s wall (which extends from Rassova to Kustendji, on the Black Sea), were reduced; while Omar left them to their fate, and took no steps to retrieve the fortunes of the campaign in this quarter. These reverses, however, were partially compensated by another victory near Kalafat, and, as the Russians retired before the Turks in this direction, Krajova was occupied by the latter. This retreat was in reality a change of plan, for the enemy moved a portion of his forces to the east, and pressed on the right of Omar’s line, with the design of establishing himself between Varna and Silistria.^[203] His design was now to lay siege to the latter place, which interposed, and which he had to take, if he meant to try and establish a footing in Eastern Bulgaria.

The protracted siege of Silistria has become famous in the annals of the war, indeed in the history of military achievements. Space does not allow a proper description of the gallant and desperate resistance, which was then made by the Turks against overwhelming odds; but the principal points connected therewith may be glanced at in this work, if only because the British Officer, Major Butler, to whom, with Major Nasmyth, great glory is due for the defence, was transferred to the Coldstream Guards, as a reward for his brilliant services, though he never belonged to the Regiment, for his death occurred before he was actually gazetted.^[204]

Silistria was attacked on the 14th of April, but it was three weeks later before a partial investment of the place was effected. The Russians were determined to take the place at any cost, and they made desperate efforts to accomplish their object; they brought up all their available forces, and placed their most 147renowned and capable Officers in command. During the siege, the war seemed almost everywhere else to stand still in Eastern Bulgaria, and all eyes were fixed on the memorable drama, that was being enacted in this part of the theatre of operations. The garrison was weak, and the indifferent works were only hastily repaired and strengthened; but the defenders were well led, while the matchless bravery and the military virtues of the Turk were fully displayed. Among the leaders, Mussa Pasha, the Commander, stood pre-eminent for intrepidity and firmness. He was admirably supported by the two British Officers, Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, whose scientific knowledge, ardent valour, and cool judgment made their services of the utmost value, and gained for them undying renown. The enemy having drawn his lines as close as possible to the fortifications, resorted to every art to carry them. His principal efforts were directed towards an open work, called Arab Tabia, whose fall would have disconcerted the whole defence. Time after time, during the month of May, the besiegers bombarded the stronghold, sapped up to it, tried to mine it, and assaulted it both by day and by night. All to no purpose; every attempt was repulsed with slaughter and disgrace. The Turks held fast to their entrenchments, repaired them, met the enemy underground by countermines, and made continual sorties, which they always pressed home. Nowhere was a lodgment made; the troops of the Tsar gained no single advantage, but were harassed and beaten. During this time Omar Pasha was at Shumla, only some fifty miles distant, at the head of a formidable corps. Contrary to his well-known character and to his previous conduct in the war, he unaccountably remained inactive, and his subordinates near him followed his example. But in the beginning of June, he broke loose from the fetters that seemed to numb his faculties, and once more began to display something of his wonted energy. He ordered attacks to be made on various points of the Danube, which were successful; and he pushed a brigade to Silistria, which entered it and reinforced it. The Russians were now thoroughly disheartened, and, under cover of a final assault, they raised the siege on the 23rd of June, and fled in disorder from the scene of their disaster. In the siege alone they lost as many as 12,000 men, and all their principal leaders were severely wounded. Of the Turks, 4000 to 5000 men fell, but among them were counted the brave Mussa 148and the heroic Butler, who succumbed to his wounds on the 22nd, the day before victory crowned his noble deeds.^[205]

Nor was this the only success gained by the Ottoman troops. During May, the Turkish army based on Western Bulgaria, and operating from Kalafat, was not idle, and defeated the enemy in several engagements, pushing him back towards the east. By the end of the month, this advance began to have some effect on the fortunes of the siege, and to be inconvenient to the communications of the Russians. When, therefore, the latter gave up all hope of taking Silistria, and left it in despair, they also soon after evacuated all the strong places they had taken in the Dobrudsha, and, re-crossing the river, they abandoned that province. This event was followed by an attack on Giurgevo, opposite Rustchuk, where the Russians still endeavoured to maintain a position; but the Turks drove them out, and forced them to fall back towards Bucharest, in the middle of July. Shortly afterwards, the enemy made a disorderly retreat towards the Pruth, pursued by the victorious Turks, who entered the Roumanian capital in triumph on August 8th.

N^o. 2.

BLACK SEA
AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY
A.D. Innes & C^o London.

About this time another element was introduced into the tangled web of Eastern affairs, which had great influence over the course of events, and over the future conduct of the Anglo-French Allies. Austria now intervened; and her action at this juncture led to important results. This action must be taken briefly into consideration before we can understand the causes that led to the invasion of the Crimea. The geographical position of this Empire necessarily exercises a deciding control over the communications of an army entering the Ottoman territory from the north. Austria, in short, commands the lid of the Turkish box; she can open it, and she can shut it, and prevent the hand of Russia from trying to snatch the prize—Constantinople—which lies at the bottom. In 1853, she held the lid wide open; but in 1854 another course was adopted, 149more pleasing to the Allies, though not less gratifying to the Tsar. It would not have suited the Government of Vienna to run directly counter to the two maritime Powers of Europe, and to declare themselves openly on the side of Russia; a diversion in Italy might have been serious to their prosperity. So the plain policy of opening the lid could no longer be maintained with safety. They therefore concentrated a force of observation on the south-eastern frontier early in spring, and, having prudently made an offensive and defensive treaty with Prussia, whom they did not trust, they calmly awaited events; and nothing was done till the summer. Austria then prepared for future contingencies, by inducing the Porte to sign a convention (June 14, 1854), by which she undertook to make Russia evacuate the Principalities, and to occupy them herself while hostilities lasted. Still she avoided any dispute with the Emperor Nicholas; she remained inactive, until the fortunes of the war should decide which of the belligerents was going to win in the field. On the 20th of August, however, when victory had declared itself entirely on the side of the Ottoman armies, then, and then only, her forces entered the Principalities, under the agreement that had been already signed, and thereby she rendered several important services to the Russians. She protected their retreat, saved them from disaster, and enabled them to proceed undisturbed into the Crimea, by preventing the Turks from pressing upon them, during their unfortunate march to the Pruth. She became a barrier in the way of the Allies should they deem it necessary to invade Bessarabia, and take a “material guarantee” for the repression of future encroachments in Turkey. And, lastly, she upheld the false prestige of the Tsar’s omnipotence, by making it appear that the Russians had evacuated the Danubian Principalities, not because they were forced to do so by the unaided valour of the Turks, but because the strategic position of the Austrian Empire had obliged them to retire.

Meanwhile, little or nothing had been done by the Allies. Their fleets, indeed, found no enemy to oppose them. Except, therefore, bombarding Odessa (April 22nd) to avenge an outrage on a flag of truce, and destroying batteries erected at the mouth of the Danube, there is nothing of interest to record. It is to be noted that we neither utilized, nor assisted the Turks to utilize, this great and important river—over which our naval superiority gave us considerable power—for the purpose of the war; but if 150our Ministry had the intention of remaining inactive in Bulgaria, the want of all enterprise is easily understood, and was the natural result of the policy pursued in London. In the military sphere, a few squadrons, under Lord Cardigan, were sent, in the end of June, when the fighting was all but over, to reconnoitre towards the Dobrudsha, and returned about the 10th of July. They acquired no information that could be of service, but, owing to the heat, exposure, and insufficiency of food, many of the horses perished or were disabled, and our small body of cavalry was uselessly weakened. After their return, a large French force was pushed forward from Varna as far as Kustendji. There was obviously nothing to be done in this quarter at this period, so no advantage was or could be gained; but cholera attacked the expedition, causing enormous loss, and they, too, were needlessly weakened.^[207]

We left the Guards Brigade at Aladyn, close to Varna, which they reached on July 1st. Here a halt was called, and the humdrum of camp life was resumed. In the morning, the men were drilled, they practised musketry, made fascines and gabions, or threw up earthworks; in the heat of the day they lay about and slept; in the evening, the more energetic endeavoured to obtain some addition to the ordinary scanty and insipid supper. The peasants were conciliated, and a bazaar was established, under the auspices of Colonel Gordon Drummond of the Coldstream, which was fairly successful. It may be also noted that, after some discussion, the old-fashioned regulations were further relaxed at this time, and, shaving being dispensed with, beards were at length allowed to be worn in the field.^[208]

The Brigade was inspected by Omar Pasha on the 6th of July, and his presence inspired the men with genuine admiration. Here at last, was a General who had really seen the Russians, who had fought against them, and who had beaten them. The sight of such a leader gladdened our gallant soldiers not a little; for they were sadly disappointed with their forced inaction in Bulgaria,—so close to scenes of martial glory. Now at last they buoyed themselves up with hope; they would move to the front and take 151the field in earnest against the enemy. But this, alas! was not yet to be, and before their warlike ardour was to be satisfied, many trials were still to be endured.

Next day, the Brevet, dated June 20th, arrived in camp, and made considerable changes in the Coldstream. By this gazette, Brigadier-General Bentinck and Colonels Hay and Codrington were promoted Major-Generals. The first of these Officers continued to command the Guards Brigade in Turkey; the second, appointed to the Mauritius, returned home; while General Codrington remained at the seat of war, and shortly afterwards obtained a brigade there;^[209] and before the peace, he became Commander-in-chief of the British army in the Crimea. Owing to these changes, Colonel Hon. A. Upton became Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, while Colonel Hon. G. Upton was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel G. Drummond to the 2nd Battalion. The latter accordingly, as soon as he was relieved, was ordered to proceed to England, as also were the following Officers, who were transferred on promotion to the home Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel Newton, Captains Halkett, Cowell, and Lieutenant Thellusson. By Brigade Order (London, June 6th) a draft of 150 men for each Battalion in Turkey, was held in readiness to proceed to the East on the 1st of July. The Coldstream detachment, under the command of Colonel Hon. G. Upton and nine other Officers, including a Medical Officer, embarked in H.M.S. Vulcan on the 27th, and reached Aladyn on the 20th of July. About the same time, on the promotion of Captain F. Stephenson, Captain Hon. P. Feilding temporarily took his place as Brigade Major, and Captain Hon. G. Eliot became Acting Adjutant of the Battalion.^[210]

152The camp at Aladyn was placed near the lake of Devna in a singularly beautiful spot, “the seventh heaven of the artist;” but it was terribly unhealthy, and entirely unsuited to a military station.^[211] Sickness, in the shape of typhus, dysentery, and ague, was not long in appearing among the troops. It assumed increasing and alarming proportions, and it was found very difficult to restore the strength of those who were once attacked. During July, about a fifth of the Battalion were admitted into hospital; the men lost their elasticity, and their spirits drooped. On the 27th of the month, it was determined to move to a higher situation near Gevreklek, a village about three miles away. It was hoped that the change would produce an improvement, and everything was done to endeavour to stay the disorders that had broken out; but without avail, and cholera appearing, added its ghastly horrors to the general distress. In spite of the efforts of the military authorities, and the devotion of the doctors, the medical department was unable to bear the strain thus suddenly put upon it, and the sick, placed in small bell tents, and unprotected from the scorching heat, suffered terribly. The rest, weakened by disease, awed by the plague that burst upon them, and doomed to passive inactivity, were depressed and nerveless.

153At length the stricken troops were moved out of the pestilential place in which they were stationed; a new decision was made, and the British army was to be taken back to Varna. The Brigade left Gevreklek early on the 16th of August, and such was the condition to which they were reduced, that three days were required to accomplish a distance of less than fifteen miles; the health of the men was so entirely broken down, that they were unable to carry their packs during the short stages of five miles each.

During the period the Battalion was stationed in Bulgaria, 57 men died in the camp hospital, 28 of them from cholera and 25 from typhus fever. The chief mortality occurred among the men lately arrived from England, who appear to have been very young, with an average age and service of 21¾ and less than 2 years respectively. Many Officers were also affected by the pestilence, and the Regiment had to mourn the loss of two among them—Colonel Trevelyan, and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, M.P. Five others were invalided.^[214]

Arrived at Varna, the sea breezes, the prospects of at last getting a glimpse of the enemy, and possibly the new site selected for encampment—away from the influence of the plague-breeding lake, in the position which Omar Pasha had originally advised before the British army left Scutari—produced beneficial effects upon the men. Though they were still sickly and weak, and cholera lurked among them, their health improved, and their spirits revived.^[215] On the 29th of August, the Brigade embarked 154for the much talked of invasion of the Crimea, but the start was not made till some days later. The Coldstream, 26 Officers and 737 men, were divided into two wings; the left wing and head-quarters on board the Tonning, the right in the Simoon with the Grenadier Guards. From the latter, to prevent overcrowding, two companies, under Colonel Lord F. Paulet, were subsequently trans-shipped to the Vengeance, and, on the 4th of September, to H.M.S. Bellerophon. The sick of the Battalion, 89 in number, and 30 convalescents, were left behind in the camp hospital, in charge of Assistant-Surgeon Trotter; shortly afterwards they were sent to Scutari with the same Medical Officer, who rejoined the Battalion on the 9th of November. A Brigade detachment, moreover, consisting of three Officers (under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel), four sergeants, and 100 rank and file, selected from convalescents and those unfit for active service, were left behind at Varna; of these the Coldstream furnished a sergeant and 33 rank and file, under Captain MacKinnon, who rejoined the Battalion in the Crimea, on the 4th of October.

The fleet weighed anchor on the 7th of September, and, getting into communication with our French and Turkish allies, the united armada started on its errand to the Crimea. The events that now took place will be described in the next and subsequent chapters, but, before concluding this one, it will be necessary to give some idea of the forces and organization of the Allied hosts that sailed on this memorable occasion to invade the Empire of the Tsar of All the Russias.

The British army, under the command of General Lord Raglan, consisted of five infantry divisions and of one cavalry division, each of two brigades. The First Division, under Lieut.-General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, consisted of the Guards (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, Major-General Bentinck), and the Highland brigades (the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Regiments, Major-General Sir Colin Campbell), and of two field batteries of artillery. The Second Division, under Lieut.-General Sir de Lacy Evans, consisted of Major-General Pennefather’s (30th, 55th, and 95th Regiments), and Brigadier-General Adams' brigades (41st, 47th, and 49th), and of two field batteries. The Third Division, under Lieut.-General Sir R. England, consisted of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Sir J. Campbell, Bart. (1st, 38th, and 50th), and Eyre (4th, 28th, and 44th), and of two 155field batteries. The Fourth Division, under Lieut.-General Hon. Sir G. Cathcart, was still incomplete, as two battalions had not yet arrived; the remainder was formed of the 20th, 21st, 63rd, 68th Regiments and the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, together with one field battery; the brigades being commanded by Major-Generals Arthur Torrens and Goldie. The Fifth or Light Division, commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Brown, was formed of the brigades of Major-General Codrington (7th, 23rd, and 33rd), and of Major-General Buller (19th, 77th, and 88th), also of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, and of one troop horse artillery, and one field battery. The Cavalry Division, under Lieut.-General Earl of Lucan, was formed of the Light (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 11th Hussars, and the 17th Lancers, Major-General Earl of Cardigan), and of the Heavy brigades (4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, and 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, Major-General Hon. J. Scarlett), also of one troop of horse artillery. General Scarlett’s brigade left Varna later than the rest of the army, and reached the Crimea in October. A siege train had also been provided; but it was temporarily left behind. Each division was about 5000 men strong, and the English army numbered altogether some 26,000 infantry, nearly 2000 cavalry, and 60 guns.^[216]

The French, under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud, were formed into four infantry divisions, each about 7000 strong, commanded by:—Generals Canrobert 1st Division; Bosquet, 2nd; Prince Napoleon, 3rd; and Forey, 4th Division. At first they brought no cavalry with them to the Crimea, but they had 68 guns. They were also accompanied by some 7000 Turks, who, commanded by Suleiman Pasha, were attached to the French Marshal’s army.

Small results gained by the Allies—Sudden determination to attack Sevastopol—Russian position in the Trans-Caucasian provinces—Conditions under which the Crimea was invaded—The allied Armada sails from Varna to Eupatoria—Landing effected at “Old Fort”—The move to Sevastopol; the order of march—The enemy on the Alma river, opposes the advance of the Allies—Description of the field of battle; strength and position of the enemy—Commencement of the battle of the Alma—Advance of the Light and the Second Divisions—Deployment of the First Division—Advance of the Guards and Highland Brigades—Defeat of the Russians—No pursuit—Losses—Bravery and steadiness of the British troops—The Allies lose valuable time after the battle—Arriving at last before their objective, Sevastopol, they refuse to attack it—General description of Sevastopol.

Hitherto the Anglo-French Allies had done nothing in the great struggle, which had been raging between Russia and Turkey since the autumn of 1853, though they had been officially at war with the former for more than five months, and were preparing for the strife before hostilities had been declared. There was much cause for disappointment at this inglorious result; and it was humiliating to the gallant armies of the two foremost nations of Europe, to be sent to the East, merely to eat out their hearts in inactivity, when feats of valour against the enemy were performed almost within earshot of their camps. Nor was the excuse put forward for this apathy—the want of transport—of any value; for every member of the Government knew that transport is indispensable to an army’s motion, and that without it no campaign is possible. That it could have been obtained is not to be denied; and the conclusion is irresistible, that the intention of taking the field in earnest, did not enter into the calculations of our Cabinet. But now, when the enemy, driven out of the Principalities, effected his escape under the friendly cover of an Austrian force, when the Tsar, moreover, in no mood to sue for peace, still breathed defiance, our Government were placed in a 157difficulty. They had undertaken to make Russia submit; but their diplomacy was unsuccessful, and their demonstrations were disregarded; added to these failures, valuable time had slipped away, and the season was wasted. Something, then, had to be done at once to retrieve the past, for the country was losing its patience, and would brook no further vacillation. Hence a change in policy became inevitable.

The Government had been cautious, not to say timid; but they now entirely altered their demeanour. They suddenly became bold to the verge of rashness, and resolved at any price to take Sevastopol by a coup de main. It is true they were in complete ignorance of the strength, defences, armament, and capacity of that fortress; they knew little of its position, and nothing of the peninsula in which it is situated; and, while the transport of the army was more than defective, the commissariat and medical services were not in a much better condition. But these things seem to have pressed them lightly. Their opinion was strong, that Sevastopol was sure to fall, directly the Allied forces appeared before its ramparts; and its destruction, they doubted not, would bring about a peace, and cause the Tsar to relinquish his arrogant pretensions. As soon, therefore, as the raising of the siege of Silistria put an end to the war on Ottoman territory, they hastened to frame a despatch to Lord Raglan, dated June 29th, directing that an expedition against Sevastopol should be prepared. The despatch was so worded, that it left the British Commander little option but to comply. He therefore accepted the arduous undertaking which was pressed upon him, though he did so very much against his better judgment, and he announced his intention to the Government in a letter, dated July 19th.^[217] It was early in September, as we have seen, before the armada was ready to sail from Varna.

There can be no doubt, that it was anomalous and very inconvenient to send out a military expedition to check Russian aggression with no rational plan of action. In the beginning of the 158year, the terror which the supposed omnipotence of the Emperor Nicholas inspired, made us believe that all our efforts would be required to save Turkey from certain and swift destruction. We even imagined that Constantinople was in imminent danger; and the French rushed to Gallipoli, to take up a flanking position against the hostile columns, which were almost immediately expected to assault that city. This was our only plan, and we trusted to events to develop another for us, should it be required. When, therefore, we found that the result of the war on the Danube had overturned all our preconceived ideas, we were unprepared for such an event; and we drifted towards the first plausible scheme put forward, irrespective of ways and means. Hence, the descent on Sevastopol was in the nature of an afterthought: a crude design, hastily proposed and rashly adopted, without reflection or calculation, and concerted without reference to the Commanders at the seat of war, who, nevertheless, were forced to accept it, and were held responsible for its execution.

After the collapse of the campaign in the Principalities, the urgent question naturally arose—where was Russia to be attacked, and how was she to be coerced by the Western Powers? There were vitally delicate joints in the armour of that Empire, not inaccessible to our resources, in Poland and in Finland. But the resuscitation of the oppressed northern nationalities formed no part of our policy; they were held to be beyond the scope of our aspirations. So we confined ourselves to a few inconclusive descents on the coast of the Baltic, and the enemy had no serious cause of disquietude in this important portion of his dominions. Our intervention, therefore, in these quarters need not further be discussed.^[218] The army being in the Levant, principal operations were to be conducted there.^[219] The Crimea, no doubt, occupies an important position in the Black Sea, and its conquest would necessarily cramp the future plans of Russian aggrandisement. But who 159was to hold it, if it were taken? Sevastopol, also, situated in the peninsula, is a land-locked harbour, and a base of naval operations, defended from the sea, and, in 1854, it was partially protected, on the land fronts, by some indifferent works. If there were a good prospect of rapidly capturing it, the design to do so had much to recommend it. Such an event would injure the prestige of Russia, on which she greatly relies for acquiring power; it would temporarily put an end to a secure harbour suitable to maintain her fleet in the Black Sea, and it would be one step towards the conquest of the Crimean Peninsula. But was the chance—the slender chance—of prompt success worth the risk? Why enchain our whole forces before the walls of a single and isolated fortress, if the coup de main were to miscarry, and a lengthened siege became necessary? Was not the Euxine in our sole possession, and, as long as this remained so, was not Sevastopol outside the sphere of military operations, and entirely innocuous?

Austria had been allowed to close the western theatre of operations against the belligerent Powers. But it never seemed to have occurred to them to cast a thought on that other theatre of war, which still lay open to their attack in Asia. During 1854, the Turks were in disorder there; acrimonious quarrels broke out among the leaders of their forces, and, though the Russians made no great progress, the fortunes of the war were deciding against our allies, to the detriment of the cause we had undertaken to defend. In this quarter, moreover, we had every prospect of success; we should have exposed ourselves to the least risk, and, if victory crowned our efforts there, we should have secured the most brilliant results. This field of operations, not distant from the Crimea, offered ample scope for our energies, and, as we approached it in 1855, though we did not avail ourselves of its advantages, a brief allusion to it must here be made.

The Caspian Sea is connected with the Euxine by a chain of lofty mountains (the Caucasus), which runs from Baku, on the former, to near Poti, on the latter, and then, taking a north-westerly direction, skirts the shore as far as Anapa, close to the straits of Yeni-kale. The Caucasus forms the natural southern limit of Russia, but, in the course of years, by the incomparable ability and, perhaps, by the unscrupulous character of the policy pursued at St. Petersburg, the frontiers of the Empire have been pushed south of these mountains, pressing upon Persia on the 160Araxes, and on the Ottoman Empire in Armenia. Now, communications with these Trans-Caucasian provinces (Mingrelia, Georgia, etc.) were insecure in 1854; for, inhabiting the northern slopes of the great range were vigorous, unsubdued races of hardy mountaineers, called by the general name Circassians, who for years had preserved their liberties and independence, in spite of the efforts of the Tsar to enthrall them. This eastern Switzerland had some claim upon our sympathy, if not because of the cause of freedom for which the people struggled, at least on account of the peculiar position they occupied on the Russian line of communications. Nor should it be forgotten that the subjugation of these mountaineers affected, in no slight degree, the tranquillity and the future security of India; for, until they were overcome, the systematic advance of Russia into Central Asia was not easily accomplished. Operations to support the Circassians and the kindred tribes in the Caucasus, had the advantage, then, of directly protecting, in the far East, those interests, to secure which, we had embarked in the war; and, if they had been successful, as they could not fail to be successful, even by the employment of a moderate force, the enemy must have lost Trans-Caucasia. The Russian Empire, considered to be safe from attack, was very vulnerable in this quarter, at a time when the mountain region was still unsubdued; and a blow struck there, making the Allies masters of the situation, would necessarily have enabled them to settle the Eastern Question as they thought best for the welfare of Europe. But the influence which was exercised over the Tsar’s aggressions in Turkey, by the brave races, who for so long held the passes against tremendous odds in defence of their homes, was scarcely recognized and hardly noticed in the West in 1854.^[220]

We have already seen that, owing to the benevolence displayed by Austria to the Russians, the latter were enabled to retire from the 161Danube into Bessarabia unmolested by the pursuing Turks. This act on the part of a Power regarded as a friend by Great Britain, cost us dear shortly after this time. Its immediate consequences were, however, not unnoticed, and it was plain both to the allied Governments and to the Commanders, that the enemy would push his forces into the Crimea, without delay, if he got an inkling that an attempt on Sevastopol were imminent. Unfortunately the enemy got more than a hint as to our intentions. In order to prepare for the success of a coup de main on a position, it is evident that one essential condition to be observed is secrecy; nor is it immaterial to mislead the enemy by false attacks, alarms, and reports. But exactly the reverse took place. No demonstrations were made, and we blazoned our design to the whole world; the English press spoke of it freely and openly, since the end of June; and Marshal St. Arnaud had the imprudence to issue a vainglorious proclamation to his army, on the 25th of August, which ended with the following inflated words: “Bientôt nous saluerons ensemble les trois drapeaux réunis flottant sur les remparts de Sévastopol de notre cri national, Vive l'Empereur!”

A plan, previously concerted with the Officers who were to carry it out, upon so difficult a subject as the operation in hand, could not have been matured and adopted, unless the means of isolating the Crimea from the rest of Russia, had also been considered. There are two principal lines by which the peninsula is fed from the main land. The isthmus of Perekop and the Sea of Azof. The former, unconnected with the great river system of the Empire, was of service mainly to bring portions of the army of Bessarabia to the neighbourhood of Sevastopol. The latter, however, receiving the waters of the Don, served to take down reinforcements and supplies from the interior to the new seat of war. The despatch of the 29th of June already alluded to, contains a passage on this matter: “As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land, between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions.” It would have been fortunate if, in accordance with these instructions, we could have seized the narrow isthmus of Perekop, but we did not do so, and it remained open to the enemy. On the other hand, a small body of troops could have gained a footing near Kertch, and have maintained itself there; for, the Allied naval resources were more than ample to support it, to occupy and 162dominate the Sea of Azof, and to cut the Crimea off completely from the supplies sent down the river Don, from the large depôts and magazines established in its vicinity. Such an expedition, moreover, would have served to blind the enemy as to the intentions of the invaders with regard to Sevastopol, and have made him uncertain whether the ultimate aim was not to operate in the neighbourhood of the Caucasus. Having much to lose in this quarter, he was all the more sensitive to pressure there, and greater deception could thus have been practised on his fears.

That these expeditions did not take place at that time, is probably to be ascribed to the belief of the Commanders that the whole force was little enough, in order successfully to carry Sevastopol by storm. The orders they received from home did not contemplate a lengthy operation. Not for an instant did any one suppose, that it could last through the winter. It was late in the year; barely six weeks, or at least two months, of good weather could be expected to continue. It was known that the winter in the Black Sea region was intensely severe and cold; there was no provision made for the army against the terrible hardships which the snow, frost, and hurricanes of the Crimea must entail. The plan proposed to the allied Commanders was a short operation, and by them it was so accepted; it was a descent upon a coast, a march, and an assault. Fixing their eyes intently upon this plan, the importance of attacks on the enemy’s communications, dwindled in their estimation, and lost much of its value. Expeditions of this nature, were fitted rather to a regular siege, which might be expected to last for many months, and were scarcely essential to carry out the object which was then in hand, viz. to bring up every available battalion to the point, where a ready-prepared and decisive victory was to be gained.

These preliminary observations are necessary to a Regimental history, as an introduction to the events which are now to be recorded. For if they were not stated, it would be impossible for the reader to understand the reasons for the hardships, which our troops had soon to suffer, or to appreciate the glorious part they played in a calamitous war, where their fortitude and courage not only saved, but enhanced, the military greatness of Great Britain, and stood out in bright relief to so much that was unfortunate and damaging to our reputation as a nation of the first magnitude in Europe. It may in truth be stated, that to the British soldiers, and to the Officers who led them, the country owes it 163that a national catastrophe did not occur. Their discipline and dogged resolution never wavered for an instant, and they carried England unscathed through the ordeal. A history dealing with the actions of a Regiment engaged on that memorable occasion, would be sadly incomplete, if it failed to show this truth, or to describe the false positions in which the vital interests of this country became unhappily involved, and from which it was extricated solely by the manly bearing, and unflinching self-sacrifice of the army.

The armada, which left the shores of Bulgaria on the 7th of September, did not immediately sail to its destination; part of the Allied fleet had started before that date, but the whole met together on the 8th, and next day the British portion anchored in deep water some miles east of the Isle of Serpents. Lord Raglan now left to reconnoitre the coast, and to select a landing-place. His French colleague was ill, and could not accompany him. Proceeding from Balaklava to Eupatoria, he finally selected a stretch of sandy beach, covered by lagoons, at a spot marked on the maps as “Old Fort,” situated some twelve miles south of the latter town, and about twenty-five from Sevastopol.^[221] Meanwhile, the Allied flotilla again got into communication, the slower sailing ships coming up to the rendez-vous. On the 12th, the magnificent and orderly array of the united fleets, occupying nearly nine miles of sea room, approached the Crimea, and converged on Old Fort; and then our men got a first welcome glimpse of the strange and unknown country they were about to invade. Next day, Eupatoria was summoned, and surrendered without a shot being fired; and on the 14th, exactly the forty-second anniversary of the triumphant entry of Napoleon I. into Moscow, the Allies began to land, the Turks on the right, then the French, and the British on the left.

The sea voyage braced up the health of the men; they were fast losing the lassitude and despondency that so lately oppressed them, and were regaining their usual strength, elasticity, and good spirits. “Notwithstanding there is no casting loose the foul fiend—cholera,” and many casualties were reported; but the Coldstream seem to have been spared by the scourge during the passage, though eight sick were unable to disembark, and were sent to the Simoon. A foretaste of cold weather was also unexpectedly experienced, for on the 12th, there was a hail-storm “abundantly accompanied by snow.”^[222]

164Before leaving their ships, the troops had the temporary character of the expedition brought strongly before their imagination. The bât-horses, collected with difficulty at Scutari, were left behind in Bulgaria; there was no transport for regimental baggage, except an animal to carry the medicine-panniers. Officers loaded their haversacks and their persons with three days' salt pork, biscuit, and such indispensable articles, that a short campaign required. Dressed in tight-fitting swallow-tailed coatees, resplendent with gold lace, now sadly tarnished, their clothing was scarcely adapted to the harsh trials of actual warfare; added to which, they were weighted and encumbered, and had the appearance of “animated lumps of undigested packages, all cloak, bundle, and hairy cap.” Nor did the men fare any better. It appears that the only heavy part of the knapsack was its wooden frame, and this had been discarded some weeks before; when this was done, it served as a light and fairly good valise in which to carry the necessary kit safely and secure from rain. At the last moment, however, it was feared that the men were still too weak to carry even their lightened packs. But, instead of reducing the articles to be taken therein to a minimum, this minimum, in the shape of a pair of boots, a pair of socks, a shirt, and a forage cap, was ordered to be wrapped in the blanket and great coat; while the knapsack itself, designed to hold them, was left behind on board ship, together with all other articles of private property brought from Varna. Thus an unsightly and most inconvenient bundle was formed, ill-adapted to its purpose, and a doubtful place for the safe keeping of the few articles that were considered indispensable to the soldier’s welfare.^[223] Three days' rations, some cooking utensils, wooden water-kegs, and sixty rounds of ammunition completed the personal equipment brought into the enemy’s country.

N^o. 3.

COUNTRY BETWEEN
EUPATORIA AND SEVASTOPOL
Compiled from Hamley’s Crimea by kind permission.

From the 14th to the 18th, the disembarkation of the Allies continued, observed by Cossack horsemen until driven away, and interrupted only by the rolling waves, which, tumbling on the beach, made it sometimes unsafe to land the horses and guns. The Light and First Divisions were on shore on the 14th; the Guards Brigade, remaining in formation till the afternoon, marched inland for about three miles, after the Light Division had started, where 165they bivouacked for the night. The morning was fine, but the evening turned very cold, the wind rose, and the rain came down in torrents, drenching all ranks and conditions, from the Divisional Commander, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, to the youngest drummer. It was an inhospitable welcome that awaited our first night on the Crimean coast, but the men were in good heart, and made light of their misfortunes. On the 16th, a few tents were landed, but, for want of transport, they had to be returned on board the following day,—except one, which was retained for the sick, and was to be carried between the medicine-panniers on the hospital bât-horse. The story of the halt near Old Fort, would not have been complete had there been no “scare” to record. Was it ever wanting among troops, who for the first time await the approach of an enemy? Here it took place about midnight on the 16th, when an alarm was raised of the approach of Cossacks, and the troops turned out hurriedly; nor was it unlikely that the Russians would endeavour to attack the Allies, before they were ready to advance from the coast. Upon this occasion, however, a false report only had gained credence; there was no enemy in the vicinity, and the occurrence, though startling for the moment, doubtless, eventually served to steady the nerves of men who had never yet heard a shot fired in anger. In one way, things went smoothly enough, at all events in the camp of the Brigade, who, placed near a friendly Tartar village, bought small sheep at two shillings each, and fowls for fourpence or fivepence; but the dreaded cholera still hovered about, and one man of the Battalion died, after a few hours' sickness, on the 17th.

At last, early on the 19th, all arrangements being completed, the troops, horses, and guns landed, a small number (250) of country carts collected, and some cattle, sheep, and other supplies procured from the neighbourhood, the Allies began their march to Sevastopol, supported by the fleets that steamed slowly along the coast in the same direction. They numbered rather less than 60,000 men and 128 guns, and as the French and Turks had no cavalry with them, the united army had only one brigade (Lord Cardigan) to rely on. Marshal St. Arnaud marched near the sea; Bosquet’s division was in front, followed by Prince Napoleon on the left, by Canrobert on the right, and by Forey in rear; and, lastly, the Turks and the baggage and reserve ammunition, were in the open space which was surrounded by these four divisions. 166The British army moved on the left of the French, and were thus placed on the exposed flank; the Second and Light Divisions leading, the former nearest our allies, followed respectively by the Third and First Divisions, the Fourth marching after the First. The guns were on the right of their divisions, the infantry in double column of companies from the centre of battalions, and the cavalry divided, two regiments on the left flank, two covering the advance, and one in rear. This formation was adopted, because, the left of the Allies being undefended, it was not improbable that the enemy might venture to make an onslaught upon that flank from Simferopol. The weather was sultry, and the advance lay across a vast rolling plain, destitute of trees and shrubs, and swept bare of inhabitants and supplies by the Russian cavalry. After two hours, the heat affected some of the men, and, the ever-recurring plague of cholera still dogging their footsteps, victims to its ravages began to fall out.

But in the afternoon the attention of the troops was diverted from these scenes of suffering; shots were heard in the front. The enemy was expected to take up a position near one of the rivers that flow at right angles across the Eupatoria post-road, on both sides of which the Allies were advancing; and here, at length, on the Bulganak, the divisions in rear thought that they were going to try conclusions with the enemy. In a very short time, however, the firing proved to be but a skirmish; for, after the expenditure of a few rounds, the Russians—6000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and two batteries—moved back, before they had made us deploy 167much of our force, and left us in possession of the stream without further resistance. There we bivouacked for the night, in the full assurance that a great action would be fought on the following day.

According to an estimate of the enemy’s forces in the Crimea, made by the Foreign Office at home, it was computed that there were some 45,000 men near and in Sevastopol, excluding troops which might be drawn from the Caucasus and Bessarabia. Of this estimate Lord Raglan had been informed, but it seems he placed no great reliance upon it. He knew, however, that the Russians were relatively strong in cavalry, and that their army was commanded by Prince Menshikoff.

It was between nine and ten before the Allies moved from their bivouacs on the morning of the 20th, the British army bringing their left shoulders up, to get into closer communication with the French. On reaching the top of a grassy ridge which looks over the valley of the Alma, the position taken up by the enemy on the heights above that stream, first came into sight, and immediate preparations were made to dislodge him. The field of battle is a sloping plain from the north to the river, which is fordable in summer, from whence springs abruptly on the south bank, to a height of 300 to 400 feet, a commanding range of hills overlooking the plain, and running from the sea, for a distance of five miles, to a bluff called Kurgané Hill.^[225] The river makes a trifling bend, forming a slightly re-entering angle towards these heights, on the western side of the Kurgané; and here the post-road crosses the stream, close to the village of Burliuk, by a wooden bridge, which had not been destroyed. This point marked the junction of the English right and the French left. On the French section of the field, the heights press close and cliff-like to the river, but they recede and become more accessible for a mile to the west of the angle mentioned. Roads available for guns ascend the hills at the mouth of the Alma, at the village of Almatamak, at a farm a mile further up, and again close to Burliuk, where, on the Russian side, the ground is more practicable; this last road leads to a height known as the Telegraph Hill. On the English section, the heights are further from the river, and the ascent is everywhere easy for all arms; but on that very account it was the more difficult to storm, for here the ground could be swept with fire, and the defenders had every facility for 168making counter-attacks. The tops of the hills form a wide plateau, stretching southwards towards the Katcha river, indented only near the angle, by a depression between the Kurgané and Telegraph Hills, through which the post-road rises, as it proceeds to Sevastopol.^[226]

The Russian army, numerically weaker than the Allies, being 33,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 120 guns, occupied the plateau. The main portion, 21,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 84 guns, was placed on Kurgané and on the post-road, opposite the English section; the remainder, 12000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 36 guns, near the post-road and on Telegraph Hill, were opposed to the French. The cavalry took post on the enemy’s right and rear, supported by horse artillery; but no troops were further to the west, where the ground was under fire from the war-ships. Menshikoff, however, forgot, though he had time at his disposal, to block the roads which ascend the cliff and the rough precipitous hillsides opposite the French position. Nor did he construct fieldworks on his front and right flank, contenting himself with only two gun-epaulments on Kurgané, one of which, about 300 yards from the river, was armed with 14 heavy guns of position.

There was a pause when the Allies approached the position they were about to assail, during which the troops refreshed themselves with cold pork and biscuits, after their march on a warm and glorious morning. In the interval, all eyes were turned to the heights that frowned in front, and saw in the distance the hostile sharpshooters extended along the river, in the vineyards and gardens, through which the advance was about to be made. Nor were we unconscious that the whole of our force was easily to be discerned, and our intentions to be divined by our antagonist; for we halted boldly on the sloping plain, in full view of the enemy, who, perched on the higher ground, was enabled to make his observations and to conceal much of his own order of battle from our anxious gaze. Meanwhile, the two Commanders-in-chief were concerting their plans. They had met before, but this was their final consultation. St. Arnaud had fixed and strong ideas on the situation; he was voluble in expressing them, and, though zealous and brave, he was somewhat shallow and self-opinionated. Lord Raglan’s first care was to insure a good understanding with his impetuous colleague. He was hampered by the alliance; and there was no supreme Commander to give a decision at this 169moment when unity of action was indispensably necessary. The Chiefs parted, and came to no definite conclusion; unless a hazy understanding can be called so, that the French were to try and turn the Russian left, but that the British could not do the same thing on the other flank “with such a body of cavalry as the enemy had in the plain.”^[227]

At one o’clock Bosquet’s division advanced. One brigade with the artillery, pushed through Almatamak and up the road there; the remainder, and the Turks, some 10,000 men, crossed the Alma near its mouth, and, ascending the pathway that leads thence to the cliff, found themselves far from the battle-field, and never fired a shot during the action. Canrobert took his division along the road at the farm, and debouched on the plateau a mile to the west of Telegraph Hill; but his own artillery followed that of Bosquet, and were with the latter’s left brigade, a mile still further to the west. Prince Napoleon’s division was on Canrobert’s left, and made for Telegraph Hill; while Forey was in second line, in reserve. As the Turks were 7000 strong and the French 28,000, Marshal St. Arnaud had only 25,000 men and 68 guns in action.

The original formation of the British army had not been altered: the Second Division was on the right, the Light on the left, both in the first line, followed by the Third and First in the second line, the Fourth Division in reserve; four regiments of the cavalry covered the left, one followed in rear. The whole, 23,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 60 guns—for part of the Fourth Division were still on the road from Old Fort—covered by the Rifles, now moved forward straight for the enemy’s strong position on Kurgané, the right being directed upon Burliuk. The Russian skirmishers retired, setting fire to that village as the first line approached; while the latter, coming nearly within range of the hostile artillery, deployed. But too little ground had been taken up, and, in spite of every effort to rectify the mistake, the battalions overlapped, and were dangerously crowded. Lord Raglan, in pursuance of the arrangement already made with St. Arnaud, now delayed the attack until the French had time to complete the movement they had begun; but the Marshal was impatient, and before his troops could produce any impression on the enemy’s left, he urged his colleague to wait no longer. In response to this strong request, Lord Raglan ordered his first line to advance.

170The Second Division (Sir De L. Evans) was delayed by the conflagration raging in Burliuk; but the Light Division (Sir G. Brown), breaking through the vines and fording the river, gained a footing on the south bank, disordered by the obstacles they met, by the want of space, and by the hot fire poured upon them. General Codrington, heading his brigade and two battalions that joined him—one of Buller’s and one of the Second Division—led them boldly up the slope under the fire of the battery behind the epaulment; while the rest of Buller’s brigade covered his left flank from a threatening movement observed in that direction. On his right were three of Evans’s battalions; the other two, under Adams, having crossed the Alma, below the burning village, pushed into the space to the west of the post-road. The Russians, seriously alarmed at Codrington’s impetuous onslaught, withdrew their heavy guns from the epaulment, except two, which they could not get away, and which were captured. Cheered by this retreat, the British gained the breastwork, and took possession of it; but they now found themselves face to face with large masses of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry, supported by field-guns. The gallant rush in the face of a tremendous fire had come to an end; it was the moment for supports to arrive; but as they were not close enough to be available at this critical moment, the attacking brigade was soon afterwards forced back to the foot of the slope.

Meanwhile, the First Division (Duke of Cambridge) deployed and halted just beyond effective range, watching with enthusiastic animation and breathless interest, the movements of their comrades in front of them. There was more room for them, as they were not overcrowded by the Third Division (Sir R. England), which took up a position somewhat in rear. On the right stood the Guards Brigade in their usual order—Grenadiers on the right, Coldstream on the left, and Scots Fusiliers in the centre; the Highlanders were formed on the left of the division. While they waited, spent round shot came bounding through the ranks like cricket balls. The men, longing to take part in the fray, were in exuberant spirits; the least trifle amused them, and a little Maltese terrier called “Toby,” belonging to the Coldstream drummers, drew loud laughter from the light-hearted soldiery as it gave chase to the Russian round shot which rolled slowly along the smooth ground.

At length Lieut.-Colonel Steele brought the order to advance, 171and never was it obeyed with greater alacrity and spirit, the whole division moving forward with admirable precision. Approaching the vineyards, the enemy directed his artillery upon our men; but they quickly pushed their way through the tangled shrubs, and over a low wall obstructing their path up to the Alma, which they immediately crossed, and here they found shelter from the fire of the Russians. As it had been impossible to reconnoitre the ground, each regiment had to take its chance of finding a favourable spot, or the reverse, for its passage; and it happened that the Coldstream reached the river, where it makes a large S-shaped bend, so that the greater part of the Battalion had to go through the water three times. Owing to the many obstructions in their way, all three Battalions were in considerable confusion when they arrived at the foot of the southern bank, and they at once began to reform their ranks. Colonel Upton, having halted the Coldstream, called out the markers to the front, quickly assembled the companies upon them, and then wheeled the Battalion into line, before making any further advance, in a manner that would have satisfied the most exacting drill-sergeant on parade in Hyde Park.^[228]

Meanwhile Codrington’s brigade were still in front, clinging to the epaulment they had captured, and engaged in a very unequal struggle with the enemy. Their distress was apparent from the river, and General Bentinck immediately ordered the Scots Fusilier Guards to hurry to their relief before there had been sufficient time to reform their line, and while their ranks were still disordered and their companies mixed up. As they moved forward, they met General Codrington’s Aide-de-camp, who was sent to beg them to hasten to the front as quickly as possible, and they eagerly complied. Just at this moment a series of untoward circumstances occurred. The backward rush of some of the Light Division struck them with tremendous force; an order intended for the 23rd Fusiliers, “Retire Fusiliers!” was heard in the field, and was believed by many of the Fusilier Guards to apply to them; the enemy was close, and in hot pursuit, and his artillery was firing furiously upon them. It was a critical moment, and one that would have been fatal to any but the best troops; but in spite of the gallantry of the Officers, who, running forward, endeavoured to 172rally the men, two or three companies were swept back by the retreating brigade, and were carried away with them towards the river, while the remainder halted, opened fire, and held their ground.^[229]

As this was going on, the other two Guards Battalions, now completely reformed and in proper order, advanced steadily forward up the hill. Coming into alignment with the Scots Fusilier Guards, and perceiving the hot engagement that was still raging, the left company of the Grenadiers was wheeled back, and fired across the front, while the Coldstream, without changing position, opened upon the Russians as soon as they got the opportunity, and the latter retired. Though there was a gap in the Brigade which could not be immediately closed, the Guards—

Soon they reached the epaulment, firing as they advanced, the enemy giving way before them, and as they came up to the crest of the hill the three companies, previously mentioned, rejoined their Battalion, and the whole Brigade was again complete.^[231] To 173our left, protecting the left flank of the British army, were the Highlanders in echelon of battalions from the right; and this magnificent corps, handled with great ability, fired into the hostile columns that passed them on their way to the epaulment (round which the fight centred in this quarter of the field), and contributed in no small degree, to lighten the task of the Guards.^[232]

Nor had the British artillery been inactive; pressing forward, they took up positions wherever they were to be found, whence they fired either upon the enemy’s guns or into the solid masses of his infantry. At the moment when the Duke’s division appeared upon the slope, three of Evans’s battalions were engaged near the post-road; two more, under Adams, were further to the right, moving up the hill; England’s Division was crossing the river, and the Fourth Division (Sir G. Cathcart) was still in rear, as a reserve. The first onslaught of the Light Division had shaken the enemy; and now, when opposed to the steady advance of the Guards and Highlanders, he did not long maintain the contest. The Russians were unable to fight in line; they remained throughout the whole day in dense columns.^[233] This faulty formation, adopted to suit the quality of their troops, gave them greater weight had they been able to come to close quarters with their antagonist, but it prevented them from using their muskets, and offered a large target to our fire. On the other hand, the fire of the two British brigades was fully developed. Moving as if on 174parade, the Guards in line kept up a continuous and well-aimed stream of lead, at short ranges, into the masses in front of them, while the Highlanders in echelon succeeded in striking the right flank of the enemy.^[234] Unable to bear down on the thin lines that opposed them, the Russians wavered, and, with a ringing cheer, our men charged home, and drove them from the field. The English army had cleared the formidable position held by the enemy on Kurgané, as well as from that hill to the eastern slopes of the Telegraph, where the French had now arrived. Menshikoff’s troops fled from the field, and their retreat was so precipitate that it was not even covered by cavalry or artillery. For a short time our batteries played upon their ranks; but Lord Raglan’s request that Marshal St. Arnaud might complete the rout by sending forward his comparatively fresh troops, was met by a frivolous excuse, and there was no pursuit.

The British losses amounted to 106 Officers, 121 sergeants, and 1775 rank and file, total 2002, of whom were killed 25, 19, and 318 respectively. The French, who played a minor part in the action, exaggerated their casualties, which really numbered only 60 killed (including three Officers), and 500 wounded. The Russians put their losses at nearly 6000, but this was probably less than the truth. The Coldstream and the Highlanders had been protected to a great extent by the folds of the ground, and they were fortunately not under the direct fire of the Russian guns, as the other two Battalions of the Division had been. The casualties of the Scots Fusiliers have been already given; those of the Grenadier Guards amounted to 4 Officers and 137 men; the Highland Brigade (three battalions) lost 90 of all ranks. In the Coldstream there were two Officers and 27 men wounded,—of the former, Captain Cust, who succeeded Captain Byng as Aide-de-camp to Major-General Bentinck, died of his wounds immediately after the action; the other, Captain C. Baring, had his arm amputated.

N^o. 4.

BATTLE
OF THE
ALMA

A.D. Innes & C^o. London

Military critics are disappointed with this battle, and condemn 175both sides for displaying little tactical knowledge or talent. Menshikoff left almost everything undone, to enable him to make a stand on the ground he had himself selected for barring the march of the Allies. The influence of St. Arnaud, who at this time was in bad health, seemed to damp the usual ardour of the French; and on this occasion they hardly maintained the high standard of their brilliant military reputation. We have seen that Lord Raglan and the Marshal had formed no definite plan of action before the fight began. If they intended to turn the enemy’s left, and drive him off the road to Sevastopol into the interior, the English attack was too soon delivered; and if they hoped to push him towards the sea, they took no measures to effect that object. They pursued neither of these courses, and a mere frontal attack was undertaken, which resulted in dislodging the Russians, but which, in the absence of a vigorous pursuit, involved them in no serious disaster. Lord Raglan, moreover, having ordered the first line to advance, took up a position well in front of his own army, within the ground occupied at that time by the enemy; in this exposed place he watched the course of the battle, but he ceased to be able to control it. Hence the co-operation between his divisional commanders, necessary to the attack, was wanting, and we missed the opportunity of inflicting a greater defeat upon the enemy than we succeeded in doing. Of the bravery of both the Officers and men, of the steadiness and discipline under fire of the rank and file, who for the first time were in action, but one opinion has ever been expressed.

As has been said, there was no pursuit after the battle, and the enemy was allowed to leave the field unmolested. This was the more unfortunate, since the retreat of the Russians degenerated into a rout. But worse followed, for the morning of the 23rd dawned before we stirred from the scene of our success, and two of the most valuable days of the campaign were irretrievably lost 176to the Allies. The fault was St. Arnaud’s, whom nothing could shake in his determination to remain where he was. Happily the strain of the alliance touched not the troops of either nation, and among them existed warm feelings of an honest camaraderie. Just as the First Division was about to fall in, a French brigade passed by on its southward march, and friendly expressions of mutual recognition and of good will were heard; from us, by lusty cheers and waving of bearskins and bonnets, and from them by hearty cries of “Vivent les Anglais! Vivent les Montagnards!”

Leaving the Alma, the approach to Sevastopol was made by easy stages. On the 23rd a halt was called at noon on the Katcha, where we had the mortification of learning that the heavy field-pieces, which had done us so much damage on the Kurgané heights, had left but four short hours before our arrival. Next day, we reached the Belbek, thirteen miles from the late field of battle, and within striking distance of Sevastopol, the goal of our ambition. And now a strange thing happened. Far from attacking the very position we had come to assail, we even refused to make a reconnaissance to ascertain the nature of its defences, and the force and quality of the enemy holding it.

The expedition, we have seen, was expressly designed to be a speedy operation, and every step taken with respect to it was governed by that one idea; otherwise, it would never have been undertaken in the autumn of 1854. Hence, a coast destitute of secure harbours wherein to form a base of operations, was not considered unsuitable as a landing-place; communications between the Crimea and the rest of the Russian Empire were not intercepted; a line of advance exposed to attack by a relieving army was not rejected; a late season of the year did not put an end to the enterprise; and hence, also, there was no provision made for the winter. These conditions were none of them in accordance with sound military science or practice; but they were accepted, and they led the army to the north side of Sevastopol—to the objective which the Allies designed to reach when they landed at Old Fort. Arriving there, the Anglo-French armies came face to face with an obstacle, some works loomed in the haze before them, and they began to deliberate. Counsellors, not consulted when the expedition was planned, were now admitted as advisers, and they naturally viewed the problem without reference to the past. We had lost touch with the defeated Menshikoff, and it was thought 177that he probably had his army safe behind the entrenchments in front; the attack might not succeed, a delay might occur, and at any rate it was dangerous to wait when we had no secure base in our rear. In short, the hazardous nature of the expedition which had been forced upon the allied Commanders from home, suddenly burst upon them with a vivid light never experienced before, and they had to recognize, although unfortunately they did not yet acknowledge, that the surprise had failed, that a lengthened siege was inevitable, and that the descent on the fortress, as originally conceived, was a snare and a delusion.

And yet, had the position been reconnoitred, some interesting facts would have been revealed. We should have found the defences weak, imperfectly armed, and garrisoned only by 11,000 men, whose weapons for the most part were antiquated flint-locks, while others were only provided with pikes or cutlasses.^[236] The field-force that fought on the 20th was not there at all; it had hastily retired to the south side to re-organize itself after the disaster it had suffered.

The possession of the north side of Sevastopol offered the Allies considerable advantages.^[237] The town, barracks, dockyards, and arsenal are built on the south side of an extensive creek, deep enough to float the largest ships of war, which runs from the sea in an easterly direction four miles inland, 1000 to 1200 yards in breadth. This inlet, forming the roadstead or harbour of Sevastopol, is defended at its mouth by several strong forts, some of those on the north side being perched on cliffs 100 feet high. The northern bank entirely commands the south side, and rises from the water’s edge more abruptly than the latter. These things were known to the Allies before they landed in the Crimea. It is obvious that, if the invaders could have established themselves on this northern bank, they would have taken the town and some of the forts in reverse; and that, if they could have brought up sufficient guns of the requisite calibre, the fortress itself would have been untenable, and the destruction of the ships in the harbour ensured by the force of plunging fire directed upon them.

While we lingered on the Alma, General Menshikoff had not been idle, and he determined to secure all the advantages which the Russian fleet of the Black Sea might be able to confer. It was hopeless to suppose that this fleet could cope with our own 178magnificent ships which lay outside the harbour; and indeed, ever since the battle of Sinope, it had been carefully kept out of harm’s way. The only use to which it could be put, was to convert it into an addition to the land defences of Sevastopol; but even then, it would be exposed to danger, for the enemy had a wholesome dread of what the historic daring of British seamen is capable of achieving when directed by an enterprising commander. On the night of the 22nd, therefore, he effectually barred the entrance of the roadstead by sinking seven vessels, and by constructing a boom across it, and thus he secured his shipping from any direct attack which our navy might have contemplated. Hence, the Russian war-ships became stationary floating batteries, and their function was to play their guns upon the ground that bordered the roadstead. For this device, also, the Allies must have been prepared, and might have taken it into consideration before even they started on the expedition. Now, the plateau on the top of the heights overlooking the town from the north, was much less (if at all) exposed to the enemy’s naval artillery than the ground over which the invaders must advance, if they meant to deliver their attack from the south; and the fire directed upon this plateau would be uncertain and inefficient, since considerable portions of it were out of sight of the ships below.

The British Admiral, Sir Edmond Lyons, at that time second in command, never lost sight of the original plan of invasion: he advocated strongly an attack upon the north side, and was prepared to take a prominent part in the action he expected to follow. If successful, the closing of the harbour was of trifling moment. This powerful co-operation was impossible on the south side. Lord Raglan agreed with the Admiral, and was also in favour of striking a blow from the north, as had always been intended. But he was in a position of great difficulty. Some of his own advisers were against the proposal, and the French Marshal, always unfavourable to activity in this quarter, was sinking under a disease that carried him off before the end of the month. The question whether this attack from the Belbek river would have brought about the immediate fall of Sevastopol, need not be further discussed; no attempt was made to ascertain whether it was practicable. Suffice it to say that General Todleben, who defended Sevastopol, afterwards expressed his deliberate opinion, and elaborately argued it out, that the northern plateau was untenable by the Russians, and that 179operations conducted against it would have led the Allies to a speedy success. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the original design of taking Sevastopol by a coup de main under the effects of a surprise, was given up before even a reconnaissance was made to ascertain the strength of the objective, to which the Allies were committed by that very design. We shall now see that, refusing to pursue their plan, on account of the serious military errors it disclosed, the Allies were forced to adopt another plan, which equally, if not in a greater degree, violated the canons of the science of war.^[238]

180h2 CHAPTER VIII. | BEFORE SEVASTOPOL.

Predicament in which the Allies found themselves—Flank march round Sevastopol—Occupation of Balaklava by the British and of Kamiesh Bay by the French—The Allies refuse to assault Sevastopol; they prefer to bombard it—Depression of the Russians, who fear a prompt assault—Description of the defences round the south side of Sevastopol; successful efforts of the enemy to strengthen them—Description of the upland of the Chersonese, occupied by the Allies; their position and labours—First bombardment and its results—No attack; a regular siege inevitable—Draft of Officers and men to the Coldstream arrive in the Crimea—Establishment of the Regiment—Russian reinforcements begin to arrive—Battle of Balaklava; Cavalry charges—Sortie of the Russians against the British right flank; its failure.

The Allies, at this juncture, found themselves placed in a strange predicament. Their plans had hitherto been successful, and nothing remained to be done except to justify their first resolutions by standing firm to their original purpose. The critical moment at length arrived, and then, in the very presence of the enemy, they changed their minds. They would not operate against the north of Sevastopol; they would attack it from the south, and form a secure base in the harbours of Balaklava and Kamiesh, that indent the coast of the upland plain, called by the ancients the Chersonese. In order to accomplish this new design, they had to march the united armies from the Belbek to the south-west corner of the peninsula, quite close to the fortress they intended to capture. Added to this, the ground over which they had to pass was unknown; they left behind them the broad, open, and treeless plains, where they could march in battle array, ready for emergencies; they now approached a woody, difficult, and intersected country, and had to adopt long columns of route in moving across it. According to the information in their possession, moreover, a hostile army was sheltered somewhere within the lines of Sevastopol; it was believed to be securely posted behind the 181entrenchments on the northern plateau. They did not wish to meet it there, and, to avoid doing so, they were obliged to have recourse to the only alternative, and to commit a bad military error. They exposed the right of their long columns and their rear to imminent danger, and, courting disaster, invited the Russians to fall upon them, in a position where partial defeat must prove fatal to their existence.

On the 25th the main body, preceded by a regiment of cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of Rifles, left the Belbek, and the perilous flank march commenced. It was carried out in a manner which would have given the fullest advantages to the enemy had he availed himself of them. The general direction was kept, often by consulting the compass; but the difficulties of the country, the thick woods, and the haste which urged us forward, disarranged the order of the troops. At one moment, indeed, the head-quarters, leading the whole advance, were followed by a long procession of thirty guns without supports, and offered a tempting and easy reward to Russian enterprise. But, slow though we may be to recognize it, a miracle does sometimes take place, and in this case it showed itself in the fact, that the extraordinary march proceeded onwards without the slightest mishap. Not only this, but the British even captured some twenty carts from the enemy, though they failed to get hold of the horses, which were cut away directly we came into sight. This meeting came about in a curious way. It happened, as we have seen, that Prince Menshikoff, far from taking post on the north plateau, was refitting his defeated army in the town of Sevastopol south of the roadstead. He came to the conclusion that he ought to preserve his communications with the interior of the Crimea, and support the advance of the reinforcements he expected to come from Bessarabia. At dawn on the 25th, therefore, he, too, emerged from his retreat, crossed the Tchernaya at Traktir Bridge, and, advancing to Mackenzie Farm, marched towards Bakshiserai. Thus it came about that the two contending armies, moving on the same day, and for some time advancing towards one another by the same road, crossed each other’s path, and that neither had the least conception of what the other was doing. It was fortunate that, in this curious game of blind man’s buff, Menshikoff did not strike our columns of route full in the flank; as it was, we justjust happened to drive our ram into the tip 182of his tail; for, as the head-quarter Staff, stumbling suddenly on the last portion of the enemy’s baggage train as it passed unconsciously by, stood wondering at the sight, a few of our guns hurried up to the rescue, unlimbered, and secured some of his unhorsed carts. Among the booty was a carriage belonging to one of the Russian Commanders, in which were stars, crosses, medals, uniform, French novels, and a portfolio “of coloured prints, the morality of which will not bear discussion.”

The experiences of the First Division on this march should not be omitted. After waiting ready equipped for two hours, the men at length moved off, at 8.30 in the morning, and plunged almost immediately into the forest.

N^o. 5.

SKETCH MAP OF COUNTRY
NEAR
SEVASTOPOL

Compiled from Hamley’s Crimea by kind permission.
A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

After four hours or more, the troops emerged on a lane blocked by the cavalry and baggage, and squeezed through. A little later they heard an explosion, and, pushing forward, they came upon the scene of the singular meeting that took place between the head-quarter Staff and the rear of the enemy’s army. Continuing along a tolerably good road, they approached the valley of the Tchernaya after dark, and, crossing it at Traktir Bridge, they finally bivouacked near the village of Tchorgun, at ten o’clock at night, “completely exhausted, parched with thirst, and their clothes much torn by struggling through the wood.” Indeed, they were fortunate, for it was one in the morning before the last British division reached its halting ground. The French, who followed their English allies, remained for the night midway on the wooded heights near Mackenzie Farm, where they suffered much from want of water. Next day the movement continued; 183and the cholera, that accompanied our troops without intermission, burst out with renewed malignity, and struck its victims down on the roadside along our line of march. After three hours, the division reached Kadikeui, about half a mile from Balaklava; while our ships, approaching, threw a few shells into an old Genoese fort, which commanded the harbour, and which was held by a handful of Greek troops in the Russian service; after a mere show of resistance, they surrendered without difficulty. The French also moved forward on the 26th, and established themselves on the Fediukhine heights near the Tchernaya. The Fourth Division, under Sir G. Cathcart, had been left behind on the Belbek, to embark the sick that remained there; on the same day (26th) he, too, started from his bivouac on the north of Sevastopol, and, following the track of the Allied armies, arrived on the Tchernaya without misadventure.

Thus the flank march was completed, and during the whole of the difficult and dangerous operation, lasting two days, the Russians stood by absolutely passive, and the Allies were entirely unmolested. Not a company was cut off, nor was a gun taken. This was the more remarkable since, perceiving the movement from a high tower in Sevastopol, they were accurately informed of our plan at midday of the 25th; General Menshikoff must also have known it, from the meeting that took place between the hostile armies near Mackenzie Farm. It was, indeed, fortunate that we had so forbearing an enemy.

Communications having now been fortunately re-established with the fleet, the British occupied the Bay of Balaklava, the French that of Kamiesh, where their respective bases of operations were formed. Thus we were placed on the right of the new line fronting northwards, and we were again posted upon the exposed flank. About this time, an event of importance occurred to the French. Marshal St. Arnaud got so ill, that he was obliged to give up his command, and to leave the seat of war. He was to be taken to Scutari, but he died on the passage. General Canrobert succeeded him—a valiant, honourable, and straightforward soldier, but one little fitted to take upon himself the onerous responsibilities of his new position.

The Allies now found themselves occupying a fertile country, almost entirely denuded of inhabitants, who fled at their approach, covered with highly cultivated gardens, orchards, and vineyards, 184which teemed with vegetables and fruit in great abundance. Never were troops so amply supplied as during the first few days of their stay in this land of plenty; but the good things did not last, they were soon exhausted, and could not be replaced. The men were not easily restrained from enjoying to the full the luxurious feast which lay before them, after the fatigues of the forced flank march; though it is to be feared they suffered from its effects, and from the fact that they were still without tents. Cholera continued, and diarrhœa (its pilot-fish) increased considerably.^[240]

The idea seems to have been pretty general among the troops that the flank march was intended to shift the position of the united armies from a strong front of Sevastopol to a weaker side, and that the attack was only delayed until we got close to the southern defences of the town. It was confidently expected that the assault would be soon delivered, and the landing of the siege-train did not put an end to that hope. As days went by, however, it began to be realized that operations of a slower nature were to be begun, and that a siege, not an assault, was to be undertaken. This surmise was entirely correct; though the Chiefs of the armies still held to the belief that, when a bombardment by siege guns had taken place, the defences would be destroyed, and the town would then fall before the winter set in. Lord Raglan personally seems to have been disposed to make an immediate attempt against the enemy’s lines, without incurring this further delay; and this view was certainly shared and supported by Sir George Cathcart, and was also advocated by Sir Edmond Lyons. It was urged that the Russian fortifications were slight and weak at the end of September, when the Allies got within striking distance, and, though we should be stronger against them as soon as the siege batteries were constructed and armed, yet the time required to do so could be utilized by the defenders in so strengthening their works, that the advantages of a delay would accrue to them, and to our detriment. General Canrobert, however, was cautious, and was disinclined to run any risks just as the supreme command was vested in him by the French Emperor. Others, among the British advisers at head-quarters, held the opinion that it was dangerous to deliver an attack unless prepared 185by artillery fire; they feared that the attempt might cost us 500 men, which loss they hoped would not occur if a siege were opened in the regular manner. Lord Raglan was forced to concur.

During this time the Russian commanders, left in Sevastopol after General Menshikoff’s departure, were in a state of great depression, and believed that the town could not hold out against a vigorous assault. The entire garrison amounted to 35,850 men, made up of heterogeneous elements—one single battalion of regulars (750 men), militia, gunners, marines, seamen, and workmen. Of the latter, there were 5000—a useful body to create a fortress, if time were granted, but useless to repel an immediate attack. Of the sailors set free from the imprisoned fleet, there were 18,500, of whom a fourth part only were well trained or even decently armed.^[241] The south side, moreover, does not lend itself easily to a good defence.^[242] A creek, hardly half a mile broad, called the inner harbour, runs inland for nearly two miles from the main roadstead, terminating in three ravines which ascend the upland of the Chersonese. This inlet divides the town from a suburb, called the Karabelnaya, and as both had to be held against the Allies, there was a formidable obstacle obstructing communications between them. The French, based on Kamiesh Bay, were opposite the western portion of Sevastopol, that is the town itself, from the sea to the head of the inner harbour. The British army on the right, faced Karabelnaya, and were responsible for the ground from the inner harbour to Careenage Bay,—another inlet, half a mile long, which also terminates in a ravine indenting the upland,—where the enemy’s defences ended. The line held by the Russian garrison was about four miles in length: two miles from the sea to the head of the inner harbour, and the same distance onwards to Careenage Bay. On the 25th of September, this long line was imperfectly defended. On the French section, the gorges of the Quarantine and Artillery Forts had been closed, and three bastions or redoubts had been constructed between them and the head of the inner harbour, where the Flagstaff bastion stood, connected, with but little interruption, by a naked loopholed wall. On the British section, there were four works, which were unconnected by wall or entrenchment, known as the Redan, the Malakoff Tower, the Little Redan, and 186No. 1 Battery, near Careenage Bay. Of these the Malakoff was “a mere naked tower, without a glacis, exposed from head to foot, unsupported by the powerful batteries which were destined to flank it, and uncovered as yet by the works which afterwards closed up round its base.” The whole of the south side of Sevastopol, moreover, was armed with 172 guns, of which by far the greater number faced the French, and only a few the British position.^[243]

The serious and very reasonable apprehension entertained by the Russian chiefs did not, however, prevent them from taking every measure to fortify their position, directly they understood that the Allies were approaching the south side in force. The greatest activity prevailed day and night in the garrison and among the inhabitants, the women and children taking their share of the labour, and thus the works designed by the Russian Engineer Officer, Todleben, were rapidly thrown up. The Anglo-French Commanders never interrupted these operations, nor did they make any demonstrations to try the quality of the defences; they contented themselves with distant reconnaissances, so that in a short time the entrenchments were greatly strengthened, especially the Malakoff, and began to look more formidable than had been the case before; the armament also was being changed, the lighter guns giving place to heavier ordnance drawn from the ships and arsenal.

The upland of the Chersonese, on which the Allies had established themselves, is a sloping plain, trending from a line of hills called the Sapuné Ridge, 500 to 700 feet high, that bounds it on the east, from the head of the roadstead of Sevastopol to a point on the coast some four miles west of Balaklava. The upland is scored by numerous ravines, running from the ridge in a general north-westerly direction to the town and coast; but on the eastern side of the ridge the ground falls abruptly and almost in a cliff-like manner into the valley of the Tchernaya river, which discharges itself into the roadstead. The distance from Balaklava to Sevastopol is nearly eight miles. Of the two roads connecting them, one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled, and, proceeding along the Causeway Heights, formed the main communication with the south of the Crimean peninsula; the other, a 187mere cart-track or pathway, more to the south, ascended the ridge over the “Col de Balaklava,” three miles from that place, and joined the Woronzoff road two miles further on, on the upland.

This extended position had to be defended from attacks that were to be feared from Menshikoff’s army. The latter, having left Sevastopol, was in easy communication with the town and was securely posted on very defensible ground, from whence it could advance upon the right of the Allies or upon our base at Balaklava. Moreover, the Russians would, before long, be strongly reinforced by troops which, as we have seen, were hurrying without opposition from Bessarabia into the Crimea; but when this event would take place was still uncertain. The Allies had lost all touch with the enemy’s army they had defeated at the Alma, and their hesitation to assault the weak defences that covered Sevastopol directly after the flank march, was in a measure due to their ignorance of what their opponent was doing. In reality he was then many miles away, and had no intention of resuming hostilities without further assistance; he was re-organizing his men, and waiting for the fresh forces he expected from the north.^[244] Only for the moment, therefore, was the right flank of the invaders free from danger, and under no circumstances could it have been left unguarded.

The French divided their army into two Corps. The 3rd and 4th Divisions, under General Forey, formed the besieging force, and took post before Sevastopol, their right on the great ravine which runs into the inner harbour, their left on Streleska Bay. The 1st and 2nd Divisions, together with the Turkish contingent, constituted a Corps of observation, under General Bosquet, and were entrenched on the Sapuné Ridge, facing the east, between the Woronzoff road and the Col previously mentioned. The whole of the British army was engaged in the siege, before the suburb of Karabelnaya, the left on the ravine, in communication with the French, the right upon ground not far from the Sapuné heights. The defence of Balaklava was provided by the 93rd Regiment (withdrawn for the purpose from the Highland Brigade), 1,000 Marines, a battery of Artillery, and a body of Turks (3,500 of whom had been recently despatched to the Crimea, the remainder, two battalions, being lent by the French). These troops, which included a provisional battalion formed of 25 to 30 weakly men drawn from every regiment, were placed under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, who was detached 188from his brigade. In front of them, in the valley, was Lord Lucan’s cavalry division.

These measures did not, however, secure the right flank of the British siege-works. At this point, the cliff-like appearance of the heights overlooking the Tchernaya partially disappears, and the upland falls towards the roadstead and the river, in numerous spurs, intersected by ravines. This broken country was known to the Allies by the name of Inkerman, and along its foot there ran a road from Balaklava, which, skirting the Tchernaya to the roadstead, proceeded to Sevastopol along the southern shore of the latter. The river, moreover, was crossed at its mouth by a bridge and a causeway, over which another road led to Bakshiserai. This was a vulnerable point in the line adopted by the Allies, who far from being able to invest the place they intended to besiege, were too weak even to establish themselves upon the head of the roadstead, and prevent an irruption from the town, or an attack from the direction of Bakshiserai upon the right of their position. To guard this vital point, only a strong piquet was employed, and a battery of two guns of position, called the “Sandbag battery,” constructed to strengthen it, had soon to be disarmed, as it was found impracticable to support the guns by infantry. The flank, in short, was left undefended, because the whole of the British army was required to undertake the siege, and because Bosquet’s corps had entrenched themselves on an inaccessible position on the ridge, where no enemy could attack them, and where they could neither give efficient support to the defences of Balaklava, nor be of any immediate use should an onslaught be made on the unguarded spurs of Inkerman. In other words, we suffered from the effects of a divided command.^[245]

We left the Guards Brigade, on the 26th of September, near Balaklava, at the end of the flank march. For the first few days there was little done. “Troops passive and grape-gorging, with the exception of strong fatigue parties engaged in the slow and laborious office of landing the siege guns from the transports, which now cram the harbour of Balaklava.”^[246] On the 2nd of October, the First Division marched to the front, and about this time the British army was thus bivouacked before Sevastopol. The Second Division on the right, with the First in support, nearly 189a mile in rear; next came the Light Division, separated from them by the Careenage Ravine. These three divisions manned the British Right Attack. The Fourth and Third Divisions were posted south-west of Cathcart’s Hill, and continued the line to the west, in rear of the Left Attack, to the ravine, on the other side of which lay the French siege corps, near Mount Rodolph. The work of bringing up the battering train continued without interruption, and some heavy guns from the ships were drawn to the batteries by sailors, who, forming a brigade under command of Captains Lushington and Peel, took part in the operations which were soon to commence.

It was fortunate that tents were at last issued, on the 5th of October; for the men, having been constantly bivouacked since the disembarkation at Old Fort, nearly three weeks before, were again attacked by sickness. Cholera reappeared on the day after the troops stood on the upland plain before Sevastopol, and an Officer of the Coldstream, Captain Jolliffe, died of it on the 4th. It seems that the delay in providing shelter, even of an indifferent nature, was due to the want of transport, which still failed us; nothing apparently could induce our Government to give the army this indispensable requirement. The boon of again having a tent to cover them in the chilly autumn nights of the Crimea, was keenly appreciated by Officers and men; but comfort is a relative term, and, judged from the ordinary standpoint, the slight shelter which was supplied, was inadequate and insufficient.

On the 4th, Captain MacKinnon and a small detachment of convalescents, who had been left behind at Varna, reached the Battalion.

The constant labour which the Russians devoted to the improvement of their fortifications became apparent to regimental Officers, as they anxiously scanned the enemy’s works during their leisure time.

190On the same day, it seemed to leak out, that “the place looked so much stronger than had been anticipated, that perhaps we might not take it this winter;” and it was devoutly hoped that precautionary measures would be taken in time, against “the onslaughts of Generals Rain, Frost, and Snow, no matter how great soever may be head-quarter confidence in the overwhelming efficacy of our opening fire.”^[247]

It was, however, still officially considered that the projected bombardment would shatter the Russian defences, and that the speedy capture of Sevastopol would be the result. This opinion was also shared by many of the Officers of the British army, and every nerve was strained to make the operation a success. On the 10th we broke ground, and began the construction of three batteries. Two, known as Chapman’s and Gordon’s, called after the Engineer Officers in charge, were some 1400 yards from the Redan, and the trench connecting them became eventually the first parallel. Chapman’s battery, 41 guns, was placed on Green Hill, between two ravines that descend into the inner harbour, viz. the valley of the Shadow of Death and the Woronzoff ravine. Gordon’s battery, 26 guns, stood on Mount Woronzoff (also called Frenchman’s Hill), between the Woronzoff and the Docks ravines. On the next hill, between the Docks and the Careenage ravines, the Victoria or Lancaster battery was built, armed with 6 guns (5 of the Lancaster pattern), more than 2000 yards from the enemy’s lines. The French began their siege-works on the 9th, on Mount Rodolph, and placed 53 guns in battery, 1000 yards from the enemy’s fortifications. Thus the Allies had 126 guns in position, not counting the field artillery. The enemy had 118,—64 facing the French, and 54 the British,—besides 223 of lesser calibre.

The Battalion, in common with the other troops stationed before Sevastopol, took their full share in the construction of these batteries, by supplying working parties and covering guards to resist sorties. The operation was new to all ranks, who had received little training in these special duties, the greater part of which had to be performed at night. But any confusion incidental to the circumstances of the case speedily passed away, and from start to finish the men stuck to their work, and did it thoroughly, under a heavy and unreturned fire, that constantly poured upon them from dawn to dark from the Russian lines.

The excellence of the work performed by the Brigade is thus described in a recent publication, already alluded to:—

The following extracts from Colonel Tower’s diary, give, 192moreover, an idea of the nature of some of the duties discharged by the men, and the conditions under which they were performed:—

In preparation for the bombardment, fixed to commence at 6.30 a.m. on the 17th of October, the troops were held in readiness in their camps to fall in at a moment’s notice, arrangements were made in case the army was ordered to move forward to assault the Russian position, scaling ladders, tools, etc., were collected, and a body of sharpshooters was specially organized. In the First Division, the latter were placed under Captain Goodlake of the Coldstream, whose gallant services soon earned for him the Victoria Cross.^[250] But the first onslaught on Sebastopol failed to 193produce the results that were expected from it. The Allies found the enemy placed in far other circumstances than had been the case when they first presented themselves before the south side on the 26th of September. At that date the advantages gained by the battle of the Alma had not been entirely dissipated: the Crimean field army, under Menshikoff, was beaten, and was far away from the scene of hostilities, refitting and awaiting reinforcements; the garrison of Sevastopol—composed of a mere medley of details, imperfectly armed, and many of whom could scarcely be called “combatants”—was physically and morally weak; the entrenchments were slight and incomplete; the guns to oppose an attack were light. On the 17th of October a great change had been effected. The forces from Bessarabia were arriving; the Russians had been able to reconnoitre the valley of the Tchernaya, and to threaten our exposed right flank and our base of operations; they spared as many as 25,000 of the regular army to strengthen the garrison of the town; the morale of the latter had been raised; the defences were much improved—they assumed the appearance of genuine fortifications; the armament was greatly increased, and had been rendered formidable.

Nevertheless, the operation was an affair of great importance and magnitude. The Allied fleets took part in it in full force, though it was not possible for them to produce any real effect; for the land defences were out of their reach, and the sea forts were extremely strong. Still all the artillery the invaders could muster, discharged their thunders upon the fortifications which covered the south side of the town and the entrance of the roadstead. The French, subjected to a hotter and closer fire than we, suffered severely, and between ten and eleven in the morning, two explosions having occurred in their batteries, their guns were silenced. The British, on the other hand, were very successful. Directing their fire upon three of the enemy’s works, they inflicted considerable damage on the Flagstaff battery, silenced the Malakoff, and almost demolished the Redan, the salient of which was blown to pieces by the explosion of a powder magazine. The defences of the Karabelnaya were completely paralysed, an immediate assault was 194expected, and the troops to oppose it being demoralized, fell back in confusion.^[251]

N^o. 6.

SEVASTOPOL
October 17^th 1854
By kind permission from Kinglake’s Crimea.
A.D. Innes & C^o. London

But no attack took place. The French were unable to advance against the lines which had silenced their siege guns. It was too much to ask them to allow us to go on, under cover of their friendly co-operation and support. The enemy, in a word, gained by the Anglo-French alliance, and the common interests were obscured under the pressure of inter-national courtesy. Thus a severe strain was still to weigh down the resources of the two Great Powers of Europe; an insignificant fortress was to baffle their united efforts; their armies were to be destroyed on the upland of the Chersonese by cold and famine; and, while our British Engineers alone could survey with complacency the results of their skill, evidenced by the speedy destruction of the defences around Karabelnaya, the Allies were not one whit nearer the accomplishment of their object than they had been before the bombardment began. Still the Chiefs of the invading forces were sanguine that their fire at last would tell, and would allow them to storm the place together, at points where each had breached the defences opposed to them; but in this expectation they were, as they deserved to be, disappointed. The bombardment was continued on the 18th, and the British batteries alone took part in it—for the French were not ready, and were improving their earthworks after the disaster of the day before,—not, however, against the wreck which we had created by the evening of the 17th, but on renewed and freshly armed defences that were repaired in the night by the ceaseless energy of the garrison, whose labours were undisturbed by any countermove on our part. Again, on the 19th, the united artillery fired on the hostile batteries with complete success on our side, but once more the French guns were silenced. The bootless bombardment continued till the 25th, ever with the same result: the lines covering the Karabelnaya were open to attack, but the forts opposite Mount Rodolph were unsubdued. Thus no advantage was gained, or indeed could be gained, under the rule which the Allies had imposed upon themselves to the benefit of the enemy, who, not slow to perceive the situation, took every advantage therefrom. A great display, therefore, was all that took place, which cost the Russians nearly 4000 men, while the Allies lost less than a fourth part of that number.

195As the fire proceeded from day to day, the attention of the First and Second Divisions was directed to their right flank.

The enemy, seen upon this occasion, was again observed by a piquet of the Coldstream on the 20th, among the Inkerman ruins (beyond the Tchernaya), mounting guns. Towards evening he opened fire, and directed his aim upon the camp of the Second Division, until the Sandbag battery, previously mentioned, was constructed, and armed with two 18-pounders. The British fire soon drove away the guns from the ruins, but the 18-pounders had to be removed to a less exposed position.

Nine Officers reached the Crimea and joined the Battalion on the 17th, the first day of the bombardment, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Newton, Cowell, and Halkett (who had left Bulgaria on promotion in July), Lieut.-Colonels Mark Wood, Dudley Carleton, and Lord A. Charles FitzRoy, and Lieutenants Heneage, Hon. W. Amherst, and Greville.

It should be stated here, that, on account of the war, the Regiment received an augmentation, first on the 13th of February, and again a little later. The establishments were as follows:—

196Of the twenty companies, twelve were at home and eight at the seat of war, but the latter were strong companies on paper, and the former weak; it was further ordered that the service Battalion was not to bear upon its strength less Officers than were required for 10 companies, the Adjutant not included.^[253] Hence the two mounted Officers who, before the receipt of this order, were posted to companies in the field, were placed upon the 1st Battalion establishment, and nominally belonged to companies at home.

During the first few days of the operations against Sevastopol there were several casualties among the Officers of the Grenadier Guards. On the 16th, Captain Rowley was killed, and, two days later, the same fate overtook Colonel Hood, the gallant Commanding Officer who had greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and intrepidity at the Alma. The losses of the Coldstream at this moment were happily less. It was not till the 20th, that the first man was wounded in the trenches; but next day, Lord Dunkellin was unfortunately captured. Commanding a working party without arms—for at that time the men told off to dig were sent to the front unarmed,—he lost his way in the darkness, and, stumbling upon a piquet which he thought was English, he went forward by himself to ask where he was. As it happened, he found himself within the enemy’s lines, and was taken; his men, however, luckily escaped under cover of the night.^[254]

Prince Menshikoff so far recovered from his defeat on the 20th of September, that he occupied the hills in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie Farm, and took possession of the roads leading therefrom into the valley of the Tchernaya on the 7th of October. He had good reason to be proud of the achievements of the garrison of Sevastopol, and to rejoice at his own singular good fortune. The town was fast growing into a powerful fortress, sufficiently strong to resist any sudden assault, and likely for months to occupy the energies of a far more numerous force than stood before it at that time. He himself was placed in an unassailable position. Secure as regards his communications with the interior of Russia 197and with Sevastopol, he not only received without difficulty the fresh forces that were hurrying to his assistance; but he also hemmed the invaders into a small corner of an exceedingly inhospitable country, restricted their enterprise, and threatened them with destruction in case a reverse were to happen to them. History, indeed, fails to record any great genius in this Russian General, nor were his troops of that high order to account for the immense advantages he gained at this moment. He was simply fortunate in the Governments and in the leaders of his antagonists, who, unable to combine to carry out any single plan, continually changed their intentions, until a surprise on the north side was converted into a lengthy siege (without investment) of the south side.

The Bessarabian reinforcements began to reach Simferopol early in October, and on the 15th, General Liprandi arrived there. A few days later it was determined to make an attack on our base at Balaklava, with some 25,000 troops (22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 78 guns) commanded by that Officer. The attack took place on the 25th, a day immortalized in our military history by the bravery of the British cavalry, particularly by the charge of the Light brigade, “one of the most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war,” though it resulted in the destruction of that corps.^[255]

Balaklava was covered by two defensive lines, the outer and the inner. The outer line, more than two miles in length, running along the Causeway Heights and near the Woronzoff road, had the support of a few small earthworks, “mere scratches with the spade, a donkey might have been ridden into some of them,” armed with only nine 12-pounder guns in all, and occupied by about two battalions of Turks. The inner line, near Kadikeui, was 3000 yards in rear, and was held by the 93rd Regiment, a few invalids, the Marines, and the rest of the Turks. The Russians, advancing in force at dawn on the 25th, brought 30 guns (some of them of heavy calibre) against the earthworks on the Causeway Heights,—which were isolated, entirely unsupported, and commanded by neighbouring ground,—and captured two of them on the right of the line, after a stubborn resistance; a third soon after fell into their hands. They then pushed forward their cavalry, of which 198four squadrons reconnoitred towards Kadikeui; the latter came within range of the 93rd, drawn up in line, who received them with a volley, and with such determination that they quickly wheeled about and fled to the rear. The rest, a solid column, nearly 3000 strong, supported by 32 guns, moving in somewhat the same direction, came suddenly close to the British Heavy cavalry brigade, who, without the slightest hesitation, charged, and in a few moments routed them, and sent them back in confusion, past the front of the Light brigade. Unfortunately Lord Cardigan did not fall upon the flying mass and complete their discomfiture; so they got away down the valley that lay between the Fediukhine and Causeway heights, both of which were held by the enemy’s infantry and artillery, and took up a position about a mile and a quarter away, behind some Russian guns. And now “some one blundered,” and the Light brigade made their famous charge, over this dangerous ground, flanked on each side by well-posted artillery, straight into the guns and the cavalry at the end of the valley. The story of this gallant deed is well known. The Russian gunners and cavalry were swept away, and forced to retreat before the impetuous onslaught of our weak squadrons, but the brigade was broken, and indeed destroyed. It numbered 670 sabres at the commencement of the action, and at the conclusion its mounted strength was only 195. The enemy was quite unable to cut off the retreat of the remnants of our light horse, as they rode back after their desperate expedition, very few prisoners were taken, and the French, making a spirited and successful charge upon the Fediukhine Heights, prevented the Russians from harassing our men from that quarter, as they emerged from the deadly and unequal conflict.

Heavy firing had been heard in the British camps before Sevastopol at dawn, and, when the serious nature of the attack was perceived, orders were sent to the First and Fourth Divisions to march down to meet the danger. Two of Bosquet’s infantry brigades, as well as the French cavalry, which had by this time reached the seat of war, were also brought to the field of battle. When our troops got to the Sapuné Ridge, and looked on the plain beneath, they saw with breathless interest the first encounter between the contending horsemen.

The subsequent charge of the Light brigade was not so apparent to our infantry:—

Despite the glorious conduct of our troops upon this occasion, we lost a good deal and gained very little. The eastern portion of an unsupported advanced line of redoubts on the Causeway Heights was captured by the weight of numbers, and the outer defences of Balaklava were occupied by the enemy; but his further movements towards Kadikeni were crushed by a handful of our Heavy cavalry, and our Light brigade proved their superiority over him by a useless feat of daring which is unparalleled in warfare.

Thus, though Balaklava was still safe, we were deprived of the use of the Woronzoff road as a means of communication between our base of operations and the upland, and we had only the unmetalled path which led over the Col to rely on. We shall see that this result of the battle of the 25th was a serious one for the British army besieging Sevastopol. There was, indeed, some idea of turning Liprandi out of the Causeway Heights; but had it been definitely formed, the infantry would have descended from the ridge on which they stood by the Woronzoff road, whence the object would have been more easily accomplished. Instead of this, however, they were moved onwards to the Col, and remained during the day covering Balaklava. No forward operation was 200undertaken, and it was probably considered that we had not sufficient troops to hold the outer line efficiently. So the main road was placidly given up to the enemy, and at nightfall the Guards Brigade and the Fourth Division returned to camp, while the remaining two Highland regiments were left at Balaklava to strengthen the garrison at that important place.^[257]

The vulnerable point on the right flank of the British position has already been adverted to, also the position taken up by the French Corps of observation under General Bosquet. We have seen that this force could not help the Allies to retain possession of the Woronzoff road, nor could it, as we shall see, secure the right of their siege-works from serious attack. The first attempt to disturb this flank was made at noon on the 26th, when a force emerged from Sevastopol, of which 700 men advanced up the Careenage Ravine, while the remainder, 4300 men and four guns, crossed that obstacle, and directed themselves upon Shell Hill, in front of the camp of the Second Division. The former column was met by the sharpshooters of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, who, drawing up his insignificant detachment behind a ditch that ran across the ravine, held the hostile column in check, and barred its further advance,—even capturing several prisoners,—until, a little later, some men of the Rifles appearing upon the scene, the enemy was driven back.^[258]

The main column, endeavouring to reach Shell Hill, met the outposts of the Second Division, some 250 strong, who, instead of retiring before so superior a force, stubbornly resisted it, and held it at bay, until, outflanked and pressed back by numbers, they retreated slowly and in good order. But the Russians gained nothing, for the divisional artillery, reinforced by a battery of the First Division, had time to come into action, and when the enemy 201appeared upon the crest of the hill, he was met by the fire of our guns, which speedily repulsed him, and made him retire precipitately to the fortress, pursued by the piquets, and under fire of the Lancaster battery. In this combat, where the Russians acknowledge the loss of 270 men and 80 prisoners, as against 12 killed and 77 wounded on our side, Lieutenant Conolly, of the 49th Regiment, greatly distinguished himself. He was promoted Brevet Major, obtained the Victoria Cross, and a commission in the Coldstream. The Brigade was not employed in this action; they stood in reserve out of musketry fire, and watched the fight, ready for emergencies, but their services were not required.^[259]

This sortie was intended, according to Todleben, to distract our attention from Balaklava; and it may well be that Liprandi, knowing its importance, was under grave apprehension lest the Woronzoff road might be wrested from him. It has also been thought that the Russians were endeavouring to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, preparatory to the attack they meant soon to deliver on our right flank at Inkerman, and this is very likely. But, if so, they had an inadequate force to accomplish such a purpose, and by this time they had ample experience of the fighting qualities of the British troops, who, man for man, were immensely superior to their own. Indeed we had every need of the sterling bravery of our gallant soldiers, for a great crisis was at hand. The strength of our Crimean army was becoming alarmingly weakened, not only by the wear and tear of active service and losses incurred on the field, but through the unusual amount of sickness that prevailed, and the arduous nature of the campaign in which we had become engaged. In the Coldstream there were 190 more admissions into hospital in October than there had been in September.^[260] On the other hand, the actions of the 25th and 26th increased the confidence of our men when opposed to the enemy. They felt themselves more than a match for him if they could only get leave to be at him; but they little knew how severe the trial would be that awaited them in a very few days.^[261]

202On the night of the 28th, many of our camps were alarmed, and believed they were about to be attacked. The outposts watching the plain of Balaklava heard cavalry approaching, and a great deal of firing in the dark took place—the sentries blazing away whenever they saw, or fancied they saw, the phantom horsemen, “who seemed perpetually galloping, but never coming any nearer. Staff Officers kept arriving to know what the commotion was about. Of course I could give them no information.” A regiment of Zouaves and the guns in a French redoubt poured volleys into imaginary columns coming to storm our position. “The Russian drums all along the Fediukhine heights beat to arms; and I sat down quietly on a stone in advance of my sentries, and could hear nothing more, but made up my mind Liprandi intended to give us a benefit in the morning.” When the morning broke the mystery was cleared. It was found that a number of Russian horses had stampeded from their lines, and that no enemy was near. A hundred or more were caught, and served to mount a few of our cavalry, while the remainder scampered back across the plain to their legitimate owners.^[262]

The weary monotony of the siege continued after the sortie of the 26th, the troops being largely employed in the trenches, constructing approaches or batteries, or acting as covering guards, generally under a heavy fire from the fortress in front of them.

The French were sapping up towards the Flagstaff Battery with the greatest energy. They were becoming strong enough to 203withstand the guns of the garrison, and to retrieve their failure of October 17th-25th. Another bombardment, to be followed by an assault, was contemplated, and the allied Commanders had full confidence that this time, at least, the effect would be decisive. They even agreed to meet on the 5th of November to arrange the details of their projected operation. But neglected opportunities too often rise in judgment against a General in the field. The 5th was the day of Inkerman, and all our plans were completely frustrated.

Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea—Position and strength of the enemy; of the Allies—Description of the field of Inkerman—Commencement of the battle, 5th of November—The progress of the first part of the fight—The Guards Brigade advance to the scene of action—The struggle round the Sandbag battery—Arrival of the Fourth Division under General Cathcart—The manœuvre of the latter, and its failure—The arrival of the French—Successes of the British artillery—Repulse of the Russian attack; the retreat of the enemy; there is no pursuit—Operations of the garrison of Sevastopol and of the Russian force in the Tchernaya Valley during the day—Great losses incurred on both sides—Reaction among the soldiery after the battle.

The Russian reinforcements which, as we have seen, began to arrive in the month of October, continued their advance upon the Crimea, so that early in November the hostile forces at the seat of war amounted, all told, to more than 120,000 men capable of taking part in the operations of the campaign.^[264] The moment had now come when the enemy determined to deliver his well-prepared attack upon the invaders, and hoped to rid the Crimea for ever of their presence. It must be confessed that he had a good opportunity of accomplishing his object, and that every advantage was on his side. He could choose his own time and place of attack; his forces were far more powerful than those of the invaders, both in numbers and in position; and, by the reconnaissance or sortie of October 26th, he found out (if he did not already know it) that our vulnerable right flank was unsecured by any fieldworks to make up for our other deficiencies. The onslaught, then, that was to drive us away from Sevastopol, and to sweep us into the sea, was to be directed upon this flank, upon ground which our soldiers called Mount Inkerman, and Sunday, the 2055th of November, was chosen as the day upon which to put the design into execution.^[265]

On the evening of the 4th, Prince Menshikoff established his head-quarters near the mouth of the Tchernaya, and his troops were posted as follows: The garrison was not increased beyond the numbers it contained towards the end of October. General Dannenberg, head-quarters on the Old City Heights, midway between Mackenzie Farm and the head of the roadstead, commanded a corps of 50 battalions, 1 squadron, and 134 guns (of which 54 were guns of position). This corps was divided into two columns, namely, General Soimonoff, 19,000 infantry and 38 guns (22 of position), whose troops were temporarily sheltered in the lines of the fortress in the Karabelnaya; and General Pavloff, 16,500 infantry and 96 guns (32 of position), concentrated on the Old City Heights. To the left of Pavloff, there was another force of 16 battalions, 62 squadrons, and 88 guns (15,000 infantry), composed mostly of Liprandi’s column, but now under Prince Gortchakoff, whose head-quarters were at Tchorgun. Lastly, there was a body of 4000 infantry and 36 guns guarding the road to Bakshiserai, somewhere near Mackenzie Farm. Thus, besides the garrison which amounted to nearly 60,000 men, placed in what was now a secure stronghold, amply covered and well armed, there was a force of 54,500 infantry, a powerful body of cavalry, and 258 guns available to operate against the undefended flank of the Allies.

The latter, on the other hand, had received a few reinforcements, but not sufficient to compensate for the immense losses to which they had been subjected. On the evening of the 4th, they numbered but 58,000 infantry,—16,000 British, 31,000 French, and 11,000 Turks; and this small force was further weakened by the fact that the allied Commanders, totally unacquainted with the warlike qualities of their Ottoman auxiliaries, would not allow them to develop their value, and left them no chance to assist in the approaching battle. So far did Lord Raglan’s prejudice go, that the 6000 attached to the British army, were not suffered to take part as combatants, and when Omar Pasha proposed to send him a further contingent he refused the offer.^[266] Hence there were practically 206only 47,000 British and French infantry left to meet the grave crisis which now confronted us. These troops were disposed on an irregular curve which stretched from Streleska Bay (north of Kamiesh Bay) along the front of the enemy’s lines of Sevastopol to the heights of Inkerman, thence southwards on the Sapuné Ridge to the Col, where it ran more to the east, near Kadikeui, and covered Balaklava. This line measured twenty miles in length, it was unsupported by any central reserve, and was everywhere in contact with powerful masses of the enemy.

Menshikoff’s onslaught was to be delivered as the first gleam of light appeared at dawn on the 5th, when his forces were to be before our outposts, ready to press the advance home. The principal attack was confided to Dannenberg’s corps, whose two columns were to converge upon the British unguarded position at Inkerman,—that of Soimonoff, issuing from the Karabelnaya by the road that skirts the south bank of the roadstead, that of Pavloff marching down to the Tchernaya and crossing the river by the causeway and bridge near its mouth. Gortchakoff was to support this operation, and endeavour “to seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné Ridge;” and the garrison was to “cover by its fire the right flank of the assaulting columns, and, should there be confusion in the enemy’s batteries, to storm those batteries.” The Russians were elated by the bright prospects before them. “Future times, I am confident,” wrote their Chief, “will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies.... Heaven visibly protects Holy Russia. Have the kindness to bring this to the knowledge of our august Sovereign for the great satisfaction of his magnanimous heart.” Two of the Grand-Dukes, sons of the Tsar, arrived in the Crimea, to encourage the Muscovite troops, and to bear witness to the “exemplary chastisement” about to be inflicted; but the “magnanimous heart” was not to be satisfied, for Menshikoff forgot to take into account, what a handful of British soldiers are capable of doing when sorely pressed, and when protecting the honour of their Queen and country, even against overwhelming odds.

A general description of the ground known as Inkerman (or Mount Inkerman) has already been given. The Lancaster battery, now nearly dismantled, and holding but one gun, had been planted 207on the Victoria Ridge between the Docks and Careenage ravines, and more than a mile in rear, stood the camp of General Codrington’s brigade of the Light Division. To the east, another main spur, jutting out from the upland, fills up the space between Careenage Ravine and the Tchernaya, broken by water-courses which descend into the ravine, the roadstead, and the river. Into the ravine, there is one water-course, the Wellway, which joins it 400 yards in rear of the Lancaster battery; and into the Tchernaya there is another, the Quarry Ravine, through which a post-road runs connecting the upland with the head of the roadstead. Between the Wellway and the Quarry Ravine, the main spur is some 1300 yards broad, and supports a rise, called Home Ridge, that bends to the north under the name of Fore Ridge, and thence slopes away towards the Tchernaya, in two spurs, which overlook the valley, and which are divided by St. Clement’s Gorge, viz. Inkerman Tusk and the Kitspur. On the Kitspur the Sandbag battery had been erected on commanding ground: it was a mere short wall of earth, only eighteen paces in length, too high to shoot over except where cut by two embrasures; it was unprovided with a banquette, and at this moment it was vacant and unarmed. Astride the post-road the Second Division was encamped, immediately behind Home Ridge, in front of which the main spur is contracted to 250 yards in breadth. But at a distance of 1400 yards from the ridge, the main spur again widens out considerably, and here there is another rise, called Shell Hill, flanked on each side by buttresses, West and East Jut, which the enemy had vainly tried to capture on October 26th. About a mile in rear of the Second Division, and always on the same main spur, near a ruined windmill, stood the camp of the Guards Brigade, the Coldstream being somewhat in rear, and separated from the rest by a narrow ravine. Thus, in the first instance, available to resist an attack on Inkerman, there was one division, viz. the Second, of 3000 men and 12 guns; supported in rear by the Household Brigade, 1300 men, and 12 guns of the First Division, and, on the left, though with a great obstacle intervening—the Careenage Ravine—Codrington’s brigade, 1200 men. To the rear, some two miles from the Guards, lay the northern portion of Bosquet’s Corps of observation, which at this time was in closer communication with the Highlanders and Marines, at Balaklava, than had been the case before October 25th. To the left, were Buller’s brigade of the Light, and the Fourth and the Third Divisions, distant respectively from 208Home Ridge, 1½, 2½, and 3 miles. These latter troops were covered by the defences which the trenches and batteries afforded, as was also Forey’s French siege corps, which, as already mentioned, took up the line from the British Left Attack to Streleska Bay. But no such protection was available for the division and the two brigades more immediately threatened in the vicinity of Inkerman.

Though both Commanders of the Allied armies felt anxiety on account of this exposed flank, nothing was done to make it secure. General Canrobert paid us the compliment of placing extraordinary reliance on our troops,—especially the bonnets de poil, as he called the Guards; on the other hand, Lord Raglan, weak in numbers, thought he could not spare any of his men from the trenches. Still, the omission to safeguard this vital position with earthworks has never been explained, for as Turks could have been obtained for this purpose, and as Engineer Officers were available, the excuse given, like many others put forward to cover our deficiencies in this extraordinary war, can hardly be deemed satisfactory. Of the value of works of defence to be occupied in case of attack, it is sufficient to point out that, if we were victorious without them, we should have been far stronger with them, and the battle (if it had taken place at all under these circumstances) could not have failed to result in greater disaster to the enemy, and in much less loss to ourselves.

The Guards furnished piquets to watch the flank and rear of the British army. On the 1st of November a stronger force was considered necessary to accomplish this object, and the Brigade supplied eight piquets daily. Six (numbered 1 to 6) mounted an hour before daybreak for twenty-four hours, under the Field-Officer of the day while the other two (Nos. 7 and 8) were posted as a reserve from sunset until an hour after sunrise, the whole during the night being placed under the command of a “full Colonel of the Brigade.”^[267] Besides finding three working parties in the trenches, each 40 to 50 men strong under an Officer, the Coldstream furnished, on the 4th, piquets Nos. 5 and 8, and again on the 5th, Nos. 3, 5, and 6. Thus before dawn on the morning of the battle, the Battalion had two piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies) coming off, and three (Nos. 6 and 7 companies) going on duty; so that four companies were absorbed, and when the first alarm was given, only half the Battalion (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8 companies) were in camp. The Colonel on duty, during the night 4th-5th, should have been 209Lord F. Paulet, but as he was incapacitated by illness, Colonel Upton took his place; moreover, Lieut.-Colonel Newton, detailed Field Officer of the day for the 5th, had left long before daylight began to appear. The next senior Officer was Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, and, when the first alarm was given, he quickly formed up what remained of the Battalion, and immediately marched them to the front where the battle was heard, to the support of the Second Division, who were then seriously engaged with the enemy.

Meanwhile, what had happened was this. Although we knew that an attack was imminent, we were unable to tell the precise day on which it was to take place. The night 4th-5th passed quietly, there was no firing, no alarm, no spies came to warn us. The sentries on outpost, and the piquets, heard a rumbling noise in the valley, but the sounds were deadened by the heavy rain that fell during the 4th and throughout the night, and they were not sufficiently distinct to induce us to concert any definite arrangements to meet the emergency. In so far the enemy acted with caution and ability; the attack came upon us as a surprise, even 210though we expected it. He failed, however, to marshal his immense masses to the best advantage. The orders given to Dannenberg’s forces were vague, and there was a confusion as to whether both Soimonoff and Pavloff were to operate on the eastern side of the Careenage Ravine, or whether the former was to advance along the Victoria Ridge and the latter against Inkerman. Obviously, had this plan been adopted, Codrington’s brigade and Evans' division would both have been in imminent danger; and had either been driven in, the results must have been disastrous. Fortunately, the two unwieldy Russian columns jammed themselves together on the broken ground east of the ravine, and interfered by their numbers and proximity with each other’s movements.

Soimonoff, arriving on the ground a little before his colleague, commenced the attack with his powerful column. Advancing cautiously and silently in three lines covered by skirmishers, he had 6000 men in the first line, followed by 3300 and his heavy guns, and 9000 with the light artillery in reserve. The latter was the first hostile body perceived by the British advanced piquets; who, though they could then see nothing, heard their approach. On discovering them, they opened fire, and these volleys were heard by General Codrington, who, according to his usual practice, was near the Lancaster battery reconnoitring to the front with his relieved piquets, before the day broke. He at once got his brigade under arms, moved them to the edge of the ravine near the battery, and lost no time in conveying the alarm to head-quarters and to the left. Buller then moved out towards the threatened point, and the Fourth and Third Divisions were in readiness to march.

The enemy soon pressed back the outposts of the Second Division, and the camp being aroused, the troops formed on Home Ridge; while the 22 heavy Russian pieces establishing themselves on Shell Hill, opened on the ridge and on the ground in rear of it: by this means the Russians hoped to crush the British supports that were supposed to be in their ordinary place. But, as a matter of fact, we had none there, a single thin line held the crest, and the fire beyond it succeeded only in destroying the camp and the horses left behind. While this was going on, the twelve field guns of the division were neither silent nor inefficient, and General Pennefather (in command, Sir De Lacy Evans being at Balaklava, on the sick list^[269]) now pushed forward bodies of 200 to 500 men to 211reinforce the piquets, who were slowly retiring before the advance of the masses opposed to them. One of these detachments, 500 strong, under General Adams, moved to the right, towards the Sandbag battery; and another, hurrying to the left, soon came in contact with a huge hostile column which bore down on them in the mist. The Officer in command had just time to sing out, “Fire and charge!” and the men obeying with loud cheers, the enemy was driven back, right through the line of his guns on Shell Hill, before the impetuous onset could be arrested. The result of this hand-to-hand encounter between a thin line of red-coats and a strong column of the Russians, was often repeated during the day. The battle, in short, resolved itself into a series of personal combats between small British detachments and dense masses of the enemy; the former, under the nearest Officers, dashing boldly, without supports, against the latter wherever opportunity offered or danger pressed. There was no central control, nor were manœuvres attempted; both were impossible. But the activity, intelligence, and courage of the few—to be counted by hundreds against thousands—never flagged for an instant, and the unwieldy forces opposed to us, though so much more powerful in point of numbers, were shattered and driven back in confusion.

Soimonoff, leaving 10,000 men in rear of his guns on Shell Hill, made his first real assault with 9000 infantry, who, to avoid our artillery fire, moved along the eastern slope of the Careenage Ravine. Part of Pavloff’s corps, 6000 men, had by this time arrived on the scene, and they got into the Quarry Ravine, and, bearing across Inkerman Tusk, made for the Sandbag battery. Thus the narrow flat of the main spur, connecting Home Ridge with Shell Hill, was swept with fire from the enemy’s guns, and on one side of it (our left) were 9000 Russians advancing, while 6000 more were threatening our right front at the head of the Quarry Ravine and on the spurs in the vicinity overlooking the Tchernaya. General 212Buller reached the field at this juncture, with 600 men and a battery from the Fourth Division. To meet the onslaught of 15,000 men suitably supported by artillery, against both our flanks, Pennefather, therefore, had just 3600 men and 18 guns. Soimonoff’s advanced troops on our left met with a transient gleam of success; they captured three guns, which were hurrying into action, and they managed to push into the Wellway. Had they been able to emerge on the plateau near Home Ridge, they would have taken the British position in reverse.^[271] But this column was quickly discomfited by a gallant charge of a few men of the 77th Regiment, and by a piquet of the Grenadier Guards under Lieut.-Colonel Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, posted close by. Nor did the remainder of Soimonoff’s corps hold their ground, for they also gave way when met by the steady line of British infantry, and the whole attack upon our left was soon repulsed; indeed, one of our groups, having driven in immensely superior forces, pursued them, and halted not until Shell Hill was reached. The three English guns taken by the enemy were speedily recaptured, and were found to be uninjured; the Russian General, Soimonoff, moreover, was killed at this period. Nor did Pavloff’s 6000 men fare any better, though they were confronted by only 700 to 800 Englishmen. At the head of the Quarry Ravine, the leading hostile battalions were charged by 200 men of the 30th Regiment, and were routed; while the rest, attacked by General Adams and the 41st Regiment near the Sandbag battery, were also driven back in confusion.

It was now nearly 7.30 in the morning, and everywhere the struggle had resulted in our favour. But the battle was only in its infancy. Soimonoff’s reserve, 10,000 strong, was intact, and the remainder of Pauloff’s corps, 10,000 men, had arrived, together with his long train of artillery, which, placed on commanding ground, prolonged the line of guns from Shell Hill to the end of East Jut. Dannenberg now assumed command of these 20,000 infantry, and of the columns whose first attack had failed. He determined to employ his masses against our right, and so co-operate more closely with Gortchakoff, who, as we have seen, was manœuvring in the valley, with orders to seize the Sapuné Ridge. This latter corps had very early assumed a threatening attitude 213as far north as the heights for which the Guards Brigade were responsible, and this fact somewhat delayed their advance to the front;^[272] but it was soon perceived that the enemy in this quarter was making a mere empty demonstration, that the real crisis was round Home Ridge, and that the piquets were sufficient in the present emergency to guard the hills overlooking the Tchernaya. The Grenadier and Scots Fusilier Guards, encamped closer to the scene of action, were therefore moved forward to take their share in it, followed soon after by the Coldstream (four companies strong, under Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, as we have seen), and the whole came into action about 7.30, when the introductory phase of the fight was over, and just as the new attack was developing itself. Shortly after the departure of the Regiment, the two relieved Coldstream piquets (Nos. 4 and 5 companies), having been kept out somewhat longer than usual, on account of Gortchakoff’s movements, came into camp, and, finding it empty, advanced to the front, as did also Colonel Upton. The strength of the Brigade was as follows:—

Dannenberg’s advance was directed against the Sandbag battery, 214a work, although quite unfit for defence, and worthless when gained, yet served as a rallying-point, which the enemy endeavoured to capture, and which we determined to defend. Round it and near it, therefore, there surged the bloody and lengthened contest in which the Brigade was about to take a leading and conspicuous part. The attack was of a far more fierce and formidable nature than those which preceded it, and which were almost as child’s play compared with what followed. Instead of yielding to an impulse to fly when the heads of their columns recoiled before our impetuous charges, as had invariably been the case in the early morning, the Russians, still assailed by the same dauntless and romantic British courage, now fought with greater determination; they worked round our flanks and rear, and refused to be carried back by the retreating bodies which our men repulsed. The advance, in short, was better regulated, better fed, and better covered by artillery.

Adams was still holding the Sandbag battery, and had received reinforcements after his first success; our troops were also at the head of the Quarry Ravine, where a short wall of loose stones, called “the Barrier,” blocked the post-road. Little breathing-time was allowed them after the repulse they had just inflicted on the enemy, and a desperate struggle recommenced at these points. The small British detachments, overpowered by numbers and threatened in flank, were forced back; they retired fighting, and in good order, losing many men, among them General Adams. Three guns, under Captain Hamley (the late Sir Edward Hamley, whose book has been so frequently referred to), effectually checked any desire the Russians might have indulged in to harass our retreat. At this juncture the Guards Brigade arrived on Home Ridge; and it will be useful to take a rapid glance at the position as it was at that moment.

On the left, General Codrington was chained to the slopes near the Lancaster battery, and could not move therefrom without endangering the whole line. He received, though unwillingly, slight reinforcements, and his force then amounted to 1400. Later, additional troops reached him from the Third Division, and some artillery, but the latter were overpowered by heavier fire, and the one gun in the Lancaster battery could not be used till near the conclusion of the battle. During the day he held the ridge, maintained a heavy fire upon the enemy in Careenage 215Ravine, and stood ready to oppose any hostile advance that might have been contemplated up its course. His casualties amounted to about 180 men. Next, in and near the Wellway and in front of it, were the various groups who had repulsed Soimonoff’s first attack, including the company of Grenadier Guards previously mentioned; in all, about 1000 men—that is, allowing for losses, less than a third of the whole force that held Inkerman during the preliminary stage of the battle. It was not known that the enemy meant to concentrate all his efforts on our right, and to leave the other flank practically unmolested, so these men were also chained to the places where they stood, expecting fresh adventure, and, if any of them had to be moved to meet an emergency elsewhere, others replaced them in the position they held. Of the rest, a proportion were men exhausted or unrallied after their previous exertions, and it is calculated that some 1400 men only remained to defend Home Ridge and the Kitspur, 700 on each. As we have seen, those holding the latter were slowly retiring. Of reinforcements arriving, the Guards, 1300, had just reached the ridge, as well as 12 guns of the First and 6 of the Light Divisions. The Fourth Division, 2000, under Sir G. Cathcart, was approaching, so that some 4700 men and 36 guns might be reckoned upon for immediate purposes, while 1600 French and other of Canrobert’s troops were moving forward. On the other hand, the enemy was still very strong, though he had lost part of the 15,000 troops that first attacked, some of whom, indeed, were streaming away from the field panic-stricken, down the Careenage Ravine into Sevastopol, and over the Tchernaya bridge. But he had his powerful and numerous artillery securely posted on West Jut, Shell Hill, and East Jut, and, besides the greater portion of the 15,000 men, there were 20,000 fresh troops. Of these latter, 10,000 were in reserve, and the other 10,000 in the Quarry Ravine, in the neighbouring glens, on the post-road, and in the Sandbag battery which they had just captured.^[274]

216The enemy had secured a footing on the plateau of the Inkerman main spur, and the Guards Brigade, coming up at that instant, were launched against him, the Grenadiers in front, then the Scots Fusiliers, the Coldstream following a short distance in rear. The leading Battalion charged, and drove the Russians back to the crest; the next formed on its left, and Dawson prolonged the line to the right.

Many of the rifles at first missed fire, for the incessant rain had saturated everything; but by snapping off caps to dry the channel and by other means the arms were got to work.^[276] The failure to use their weapons at this crisis caused great confusion, as may well be imagined, for there was a dense mass of Muscovite grey coats and flat caps in front, advancing against the Brigade.

N^o 7.

INKERMAN
about 8 A.M.

This map has been drawn from Kinglake’s “Crimea” by kind permission.
The position of the troops has been slightly altered to suit the hour.

A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

This account of the fierce struggle between the Brigade and overwhelming masses of the Russians, written in the private diary of an Officer of the Regiment, gives a few of the confused events that took place immediately near him. Colonel Tower belonged to No. 1 company, and as Colonel Wilson was with No. 8 company, a few words describing what occurred about him may be also reproduced.

It is unnecessary to proceed further with this account, for 221the writer now gives his experiences, when his excited men, having forced a superior number of Russians into hurried flight down the hillside into the valley, rushed after them in pursuit, in spite of their Officer’s efforts to call them back. It is sufficient to say that any description of the struggle between the Guards and the masses which Dannenberg brought against them is impossible. The combatants were in close proximity, the contest was fought out in a thick fog, and on broken ground covered with tough hornbeam bushes and oak scrub, so that our men were speedily dispersed into groups, and few could really say what their neighbours were doing.^[280]

But the main features of the contest are fairly clear. The Russians, securely posted in the Quarry Ravine, St. Clement’s Gorge, and on the eastern slopes of the Kitspur, made their main attack against the latter, and as their assaulting columns were 222driven from the crest, they rallied again in the hollows beneath, and kept surging upwards, and renewing the strife. For some time the Brigade drove back the successive waves of the advancing enemy unassisted, except by the broken fragments of Adams' men; but a little later, when Cathcart’s division approached, some 500 of his troops were pushed forward, and joined in the fray, while another portion moved to the head of the Quarry Ravine, and regained the Barrier. The latter, reinforced from time to time, remained there during the rest of the battle, and though the enemy passed them by, now as he advanced and again as he retired, it seems he never closed in on their rear or reconquered the post. Colonel Upton, reaching the ground some time about 8 a.m., with No. 5 company and a company of the Scots Fusilier Guards, also coming off piquet,^[281] endeavoured to close an undefended gap which existed between the Sandbag battery and the Barrier, and he prevented the enemy from seizing its advantages at that moment. But his force was insufficient to hold it for more than a brief space, and his men were most of them drawn into the vortex of the principal fight. Hence, it was not difficult for the Russians, pressing through the gap, to work round the left flank of the Brigade, and to penetrate to their rear. Most of the Fourth Division, having been split up into fractions, were sent wherever the pressure of the battle required their presence; but a residue of 400 men under General Torrens remained, and with this force Cathcart hoped to relieve the Brigade in their arduous struggle, and assail the enemy in flank by descending the slopes on our right. The attempt, though successful at first, was not fortunate, and it failed to accomplish the results that were expected from it. The men soon dispersed in groups, were almost surrounded, and had to fight their way upwards with the Russians above them. It was here, moreover, that the valuable life of Cathcart was lost, and that Torrens (some time in the Grenadier Guards) was severely wounded.

This manœuvre appears to have changed the principle on which the Brigade had been resisting the hostile columns, and many who hitherto never pursued the beaten bodies of the enemy beyond the crest, now rushed after them down the slopes into the hollows beneath. In this way the group near Captain Wilson got out of hand, and pursued far down into the valley of the Tchernaya, where they 223were met by shots from Gortchakoff’s riflemen, “who sprang up among the bushes, and blazed full in our faces.” Meeting some stray groups of Cathcart’s submerged detachment, the whole party reascended the heights, and lost heavily as they climbed up. Here they found themselves between two fires, and ascertained that the enemy was really above them, for at first they thought they were mistaken for Russians, and were being shot at by English soldiers. Avoiding this danger, by taking an upwards direction to the left, they stumbled upon a dead ammunition mule, and eagerly replenished their pouches, as for some time they had not had a round among them. Having at last reached the top, they found that the fog had lifted, that the Brigade was not where they had left it, and that Zouaves and Algerines (the Indigènes) were approaching the ground, and were driving the enemy back, as Colonel Tower has already told us. Wilson and the last of his men joined this attack, and many fell; he finally attached himself to the French 50th of the Line as they advanced, and then finding he could do nothing more, he sought the Coldstream, eventually falling in with them near Home Ridge, which he reached before the shattered remains of the Battalion got there.

From the moment our men began to descend the slopes their means of maintaining their post on the Kitspur seemed to diminish. Under any circumstances, the struggle of the few against the many was gradually exhausting the power of the former, and reinforcements were urgently required. It was fortunate, therefore, that our allies now appeared upon the scene. Bosquet, who for some time in the early morning had been observing Gortchakoff, came speedily to the conclusion that that General meant to remain quiescent; he therefore sent forward some of his troops without delay, to Home Ridge, where the danger was most pressing. Two Battalions, 1600 strong, arrived first; and one, the French 6th of the Line, pushing towards the Kitspur, struck in flank the Russians, who, advancing through the gap, which was ever getting wider, were endeavouring to operate against our rear. This French battalion, however, soon got into difficulties, and the other, the 7me Léger, was sent to its support. But before this was effected another crisis occurred; for, the enemy, urging forward his numerous forces up the ravines which he occupied, brushed past the Anglo-French then on the Kitspur, and made a very determined onslaught on Home Ridge itself. This serious manœuvre 224was repulsed by the gallantry of a few British detachments present on the spot, and of the 7me Léger; the defeated column was driven back, so that the two French battalions were brought together. It was now 10 a.m., and another French force, a brigade with some artillery, led by Bosquet in person, reached the battle in two columns: in the first, some rifles, a battalion of Algerines, and one of Zouaves (1900); in the other, more Zouaves, and the French 50th of the Line (2200). There was still a good deal of difficulty in forcing the enemy to recede; for as the first column pursued him, they advanced too far, and fresh hostile forces were able to move up the ravines leading to the main spur, thereby threatening our allies in rear. But on the arrival of the second column, the Russians, now thoroughly broken by their losses and by the stubborn resistance which held them in check, gave up the contest. They were finally driven off the Kitspur and out of the ravines which had been so useful to them during the struggle, by enabling them to re-organize after so many repulses inflicted by our slender forces. Kinglake thus speaks of a band of the Coldstream during this phase of the fight:—

Meanwhile we had already gained an immense superiority over the enemy’s artillery. As early as about 9.30, two 18-pounder guns of position had been brought on Home Ridge, and after a short space of time the power of the hostile batteries began to wane. The French guns, coming up, posted themselves on our right, and the bombardment continued with increasing advantage on our side, though the number of our pieces was not half that of our opponents. Some of our men on the left and centre of our line also advanced, and added to the misfortune of the gunners on Shell Hill. The battle was really decided at eleven, though the artillery continued to fire till much later. As soon as the bulk of the Household 225Brigade returned to Home Ridge, and after ammunition had been served out, the men were reformed, and were moved up to protect the guns against any sudden assault. This duty was “worse than fighting the infantry, for we got no revenge for the men we lost,” and we incurred casualties not a few.^[283]

The retreat of the Russians commenced about one o’clock, and was covered by a column of their reserve; which, attempting to advance, was quickly dispersed by a few rounds of the 18-pounders. There was no pursuit. The enemy slipped away, and “seemed to melt from the lost field; the English were too few and too exhausted, and the French too little confident in the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.” Our allies, deducting losses, numbered at the end of the engagement some 7000 infantry, for, besides the troops already mentioned, three battalions (2400) arrived on the ground at eleven; they also had 700 cavalry and 24 guns present. Lord Raglan was anxious to complete the victory by falling on the rear of the flying Russians, but his cautious colleague would not consent; for he still feared an attack from Gortchakoff’s untouched forces, and was unwilling to expose his men to the fire of the ships that were moored in the roadstead.^[284]

While the battle was going on, the garrison of Sevastopol kept up so poor a demonstration, that we were able to denude our camps of men, and push them to Inkerman. Besides the men on duty in the trenches, the greater part of the Third Division watched the 226fortress, and they were subjected to no further inconvenience than that which the fire from the place, intensified on this day, entailed. About 9.30, however, the enemy made a sortie against Forey’s siege corps, under General Timofeyeff, with 5000 men and 12 guns. The blow, though it met with some success at first, failed, and the Russians were pursued by our gallant allies back under the shelter of the fortress. Thus little was done by the garrison to assist Dannenberg, and that little was of trifling value. Gortchakoff’s operations during the day were still less effective. He made a few feints, fired upon the Sapuné Ridge, and, it is said, did lose 15 men. He thereby gave the companies on piquet (among them, Nos. 6 and 7 companies of the Coldstream) the opportunity of engaging him with distant volleys, without apparently causing much, if any, loss to our side. In short, he did nothing, when by attacking Bosquet, he would have prevented that General from advancing to our assistance at Inkerman. His orders were “to support the general attack, to draw the Allied forces upon himself, and to try and seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné Ridge.” Mr. Kinglake, however, tells us that these written orders were explained away by “oral communications” into something different,^[285] and makes us believe that there is a mystery which has never been explained, hanging over the operations of this Russian Commander, who held so much power in his hands on that day. What we do know is that Dannenberg, in spite of his overwhelming numbers, was unable to secure a footing on the Kitspur, that this was due to the manner in which it was defended by our scanty forces, and that in this defence the Household Brigade played a glorious part, and suffered much in consequence.

The losses were very great on both sides: those of the enemy, who moved in heavy columns, being more than those of the Allies, though relatively, in proportion to numbers at the seat of war, he suffered less than we did. The Russians had 10,729 killed, wounded, and prisoners, including 256 Officers. The English 2357 of all ranks, of whom 130 were Officers (or 39 Officers, and 558 men killed, and 91 Officers and 1669 men wounded). The French 929, among them 49 Officers (or 13 Officers and 130 men killed, and 36 Officers and 750 men wounded).^[286] The Brigade lost nearly half its effective strength, viz., out of a total of 1334:—

The Coldstream suffered in like proportion, but the casualties among the Officers far exceeded those that occurred in the other Regiments. In fact, almost all the Officers were swept away. Out of seventeen present, four only escaped uninjured, viz. Captains Strong, Wilson, Crawley, and Tower. Of the rest, eight were killed or died soon after of their wounds, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Dawson, and Cowell, Captains MacKinnon, Bouverie, Eliot, and Ramsden, and Lieutenants Greville, and Disbrowe. The remainder were wounded; viz. Colonel Upton (slightly), Lieut.-Colonels Halkett, and Lord C. FitzRoy, Captain P. Feilding, and Lieutenant Amherst (all severely). The losses of the Battalion amounted to—

The principal casualties were in the flank companies. No. 1 entered the action with 50 to 60 men, and No. 8 was slightly stronger. The former lost one sergeant and 43 rank and file, and the latter two sergeants and 41 men. No. 2 came next, losing 37 men. Where a Battalion has so freely shed its life-blood in the stubborn defence of the position assigned to it, it may seem strange that no official notice should be taken of the death of the Officer who led it into action, and who directed its movements until he fell, and more especially when in the Brigade to which the Battalion belonged, no other Commanding Officer lost his life. Yet this is what occurred with respect to the memory of the gallant Colonel Dawson, and the feelings of his brothers in arms were not inadequately expressed in the following lines, written by Colonel Wilson:—

We are told that this great victory caused no outward elation among our troops. A reaction succeeded the excitement of the struggle; the danger now past began to be realized for the first time; and the men, though hardened to the miserable scenes which war creates, were almost awed by the terrible carnage and devastation that met their eyes on the hard-fought field. The Second Division camp was laid flat, the tents uprooted and scattered, canvas saturated with blood carpeted the ground. Our own camp swarmed with the wounded and the dying, and the sight sent a chill of depression through the few survivors as they returned to their bivouacs. Everywhere on the narrow space of the battleground the victims lay thick, some killed, others groaning in agony, and nowhere thicker than in and around the Sandbag battery, where the contest raged the fiercest. Here the dead were literally piled up on one another as they fell.

Saddest of all, was the cruel thought surging in every mind that many of our brave wounded had been basely bayoneted as 229they lay helpless on the ground, by an uncivilized enemy, who, unable to drive off the few that held the plateau against him, wreaked his vengeance on the defenceless, as soon as they fell into his hands. We had ample evidence of this savagery—established, moreover, by a special inquiry—that cast so black a stain on the Russian army, for, when our men hurled the foe from a corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to death.

Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and where we had absolutely no defences.^[290] The result proved the immense superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery, by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might have given 230him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.

N.R. Wilkinson del.    PRIVATE 1742.    Mintern Bros. Chromo.

Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman—Sevastopol not to be taken in 1854—Tardy arrangements to enable the army to remain in the Crimea during the winter—Violent hurricane of the 14th of November; stores scattered and destroyed—The winter begins in earnest—How the Government at home attended to the wants of army at the seat of war—Absence of a road between the base at Balaklava and the front—Miserable plight to which the army was reduced—Indignation in England, and the measures taken to relieve the troops—Admirable manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British soldiers—Operations on both sides during the winter—The Turks occupy Eupatoria; successful action fought there—The Guards Brigade sent to Balaklava.

The battle of Inkerman exhausted the energies of the combatants, and for a few days they recoiled from each other, stunned by its effects. The Allies had gained a Pyrrhic victory; another such victory, and their forces must be annihilated. The enemy also had received a crushing defeat, which shattered his military prestige and ruined the morale of his army. Neither side was in a condition to operate against the other, and each faced his opponent listlessly, almost helplessly. But Menshikoff, though disgraced in the field, deserved the gratitude of his Imperial Master, and had every reason to be content with what he had achieved; for, he had gained an advantage of supreme importance. He had put it out of the power of the Anglo-French invaders to finish the war during the year 1854, and thus, while chaining them fast to the bleak and narrow upland of the Chersonese, he had the satisfaction of knowing that they would be exposed to the rigours of the approaching winter. This result was all the more disastrous to us, since, not having foreseen it, we were in no position to meet it, and were unprovided with the means of maintaining our troops in the inhospitable region to which we had become committed. In short, the Allies were about to be handed over to foes far more destructive 232and terrible than those they had hitherto met. Instead of contending against Russian weapons, they were now also to struggle with the forces of nature and the fury of the elements. On the 6th of November it was finally determined to put off the bombardment, and to winter in the Crimea. The Commissariat Department, informed of this decision, was then, and then only, ordered to make such preparations as would enable the army to remain on the upland. But the tardy order came too late, for in less than ten days the winter began in earnest, and nothing could then be got ready to save the troops from the cruel trials that awaited them.

On the day after the battle, the Allies were engaged in burying the dead, in removing the Russian wounded who still lay on the ground, and in clearing the field of the traces of the struggle. An invitation addressed to General Menshikoff to agree to a truce, and to send out his men to bury their own dead, was refused, for that prudent commander was naturally disinclined to give his troops so sombre and depressing an object-lesson of their utter inefficiency in the field. His army, however, met this invitation in another fashion, and, whether in error or by design, they answered it by firing upon our burying parties. As another attack was feared, the front was cleared of incumbrances as soon as possible, and the wounded were promptly taken to Balaklava. Their sufferings were considerable; there was a scarcity of hospital comforts and appliances at the seat of war, and the ambulances in use were unfitted for the purpose of conveying injured men.

Much affected by the heavy losses sustained by his “First Brigade,” the Duke of Cambridge came early into the Guards camp, where the few men present turned out to cheer him.

The funeral of the numerous Coldstream Officers formed a most sad procession. Seven—Dawson, Cowell, MacKinnon, Eliot, Ramsden, Disbrowe, and Greville—were laid to rest in one grave, in a small rocky ravine near the Windmill. Bouverie’s body was 233only recovered late on the 6th, and he was buried by the side of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter-Blair of the Scots Fusilier Guards, who survived the action twenty-four hours.

Colonel Upton, though badly hurt, was able to remain at his post till the middle of November, and he assumed the command of the Brigade, vice General Bentinck, wounded, and of the First Division from the 7th, when the Duke of Cambridge was sent to Balaklava, on the sick list. The command of the Battalion thus devolved upon Colonel Lord F. Paulet. The Coldstream was, in truth, a mere skeleton of the fine body which embarked at Portsmouth in the spring of 1854. It only mustered now 11 Officers and 307 men, while no draft,—except a small one of 58 men, which, having left London on the 26th of October, reached the Crimea on the 22nd of November,—was on the road to compensate for this serious deficiency of strength in the field. When news of the battle arrived in England, strenuous efforts were made to fill up the attenuated ranks of the army, by sending out fresh battalions and reinforcements to those already at the seat of hostilities. But the campaign, ever since July, when we were first encamped near the pestilential lake of Devna, had sadly drained our resources—far more rapidly, indeed, than the home authorities had anticipated,—and though recruiting had been actively going on, the large demands which this war created could not be satisfied. In this way, the next draft sent to the Coldstream only amounted to 153 men, and could do little to restore our depleted ranks to an efficient state. This draft started on the 24th of November, and arrived in the Crimea on the 18th of December.^[294] In France, 234however, there was not such a dearth of fighting men as seems to have been the case in England, and considerable reinforcements were despatched to the east, so that somewhat later (in February) our allies were able to extend the siege-works that surrounded the south side of Sevastopol.

We have seen that the omission to strengthen the unguarded flank at Inkerman by earthworks had led to serious consequences. The critical nature of the battle made this so clear, that, when the fight was over, though we had fewer men to spare than were available before, this vital position was at once placed in a state of defence. English, French, and even Turks—held hitherto to be an incumbrance—were set to perform this duty, and Fore Ridge and Shell Hill were soon crowned with works, commanding the approaches to the scene of the recent struggle, and securing it at last, as far as possible, from further molestation.^[295]

The ordinary routine of siege life had hardly recommenced after the rude shock which interrupted it on the 5th, when the winter burst upon the Crimean peninsula with a suddenness and violence that marked a distinct feature in the story of the war, and brought innumerable troubles upon the Allies engaged in it. The weather lately had been cold and stormy, varied upon occasions by short gleams of sunshine and partial warmth. At daybreak on the 14th, however, a violent hurricane, accompanied by a deluge of rain, unexpectedly arose, and swept with terrific force over the country, and not only blew away every tent standing on the upland, scattered the stores upon which the army depended, and stopped all communications, but also dashed to pieces or disabled much of the shipping laden with supplies that were then very urgently needed.^[296] The ground was speedily converted into a deep and impassable sea of sticky mud, which flew about in large quantities; the temperature fell, and snow 235came down. The men of the various regiments huddled together like sheep, behind bushes or rocks, or wherever they could find some protection against the violence of the elements. The condition of the houseless troops was miserable in the extreme, both during the day and long afterwards, for they had nothing wherewith to repair their losses; but it was worse with the sick and wounded, who were exposed to the full force of the cyclone, and to the cold and the rain. A considerable amount of shipping had been left outside the harbour of Balaklava, instead of being safely berthed inside the landlocked bay. Of the vessels anchored in this dangerous position, many went to pieces on the rocks forming the iron-bound coast; altogether twenty-one were sunk, and their valuable cargoes were all lost. H.M.S. Retribution, with the Duke of Cambridge on board, narrowly escaped destruction. On that fatal first day of a severe Crimean winter, the troops were deprived of vast quantities of ammunition, food, clothing, and forage, and there was no reserve at hand from whence they could be replaced.

The difficulties and sufferings that now overwhelmed the army began with this storm, but they are clearly to be traced to the aimless manner in which the campaign had been conducted. The original intention had been to surprise Sevastopol, but it soon disappeared out of sight, and no step was taken to capture the town in accordance with the conditions under which the expedition landed on Russian soil. On the contrary, a regular siege was gradually commenced, and a completely new plan was thereby adopted. But the change was never recognized, its bearing upon the fortunes of the war was not appreciated, and no stores were accumulated at the base of operations to meet the requirements of the lengthy proceedings into which the invaders had drifted. This was the more unfortunate, since, when the allied Commanders undertook the flank march, and shifted their ground from the north to the south side of Sevastopol, they found themselves obliged to operate upon a barren upland which afforded no supplies, and very soon they even lost the advantage of drawing forage from the valley of the Tchernaya. Thus, after the 25th of October, if not before, nothing whatsoever was to be obtained from the land in which the army was established, and every single article had to be transported by sea from a distance. The battle of Inkerman at last revealed the true position in which we 236stood; but it was then too late, and when the storm destroyed the vessels lying outside the harbour, which contained considerable addition to our scanty stores, it must be acknowledged that this position was indeed deplorable.

Nor should it be forgotten that requisitions put forward were imperfectly attended to by the authorities in England, and that there was often confusion at the base (Scutari and Balaklava), which appears to have been incompletely organized. Owing to these circumstances, many misfortunes overtook the British army, some of which may be cited. Though a request was made early in September for 2000 tons of hay, only 228 tons were received in the Crimea by the 1st of February, 1855.^[297] In November an application was forwarded for 3000 tents, and for a steam mill and bakery, but more than six months elapsed before they arrived at the seat of war.^[298] Again, we have seen that a substantial portion of the kits were left behind in the squad bags, at Scutari, at the end of May; also that, on landing at Old Fort, the packs were taken away from the men. The former seem to have been allowed to remain where they were stored. But an effort was made in the middle of October, just a month after they had been left on board ship, to recover the knapsacks, though apparently with very indifferent success; and the troops remained, exposed to the severe inclemency of the weather, without any change of clothing, in the worn-out and tattered garments that had uninterruptedly done duty day and night from the beginning of June, when they landed at Varna. Lastly, biscuit and salt pork formed the usual, indeed the never-varying ration served out to the British soldier. This diet was his only food, and it produced scurvy, as was only to be expected. To counteract this plague, limejuice and vegetables were thus urgently required, but neither was available. It is true that small quantities of vegetables were sometimes to be had, but then they were sold to the starving men at famine prices.^[299] A tardy requisition was made in October for limejuice, and half the quantity demanded (20,000 lbs.) reached Balaklava on the 19th of December; but there it remained almost unnoticed, and 237this antidote against the scourge of scurvy was only unearthed on the 29th of January following; nor was it apparently ordered to be issued to the troops as a ration, until the middle of February.^[300]

Arising directly out of the incomprehensible manner in which this extraordinary war was conceived and carried on, another circumstance, more powerful for evil than the apathy with which the necessities of the army were regarded by the Government, caused famine and distress to oppress our troops. We had no road between Balaklava and the front; and hence, when supplies reached the former place, we were without means of conveying them to the spot where they were to be consumed. And yet the distance to be traversed was under eight miles. It has been shown that, of the two roads connecting the English before Sevastopol and the base, one, the Woronzoff road, was metalled; the other, over the Col, was but a mere pathway or cart-track: also that on the 25th of October, we lost the use of the former, and were restricted to the latter. During the autumn this pathway was serviceable; indeed, so firm and open was the country, that waggons and guns could easily move across it anywhere. But when the torrents of rain flooded the ground on the 14th of November, the whole aspect of the upland became altered, and the track as well as the plain were converted into a deep morass, over which communications were rendered almost impossible. The French, with proper forethought, constructed a good road between Kamiesh Bay and their camps, directly they occupied the Chersonese; but as all the British troops were required to push forward vigorously the siege-works, and as we indulged in the misplaced confidence that Sevastopol would fall immediately after the bombardment of 238the 17th of October, we never even thought of securing our communications, until after the 5th of November, when it was decided to winter in the Crimea. The rejected Turks, offered by Omar Pasha, might certainly have performed this important service while the weather was clear and dry, but the prejudice against them has already been mentioned, and their assistance was refused. After the battle of Inkerman we took measures to construct the road, and we acted as we did with respect to the defences near Home Ridge; tools were hastily procured from Constantinople, and Turks were at last employed. But it was then too late. The unfortunate men were unprovided with food and shelter, and the weather was severe; they died so rapidly that the living were all required to bury the dead, and in a short time this ill-fated contingent disappeared altogether.

The scarcity of forage and the want of a road acted and reacted on each other, and formed the principal causes of the winter troubles. The horses and mules died of starvation, and it was useless to replace them, as there was not wherewithal to feed them. The transport, miserably insufficient as it always had been, dwindled into nothing, and all but disappeared; troop horses of the cavalry were impressed into this service, but they too perished. Carriage traffic soon ceased, and an attempt was then made to convey supplies on the backs of the wretched beasts that survived. This expedient also failed; the quagmire of tenacious clay intervening between the port and the front, the famine, and the exposure to cold and wet, all operated together, and the animals could work no more. Thenceforward there was nothing for it but to make the men themselves wade through the deep mud, and fetch up such things from the base as they required, to keep body and soul together. The duty was no inconsiderable addition to their ordinary toil, for while they were decreasing fast in numbers, the labour in the trenches did not abate. The journey also sometimes took twelve hours to accomplish, and during the time it lasted they were without food, shelter, or rest.^[301] This miserable makeshift was, of course, entirely inadequate to supply the troops, and the more bulky or heavy articles, however necessary to the well-being of the army, could not be brought to camp at all. The serious error by which magazines had not been established in time at the seat of war, was repaired quickly by the great energy 239displayed at head-quarters, and in December considerable quantities of every kind of stores were available at Balaklava, but there most of them remained unused, because, as Government would not supply forage (and it seems it was not easily procured out of England), there was no transport, and as there was no road to span the morass, means did not exist of crossing it and of reaching the front.

The winter all through Europe was a peculiarly severe one, and there was no exception to its inclemency in the Crimea, where the season was specially cold. All the combatants suffered from its effects; even the Russians felt it acutely, though housed and provided with a tolerably fair transport service from their well-stored magazines on the Sea of Azof. Our French allies also underwent many privations, due to the general difficulties that affected the invaders established on the barren upland and exposed to the wind, the snow, and the rain; but more especially on account of the small tente d’abri which sheltered them at night, and which was not so useful as our bell tent. But the British army suffered most. Like the French, our men were sent to trenches filled with water, where they remained wet to their knees for many hours during the day and night; but, unlike them, these hardships were of constant recurrence. Reinforcements were rapidly sent to General Canrobert, and his force was strong enough to enable him to give his soldiers rest when their tour of service in the siege-works was finished. But the British had no such exemption; their numbers were insufficient for the purposes of the campaign; and they practically were always at work. Lord Raglan computed that they were “on duty five nights out of six, a large proportion of them constantly under fire.”^[302] If we add, that they were seldom dry; that they had little or no fuel except brushwood and roots; that they could not cook their food; that the coffee served out was in the form of the green unroasted berry;^[303] that the ration of rice failed from the 15th of November to the end of December; that the boots were defective and bad; and that there was no warm clothing available until 240the beginning of the latter month;—it will be readily seen that the hardships undergone were of no trivial character.^[304]

Nor did the men’s sufferings end here, for when exhausted by toil and privations there was no alleviation to those whose health and strength had given way. So badly organized were the hospital arrangements, that we are told the climax of misery was only reached in the places set apart for the sick. Circumstances necessarily made the field-hospitals in the front rude habitations for numerous patients seized and tormented by painful complaints.^[305] The transport of invalids to Balaklava was, moreover, a difficult proceeding and an agonizing ordeal; but arrived at the port, their troubles should surely have come to an end. It was not so, however, for such was the confusion prevalent at the time, so great the number of the sick, that they were subjected, if possible, to worse treatment during the voyage across the Black Sea and in the great hospital established at Scutari. In short, this hospital was a loathsome lazarette, “crammed with misery, overflowing with despair,” until Miss Nightingale and a number of Nuns and Sisters, having arrived on the scene early in November, acquired such influence and acted with such admirable prudence and energy, that gradually—the evil was too great to be arrested at once—order was restored, sanitary conditions were introduced, 241and the sick were well tended and cared for by the gentle and able nursing of kindly ladies.^[306]

The British forces before Sevastopol were rapidly melting away in consequence of the combination of misfortunes that overwhelmed them. Diseases of a violent type broke out, and cholera, typhus, diarrhœa, dysentery, scurvy swept away the ranks; frost-bites were common, and even men reported fit for duty, were so weakened as to be scarcely able to continue their labours under the hard circumstances that surrounded them. The drain was excessive upon our strength in the field, and the small army was in truth threatened with extinction. Between the 1st of November and the 28th of February we lost as many as 22,506 men, not including the killed in action; of whom 8898 had died in hospital, while the remainder, 13,608, were lying there sick on the latter date. In spite of fresh regiments and drafts which reached the Crimea after Inkerman, the total effectives all told at the seat of war, reckoning the troops at Balaklava, amounted then to only 17,311 men. In January there would have been about 3000 to 4000 men of the infantry available to repel another attack of the enemy, had he attempted to repeat the operation of the 5th of November.^[307] The British would have had a smaller force at the end of February.

The Coldstream shared to the full the calamity which has just been so imperfectly described. Taking part in the constant duty which exhausted the army, exposed to the cruel suffering that the winter brought about, and conspicuously displaying the virtues of strict discipline and of uncomplaining fortitude which enabled our men to preserve a bold and defiant front against the Russians, the lot of the Battalion can scarcely be separated from that which afflicted and honoured its brethren in arms standing before Sevastopol. Its fate was the same as theirs, its sorrows were equally acute, its bearing likewise was proud and dauntless, its glory bright and lasting. But its losses were heavy, as the following table will show:— 242

On the 1st of November the effective strength of all ranks in the field was 600 Officers and men; 1st of December, 451; 1st of January, 353; 1st of February, 173; and at the end of February there were fewer than 100.^[308]

But there was an end at last to these mournful circumstances that oppressed our forces fighting in the Crimea; and with the first peep of spring a new era of hope dawned upon the army. The news of the winter troubles roused a strong feeling in England, and the nation was stirred to its depths with sympathy for its brave and suffering soldiers, of whom no country had more reason to be proud, and with resentment against the supposed delinquents who were accused of bringing about the disaster. Greater activity and energy were displayed at home, and a railway was begun to connect Balaklava with the front, so that by the end of March it reached the Col on the edge of the upland, at a time when the road, constructed by ourselves and the French, was made to the same place. A Land transport service was also at length organized. Subscriptions were collected, and clothing, food, stores, and even luxuries poured into the Crimea, and into the hospitals established at and near Scutari. The Government was overturned, and a Commission of inquiry was instituted, both in England and at the seat of hostilities, to report upon every circumstance connected with the war. The result of these investigations, as well as the conclusions arrived at by another that sat later (in 1856), need not be alluded to in this 243volume. But one point cannot be omitted which deals with the conduct of the troops, who, in the dark hour of trial, did honour to their Queen, to their country, and to their noble profession.

The Russians, on the other hand, except for the great labour and care expended on the fortress, remained almost quiescent during the winter months. Restricting their energies to the defences of Sevastopol and to the annoyance of the besiegers, they made the fortress exceedingly strong, and pushed advanced works in front of the line they had already occupied. The greater portion of their field army was brought into the town to reinforce the garrison, the remainder being quartered in the neighbouring villages, or in the Tchernaya Valley. But no offensive operations were undertaken, notwithstanding their immensely superior numbers; and this was the more fortunate, since in the midwinter our forces were so weakened that the English trenches were guarded by only 350 men. This extraordinary inactivity on the part of the enemy has excited astonishment, and it may well be asked—

On the part of the Allies, the approaches to the fortress were pushed forward with considerable activity, both by ourselves and by the French, but there was little actual fighting except what was brought about by the siege operations. In the beginning of February, the French, who, thanks to the liberal supply of men sent to the seat of war, were growing in numbers, undertook to extend the siege-works on our right;^[311] thus continuing the line of trenches towards the roadstead of Sevastopol. Bosquet’s Corps was employed for this purpose. Another element of strength was brought into the field during the winter, to which brief allusion must be made. It was at last determined that Omar Pasha’s army should be removed to the Crimea from Bulgaria, where it was unable to influence the course of hostilities; the concentration was effected at Eupatoria, and, on the 17th of February, before the movement was complete, the Turkish force there amounted to 23,000 men. The Russians, having reinforced the troops they had in this part of the peninsula to 20,000 men, attacked the 245place on that date, and were repulsed with a loss of some 800 men. This success seems to have been decisive, in so far that the Allies now held firmly a point within striking distance of the enemy’s communications through the isthmus of Perekop; but its value was considerably lessened by the following fact. In the autumn of 1854, General Menshikoff was dependent upon this line to draw reinforcements from Bessarabia, and, as he found it open, he advanced freely along it, and reached Sevastopol before the 5th of November, as has been already related. This advantage gained, the road through Perekop became of comparatively minor importance, and the enemy thenceforward relied upon the line from the Sea of Azof. His communications in this quarter could, of course, only be threatened by a force based somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kertch; but that place was avoided, and Eupatoria was selected. Hence the achievement of the 17th of February, while it might have been followed by satisfactory results had it taken place early in October, was, to a certain extent, a barren victory, and served only to show that our Turkish auxiliaries were capable of performing some service in the war.^[312]

The Guards Brigade, having suffered so severely at Inkerman, and being the only infantry force in the front composing the First Division (the Highlanders occupied Balaklava since the 25th of October), it was necessary to reinforce that division by adding thereto the 97th Regiment (November 23rd). This regiment was armed with the old smooth-bore musket, but as sickness diminished the ranks, the Minié rifles of non-effective Guardsmen were handed over to the survivors of the 97th and of other corps similarly situated. On the 22nd of November the position of the camps of the Grenadiers and Scots Fusiliers were moved to the spot where the Coldstream was established. Two days later, a new disposition of the piquets was ordered; of the eight furnished by the division, six were found by the Brigade and two by the 97th. The strength of these piquets, 50 men each, allowed a double sentry every fifty paces of the entire front; three piquets were placed in reserve, and all were “to be encouraged in making fires, as it is desirable that our full strength should be estimated.”^[313] 246On the 25th of December the piquets were reduced to 30 rank and file each.

During Colonel Upton’s absence at Balaklava on sick-leave, Colonel Lockyer commanded the Division until the 15th of January, when the former returned to the front; the senior Guards Officer present commanded the Brigade during this interval. Colonel Lord Frederick Paulet was also away on the sick-list until the 16th of January, and the Battalion during this time was under Lieut.-Colonel Newton; Captain Armytage was appointed acting Adjutant, vacant by the death of Captain Eliot. On the 17th of January the Brigade lost the services of their Paymaster, Captain South (late 20th Regiment), who, having been present with them ever since they left England, was obliged to leave the Crimea through ill-health. His duties were undertaken by a committee, composed of Colonel Hamilton (Grenadiers), president, and Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson (Scots Fusilier Guards), and Captain Sir J. Dunlop (Coldstream), members.

On the 26th of November the Household Brigade furnished a detachment of 200 men, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, to the neighbourhood of the monastery of St. George, on the coast west of Balaklava, for the purpose of making gabions, which were required for the siege-works. Of these, the Coldstream provided 70 men with Officers, and Non-commissioned officers in proportion. The detachment was relieved by a similar party on the 21st of December, and again on the 20th of January by 150 men, each Battalion finding a Subaltern Officer and 50 men, with the usual number of Non-commissioned officers.

Major-General Lord Rokeby arrived in the Crimea on the 2nd of February, and assumed the command of the First Division and of the Brigade, when Colonel Upton reverted to the Battalion. But not for long, for, owing to the promotion of the Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment (Colonel Hon. A. Upton), he was gazetted to that command (February 20th), and left soon after to take up his duties in London.^[314] By this change Lord Frederick Paulet

247became Major of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Gordon Drummond obtained the command of the 1st; at the same time Lieut.-Colonels Daniell and Perceval were posted to the latter, and Newton to the former (Acting Majors, mounted).^[315]

When the sick of the Battalion left the front for Scutari, no information regarding them was obtained by the Regimental authorities, and to correct this serious inconvenience, a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel from each Battalion of the Brigade was sent to inspect the hospitals where Guardsmen were treated, and to arrange a more proper system for future adoption (February 16th). Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton, who represented the Coldstream, reported that the admission of men into hospital, as well as the patients' death or discharge, were imperfectly registered:

Colonel Carleton remained absent six weeks, and during this time he established a system of fortnightly returns, which thenceforward were regularly despatched to the Crimea, and he placed a sergeant of the Coldstream on the staff of the hospital at Scutari to carry it out.

It has already been mentioned that the winter troubles added to the losses incurred at Inkerman, and, in the absence of sufficient reinforcements from home, had destroyed the efficiency of the Brigade at the seat of war. At the end of January the three Battalions could hardly muster a tenth of their proper strength, and numbered only some 312 men able to do duty.^[317] Lord Rokeby seems to have been so struck with their exhausted appearance, that he endeavoured to obtain for them an exemption from trench duty for a time; but as the Order book shows them to be still continually at work, it is evident that it was not possible to comply with the proposal. Towards the end of February, however, it was found 248absolutely necessary to make a complete change, and to move them to Balaklava, there to rest and to recruit their strength after the very arduous labours in which for so long they had been engaged. Accordingly, on the 22nd, the Grenadiers marched there, followed by the Coldstream on the 24th, and by the Scotch Fusilier Guards about the same time. In the Regiment there were less than 100 men of all ranks on parade. For some time previously it had become manifest that, if the men continued to live under existing conditions, it was but a question of time how long the Battalion could survive except on paper. Of the sick left behind, 41 followed on the 27th, and 75 were conveyed next day by French mule transport (the usual conveyance lent us by our allies, and indeed the only transport procurable, since our own arrangements had broken down), but the last detachment was not removed to Balaklava until the 28th of March.^[318] The Guards remained at the base till June, 1855, and though absent more than three months from the front, they missed little chance of performing any useful military service.

REGIMENTAL
1669
COLONEL      LIEUT: COLONEL      MAJOR      N^o. IV COMP^S.
1684
COLONEL      LIEUT: COLONEL      N^o. VI COMPANY
1685
N.R. Wilkinson del.      A.D. Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros. Chromo.

Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava—Improvement in the condition of the men—Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th—Changed aspect of affairs before Sevastopol—Review of events during the time spent at Balaklava—Second bombardment—Interference by Napoleon III. in the course of the war; operations paralysed—General Canrobert resigns, and is succeeded by General Pélissier—Energy displayed by the latter—Third bombardment—Fourth bombardment; assault on Sevastopol—Its failure—Death of Lord Raglan; succeeded by General Simpson—Siege operations continued—Battle of the Tchernaya—Fifth bombardment—Sixth bombardment; second assault—The Malakoff is captured—Fall of the south side of Sevastopol—The Russians evacuate the town, and retreat to the north side—State in which the Allies found Sevastopol.

There are few incidents of Regimental interest to record during the stay at Balaklava. The men were lodged in huts, but as these were situated near a burial ground and close to the stables of the Land Transport Corps, the advantages gained by a change from the fatigues and hardships of the siege to the base of operations were sadly diminished, and several cases of maculated fever for the first time appeared. In March, another site having been selected on the west side of the harbour, in a more favourable and sanitary position, and huts having been constructed, the Battalion moved there towards the end of the month. The better food, the shelter, the increased comfort, and the rest now enjoyed by the men, produced a satisfactory effect upon their health, to which the improvement in the weather also contributed; for, the short, though terribly severe winter had passed away, and with the spring the temperature became warm and pleasant. During March, 101 men were admitted into hospital, of whom 24 were suffering from typhus, and the mortality amounted to 10; while next month, 53 men only were admitted, and but 5 deaths occurred.^[319]

250The Battalion were employed principally in the ordinary duties performed at the base of operations, guarding the stores and buildings or other places set apart for the use of the army, and unloading the ships that arrived in Balaklava. Drills were carried out, and the troops practised, in occupying the trenches at night, to meet any sudden attack which the enemy might contemplate. The danger of such an attack was lessened by the fact that the enemy had relaxed his hold, as far back as the end of December, upon the heights on the left bank of the Tchernaya, captured by him on the 25th of October, though he continued to occupy the line of the river. It was still necessary to restrain his activity in this quarter, and several reconnaissances took place to prevent his advance. As was only natural, the Officers at Balaklava, when off duty, rode frequently to points where operations of interest were being undertaken, but the Brigade itself was not engaged at this period.

The gabion-making detachment was continued near Balaklava, to supply the siege-works before Sevastopol.

Early in March, convalescents from Scutari, wounded at the Alma and at the Inkerman, returned to the Battalion, but the next draft did not arrive until the 1st of May, when 7 Officers and 307 men, whose average age and service were 22-1/12 years and 7 months respectively, landed in the Crimea.^[320] Owing to the Regimental promotion which had taken place, Colonels Lord F. Paulet (commanding the 2nd Battalion) and Newton, and Lieut.-Colonel Wood were now ordered home to the 2nd Battalion; while Colonel Gordon Drummond assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, Colonels Daniell and Perceval being Acting Majors (mounted), as has already been stated. About this time, also,^[321] Officers were posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Captains F. Burton, H. Tower, and C. Blackett. (Subsequently Lieut.-Colonel Lord C. FitzRoy.)

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain M. Heneage; Lieutenant St. V. Whitshed.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stepney; Captain Le Couteur; Lieutenant Rose.

251No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel W. Dawkins; Captain Hon. R. Drummond; Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 5 Company: Major P. Crawley; Lieutenants A. Lambton, Lane-Fox.

No. 6 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop; Lieutenant A. Adair. (Subsequently Major C. Baring.)

No. 7 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Cocks; Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenant G. Ives.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dudley Carleton; Captains A. Thellusson, Gerald Goodlake; Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

As the summer approached, the weather became extremely hot, and towards the middle of May, 90 degrees were registered in the shade. Cholera again broke out among the troops, but, warned by the visitation of this plague in the previous year, every precaution then known to medical science was taken to avert it. The number of sick increased during May and June, the admissions into hospital being in the first month 134, and the deaths 5, and in the second month 267 and 36 respectively; of the latter, 24 men died of cholera.

On the 16th of June, the Brigade returned to the front to join in the operations which were intended to be undertaken by the Allies on the 18th, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo.^[322] The Battalion was 488 strong (excluding Officers). Three Officers and 61 men were left behind sick, as well as 15 convalescents; altogether 111 men were abstracted from the effective strength. On reaching the upland the old positions were scarcely to be recognised by the rank and file who had remained more than three months at Balaklava. The French having already extended the British Right Attack, occupied the ground in front of the Karabelnaya from the Dockyard Ravine, past the Careenage Ravine, and along Mount Inkerman to the heights overlooking the roadstead. Innumerable siege-works cut up the plateau, the lines were pushed further forward, 252a large force was concentrated on the spot, and the face of the country—so bleak and barren in February—was now covered with the green carpet of a luxuriant vegetation.

We must now take a hasty glance at the state of affairs prevailing before Sevastopol and elsewhere, which controlled the war, while the Guards were at Balaklava. In spite of the united efforts of the British and French occupying the ground before the Malakoff, the enemy succeeded in extending his works to his front, and in materially strengthening the lines that covered the Karabelnaya. The fact was becoming more apparent that General Canrobert, gallant soldier though he was, was not disposed to risk the chances of making a bold move against the Russians; and that the latter, under the distinguished leadership of Colonel Todleben, were enabled thereby to prolong the struggle.

But Canrobert was not entirely his own master in this matter, for towards the beginning of the year 1855 the Emperor Napoleon interfered with the conduct of the operations in the Crimea, in a manner to impede seriously the progress of hostilities. Declaring himself to be dissatisfied with the course pursued, the Emperor conceived the idea of delaying the siege until he could isolate Sevastopol from the rest of the peninsula; and he even proposed to go himself to the Crimea to carry out his design. He was happily dissuaded from undertaking this latter part of the project—dangerous both on account of his inexperience in war, and because of the instability of his authority in Paris,—and it was finally abandoned, after he had been received as a guest at Windsor (April 25th); but he still adhered to his determination to enforce some hazy plan which his vanity had formed, and thereby he increased considerably the difficulties of the Allies.

Added to this, there was a renewal of negotiations at Vienna. The Tsar Nicholas died early in March, and though his successor Alexander II. was clearly in the hands of the war faction, some feeble attempt was made to patch up a peace. The negotiations failed; but the events alluded to could not but exercise some influence over the fortunes of the war, by fettering the action of the French army engaged in it.

This appears to be shown by the results that followed the second bombardment of Sevastopol, which commenced on the 8th of April. Immense preparations had been made to ensure its success, and it was confidently expected by the Allied hosts that this bombardment 253would at last lead to an immediate and triumphal assault of the fortress.

All this expenditure of lives and of war matériel effected just nothing, nor was anything even attempted against the enemy; for the French, though having an opportunity to assault, not possessed at that time by their British allies, were “kept waiting for Louis Napoleon, and were restrained from engaging in any determined attack.”^[324]

In order to accomplish the views of the Emperor Napoleon, a French army of reserve was being collected near Constantinople, and as it was expected soon to reach the Crimea—to undertake the plans which had been sketched out in Paris,—two important operations against the enemy were delayed. First, a further bombardment, arranged to take place at the end of April, and to be followed by an assault, was put off; and secondly, an expedition, at last agreed to, against the Russian communications in the Sea of Azof, and which had actually started to Kertch (May 3rd), was recalled.^[325] Both these events caused much embarrassment to Lord Raglan, who, understanding imperfectly even then the Emperor’s proposals, found his own plans thwarted by the supine and unintelligible conduct of his colleague. The confidence reposed in the latter was naturally shaken; and when, a few days later, Napoleon’s scheme was fully revealed to the allied Commanders, was discussed, and was found to be impossible of execution, General Canrobert felt 254his position to be intolerable, and he resigned the chief command of the French army. It is right to add that, though Canrobert’s character unfitted him to direct the difficult operations which lay before him, he was well suited to assume the lower functions of a commander of a division or army-corps. Being of a loyal and soldierlike disposition, and unwilling to leave the seat of war, he begged that he might revert to the position he originally occupied in the French army when the war broke out, and recommended that General Pélissier (who had reached the Crimea in January) should be appointed the new Commander-in-chief. These proposals were sanctioned in Paris by telegram, and were immediately carried into execution (May 19th).

The change in the French command completely altered the state of affairs in the Crimea. The vacillating weakness of Canrobert and his subserviency to the foibles of his Imperial Master, were at last replaced by the hardy daring of Pélissier and by his manly disregard of an ill-timed interference in the conduct of the war, which could only end in disaster. The forces fighting against Russia, moreover, were increasing; while the strength of that Empire was ebbing fast. In April nearly half of Omar Pasha’s Turks, about 45,000 strong, were taken from Eupatoria to the Chersonese, and next month a compact division of 15,000 Sardinians—who had joined the confederacy against Russia—landed in the Crimea, under the command of General La Marmora. The enemy about this time, by reason of his immense losses, had little more than 100,000 men in the peninsula; the Allies were more numerous, and could dispose of about 180,000 men.^[326] Thus, it was becoming apparent, that by vigorously pushing on the siege, Sevastopol must fall, and that the resources of Russia—so fatally allowed to accumulate in the early stages of the war—were beginning to fail.

Immediate arrangements were made to storm the advanced works which Todleben had constructed, to occupy the Tchernaya and the plain of Baidar that lay beyond it, and to attack Kertch and the Russian base of supplies formed on the coast of the Sea of Azof. On the 23rd of May, after severe fighting, the French gained an important advantage over the enemy near Quarantine Bay; and, two days later, he was also attacked on the Tchernaya 255and driven out of Tchorgun. About the same time, the expedition to Kertch, composed of 15,000 English, French, and Turks, started for its destination. Operations in this quarter were entirely successful, and by the middle of June the Allies, having struck deep into the resources of the Russians, cut their chief line of supply, and in no small degree carried out practically the policy of investment which the Emperor professed to desire.^[327]

The allied Commanders now directed their efforts to the Russian advanced works covering the Karabelnaya, and, determining to attack them, they prepared for the assault by a fierce cannonadecannonade (the third bombardment), which opened on the 6th of June with tremendous violence and effect, and lasted until the 10th. On the evening of the 7th, the French advanced against the White works (situated on Mount Inkerman, to the east of Careenage Ravine), and the Kamskatka Lunette (on the Mamelon, covering the Malakoff and some 500 yards in front of it); and the English moved against the Quarries (covering the Redan and about 400 yards from it). These attacks were successful, and the enemy, driven from all these outworks, was restricted to his main line of defence. The captured positions were occupied and held by the Allies. Between the 6th and the 10th the Russians lost altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 8500 men and 73 guns; the Allies nearly 7000 men.

These advantages were now to be pressed home, and a great effort made to assault the main line round the Karabelnaya; the Malakoff and the Redan were to be attacked, and the fortress so long besieged was at last to fall. The final act of the long drama was fixed for the 18th of June, when the Anglo-French allies, having shared so many dangers and hardships in common, might reap the 256reward of their arduous labours, and obliterate the memories of the day of Waterloo.

The fourth bombardment opened on the 17th, and the fleets once more joined their fire to the numerous great siege guns planted before Sevastopol. The devastating force of the artillery soon obtained a mastery over that of the fortress, and the usual results followed: the enemy’s works were knocked to pieces, his defences ruined, and he lost 4000 men. Now, therefore, was the time for the assault to take place, and, as we have seen, the Guards Brigade were brought up to the front from Balaklava to participate in the operations about to ensue. But the ardent expectations of the besiegers were not yet to be realized, and the attack ended unfortunately. Neither in the Malakoff nor in the Redan, were the French or ourselves able to effect a lodgment; the only consolation was the capture of a position in front of our Left Attack. Among the blunders that occurred to account for the failure, perhaps the most unfortunate was that of Pélissier himself. It had been settled that the bombardment was to continue for two hours after dawn on the 18th, so as to shatter the repairs which the Russians invariably made to their works during the night, and that then the assault was to commence at about 5.30 in the morning. But this plan was altered at the last moment, by Pélissier, who wished the advance to begin at dawn, without any previous preparation by artillery fire. Lord Raglan was not consulted, and, when he heard of it, he submitted to the change most reluctantly. The enemy, therefore, was ready, behind parapets hastily renewed and armed with field guns during the night, and thereby he was enabled to repel the attack. That this was probably the main cause of the failure, may perhaps be inferred from the fact that when, after the assault, the bombardment recommenced, the soldierlike spirit of the Russians gave way, and many of them, unable to stand against the terrific fire poured upon them, fled to the harbour, and endeavoured to escape to the north side of Sevastopol.^[328] The Guards Brigade were not engaged upon this occasion; they remained in reserve, and were not brought forward. In fact, the attack had failed, and further expenditure of lives had to be avoided. The losses were great on that fatal day; that of the English amounted to 1500, of the French to 3500, and of the enemy only to 1500.

257Two Officers occupying very conspicuous positions in their respective armies disappeared from the scene of their labours about this time. General Todleben was slightly wounded on the 18th, and more gravely hurt a few days later, so that he had to leave Sevastopol, and the Russians lost the services of that master mind to whose conspicuous ability, energy, and courage the prolonged and successful defence of the fortress was primarily due. The Allied armies also were plunged into mourning by the unexpected death of Lord Raglan, who never recovered from the grief and disappointment which oppressed his mind after the events of the 18th. This reverse, added to the labours and anxieties of the previous fifteen months, during which time he discharged his high but onerous duties without intermission, undermined his constitution, and he died on the 28th, surrounded by his personal friends and his military staff. He was succeeded by General Simpson.^[329] His body was removed to England, and was taken to the Bay of Kazatch with full military honours, on the 3rd of July; and, in accordance with General Orders, the troops not engaged in the funeral or on duty in the field, remained in their tents during the afternoon. While the ceremony lasted, the Allied forces before Sevastopol were passive in the trenches, and, whether owing to chance or to a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the Russian Commander, the guns of the garrison also kept silence.^[330]

The siege was pushed forward with great activity after the 18th, and in this portion of the weary operations the Guards Brigade took their full share. Seeing the mistake committed by advancing over open ground for a distance of 400 to 500 yards, against the enceinte covering the Karabelnaya, General Pélissier now proposed to sap up close to the fortress. The soil near his own siege-works favoured such an undertaking; but not so, that which lay in front of our positions, where a thin layer of earth only covered the solid rock. Thus, while the French were able to get close to the ramparts of the Malakoff, the British were prevented from pushing through the ground much beyond the Quarries, or from lessening to any considerable extent the distance that separated them from their objective—the Redan.

These siege operations lasted without intermission until early in September. On the night of June 18th, the Brigade found 30 Officers 258and 1000 men for the trenches, of which the Coldstream, furnished 8 Officers and 263 men; and so on, from day to day, in varying numbers, according to the requirements of the moment. It was ordered on the 21st, that “in future the proportion of Officers and men in the trenches will be one Captain and one Subaltern to every 100 men;” and also “should any part of the guard of the trenches be called upon to work, they are positively forbidden to take off their accoutrements or to go far from their arms.”^[331] Commencing July 10th, the duties were found by divisions—the First, Second, and Light in the Right, the Third and the Fourth in the Left Attack,—and during that night the Battalion furnished 7 Officers and 312 men, also 21 men more as a special working party.^[332]

259It should be noticed here, that the Guards Brigade, on August 31st, exchanged the whole of their arms and ammunition for the new Enfield rifle then introduced, and that, at this time, there were two patterns in use by the troops of the British army standing before Sevastopol.^[333]

Notwithstanding the interest which the operations undertaken between June and September excited, and the high hopes generally entertained that the fortress would soon fall, the little-varying duty in the trenches became monotonous in the extreme, and all wished earnestly that this phase of the war might quickly pass away. Some cricket matches served to while away a few of the weary hours; but the weather was extremely hot and oppressive, and the season was sickly. There was, of course, much to distract the minds of men who, for the first time, found themselves in the presence of an enemy; but it was different for those who had been almost constantly at work for many months on the same spot and at the same object, and thus even these distractions lost much of their novelty and interest.

The casualties in the Battalion were not very severe during these three months, and amounted to 47 wounded, of whom 6 died of their injuries. Besides this number, an Officer of the Regiment, Captain Hon. R. Drummond, was wounded, on August 25th, in the trenches, having been shot through the chest; he left the Crimea on September 6th, but died before he reached England, unfortunately, indeed, just before the steamer anchored at Spithead. The general health of the Battalion may be seen from the following table:—

Between June 20th and September 21st, 78 men returned to duty from the hospital at Balaklava; but, per contra, 95 men were sent down from the front for treatment during the same period.^[334]

The Russians could do little to resist the formidable preparations made by the Allies to bring about the capture of Sevastopol. They lost heavily every day, even under the ordinary fire which the besiegers poured upon them, and, perceiving that the end of the long struggle was imminent, they resolved to make one final effort to free themselves from the forces that were closing nearer and nearer to their defences. After much consideration, General Michael Gortchakoff^[335] determined to bring down the field army, 261which was established on the Mackenzie heights and on the Belbek, into the valley of the Tchernaya, and to attack the French, Sardinians, and Turks holding that portion of the field. On August 15th, accordingly, a general action took place in that quarter, known as the battle of the Tchernaya, between a Russian army of 48,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, and a somewhat smaller force of the Allies, who, though they massed as many as 60,000 men, did not deploy their whole strength upon that occasion. The enemy displayed much bravery, but showed little skill; he was routed, and fell back slowly towards Mackenzie Farm, losing 69 Officers and 2300 men killed, 160 Officers and 4000 men wounded, and 31 Officers and 1700 men missing—total 8260. The French had 1500 killed and wounded, and the Sardinians 200.^[336] The besieging armies expected that this battle would be accompanied by a general sortie from Sevastopol; but it did not take place, for, the Russians were getting exhausted, and their resources were almost entirely at an end. In order to prevent any such attempt, and also to enable the French to sap up quite close to the defences of the Karabelnaya opposite to them, the Allies opened another, though only a partial, bombardment (the fifth) on August 16th, and continued their fire for some days with great violence; but no assault followed, for they were not yet ready to enact the final scene that was soon to begin.

General Gortchakoff might now have yielded the fortress which had been held so tenaciously and gloriously by the armies of the Tsar; but, after a full inspection of the town, of its ruins, and of the miseries and horrors it contained, he came to the resolution that it was to be held to the last extremity, and that the honour of his Sovereign prevented him from either evacuating it or capitulating. He determined, therefore, to bring into Sevastopol all he could spare of his field army, and to resist to the end. Hopeless as the outlook was at this moment, he still professed to believe that he could hold out for another month.

The last and sixth bombardment commenced on September 5th, and continued, if possible, with even greater fierceness and intensity than before, till the 8th, the day set apart for the grand assault. Pélissier guarded himself this time against advancing at dawn; and, having observed that at noon the Malakoff was usually more weakly occupied than at any other hour of the day or night, 262he resolved to take advantage of this circumstance, and to deliver the attack then. At noon therefore, the French, under Bosquet, were to storm the Malakoff, the Curtain near, and the little Redan; while the English, under General Codrington, were to attack the Redan. The town defences, moreover, were to be assailed by the French opposite to them, aided by a Sardinian brigade under General Cialdini; but this movement was subject to further orders.

A very fierce fight took place at all these places, of which one alone was successful; for the French, having entered the Malakoff, secured a firm footing there, and gained that important position in the enemy’s main line. Their losses were immense, not less than 3087 in killed and wounded out of 7446 men engaged in this portion of the battle-field. Everywhere else the assaults were beaten back, and the Allies could only believe at first that they had but gained an indecisive victory.

The attack on the Redan was made, as has been seen, under very difficult—almost impossible—circumstances; but, if it was only undertaken to relieve the pressure which the enemy brought to bear upon our allies near the Malakoff, our purpose was fulfilled. It is, however, difficult to believe that a diversion was all we intended to effect, since this assault was to be the final act of the great military drama which had been going on for a whole year in the Crimea, and which riveted the eyes of Europe upon Sevastopol. The troops engaged comprised the Second and Light Divisions, 6200 strong—1700 in the first line, 1500 in support, and 3000 in reserve in the 3rd parallel; the Third and Fourth Divisions formed a main reserve; but neither the Highland nor the First Division, to which the Guards Brigade belonged, was called up to share in the action. The Brigade was posted in rear, about half a mile from the Malakoff, where a splendid view of the fighting was obtained. There was much regret among all ranks composing it that they were not allowed to advance and take part in the attack; more especially since, when the French (according to Colonel Tower) asked General Simpson to send some of his troops to help them to hold the Malakoff, the request was refused, and the First Division, or, at least, the Guards, who were close by, were not told off to perform this duty. If this is more than camp gossip, it is, indeed, to be regretted that no British troops were enabled to participate in the glory of inflicting a final reverse upon the enemy’s position in the Karabelnaya.

263General Simpson explains that he determined to give the honour of leading the assault to the Second and Light Divisions, because they had defended the trenches and approaches to the Redan for many months, and because of the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. Military critics believe that this was a “cruel kindness to the army.” The two divisions were exhausted by the siege, and the knowledge of the ground is considered upon this occasion to have been a positive disadvantage, “for, in acquiring it, the troops generally lost the dash which is essential to success.” Moreover, these divisions were now filled with young and only partially trained soldiers, “who paid no attention to the orders that were given;” “the companies lost all formation and cohesion from the irregular manner in which they ran forward, and they stood in confused groups behind the parapets;” “the battalions got mixed up;” in fact, “the young, raw recruits failed to follow their leaders in the way in which the soldiers had done at the Alma and Inkerman.”^[337] On the other hand, there were fresh troops available; the Guards had only shortly before come up to the front from Balaklava, where they passed three and a half months, and the Highlanders had been there between October and June. Neither, as we know, were employed in the assault, much to their disappointment and chagrin.

But all this is only one side of the story. The task before the British was, under any circumstances, most difficult to fulfil. They had to advance over the open for a considerable distance, against a strong work, covered in front by obstacles, whose rear was unenclosed, and whose fire was unsubdued. It had been impossible to construct places d’armes in our trenches, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, and hence the reserves could not be concentrated in suitable positions whence to push forward at the proper moment and feed the attack. Nevertheless, the leading British troops advanced with the utmost gallantry and spirit, notwithstanding the furious fire to which they were exposed; they penetrated into the Redan, and clung to the position they had gained. But they could not maintain themselves there; for, the Russians, hurrying up in immense numbers, forced them to retire before the reserves—hampered in the narrow trenches—were able to advance to their support. The French, moreover, having spiked the guns they found in the Malakoff, had none to turn

264upon the enemy as he entered the Redan in force to drive out our storming parties. After this failure, the attack was put off to the following day; our losses amounted to 2271 Officers and men, those of the French to 7567, and of the Russians to 12,913.^[338]

But there was no necessity to renew the combat; for the enemy, aware of the strength of the Malakoff position, which commanded the whole of the defences of Sevastopol, evacuated the south side during the night of the 8th-9th, and withdrew to the northern bank of the roadstead, blowing up their magazines, and firing the town in several places. The Allies had thus early intimation of the impending fall of the fortress which for so long had withstood their valour; but the full extent of the victory was scarcely appreciated before the morning of the 9th, when the enemy’s retreat became known to the armies engaged. The evacuation of the Redan was first ascertained by some Highlanders in the trenches in the night, who, stalking up to the ditch and abatis that was near it, found the work tenanted only by spiked guns and by dead men.

The Allies did not enter the town on the 9th, for Sevastopol was a blazing mass of ruins, and the frequent explosions showed the place to be undermined: the garrison having escaped under 265cover of the night, when we were unaware of their intention, could not be further pressed at that moment, so there was no object to serve by sending the troops into a fire-trap. A terrible conflagration raged, and to this was added the burning and the final destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The minds of our men could be well filled with awe and joy at the wonderful sights that met their gaze—awe at the fiery furnace the enemy kindled to mark his departure from the stronghold he had held so audaciously and bravely, and joy that the protracted siege was at last concluded.^[340] Early on the 10th, the fires had ceased, and the conquerors, advancing to secure their prize, found one great building intact. Having penetrated into it, they were amazed to discover that it was a hospital containing no less than 2000 dead and dying men, who had been left to their fate without food or treatment for two days and nights, in the midst of the dire confusion and chaos that prevailed in the town; among them were three English Officers.^[341] At midday on the 13th, a fatigue party of 500 men of the First Division, under Major Ponsonby, Grenadier Guards, were ordered into the town to help to cleanse it, and to bury the numerous dead. The duty was a disagreeable one, as may well be imagined; it was well performed, as can be seen from the following Divisional Memorandum, dated September 15th:—

The French now occupied Sevastopol, and the English the Karabelnaya, where regular guards were established. The British troops (500 each day from the Brigade) were employed, with a working pay of 1s. 6d. a day, in making a main road from Balaklava to the front, and others in the neighbourhood, under the superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A. Hardinge, Coldstream Guards.

It should be stated here, that, on the 27th of August, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Ambassador at Constantinople, reached 266the Crimea for the purpose of investing several Officers with the Order of the Bath. The ceremony took place at the British head-quarters, in the presence of General Pélissier and his Staff. The Guards Brigade furnished a Guard of Honour; the Coldstream, the Queen’s Colour, the Ensign and Lieutenant (Lieutenant Whitshed), and 50 men; and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, the Lieutenant and Captain, and 50 men. Among those on whom the honour was conferred, connected with the Regiment or to be connected with it, were Lieut.-Generals Sir Colin Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, and Sir W. Codrington.

The Brigade paraded in review order on the 20th of September, for the purpose of receiving medals and clasps, which were distributed to the Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who had landed in the Crimea before the 1st of October, 1854.

Early in October, 1855, new reinforcements reached the Battalion. On the 2nd, 24 convalescents arrived for duty from Balaklava, as against 7 invalids sent to England next day. On the 4th, the fifth draft landed from home, consisting of 8 Officers and 207 men, whose average age was 24 years, and service 15 months. “They were principally volunteers from the Militia, and a remarkably fine body of men, not so tall as the original Guardsmen, but in every way better adapted for the exigencies of active service.”^[342] Officers were posted to companies as follows, October 7th:—

No. 1 Company: Major C. Baring, Captain H. Tower, Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett, Major Lord Bingham, Lieutenant Julian Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Herbert-Stepney, Captain C. Blackett, Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Le Couteur, Captain Lord E. Cecil, Lieutenant Whitshed.

No. 5 Company: Captain Sir J. Dunlop, Lieutenant A. Lambton.

No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate, Captain W. Reeve, Lieutenant H. Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major H. Armytage, Captain Hon. W. Feilding, Lieutenant Godfrey Wigram.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin, Captain Heneage, Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.^[343]

COLONEL
1750

LIEUT. COLONEL      MAJOR

QUEENS COLOUR 1^ST. BATT^L. 1893.

N.R. Wilkinson del.      A.D. Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros. Chromo.

Home events during the war—Sympathy of Her Majesty with her Crimean soldiers—Badges of distinction added to the Colours—Inactivity of the Allies after the fall of Sevastopol—Expeditions against the Russian coast—Sir W. Codrington succeeds Sir J. Simpson as Commander of the Forces—The winter 1855-56—Negotiations for a peace, which is concluded, March 30th—Events after the cessation of hostilities—A British cemetery in the Crimea—Embarkation and return home—The Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot; visit of Her Majesty the Queen—Move to London, and cordial reception there—Distribution of the Victoria Cross—Summary of events connected with the war—Losses—Appointment of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, and of Major-General Lord Rokeby to command the Brigade of Guards.

The details of the great struggle in the Crimea have necessarily occupied so much of the space of the last few chapters, that there has been little opportunity to allude to the occurrences connected with the Regiment which took place at home during this eventful period. It will therefore be well to pause in the narrative of the war, and to devote a few lines to that subject.

As soon as the Guards Brigade started for Malta in February, 1854, the public duties in London were reduced; and later in the year, when the requirements of active service necessitated a still further reduction, they were fixed at 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 9 sergeants, 10 corporals, 6 drummers, and 144 men, to furnish the Queen’s Guard, Buckingham Palace, the Tylt, the British Museum, and the Magazine Guards; and at 1 Subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 20 men, to furnish the Bank piquet.^[344]

The principal duty of the home Battalion was naturally at this moment to train and supply men to the 1st Battalion in the Crimea, and we have already seen something of the quality of the drafts that were sent out to the East.^[345] But as the ordinary 268recruiting was not sufficient to maintain the forces at the seat of war in a proper state of efficiency, the militia—the true reserve of the British army at that time—was called upon to perform its functions in the emergency. Not only was a portion of the militia embodied and employed as garrisons in those places where regular troops were not available, but volunteers were obtained from its ranks to fill up the gaps which the war created in the active army fighting before Sevastopol. In this manner men of good physique and trained to military service were obtained, and were drafted into the regular army. In April, 1854, the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Brigade told off to assist in training militia regiments, were ordered to use their best exertions to induce men to volunteer for their Regiments.^[346] In December, 1854, Officers of the Brigade were employed to superintend recruiting from the militia. Men were also obtained from the Irish Constabulary, and it was settled, December 18, 1855, that volunteers to the Guards from that corps might reckon their previous police service as military service.

It appears that there was an intention to form a Brigade depôt at Malta, in March, 1855, the companies to form which, were to be borne on the strength of the Battalions in the East, from the date of embarkation. But this plan was not carried out, and the home Battalions remained all through the war with twelve companies, as against eight companies belonging to the service Battalions; the drafts to the latter were always furnished direct from London.

As soon as the three Guards Battalions had left England, the other four were stationed in the West-end (St. George’s, Portman Street, and Wellington barracks), and there they remained (subject to the ordinary half-yearly change of quarters) until January, 1855, when the Tower was again garrisoned by the Brigade. In May, room had to be found for 500 men of the Line passing through London, and a portion of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards then in Wellington barracks, were put into billets in Westminster, for four days. This probably is the last time that any men of the Brigade have been billeted in London. On the 13th of June, the 2nd Battalions of the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards proceeded to Aldershot Camp, then newly established, until the 27th of August, when they were relieved by the two Grenadier 269Battalions, left in England.^[347] The latter remained there until the middle of December, when Windsor was again occupied by a Battalion of Guards, and there were then less than three Battalions of the Brigade stationed in the West-end, the head-quarters of one being in the Tower, with a detachment only, in Portman Street.^[348] During the absence of a portion of the Brigade in Aldershot, the Depôt of the 66th Regiment furnished a part of the public duties in London; but at the end of August, most of these men having been moved out of town, temporary reductions in the duties were made (September 16th, and October 9th) until the return of the Grenadiers.

It has been already stated that the Emperor Napoleon visited England in April, 1855, where a cordial welcome awaited him and the Empress, who accompanied him. A detachment of a Subaltern and 25 men from each Battalion, under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Grenadier Guards (with the Queen’s Colour belonging to that Battalion), proceeded to Windsor on the 14th, and were stationed there until the 19th, during the period of the French Sovereign’s visit to the Queen. Numerous Guards of Honour attended upon His Majesty, two of which were found by the 2nd Battalion, both at Bricklayers' Arms Station, on the 16th and 21st, on the arrival at, and departure from London, of the Imperial guest. On the 19th, the Emperor went to Guildhall, and the streets were lined by the two Grenadier Battalions as he went to the City and returned back to the West-end. Another Royal visit of one of Her Majesty’s Allies took place on the 1st of December, when the King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel, arrived in London, and went to Windsor. Of the Guards of Honour furnished upon that occasion, the Coldstream found four—two on the arrival of the King at Bricklayers' Arms Station and at Paddington Station on the 1st, one at Lord Palmerston’s house in Piccadilly on the 4th, and one at Bricklayers' Arms Station on the 6th, in the early morning.

The dress of the Brigade occupied the attention of the military authorities at this time. The white summer trousers were exchanged 270for another pattern made of a light grey stuff; the coatee was done away with, and the tunic was introduced (April, 1855). Epaulettes ceased to be worn, and thereby the badge of the Rose, still worn by the men, disappeared from the uniform of the Officers of the Coldstream. The tunic at first was a double-breasted garment, but a year later (March, 1856), when Officers required new red coats, they were ordered to supply themselves with single-breasted tunics, such as are still worn in the Brigade. The bearskin caps had been cut down early in 1854, to nine inches in height, and the plume was not to exceed six inches. Also, by an order dated October 7, 1854, peaks to caps were to be discontinued by sergeants, and were only to be worn by the Sergeant-Major, the Quartermaster-Sergeant, the Armourer Sergeant, the Regimental Clerk, the Drill Sergeants, and the Drum Major—a custom which still prevails in the Brigade.

A curious means taken to test beer may be gathered from the following Brigade Order, dated April 18, 1854, and shows the practical, though perhaps unscientific, manner in which our predecessors went to work when they wished to ascertain a matter of sanitary importance to the men:—

We find that a few days previous to this order (April 13th), a committee of Officers was appointed to consider the question of the general introduction of gas into barracks.

Later (July 17, 1855), a Field Officer of the Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel Wood, Grenadier Guards) was sent to the “end of Commercial Road, Pimlico, near to the projected Chelsea Bridge, there to view, in conjunction with a Medical Officer, a site for a barrack.” It will be seen that this was the first step taken to construct Chelsea barracks, which, when completed, removed the Foot Guards from the cramped quarters in Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, which they occupied at this time.

The Enfield rifle (pattern 1853), issued, as we have seen, to 271the Brigade in the Crimea at the end of August, 1855, was served out to the Guards Battalions on home service on the 26th of October of the same year. Nine hundred and one stand constituted the armament of the 2nd Battalion, and “on their receipt the smooth bore now in possession, including the sergeants' fusils, are to be returned into the Ordnance stores.”

It is well known to all her subjects that Her Majesty the Queen followed the varying fortunes of the Russian war with the utmost attention, interest, and concern; and that to none was her warm sympathy more heartily and graciously expressed than to her gallant army, who, amid unparalleled privations and difficulties, maintained intact the glory of the British Crown and of the country. Frequently did Her Majesty, surrounded by the Royal Family at Buckingham Palace, personally see such of her wounded soldiers as were able to be brought into the presence of their Sovereign, and there praise them for their merit, and condole with them on their sufferings. This honour was freely bestowed on the men of the Brigade, and on many occasions the Commanding Officers of Regiments were ordered to furnish lists of Guardsmen who were well enough to participate in it. In 1855, the Queen’s birthday was celebrated on the 18th of May, and on the Horse Guards parade, Her Majesty presented medals for service in the Crimea to all Officers and to three Non-commissioned officers and twenty privates per Regiment of the Brigade, entitled to receive them. Next day the following Order was published:—

When the fall of Sevastopol was known in England, there was much rejoicing that the Allied arms had captured the enemy’s stronghold and great naval arsenal in the Black Sea. But hostilities were not at an end, nor was an immediate peace in prospect. Nevertheless, certain distinct stages in the war were concluded, and victory had more than once smiled upon our standards. A General Order, therefore, was issued on the 16th 272of October, 1855, giving authority to inscribe the words “Alma,” “Inkerman,” “Balaklava,” and “Sevastopol” upon the Colours of the regiments taking part in these actions and in the siege. On the following December 28th the three badges of distinction, “Alma,” “Inkerman,” and “Sevastopol,” were inscribed upon the Colours of the Regiments of Foot Guards.

The Allied armies, having captured the fortress that so long resisted their skill and courage, found themselves placed in considerable embarrassment. The question naturally arose as to what should now be done. But that question was not readily answered, because no steps had been taken beforehand to decide it. The northern side was still held by the Russians, and their forces there were closely united to their field army, which occupied defensive positions on the Mackenzie heights. The undertaking to clear the two banks of the Sevastopol roadstead of the enemy, and to drive him out of the peninsula had the outward appearance of a difficult operation, and no measures had been concerted to proceed with it.^[349] The Anglo-French armies made no attempt to follow up the victory of the 8th of September, but hung listlessly on the ground they had won, deliberating as to their future movements, and doing nothing to secure success. In short, though the capture effected brought prestige to the besiegers, and placed in their power the fleet, the docks, and most of the forts at Sevastopol, no further advantage seemed likely to accrue, and we found ourselves almost as far as ever from exercising a coercive control over the councils of the Tsar.

As a matter of fact, General Gortchakoff was by no means as strong as he was supposed to be, and could scarcely have maintained himself in the Crimea had he been vigorously attacked by the brave forces that had invariably beaten his troops whenever they met them in the field. His position, indeed, was very precarious—so precarious was it, in the opinion of his own Government, that he had the fullest liberty given him to evacuate the peninsula if he found it necessary to do so. But he was not obliged to resort to this painful and humiliating measure; for the Allies never pressed him. Far from making any effort to dislodge him, or from even manœuvring against him to ascertain how he was 273circumstanced, they kept almost entirely aloof, and they left him alone in peace.

The British Government, sincerely desirous to achieve a more important success than had been gained, urged that the war should be vigorously prosecuted. They poured troops into the Crimea, so that our army there in November numbered as much as 51,000 men, of whom 4000 were cavalry, and 96 guns, besides a Turkish legion, raised by England, of 20,000, and a German legion of 10,000. The transport was now completely re-organized, and the medical service in good working order; and, added to this, the fleet, always overwhelmingly strong, was more powerful than it had been before.^[350] A campaign was now at last possible against an enfeebled enemy under far better conditions than had been the case in the same season of the previous year, when we invaded Russia, whose resources then were practically unimpaired. The English people, also, were at one with their Government, and were anxious for a vigorous prosecution of hostilities, if the enemy could not be otherwise subjugated. But they and their rulers could effect nothing, for our allies would not move, and above all things was it necessary that the alliance should be cordially maintained. Hence, our political relations with the French interfered with our national interests, and controlled our military operations against the enemy: and, as has happened in the past, and will again happen, in wars conducted by several nations, the common foe reaped no inconsiderable benefit by having a confederation of Powers ranged against him.

In short, the fall of Sevastopol practically brought the drama to a close. The efforts of the besiegers to take the town, after they had allowed it to grow into military importance, seemed to exhaust the further zeal and ardour of the Emperor Napoleon: it was impossible for us to re-kindle them into activity. Nor could Marshal Pélissier be roused to action; his enthusiasm for the success of the struggle had now grown cold, and his former energy had evaporated. His troops had taken the Malakoff, the key of the fortress, and, proud of their victory over the enemy, the French 274were content with the glory their army had achieved. So, also, had the Emperor gained all he wanted to secure; and, the war having established him firmly on the throne, he was anxious for peace with Russia, and for some new and more profitable adventure.

And yet something had to be done to preserve the semblance of war. The Turks, already at Eupatoria, were therefore reinforced, and some successful reconnaissances were effected in that important quarter: operations were, moreover, continued on the shores of the Sea of Azof, with advantage to the Allies; and lastly, after threatening Odessa, a descent was made upon Kinburn and its neighbourhood. These desultory expeditions served to keep up the illusion that the fight was still earnestly maintained. But they led to no permanent results, and they need not be further described; because, under the circumstances and conditions in which they were undertaken, they only exercised, and could only exercise, a very minor influence on the war. Omar Pasha had at last (end of September) been allowed to take a portion of his hitherto inactive army—chained for no useful purpose in the Crimea—to attempt the relief of Kars, a Turkish stronghold in Armenia, then besieged by the Russians. He was only barely supported by the Allies, if indeed he was not hampered by them, and he failed to accomplish his object. Kars fell on the 28th of November, and the victory gained there by the enemy compensated him not a little for the reverse he sustained at Sevastopol. The French might view the incident with unconcern; but to England, having vital interests in Asia, the loss of this place was of far greater moment.^[351]

Officers of the 1st Battalion were posted to companies as follows on December 17, 1855:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captain H. Jervoise; Lieutenant G. Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel C. Burdett; Captain Whitshed; Lieutenant Hall.

No. 3 Company: Major Thellusson; Captain Blackett; Lieutenant Adair.

No. 4 Company: Captain Reeve; Captain Heneage.

No. 5 Company: Captain Hon. H. Byng; Lieutenant A. Lambton.

275No. 6 Company: Lieut.-Colonel F. Newdigate; Captain Lord E. Cecil;Cecil; Lieutenant Lane.

No. 7 Company: Major Le Couteur; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkellin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding; Lieutenant Wigram.

Colonel Gordon Drummond still commanded the Battalion, while Major Lord Bingham was appointed Adjutant about that time (21st December).

The Brigade remained on the upland of the Chersonese, with the bulk of the British army, guarding the Karabelnaya, constructing roads, drilling, practising musketry, and performing the ordinary duties of camp life.^[352] A tent had been converted into a Crimean Guards Club, “where we used all to meet, read the newspapers, talk, and smoke,” and there the first anniversary of the battle of the Alma was duly celebrated by a dinner. There were races at Kamara on the 17th of October, shooting expeditions, and other expedients to pass away the time. Occasionally an interchange of shots took place across the roadstead that divided the hostile armies; but they were rather signals to show that the war had not yet officially come to an end than anything else, and they never produced any important results.

The monotony of these proceedings during an inactive campaign, and in the presence of an unsubdued enemy, was one day electrified into new life by a terrible explosion that occurred in the lines of our allies. On the 15th of November, 100,000 lbs. of powder blew up in the French artillery park, and kindled a fire that placed one of the principal English magazines in imminent danger. Looking from the British camp, a huge column of smoke was seen to ascend high in the air; it then spread out like a tree,^[353] broke, and sent down a shower of iron, stones, rubbish, broken side arms, guns, gun carriages, and every conceivable appurtenance of war; shells burst in all directions, and other combustibles added their flames 276to the conflagration. Happily the fire was got under without further mishap, but many Officers and men, mostly French, were killed and wounded.^[354]

On the 11th of November, a few days before the accident just mentioned, General Sir James Simpson having resigned, Lieut.-General Sir William Codrington was appointed by Her Majesty the Queen to the chief command of the British army in the Crimea. This Officer, a Coldstreamer, served in the Regiment from 1823 until July, 1854, when, as junior Acting-Major of the 1st Battalion, and present with it in Bulgaria, he was promoted Major-General. Remaining at the seat of war, he very soon obtained the command of a brigade in the Light Division, as has been previously recorded. At the head of this gallant brigade he greatly distinguished himself at the battle of the Alma by his cool and intrepid bearing; the part he played at Inkerman has already been mentioned. He was with the army from start to finish of the war against Russia, being present on the upland before Sevastopol throughout the whole of the first severe winter (except once for the space of a very few days, when on the sick list), and engaged in all the fights (usually in executive command) that took place round and in the Redan. Few Officers in the British army were more exposed to the dangers and the privations of this war than Sir W. Codrington, and he survived both without a scratch and without even a temporary illness of a serious nature.

The second winter was now approaching, and hostilities, while 277they showed no sign of coming to an end, still languished. But it was passed under very different conditions to those which prevailed during the terrible season that overtook us in 1854-55. The autumn was fine and enjoyable, and the real cold weather was not felt until the end of November. We were then quite prepared for it, so that the army did not suffer. The health of the troops was excellent, and for some time prior to the end of 1855 there was such an abundance of every kind of supply, that scarcely any requirement remained for the Medical Officer in charge to suggest.

Both in respect to the comfort and the good administration which our men now enjoyed, we contrasted very favourably with the French, who, though they were better off than we had been in the winter 1854-55, did not improve their services as we had done; they consequently fared worse than the British army in the cold season of 1855-56, and suffered considerably in the spring of 1856.

When Sevastopol was in the power of the Allies, they destroyed its value, as much as they could, as a naval arsenal, and thus the docks, all the forts in their possession, the barracks, and the aqueducts that led into the town were demolished. These tasks were accomplished in the mid-winter.

On the 1st of March the sixth and last draft reached the 1st Battalion, consisting of 8 Officers and 263 men, whose average age and service amounted to 23½ years and 18 months respectively. The men were stout and robust, and, like the preceding draft, well adapted for all the possible requirements of active service.^[356]

278Next day Officers were posted to companies as follows:—

No. 1 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Hon. P. Feilding; Captains Tower; Jervoise; Lieutenant Rose.

No. 2 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Burdett; Major Crawley; Captain Hall.

No. 3 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Newdigate; Captain Hon. H. Byng; Lieutenant A. Adair.

No. 4 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Reeve; Captain Lord E. Cecil; Lieutenant Sir W. Forbes, Bart.

No. 5 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Dawkins; Captain G. FitzRoy; Lieutenant S. Mainwaring.

No. 6 Company: Captain J. Caulfeild; Lieutenants W. Seymour; Hon. E. Legge.

No. 7 Company: Majors Armytage; Thellusson; Lieutenant Hon. W. Edwardes.

No. 8 Company: Lieut.-Colonel Lord Dunkelin; Captain Hon. W. Feilding; Lieutenant Lane.

Ever since the capture of Sevastopol, the work of diplomacy had again been active at Vienna; and with some additional advantage this time to the Russians, for it succeeded in partially alienating the Emperor Napoleon from the alliance. In form that Sovereign remained true to Great Britain; but it was clear that, as far as he was concerned, the war was at an end, and that the Tsar had no more to fear from his animosity. This facilitated the action of Austria, and under her mediation a project of peace was accepted by the Russians on the 16th of January, 1856. A month later a Conference sat in Paris to settle an immediate armistice and to conclude a general peace. The Treaty of Paris was accordingly signed on the 30th of March, and it put an end finally to the war that had lasted two years. By the terms of this agreement, which yielded back to their original Sovereigns all territories in possession of either of the combatants, an important article was included, viz. the Black Sea was neutralized, its waters and ports were “formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war,” naval arsenals on its shores were not to be maintained, and ships of war were forbidden to enter or pass through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It is of interest to record the fact that this article, to gain which England had expended so much blood and treasure, was infringed by Russia in 1859, who, with no one to interfere in the neutralized sea, blockaded the Circassian coast, and at last overcame the stubborn resistance of 279the liberty-loving tribes of the Caucasus that for so long checked her progress in Central Asia. Having accomplished this work, she then boldly repudiated the article, with scarcely a protest on our part, in the beginning of 1871, when we were at peace with her, just fifteen years after the conclusion of the Crimean war; and again she prepared her forces to effect another development of the Eastern Question.

On the 2nd of April official tidings of peace were communicated to the several armies engaged in the struggle, by a salute fired upon the upland. Thenceforward the contending forces, drawn together by that mutual respect and esteem with which brave men regard one another, looked upon each other as friends, and all traces of hostility vanished as if by magic. British and Russian soldiers were to be seen in scores on their respective sides of the Tchernaya, conversing as best as they could, and exchanging presents. The thoughts of our men, however, were now naturally turned towards home; but two months were still to elapse before the Coldstream quitted the soil on which they had for so long lived and suffered, and where their military virtues had been so conspicuously displayed.

About this time the French appointed a special mission to inquire into the relative sanitary conditions of the English and French field hospitals in the East, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyatt was sent to aid in the investigation made.

Added to this, British Sanitary Commissioners made an inspection of the hospitals in the Crimea, and it is with satisfaction that portions of two paragraphs of the report are recorded here.

Shortly before the conclusion of the peace an event of great interest to our allies took place (March 16, 1856)—the birth of a son to the French Emperor, an heir destined, it was confidently hoped, to preserve the Napoleonic dynasty, and to hand down to posterity the glory of the great founder of the Imperial House. Rejoicings were unstinted in Paris and in London; and in the former place, where the peace Conference was sitting, the representatives of all the Powers, not excluding Russia, added their congratulations to the happy Emperor. Nor was the auspicious occasion forgotten in the Crimea, where it was celebrated by a ball on the 1st of April.^[358] And yet how fickle is Fortune, and how she decided against this unfortunate prince! He did not ascend the French throne, and was but fourteen years of age when he was condemned to fly from his native land, never to return to it. Napoleon III., overwhelmed by the united might of Germany, was driven from his capital in 1870, and a few years later he ended his days an exile in England. Living in our midst, his son, the Prince Imperial, served in the British army, and lost his life, when only twenty-three years of age, in a small skirmish in South Africa; and thus he died before any new phase among his unstable countrymen could recall him in the character of a pretender to the French Imperial crown. Sic transit gloria mundi.

The interval between the conclusion of hostilities and the departure from the Crimea was eagerly seized by many to visit their late enemy and the places of interest to be found in the peninsula. A few extracts from the diary of Colonel Tower will perhaps give a fair example of these experiences.

So the days passed on, varied, besides duty, by fêtes of pleasure, excursions, cricket matches, and races, until the embarkation took place, and the Battalion returned to England. But, prior to this event, a solemn duty was performed, and a resting-place for the dead was prepared, where the remains of those who had fallen in the war might be laid. A site selected on Cathcart’s Hill was enclosed, and a portion of it was devoted as a burial place for the Brigade. A number of masons from the Guards were employed, early in April, to build a suitable wall, and fatigue parties were furnished to finish the work. The bodies of most of the Officers and others, killed at Inkerman and elsewhere in the vicinity, were exhumed, and reverently interred in the new cemetery. The masses of the dead, however, could not then be removed there, so, instead, the places where they lay were carefully fenced in. But this arrangement did not last, because the enclosures became dilapidated through time, and the graves were liable to be desecrated. A few years ago this was remedied, and the bones of the departed, together with the monuments erected by the care of their comrades, were taken to Cathcart’s Hill, and are there preserved in perpetuity within the cemetery which had been first laid out in the spring of 1856.

The welcome news that the Battalion was to be sent back home, published on the 3rd of June, was preceded by a Divisional Order of Lieut.-General Lord Rokeby, commanding the First Division, dated the 2nd:—

On the 4th of June, the Battalion embarked at Kamiesh Bay, and sailed from the Crimea in H.M.S. Agamemnon, arriving at Spithead on the 28th, whence they were sent by train to Aldershot camp. They had been absent on foreign service for 2 years and 126 days (856 days), which time was passed in the following places: Malta, 48 days; Scutari, 45 days; Bulgaria, 75 days; Crimea, 627 days; and at sea 61 days.

The strength on embarkation from England (February, 1854) had been 35 Officers and 919 Non-commissioned officers and men, and during the period of duty in the East, reinforcements amounting to 1141 men were sent out in six drafts, making a total of 2060 men who served in the war. The number of primary admissions from all causes into the Regimental and general hospitals was 3101, of which 2785 were from disease, 243 from wounds, and 73 from accidental injuries. Death reduced the Battalion by 699 men, of whom 81 were killed in action, 54 died from wounds, and 564 from disease: 65 men were invalided home by wounds, and 187 by disease; and 111 men were finally discharged the army on account of disabilities contracted during active service—59 from the effects of wounds, and 52 from those of disease.^[359] Total loss of Non-commissioned officers and men, 810. Ninety-one Coldstream Officers were employed in the Russian war.^[360] Of these, nine were killed in action, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Hon. T. Vesey Dawson and J. C. Cowell, Captains L. D. Mac-Kinnon, H. M. Bouverie, Hon. G. Eliot, Horace Cust, and F. Ramsden, and Lieutenants E. A. Disbrowe and C. H. Greville; one died of wounds, viz. Captain Hon. R. Drummond; three died of disease, viz. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Boyle, Colonel Trevelyan, and Captain 284Hylton Jolliffe: total loss of Officers, thirteen. Seven were wounded, viz. Major-General Sir H. Bentinck, Colonel Hon. G. Upton, Lieut.-Colonels J. Halkett, Lord C. FitzRoy, Hon. P. Feilding, and C. Baring, and Captain Hon. W. Amherst. Seventeen were invalided on account of illness, of whom seven were unable to return to the Crimea. Several were obliged to leave the seat of war on promotion, and altogether twenty-two seem to have done duty at least twice before Sevastopol.

The Crimean Guards Brigade, concentrated at Aldershot, remained there a few days, and during that time the Battalion was inspected by the Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal Earl of Strafford, whose presence, as a Coldstream Officer, formed a connecting link between the glories of Waterloo and those achieved in the Russian war.

On the 8th July, Her Majesty the Queen appeared at the camp, and was received by the troops quartered there who had lately come back from the East. After the march past, a representative body of Officers and men, who had been under fire, from each regiment, was formed up in a hollow square round Her Majesty’s carriage, to listen to the gracious address of welcome pronounced by the Queen herself to her brave men just returned from an arduous and protracted war. The address was thus published in Orders:—

Colonel Tower, who was present upon this interesting occasion, throws light upon it by recording in his diary that Her Majesty “made us a capital speech, full of gratitude and good feeling, and got quite eloquent; at last she quite broke down, and burst into tears when she talked of the poor fellows that were not there to receive her thanks.” He adds, “If she had seen us in the 285trenches in July, 1855, or in Bulgaria in July, 1854, she would not have recognized her Brigade; we were now [July, 1856] all so nice and smart.”

Next day the Crimean Battalions of the Brigade, 3200 strong, left Aldershot to make their public entry into London. Parading at 5.30 in the morning, they were conveyed to Nine Elms Station by train, where the three bands met them. The day was observed as a general holiday; the route taken was densely thronged by an enthusiastic crowd; the houses were decorated with flags; and the church bells rang out a joyous peal of welcome. On passing the Horse Guards, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge met the column, and as soon as the men perceived their former Commander, who had been with them at the hard-fought battle of Inkerman, “their stern gravity gave way, and they honoured him with the heartiest cheers.” As they defiled through Buckingham Palace, the Queen, accompanied by the Royal children, by her mother the Duchess of Kent, her uncle the King of the Belgians, and by other illustrious persons, came to the balcony to greet her gallant troops with her gracious presence. Arrived in Hyde Park, they found the other four Guards Battalions, with the Colonels at the head of their respective Regiments, formed up in a line of quarter columns, facing Park Lane, with sufficient interval between them to receive the Crimean Battalions in their proper places on parade; and while the latter marched into their positions under the orders of Generals Lord Rokeby and Craufurd, their comrades presented arms. The three Regiments, now complete, were then handed over to their respective Colonels, to H.R.H. the Prince Consort, Field-Marshal Earl of Strafford (seated in a carriage, because he was too infirm to head his Regiment on horseback), and H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge. The Prince Consort having proceeded to join Her Majesty, the Duke of Cambridge assumed command of the whole. On the arrival of the Queen the bands played the national anthem, and the seven Battalions marched past Her Majesty, to the air, “See, the Conquering Hero comes.” The Brigade then advanced in Review order to the flagstaff; another Royal salute was given; and the pageant came to an end.

On the same day the following Brigade Order was issued:—

After the review, a complete change of quarters took place in the Brigade: The 1st Grenadiers proceeded to Aldershot, 2nd Grenadiers to Dublin (which was again occupied by the Household troops), 3rd Grenadiers to Wellington barracks, Buckingham Palace, the Magazine, and Kensington; 1st Coldstream to the Tower and St. John’s Wood, 2nd Coldstream to Windsor; 1st Scots Fusilier Guards to Portman Street and St. George’s barracks, 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards to Aldershot. A few days later the Battalions of the Regiment were equalized, in that each was formed of ten companies, instead of twelve and eight, as had been the case during the war; two companies belonging to the 2nd Battalion were therefore transferred to the 1st, and the Officers were posted as follows:—

DRUMMER 1745.
N.R. Wilkinson del.     A.D. Innes & C^o London     Mintern Bros. lith.

Where four allies were conducting a war in common, it was only natural that there should be an interchange of medals and of decorations, and this was done with no ungenerous hand. A new medal, more coveted than any other by soldiers and sailors, was established early in 1856, both for Officers and men in the Naval and Military services, who had distinguished themselves before the enemy “for valour.” The distribution of the Victoria Cross did not, however, take place until the 26th of June, 1857, when all the claims for that most conspicuous honour had been fully investigated. The day appointed for the ceremony was observed as a general holiday, and a review was held in Hyde Park before Her Majesty the Queen, who affixed to the breast of each man entitled to it, the bronze cross he had won in the field by his personal bravery. In the Coldstream the recipients of this proud distinction were Majors Goodlake and Conolly, and Privates Strong and Stanlock.^[362] This event, though it took place more than a year after the 288conclusion of peace, is connected with the Crimean struggle, and may be said to terminate the history of the protracted hostilities that troubled our relations with Russia. Thenceforward the war became a thing of the past, and its memories were merged into or overshadowed by other events which occurred elsewhere.

We have seen how the struggle shaped itself; how disastrously it was directed; and how devotedly our army maintained it, under very adverse and wholly exceptional circumstances. We allied ourselves to a Potentate whose tenure of power was precarious, whose interests were not our interests, and who only wished to adopt a foreign policy of adventure to reconcile his new subjects to his rule. His armies loyally supported ours in the field, and there we happily formed a sincere respect for the brave French troops who fought by our side. But the Government of Paris,—objecting always to transfer the theatre of war to Asia, where the enemy was really vulnerable,—restricted our field of operations to Europe; and as Austria protected the Russians on the Bessarabian frontier, we were forced at a late period of the year to make a descent upon the Crimea. Unhappily we had made no preparations for such an expedition, and had formed no plan for carrying it out; in fact, such an invasion had not seriously entered into our calculations when we declared war against the Tsar.

Thus, we landed fortuitously at a point where the road led to the north side of Sevastopol, but where no harbours near that town, were at hand to form a base of operations. Hence, without a base, we advanced to our objective, and, in due course, and after a successful battle, we arrived before it. But, on reaching this point, the Commander of our allies was indisposed to carry out the plan to which we had committed ourselves. We therefore shifted our forces by a strange flank march to the south side, in the hope that we might there at least be enabled to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion. Sevastopol was at that time guarded by a small garrison, composed of a medley of indifferent and badly armed troops; it was imperfectly defended towards the land, and in this direction it was an insignificant stronghold. Still, as long as it remained in that state, we hesitated to make any or even the least move against it; we preferred to wait to bring up our siege-train, and to open regular approaches, with the expectation that the town would fall before the cold weather should set in, and put an end to all field operations.

289But we had miscalculated. We did not take into account what a patriotic and energetic garrison might achieve during the unexpected respite granted them, nor did we perceive that we were altering, just as winter was approaching, the whole plan of invasion from an expedition of surprise to the more lengthened process of a regular siege. Thus, under the direction of an Engineer Officer of genius, did Sevastopol assume the proportions of a fortress, while the English and the French were looking idly on; and before they could batter down simultaneously the new works in front of each—which they allowed the enemy to construct,—the Russian forces, drawn from the Danubian Principalities, were hurried by forced marches into the Crimea, to the support of the scanty troops that were then to be found there. The very moment we had meant to deliver our final blow, the enemy’s arrangements were complete, and we had to fight the unequal battle of Inkerman. Although we were victorious there against tremendous odds, the result obliged us to spend the winter on the barren and snow-swept plain of the Chersonese.

For this emergency we were entirely unprepared, and an intensely cold season having begun early, our troops, as we have seen, suffered in consequence. We then hung on to our positions before Sevastopol with strong tenacity of purpose, and with a resolution which is above all praise. But we could not resume the siege till the spring of 1855, and it was early in September before the south side fell. Taught by disaster, we then made every arrangement to continue the struggle with the best prospects of success; but the French, having gained the objects they had in view, became inactive; they clamoured for a cessation of hostilities; and thus, to preserve an alliance into which we had permitted ourselves to be drawn, we signed a peace of little value, and so put an end to the war.

The successes gained were not due to the skill of the Government that directed the struggle; they were solely due to that indomitable bravery, discipline, and power of endurance which have ever characterized our soldiers, as well as to the admirable system which made the British regimental Officers and men second to none that existed at that time in the other European armies.

The results of the war were dearly purchased. According to a return presented to Parliament, 390 Officers and 20,425 Noncommissioned officers and men were killed or died of wounds 290or of disease in the Crimea, and 14,718 men were invalided at the conclusion of the war, bringing the total casualties up to 35,533 of all ranks. But this return omits to include casualties in the Naval brigade and in the Marines (doing duty on land), and in the Commissariat, Transport, and Hospital departments; nor does it seem to give our losses incurred during the disastrous stay in Bulgaria, etc.: so that the figures do not represent the entire losses to which even our Land forces were subjected.^[363] On the other hand, it was computed that the Russians lost as many as half a million men. But this is a surmise, and the facts have never been known. The estimate is probably exaggerated, though it is certain that the enemy’s casualties were exceedingly great; but loss of men is not the greatest calamity that could befall an Empire like Russia.

Two events must be noted here which took place about this time, one of which affected the whole army, and the other the Brigade only. On the death of Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded the Duke of Wellington as Commander-in-Chief in 1852, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was appointed to that high office, and assumed his new functions July 15, 1856—an office which he held without interruption until the 31st of October, 1895, for a space of nearly forty years.

The day before, the following Brigade Order appeared:—

It may be well to explain that, previous to this appointment, orders to the Brigade had been issued by the Field-Officer in 291Brigade Waiting—a Commanding Officer of a Guards Regiment or Battalion, taken by roster—who is always an Officer of the Sovereign’s Household. The effect of the order just quoted, was to place a General Officer in actual command of the Brigade, while the Field Officer in Brigade Waiting was still retained to fulfil the Court duties, he being, as formerly, the direct medium of communication between the Court and the Household Infantry.^[364]

Reductions after the war—Comparison between the situations in Europe, in 1815 and in 1856—Fresh troubles and complications imminent—Many wars and disturbances—Scientific instruction introduced into the army—Practical training of the troops carried out—The material comfort of the soldier attended to—Military activity in England in 1859—The Earl of Strafford succeeded by General Lord Clyde—Death of H.R.H. the Prince Consort—Misunderstanding with the United States of America—Chelsea barracks completed—Marriage of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales—Death of Lord Clyde; succeeded by General Sir W. Gomm—The Brigade of Guards Recruit Establishment—Public duties in London—Fenian troubles in Ireland; the 1st and 2nd Battalions succeed each other there; the Clerkenwell outrage—Reforms in the armament of the British infantry.

The termination of the Crimean war, though it entailed considerable reductions in the army, was not accompanied by the acute distress that marked the close of the great struggle with France in 1815. In the latter case, the country had been seriously engaged with a formidable enemy for twenty years, and was constrained to devote all its resources to crush him. For nearly a generation, Great Britain had been a nation standing in arms, and thriving, so to speak, upon the success of her operations by sea and by land. The sudden cessation of hostilities, and the no less abrupt and violent change from a strong war footing to a small peace establishment, caused a temporary dislocation in trade, and this contributed in no small degree to create an unfortunate effect upon the economic conditions under which the people were then living. Whereas, in the more recent case, we were engaged for a relatively short space of time, and were not involved in efforts which could bear comparison with those we had been obliged to make earlier in the century. Hence we were able to diminish our armaments without incurring the same difficulties that had previously oppressed the industry of the country; and arrangements could be safely made 293to reduce the regular army by 50,000 men, and to disband all those other forces that were brought together for the purposes of the Russian war. On the 1st of November, 1856, the establishment of the Regiment was diminished by some 600 men, and was fixed on the following scale:—

Another difference between the peace of 1815 and that of 1856 is also of sufficient importance to require a notice. The final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo found Europe exhausted by the long wars of the French Revolution; and the Congress of Vienna effected such a settlement among the civilized nations, of apparently so stable a character, that all Governments believed in the certainty of a protracted period of international tranquillity. Nor was this expectation disappointed, and for forty years there were no complications to disturb the political order that had then been established. But the assurance of peace led many to suppose that the era of war had come to an end, and we in this country were inclined to adopt that view—to such an extent, at least, that we deprived the army of some of the departments which are necessary to its existence in the field. So to say, we hid the remnant of the standing army away from the sight of the nation, as an institution almost out of harmony with the spirit of the age, and as an instrument of offence which would scarcely be again required for practical use. The warlike traditions of the past, however, remained in full vigour among the British troops, between 1815 and 1854; nor was there any relaxation of the strict principles of soldierlike bearing and conduct which had been inaugurated and enforced by the Duke of York and by the Duke of Wellington. No troops were more highly disciplined than those that belonged to the British army; among none had the military spirit and tone been so carefully fostered and so fully developed: and it was due to the splendid qualities which had been instilled into them, that the achievements of our men in the Crimea commanded the respect and the admiration of the world. But the knowledge of even elementary military sciences failed us; no instruction beyond drill was given; 294we had little organization, no warlike grouping or cohesion of units, no transport, no real power to take the field or to utilize there the magnificent troops which their Officers had formed. The struggle with Russia had revealed these defects; and, taught in the bitter school of adversity, we were naturally slow, when the peace was signed, to destroy entirely those auxiliary services which had been so painfully created in the midst of war.

Now, the year 1856 was not like its predecessor, the end of a disturbed period; it marked the very commencement of a new era of European complications. The statesmen of the day were filled with no illusions, and were well aware of the unsettled state of affairs which the peace of 1856 had inaugurated. The Italian question was directly raised; Austria lost credit by her weak and vacillating action, and had become despised and isolated; steps to secure the aggrandisement of Prussia were already prepared; the policy of Napoleon III. was obscure and uncertain. Changes in the old landmarks of the Continent and serious trouble loomed in the near future. The threatening aspect of the coming storm, in short, was easy to be discerned: it was only too manifest that England might have to defend her rights, and could not afford, at such a moment, to neglect the affairs of her army and navy.

As events turned out, the war-cloud hovered over the whole world, and oppressed humanity with more or less intensity until 1871. Great Britain had to contend against many difficulties; but they were not of serious importance, except the Indian Mutiny,—which, breaking out unexpectedly in 1857, was not crushed finally until 1859,—and except the rapid advance of Russia across the barren steppes of Central Asia towards the frontiers of our Empire of India. Of our minor troubles, we may note: the Persian war, in 1856-57; the expedition to China, in 1857-61; the subjugation of the Maori natives in New Zealand, 1864; the invasion of Abyssinia, 1867-68; and the threatened dispute with the United States, 1861. In none of these, except the last, was the Brigade of Guards concerned. On the borders of Europe, the Caucasian Switzerland of Circassia was finally overpowered and assimilated with Russia, and the one barrier to her progress in the East was at last swept away, 1859. Nor was America free from disturbance. The United States, torn by dissensions, fought a fratricidal war of secession, 1861-64, that ended in re-establishing the authority of the Northern States over the revolted South; while that political stormy petrel, 295Napoleon III., took part in a policy of adventure, by attempting, though unsuccessfully, to establish French influence, under cover of an Austrian prince, in Mexico. But in Europe itself the trouble was greater: France and Sardinia attacked Austria in Lombardy in 1859, and forced her to relinquish her possession of that province; Italy also rose in rebellion against the Princes that then ruled her States, and was consolidated into one kingdom under Victor Emanuel, our late ally in the Crimea. In 1859, also, Napoleon III. showed considerable animosity against England, and it was thought by many that there would be war with France. In 1864, Austria and Prussia joined to wrest the Duchies of Schleswig Holstein from Denmark: and two years later, having quarrelled over the booty, they came to blows, when Prussia defeated her rival hopelessly in the short and sharp campaign of a few weeks' duration in Bohemia, and acquired a complete ascendency over Germany. Italy, at the same time also, was enabled by foreign aid, to compel Austria to surrender her hold on Venetia. Then came the great war of 1870-71, when France and Prussia, regarding each with mutual jealousy and international hatred, engaged in deathly strife, that resulted in the fall of Napoleon, in the signal defeat of France, and in the refounding of the German Empire under the autocracy of Prussia.

The results of these constant contests upon our own army were not, of course, immediately apparent, nor could they produce a decided effect all at once upon the course of our military administration. But sufficient has been said to show that there were obvious reasons why the lethargy which affected the vital concerns of the forces of the Crown in 1815, was not reproduced in 1856, and how it came about that the nation began to take an increased interest in these most important affairs.

The Officers of the British army formed at that time a competent body. Taken from a class where the best leaders of men might be expected to be found, trained in the manly school of field sports and of outdoor exercises, brought up to early habits of obedience and of discipline, and endowed with the faculty of commanding the respect and the confidence of their subordinates, they were as well qualified to manage the rank and file placed under them in peace time, as they were conspicuous for their bravery and for the good example they set when danger pressed, or when difficulties were to be overcome in war time. One thing only did 296they lack—they had little scientific knowledge of their profession. To remedy this grave deficiency, a Council of Military Education was appointed in May, 1857, to superintend the system of education introduced among the Officers, and the examinations of candidates for admission to the service. It cannot be stated that this subject had been entirely ignored in the past, but it had been little regarded. After 1857, however, considerable attention was given to it, and the new system eventually expanded to its present dimensions—adding, in fact, to the army, as part of itself, a military University, where degrees are bestowed upon graduates, in their various ranks, who pass its examinations. These degrees attesting the scientific and theoretical proficiency of the candidates then became a necessary qualification for promotion in the service, at first to the rank of Captain only, but subsequently to a higher grade. In this respect, the policy has rather been to form an examining Board, for the purpose of testing the acquirements of Officers, than to institute something more akin to a teaching University, with the result that what is called “cramming” (or hasty learning of special subjects) has been largely increased, to the detriment perhaps of a more solid system of instruction. At any rate, whilst the old leaven of manhood and of common sense which has ever characterized the body of British Officers has not been weakened, a form of education calculated to teach technical and scientific duties in the field has been accepted with gratitude and satisfaction.

This important reform was supplemented by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the new Commander-in-Chief, who carried on the work, initiated by his predecessor, Lord Hardinge, which had been strongly urged by H.R.H. the Prince Consort. The camp of instruction established at Chobham in 1853 was moved to Aldershot, in the midst of a wide extent of heather country; the Crimean huts were erected there, and the head-quarters of a new military district were formed, where manœuvres could be undertaken by large bodies of troops, and where the men could be taught practically their numerous duties in the field. As will be seen, Guards Battalions were often sent there for this purpose. Nor was musketry neglected. Officers were told off as instructors in the art of correct shooting with the rifle that had been introduced into the service; every soldier was trained individually in its use, in a systematic way and in accordance with the regulations laid down at the School of Instruction established at Hythe; 297parties, moreover, of Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men were constantly sent there to undergo a course of musketry, and receive a certificate of efficiency in that very necessary branch of their military training.^[365]

It has been noted that General Sir W. Codrington utilized the time when warlike operations practically ceased in the Crimea, by directing that all British soldiers should be put through an efficient course of musketry. After the war, the Guards continued to shoot on the range at Kilburn, but in 1859 a camp was formed for them at Ash, where rifle practice was carried out by companies, sent there in succession from the Battalions in England during the spring and summer months. Next year a Mounted Officer with a regular staff took command of the camp. Though Ash and Aldershot were the usual places selected for the Guards' musketry, companies were also sometimes sent to Eastbourne and to Gravesend for this purpose.

In the winter months marching was practised, and great gun drill was taught.^[366] In 1861, gymnastic training was introduced, 298and in September of that year, sergeants from the Brigade were sent through a course, so as to qualify as instructors. A gymnasium was about this time first constructed at St. John’s Wood barracks, and companies were required to go there for a few weeks at a time. The gymnasium at Chelsea barracks was ready in 1865, and another at Windsor in 1870. The physical development of their men had before this been a special interest to the Officers of the Brigade, who endeavoured to introduce a system of outdoor gymnastics in the Guards, as far back as 1843. The practice, however, on being objected to by the Duke of Wellington, was given up.^[367]

It should be mentioned here that signalling courses were not introduced into the army until 1869. Much attention was then immediately given to this subject in the Brigade, and the Battalions of Foot Guards were frequently complimented upon the efficiency they displayed as signallers.

While military training in many of its various important aspects was eagerly attended to, and was put upon a basis from which it could receive its proper development, the material comforts and welfare of the men were not neglected.^[368] The cooking arrangements of the men in the Crimea had been signally defective, as much on account of the conditions under which they were placed, as by reason of the very little knowledge which they had of the subject. This, no doubt, was a serious want, and it militated against the health of the soldier. A school of cookery was established at Aldershot in 1862, and Non-commissioned officers were sent there to be trained in the new system then adopted. Considerable interest was taken in this matter in the Brigade, reports were frequently called for, and experimental stoves set up to secure the best results combined with economy. Sergeant Cooks were appointed in the Coldstream—in the 1st Battalion, December, 1863, and in the 2nd Battalion, in the following March; but it was not until May, 1868, that the establishment of the Regiment was increased by two sergeants for this purpose, nor was it until May of the year before, that the assistant cooks were 299struck off other duties. As part of the same subject, it may be noted that the Commissariat Store at Chelsea barracks for the bread and meat to be issued to the troops in London, was established December 1, 1865, and an inspecting board of three Officers met daily to examine and to report upon the supplies furnished by the contractors.

Reforms in the canteen system were introduced shortly after the Crimean war. In conformity with instructions contained in the Quartermaster-General’s letter of the 30th of November, 1857, boards of Regimental Field-Officers were assembled quarterly to revise the prices of articles sold, and to report upon the canteens inspected by them. The accounts were examined more frequently, and suggestions were invited as to the management of these institutions. In 1864, groceries began to be supplied to the messes, so that the men might only pay wholesale instead of retail prices, and married soldiers were encouraged to take advantage of the low cost of articles sold there. As the management became more efficient, the profits rose, and with this fund at the disposal of Commanding Officers, a great deal was done for the benefit of the men,—books and newspapers supplied at the various metropolitan Guards, extra food provided on long field days, being some of the items of expenditure that first appear to have received the sanction of the authorities.

Nor should we omit to draw attention to the encouragement given to outdoor games and amusements. Officers have always been inclined, naturally, to introduce among their men the healthy exercises which they themselves were taught at school, and which they continued to indulge in after joining the service. Thus cricket was well known, and we have seen that during the Russian war it was not neglected. Football, however, was not as common then as it is now, nor had some other forms of athletic sports taken a firm root in the public schools forty years ago. But as they became better known there, so did they grow in popularity among the troops—as also did boating at Windsor,—until at last they have become well recognized institutions, to the great benefit of the men, and to the immense advantage of the army. Hunting has always been a favourite pastime among Officers, and where it is not sufficiently available they often establish a drag hunt of their own. This was done at Windsor, in the winter of 1856-57, mainly by the Coldstream, whose 2nd Battalion was then quartered 300there. This institution flourishes to the present day. When the Brigade had the out-quarter at Shorncliffe, as will be seen further on, another drag hunt was also established there, but on leaving that station it had to come to an end.

On the 17th of July, 1856, at the suggestion of the Major-General Commanding the Brigade of Guards (Lord Rokeby), the Battalions who had just returned from the Crimea applied for new Colours, and, on the 27th of February following, the old Colours which had seen service in Russia were deposited, escorted by Guards of Honour of the usual strength, in the Royal Military Chapel at Wellington barracks.

Owing to the death of Colonel Gordon Drummond, Colonel Newton was promoted Major, and took command of the 2nd Battalion, November 18, 1856.

On the 3rd of March, 1857, the 1st Coldstream relieved the 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards at Aldershot (the 1st Grenadiers having been removed to Town from that camp in December), and returned to London at the autumn change of quarters (September 1st), when the 2nd Coldstream proceeded to Dublin, and the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards to Portsmouth. On the return of the latter (November 20th) the Brigade was again quartered in their usual stations, viz. four Battalions in the West-end and the other three in the Tower, Windsor, and the out-quarter (Dublin).^[369] After this time, Battalions were frequently sent to Aldershot for the purpose of receiving practical instruction, but not to be stationed there for merely general duty.^[370] About this time also—that is, between the 1st of September and the 7th of December, 1857—the Brigade furnished a detachment of about 200 Officers and men at Deptford, where occasional duty had been done by it, as we have seen, between 1815 and 1854.

SERGEANT 1775.

OFFICER 1795.

N.R. Wilkinson del.        Mintern Bros. Chromo.

While the Indian Mutiny obliged Government to strengthen 301the army in India, drafts were collected at Colchester and Canterbury to be sent out to the East as they were required. In April, 1858, fourteen Ensigns of the Brigade (three from the 1st Coldstream) were sent to these places to look after the men that were assembled there. The following letter, dated July 3rd, from the Adjutant-General to Lord Rokeby, was published and ordered by the latter to be entered in the Regimental records:—

The 2nd Coldstream, returning from Dublin to London, September 1, 1858, brought a record of services performed in Ireland which was embodied in a Garrison Order, dated Dublin, August 30, 1858:—

302Colonel Hon. G. Upton, C.B., appointed Major-General, October 26, 1858, was succeeded by Colonel Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment; thereupon Colonel Newton assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Spencer Perceval, promoted to the rank of Major, was posted to command the 2nd Battalion.

As previously mentioned, events in the year 1859 produced the impression that Napoleon III. was about to declare war against us, and visions of invasion began to haunt us. Considerable military activity was displayed at this time. Second battalions to twenty-five regiments of the Line, and third and fourth battalions to the two Rifle regiments, the 60th and Rifle Brigade, were raised and incorporated into the army: we find also that, early in the year, the Brigade was called upon to furnish Non-commissioned officers that could be spared, as drill instructors to train the men of some of these new corps. Of these, the Coldstream supplied four to the 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment, at Newport, February, 1859. Nor was the condition of the Militia neglected, and Field-Officers of the Guards, who had been sent to inspect the regiments when embodied, were more frequently employed on this duty about this time. Now, in 1803, when Napoleon I. threatened to make a descent upon our coasts from his great camp at Boulogne, bodies of Volunteers were raised to watch our shores. The same thing happened in 1859, and, although our danger was scarcely real, yet so strongly impressed were the people with the facilities of transit across the narrow channel, which steam would give an invader, and so convinced were they of the power and of the evil designs of the French Emperor, that they began spontaneously to form rifle corps for the defence of the country. This was the commencement of the Volunteer movement which has now developed into an important auxiliary branch of the forces of the Crown intended for service at home. Its usefulness in the field has not yet been practically tested, and we may well pray that the day when it must meet an enemy on our own soil, may never come. But the influence it commands, by strengthening the ties that bind the military and the civil elements, by rendering the regular army popular, and by therefore facilitating the recruitment of a good class of man, is well known; while the self-sacrifice of many who devote their leisure to martial exercises, without prospect of reward, is creditable to the British character, and tends to 303spread a wider interest in military affairs than was formerly the case.

In the summer of 1859, many of the Officers of the Brigade were employed in reporting upon the numerous ranges which had been proposed as suitable sites for rifle practice. This duty did not cease until the beginning of 1862, when facilities for musketry existed in almost every district, and when the exercise became a popular pastime throughout the country. A National Rifle Association was formed, and a Volunteer camp established at Wimbledon (1860), where shooting competitions took place. The meetings continued year after year with ever-growing popularity, and detachments of Guardsmen were sent from London to perform the military duties in camp and on the ranges. Colonel Tower (Coldstream Guards) was the first Field-Officer selected to command these detachments, in 1865, and since then the Brigade has regularly furnished an Officer of that rank for this purpose, to attend the Rifle meetings, and, later (from 1874), to command the camp.

As far back as 1860, the drill of Officers of the Militia and Volunteers was often superintended by Officers of the Brigade of Guards. In October, 1870, moreover, schools of instruction were established at the Tower and at Wellington barracks, which were eventually consolidated into one, where Officers of the auxiliary forces, having passed a practical course in drill, can obtain a certificate to that effect. Colonel Hon. R. Monck (Coldstream Guards) was the first Commandant of the school at Wellington barracks.^[371]

The Coldstream, having lost their Colonel by the death of Field Marshal Earl of Strafford, the chief command of the Regiment was bestowed upon General Lord Clyde, G.C.B., June 22, 1860, better known by the men in the Crimea, as Sir Colin Campbell. After the war with Russia, this very distinguished Officer was employed in India, where, appointed Commander-in-chief, he took a conspicuous part in the suppression of the 304Mutiny. Several other changes occurred in the Regiment about this time. On the promotion of Colonel Lord F. Paulet, C.B., to the rank of Major-General, Colonel Newton became Lieutenant-Colonel, whereupon Colonel S. Perceval assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Steele, C.B., appointed Major, of the 2nd (December 13, 1860). In a few months, however, there was another change; Colonel Perceval was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, when Colonel Steele was posted to the 1st Battalion, and was succeeded by Colonel Wood in the 2nd (July 2, 1861).

On the 1st of April, 1861, Major-General Lord Rokeby retired, and the command of the Brigade devolved upon Major-General Craufurd. Shortly afterwards (June 27th) a Major of Brigade was appointed in the Foot Guards, and the new post was given to the senior Adjutant, Captain and Adjutant Gordon, Scots Fusilier Guards.

In December, 1861, the whole country was plunged into deep mourning by the premature death of the Prince Consort. It is less than the truth to say that all hearts were moved with profound grief for the Queen in this, the greatest of domestic afflictions; and at the decease of a patriot Prince, whose sage counsels had so often ably directed Her Majesty in many important matters, and who had done so much for the intellectual elevation and the material advancement of her people. The sorrow of the nation was felt nowhere more strongly than among the Guards, who thereby lost their Senior Colonel, and whose inalienable privilege it is to share, as part of the Sovereign’s Household, the trials as well as the joys that visit the Royal Family.

This most sad misfortune happened at a moment of a misunderstanding with the United States of America, when it was apprehended that war might break out between the two countries, and when an expedition was being fitted out to defend Canada should the crisis assume an acute stage. It is scarcely necessary to go into the details of the dispute, well known as the “Trent affair,” for the Coldstream took no part in the operations which followed. Suffice it to say that two Battalions of the Brigade (1st Grenadiers and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards, under Major-General Lord F. Paulet) were shipped to British North America, December 19th, and remained there until the autumn of 1864. Fortunately peace was preserved, and the expedition, while watching proceedings during the civil war that was then raging 305in the States, assumed the character of a movement of troops from one part of the British Empire to another, for ordinary purposes.^[372]

The 1st Battalion Coldstream, having gone to Dublin in October, 1861, did not return to London until the next change of quarters in April following, and so, for the first few months of 1862, there were but three Battalions in the West-end, while the Tower was occupied by a Line Regiment (the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Buffs). To lighten the duties, the latter furnished a detachment at Wellington barracks, which occasionally supplied the guards at Kensington Palace, the Magazine, and at the British Museum. In April, 1862, the full complement of four Battalions did duty in the West-end, and Dublin was given up as a Guards station. On the return of the Canadian expedition the Tower was again occupied by Guards, and the out-quarter was transferred to Shorncliffe. Chelsea barracks, designed as we have seen in 1855, were ready for occupation in the autumn of 1863, and an entire Battalion and a few companies of another were stationed there. Subsequently, the head-quarters of the latter, transferred from St. George’s, were also placed in these barracks; while Portman Street had been given up in September, 1863. The new wing of Wellington barracks had been occupied prior to this date, and was opened shortly after the Crimean war, as we have seen.^[373] Thus considerably more space was obtained for the Brigade in London, which was distributed almost as is the case in the present day.^[374] It is only necessary to add that the small barracks at the Magazine were vacated, and handed over to the police authorities on the 21st of December, 1866; that those at St. John’s Wood ceased to be occupied by the Foot Guards about the year 1876; and that Windsor barracks, which was a crowded and unsuitable 306building for a whole Battalion, were greatly improved and enlarged, and were ready for occupation in 1868.

On the 9th of November, 1862, Colonel Steele, was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, vice Colonel S. Perceval, appointed Major-General; the command of the 1st Battalion then devolved upon Colonel Mark Wood, and that of the 2nd Battalion upon Colonel Dudley Carleton.

Many remember the marriage of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales to the Princess Alexandra of Denmark, March 10, 1863, and the enthusiasm and joy evoked throughout the length and breadth of the land at the auspicious and popular event. Her Royal Highness arrived in London on the 7th, and proceeded to Windsor, where the ceremony was performed, and the following military arrangements were made for her reception in the Metropolis. The 3rd Grenadiers furnished a Guard of Honour at Bricklayers Arms Railway Station, the remainder of the Battalion being in column of wings in front of St. James’s Palace; the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, then at the Tower, were formed outside the station; the 2nd Coldstream Guards in Waterloo Place lining the streets, with a Guard of Honour (the Queen’s Guard strengthened to the usual complement) near the Palace, and at right angles to the Grenadiers. The 1st Scots Fusilier Guards were in line near Hyde Park Corner; the Park was occupied by some 17,000 Volunteers; and the 2nd Grenadiers were stationed at the Marble Arch, and had a Guard of Honour at Paddington Station. The 1st Coldstream, then quartered at Windsor, sent a Guard of Honour to Slough. At the Royal wedding on the 10th, the Brigade was fully represented; the 2nd Grenadier Guards (in which Regiment His Royal Highness had served) found a Guard of Honour at St. George’s Chapel; the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards furnished another at the railway station on departure; and the 1st Coldstream, besides providing two Guards of Honour, one at the State Entrance of the Castle, and the other at the Chapel, were also present. The Berkshire Volunteers, moreover, had a Guard of Honour outside the gates of the Castle. The Guards Battalions quartered in London celebrated the occasion by parading in Hyde Park, where the 2nd and 3rd Grenadiers and the 2nd Coldstream fired a feu de joie, while the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards kept the ground. The day was observed as a general holiday throughout the country, and all classes joined to express their heart-felt congratulations 307on the happy alliance which had been made by the Heir Apparent of the Throne.^[375]

Nor ought we to forget to mention that a ball was given by the Brigade in the Exhibition buildings, June 26th,^[376] to the Prince and Princess of Wales, in honour of the Royal marriage that had just taken place; the Guard of Honour to receive Their Royal Highnesses was furnished by the 1st Scots Fusilier Guards.

Several changes occurred in the command of the Brigade and Regiment during this same year (1863). On the 25th of June, Lord F. Paulet, having returned from Canada, was appointed Major-General of the Brigade of Guards vice Lieut.-General Craufurd.

At the death of General Lord Clyde, General Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., succeeded him as Colonel (August 15, 1863), and was thus again posted to the Coldstream Guards, which he had joined as a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel just before the battle of Waterloo, and with which he had served up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, until January, 1837, when he was promoted Major-General. Colonel Steele, moreover, relinquishing the command of the Coldstream (November 24th), the Lieutenant-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Wood, when Colonel Carleton was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion, and Colonel Stepney, C.B., to that of the 2nd Battalion.

Just at this moment, also, the Regiment lost their Bandmaster. Mr. Charles Godfrey, who died much regretted in December, having joined the Coldstream fifty years before (in 1813). This excellent musician had efficiently conducted the Band ever since 1825.^[377]

We have seen that hitherto, when promotion took place, and when the Senior Major either left the Regiment or was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, the Junior Major was invariably transferred 308to command the 1st Battalion, and the Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, promoted Major to fill up the vacancy created, was posted to that of the 2nd Battalion. The same rule prevailed as regards the Acting-Majors (Mounted Officers), so that the senior and the third senior always belonged to the 1st Battalion, and the second and fourth seniors to the 2nd. It had also prevailed among the Adjutants up to the first Canadian expedition in 1838, but then it seemed to lapse as far as they were concerned, in the Coldstream at least. This custom was abolished on the 19th of January, 1864, when the following Order was issued:—

The following list shows the Officers belonging to the Regiment in January, 1865:—

Colonel.—General Sir William Gomm, G.C.B.

Lieut.-Colonel.—Colonel Mark Wood.

Majors.—Colonel Dudley Carleton; Colonel A. Herbert-Stepney, C.B.

Captains.—Colonels J. Airey, C.B.; W. G. Dawkins; C. W. Strong; Hon. H. Hardinge, C.B. (Mounted).

Lieut.-Colonels Hon. P. Feilding; W. Reeve; C. Baring; J. H. Le Couteur; H. Armytage; G. Goodlake, V.C.; H. Tower; A. Fremantle; Colonel Hon. W. Feilding; P. Crawley; M. Heneage; C. Blackett; G. FitzRoy; J. Conolly, V.C.; Hon. R. Monck; Hon. W. Boyle.

Lieutenants.—Captains C. Greenhill; H. C. Jervoise; Hon. H. Campbell; Julian Hall; G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Hon. W. Edwardes; H. Lane; W. F. Seymour; Hon. E. Legge (Adjutant); E. S. Burnell; Hon. G. Windsor-Clive; R. Thursby; N. Burnand; FitzRoy Fremantle; F. Buller; E. Reeve; H. Bonham-Carter; Hugh Fortescue (Adjutant); J. F. Hathorn (I. of M.); H. Herbert (I. of M.); H. Brand; Denzil Baring; Hon. F. Howard; R. Cathcart; C. Lee-Mainwaring.

Ensigns.—Lieutenants Hon. V. Dawson; E. Chaplin; Sir E. Hamilton, Bart.; G. FitzRoy Smyth; Lord Wallscourt; H. R. Eyre; J. B. Sterling; G. G. Macpherson; C. Thomas; Hon. J. Vesey; Hon. F. Wellesley; Hon. H. Legge; R. Hall; A. Farquhar; C. Alexander; W. Ramsden.

309Quartermasters.—A. Hurle; and A. Falconer.

Surgeon-Major.—J. Wyatt. Battalion Surgeon.—C. V. Cay. Assistant-Surgeons.—J. W. Trotter; R. Farquharson; A. B. R. Myers.

Solicitor.—R. Broughton, Esq.

To persons living in the present day it may perhaps seem strange to hear of the rigid social laws which were current in our fathers' time against smoking. This indulgence was regarded, only a few decades ago, as a more or less uncivilized habit, which might be enjoyed on occasions in the privacy of a man’s own apartments or in some far-away room of a country house, out of sight of all general society, but never to be countenanced in public. Hence, Officers on any sort of duty were not allowed the use of tobacco even during hours of relaxation, and there were stringent rules against the practice on the Queen’s Guard. In 1838, for instance, attention is drawn to orders on that subject there, and again in 1844:—

Nearly six years later the rule was modified, in that the prohibition only applied to the mess room in the Palace, and the Captain’s certificate was altered accordingly.^[379] The Crimean War, no doubt, did a great deal to destroy the old prejudice which existed on the subject; for British Officers learnt the advantages of the weed in the trenches, and were in close quarters with habitual smokers, the Turks and the French. Still tobacco was not permitted in the barrack rooms, and, early in 1859, the Medical Officers were seriously called upon to report whether smoking there would be likely to prove deleterious to the health of the men. It was not until October 28, 1864, that leave was given to soldiers to smoke in the barrack rooms from the dinner hour to tattoo.

It has already been mentioned that the recruit establishment of the Brigade had been transferred to Croydon in 1833, and there it remained for thirty years, except only that the Grenadier section was moved to St. John’s Wood barracks during the war 310with Russia, from March, 1854, to the 18th of June, 1856. On the 1st of April, 1863, the recruits of the three Regiments were taken to St. John’s Wood, for the purpose of receiving gymnastic training, until the 2nd of August, 1865, when they proceeded to Warley.^[380] During all this time the establishment was under the command of a resident Officer (Lieutenant and Captain), who took the duty there for a fortnight (at St. John’s Wood for a week). Considerable responsibility rested upon the Regimental Drill-Sergeant for the training of the men, and several orders attest the fact that these Non-commissioned officers did their work faithfully and efficiently. In 1870, a permanent Commandant was appointed, when Lieut.-Colonel Moncrieff, Scots Fusilier Guards, assumed the new post (November 28th), and, soon after, another Officer was told off to perform the duties of Adjutant, the resident Subaltern still remaining for a fortnight as Piquet Officer. Besides the Medical Officer, and a Quartermaster who was added later (in 1885), this staff of Officers was all that looked after the Depôt until 1893, when it was again enlarged. On the 12th of April, 1875, a board was assembled at Caterham to view and report upon a site for the Guards Depôt, and this new quarter was occupied on the 23rd of October, 1877. The Senior Drill-Sergeant,^[381] appointed Acting Sergeant-Major, May 5, 1881, was promoted Sergeant-Major on July 1st following. The Depôt then contained a Sergeant-Major, a Quartermaster-Sergeant, an Orderly Room Clerk, four Colour-Sergeants, four Sergeants, twelve Corporals, and two Drummers; and these men remained “on the rolls of their respective Battalions for promotion and married leave.”

In 1866 the public duties in London were reduced, and in July they stood as follows:—

311The years 1866 and 1867 are chiefly marked in the domestic history of the country by the troubles in Ireland, and by the efforts of a secret society, called the Fenians, to stir up rebellion and serious disturbances, not only in that island but in England also. The Fenian body, born and nurtured in the United States, had for some years been endeavouring to infect the mass of Irishmen distributed throughout the whole of the United Kingdom with their pernicious doctrines; and in a sense they accomplished their object by intensifying a feeling that had existed for many a generation between the Celtic and Saxon populations, into one of extreme bitterness and animosity. Beyond this, however, they achieved no immediate success; the illegal and violent measures they advocated, while they caused a momentary panic among the peaceably disposed, soon recoiled upon those who perpetrated them. Hence, the movement speedily dwindled into insignificance, though it left behind a residue of secret organization, which at no distant date was to support another agitation, that again was destined to disturb the country.

In the beginning of 1866, the usual spring change of quarters in the Brigade had been ordered to take place on the 1st of March; the 1st Coldstream was to move from Chelsea to another station in the West-end, and the 2nd Battalion from the Tower to Shorncliffe. But the troubles in Ireland were then giving cause for much anxiety, and the order was not executed. It was known that some few men belonging to Line Regiments had secretly joined the Fenians; it was feared that an armed rising might take place; an attempt to seize Chester Castle had just been frustrated (February 13th), and a Battalion of the Scots Fusilier Guards had been hurriedly despatched there to protect the place. A Guards Battalion was thus urgently required in Dublin, and on the 20th of February the 1st Coldstream were sent there at twenty-four hours' notice, “the sick, boys, and men unfit for active service” being attached to the 2nd Battalion. Shorncliffe was therefore given up as the Guards' out-quarter.

The stay of the 1st Battalion in Ireland during the year, cannot 312be termed a pleasant one. Preserving the public peace against the machinations of a secret band of conspirators who succeeded temporarily in deluding a portion of the people, and in partially alienating them from their legitimate rulers, is a duty too nearly allied to the police service to be a favourite one with soldiers. The work, however, was well performed by the Battalion, and this is attested by the following order, which was issued by the Major-General Commanding the Brigade, on the 6th of March, 1867, when their tour of duty was completed in Dublin, and when they returned to London:—

Lord Strathnairn’s Memorandum ran thus:^[383]—

The 2nd Coldstream relieved the 1st Battalion early in 1867, and also remained in Ireland for twelve months under conditions nearly similar to those that existed in 1866. At the end of this period, 313the Lieutenant-Colonel was able to express to the Regiment the high opinion entertained by the General Commanding the Forces of the 2nd Battalion, and his own gratification at this good opinion “during trying times, and when the men were exposed to mischievous temptations.”^[384]

Nor had the Battalions of the Brigade stationed in London an easy time during these two years (1866-1867), for they too were harassed by popular effervescence. A reform bill was before the country, and many demagogues, attended by their followers, found it easy to disturb the public peace. Towards the end of July, 1866, the troops were confined to their quarters; a wing of the 2nd Coldstream occupied Knightsbridge barracks during the day; the Major-General took post at the Magazine, to receive reports should anything extraordinary happen; the piquets were increased; a magistrate was placed in every London barrack, and for a few days all Officers on leave were recalled. Next year, the fear of riots still haunted the authorities, and on several occasions the public duties were doubled. But this was little when compared with the excitement produced by the explosion at the Clerkenwell House of Detention on the 13th of December—an outrage of a vile type, perpetrated by the Fenians for the purpose of terrorizing the Government. Immediate steps were taken to defend the Metropolis from a repetition of another such dastardly attempt upon the lives of innocent persons, and for nearly a month the troops were busily engaged, while the ordinary military exercises, marches, gun drill, and gymnastic courses were suspended. A guard was immediately sent to Clerkenwell, of 100 rank and file, under three Officers; sentries carried their rifles loaded; strong piquets, of 100 men under a Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel, were mounted daily in the principal barracks; half the Officers doing duty were held available for any sudden emergency, from five in the afternoon till eleven o’clock at night; the Captain of the Queen’s Guard was made responsible for calling upon the nearest piquet to turn out in case of disturbance; a guard was furnished at Millbank prison, and over the small-arm factories in London; signal communication by rockets was established between 314the barracks and where an attack might be expected; a party of the 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards was despatched to Cowes and to Osborne; the Bank piquet remained on duty for twenty-four hours on Sundays and on Christmas day, and all leave and furloughs were suspended. At the Tower, moreover, where the 1st Coldstream were quartered, the Officer of the main guard patrolled round the ditches and wharves during the night. These arrangements were not relaxed till the 11th of January, 1868, and things did not resume their normal course until somewhat later. But as a net result of the Clerkenwell outrage, it may be mentioned that the metropolitan barracks were put in telegraphic communication with the Horse Guards, and the work was completed in March, 1868. By an order of the 31st of December, 1867, also, two Non-commissioned officers per Battalion were told off to be instructed in the duties of telegraphist.

In 1867, the Sultan of Turkey came to England, and in 1869 his nominal vassal, the Khedive (the Viceroy of Egypt), did the same thing. There were reviews upon these occasions in their honour, and other martial displays; but these visits, though of political importance, need not further be alluded to here, since, in a military sense, they entailed only the ordinary duties performed by the Brigade when a foreign Sovereign is received in State by Her Majesty the Queen.

Between 1866 and 1871 the following changes took place in the command of the Regiment. In May, 1866, Colonel Wood having retired, Colonel Dudley Carleton became Lieutenant-Colonel, and thereupon Colonel Airey, promoted Major, assumed the command of the 1st Battalion, under the rule of the 19th of January, 1864, already quoted; while Colonel Stepney remained with the 2nd Battalion, until the 14th of August, when, retiring on half-pay, he was succeeded by Colonel Strong. The latter also shortly afterwards (March 15, 1867) went on half-pay, and the command of this Battalion devolved upon Colonel Hon. A. Hardinge; on the 23rd of October following, Colonel Hon. Percy Feilding was promoted Major, commanding the 1st Battalion, Colonel Airey having left the Regiment. Colonel Hardinge succeeded Colonel Carleton as Lieutenant-Colonel, September 2, 1868, when Colonel C. Baring was posted to the command of the 2nd Battalion. Shortly afterwards the establishment of the Regiment was reduced by one Major, and the following Brigade Order was issued on 315the 29th of May, 1869, to direct how this reduction should be brought about—

The opportunity to give effect to this order did not come in the Coldstream until January 4, 1871, when, on the retirement of Colonel Hardinge, Colonel Hon. P. Feilding, C.B., was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, and still retained the command of the 1st Battalion. Colonel C. Baring remained in command of the 2nd Battalion until the 13th of August, 1872, when, retiring on half-pay, he was succeeded by Colonel Goodlake, V.C.

In the Brigade, Lord Frederick Paulet, C.B., was succeeded by Major-General Hon. J. Lindsay (January 29, 1867), and during the period of his command the Guards Institute, near Vauxhall Bridge Road, was opened by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, July 11, 1867, as “a convenient place of refreshment, resort, amusement, and occupation for Non-commissioned officers and men stationed in London.” This club only flourished a few years, and was closed in 1872, when the building was bought by Cardinal Manning, and was converted by him into the present residence of the Archbishop of Westminster. General Lindsay also promoted a military industrial exhibition, which took place in Chelsea barracks on the 9th of July, 1868; but on that date Major-General Hamilton, C.B., had already succeeded him in the command of the Brigade, having assumed it on the 1st of April. The latter, promoted Lieutenant-General, left, April 1, 1870, and Major-General, H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, C.B., was then appointed in his place.

Of changes in the uniform of the Regiment, the following may be noted: On the 6th of December, 1859, it was ordered that the 316chin-straps of the bearskins were to be worn under and not on the chin; but this method, apparently, was not long maintained in force. A mess dress was authorized for the Officers of the Brigade, January 30, 1864. Silver stars on the forage cap, and sling belts were to be worn by the Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster-Sergeant, Bandmaster, Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry, Drum-Major, Band-Sergeant, Drill Sergeants, Regimental Orderly Room Clerk, Assistant Regimental Clerk, Battalion Orderly Room Clerk, Hospital-Sergeant, Armourer-Sergeant, Master-Tailor, and the Sergeant of Cooks, April 25, 1870. Lastly, on the 28th of June, 1872, gold cords on the shoulders of the Officers' tunics were substituted for the red silk cord which was worn on one side to secure the sash.

A Regimental Order, dated April 18, 1871, possesses an interest to the Coldstream, which requires a place in this account of their services:—

In October, 1871, the names of the Officers posted to the two Battalions were:—

317

This chapter should not conclude without making some mention of the new armament introduced into the British infantry during the period under review. The Danish war, 1864, and more especially the Austro-Prussian struggle of 1866, revealed the immense superiority possessed by troops in the field who were supplied with the breech-loading rifle, over those that still retained the muzzle-loader. In the campaigns which have taken place between the two Germanic Powers, it has been remarked that Prussia has more than once been provided with better war matériel than her antagonist. In the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great had an iron ramrod, the Austrians a wooden one, and the advantages he gained thereby were not inconsiderable. So in the Bohemian campaign of 1866, the Prussians were armed with a breech-loader, and the mass of fire they were able to develop on the battle-field was much greater and far more effective than their enemy could return against them. The great importance of this military question had not been neglected in England, and the object-lesson caused by the struggle in Central Europe stimulated the authorities to greater exertions. While, therefore, we were considering what pattern of breech-loading rifle we should finally adopt, immediate steps were taken to hurry on the conversion of 318the Enfield into the Snider breech-loader, so that by the end of 1866 Commanding Officers of Guards Regiments were directed to send in requisitions for the new converted weapon (December 19th). The rifle eventually adopted was the Henry-Martini, which was served out to the Coldstream in October, 1874. In time, the latter was discarded for the small-bore magazine breech-loader (the Lee-Metford .303 Rifle), and this was issued to the Regiment early in 1890. Immediately afterwards, the ordinary black powder, which had been in use for many centuries, was replaced by the present cordite, a smokeless nitro-explosive.

OFFICER 1839.

OFFICER 1849.

N. R. Wilkinson del.     A.D. Innes & C^o. London.     Mintern Bros. Chromo.

Effect produced in England by the military successes of Prussia—Short service and the reserve system introduced—Abolition of army purchase—Abolition of the double rank in the Foot Guards—Substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign or Cornet—Manœuvres and summer drills—Changes in the drill-book—Illness and recovery of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales—Death of Surgeon-Major Wyatt, and of Field-Marshal Sir W. Gomm—General Sir W. Codrington appointed Colonel of the Coldstream Guards—Death of Captains Hon. R. Campbell and R. Barton—Company training—Pirbright Camp established—Medical service in the Brigade—Change in the establishment of the Regiment—Death of Sir W. Codrington, and appointment of General Sir Thomas Steele as Colonel—Troubles in Ireland—Alarm in London—The Royal Military Chapel.

The wars that disturbed the Continent could not fail to rouse the serious attention of every thinking man in this country, and to make all look closely into the causes which had brought about very unexpected results. Englishmen were not surprised at the ease with which the great Germanic Powers overcame the resistance of Denmark, in 1864: nor yet, indeed, to see Austria driven from Lombardy when Napoleon III. set himself to the task, in 1859; because the alliance which we had contracted with the French in 1854, taught us to respect their army, and to believe they possessed a system and organization which placed them at the head of the military nations of Europe. But the struggles of 1866 and 1870-71 were of a very different nature. In the first case, we saw Prussia suddenly emerge from a small peace to a strong war establishment, strike swiftly and surely the minor States of Germany, and swoop down on Bohemia, where, meeting an enemy apparently worthy of her steel, and of about equal numerical strength to herself, she annihilated his forces in a few weeks, and obliged him to conclude a peace almost before he knew that fighting had commenced. In the second case, we again 320saw Prussia, in union this time with the smaller Germanic States, arm herself with even greater rapidity than before, concentrate her large armies on the frontier of France, invade the territories of her formidable rival, and lock up the bulk of the hostile forces in the fortress of Metz, while she captured the remainder at Sedan. These astounding successes occurred when scarcely two months had elapsed after the declaration of the war, and the course of hostilities was so favourable to the invader that, in less than seven months, France lay prostrate at the feet of Prussia, and was obliged to sue for terms of peace, humiliating to her national pride and derogatory to her great position in Europe.

No statesman could neglect to examine the causes of these stupendous events, and the institutions which had rendered them capable of realization: no soldier could abstain from studying the new conditions under which hostilities in the future must be conducted, and the numerous questions of warlike interest which modern science had introduced. It is not surprising that the Prussian system should speedily have become our model in the affairs relating to the army, and that the British nation should determine to make a searching inquiry into its military concerns.

It is not necessary to attempt to give a description of all the matters that claimed the earnest attention of the country at that time. Some of them did not affect the Coldstream, or did so only in a slight manner, and their discussion in this work may be omitted, or need receive but a passing notice. Among them, however, the two following should be mentioned: (1) the more efficient training of both Officers and men in their duties, and in the new system of tactics which had to be adopted in the field in consequence of the increased power of artillery, and of the great development of the fire of the breech-loader; and (2) the recruitment of the men, and the term of service during which they should remain with their corps.

We have seen that, as early as 1856, considerable interest had been taken in the first of these points, though it is also true that the reforms introduced were merely in their infancy, and had not by any means gone far enough. This was a natural result, because to effect a change of a salutary character, the expenditure of money is necessary, and public opinion must be moved before it can be obtained. The successes of Prussia had not then thrown light upon the requirements which a state of war in the present 321day exacts; and it was after these victories had been achieved, and not before, that the country acquired the faculty of realizing the advantages to be gained if all ranks are efficiently taught the details of the military profession.^[386] Later in this chapter, an occasion will present itself to refer to some of the methods undertaken to accomplish this object, and we now pass to the second point, which, having a peculiar interest of its own, exercises a special influence on the fortunes of every regiment that forms part of the army.

Up to 1847 military service had been unlimited, and men who enlisted might be held to remain with the Colours for life.^[387] The system was not satisfactory, and a change was then made by which men contracted to serve for ten years only, with the power of remaining on eleven more, should they be permitted to do so, and, at the end of that period, to receive a pension. In 1867, the first term of service was raised from ten to twelve years, and soldiers were encouraged to continue their service for twenty-one years for pension.^[388] The advantage of having a reserve to fill up the ranks of the army in war time had, for some years, occupied the attention of the authorities, and, before 1867, two small attempts had been made to secure this object; but, though the principle was admitted, very little was done in this direction. The war of 1866, however, made the country realize the importance of a rapid mobilization; and the Prussians, having practically 322shown how, with a reserve at hand, they could, in a short space of time, convert a small peace establishment into a fully equipped army ready to take the field, we also desired to follow their example. In 1867, therefore, we strengthened the reserve; but, as a matter of fact, we still merely nibbled at the question, until 1870, when it at last received a more thorough consideration. In that year the Enlistment Act was passed, introducing “short service” and a more efficient reserve into the army.

By the new system, recruits enlist for twelve years, and engage to serve the whole time with the Colours, or part of the time with the Colours and the rest in the reserve, according to the conditions laid down by the Secretary of State. At first, it was proposed that the two periods should be equal; but this was soon modified to seven years in the ranks and five in the reserve, and in the Guards (since 1883) to three and nine, for such recruits who might prefer those terms. Hence, in the Brigade, men may now enlist for three or seven years with the Colours, and spend nine or five in the reserve; three-years men may, with the consent of their Commanding Officers, extend their service in the ranks to seven years, and from seven to twelve years, after which, still under the same conditions, they are able to re-engage for some years more up to twenty-one, with a view to obtain a pension.

Thus the present system is elastic, and has the merit of training a larger proportion of the population to the use of arms than was formerly the case; of enabling the nation to maintain a relatively small force in peace time, which can be rapidly expanded into an army when hostilities break out; and of reducing the pension list. It also increases the domestic comfort of the men, for it definitely disposes of the question of marriage of the rank and file, which, with long service, was difficult, indeed impossible, to solve. The practical utility of the plan has not yet been tested under the strain of war, and, until it has been so tried, it is manifestly premature to unduly praise it; nor are we yet in a position to judge whether the fighting material we now possess, is as well endowed with the fortitude, virtue, and cohesive force, which discipline bestows, as was the case in so eminent a degree in the past. We can point to this, however, that Continental nations who have tried their reserves in the field consider them to be fully equal to any other troops they have in their ranks; and we, too, have had experience of the noble qualities of comparatively 323untrained men in some very critical situations and emergencies. But, of one thing, at least, we may be sure: the reserve men will loyally come up when their presence is required. Englishmen have never failed to respond to the call of duty, and it is notorious, when even a fear arises that British interests may be attacked, how quickly the manhood of the country rises to the occasion, and offers to come forward to defend them. It cannot be forgotten that, in 1878, when the then existing reserve was called out, 13,684 men, out of a possible of 14,154, reported themselves; and, in 1882, when 11,642 reserve men were summoned, 11,032 appeared.^[389]

The Prussian model, upon which we based our army reform, was departed from in two important particulars. In one, the departure was fully acknowledged and thoroughly explained in public; but not so the other. In the first, we repudiated the idea of inflicting the evils and the tyranny of universal service upon the country, and deliberately declined to make the people liable to a blood tax, that wastes their wealth and attacks their liberty and independence. Our military forces, hence, are smaller than they would otherwise have been, and our means of mobilization less rapid than those which exist on the Continent, because our reserve men, living where and as they like, are not localized and controlled in the manner which obtains among the Powers of Europe. Nevertheless, we willingly gave up these advantages for the sake of preserving our freedom, so dear to the mind of every Englishman, and the foundation of our national prosperity. As we inhabit an island, and hold the command of the sea by an overwhelmingly powerful navy, there was no valid reason to press for any alteration in our time-honoured custom of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment.

The second departure from the Prussian organization seems to have been as carefully hidden from the public gaze as the other was ventilated and discussed. The system we chose to copy approached our own, in that the Sovereign was the direct and immediate Chief of the army, and from a purely military standpoint it is easy to 324perceive that such an arrangement—adopted moreover, by every great Power that has a Sovereign, and that aims at real military strength—is the best adapted to produce the most efficient results. Our reformers, however, completely ignored in this respect the model they announced they would follow, and as Englishmen have never been a military race properly so called, they scarcely saw or appreciated the change that was brought about, when the Supreme Command, still vested in the Crown, was exercised through the political channel of the Secretary of State (1870). The historian is bound to record this vitally important alteration in the constitution of the army—a change rendered desirable, perhaps, for reasons that are outside the scope of this work,—for, it affects and must affect the life of every regiment that composes it, and subjects many of the details of purely military interest and of the military profession, to the fluctuations and necessities of party strife.

Nor was it long before the army was made the victim of a political dispute. The war of 1870-71 had roused the people to fever heat, and army reform became the universal cry. Politicians, not gifted with military instincts or knowledge, soon led their followers into those points of the subject that best suited the interests of their party; and as the “abolition of purchase” offered just such an advantage in the parliamentary struggle then going on, it was eagerly seized upon as the most urgent question of the hour. It cannot be said that army reform was impossible without abolishing purchase, for every improvement introduced could have been as easily effected, whether purchase had been retained or not. But it is also true that the practice of buying and selling a commission was an anomaly quite indefensible in itself, which deserved to come to an end, and which was scarcely likely to survive for long. If so, its abolition, safeguarding the interests of all concerned by it, would have benefited the army more than can be said was the case, when it was achieved in 1871, and thereby increased the influence of the political party that carried it.

The purchase system had the disadvantage of checking the rise in their profession of men of very moderate fortune, who entered the infantry or cavalry;^[390] and this without doubt was an evil which required reformation, for it excluded from these branches of the army some whose service there might have been of value to 325the country. On the other hand, this defect was more theoretical than practical; and the system had the advantage of keeping up a flow of promotion, and of keeping down the pension list. It was not an arrangement by which any purchaser could buy his steps; to be allowed to spend money for this purpose was a privilege to which any conditions could be attached. So was it also a cheap means of keeping up the supply of Officers, for the sale of a commission was the only pecuniary reward that was expected, and Parliament was not asked to spend money to provide gratuities, retired pay, pensions, and the like, that now have to be given. Officers, in short, tendered security for their good behaviour, and proved their devotion to their profession by offering their service for a smaller return in the shape of pay than they now receive.

The Bill to do away with this system passed the House of Commons, and went in due course up the Lords, where it was read the first time. On the second reading, a demand was made for further information on the proposals that were then contemplated, and a resolution to that effect was carried. Thereupon a Royal Warrant, July 20, 1871, was immediately issued, which abolished purchase without the aid of Parliament, from the following 1st of November.

On October 31, 1871, another Royal Warrant was published, which contained two points that affected the Brigade: (1) it abolished what has been called the “double rank,” and (2) it substituted the new rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign in the infantry, and of Cornet in the cavalry, both of which had existed ever since the formation of the standing army.

The abolition of the “double rank” is of too recent a date, and concerns the Officers of the Brigade too intimately and personally, to be able easily to discuss it at the present moment. It will be time enough to do so at some future date, when war on a large scale has tested the quality of the modern army, when it has been practically shown where the military virtues are most plentifully to be found in it, and when we shall have emerged definitely from the transition state in which the reforms of 1871 has placed us. Guardsmen do recognise, and have for a long time recognised, that the advantage which the double rank conferred upon them was an anomaly which deserved to be swept away, for they have ever been anxious to possess no purely military privilege which the rest of their comrades did not enjoy, and have been eager to see removed 326anything that might savour of favouritism, or give cause for jealousy. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that the double rank was an institution which had obtained the sanction of two centuries, and that it was the survival of an ancient system which possessed some merit. In the infancy of the British army, shortly after the Restoration of King Charles II., brought about by General Monck and his Coldstreamers, there was much debate over the vexed question of “precedence of command.” This precedence, in some regiments, not all of them Guards regiments, was fixed, not by seniority of commission, but by seniority of corps, and this arrangement appears to have developed into the institution of the double rank for the Foot Guards, and of Brevet rank for all.^[391]

Now, it seems evident that the object in view, when these things were arranged, was to maintain efficiency in the army; to keep up a flow of promotion; and to prevent Officers from ranking low down in the army list, when, by length of service or for other reasons, it was desirable that they should rise with others in their profession. The regimental system, being the basis of military advancement, then, as it is now, it is obvious that unless some such means were adopted to accelerate the promotion of an Officer, who belonged to a corps where men were unwilling to leave the service, no efforts on his part could secure his rise. Nor can it be forgotten that promotion stagnates in proportion as Officers generally are attached to their profession and to their corps,—that is, in not the least distinguished regiments of the army; and if the regimental system have any value (and that it has a value is evident, while the promoters of army reform showed their opinion of it by retaining it), it becomes clear that relief is most required in those regiments where duty is well performed, and where a high standard of military efficiency is maintained. The principle laid down was neither unwise nor unfair; and if in the case of the Foot Guards it was applied with too generous a hand, it must still be remembered that this was done, not less on account of their services in the field, than by reason of the position they occupied in the army.

The sudden abolition of the double rank in 1871, put the Foot 327Guards in a worse position than if it had never existed; but they still have the honour of occupying a unique position in the army, for, while before 1871 they held the first place, after that date they sank immediately down to the lowest place in their profession. The following table will illustrate this fact:—

The substitution of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant for that of Ensign led to some curious results. By the rules established in October, 3281871, a Commission as a Sub-Lieutenant might be given to a successful candidate who had passed certain examinations; and in order to qualify for the rank of Lieutenant, a Sub-Lieutenant was required to serve satisfactorily for twelve months in a regiment, and after such service to go through a course of study, and to pass a professional examination, fixed from time to time by the Secretary of State.

The position of the new Officer was unprecedented, and no one at first knew exactly what he was. Accordingly, on March 5, 1872, we find that he was forbidden to present himself before his Sovereign, because he was “not positively confirmed as a Commissioned Officer;” but then, on the 21st of May following, he was stated to be a “regularly Commissioned Officer, and, when qualified by a knowledge of his work, he was eligible for Courts-Martial and all other military duties performed by Subaltern Officers;” and at last, February 24, 1873, it was announced that he would be received at Court. The trials of the aspirant to serve in Her Majesty’s army did not end here. The new civilian chief who assumed the direction of every military detail, determined that the stage of initiation into the most glorious profession the world has produced should be thorny, painful, and difficult. The Sub-Lieutenant, just as he emerged from school and opened the first and brightest page of a happy youth, was allowed to spend a year full of liberty among his new companions in arms, and to enjoy to the uttermost the sweets of life as they unfolded themselves before his vivid imagination. But the bright holiday was brief, and when it ended, the hapless lad was to experience a very different treatment. The year of enjoyment was over, and, giving up his freedom, he was sent back to the rigid discipline of school, (in this case even more severe than that to which he had been accustomed in his boyhood). Here he was tutored, controlled, corrected, and crammed. The power of a Secretary of State is great; but, just as he cannot make water run uphill, so can he not alter the ardent character of a young English gentleman, and the latter, we regret to say, rebelled at the indignities heaped upon him! Solemn indeed were the warnings which his sympathetic military superiors gave him. But they did more than this, for they persuaded the political chief to avoid running counter to human nature, and the rule was changed, and a more rational one substituted for it. The Sub-Lieutenant went first to school, and then he joined his Regiment.

329It is pleasant now to leave these matters, and to turn once more to the solid and effective improvements that were introduced about this time. In 1871, manœuvres on an extended scale were, for the first time, held in England, when a successful endeavour was made to conduct operations which should, as far as possible, imitate those that have to be undertaken in war time. Aldershot and its neighbourhood was selected for these exercises, and they lasted for about seven weeks, commencing early in August until the end of September. The Guards Brigade present, was formed of the 1st Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards. Next year similar manœuvres took place in Salisbury Plain, which were even more successful than those of the year before. They lasted about a month, beginning in the middle of August, and were attended by the 3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots Fusilier Guards. In this year, also, Regimental transport was introduced, and, in June, one Non-commissioned officer and twenty men of the battalions just mentioned were sent to Woolwich to be trained as drivers. In 1873, parties of the same strength, from the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Coldstream, again proceeded to Woolwich for a similar course, this time under the command of a Subaltern Officer from each Regiment, and manœuvres, lasting a month, took place at Cannock Chase, in Staffordshire. The two Battalions, above mentioned, formed the Guards Brigade upon that occasion, each made up into eight companies (25 Officers, 641 Non-commissioned officers and men, exclusive of the Regimental transport detachment). With this year the mimic war undertaken to exercise every part of the army, the fighting units as well as the transport, commissariat, medical services, etc., came to an end: manœuvres cost money, and the recollection of the great struggle between France and Germany was beginning to fade from the memory of those whose privilege it is to pay taxes and return members of Parliament. Henceforward summer drills were substituted for the larger and more instructive operations.

Concurrently with these reforms, and, indeed, during a longer period than is above indicated, the drill-book was often revised, and a system of tactics introduced, calculated to satisfy the conditions under which troops have to move when opposed to modern arms of precision. The space allowed to each man in the ranks has been increased, the rigid structure of the British line has 330given way to a looser formation, and, greater independence of individual action being deemed desirable, the intelligence of the private soldier has been raised and cultivated. The principles of the science of tactics remain constant, but the system adopted necessarily varies as new weapons are invented; the problem before us, therefore, was how to apply the principles to modern conditions. Our forefathers resolved the question satisfactorily, as far as their generation was concerned. They inculcated a stiff and rigid discipline into the British army, and they endowed the rank and file with a moral stamina sufficient to enable them to maintain themselves on the field of battle in line, and thus develop to the fullest extent the fire of their muskets. Our enemies, not so highly trained, could only fight in column; and, hence, in no small degree, our victories and their defeats. That the closest attention has been unremittingly given to this great problem, all know already; but, as we have not yet had the experience of a great war under new conditions, the results of our labours are not yet practically tested.

It will be remembered that the Prince of Wales fell grievously ill in the end of 1870, and that, hoping against hope, it appeared only too likely that the august patient could not recover. The whole of the English people, at home and abroad, were deeply agitated with anxiety for the life of His Royal Highness, and great was the joy, sincerely felt and universally expressed, when it pleased Providence to spare him to the country, and to raise him up again in vigour and in health and strength. Full of gratitude for this signal favour, the Queen commanded a thanksgiving service to be held in St. Paul’s Cathedral, and proceeded there, accompanied by His Royal Highness and the Royal Family (February 27, 1871). It need scarcely be said that all classes of Her Majesty’s loyal subjects eagerly seized this opportunity of joining their prayers to those of their Sovereign and of the Princess of Wales, and, as the Royal procession moved to the Cathedral, the people made a demonstration of sympathy, which showed how acutely they had felt the danger as long as it existed, and how great was their happiness now that it was past. The army was fully represented at this ceremony; small deputations from every regiment in the British Isles had assigned to them a place in St. Paul’s. The Brigade lined the streets; the 1st Coldstream, occupying a portion of Oxford Street, near the 331Marble Arch, represented the Regiment, as the 2nd Battalion was then at Windsor.

In the summer of 1873, the Shah of Persia visited England (June 18th) and remained for a few days. It was the first time that the Monarch of this distant Asiatic kingdom had ever come to Europe, and his reception in this country was conducted on a scale of much magnificence. There were, as usual, numerous Guards of Honour, the streets were lined by the Brigade when he entered the Metropolis, and a review was held at Windsor on the 24th, at which the whole of the London Battalions were present, the public duties being found by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. The Shah was also taken to the Tower on the 25th, when the 2nd Coldstream, being quartered there, received him with two Guards of Honour.

The marriage of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh to a Princess of Russia, the only daughter of the Tsar Alexander II., and grand-daughter of our late antagonist, Nicholas I., took place at St. Petersburg early in 1874, and was an event of some importance and novelty; for never before had the reigning Houses of England and Russia been directly united by the close ties of a family alliance. The marriage was looked upon as a happy augury for the future, and strong expectations were entertained that any past estrangement between the two countries might henceforth cease, to the benefit, it was hoped, of both. On the occasion of the public entry of Their Royal Highnesses, March 12th, a warm welcome awaited them on the part of the people; the streets were lined by the Brigade, both Battalions of the Regiment being present. In the following May, the Tsar came to England, and proceeded first to Windsor (13th) for two days, and was received by the 1st Coldstream, who were stationed there. When His Majesty went to Guildhall, on the 18th, the streets were again lined by the Brigade, and next day a review in his honour was held at Aldershot, attended by the four West-End Battalions.

It may be interesting to note that the power, then vested in the Colonel of the Regiment, to reduce a Non-commissioned officer summarily to the ranks was exercised, in 1874, for the last time:—

332In the same year, the Coldstream lost a distinguished Officer, Surgeon-Major Wyatt, whose report, on many important Regimental details connected with the struggle in the Crimea, has been frequently consulted in the preparation of the account given of the war in this work. The event stands thus recorded in Regimental Orders, and requires no further comment on our part:—

The two Battalions were both represented at the funeral, the 1st finding the firing party, and the 2nd the escort.

But this was not the only loss that the Regiment had to experience about this time, for a greater cause for mourning was in store for them, when their veteran Colonel, Sir William Gomm, died, March 15, 1875, in full vigour of an unimpaired intellect, though more than ninety years of age. Having entered the army as Ensign, in the year 1794, at an early age, this distinguished Officer had served his Sovereign for more than eighty years, and thus the last link which connected us with the past glories of the great wars of the French Revolution was severed. The Lieutenant-Colonel only expressed the universal feeling of sorrow that prevailed in the Coldstream, when he issued the following short sympathetic order upon this melancholy event:—

The Bands and drums of the Brigade ceased to play while the Coldstream was in mourning, until after the funeral, which took place at Rotherhithe, and was not accompanied by any military display; but all available Officers of the Regiment were, of course, present upon so sad an occasion.

General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., the late Commander of the Forces in the Crimea, now succeeded as Colonel of the Coldstream, and issued an address to the Regiment:—

From 1871, as we have seen, there had been but one Lieutenant-Colonel and one Major in the Coldstream, the former being in command of the Regiment and of one Battalion, the latter having the command of the other Battalion. In 1875, however, the original establishment of one Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors was restored, and Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle (son of a former well-known and distinguished Coldstream Officer), being promoted Major to fill up the vacancy, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion (April 28th). The reason for this change was that the Lieutenant-Colonels of Guards Regiments were to be employed, in addition to the command of their own Regiments, in the capacity of Brigadiers of the metropolitan Volunteer Corps, which were then incorporated into three separate brigades. In order to discharge these duties, Regimental Adjutants were shortly afterwards (1881) also appointed, and these Officers, besides performing the ordinary work attached to that position (carried out up to this date by a Battalion Adjutant), acted as Brigade-Majors of the Volunteer brigades so created. Captain and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Digby was the first Regimental Adjutant of the Coldstream.

Just before Colonel Goodlake, V.C., left the service (August 7, 1875), Colonel Fremantle was transferred to the command of the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Hon. William Feilding succeeded the former Officer as Major Commanding the 1st Battalion. On September 5, 1877, Colonel Hon. Percy Feilding, C.B. retired upon half-pay, and the Lieutenant-Colonelcy devolved upon Colonel Fremantle, who was replaced in the command of the 2nd Battalion by Colonel FitzRoy. Only a few days later, Colonel William Feilding also went on half-pay (September 29th), and Colonel Julian Hall, promoted Major, was posted to the command of the 1st Battalion.

The Regiment then stood thus (December, 1877):—

Colonel.—General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B.

Lieut.-Colonel.—Colonel A. Lyon Fremantle.

Majors.—Colonels G. FitzRoy; Julian Hall.

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels G. Wigram; A. Lambton; Lord W. Seymour (Staff); E. Burnell; FitzRoy Fremantle; (Mounted).

F. Manningham-Buller; G. FitzRoy Smyth; H. R. Eyre; J. B. Sterling; C. D. Thomas; Viscount de Vesci; Hon. F. Wellesley; 335R. S. Hall; W. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Aldenburg-Bentinck; Hon. L. Dawnay; Hon. E. Digby; Hon. H. Corry; R. Follett.

Lieutenants.—Captain Hon. E. Boscawen (Adjutant); Major R. Goff; Captains Waller Otway; H. Bruce; Amelius Lockwood; Hon. R. Campbell (Adjutant); Hon. G. Bertie; F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; Hon. M. Stapleton; R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; Cyril Fortescue; F. Manley; R. Barton; F. Arkwright; L. MacKinnon (I. of M.); Lieutenants V. Dawson (I. of M.); Hon. E. Dawnay; Hon. H. Monck; Lord D. Gordon; A. FitzRoy; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg; A. Codrington; Hon. H. Legge; J. Gladstone; D. Dawson; C. Brand; Hon. F. Lambton; Hon. G. Gore; H. Stopford; Hon. H. Gough; Hon. A. Henniker-Major; Lord Sandhurst; A. Clarke-Jervoise; G. V. Boyle; Viscount Lambton; Hon. A. Dawson; Hon. H. Amherst.

Sub-Lieutenant.—H. Surtees.

2nd Lieutenants.—Edgar Vincent; W. Corbet.

Quartermasters.—J. Birch; W. Reynolds.

Surgeon-Major.—C. V. Cay, M.D. Battalion-Surgeon.—Surgeon-Major C. Read.

Surgeons.—A. Myers; J. Whipple, M.D.; J. Magill, M.D.

Solicitor.—R. Broughton, Esq.

As the aspect of affairs in Ireland had improved, and as the disturbances that distracted the people had entirely ceased, it was found unnecessary to continue to keep a Guards Battalion any longer in Dublin. At the spring change of quarters of the year 1876, therefore, the Battalion there was not replaced, and the occupation of Shorncliffe camp was again resumed as the out-quarter of the Brigade. The 1st Coldstream accordingly went there at that time, and lost then, with sincere regret, an Officer of much merit in Quartermaster Falconer, who, having been in that position ever since 1853, left the Regiment in 1876. This excellent Officer was born in the town of Coldstream; he had been present with the Battalion during the whole of the war with Russia, and had gained for himself, during his long period of service in the Regiment, the sincere respect and the hearty good will of all ranks.

Major-General Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar retired from the command of the Brigade of Guards, and was succeeded by Major-General F. Stephenson, C.B., August 1, 1876, who retained that appointment until July 31, 1879, when Major-General G. Higginson C.B., replaced him.

A second change was made in the course of this century in the title of the Scots Fusilier Guards, and on April 4, 1877, it was 336promulgated for general information that this Regiment would in future be designated by the name of Scots Guards.

During the period under review, from 1871-1885, the country was engaged in some minor wars. An expedition to Ashanti took place 1873-1874; hostilities were undertaken on the North-West frontiers of India, notably in Afghanistan, to keep out the influence of Russia, which we feared, and to counteract the rapid advance of her forces towards our borders; and operations were conducted against various native tribes in South Africa, principally against the Zulus, and against the Transvaal Republic in the same quarter of the world. In none of these were the Coldstream employed;^[395] but some of the Officers of the Regiment were engaged in them in different capacities, and of them three lost their lives. Lieutenant Hon. Alfred Charteris, Aide-de-camp to the General Commanding the Ashanti expedition (Sir Garnet Wolseley), was attacked by fever, contracted in that unhealthy climate, and died, deeply regretted, on board ship when on his way home. The other two, Captains Hon. Ronald Campbell and Robert Barton, fell the same day in South Africa, on March 28, 1879. The high estimation in which these two brave Officers were held by their brothers in the Regiment, and the promise they gave of future distinction, have never been forgotten by their companions; their loss is still mourned, and their memory 337is preserved and cherished, for they recall to the mind of those who knew them the type and embodiment of the Coldstream Officer. Of the details of their services it is not necessary to say more than this, that Captain Campbell, Chief Staff Officer to Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., (now General Sir Evelyn Wood), lost his life while performing an act of daring gallantry, for which, had he lived, he would have received the Victoria Cross; an Officer and a soldier who followed him (Lieutenant Lysons and Private Fowler, 90th Regiment), and who fortunately escaped unhurt, were both awarded that high order of military merit. Captain Barton, in command of the Frontier Light Horse, was also killed in the same neighbourhood. In Colonel Wood’s despatch, the following sentences are worthy of record in these pages.

The grave outlook of foreign affairs in the spring of 1878, when Russia, after a successful war with Turkey, forced a disastrous 338treaty upon the Sultan (treaty of San Stefano), led many to think that England would again become involved in further hostilities in the East, and for a time there was serious anxiety on the subject. But, warned by the Crimea, we were hardly inclined to embark in another quarrel with the Tsar. A European Congress then assembled in Berlin to modify the Treaty of San Stefano, and to conclude a new international agreement, known as the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). As a demonstration, and indeed also to take advantage of the opportunity to test the system introduced into the army by short service, the reserves were called up in April, and, as we have already seen, the summons to attend was well responded to by the men. The Coldstream reserves were posted to the 2nd Battalion. The three Guards Battalions first on the roster for active service (viz. the 2nd Grenadiers, 2nd Coldstream, and 1st Scots Guards), each selected thirty-two men to go to Aldershot to be trained as stretcher-bearers. The Regimental transport was re-organized, and proceeded later to Aldershot with the Battalions above-mentioned, to take part in the summer drills; shortly after which (September 11th) its establishment was fixed at one Officer, one sergeant, six drivers, three waggons, and one small-arm ammunition cart. Later (January 25, 1879), this transport was kept together as one corps, and the three Officers took it in turn, for four months at a time, to have it in charge.

The efforts to extend and improve the training of Officers and men, which have been already alluded to, were still continued, and in 1883, it was ordered that Company Commanders should give personal attention to the subject, and be responsible for the efficiency of the men placed under their immediate command. Before this date, however, the Brigade had already availed themselves of the advantages which Pirbright offered for some of these purposes. A Guards camp having been opened for musketry in 1881, it was soon utilized as a place where practical instruction in military exercises (other than ordinary drill), could be given by the Company Officers. In April, 1882, Commanding Officers were enjoined to carry out a series of minor tactical operations in conjunction with the course of musketry practice, and to examine their Battalions by companies, and by double companies, in outpost duty, attack formation, shelter-trench exercise, etc. The Battalions were also to stay at Pirbright for fourteen days, five to be devoted to minor tactics, four to preliminary drill, and five to musketry. Afterwards, they remained 339a longer time in camp, and were thus enabled to all their company training there, besides their musketry.^[397]

Following the example set us by Continental armies, we added sectional and field firing to the course of target practice which was annually carried out, and increased the number of rounds to be expended by the trained soldier from 100 to 150 (1882). Musketry had received considerable attention from the authorities, and it was held imperative that the men should not only be able individually to shoot with accuracy, but that they should also be trained to fire together, under conditions that prevail in the field, and against objects similar to those which present themselves to the aim of troops in war time. A Siege Operations Committee having been appointed to conduct experiments at Dungeness early in 1880, a detachment of the 1st Coldstream, then at Shorncliffe, was told off to assist them in their labours. The following Brigade Order (March 11, 1880) relates to this service:—

We have already had occasion to remark that, on the introduction of signalling, great interest was taken in the subject in the Brigade, and frequent allusions were made to the efficiency of the Guards in this respect. An extract of an order, dated March 11, 1884, may be quoted:—

340In the last chapter some notes were given upon the improvements which were made in the canteen system after the Crimean war. In 1879, the “coffee bar” was separated from the canteen proper, and thus two shops were established in barracks for the soldiers' use, in one of which no alcoholic liquor could be bought; this change was completed in London in 1880 and 1881. We may also state here that, through the instrumentality of Officers of the Brigade, early in the latter year, a coffee tavern was set up outside barracks in Buckingham Palace Road, for the use of the Non-commissioned officers and men of the Guards; the arrangement that was then made did not, however, continue for any great length of time, and though the tavern still exists, its connection with the Brigade is now severed.

A few changes in uniform since 1872 deserve a passing mention. Shoulder straps were added to the Officers' tunics and blue coats (end of 1880), and the gold cords on the former garments were then abolished. New badges were put on these straps to show the military rank of the wearer. Previous to this, although the rank of an Officer was indicated on the collar of the tunic, no such distinction was to be seen on the blue coat. In the following March, the dark grey cloth, adopted for the trousers of Officers in the Brigade in 1830, gave place to a blue tweed. Up to 1874 Non-commissioned officers and men wore buttons on the skirts of the tunic, but they were then removed on account of the new valise equipment which was introduced at that time, instead of the old knapsack. Since that date the valise has been always carried by the soldier, though the pattern has more than once been changed.

Some alterations were effected in the medical service of the Brigade. Up to the year 1865, the Surgeons belonged exclusively to their respective Regiments as much as any other Officer of the Guards, and their promotion took place therein when vacancies occurred in their own corps only. Forming a small body in each, it is evident that their advancement was always uncertain, and too frequently was it exceedingly slow. To relieve this stagnation, the Medical Officers of the Brigade, though still belonging to and wearing the uniform of their respective Regiments, are now placed upon one list according to seniority, and are promoted in their turn into whatever corps the vacancy occurs. A better flow of promotion is thus obtained, though the Medical Officers are subject to the 341inconvenience of being sometimes obliged to change their Regiments when they gain a step. Another change, made in April 2, 1881, was the appointment of a Brigade Surgeon in the Guards to act as Principal Medical Officer. This system replaced the old arrangement by which the three Regimental Surgeons-Major took it in turn to do duty in Brigade Waiting, and to act as the medical adviser to the Major-General. Lastly, in 1881, the three Regimental hospitals were converted into station hospitals, for the general use of all troops quartered in the London garrison.

The grade, created to supplant the old military title of Ensign, met with some vicissitudes. Sub-Lieutenants ceased to be so called in 1877, and the name Second-Lieutenant was then substituted for it. In 1881, however, the rank was altogether abolished, and Second-Lieutenants were promoted Lieutenant, while young Officers joining the army were gazetted Lieutenants. But this arrangement did not last long, and again there was another change, for in 1887 Second-Lieutenants were re-introduced into the army; but there appears to be no tendency to restore the old traditional rank of Ensign.

One of the consequences of the abolition of purchase, clearly foreseen by the authors of army reform, was to produce a state of complete stagnation in promotion. To relieve this evil, a device was resorted to, whereby Officers, their qualifications or inclinations notwithstanding, were not allowed to remain in certain positions in their regiments for more than a definite period or after attaining a specified age. For instance, Commanding Officers of regiments and battalions were limited to five years command (reduced to four in the case of the latter, 1881), and all Captains were forced to retire from the service if not promoted to Major before the age of forty. The relief thus afforded was not of great advantage to the bulk of the juniors, and it constituted a well-founded grievance to many who, while able and willing to serve were thrown out of their profession through no fault of their own.^[398] Now, in 1881, a large number of Captains were doomed to be ejected, 342whereat it appears the Secretary of State got seriously alarmed. Nor is it surprising that he should fear the prospect of having between 3000 to 4500 vigorous and educated men going “up and down the country,” and pointing out in every constituency the grievances to which they were subjected by the hasty introduction of political army reforms that his own party had effected in 1871.^[399] He was constrained to save these men, and the only way to do this was to promote them en masse to the rank of Major. Hence all Majors in the infantry below a Mounted Officer, (since 1893, below the Second in command), are “Captains and Majors,” fulfilling the duties of the former, and dignified with the rank of the latter. They therefore enjoy the “double rank,” which was held to be so objectionable, in 1871, when it prevailed in the Foot Guards. The advantage, however, does not go on, for on becoming “Second in command,” an Officer performs the duty of Major, but has no extra rank given to him.

The introduction of Warrant-officers into the army was brought about at this time also; and the Sergeant-Major and Bandmaster (and later the Regimental Clerk) were so promoted.

These things were effected in July, 1881; and then the following changes were made in the establishment of the Coldstream: The companies were reduced from 20 to 16 (8 per Battalion, instead of 10, as had been provided during the Crimean war). The Lieutenant-Colonel remained in command of the Regiment, but instead of two Majors Commanding Battalions, the designation of these Officers was altered, and they were called Lieutenant-Colonels Commanding Battalions. Of the Captains there had been twenty, or one to each Company, and the four seniors used to be called Acting-Majors, or Mounted Officers; instead, there were now eight Majors in the Regiment (the four seniors being mounted,^[400] and the four juniors unmounted), and nine Captains. Lastly, the rank of Second-Lieutenant was abolished, and instead of 20 Lieutenants and 20 Second-Lieutenants, there were 36 Lieutenants. The differences in the two establishments are to be seen in the following table:—

343

May, 1881.				July, 1881.
20	Companies.			16	Companies.
1	Colonel.		Field-Officers	1	Colonel.		Field-Officers
1	Lieut.-Colonel			1	Lt.-Col. Com. Regt.
2	Majors.			8	Lt.-Cols. Com. Batns.
2	Captains			8	Majors
2	Majors.			2	Lt.-Cols. Com. Batns.
20	Captains.			8	Majors.
20	Lieutenants.					9	Captains.
2	Second-Lieutenants.			36	Lieutenants.
3	Adjutants.			36	Adjutants.
					(1 per Battn. and 1 Regtal).
2	Quartermasters.			2	Quartermasters.
2	Surgeons-Major.			2	Surgeons-Major.
3	Surgeons.			3	Surgeons.
3	Solicitor.	Total Officers 74.		3	Solicitor.	Total Officers 68.
2	Sergeants-Major.Sergeants-Major.			2	Sergts.-Major. (Warrant-officers).
				1	Staff Clerk.
2	Quartermaster-Sergeants.			2	Quartermaster-Sergeants.
1	Bandmaster.			1	Bandmaster.
2	Quartermaster-Sergeants.			2	Quartermaster-Sergeants.
2	Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry.			2	Sergt.-Instructors of Musketry.
2	Drum-Majors.			2	Sergeant-Drummers.
2	Armourer-Sergeants.			2	Armourer-Sergeants.
2	Orderly Room Sergeants.			6	Orderly Room Sergeants.
2	Pioneer Sergeants.			2	Pioneer Sergeants.
20	Colour-Sergeants.			16	Colour-Sergeants.
2	Sergeant Cooks.			2	Sergeant Cooks.
60	Sergeant.			48	Sergeant.
Total Sergeants, etc., 97.				Total Warrant-officers, Sergts. etc., 86.
32	Drummers and Fifers.			32	Drummers and Fifers.
Total 32.				Total 32.
80	Corporals.			80	Corporals.
1420	Privates.			1420	Privates.
	Total Rank and File, 1500.				Total Rank and File, 1500.
1703	Total.			1686	Total.

UNDRESS CAP PRIVATES
ABOUT 1850.

OFFICER 1849

N. R. Wilkinson del.      A.D. Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros. lith.

On the 10th of November, 1880, Colonel Fremantle having left the Regiment, Colonel FitzRoy was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, when Colonel Wigram, promoted Major, assumed the command of the 2nd Battalion. On the completion of five years period of command, Colonel Julian Hall retired on half-pay, September 29, 1882, and was succeeded in the command of the 1st Battalion by Colonel Arthur Lambton, who thus became 344Lieutenant-Colonel of a Battalion in the Coldstream, and who was appointed to serve for four years in that capacity. Colonels FitzRoy and Wigram, C.B., finished their periods of five years simultaneously, November 10, 1885. The latter, placed on half-pay for a few weeks, was brought back as Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment (December 16th), and the command of the 2nd Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling (November 10th).

By the death of General Sir William Codrington, G.C.B., on the 6th of August, 1884, the Coldstream lost their Colonel, who had served as such for more than nine years. The following Regimental Order was published:—

The funeral was accompanied with military honours, and took place at Woking Cemetery on the 9th. All Officers attending it were dressed as for Guard, and, including the firing party of 50 men, there was a detachment present of the 1st Battalion, consisting of 100 Non-commissioned officers and men under three Officers.

Sir W. Codrington was succeeded by General Right Honourable Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B., at that time Commander of the Forces in Ireland, whom Her Majesty appointed the new Colonel of the Regiment.

In the same year, Lieut.-General Higginson, C.B., vacated the command of the Brigade of Guards, and was replaced by Major-General R. Gipps, C.B., April 1, 1884.

The 1st Coldstream was first on the roster for duty in Ireland, and at the end of 1880 was quartered in Chelsea and St. George’s Barracks. Serious troubles once more affected that country, and Government was sorely perplexed how to deal with them. The presence of the Guards was again required, and the Battalion was despatched there at a few days' notice, by two special trains from Victoria Station, viâ Holyhead (December 6th). Upon this, the 2nd Grenadiers, then at Shorncliffe, were brought to town, and that out-quarter was given up. On the 15th of December, a detachment of 100 men from the 2nd Battalion joined the 1st in 345Dublin, and five days later the 1st Scots Guards left London for the same destination. The Coldstream were quartered in Richmond Barracks, but the Scots Guards were scattered through the town, their head-quarters in Ship Street, with detachments in Richmond, and in Linen Hall barracks.

A novel procedure was now adopted with respect to the command of these two Battalions, which shows how critical the authorities conceived the situation to be. Shortly after their arrival in Dublin, the Major-General Commanding the Brigade and the Home District proceeded there accompanied by his Brigade Staff, and left Colonel Gipps, Scots Guards (the senior Officer) with the District Staff to command the Home District; but the arrangement did not last long, and the latter, temporarily promoted Brigadier General, took General Higginson’s place in Ireland, who thereupon returned to London, February 15, 1881.^[401]

The stay of the Battalion in Dublin, lasting until March, 1882, was not more pleasant then than it had been during the Fenian troubles of 1866; but the duties assigned to the troops were everywhere cheerfully undertaken and zealously discharged. Among these duties two may be specially mentioned. In the first place, such was the violence of the mobs that collected to interfere with the due administration of the law, that a collision was apprehended every time a writ was served, a seizure made in a farm, an eviction put into execution, or any other legal process carried out. To avoid the danger, the Irish authorities established the rule that the force protecting the sheriff or other officer employed, should be so overwhelmingly strong, as to put an end to all thoughts of resistance, on the part of those who assembled to frustrate the course of justice. The Royal Irish Constabulary were, of course, always employed on these occasions, but it was also believed that the presence of red-coats would have a greater effect with the excited populace, and for this purpose numerous military posts covered the disturbed districts; but the Guards in Dublin, occupying a central position there, were not obliged to furnish any of these detachments.

Soldiers, therefore, were often requisitioned to escort the civil authorities, and the two Guards Battalions (as well as those that 346succeeded them in Dublin during the troubles), were often employed in this manner—generally by despatching small parties of some fifty men under an Officer. On one occasion, however, the 1st Coldstream had to do more than this. There was a series of evictions near New Pallas, in the county of Limerick, and the whole Battalion, together with a portion of Scots Guards, were sent there for two days to guard the sheriff, who had to execute the judgment of the Court. It was, at least, an uncommon service for so large a force to perform; and the Battalion was in all conscience powerful enough to prevent any breach of the peace!

The other duty to which allusion has been made, refers to what was called “personal protection.” Many landlords, and indeed others, were in danger of their lives from the outrage-mongers that infested the land. In order to afford adequate protection to these persons, soldiers were told off to reside in their houses, to accompany them in all their movements, and to be responsible for their safety. The Coldstream and Scots Guards furnished a number of men to perform this duty, and an Officer from each Regiment was appointed to inspect them frequently, and to satisfy himself that this novel service was efficiently discharged. That this was the case may be gathered from the following order, issued in London, dated March 17, 1882:—

But the Coldstream had some further experiences. It will be remembered that Mr. Parnell, the leader of the Irish agitation, was arrested as a suspect, October 13, 1881, under an Act of Parliament which had been passed in the spring of that year. The authorities, expecting some resistance, made every military preparation in Dublin to prevent a riot; and their precautions 347being sufficient, and their resources ample, the capture was very easily accomplished without mishap. Still, the quick-witted Irish very soon realized that the Government in London were afraid of them. They had early perceived that the Cabinet, instead of facing the difficulty boldly, dallied with it, and failed to support the Chief Secretary, Mr. Forster, in his strenuous efforts to cope with it. Hence, seeing no strength in the authority that should have protected them, the people were constrained to obey those who did wield power in the country, by setting its laws at defiance and by oppressing it without mercy. The winter, 1881-82, was disturbed and troubled. The No-rent conspiracy was in full swing; murder clubs, under the name of Moonlighters, kept the land in terror; juries were intimidated, and refused to discharge their functions; and the executive was all but paralysed. It was, moreover, known that a gang of assassins, called “the Invincibles,” had bound themselves together to murder Mr. Forster, and it was afterwards ascertained that they had made numerous desperate attempts upon his life, all of which were happily unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, in January, 1882, the 2nd Grenadiers were sent to Cork, and for two months there was the unprecedented number of three Guards Battalions in Ireland, until March, when the 2nd Coldstream relieved the 1st Battalion, who returned to England, and were soon after followed by the 1st Scots Guards. So the gloomy spring passed, when a new complication arose. Mr. Forster had remained at his post with steadfast courage, and scorned the imminent personal danger that surrounded him, with which he knew he was threatened. But he was unable to stand by a leader of whose policy he disapproved, or to follow him in the tortuous intrigue, which became known in history as the “Kilmainham treaty.” He resigned, and the then Lord-Lieutenant (Lord Cowper), having also withdrawn from office, Lord Spencer was appointed in his place, and arrived in Dublin, May 6, 1882, accompanied by his new Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish.

On that very afternoon, in broad daylight, while walking through the Phœnix Park, which was then full of people, Lord F. Cavendish and Mr. Burke, the Under-Secretary, were murdered by the Invincibles, who had for so long unsuccessfully lain in wait to assassinate Mr. Forster. The event sent a thrill of horror through the United Kingdom, and effectively and at last forced the Government to open their eyes to the true nature of 348the conspiracy with which they had to deal. The miscreants got away, and for a time there was little information to be obtained as to the perpetrators of this foul deed, and twelve months had to elapse before the conspirators were convicted and punished. The 2nd Coldstream, quartered in Dublin when this tragedy took place, were not called upon to act in the emergency. There was nothing, indeed, for soldiers to do at the crisis, except to redouble their vigilance; for it soon became clear that the Irish were as much the victims of the agitators and outrage-mongers who had mastered them, as were the officials who suffered by their violence.

In less than three months both the Guards Battalions, quartered in Dublin and in Cork, were required to proceed on active service to Egypt, and left the scenes of internal discord and disorder to meet the open foes of their country. The 3rd Grenadiers replaced them in Dublin (August 8th), and since that time there has been only one Battalion in Ireland. The Coldstream did not return there till the autumn of 1887, when the agitation had assumed a new phase, although the crisis had by no means passed away, nor the difficulties come to an end. Thanks, however, to the vigour of Government, to the remedial measures introduced, to the disappearance of Parnell, to the absence of another leader of character, and to the quarrels that have split up the Nationalist party into hostile fragments, the people are now steadily quieting down; and, eschewing agitation, they are improving their material prosperity under the new laws which have been enacted for their benefit.

In February, 1881, that is, shortly after the two Battalions went in haste to Ireland at the end of the previous year, the Tower was vacated by the Foot Guards, and was occupied by a Line regiment until November, 1882. There were then four Battalions in the West End, and this continued to be the force maintained there—excepting for the two months, January 25th-March 22nd, 1882, when, as we have seen, three Battalions were stationed in Ireland—until the departure of a Guards Brigade of three Battalions for Egypt. During this war, Dublin was still occupied by a Battalion, but Windsor was vacated, and, until the return of the Brigade from active service in November, the 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps furnished the Kensington Palace and the Magazine guards. In the following year, 1883, London was the scene of dynamite outrages, perpetrated by the agents of the same 349secret societies, of American origin, which financed and supported the agitation in Ireland. “For a time the air was dense with rumours of plots and explosives,” and all minds were filled with vague alarms. A measure to punish dynamiters was passed in haste through all its stages in both Houses of Parliament, in one day (April 9th), and received the Royal assent next day at noon.^[402] The garrison of the Metropolis also required strengthening, and a Line regiment being brought to the Tower, there were then five Guards Battalions in the West End. Extra guards were mounted on Somerset House, the Royal Courts of Justice, and Millbank prison, the London duties were increased, the public offices protected, and other precautions taken. The panic was considerable while it lasted, but it passed away in about six months, and in the summer the garrison of London assumed its normal strength and condition.

This ends the history of the Coldstream up to 1885, as far as affairs in the United Kingdom are concerned; and we now turn to events that occurred in Egypt and in the Sudan, 1882-1885. Before doing this, however, we may briefly allude to a subject which possesses much interest to all Guardsmen. Some members of the Coldstream may perhaps be unaware that the exquisite decorations that adorn the interior of the Royal Military Chapel in Wellington barracks have been scarcely twenty years in existence. Before that time the walls were cold and bare, and the building contained little to show how zealously the Brigade guard the great traditions of the past,—traditions which they have inherited,—and how warmly they cherish the memory of the Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men who, ever since the formation of the standing army, have faithfully and bravely performed their duty to the Sovereign of this realm. Numerous are the monuments placed in the Chapel to record the military virtues of departed Guardsmen of every rank, and their deeds on many a hard-fought field of strife; while these memorials furnish a proof of the solid union which knits the three Regiments of the Household Infantry together, in love for their profession and in devotion to their Queen and country.

Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule; introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin, August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed, September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the Coldstream to England.

The hostilities conducted by England in Egypt in 1882 have been described as a mere bondholders' war. This, in a sense, is true, for our intimate relations with that country, which eventually led to military operations, were ostensibly due to our desire to protect the financial interests of those who had lent money to its ruler. But this is far from being the whole truth, because other and higher motives induced Great Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the native government. Facing alike the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and containing within its limits the isthmus of Suez, Egypt, besides being the key of the valley of the Nile, commands the most convenient water communications to India, to the further East, and to Australia. Having interests of a vital nature to defend in this far-distant quarter of the globe, it is evident we could never remain unconcerned if anarchy were to prevail in a region through which the main lines pass that connect together portions of the British Empire. Nor was the problem a new one. At the close of the last and at the commencement of the present century, England was struggling with the French for supremacy in India, and at that time Napoleon—then in the beginning of his great career—made a descent upon Egypt 351to secure a road to that Empire for his own nation. We were then obliged to drive his soldiers out, and, having succeeded in doing this, we prevented the French from forming an Asiatic dominion. Still the trouble continued, in a minor degree, until 1809, when we took the island of Mauritius from them, on which they depended, to base their operations against our possessions. From this date their power in the East declined; and England, relieved from rivalry, has thenceforward been able to exercise an undivided influence in India. If in the beginning of this century it was necessary to prevent France from interfering with our national expansion; so was it also the more necessary to restrain the Egyptians from obstructing (as we apprehended) our communications in 1882,—when the Suez canal having been opened (1869), nearly all our Eastern commerce was squeezed through that narrow passage, and when the importance of African exploration was adding greater value to the valley of the Nile.

Egypt has passed through some vicissitudes during the last sixty years. Still considered in theory to be a portion of the Turkish Empire, it was formerly ruled directly by the Porte, until Muhammad Ali, the Governor-General, or Vali, rebelled, and wrested concessions from the Sultan. In 1841, the Governorship was vested in him and in his heirs, and subsequent Firmans having been granted in his favour, Egypt became practically an independent principality. The last privilege accorded to his successors was the right to contract foreign loans without the previous consent of the Porte, and this right to run into debt was freely indulged in by Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha. The latter, after becoming Viceroy—or Khedive, as the title is called—embarked in wild speculations, and indulged in unbounded extravagance. Desiring, like his grandfather, to erect an independent state by the adoption of European civilization, he failed to understand how this civilization was to be brought about. He hastened to produce its effects by an immense expenditure of money, but he omitted to establish an efficacious administration to curb peculation, or to introduce order into his affairs. Numerous speculators of every nationality rushed forward to help him to dissipate his fortune, and it was not long before he involved the people in financial ruin. As the import of alcohol corrupts a barbarous tribe, so did the influx of foreign gold demoralize this Muslim government.

Now, even if England had been prepared to let the bondholders 352shift for themselves in this crisis, so were not the other European nations; and to prevent so important a country from falling into the hands of any one of them, all agreed to intervene and regulate the evil that had been brought about. Thus Ismail, emancipated from the rule of Turkey, fell under the domination of European control. It is scarcely necessary to describe the various steps taken to secure reform in the financial concerns of Egypt. England and France were more interested in the matter than any other of the Powers. They acted harmoniously together, assumed a joint direction over the affairs of the country, and gradually tightened their hold upon the government. Thereupon the Khedive became restive, and as he would not fall in with the new order established to correct his maladministration, he was removed from Cairo. The authority of the Sultan, as Suzerain, was now requisitioned by Europe: Ismail was deposed, and his son, Tewfik Pasha, reigned in his stead, by favour of the Western Powers (June 26, 1879).

It was easy to see that such an undefined condition of things was not likely to last long. However beneficial to the people an honest administration might be, the interference of foreign officials in the internal affairs of another state, to whose ruler they owed no allegiance, could not but produce friction, and lead to trouble. It is true, Tewfik was pliant, and submitted without difficulty to the unprecedented constitution that was forced upon him; also, that there was little or no public opinion in the country, and apparently no centre of resistance to thwart the action of England and France. Nevertheless, the new Khedive soon lost his authority over his subjects, and resistance did arise, sooner than might have been expected. It originated where it ought least to have been found—in the army, where insubordination showed itself as soon as the native government was weakened and became contemptible in the eyes of the people, and when economy was introduced into the war department. Early in 1881, a military rising was threatened, and with difficulty was it appeased; but, later, a more serious event occurred (September 9th), when the Colonel of one of the native regiments, named Arabi Bey, took the lead, and, surrounding the Khedive’s palace with 4000 men, demanded, with arms in his hands, the redress of grievances from his Prince. Destitute of all real power, Tewfik was unable to crush this revolt; he met the mutineers, tried to conciliate them, and gave in to 353their demands. A change of government took place, and the Chamber of Notables was convened. From that moment Arabi’s influence grew stronger, the army became devoted to him, and around him rallied all groups of the people who were dissatisfied with foreign interference. “Egypt for the Egyptians” was now the cry, and the newly appointed Chamber, far from allaying the trouble, added fuel to the flames of discontent that were already kindled. It was evident the crisis could not be much longer deferred.

The French urged the British Government to take active measures to support the Joint Control which then existed in Egypt, and the latter were quite willing to carry out this advice. On the 6th of January, 1882, an Identical or Dual Note was presented to the Khedive, expressing the determination of the two nations “to ward off by their united efforts all cause of external or internal complications which might menace the régime established in Egypt.” The Notables answered this challenge by claiming the right of regulating the national budget, and Tewfik’s action became somewhat uncertain. It could not be accurately ascertained whether he meant to stand by his European allies who had placed him upon the throne, or whether he was about to throw in his lot with the national party. At any rate, Arabi, advanced to the dignity of Pasha, became still more powerful, and was appointed Minister for War.

Now, in England, there was a certain feeling in favour of the Egyptians, and this might be expected to find expression among the supporters of the Liberal party then in power, who claim, perhaps with greater emphasis than others, to respect the liberties of mankind, and to listen to the grievances of all who complain. It is against our custom to stifle the voice of an assembly, however feebly it may be supposed to represent the wishes of a people, and in this crisis there were not wanting some who hesitated to sanction the use of coercive measures. Nor was there a total absence of a primâ facie cause of discontent; for the European officials of every nationality had multiplied in Egypt, and in 1882 there were as many as 1324, receiving salaries from the taxes that amounted to a considerable proportion of the revenue,—to £373,704 per annum.^[403] It is possible that if we had not deferred 354to the French at this juncture, we might have put an end to the commotion without resorting to war, and that, had we been the sole trustee for European interests, we might have found some satisfactory solution to the difficulty. But, as had happened before, we were fettered by our alliance with the French, which was not defined, and in order to maintain our relations with them, we followed their lead.

The Dual Note having only intensified the trouble, our Government despaired of maintaining order unless some vigorous action were taken to disperse it. They believed that the best course under the circumstances was to resort to the only legal means which then existed: viz. to revive, in some shape, the dormant rights of suzerainty which the Sultan claimed, which in theory had never been abrogated, and which had been made use of, as we have seen, less than three years before, with the consent of all the European Powers. It was therefore contemplated to utilize the Turks, under certain conditions and restrictions, to put an end to the deadlock, and to prevent Egypt from becoming the prey to the anarchy that appeared to be imminent. Whether the remedy would have proved efficacious and satisfactory need not now be discussed; for the French objected to any such arrangement, and, to please them, we acquiesced in the objection. Then they proposed that the Anglo-French fleets should make a demonstration before Alexandria, and in this we readily concurred without any agreement as to subsequent action. The plan was therefore put into execution (May 20th). But far from appeasing the tumult, this step only aggravated it. The authority of the Khedive was now completely effaced, and Arabi became dictator. The excitement of the people increased, a serious riot occurred in Alexandria (June 11th), and earthworks for the defence of the town began to be thrown up. It was not easy to recede before this defiance. The British Admiral demanded that the construction of fortifications should be stopped, and, later, that they should be surrendered to him. The demand was resisted. It was then deemed necessary to take them at any risk, and to destroy by force the power of Arabi, who was proclaimed a rebel against his Prince.^[404] And now 355a strange event occurred. The French, though they succeeded in inducing our Government to defer to their wishes, were not bound to us in any way. Having gone just far enough to ensure an armed intervention, they refused to take their share in it, and, when hostilities were imminent, their fleet sailed away from the scene where they must commence.

The bombardment of the earthworks followed on the 11th of July, and it is needless to say that our navy soon reduced the enemy’s guns to silence, and drove him out of Alexandria. Arabi’s troops having retired, blue-jackets and marines were landed to restore order in the town. Meanwhile a force, drawn from Malta and Gibraltar, had been concentrated at Cyprus, and was commanded by Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., K.C.B., who arrived in the island, July 14th. These troops were speedily moved therefrom, and, reaching Alexandria on the 17th, they took up a line fronting the Egyptian army at Kafr-ed-Dauer, that lay a few miles south of the coast covering the road to Cairo.^[405]

Preparations were now actively pushed forward to follow up the first blow struck by the British fleet for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Khedive. A vote of credit was agreed to in Parliament, troops were ordered to be got ready to proceed to the seat of war, and a portion of the reserves were called up to serve during the emergency (July 25th). The French also at last plainly expressed their intentions, by declining definitely to take part in the expedition which had now to be undertaken. The decision was made on the 29th of July in their Chambers, by a majority of 416 against 75 votes. Thus Great Britain was obliged to act alone, and if this was the result, it may seem to be a pity that she had not been allowed to have a 356free hand from the beginning. Be this as it may, she gained the advantage of being at least unfettered in the military operations that followed, and hence the dangers and inconvenience of a joint occupation were happily avoided.

As early as the 3rd of July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B., appointed to take command of the expedition in case hostilities were undertaken, confidentially traced the plan of operations to be pursued. Soon the field army was organized, among which a Guards Brigade was included; and on the 30th of July, the first troops, the 1st Scots Guards (Colonel Knox), left England on board the Orient.^[406] The other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 2nd Grenadiers (Colonel P. Smith), and the 2nd Coldstream (Colonel G. Wigram), being at Cork and Dublin respectively, left these stations for the seat of war as soon as they received drafts from London to fit them to take the field. For this purpose, the 2nd Battalion obtained from the 1st Coldstream, one Colour-sergeant, 9 sergeants, and 204 rank and file (28th); and on the 1st of August, having proceeded to Kingstown from Richmond Barracks, Dublin, they embarked, about 750 strong, on board the Iberia, and started for Alexandria. They reached their destination on the 13th, and moved immediately to Ramleh, where the Brigade was collecting under the orders of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.^[407]

The following Officers formed part of the Battalion:—

Commanding the 2nd Battalion.—Colonel G. Wigram.

Mounted Majors.—Colonels A. Lambton; F. C. Manningham-Buller.

Dismounted Majors and Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels J. B. Sterling; Viscount de Vesci; R. S. Hall; W. F. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; R. W. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen.

Lieutenants.—Captains R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; F. C. Manley; L. D. Mackinnon: Lieutenants Hon. E. Dawney; Hon. H. Monck; J. R. Gladstone; D. F. R. Dawson; G. V. Boyle; W. O. Corbet (in command of Regimental transport); G. P. Bouverie; Hon. A. Fortescue; P. A. Lovell (Signalling Officer); D. J. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris; and H. G. Shute; also H. Somers-Cocks (who left Portsmouth for Egypt, August 16).

357Adjutant.—Lieutenant Hon. A. Henniker-Major.

Quartermaster.—W. Webster.

Medical Officers.—Surgeon-Major G. Perry; Surgeon J. Whipple, M.D.

The following Officers, also belonging to the Regiment, served upon the Staff:—

Lieut.-Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the British Admiral.

Captain Pole-Carew, Orderly Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.

Lieutenant A. Codrington, Aide-de-camp to Lieut.-General Willis, commanding the First Division.

Before this date, Sir A. Alison had been covering the concentration of the army at Alexandria, and, by means of strong reconnaissances, he endeavoured to make the enemy believe that the invaders meant to attack him from the north. But this was not the intention of Sir G. Wolseley, whose object was to seize the Maritime Canal, and, basing himself upon Ismailia, to advance thence to the capital of Egypt. In this manner, the main water-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would be secured from any attempt which Arabi might make upon it, and the invading army would obtain the best route into the interior. The route, it is true, was far from being a good one, for it lay in a desert of deep sand; but none of the communications of the country, other than by rail or canal, are good, and, in fact, roads, as we understand them, may be said to have no existence. The one selected, however, besides the strategical advantage it offered, of enabling an army to turn the Delta, and to proceed by the shortest way to Cairo, had along its course a fresh-water canal, where drinking water was to be obtained, and a railway; and both of these served as easy lines of supply. Arabi, indeed, had done his best to render these communications useless, but he could only obstruct them temporarily; and, though he thereby impeded our advance, he was not able to arrest it.

The British Commander had from the beginning believed that the enemy would make a stand at Tel el-Kebir, some thirty miles from Ismailia, on the road to Cairo; and if this were to prove to be correct, he determined to deliver a crushing and effective blow there, and so bring the campaign to a speedy and prompt conclusion. We shall see that he was entirely right in the opinion he had formed, and successful in carrying out his plan. To ensure 358this success, it was necessary to push advanced troops, of sufficient strength, from Ismailia to a point within striking distance of Arabi’s position, behind which the water and rail communications could be restored, and where the main army could be concentrated for the final battle.

The forces massing at Alexandria from the middle of July came, as we know, from the Mediterranean stations, and from the United Kingdom; but troops, native and British, also were despatched to the seat of war from India; and these, beginning to arrive on the 20th of August, landed at Suez, and, later, at Ismailia. The whole formed an Army-Corps, under the command of General Sir G. Wolseley (who landed in Egypt on August 15th), and was made up of a cavalry division, two infantry divisions, corps troops, and an Indian contingent. Each division was formed of two brigades and divisional troops.

The Cavalry Division, 23 squadrons, mounted infantry, and 6 guns, under Major-General Drury-Low: the 1st Brigade (Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell) contained, among others, three squadrons of Household cavalry, under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards;^[408] the 2nd Brigade (Brigadier-General Wilkinson), Indian cavalry. The First Division, 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Willis: 1st Brigade (three Guards Battalions), Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught; 2nd Brigade (4 Battalions), Major-General Graham, V.C. The Second Division, 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley: 1st Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir A. Alison; 2nd Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir E. Wood, V.C. The Corps troops contained one battery of Royal Horse Artillery, and three batteries of Field Artillery, 24 guns. The Indian contingent, under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., 4 battalions (of which 2 were native), 1 company Beluchis, 6 guns (mountain battery). Total force, including a reserve at Aden of 2 native battalions, not brought into the field, amounted to 23 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 60 guns, besides Engineers, Marines, Marine Artillery, siege trains, etc.; or to 1180 Officers, and 28,300 men.^[409]

Although all this army had not landed, yet a sufficient force had been collected to seize the Suez Canal, and to begin the real business of the campaign. Ample preparations had already 359been made by the Navy for this operation. The final details having been settled, a simultaneous landing was effected by blue-jackets and marines at all the important places from Port Said to Suez; and the water-way was cleared from end to end by 4 a.m. on the morning of the 20th of August.^[410] Meanwhile, those portions of the Cavalry and First Divisions that were at Alexandria were embarked on board ship, while those of the Second Division were left behind to protect the town, and to keep up the delusion that Egypt was to be invaded from the north. In order to give the greater currency to this idea, it was further given out that the troops on board ship were destined to make an attack on Abukir. The 2nd Coldstream, which since their arrival at Ramleh had been facing south towards Kafr-ed-Dauer, re-embarked on the Iberia on the 18th of August, and the whole fleet, consisting of 8 ironclads and 17 transports, left in the direction of Abukir at noon on the 19th, and approached Port Said next day, in the early morning. As soon as possible the ships entered the canal, and, piloted by Officers of the Royal Navy, were concentrated at Ismailia. They grounded occasionally as they steamed through the difficult passage, and delayed the procession; but these accidents did not materially check the movement, which was not confined merely to the fleet that sailed from Alexandria, but included also transports, conveying troops direct to the seat of war, from England by Port Said, and from India by Suez. General Graham, having landed with a small force of infantry on the evening of the 20th, pushed forward to Nefisha early next day; and the Guards Brigade, arriving at their destination late on the 21st, disembarked on the 22nd. For two days they were busily engaged in fatigue duties at Ismailia, during which time the concentration of troops continued with unabated energy, so that on the evening of the 23rd about 9000 men were on shore.^[411]

The invaders were dependent for drinking water upon the fresh-water canal previously mentioned, that runs from the Nile near Cairo to Ismailia; and now a fear seized the military authorities that Arabi might be able to destroy its banks, and stop the greater portion of our supply, not only at Nefisha and Ismailia, but also as far as Suez. It was therefore determined to send forward a small force on the 24th, under General Graham, 360to occupy El-Magfar, where the danger was most to be apprehended, and to prevent the occurrence of any such calamity. The force (1 battalion, 3 squadrons, and 2 guns) was not a large one; but it met with no resistance, and soon accomplished its object, not, however, without causing the enemy to show that he was concentrating a formidable body of men in a position further up the canal, at Tel el-Makhuta. It was evident that the British advanced detachment, if attacked with energy, might be unable to hold its own, and be obliged to fall back; but it was also clear that an initial advantage could be gained if we could bring up a sufficient force to cause the Egyptians to evacuate the ground they were engaged in taking up. Accordingly Sir G. Wolseley, who was present, sent back immediately to direct that the Guards Brigade at Ismailia and a battalion of infantry at Nefisha should move to the front without delay.

Meanwhile, the advanced troops became engaged, and a very unequal fight, as far as the numbers of the combatants were concerned, took place under the orders of General Willis. But the large Egyptian forces showed no disposition to close with the small body opposed to them, and the latter maintained their position until reinforcements, consisting of all the three arms, arrived to their support. Just before sundown the Guards Brigade appeared on the scene, the Coldstream leading; the Battalion then coming into the advanced line, under shell fire which happily was not effective, occupied an extended line of outposts during the night. The day had been exceedingly hot and oppressive, and the operations as well as the want of water had greatly exhausted the men, both those who fought and those who marched to their support under a scorching sun and through the burning sand.

N^o. 8.

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF
TEL EL-KEBIR
FROM THE
SUEZ CANAL TO ZAGAZIG
AND THE COUNTRY ROUND
SUAKIN

Mintern Bros. Photo lith.                    A.D. Innes & C^o. London.

At daybreak (25th), an advance was made by the First Division, General Graham in front, followed by the Guards Brigade in support, and, protecting the right flank, the King’s Royal Rifles and Marine Light Infantry, who had just come up, in second line; the Cavalry, under General Drury Low, on the extreme right front. Tel el-Makhuta was found to be abandoned by the enemy; but the Cavalry, still pushing on, found him at Mahsama, where, after a short struggle, they not only dislodged him but captured his camp, seven Krupp guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, stores, and provisions. Next day we took possession of Kassassin, and it was occupied by General Graham, the Guards being left at Tel el-Makhuta.

Meanwhile the disembarkation of men, horses, guns, and stores of all sorts still continued at Ismailia. As the English advanced troops had reached Kassassin,—within striking distance of Tel el-Kebir, where Arabi was known to be entrenching, with the object of making a definite stand against us,—it was now necessary to bring up all available forces for the assault of his lines. General Sir E. Hamley was therefore ordered round to Ismailia from Alexandria with the Second Division (except Sir E. Wood’s brigade, which was directed to remain there for the defence of the town and neighbourhood); so also was the Indian contingent moved up from Suez. While the concentration was in progress, communications were restored as rapidly as possible between the base and Kassassin. The line of railway was repaired where it was torn up, and where embankments of earth had been found to block it; and rolling stock brought out from England was landed and placed upon it. The fresh-water canal also was cleared by removing the dams, which had been constructed across it at Makhuta and Magfar. The Guards Brigade remained at Makhuta 362until the 9th of September, busily engaged in digging away the obstructions that impeded the traffic on the railway and on the canal at these two points, and partly in throwing up redoubts to strengthen the lines of communications. It was a laborious work;—

Supplies also ran short, on account of the impossibility of conveying them across the deep sand, through which lay the only road to the front, until the railway or canal could be used.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome, the scorching heat, and the shadeless glare, the work was well and expeditiously performed. The following communication from Colonel Drake, Commanding Royal Engineer of the First Division, refers to what the Brigade did at this period of the campaign:—^[415]

Once, on the 28th of August, this labour was interrupted for 363a brief space. On that day the enemy attempted to make an attack on Kassassin, which, owing to the fact that it was commanded by hills in his possession, was not a strong military position. Having made a demonstration in the morning, which resulted only in a distant artillery fire of little value, Arabi ordered a more vigorous attack upon General Graham in the afternoon, and this produced some fighting, and a charge conducted in moonlight by the three squadrons of the Household Cavalry. The Egyptians then retired, and the action came to an end; but as soon as it was perceived that the enemy was endeavouring to recapture Kassassin, the Guards Brigade were hurried forward from Makhuta to the threatened point, and were placed in reserve. The three Battalions did not return to their quarters until midnight.

On the 7th of September, communications were cleared, a railway service was established, the main bulk of the supplies and stores—of which large quantities had already been despatched to the front—were ready to be sent forward, and the remaining troops, hitherto kept back at Ismailia, were awaiting to be moved to Kassassin. Orders to concentrate the army there were given, when Arabi made one more attempt to defeat the advanced troops opposed to him at that place, before the rest came into position (September 9th). His previous efforts had failed; and it was scarcely likely that, having effected so little before—although in contact with a small portion of the British forces only—he would now be able to achieve a success at this late stage of the war. The attack was nevertheless a formidable one in point of numbers, and almost the whole of the hostile forces, supported by a powerful artillery, were employed in it. But it was easily repulsed, and the enemy was pursued towards Tel el-Kebir, where he ran for shelter.^[416] During the action, the Guards Brigade were once more moved forward from Makhuta to remain in reserve should their services be required; but they were not brought into action. It seems probable that, had the advance of the First and Cavalry Divisions, who were then present, been continued, Arabi would then and there have been driven out of his entrenched position. The pursuit, however, was not pressed home. Instead of returning to their former camp, the Guards remained for the next few days on the ground they occupied on the evening of the 9th.

364The Egyptian army could scarcely be considered a very formidable foe. The Generals had shown little military capacity, the native Officers no enterprise or power of leadership, and the men in consequence had displayed but a small amount of valour. Drawn principally from the fellaheen, or the peasantry of the country, the ranks of the forces opposed to us were filled with men who had no desire to excel in the profession of arms; and during the first combats of the campaign we gained ample proof of their inefficiency in the field.^[417] As regards their numbers, we are informed that at the date of the bombardment (July 11th), the Egyptian army consisted in all of about 9000 men, 288 field guns, and only 750 horses. Of these, 5000 were in Alexandria, the rest being dispersed over the country. The reserves were called in afterwards, and the 9000 expanded to 60,000, by the 20th of August; when 15,000 were before Alexandria, 12,000 at Tel el-Kebir, 11,000 at Cairo, and 22,000 were distributed in remote garrisons unmolested by the invaders; besides this, there were 6000 Beduin Arabs, half at Tel el-Kebir and the remainder before Alexandria. Again, later, 40,000 raw recruits without training were enlisted, and the total of the army reached the high figure of 100,000 men, not counting the Beduins. For all these men, it appears, arms were available, and 11,000 untrained draft horses were procured.^[418] These vast numbers of undisciplined and unorganized men could do little to serve Arabi’s cause, and they seem to have been rather a source of weakness to him. Unable to fight, they were liable to panic, and their presence was more calculated to unsteady the few soldiers who alone possessed some knowledge of their duties than to augment the strength of the army.

By the evening of the 12th of September, the whole available British forces were at Kassassin, some eight miles from Tel el-Kebir, and numbered 634 Officers, and 16,767 Non-commissioned officers and men, 61 guns, and 6 gatlings. Previous to this date, several reconnaissances had been undertaken towards the enemy’s entrenched position to examine his works, and to observe his strength, disposition, and habits. The knowledge so gained could only confirm the poor opinion in which the enemy deserved to be held. 365His lines were continuous, stretching from the canal for a distance of some 6000 yards; but they were not apparently protected by any advanced works, nor provided with efficient inner entrenchments. They seemed to present little difficulty to storming parties, nor were any formidable obstacles visible.^[419] The left (north) flank, moreover, was entirely open and unguarded; and, lastly, no outposts secured the front during the night. Thus feebly did Arabi venture to oppose the army of one of the great Powers of Europe; and if he was unable to bring civilized science to his aid, so also were his troops incapable of displaying the wild heroism that belongs to the barbarian. In short, he invited a night attack either on his left flank or in front; with the certainty that, if the invaders could reach unseen the position he endeavoured to fortify, they could turn it or penetrate it, before he was ready to meet them; and the whole of his defences would be rendered useless. This would bring about his complete defeat, and the dispersal of his raw levies, who eagerly watched for an early opportunity to desert and fly to their homes.

It is, however, one thing to perceive after the event, what ought to be done, but quite another thing to determine beforehand, the best line of action, and to ensure a result as successful and decisive as the assault on Tel el-Kebir proved to be. The night march across the desert was by no means an easy operation. It entailed the bringing up the whole army in battle array, through the dark, close to a given position at a given time. Careful arrangements to prevent confusion had to be therefore made on the part of the leaders, from the Commander-in-chief downwards; and attention and rigid discipline were more than ever required on the part of the men who were thus led to the assault. It is needless to say that all ranks vied with one another in discharging correctly the important functions that every man had to perform during that night; and in this manner was the difficult operation carried through without hitch, and even without temporary delay. It should be added here, that fortune also favoured us in no small degree. Arabi had, in fact, constructed one, and only one, advanced work in front of his lines of defence; but it had not been discovered during our reconnaissances, and we were ignorant of its existence. 366By good luck that work was avoided by our columns, as they went forward in the dark to the attack. Thus we managed to cross the desert unperceived by so dangerous a tell-tale of our movement, and arrived at dawn before the hostile lines, close enough to storm them before the Egyptians even knew that we were in their vicinity.

A conspicuous point in the lines had been selected upon which to direct the march of the Second (Hamley’s) Division; Sir A. Alison’s Highlanders in front, followed by a brigade formed of the two Divisional battalions of the infantry divisions, under Lieut.-Colonel Ashburnham, C.B., King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The First Division was on Sir E. Hamley’s right, with an interval of 1200 yards; General Graham’s brigade in front, supported by the Guards 1000 yards in rear. Forty-two guns were placed between the two divisions, in line with the Guards Brigade. The Cavalry Division with 12 guns Royal Horse Artillery were on the extreme right. The Indian contingent and the Mountain battery, on the south of the canal, with orders to move off an hour after the rest of the army.

The troops began to strike their tents when dusk set in, and marched to their various rendezvous not without difficulty. It was, of course, imperative that every corps should reach its starting-point in proper order, and there was naturally some moving backwards and forwards in the dark before the masses were correctly formed and aligned. The Brigade took post in their usual formation, the Coldstream on the left, and each Battalion was in columns of half battalions. Everything was ready at 11 p.m.; the men then lay down till 1.30 a.m. of the 13th of September, when they arose in silence, and commenced the advance. We had the advantage of meeting no obstacles in the way; the trackless gravelly soil everywhere afforded an easy passage, and, guided by the stars alone, the army maintained the direction of their march.march.

At night, however, men are always somewhat under the influence of a vague and undefined feeling. The absence of sound, the inability to see for more than a few feet, the sense of isolation which every group experiences, the strange surroundings, the uncertainty of the future, the idea that some untoward event may happen,—all contribute to produce a suppressed excitement almost akin to nervousness.^[420] The principal danger lay in the fact that 367should the centre halt, the wings would continue to move, and so wheel inwards, until one flank faced the other. This actually occurred in the Highland Brigade; but the mishap went no further, and was very speedily rectified by the vigilance, discipline, and intelligence of all ranks. The First Division moved more slowly than the Second, and its leading brigade appears to have executed some changes of formation during the night; the Guards, following in support, made no change in this respect, but marched in the order in which they had originally started. Just before reaching the enemy’s position, the British army was in an irregular echelon; the left was forward and nearest to the enemy, and the right was about 800 yards back.

The Egyptians say their forces at Tel el-Kebir amounted to 20,000 men and 75 guns; but there seems reason to believe that they have under-estimated their numerical strength, and that they had from 25,000 to 30,000 men present.^[421]

As the enemy had no outposts to cover his front; and as we had been fortunate enough to pass by the only advanced work he had constructed, without coming in contact with it,—though our left was at one time unpleasantly close to it,—he had no sort of warning that our whole army was approaching his defensive position, and would assault it at daybreak. He was completely surprised. At 5 a.m., when the first gleam of light was beginning to appear, the Highlanders were close to Tel el-Kebir, and, dashing forward, they carried, after a brief but sharp struggle, the defensive lines in which Arabi apparently had placed so much confidence. While this fight was proceeding, General Graham’s brigade hurried up, and penetrated the Egyptian lines, where they presented a smaller obstacle than did those which faced the Second Division. The battle lasted scarcely half an hour. By the end of that time, the enemy was entirely overpowered, and his forces were annihilated and completely dispersed. The Guards followed, and got into the works as soon as possible, but the short action was then practically at an end.

The cavalry was ordered immediately to pursue the enemy to Cairo, the infantry advancing into and occupying the Egyptian camp and the bridge at Tel el-Kebir. The former pushed boldly on to a suburb of the capital, whence Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stewart went forward with a small force of fifty men, and secured the capitulation of the town and the surrender of Arabi (September 14th). Egypt now lay at the mercy of the British army.^[423]

The losses of Arabi’s forces at the battle of the 13th of September can scarcely be reckoned by the killed and wounded; for such was the extent of the disaster he experienced, that he had no further troops at the end of the action. Many fled to their homes, many rushed wildly onwards panic-stricken; all idea of further resistance had come to an end; every man only thought how he could best make his submission, and welcome the conquerors with demonstrations of joy. The Egyptian casualties are reckoned at 2500, and 58 of their guns were captured. The British lost 9 Officers and 48 men killed, 27 Officers and 355 men wounded, and 30 missing, total 469. Of these the Highlanders lost 45 killed, 180 wounded, and 6 missing; General Graham’s brigade 9 killed, 119 wounded, and 24 missing; the Guards Brigade 1 man killed, and 2 Officers and 20 men wounded; in the Coldstream, 1 Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Sterling), and 7 men were wounded,—of the latter, one man subsequently died of his wounds.^[424]

The victorious forces pushed on towards Cairo after the battle, and secured all the railway centres which communicated with the Egyptian garrisons, still held by the enemy. There was little trouble in causing these garrisons to submit, and by the 24th the whole country was pacified and disarmed. General Willis, with his 2nd Brigade and Divisional infantry, remained at Tel el-Kebir 369for a short time longer, while Sir G. Wolseley, with the Duke of Connaught, and a company of the Scots Guards as escort, went by train, on the afternoon of the 14th, to the capital, followed by the rest of the Scots Guards, by the Coldstream, and by the Grenadier Guards. Owing to obstructions on the line, the Commander-in-chief did not reach his destination until the morning of the 15th; and the Coldstream, starting the same day, reached Cairo that afternoon. The Battalion were then quartered in the Abdin barracks.

The rebellion had now been crushed, and the Khedive’s authority having been completely restored, Tewfik entered his capital in state on the 25th, and resumed his place in the government of the country. British troops, and among them the Guards, lined the streets, which were gaily decked with triumphal arches and inscriptions of welcome. If it is allowable to compare a small event with a great one, the scene was in a very minor degree (in principle, at least), not wholly unlike that which attended the return of the Bourbons to Paris in 1815. The “Usurper” in this case was not redoubtable, nor had he scourged Europe as had his proto-type; but he had interfered with the legal gains of European bondholders, and withstood the wishes and designs of the Western nations. The people, also, in the two cases, not having much will of their own, like many others in a similar position, were influenced by one very simple and burning desire—to give their hearty applause to the strongest party.

A draft from England left for the Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel F. Graves-Sawle and Lieutenant E. Wigram, September 11th; but they were too late to take part in any of the hostilities that marked the campaign, and they went no further than Malta.

There is little more to record. The six weeks spent in Cairo passed agreeably enough, and many eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity to see the sights and the remains of an ancient civilization that makes Egypt one of the most interesting countries in the world. Nor was a race-meeting forgotten, held on the 28th of September, even though other national sports and pastimes had to be discarded on account of the heat. A serious accident, that occurred the same day at the railway-station of Cairo, may also be mentioned. An accidental explosion took place in a waggon laden with ammunition, near the platform, and, as the flames 370could not be got under, the station buildings were soon destroyed, and much rolling stock and a considerable amount of stores were burnt. Troops were at once sent to the spot, and amongst them the 2nd Coldstream assisted to clear away the débris, and guard the place; several smaller explosions continued even during the night.

On the 30th of September a review was held before the Khedive, and the spectacle was made as imposing as possible to impress the natives, not only by the appearance of English troops, but also by the presence of the Indian contingent—Mussulmans like themselves—in the service of Her Majesty. Two days later, the Khedive gave a garden party at the Gezireh palace, to which all Officers were invited in “full dress,” the latter being defined for the occasion, “red serges, swords, and forage caps.” Lastly, there was the famous procession of the “Sacred Carpet,” carried through Cairo on its way to Mecca, and escorted by British troops—an incident which gave rise to some comment in England.

The health of the troops gave some cause for anxiety on account of fever and other illnesses, which broke out among them; and, in consequence, several Officers and men of the Battalion had to be sent home invalided. But the sickness was not abnormally great, considering the fatigues and the privations to which the men were subjected during the campaign; the losses of the Battalion in this respect amounted to eighteen men, of whom twelve died of fever.

Soon after the Carpet incident the war organization of the invading army was broken up, and Sir A. Alison, being left in Cairo with a British force, while the re-settlement of Egypt was being accomplished, arrangements were made to send the remainder home to England, and the Indian contingent to India. The Coldstream, leaving their quarters in Cairo on the 31st of October by train for Alexandria, embarked there, the next day, on board the Batavia, and, reaching Portsmouth on the 16th, proceeded thence to Chelsea barracks.

It only remains to record that, in recognition of the services 371of the army in Egypt in 1882, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to augment the honourable distinctions upon the Colours of the regiments engaged in the campaign by the words “Egypt, 1882,” and “Tel el-Kebir.”

Thus was the war in Egypt conducted, and thus did the British army conquer Arabi Pasha, and subject the country once more to the rule of Tewfik. A new period now commenced, when Egypt was placed under the protection of England—a temporary protection only, as the Foreign Secretary of the day eagerly announced,—who assumed the responsibility of forming a pure administration out of discordant elements, and of educating the people to respect the system which was introduced for their benefit. The success that has attended our efforts, under difficult circumstances, is an interesting subject; so also is the resentment which the French pretend to feel—because we are obliged to stay in a land we conquered and saved from what might have been anarchy, when they would not move themselves to put an end to the trouble. But the consideration of these matters does not enter into the scope of this volume, as the Coldstream was not employed in the work of Egyptian reconstruction. A question, closely connected with our intervention, did, however, still remain to be settled, and it very speedily involved us in further military operations, in which the Regiment took its share. We must therefore devote the next two chapters to the causes and conduct of this war.

General description of the possessions of the Khedive in 1882—Rebellion in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of the British Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is cut off and besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to Egypt—Formation of a Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a Regiment—Problem how to effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile route selected—Advance to Korti—News from General Gordon—Two columns advance from Korti: one across the Bayuda Desert, the other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru—The Nile reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to proceed to Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed by this event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both columns—Troops placed in summer quarters.

Egypt proper is generally a long and narrow strip of land formed by the valley of the Nile.^[425] Outside the influence of that river, there is nothing but desert, and it is due to the fact that the stream branches out into a Delta at Cairo, that there is any breadth at all in the country. This great water artery receives no affluents for more than 1500 miles from its mouth—the Atbara River, meeting it above Berber, being the last tributary that joins it,—and throughout a considerable portion of its lower course, reckoned from the Nubian Desert northwards, the people can only live by congregating close to its banks. A great part of the soil, in fact, which is situated a few miles from the Nile or from the canals that are fed by it, constructed for purposes of irrigation, is a mere barren waste, covered by sand, and unfit for habitation. To the south of the Nubian Desert there is the fertile province of Dongola, and, separated from it by another desert, a rich country, which, owning Khartum as its chief town, is watered by the tributaries of the great river that flow down from the Abyssinian mountains. This large region, usually called the Sudan,—which 373includes the seaboard from Suakin to Massowa, and extends to about the line of latitude eleven degrees north,—was for many a century overrun by wild tribes of nomad Arabs, until 1820, when the Egyptians, having begun then to invade it, gradually brought it under their rule. Later, the territories lying still further to the south, were opened up to the energy of the Khedives; and at the time of the war in 1882, Tewfik’s sway, outside Egypt proper, stretched to the great water reservoirs in the heart of the African continent close to the equator, where the Nile takes its rise. In the government of these enormous dominions the Khedives had been assisted by more than one Englishman, who succeeded in partially checking the evils of the slave-trade that prevailed among the natives, and in introducing some form of civilization in their midst. By far the most celebrated of these administrators was Colonel, afterwards Major-General, C. Gordon, C.B., whose illustrious name is now a household word in England.

In 1881, a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, and this calamity was mainly brought about by two causes. In the first place, the Egyptians misgoverned the country, and had been obliged to relax their hold upon it, on account of the troubles that eventually involved them in war with England. Their administration, always corrupt, became weak, and as a matter of course the Arabs grew discontented with it. But, in the next place, the people were deeply stirred by a tradition that fixed this time—the completion of twelve centuries from the Hegira, November 12, 1882—as the moment when a great chief was to arise, to regenerate Islam, and to restore the Mussulman world to its former power, glory, and magnificence. Nor had the Sudanese to wait for the exact date fixed in the prophecy; for a native of Dongola, named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaiming himself to be the long-expected Mahdi, enrolled his followers, whom we call Dervishes, headed a serious revolt, and preached a “Jehad,” or a “Holy War,” against the authority of the Khedive. By October, 1882, when the British were in possession of Egypt, the struggle had begun in earnest, and the rebels had obtained some important advantages. To meet the danger, 10,000 men of Arabi’s late army were despatched during the winter to the south; and in March, 1883, General Hicks Pasha, a retired British Officer who had served in India, reached Khartum to direct military operations against the enemy. It is sad to relate that he was poorly supported at Cairo; that, in 374endeavouring to drive the Mahdi from his head-quarters at El-Obeid, he cut himself off from his communications; and that his whole force was surrounded and entirely destroyed. General Hicks and his Staff died with arms in their hands on the field of battle, and none survived to tell the tale of their misfortunes (October 7, 1883).^[426] With this disaster, the bulk of the Egyptian forces were annihilated; the dervishes acquired an immense addition to their former strength, both material and moral: Khartum was in danger, and there were only some 2000 men left to defend it.^[427]

Nor was this the only trouble, for the dervishes of the Eastern Sudan, led by one Osman Digna, also raised the standard of revolt, and gained several successes over the Egyptians in the autumn of 1883. In order to save so important a port as Suakin from the ruin that seemed imminent, a force of nearly 4000 men was despatched to oppose the rebels, under a former British Officer, General Baker Pasha, who had rendered distinguished service in the Turkish army during the war with Russia in 1877. But all his efforts were of no avail, for his troops also were overwhelmed and destroyed, February 4, 1884.

These events showed how impossible it was for the Khedive to cope single-handed with the Mahdi; so also did they put the British Government in no small difficulty. Our intervention in Egypt had weakened the military resources of the country, and had imposed responsibilities upon us which had not been foreseen when we began hostilities by the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. We little imagined then, that we should not only have to guard the frontiers from the irruption of savage hordes of Arabs, but also be obliged to try to save the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the perils that menaced them, and to prevent that slave-dealing region from relapsing into the darkness and barbarism that oppressed it in the past. And yet little was done. The revolt was not met at once, and it had time to grow into formidable proportions. The power of the Mahdi increased with great rapidity; the native tribes were unsupported, 375and had to submit to the terror he inspired. It was then too late to act, unless we were prepared to re-conquer the huge provinces which had already been devastated. It is indeed a calamity that the first-fruits of the regeneration we determined to effect in Egypt, should thus have been unfortunately coupled with the abandonment of many of the Khedive’s troops to a merciless foe, and with the obliteration of the work of civilization in an immense tract of country, by the most cruel form of a hateful tyranny.

It was determined to evacuate the Sudan; and General Gordon was requested by the British Government to accomplish this difficult and perilous mission. Accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Stewart, 11th Hussars, he cheerfully accepted it, and reached Khartum unattended by any force, February 18, 1884. He immediately placed the town in a state of defence, infused new life and hopes into the panic-stricken garrison and inhabitants, and took early measures to carry out his instructions. But it was not long before he perceived the impossible nature of the task that had been allotted to him. He had no soldiers available to secure the withdrawal of the many for whose safety he was responsible, and soon the Mahdi surrounded him, intercepted his supplies, and cut off his communications with Egypt. In March, the enemy threatened Shendi. The month following, he established himself in the vicinity of that place. And towards the end of May, Berber fell. Gordon was thus shut out from the rest of the world, and he was little more than a prisoner in Khartum—besieged there, and fighting for his life and for those entrusted to his charge. Retreat was impossible, and the end must infallibly come, as soon as his powers of resistance were exhausted, unless an expedition were sent to his relief.

Meanwhile Major-General Sir G. Graham and a British field force of some 5000 men had been landed in the neighbourhood of Suakin, to defend that seaport and coast from the inroads of Osman Digna (February 28, 1884). In less than a month, he had inflicted severe losses upon the followers of that chieftain, and had pacified the district. But this was all; and these successes bore no fruit. Graham was not ordered to advance in force upon Berber to guard that important town and the communications thereto with the Red Sea.^[428] Instead of this, he was withdrawn from Suakin 376on the 3rd of April, leaving only a small garrison behind him. Hence, just at this critical moment, when it was obvious that the nearest and the ordinary road to Khartum should have been secured and made easily accessible by a light railway, the opportunity of approaching General Gordon was neglected, and the means of enabling him to accomplish his mission were denied him.^[429] On General Graham’s departure there was a pause for several months, during which no further operations took place as far as we were concerned,^[430] though the Arabs continued to advance northwards; and, unopposed, they re-occupied their former positions in the Eastern Sudan from which they had just been expelled.

During this interval of inaction in the field, the British Cabinet deliberated on the situation, and, having asked for advice, considered the merits of the various schemes relating to the invasion of the Sudan that were placed before them by the military authorities at home and on the spot. As a result, they at length announced their determination in a despatch, dated August 8th, when Khartum had been already beleaguered and hidden from their view for many months. In this paper^[431] they expressed their opinion that “General Gordon, acting on his instructions,” might still “secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave;” they announced their intention “to undertake operations for the relief of General Gordon, should they become necessary, and to make certain preparations in respect thereof;” and they further indicated their resolution that the expedition—“whose general scope” was to enable Government “to give directions at 377a very short notice for the despatch of a brigade of troops of all arms to proceed to Dongola,”—was to advance, “should the necessity arise,” along the valley of the Nile.

In order to produce an early moral effect upon the enemy, and to facilitate a prompt advance into the Sudan, which every one knew was imperative if Gordon was to be saved, Sir F. Stephenson, on the receipt of this despatch, was anxious to send up troops without delay to Dongola. But such a proceeding did not at once commend itself to Government, and they still hesitated before venturing so far, even though the movement could have been made with perfect safety. At the same time, 400 boats, each suitable for the conveyance of 12 men and 100 rations per man up the Nile, were ordered in England on the 12th of August, and a further number of 400 were also put in hand on the 22nd. But it was not till a month later (September 20th) that the first British battalion entered Dongola, and it was also only then decided (on the 21st) that, “if necessary,” the expedition might proceed beyond that place.^[432]

Meantime, General Lord Wolseley, having been sent to Egypt to take command, reached Cairo on the 9th of September, and two days later he wrote home to request that a special Camel Corps might be immediately placed at his disposal, in addition to the troops whom he proposed should take part in the campaign. The new corps, 1200 strong, was composed of detachments of 40 men, with one or two Officers, taken from every Battalion of the Foot Guards (280 men), from the 16 Regiments of Cavalry at home (640 men), and from two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade (80 men); also 100 men from the three Regiments of Household Cavalry, and a similar number from the Royal Marines. The corps was divided into three sections, viz. the Guards (to which the Marines were eventually attached), the Heavy, and the Light Camel regiments. The detachments were quickly got together; they left England on the 26th of September, and landed at Alexandria on the 7th of October.

The command of the Guards Camel regiment was assigned to Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards; the Adjutant being Lieutenant C. Crutchley, Scots Guards; the Signalling Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bonham, Grenadier Guards; and the Medical Officer, Surgeon J. Magill, Coldstream Guards. The following 378Officers, two from each Battalion, also formed part of the corps:^[433]—

Lieut.-Colonels C. Rowley and I. Herbert; Captain E. Crabbe; Lieutenants Count Gleichen, D'Aguilar, and R. Wolridge-Gordon: Grenadier Guards.

Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Graves-Sawle; Captain Vesey Dawson; Lieutenants Douglas Dawson, and Hon. H. Amherst: Coldstream Guards.

Lieut.-Colonels M. Willson, and Sir W. Gordon-Cumming, Bart.; Lieutenants A. Drummond, and B. Baden-Powell: Scots Guards.

The rest of the British troops required for field operations were drawn from our force already in occupation of Egypt.^[434] Of these, 3½ battalions of infantry, and one of Marines, one squadron, most of the artillery, and a portion of the Royal Engineers were left in garrison at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suakin. The remainder, 9 battalions, 3 squadrons (of the 19th Hussars), the Mounted infantry, a Camel battery, and Royal Engineers took part in the expedition, and were disposed along the Nile to guard the communications, and to form the fighting force.^[435] In addition, the Egyptian army was also utilized, but all, except a Camel battery which was pushed to the front later on, were left upon the lines of communication, not further south than Hannek.

N^o. 9.

SKETCH MAPS TO ILLUSTRATE
EGYPTIAN and SUDAN
EXPEDITIONS

Mintern Bros. Photo-lith.     A.D. Innes & C^o.     London.

Khartum, inaccessible from the south, is cut off from all ordinary communications with the north by large tracts of almost waterless desert, that lie between the town and Egypt and the Red Sea. The determination, therefore, to relieve Gordon entailed a military problem of considerable difficulty, relating to the manner in which he should be reached in time, by a sufficient number of troops and quantities of food supplies, and thus be enabled to retreat from the Sudan together with those he was pledged to save. This problem has been enunciated as follows: How to “place a force of about 5000 fighting men at or near Shendi, at the latest by the end of the year, and to carry with them, not only 379supplies for themselves, but also for the inhabitants and garrison of Khartum.”^[436] Two proposals had been made to solve it:—

1. By taking the Nile route, and advancing to the neighbourhood of Dongola, to continue either along the river by Abu Hamed, or else to strike across the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh, situated on the Nile opposite Shendi. There were many difficulties attending this proposal. The distance from Cairo to Shendi, or Metemmeh, is as much as 1527 miles, and the navigation of the river is greatly obstructed by cataracts, so that frequent disembarkations of men and stores would be necessary to surmount these obstacles. Hence much time, which was an essential element in the problem, would be consumed. Between Cairo and Dongola (1033 miles), and indeed for quite 100 miles further on, no enemy was to be expected; but beyond this point it was uncertain where he might be met. The desert road from Korti, some 100 miles above Dongola, to Metemmeh, had the advantage of avoiding the loop of the Nile that passes round Abu Hamed, and of thus saving a distance of more than 200 miles. But it was likely to be occupied by the enemy; a distance of 24 miles, in the face of the dervishes, would have to be traversed without water from station to station; and even if the route were opened up, it did not offer facilities for the transport of stores, which was a far more serious difficulty to be overcome than the mere conveyance of the troops. The desert, in short, was only suited to enable the British Commander to take a short cut towards Khartum, and to make a dash forward to Gordon’s relief, should his position become critical; and it was in view of this consideration that he requested (September 9th) to have a Camel corps allotted to him, as we have just seen. But under any circumstances the expedition would have to proceed forward across many obstacles, for more than 1100 miles from Cairo, before he could avail himself of the services of that corps.

2. The other plan was to base the army of relief at Suakin, and to push therefrom to Berber, a comparatively short distance of 245 miles. But this project, though it contained several important advantages, also presented no small difficulties. Instead of having to form a fighting base at so very remote and inaccessible a place as Dongola, or Korti, it would have been established at Suakin, 380in easy and direct communication with the centre of our national resources, and where men, and stores of even the heaviest description, could be readily accumulated as they were required. Owing to the fact that Osman Digna had been unmolested since the spring of the year, he had again taken up an offensive attitude in the Eastern Sudan; Berber also was occupied by the enemy, and hence it was hopeless to suppose that there would be any less fighting upon this route than there would be on the other. This, however, taken by itself was not of great moment. But another circumstance of the utmost importance has to be mentioned. There appears to be a more serious dearth of water in one section of the desert, between the Red Sea and the Nile, than in the worst place on the road from Korti to Metemmeh; and a greater distance to be traversed from well to well in the former (58 miles) than in the latter (24 miles). Herein lay the main difficulty of the Suakin-Berber route. To overcome it, a light railway was necessary to span the whole distance; and it had been calculated that it would have taken three months to achieve such an undertaking. If successful, the advance from Berber to Shendi (95 miles) would have been easily accomplished.

It is not our intention to compare these two methods of solving the problem that had to be faced—rendered exceedingly difficult, and perhaps not in any manner to be solved, within the short space of time allotted, by the unfortunate way in which the Mahdi had been allowed to consolidate his power, and to become a formidable foe. An effort has rather been made to give, as clearly as it is possible in a few words, a short accountaccount of the obstacles which beset both these routes, of the conditions which surrounded the two proposals, and to explain some of the considerations that had to be weighed when the Nile route was adopted.

The first stage of the campaign is the history of the advance over more than a thousand miles to Dongola, and across the many obstacles, formed by rapids and cataracts, that interfere with the navigation of the river. The most troublesome obstructions blocking the passage did not begin till Gemai was reached, just above Wady Haifa, and about 780 miles from Cairo. Up to this place, progress was made by rail and by river steamers; though even in this section, the journey entailed five disembarkations. Here the boat service began, and the first serious difficulty had soon 381to be met; afterwards many others had to be surmounted, always at the expense of much labour and of valuable time.

The boats ordered in England had been despatched to Egypt with the utmost promptitude, and such was the energy displayed that the first troops embarked in them at Gemai on the 1st of November.^[438] Assisted by the Canadian “Voyageurs,” nearly three-fourths of the fighting force were past that station on the 18th, struggling forward; though only some 1300 men were as far as Dongola. The Guards Camel regiment marched from Assuan (547 miles from Cairo), and on this date were south of Dal. Korti having been selected as the point of concentration instead of Dongola, it was now calculated that the first infantry battalion should arrive there by the middle of December, and the last on January 22, 1885.

The Mounted infantry, provided with camels, had throughout the advance been near the head of the column, and early in December were as far forward as Shabatut (some 40 miles above Dongola). The Guards Camel regiment reaching that place on the 4th, was brigaded with them under the orders of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, and until the 10th, the force was practised in their new formations and drill.^[439] On the 11th, the whole advanced to Korti, and arrived on the 15th; the Marines detachment joined the Guards here. Shortly afterwards a portion of the Heavy Camel regiment marched into that camp, and two battalions and a squadron of the 19th Hussars also reached it.

While these operations were in progress, some news had been received from General Gordon. On the 17th of November a 382letter, dated the 4th, announced that he could “hold out forty days with ease,” but “after that it will be difficult;” also that there were at Metemmeh five of his steamers with nine guns, awaiting orders.^[440] Again, on the 31st of December, a diminutive piece of paper had reached Lord Wolseley at Korti, bearing the words, “Khartum all right, 14/12/84.—C. G. Gordon,” but supplemented by a verbal message to the effect that the garrison were in great straits, that provisions were running low, and would therefore be exhausted before long.^[441]

Before the arrival of this last communication, however, arrangements had already been made to advance in two directions from Korti: one column, called the River column, under Major-General Earle, was to push along the Nile through Abu Hamed towards Berber, while the other, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, was to march across the desert and seize Metemmeh.

Now, it was known that there were no supplies to be obtained at the latter place; and as a sufficient number of camels do not seem to have been procurable, it was found impossible to convey the Desert column, with the whole of its stores, to its destination in one journey. The distance to be traversed (176 miles) is, moreover, so great, that it was imperative to establish one or two posts on the route. The principal station was fixed at Jakdul wells, where water was plentiful, 98 miles from Korti. Owing, however, to the scarcity of camels, it was necessary, before the final advance could be made, to occupy that place and to make several journeys to it, in order to victual it and organize it as a depôt for future requirements. This preliminary operation took some days to accomplish, and was not completed until the 14th of January, upon which date Sir H. Stewart was enabled to start for Metemmeh.

The orders he received were to attack and occupy that town, to leave there a portion of his force, and to return with the remainder to Jakdul. Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E. (the Chief of the Intelligence Department), and Captain Lord C. Beresford, R.N., with a small party of seamen, accompanied the column, and both had special instructions given to them. The latter was to take over one or two of the steamers which were known to be at Metemmeh, and, when he had reported them to be ready, the former was to proceed in them to Khartum, and to deliver a letter to General 383Gordon. Sir C. Wilson was to be accompanied by a small detachment of infantry; he might march the men through the city, and show them to the garrison; but they were not to sleep there; and they were to return with him to Metemmeh. Further, he was only to stay long enough to confer fully with General Gordon, and, having done so, he was to get back to Korti with all convenient despatch.^[442] Lastly, he was supplied with an estimate showing the approximate dates upon which the troops were calculated to arrive at the different stations along the route to Khartum. According to this estimate, General Earle was to reach Abu Hamed about the 10th of February, Berber the 22nd, and Shendi the 5th of March; while the remainder “will commence to reach Metemmeh the 16th of January, and should be concentrated there with sixty days' supplies by the 2nd of March,” adding, “If we hire many camels this date may be anticipated.”^[443]

Sir H. Stewart started from Korti on the 30th of December, with 78 Officers, 1029 men, 221 natives, 2206 camels, and 45 horses, among them the Guards Camel regiment. Marching in the afternoons and at night, he reached Jakdul, without opposition, early on the 2nd of January, and the same day returned, leaving the Guards and Royal Engineers behind, under Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. He was again in Jakdul on the 12th. During the interval, the water arrangements were improved, and the post strengthened. In respect to this duty, Sir H. Stewart reports as follows on the 14th January:—

Leaving a garrison behind of 150 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, the force started from Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th, consisting of two squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the Naval division, half a Camel battery, Royal Engineers, Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments, a wing Royal Sussex (on 384camels), Medical and Transport details; approximately, 115 Officers, 1687 men, 351 natives, 153 horses, 2888 (of whom 860 transport) camels, 3 guns, and one Gardner. Next day, evidence of the enemy’s proximity became apparent, and on the 16th the cavalry, which had been pushed well to the front, reported that he had taken up a position to bar our access to the Abu Klea wells. The advance was continued, and in the afternoon, when it was too late to attack, we got into close touch with him. A zeriba was then constructed, strengthened by a hastily made wall and by mimosa thorn; and during the night the Arabs fired into it, but without doing much mischief. Early on the 17th, a small garrison was placed there, and the remainder emerged in square, with skirmishers in front and on the flanks. The formation was as follows:—Front face, Coldstream on the right, Royal Artillery in the centre, Mounted infantry on the left; Right face, Scots Guards on the left, then Grenadier Guards, Marines, Sussex Regiment; Left face, Mounted infantry on the right, then Heavy Camel regiment; Rear face, Heavies on the right, then Naval division, with the Gardner gun, and Sussex; the 19th Hussars were outside on the left. We soon became engaged, and several casualties occurred, the dervishes firing, and apparently being driven back behind the folds of the ground. Our progress was slow, for the cumbrous square formation had to be maintained, and the camels, carrying the wounded, to be prevented from straying outside.^[444] We were making for a line of flags that was to be seen in front of us, and many now believed that the enemy was in full retreat.

The sudden and fierce onslaught of some 5000 fanatics, who

385held death in contempt, was eventually directed against the left rear corner; and such was the impetus of the rush, that the Heavies were pressed back by sheer weight of numbers into the centre of the square, where the camels were, and almost as far as the front and right faces. The square was practically broken, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight followed, but it happily was only of brief duration. The Guards and Marines had been unmoved by the shock; and keeping up a steady fire with the front rank upon the masses of the Arabs, who were hovering near to complete the victory should the rush be successful, they turned about the rear rank to assist in the struggle that was going on behind them.^[447] In a few minutes the violence of the dervishes had expended itself, and they fell back, slowly and sullenly, until we got our guns to play upon them, and they left us in possession of the ground. The cavalry then pushed forward to the wells, and, when the square was reformed, it followed slowly on, the men elated by success, but suffering agonies from thirst. At 5 p.m. the water was reached, but it was not until early on the 18th that the zeriba was transferred to Abu Klea, and the post there was then established and strengthened.

Our losses, which fell principally on the Heavies and the Naval division, were very great, and amounted to 9 Officers and 65 men killed, and 9 Officers^[448] and 85 men wounded; total 168 of all ranks. Of the former, Colonel Fred Burnaby (Royal Horse Guards) fell, well known for his travels and for his adventurous character. Of the Coldstream detachment 2 men (one a sergeant) were killed; Surgeon James Magill and 10 were wounded, of whom one died of his wounds. The strength of the enemy is not accurately known; it is supposed to have been from 9000 to 11,000: his losses were considerable, and 800 lay dead in the open ground close to the square.

In the afternoon of the 18th, the column started for the Nile, and continued to move throughout the night. The troops, the native drivers, and the animals were becoming exhausted by the toil they had undergone; the men found it difficult to keep awake; the camels, insufficiently fed, and at work incessantly for 386nearly three weeks, lagged behind, or got off the track. The line of advance led through a thick mimosa scrub; there was no moon, and, on account of the enemy’s proximity, bugles could not be sounded to keep the column together. During the darkness, therefore, there was much confusion, and it was not until dawn that order could be restored. In a short time the river came into sight, some four miles away. To the left front appeared a large and well-built town, now recognized to be Metemmeh, and looking far more important and strong than was represented on our maps or indicated in our reports. As the British column, from its position near Abu Kru, gazed on the fertile valley beneath, they perceived large crowds of armed men issuing from the walls of Metemmeh, and it soon became clear that no water was to be obtained without a fight.

A zeriba was at once formed, wherein to guard the stores and baggage, before a force could advance to cut its way through the enemy. But as this was being accomplished, the latter, creeping up through the long grass and scrub, opened fire from concealed positions, and several casualties occurred. Sir H. Stewart at this moment was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Sir C. Wilson.

At 2.30 the zeriba was ready, and garrisoned by half the Heavies, the Cavalry, Artillery, and Naval division, while the remainder, under Sir C. Wilson, emerged therefrom in square, the executive command of which was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. An important duty now devolved upon this Officer, viz. to lead the square past the enemy in the bush to the river, and to keep it as much as possible on the open ground. That the losses at this particular period of the day were comparatively few, may be ascribed to the manner in which the column was directed and manœuvred at this time. Warned by the tactics of the dervishes at Abu Klea, no skirmishers were extended; but as long as the enemy kept up his fire from the scrub, our men, unable to reply with effect, were at a disadvantage. Fortunately this did not last long; for the Arabs, unable to restrain their fiery ardour, charged the square with fury, and were met by the steady and withering fire of our soldiers. In less than five minutes the fight was over.

There was no more resistance that day, and Sir C. Wilson, having gone forward to select a bivouac, the column was halted on the river as dusk began to fall.

The joy of being once more near a plentiful supply of water, and the sense of relief that the march across the desert had been at last successfully accomplished, now filled the minds of our men, and atoned in some degree for the hardships and privations they had just undergone; but rest was also required, for not only the labours, but the excitement and the dangers of the last few days had told severely upon them, and a much-needed sleep was only partially obtained during the night of January 19th-20th. Next day the bivouac was shifted to the village of Gubat, which was placed in a state of defence; and the zeriba, formed the day before, having been evacuated, the wounded and stores were brought there.^[450] The enemy was hovering near, but made no attempt to interfere with our operations. In view of the orders given to the Commander of the Desert column, and to secure our position at Gubat from attacks which could be easily organized against us in Metemmeh, Sir C. Wilson determined to capture that place, if this could be accomplished without serious risk. On the 21st, therefore, he advanced against it with the greater part of his force, but found it stronger than he anticipated. During the day, Gordon’s steamers appeared on the scene, and assisted in the attack; but they also brought news that another horde of Arabs might be soon expected from the direction of Khartum, and orders were therefore given to fall back upon Gubat.

The casualties during the 19th, 20th, and 21st, amounted to one Officer and 22 men killed, and 9 Officers and 93 men wounded; total, 125: added to this, two war correspondents to London newspapers (the Morning Post  and Standard ) also lost their lives. Among the severely wounded, belonging to the Guards Camel regiment, were Lieutenant Crutchley, Scots Guards, and Major H. Poë, Royal Marines; in the Coldstream detachment 388two men were wounded. It is extremely sad to have to relate that the brilliant Commander of the column, Sir H. Stewart, never recovered from his wound, and died on the 17th of February, before he could be taken even as far as Korti, deeply regretted by all who served under his command, as well as by every one who knew his kindly, generous, and manly character.

Directly the Queen learnt that the column had reached the Nile, and heard of the pluck and endurance exhibited by her soldiers, Her Majesty caused the Secretary of State to signify by telegram “her satisfaction and warm thanks to her brave troops, and her deep concern for their losses and sufferings, but especially for General Stewart’s severe wound;” and in consideration of that Officer’s gallant service, Her Majesty was also pleased to promote him to the rank of Major-General. The Khedive, moreover, telegraphed his congratulations and thanks to the men for the success they had achieved.

Sir C. Wilson had now a double function to discharge. His original mission was to communicate a letter to General Gordon, and to give him that moral support which the appearance of a few red-coats for a day or two in Khartum might confer upon him.^[451] But a new duty also obliged him to provide for the safety of the small and sadly diminished force which had just been unexpectedly placed under his command. To this most important task he therefore applied himself. It was reported that enemies were closing about him from Berber and from the south; Metemmeh also was too strong to be taken by a coup de main. Thus it was essential that he should see for himself the extent of the Arab resources which might be brought to bear upon Gubat; and while he sent the cavalry up the river, early on the 22nd, he embarked in a steamer, and made his way down the stream. The results of these reconnaissances were satisfactory, and he returned convinced that the dervishes were not in such numbers as he had been led to believe. Meanwhile, the position we occupied was strengthened, and communications with the Nile were secured; Gubat, situated on a height about half a mile from the water, could not be evacuated, and it was garrisoned by the Guards; and another fort, connected with an island by a tête de pont, was constructed near the river.

389Then a vexatious delay occurred. The steamers required repair, and it was not until the afternoon of the 23rd, when too late to start on that day, that they were reported fit to move. Accompanied by 20 men of the Royal Sussex and 240 black troops, Sir C. Wilson left for Khartum on the morning of the 24th. The passage up the river was rapidly made, in a falling Nile, and on the 28th the beleaguered city was approached. It would be outside the scope of this volume to give any account of the numerous thrilling adventures and hairbreadth escapes that marked this perilous journey. It is sufficient to say that Khartum had fallen on the 26th, and Gordon was killed. The whole place was in the hands of the Mahdi, and the little band of Englishmen ran the gauntlet past the enemy right up to Khartum, and under its guns, until they made sure that the end had indeed come, and that there was no further use in remaining where they were.^[452] We now know that Gordon had been starved out, and that his food ran short on the 3rd or 4th of January, when the last issue of rations took place; that Omdurman, having fallen soon afterwards (January 15th), the dervishes drew closer round Khartum; that they could have entered it any day they chose, as the falling Nile laid bare the weak points of the defences of the city; that at dawn on the 26th this helpless quarter was stormed; and that the place fell after a few minutes' fighting. The expedition had been sent a month too late, and the “game was played out before the British troops reached Gubat; at that period nothing could save Khartum.”^[453]

Little occurred to the small British force near Metemmeh during this interval. Convoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Talbot (1st Life Guards), of about a thousand camels and 300 to 400 men, started for Jakdul, to bring up supplies to the Nile, on January 23rd and on February 2nd. Sir C. Wilson, 390also, after his gallant effort to reach Khartum, left Gubat on the 6th, with an escort of twelve men of the Coldstream, under Captain V. Dawson, and reached Korti on the 9th. These and other movements took place without opposition on the part of the enemy, and thus it appeared that the desert had been effectively swept of Arabs; but they were still to be feared, and rumours were not wanting to the effect that they were concentrating and were converging upon our advanced position on the river. When Lord Wolseley heard of Sir H. Stewart’s wound, he decided to send his Chief of the Staff, Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, to replace him, and to despatch some infantry to reinforce the Desert column. Accompanied by six companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, who marched on their feet the whole way from Korti, the new General reached Gubat on the 11th, and assumed command there.

The fall of Khartum, reported at head-quarters on the 4th of February, made a change in the conduct of the war, and the object of his mission being no longer possible, the British Commander was left without instructions as to his future proceedings.^[454] He was thus unable to send any precise orders to Sir R. Buller, who had already left Korti before the death of General Gordon was known there, until he had ascertained the views of Government upon the new situation that had arisen. But these views were not at once forthcoming; for, the first telegram, dated London, February 6th, gave no indication of the policy to be pursued in the Sudan, and it was only after a more explicit statement had been requested, that he was informed that “the power of the Mahdi at Khartum must be overthrown.” Orders were then despatched to the Desert column to hold on to the Nile, and, when Metemmeh was taken, to combine with General Earle in an attack upon Berber. But before this message was received, arrangements had been already taken for the evacuation of Gubat. This determination had been rendered necessary because the camels were insufficient in number, and were too much reduced by hard work, to perform the transport service across the desert; supplies were liable to run short; and a hostile force was reported to be marching from Khartum.

Accordingly, the last of the wounded left the Nile on the 13th under escort, commanded by Colonel Talbot, consisting of portions 391of the Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments. Early next day the enemy showed signs of renewed activity, by attacking the convoy, which, encumbered by wounded, many of whom were carried on stretchers, and by Egyptian soldiers and camp followers who had come from Khartum in the steamers, was not advantageously circumstanced to ward off a serious attack. After keeping the enemy at bay by some sharp fighting, the Light Camel regiment, which was luckily in the vicinity, came up to the support of the convoy, and with their assistance the Arabs were soon driven away. Our losses were two killed and six wounded, of whom one belonged to the Coldstream.^[455] On the same day, the 14th, Gubat was finally evacuated by our troops. Abu Klea was reached on the 15th, and, in order to reduce the consumption of water, for the wells were only capable of supplying a moderate force, the Hussars, Guards, Heavies, and the Sudanese who manned the steamers, were sent to Jakdul on the 16th.^[456]

The River column, under Major-General Earle, had meanwhile started on its way to Berber by Abu Hamed (January 24th), and found the ascent of the Nile, through a hostile and practically unexplored country, by no means an easy operation. The physical difficulties of the route seemed to increase day by day, but by dint of hard work and perseverance the troops continued to push on slowly. On the 10th of February, meeting the enemy at Kirbekan, where he attempted to make a stand, they attacked and defeated him; but the victory was unfortunately accompanied by the death of the General—killed by a bullet fired from a stone hut, in which some Arabs had taken refuge. The advance was immediately resumed, and was continued until the 24th, when a point, 26 miles from Abu Hamed, was reached. Here the troops were stopped by a message, dated head-quarters 20th, which ordered the column to return. A retrograde movement was therefore at once commenced. The cause of this fresh order has now to be briefly explained.

On receiving instructions directing the overthrow of the Mahdi’s power at Khartum, Lord Wolseley decided that the first step was to reduce Berber, and he therefore wished, as we have seen, 392to combine both the River and Desert columns to secure that object. But insuperable difficulties presented themselves to the execution of that design. In the first place, the absence of all means of rapid communication between Korti and the two columns was a serious obstacle to any form of combined operations. Supplies for immediate and future use had, moreover, to be carried along with the troops, over the formidable obstructions which everywhere opposed our progress. The camels of the Desert column had completely broken down, and there was no transport available; the men’s boots were also worn out, and their marching powers were in consequence diminishing day by day. The River column, moreover, though able to move forward,—but only slowly, on account of the physical difficulties in the way and the low condition of the Nile,—had not sufficient carrying power to store Berber with the supplies which it would have been necessary to place there.^[457]

These difficulties entailed a change of plan, and both columns were therefore ordered to return. Sir R. Buller had been annoyed by hostile demonstrations against him near Abu Klea since the 16th, and on that day and on the next he lost three men killed, and 4 Officers, and 23 wounded. As soon as this advanced position had no longer to be held, he evacuated it on the 23rd and 24th, in the face of a large number of Arabs, estimated at not less than 8000 men, with such skill and judgment that, having deceived them, they made no effort to interfere with his movements. The retirement was everywhere continued, the Guards reaching Korti on the 9th of March, and the last troops leaving the desert on the 16th. From Korti, the Guards went to Dongola on the 16th, and remained there for some months; while the rest of the army also took up summer quarters on the Nile, not further forward than Merowi,—to await the coming of the autumn, when a fresh advance was to be made to free Khartum from the despotism of the Mahdi.

SERGEANT-DRUMMER 1895.
N.R.Wilkinson del.      A.D.Innes & C^o. London.      Mintern Bros. lith.

Reasons for the expedition to Suakin—Departure of the Coldstream—Orders to Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham—Position of the enemy—Advance against Hashin—Engagement at Tofrek—Attack on a convoy, escorted by the Coldstream and Royal Marines—Advance to Tamai—Construction of the railway—Attack on T'Hakul—Abrupt end of the campaign—The Coldstream proceed to Alexandria, and thence to Cyprus—Evacuation of the Sudan; how the Mahdi took advantage of it; how the Dongolese were treated—Position taken up south of Wady Halfa—Defeat of the Arabs at Ginnis—Return of the Guards Camel regiment—Return of the Coldstream from Cyprus—Honourable distinctions added to the Colours—Officers of the Regiment in December, 1885.

When the British Government made up their mind, early in February, 1885, to put an end to the devastating tyranny of the dervishes, at all events in Khartum, and sent instructions to the British Commander to that effect, they also consulted him as to whether a strong expedition should be despatched forthwith to Suakin. Under the impression that his instructions to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum were intended really to produce that result, Lord Wolseley gladly accepted the offer that Osman Digna might be dealt with, without further delay. We must refer the reader to the current history of the day to seek the causes of the awakened energy which roused the Government to action at this moment. Very few years have elapsed since 1885, and the events which then took place can scarcely be forgotten. Suffice it to say that the country, justly proud of General Gordon, was roused to indignation when it was realized that, in spite of warnings from the military authorities, the Government had delayed to take proper measures to rescue him and those for whom he was responsible, until the season was too far advanced, and until rescue was impossible. So also, the large and unstinted 394sums of money, freely lavished upon the tardy expedition that was at last despatched up the Nile, had failed to accomplish the object which the nation had so much at heart. Under all these circumstances, it was clearly judicious to propitiate the popular wrath that began to manifest itself; and how could this be more efficaciously done than by the public announcement that summary punishment was about to be inflicted upon the murderers of the British hero, whose death was so universally deplored? Hence it came about that a railway to Berber was immediately to be commenced; that another expedition to protect it was to be sent to Suakin; and that a still more extravagant expenditure of treasure was to be wasted, now when it was too late, and when the necessary outlay had been curtailed up to the summer of 1884,—that is, as long as there was time to save the garrison of Khartum.

In January and February, 1885, Major-General Lyon Fremantle, in command, as we have seen, at Suakin, since July, 1884, had been reinforced by a squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, brought from Lower Egypt, and amounting to some 2500 men. With these he engaged in defensive operations against Osman Digna, who had again begun to give trouble in the district. Prompt measures were now taken to make them capable of assuming the offensive by raising them to a total of about 13,000 men. The field force, so augmented, was commanded by Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham, V.C., K.C.B., under the general orders of Lord Wolseley, who was responsible for all operations against the enemy; and composing it, there was a Guards Brigade, troops of the Line, an Indian contingent, and, lastly, an Australian battalion and battery furnished by the Government of New South Wales. This Colonial corps of fighting men, and that provided by the Dominion of Canada for the service of the boats on the Nile, form a new feature in our military history, which we should be sorry to pass over in silence; for they show the patriotic feelings which urge our brethren over the sea, gallantly to take their share in any struggle in which the interests of our Queen and Empire may be involved.

The following organization was adopted at Suakin: A Cavalry Brigade (Colonel H. P. Ewart, C.B.), two squadrons of the 5th Lancers, and two of the 20th Hussars, and a battalion Mounted infantry (4 companies). Three batteries of artillery (one Royal Horse Artillery), and eventually one battery New South Wales. 395The 1st or Guards Brigade^[458] (Major-General A. J. Lyon Fremantle), 3rd Grenadiers (Colonel Hon. W. Home), 1st Coldstream (Colonel A. Lambton), and 2nd Scots Guards (Colonel Hon. W. Trefusis). Subsequently, when they arrived, the New South Wales Battalion, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Richardson, were attached to this Brigade. The 2nd Brigade (Major-General Sir J. C. McNeill, V.C., K.C.B.), three battalions of infantry (of the East Surrey, Shropshire, and Berkshire Regiments), and one of Royal Marines. The Indian Brigade (Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B.), one regiment of cavalry (9th Bengal), three battalions infantry (15th Sikhs, 17th Bengal, and 28th Bombay), and one company Madras Sappers. Royal Engineers (one Railway and two Field companies, two Telegraph sections, and one Balloon detachment). And four, eventually five, companies of the Commissariat and Transport Corps.

The 1st Coldstream were made up by a draft from the 2nd Battalion to 1 Warrant-officer, 80 Non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers, and 710 privates, out of which a detachment of 50 men was told off to form a Mounted infantry company. Officers were posted as follows:—

The following Officers served on the Staff: Lieutenants Earl of Wiltshire, and Hon. Alan Charteris, Aides-de-camp to Major-General Sir J. McNeill; and Lieutenant Gladstone, Orderly Officer 396to Major-General Fremantle. The detachment of mounted men was placed under the command of Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg and Lieutenant G. Sutton, but until the ponies were obtained, which did not take place before the 5th of April, these Officers did duty with the Battalion, the former commanding No. 7 Company. It should also be stated that the Brigade furnished upon this occasion a company of Army Signallers, under command of Lieutenant F. Lloyd, Grenadier Guards, composed of 12 men from the 3rd Grenadiers, 12 from the 1st Coldstream, and 6 from the 2nd Scots Guards; the corps was attached to the 3rd Grenadier Guards. Further, a Field Hospital was also formed, of which Surgeons-Major C. Read (Coldstream), Lawrence (Grenadiers), and A. Myers (Scots Guards), and Surgeon G. Robinson (Scots Guards) were the Medical Officers.

The 1st Coldstream left Wellington Barracks shortly after 7 a.m. on the 19th of February, accompanied by a dense and enthusiastic crowd, and, marching to Westminster Stairs, proceeded in two river steamers to Gravesend, where they embarked on board the Manorah. Remaining a few hours at Malta, they were detained a day at Suez, and reached Suakin on the 8th of March. The Battalion then landed without delay, marched about two miles, and encamped in an advanced position to cover the assembly of the troops; they were joined by the 2nd Scots and 3rd Grenadier Guards, who arrived respectively the 9th and 10th. There had been some alarms of a disquieting nature when we reached the seat of war. The Arabs frequently sent forward a few armed men at a time, who, crawling at night past the outposts into the centre of the camp, attacked and stabbed our soldiers and horses in the dark, even in the head-quarter camp or to the rear of it, where at least every one had a right to believe himself to be in safety, and guarded against depredations of the sort. This disagreeable method of warfare was not easy to suppress, and when the enemy was successful in his raid, it produced a “scare,” which was calculated to disturb the equanimity of the troops. The dervishes, in short, were hovering very near us at night, firing into us from the bush (fortunately without much effect), though they seldom made any demonstrations in the daylight. Detachments were sent out as soon as it was dark, to watch all approaches leading to Suakin; but the nuisance only came to an end, when we moved out to attack the enemy, and drove him back from our 397neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Brigade camp, though it had never been disturbed, was withdrawn somewhat closer to the town on the 16th.

The orders which Sir G. Graham received were dated the 20th of February; and they directed him, in the first place, to destroy the power of Osman Digna, and, secondly, to give assistance and protection to the construction of the railway. The military occupation of the Hadendowa country, lying near the Suakin-Berber route, was to be accomplished; and it was indicated that this would be best done by the Indian troops, while the British portion of the army were to be placed in the hilly region, which is to be found a little beyond Tambuk wells (25 miles from Suakin), to a distance of 60 or 70 miles further on towards Berber. It was also intimated that possibly Berber might not be attacked before the autumn,^[459] and, if so,—

“the railway cannot be pushed much beyond Ariab; and there, all the railway plant and material necessary for the 100 miles between it and Berber should be collected as soon as possible, so that the advance, when the cool weather begins, and Berber is taken, may be made at once.”^[460]

These instructions clearly show the intention of the British Government at this critical moment in their fortunes, when public indignation was rising against them; viz. to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartum in the autumn of 1885, now that it was not found possible to achieve that object in the spring of the same year. This was to be effected by the co-operation of two expeditions, under the supreme command of Lord Wolseley,—one under his immediate leadership, concentrating in the province of Dongola, to pass the summer there, and to emerge therefrom when the suitable season came round for field operations; the other, under Sir G. Graham, with the objects (1) to crush Osman Digna, and to clear the country of the enemy, in order that the railway might be made, and (2) to construct that railway at least as far as Ariab (some 145 miles from Suakin), and to place troops for its protection “where the summer heats could be best endured.”^[461]

Sir G. Graham reached Suakin March 12th, and next day the 398railway was begun.^[462] A few days had to be spent in completing the assembly of the force, and in perfecting the arrangements necessary for their supply. The wells in the neighbourhood were sufficient to provide the camels and horses with water, but as its quality and quantity could not be depended upon for the troops of the expedition, ships fitted with condensing boilers were brought to Suakin, and condensed sea-water was issued in tins for their use, and was transported to the various camps by camels or by railway.

The country near Suakin is a flat sandy plain, intersected by khors, or water courses (quite dry at this season of the year), which, extending westward some ten or twelve miles, is terminated by a line of hills running almost parallel to the sea coast. Near the town, the plain is fairly open for about two or three miles, but afterwards, and especially in the khors and at the foot of the hills, it is covered by thick masses of mimosa thorny scrub, many of which look somewhat like large gooseberry bushes six to eight feet high, and wide in proportion; in many places they are tangled by the prickly pear, and by rank grass and other undergrowth. The enemy was reported to have concentrated his main force of some 7000 men at Tamai, a village about 16 miles away in a south-westerly direction from Suakin. Another thousand or more were at Hashin, eight miles due east of the town, where a valley penetrates into the hills. It was here that the Arabs were supposed to live who troubled our nights. To the north-west is the village of Handub, eleven miles off, also occupied by dervishes; and to this place the railway to Berber would have to run.

It was evidently desirable that our first movement should be directed against Hashin. On the 19th of March, a reconnaissance was undertaken against it, and next day an attack upon the position was made in force; the 2nd Brigade in front, supported on the flanks by the Guards and Indian troops, covered by the cavalry; the horse artillery and a Gardner battery (4 guns) being in rear: altogether a little more than 8000 men. Arrived at a detached group of hills about a mile and a half from Hashin, redoubts were constructed there by the East Surrey Regiment, while the remainder continued to push forward, until the entrance 399of the valley, previously mentioned, was reached. The 2nd Brigade, supported by the Indian battalions, ascended the southern heights above this valley, and soon drove the enemy therefrom. The Arabs, estimated at 3000 strong, however, were favoured by the dense bush; they seemed to swarm through it, and, hovering round, they dashed into our men with the greatest bravery, whenever an opportunity presented itself. In this way, two squadrons of Indian horse were somewhat severely handled by an almost invisible foe. Meanwhile the Guards were in reserve, formed in square, just under the heights which Sir J. McNeill had taken on our left front, and close to a small rise in the ground on our right front, which we called Bee-hive Hill. The redoubts in rear being complete soon after midday, and garrisoned by the East Surrey, the 2nd and Indian Brigades were ordered to retire, the Guards to cover the movement. The Arabs, owing to the thick cover that concealed them, remained closer to our position than they could otherwise have done, and perceiving our return towards our camp, they opened a hot fire from the bush upon us, principally from Bee-hive Hill, which was returned with steady volleys. This proceeding soon silenced them, though the Brigade lost some men during this short period of the day—1 Officer, Captain Dalison (Scots Guards), and 2 men being killed, and 16 wounded. Our total casualties amounted to 48 Officers and men killed and wounded, and of these the Coldstream numbered 1 man died of wounds, and 8 wounded. The result of the action was that we had no further trouble as far as Hashin was concerned, and thenceforward the enemy’s night raids on our camp ceased.

An advance was now made towards Tamai, the centre of Osman Digna’s resistance, and, on the 22nd of March, Sir J. McNeill was sent forward to establish a post on the road to that place, eight miles off, with one squadron of the 5th Lancers, the Berkshire Regiment, the Marines, a detachment of the Naval brigade (with 4 Gardner guns), three Indian battalions, and the Madras Sappers. On the same day, the Coldstream proceeded towards Hashin, to convoy supplies to the East Surrey Regiment, who were still in the redoubts constructed on the 20th, and met with no misfortune, except that several of our men were struck down by sun apoplexy. On returning home in the afternoon, we saw clouds of dust rising out of the bush in the place where we conceived Sir J. McNeill’s column to be, and wondered whether 400something unusual had happened there. On returning to camp we heard, at first, exaggerated accounts of what occurred, but it was not long before the real truth was known. The column, finding the bush exceedingly thick and no natural clearings in it, could only advance slowly, and halted some six miles from Suakin. The men then began to construct a zeriba; and, while so employed, they were necessarily scattered, some were unarmed, and a large number of camels blocked the ground. The enemy, lurking unseen in the scrub close by, crept up, and suddenly made a fierce onslaught on the force. Unfortunately, one of the Indian battalions was somewhat unsteady, and, though the Officers worked hard to rally the men, they were rushed, and carried away to the rear. Then followed a battle of short duration which is not easy to describe. The Berkshire—who gained the title of “Royal” for their day’s work—stood manfully up to the Arabs, though half the battalion were collecting brushwood and the other half were at their dinners, and, together with the Marines, the Sikhs, and the remaining Indian battalion, they maintained a hard fight for the space of twenty minutes. They soon, however, gained the mastery, and drove the enemy back with great slaughter. Isolated combats took place at some distance from the zeriba on the road to Suakin, entailing considerable loss, and towards evening the telegraph wire was cut. But news had, before this, been received at head-quarters, to assure Sir G. Graham that the danger was over, and that the attack had entirely failed. The Arabs were computed at 5000 strong, and their losses at 1500 men. Our own casualties were severe; and amounted to 10 Officers and 131 men killed and missing, and to 5 Officers and 150 men wounded: total 296. Added to this, there were 157 native camel drivers killed and missing, and 19 wounded. Total personnel lost, 472 men; besides 501 camels. Among the wounded was Lieutenant Charteris, Coldstream Guards. This action, known as the battle of Tofrek, occasioned more losses on one day than in any other engagement during the whole war in the Sudan.

The Guards Brigade were sent early the following morning to reinforce the zeriba and to bring up supplies and water. Forming a square, and guarding 1200 camels, the march was slow, and took nearly six hours to accomplish. Many of the loads were indifferently packed, and repeatedly fell off; the drivers seemed to have little control over the animals, which were bad movers and 401difficult to guide. The weather, also, was oppressively hot, and the men suffered a good deal from thirst. Arriving shortly before noon, the force halted for some hours; the Grenadier Guards and the Indian Brigade then returned to Suakin with the wounded and empty camels, leaving the Coldstream and Scots Guards and the rest of the troops behind. The immediate neighbourhood of Tofrek was still covered with hundreds of dead and numerous camels, many of which were hamstrung, and had to be shot. Burial parties were actively at work, but it was not easy to dispose quickly of the mass of dead bodies, both of men and animals, that lay about in large numbers; added to which there was little shade to be had from the broiling sun, and the water ration for every purpose had to be reduced to a minimum. For the next few days, the position in the zeriba was therefore anything but a pleasant one, as may be readily imagined.

On the 24th, the Coldstream and the Marines began cutting a path one hundred paces broad towards Suakin. After some hours' work, they marched, under Colonel Lambton, about halfway to the town, to escort a convoy to Tofrek, consisting of 425 camels and 818 carts, with 8000 gallons of water, which was brought up to that point by Indian troops. The Arabs were still hovering near, and they fired upon the two battalions as they proceeded on their journey, but without inflicting much loss. On their return, however, the fire became somewhat hotter, and was delivered at closer ranges than before, so that Colonel Lambton was obliged to halt several times to return it, and to allow the wounded to be attended to. The square, crowded with carts and camels that would not keep a straight course, offered an excellent mark to the sharpshooters concealed in the bush; but we were able to check this attack by small volleys fired by marksmen at the spots where we saw the enemy’s puffs of smoke appear. This lasted for an hour or more, when at last, to our great satisfaction, some of the most daring of the dervishes made an attempt to charge. They came on in line, guided by flags at each flank, in the most gallant manner, and directed their attack mainly against the left face of the square. But, unable to stand our fire, they were very soon defeated, and most of them were killed, though one or two did actually succeed in getting as far as our bayonets before they fell. After this event they left us alone, and we got back to the zeriba without further trouble. The casualties of the day amounted to 24, 402of which the Coldstream lost 2 men killed or died of wounds, and 8 wounded; three Officers were wounded, two belonging to the Royal Marines, and Captain Hon. N. Dalrymple, Brigade Major of the Guards Brigade; in addition, 5 native camel-drivers were killed.^[463] Some of the camels lagged behind, their drivers having abandoned them while the fight was going on; others were squeezed out of the square, which was from the beginning too full to hold them, and thus more than a hundred were cut off by the enemy.

Next day, another convoy was taken from Suakin to the zeriba in the same manner, the escorts meeting each other halfway between the two places. This time it was not molested, but the occasion deserves mention, since a captive balloon was then first employed; the latter, attached by a rope to a waggon that moved in the square, enabled a proper look-out to be kept upon the enemy in the bush. On the 26th, however, there was another skirmish, but it was easily repelled with very little loss; and on this day, the Grenadier Guards relieved the Scots Guards at Tofrek, while the Coldstream remained there till the 28th, when they also returned to head-quarters. After the 26th no further difficulty was experienced with the Arabs; they were apparently disheartened, and had retreated from the neighbourhood. A move, therefore, was made to Tamai.

Early on the morning of April 2nd, a force of 8000 men marched through Tofrek to Tesela Hill, near Tamai, where a halt was made for the night.^[464] Next day, the advance was continued, and Osman Digna’s head-quarters were occupied after a very slight resistance. Tamai, like other villages in the country, is a mere collection of straw huts, and it was speedily fired and destroyed, while the enemy made off into the hilly region that lies to the south, where it would have been difficult, and indeed unnecessary, to pursue him. The column therefore returned to Suakin, and the attention of the troops was now directed more particularly to the protection of the railway, which meantime had been progressing. The Battalion lost only two men wounded, on the 3rd of April.

At this time, also, ponies having arrived, the Guards Mounted infantry detachments were formed into two companies (April 4035th): the Grenadier and Scots Guards company, under Captain St. John Mildmay, Grenadier Guards; and the Coldstream company, under Captain Ross-of-Bladensburg, to which was attached a half-company, furnished by the Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant Sandbach, R.E. Ten days later, a Camel corps was formed under the command of Major James, Scots Greys, consisting of 400 British and 100 native soldiers, divided into five companies, of which one was composed of Guardsmen (31 men taken from each of the three Battalions), under Lieutenants Neil Menzies, Scots Guards, and G. Wyndham, Coldstream Guards.

The railway, leaving Suakin in a north-westerly direction as far as Handub (11 miles distant), bore round towards the west at this point, and, passing through Otao (20 miles from Suakin) and Tambuk (25 miles), was to continue across the hilly country to Ariab; from thence it was to run to Berber, over a stretch of 100 miles of desert country, which is watered only by the wells of O-Bak, lying nearly halfway between these two places. To cover the construction of the line, a zeriba was made (April 6th) by the Coldstream, the New South Wales Battalion, artillery, etc., between Suakin and Handub, called No. 1 Station. On the 8th, Handub was occupied, the Scots Guards being at No. 1 Station. On the 16th, the latter pushed on to Otao without meeting with any resistance; and when the Coldstream followed on the 18th, the Scots moved to Tambuk, finding no enemy there. On the 24th, a reconnaissance by a portion of the Camel corps was made towards Es-Sibil; and by the 30th the railway was completed as far as Otao. During this time the men were constantly employed in clearing broad roads through the bush; in digging watering-places, which had to be deepened daily as the supply became exhausted; and in protecting the scattered parties of navvies at work on the line. There were not many Arabs about, though few nights passed without some shots being fired into the camp.

About the same period, also, reconnaissances were pushed in various directions to prevent any advance from Tamai, and to clear the neighbouring valleys of the enemy. The most important was one undertaken in the early morning of the 7th of May, against a chief who had collected a force at a place called T'Hakul, lying nearly 20 miles west of Suakin and 10 south of Otao. The Brigade took no part in this operation; but the company belonging to the Camel corps and the two companies of Guards Mounted infantry 404were present, and forming part of the force at Suakin, they paraded there a little before midnight on the 6th. A small column co-operated from Otao, and in the morning both appeared before the camp of the Arabs and surprised it; the enemy fled at our approach, leaving behind 1100 sheep, goats, and some camels. The columns then returned to Otao and Suakin respectively; the latter, however, on their way home, met parties of the enemy occupying heights within range of which they had to pass; after a few volleys he quickly disappeared. One Officer (of the Camel corps) and two men were wounded, of whom one (a sergeant) belonged to the Coldstream (Mounted infantry).

This was the last operation conducted by Sir G. Graham’s force in the neighbourhood of Suakin. The district had just been pacified and relieved of the presence of the enemy: at this very moment, orders came to evacuate it, and to withdraw the troops therefrom, except a small garrison, which was to be left behind to guard the town.^[465] We must briefly explain how this came about.

The British Government never had much sympathy with the policy of opposing the Mahdi, whose usurpation of power, founded upon rapine, massacre, and slavery, had been dignified into the movement of a people struggling for freedom! This strange opinion upon the upheaval that swamped every vestige of civilization in the Sudan, was doubtless one reason, but perhaps not the only reason, for the vacillating proceedings pursued there, and for the consequent inability to effect, even at great expense, any useful object. Unwilling to face with a firm resolution the questions that required solution in that region, and prevented by public opinion from adopting a policy of non-intervention, the Government did nothing till popular clamour forced them to some action, and then the steps they took, costing many lives and much treasure, could produce no beneficial results. Thus, as we have seen, was the brave intention of taking Khartum, and of restoring order there, 405published in February; and so also, as soon as possible and upon the very first pretext, was that intention abandoned. An opportunity very soon arose to facilitate this procedure.

There was a dispute in Asia over the frontier between the Russians and Afghans, and, on the 30th of March, news reached London that the former, having agreed to make no forward movement until pending questions had been discussed, advanced and took possession of Panjdeh by force of arms—a place held to be a portion of the territories of the Amir of Afghanistan. For reasons connected with the safety of India, we had espoused the cause of that Prince, and were bound to see that his legitimate claims received proper consideration. It is unnecessary to describe either the Panjdeh incident, or those that led up to this act of aggression. It is sufficient to say that they created much excitement in England, and soon drew public attention from the Sudan. The crisis did not last long, and the dispute was soon settled, but it enabled Government to wash their hands of the whole of the troublesome business connected with Khartum.

This was, therefore, the end of the expedition to the Eastern Sudan, and, as a matter of fact, orders soon arrived to break 406up the forces assembled there. The Guards Brigade and the New South Wales contingent were the first troops to take their departure. The Coldstream, having marched from the front on the 14th of May, embarked on the 16th in the Deccan, and started next day for Alexandria, where they arrived on the 23rd. The Battalion remained in the harbour, on board ship, until the 9th of June, when they marched to Ramleh, and camped on the beach. They stayed there until the 1st of July, and, together with the Grenadiers, embarked on H.M.S. Orontes, and proceeded on the 2nd to Cyprus. Landing at Limasol on the 5th, they marched to Mount Troödos, and reached that place on the 9th; the Scots Guards followed a few days later, and the whole Brigade remained at Troödos till after the middle of August. Major-General Fremantle stayed behind in Egypt, and Colonel Lambton, being the senior Officer, assumed the command of the Brigade, while that of the Battalion devolved upon Colonel Sterling, until the 27th, when Colonel Clive, Grenadier Guards, arrived from England as Brigadier-General.

We left the Nile force getting into summer quarters in the province of Dongola, in the spring of the year, and confidently expecting to resume the offensive against Khartum as soon as the great heat should pass away. But on the 13th of April a telegram reached Lord Wolseley, informing him that, in the then condition of Imperial affairs, it was probable the forward movement might have to be abandoned. The announcement that this decision had been taken was made known in England on the 21st, though on the 11th of May the troops were ordered to retire northwards, and to evacuate the Sudan.

407Once begun, the evacuation did not take long to accomplish; the enemy offered no opposition, nor did he try to press our retreat. He was wise enough to follow at a respectful distance, occupying the country as we abandoned it. Indeed, ever since the return of the Desert and River columns we experienced no further trouble with the Mahdi, who, relieved of the danger with which he was threatened by the British advance, turned his attention to other matters. He sent a considerable force to the south of Khartum, to put down a rising which began to imperil his authority in Kordofan, and, as soon as he became aware that we were definitely about to withdraw from the province of Dongola and from the vicinity of Suakin, he despatched more of his men to hasten the reduction of Sennar and Kassala, both of which were besieged at that moment. These two places fell in the middle of August.

The operation of withdrawing from the Sudan was extremely distasteful to British Officers. The inhabitants of Dongola had trusted us, and had served us; we had necessarily interfered with their government, disturbed the means at their disposal for taking care of themselves, and prevented them from making terms with the enemy. They had been induced by us to resist the Arabs, to incur their vengeance, and to rely for protection upon the power of England,—a nation who never deserted a friend or turned away from a foe. We were pledged to defend this unfortunate people, or to make some reasonable provision for their future safety, but, in the face of the peremptory orders received from home, any such arrangement was entirely out of the question. Hence it was more than distressing to be forced to abandon these natives to the slavery that was in store for them; and we cannot be astonished that they reproached us bitterly for deserting them in this helpless condition, and for leaving them to the cruel tyranny of the Mahdi. Many appeared anxious to fly from their homes, but they were restrained by the knowledge that, in that case, they must forfeit the whole of their property; while others were unable to procure sufficient transport for their families and effects.^[468]

Nearly 13,000 natives accompanied the retreat, and by the end of June these refugees, the supplies, and most of the troops were north of Dongola. At this moment the Government of Mr. Gladstone came to an end, and Lord Wolseley, who had from 408the first protested against the precipitate withdrawal of the expedition, was empowered by the new Cabinet to arrest the movement temporarily, until the situation had been considered. It is sad to relate, that the evacuation had been too well executed, and that it was then too late to return or repair the evil that had already been done. By the 21st of July, that portion of the British army destined to remain as a frontier force, for the protection of Egypt, had taken up a position some ninety miles south of Wady Halfa, and there they covered the construction of the Sudan railway, which was completed to Akasheh on the 7th of August. Meanwhile the dervishes did not invade the northern part of Dongola at once, for the Mahdi fell a victim to his own debauchery, and, dying on the 22nd of June, left affairs in the Sudan in an unsettled state.^[470] Until, therefore, his successor, the Khalifa Abdulla, had consolidated his position, no further conquests were possible, and the province was only seized by him in the middle of August. After this, the enemy advanced northwards with the intention of invading Egypt, and he even ventured to lay siege to a British fort on the frontier, in the month of November. In December, however, he was attacked, and forced to retire, by Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, who defeated him at Ginnis on the 30th.

This event ends the war in the Sudan. Long before it took place the Guards Camel regiment had been sent home. Starting from Dongola, where they remained for nearly three months, they marched thence on the 1st of June, and, proceeding mostly by river, they reached Alexandria on the 1st of July, having halted for two hours at Cairo, where they were received by Lord Wolseley and Sir F. Stephenson. At Alexandria, they had the good fortune to meet the Guards Brigade, then on their way to Cyprus. They left Egypt on the 4th, and arrived in London on the 15th. After an inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the various detachments composing the Camel corps returned to their respective Regiments. The following Brigade Order appeared in London on the 21st:—

The casualties of the Coldstream inflicted by the enemy in the field have already been noted in their proper place; but no mention has been made of those who died of disease during the two expeditions. It appears that sickness was less common in the interior than was the case among the troops stationed on the coast of the Red Sea; and six men only of the Coldstream died of illness during the many months they were employed on the Nile. The Regiment, however, had to deplore the death of Lieutenant G. Sutton and of 13 men of the 1st Battalion who succumbed to the climate of Suakin; while several Officers and 110 men had to be sent to England invalided. Lieutenant Sutton, a young Officer of great merit and of much promise, fell ill a short time before the end of the expedition, and was sent for a short cruise, in the hope that his health might be thereby re-established. He returned, as he thought, better, and resumed duty; but a very few days later he was again obliged to be placed upon the sick-list, and, becoming rapidly worse, he died at sea, May 18th, on his way home, before the steamer reached Suez, to the great sorrow of his brother Officers.

The Guards camp at Mount Troödos was broken up, and the 1st Coldstream marched from that place on the 24th of August, down to Limasol, where they embarked on board the Orontes (26th) in company with the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards being on the Poonah. The Battalion reached Spithead early on the 41010th of September, and proceeded next day to London, where they received a hearty welcome from their friends and the public at large.

The following extract of a letter, written by Colonel Lambton soon after his return from the Sudan, to the Officer Commanding the 2nd Battalion, refers to the men belonging to the latter, and temporarily posted to the service Battalion for duty during the war:—

Medals for the Sudan campaign were issued to Officers, Non-commissioned officers, and men on the 7th of November; and by General Order, January 10, 1886, it was intimated that Her Majesty the Queen had been graciously pleased to approve of the three Regiments of Foot Guards being permitted to bear the words “Suakin, 1885” upon their Colours. Early in 1883, the record of Marlborough’s battles, which had been somewhat strangely passed over in the past, were also added to the Colours, and the Coldstream then showed the following honourable distinctions, viz. “The Sphinx, superscribed 'Egypt.' Oudenarde. Malplaquet. Dettingen. Lincelles. Talavera. Barrosa. Peninsula. Waterloo. Alma. Inkerman. Sevastopol. Egypt, 1882. Tel el-Kebir. Suakin, 1885.”

In December, 1885, the Regiment stood as follows:—

Colonel.—General Right Hon. Sir Thomas Steele, K.C.B.

Majors—Mounted.—Lieut.-Colonels R. S. Hall; Hon. E. Acheson; Hon. E. Digby; and Hon. H. Corry.

Dismounted.—Lieut.-Colonels R. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen, C.B. (Regimental Adjutant); F. Graves-Sawle; A. Moreton; and R. Pole-Carew (Military Secretary to the Commander-in-chief in India).

Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels J. G. Montgomery; F. Manley; and L. D. MacKinnon; Captains H. Wetherall; V. Dawson; J. Ross-of-Bladensburg (A.D.C. to Lord Lieutenant, Ireland); and A. Codrington (Adjutant); Major Hon. H. Legge; Captains J. Gladstone; D. Dawson (A.D.C. to the Commander of the Forces, Ireland, 411H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimer); and H. Stopford (lately A.D.C. to the Commander of Forces, Ireland, Sir T. Steele).

Lieutenants.—Hon. A. Henniker-Major (Adjutant); G. V. Boyle; Hon. H. Amherst; H. Surtees (employed with Egyptian Army); W. Corbet (A.D.C. to Major-General Hon. R. Monck); G. P. Bouverie (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); Hon. A. Fortescue (lately returned from Special Service in Bechuanaland, South Africa); B. Gosselin-Lefebre; Hon. R. Winn; P. Lovell; Earl of Wiltshire; Sir C. Miller, Bart.; C. Kindersley; D. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris; H. Shute; E. Wigram; Granville Smith; C. Frederick; G. Wyndham; G. Milligan; C. Holland; Hon. W. Lambton; J. Drummond-Hay; F. Maude; R. Grenfell; F. Ramsden; C. Monck; Hon. V. Spencer; J. Hall; J. Sterling; H. Hawkes; Hon. E. Charteris; G. Taylor; S. Earle; J. Wingfield; Hon. E. Pakenham; Hon. H. Baillie-Hamilton; J. McNeile; R. Skeffington Smyth.

Quartermasters.—W. Webster; and H. Folson.

Solicitor.—R. Broughton, Esq.

The 1st Battalion were on this date quartered at Chelsea barracks (head-quarters and 5 companies), and at St. George’s (3 companies); the 2nd Battalion at the Tower. The writer of this portion of the History of the Coldstream Guards here takes leave of them, and wishing them many a glorious addition to their illustrious records, now bids them, with much regret, farewell.